Future War: Non-Lethal Weapons in Modern Warfare

INTRODUCTION

General John J. Sheehan U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)

John Alexander has asked a very fundamental policy question about the use of force. This question, while applicable for military institutions, is equally relevant for local and state governments. Consider that while soldiers in national armies have shrunk by about 20 percent, private security firms have grown to the point that they outnumber most national armies. We in the United States spend about $50 billion annually on private security. That amount exceeds the defense budget of every NATO nation save the United States. It is estimated that, worldwide, there are about five million military-style weapons available to private citizens, and almost half of them are here in the United States. Whether you are a U.S. soldier deployed to Haiti or Bosnia or an urban police officer, you currently have few options when faced with a threatening situation. Rightly, we in the United States are still bound by a tradition of proportional use of force, but our adversaries are not. The ideas in this book are a necessary first step in the way we think about alternatives for the current kinetic solutions to today’s and tomorrow’s concerns.

PROLOGUE

WHAT’S IN A NAME?

This means that killing is not the important thing.

—Li Quan (Tang Dynasty)

No cars had passed the area for more than an hour. Checking his watch and noting that it was nearly 3:30 A.M., Yuri Krasnikov slowly emerged from his camouflaged position. To ensure that no one accidentally intruded upon him, he had stayed hidden, lying motionless for nearly eight hours. His years of training with the KGB served him well. Krasnikov had been a lieutenant when the Communist government collapsed. Recognizing that his career potential had suddenly evaporated, he searched for other employment. It was the rapidly developing criminal organization, rising to fill the inevitable power vacuum, that caught his attention. It was not his first choice, but at least he would live relatively well. In addition to skills in espionage, he was accomplished in English and had traveled abroad extensively. Combined, these attributes made him a valuable asset.

With old Soviet night-vision equipment he meticulously scanned the area, looking for any signs of police. Convinced there was no surveillance of this location, Krasnikov approached the open aquifer that flowed into the water supply for Los Angeles and surrounding southern California, opened his backpack, and extracted a sealed vial that contained a deadly biological warfare agent.

The device was cleverly designed. The sealed container would remain almost submerged but would be carried along until it entered the city’s reservoirs, There, at a prescribed time, the container would disintegrate, releasing small, water-soluble packets, each containing the deadly virus. Normally, viruses would not survive in water without a buffer. Therefore, each small packet contained hundreds of microspheres encapsulated in an artificial membrane of micelles and lipids, analogous to lipofectin. These microspheres would protect the virus from water, but would dissolve when ingested and brought into contact with the stomach acids. The deadly BW agent would be released directly into each victim. Should the large container be screened by a filter, the packages would still be released and float to their destination. The intended result was to afflict thousands of unsuspecting citizens. Some would die. Many others would become terribly ill. But all in the area would lose confidence in the ability of their government to protect them.

The action was ordered in response to arrests of several members of the Russian Mafia two months earlier. They had been caught attempting to sell weapons-grade fissile material for delivery to terrorist organizations. Reportedly, the Cali Cartel was now interested in expanding their business interests in both legitimate and new illegitimate areas. With the phenomenal profits amassed from drugs, the cartel had been able to buy state-of the-art weapons and communications equipment. They had even established their own privately funded think tanks. Their studies concluded that if terrorists posed a more daunting threat to the United States, then they could relieve the increasing pressure on the drug trade. Therefore, becoming a supplier to terrorist groups made sense. The trade would make money, and at the same time decrease the amount of drugs intercepted by law enforcement agents, thereby adding to their profit all around. To accomplish this, an uneasy alliance was established between the Russian Mafia and the Cali Cartel. The Russians would sell the critical material to the cartel, who would in turn make it available to terrorists desiring to increase their panoply of capabilities. After all, one didn’t need a nuclear weapon to cause extensive damage with such substances. The mere presence of radioactive material in any blast would make area remediation extremely difficult.

Unfortunately for them, intelligence operatives had discovered the plan and established a covert counterproliferation operation. Dubbed Dark Angel, the mission was to prevent the transfer of the nuclear material. Secret agents of the American CIA and FBI had posed as members of the Cali Cartel and offered to buy some of the nuclear material that had been stolen from the less-secure storages of the former Soviet Union. In early interactions, the Russian agents had proven conclusively that the material they offered to sell was the real thing. This revelation had moved Dark Angel to the front burner. The president had signed an executive order that authorized broad powers in removing this threat to national security. Use of force was explicitly approved. Termination of agents directly involved in the illicit trade was sanctioned. However, collateral casualties were not acceptable—especially within the boundaries of the United States.

The undercover intelligence agents had arranged the transfer meeting on the outskirts of Fort-de-France, the capital of the Caribbean island of Martinique. Martinique, a mountainous volcanic member of the West Indies archipelago, was insisted upon by the Russians. Administered by the French overseas department, they believed it would be difficult for any foreign agents to operate there without encountering the arcane diplomatic procedures followed by the French government. The tourism industry that flourished in the islands would facilitate the multinational meeting without causing suspicion.

In a temporary storage facility at a designated time, the trade was to have occurred. Brad Banta, an Army major detailed to the Interagency Counterproliferation Task Force, was in charge of the assault team that would effect the apprehension of the Russian Mafia agents. He was ably assisted by FBI Hostage Rescue Team—trained snipers and CIA field operatives. The team had trained together extensively, and at this level, interagency rivalry was negated. Participants had demonstrated their individual skills and come to respect one another. Banta was chosen to lead this operation based on his years of Special Forces experience, which included some of the most dangerous behind-the-lines missions imaginable. He was known for innovation in very difficult situations and had been involved in covert raids against the Russian Mafia in the Ukraine. In this operations security was paramount, and neither the French nor the local government of Martinique had been informed about the impending strike. There would be no host-nation support. In fact, it was highly probable that diplomatic repercussions would follow. Due to opposition to the death penalty, the French had even recently refused to extradite convicted murderer Ira Einhorn, who had been captured living near Bordeaux. In this operation it was likely that some people would die on their island. They had also been resistant to tightening the noose around Saddam Hussein when the United States wanted to demonstrate resolve. That was in November of 1997, when inspectors were refused admittance to suspected BW weapons sites in Iraq. In the current case, some additional foreign aid directly to Martinique would soothe the protocol wounds, provided no innocent civilians were injured or killed.

At about 11:30 P.M. the meeting commenced. Once it was ascertained that the nuclear material was on hand, a signal activated Banta’s response team. Disorienting flash-bang devices detonated with a deafening roar and an accompanying dazzling brilliance that caught the Mafia criminals off guard. A few instinctively raised weapons. They died almost instantly before they could begin to fire accurately. Snipers with silenced weapons had been placed strategically to eliminate any attempted resistance. Their frangible bullets were designed to enter a body and break into pieces, thus preventing high-power slugs from exiting the building and striking unwitting civilians. Those criminals who did not reach for their weapons each noticed two or three red dots illuminating their chests. Fear and common sense told them that the slightest threatening move would also end their lives.

A Russian driver stationed outside heard the commotion and attempted to flee in the van that was transporting the material. This action had been anticipated by the snatch team. A non-lethal snare capable of stopping cars traveling at rates of 60 mph had been set in place. Remotely triggered, the nearly invisible, high-strength polymer bonds intercepted the accelerating van. Within 200 feet the driver found himself unable to move forward, his doors restrained and the ubiquitous red laser designators dotting his face and head. He was a mercenary, not a zealot on a crusade. Choosing not to die today, he placed his hands outside the vehicle in full view, demonstrating that no further resistance would be attempted.

Within 30 minutes, the eight surviving criminals, bound, hooded, and sedated, were on a C-130 Hercules headed for the U.S. mainland. Temporarily, they were accompanied by the bodies of four dead comrades. Somewhere over the dark expanse of the Caribbean, long known for keeping submerged secrets, the Russians heard the rushing sound of wind as the tailgate was lowered. They were unaware of the wrapped and weighted cadavers that plummeted downward, striking the water and slipping into unmarked, watery graves. This was probably improper conduct, but disposal at sea was easier than explaining how they came to be corpses on foreign soil. The denial was plausible. As if to assuage his soul, one of the agents on board said a brief prayer for the recently departed.

Upon arrival at Hurlbert Field, home of the U.S. Air Force 22nd Special Operations Command, the prisoners were roused from their drug-induced rest, greeted, and formally arrested. They remained at a remote site in the palmetto-encrusted west Florida swamps that surround Hurlbert for several days. After extensive interrogation, they were sent on to Washington, there to be indicted on charges of terrorism.

In Moscow, the upper echelon of the Russian Mafia was furious. It was the first time so many of their colleagues had been incarcerated in the United States. Further, it meant that it would be unsafe to conduct operations anywhere in the world without concern for U.S. intervention. In actuality, they knew their extensive criminal activities had reached a point that had been determined to be a threat to national interests. Making a speech in Moscow in November of 1997, Louis Freeh, the director of the FBI, had stopped just short of making that proclamation. Continued operations had crossed the line, and the United States had demonstrated they were serious about their counterterror and counterproliferation stance.

In a bold measure, the hierarchy of the Russian Mafia decided to take a confrontational path and attempt intimidation. After all, even Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu had agreed to exchange prisoners after Mossad agents botched an assassination attempt in Amman, Jordan. The plan included kidnapping Americans working in Russia and a threat to a major metropolitan area on the mainland. When the U.S. government failed to negotiate release of the prisoners, the water supply for Los Angeles had been selected as the first target.

Kneeling beside the concrete aquifer, Krasnikov deftly started to activate the timing mechanism that would cause the BW agent to be released. Then, without warning, he heard the sound of muffled explosions followed by a second noise, that of the deploying nets that sprang forth from the command-activated VOLCANO mines. Unbeknownst to Krasnikov, agents had tailed him to this site when he was rehearsing his plan of attack. This, and his alternate sites, had all been seeded with these non-lethal derivatives of antipersonnel mines and each site placed under constant surveillance.

Before he could react, the nets enhanced with a very sticky adhesive dropped over him. Running along the polymer fiber were thin electrical wires. These were attached to a simple nine-volt battery, and a charge was automatically injected into Krasnikov, instantly interrupting his neurological motor functioning. Totally disabled, he could offer no resistance, nor could he run. Banta ran toward Krasnikov with a special foam projector. Taking aim at the BW canister, Banta directed the fast-drying epoxy stream and quickly encased the container. Even if a dead-man switch had been designed into the system, the lethal BW agent would be trapped before it could spread.

In a few minutes Krasnikov, a bit dazed and bewildered, was fully recovering in the custody of FBI agents. The BW canister, solidly entombed in epoxy, was deposited in the waiting HAZMAT truck. The response team quickly gathered all of the nets and recovered the mine casings. The following morning, prearranged grounds crews would make the area look as if the operation had never occurred. Even though Krasnikov had been captured, there was no guarantee that a second team wasn’t available for another attempt. The New York World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings had raised awareness of the potential for terrorism on U.S. soil. For now, there was no need to scare the American public further.

Fiction? Possibly. These actions, or similar ones, will occur. The nature of conflict has changed. The emerging threats are real. The non-lethal weapons are real. The complex issues are real. Let us now explore the fascinating, and dangerous, world of Future War—in real terms.

The thunder of the future portends a unique confluence of circumstances that will distinctly and forever change the nature of conflict. Meeting these complex challenges requires—no, demands—the development and use of new weapons systems, ones that dramatically limit the amount of damage they cause. Traditional lethal weapons will still be necessary to defeat stubborn conventional enemies. However, new weapons, such as those described in the preceding vignette, must be brought into the standard inventory.

In the United States the official term for these weapons systems is non-lethal . This was formally announced in March 1996 at the Non-Lethal Defense II Conference I chaired in McLean, Virginia. Ambassador H. Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict), addressed the complexity of the term and provided the definition, which is as follows:

Non-Lethal Weapons. Weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or matériel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment.

1. Unlike conventional lethal weapons that destroy their targets principally through blast, penetration, and fragmentation, non-lethal weapons employ means other than gross physical destruction to prevent the target from functioning.

2. Non-lethal weapons are intended to have one, or both, of the following characteristics:

a. They have relatively reversible effects on personnel or matériel.

b. They affect objects differently within their area of influence.

Non-lethal, while far from being a perfect word, does provide an adequate context from which to address the issues related to diminishing the number of collateral fatalities, a factor that will take on increased importance in future conflicts. In this book we shall discuss the problematic semantics endemic in attempting to describe this emerging field. The downside of our choice of non-lethal as a descriptor is that detractors will continue to claim that no system can be designed that is absolutely fatality free—a point readily acknowledged by the definition and everyone working in the area. To some people, this term connotes that no one will ever be killed by the use of any non-lethal weapons system. Unfortunately, there are no perfect systems that can ensure that loss of life will never occur. Even marshmallows, properly placed, can kill. Rather, non-lethal weapons are designed with the intent of limiting physical damage. Nothing will prohibit misapplication or eliminate accidents, which are training and management issues.

Now, three factors have converged to make the development of non-lethal weapons essential. They are:

1. the dramatic and undulating reorganization of the geopolitical landscape;

2. advances in technology, especially precision guidance, that allow refined non-lethal weapons to be effective;

3. commanders with field experience in peace support operations to establish hard operational requirements for weapons systems development.

It was not until all three factors fell into place that proceeding with a concerted effort was deemed necessary. In fact, the whole notion of non-lethal weapons is controversial and will probably remain so for some time to come. However, in many forms of future conflict, traditional military force will have severe limitations. Conventional thinkers cannot be allowed to design a military that is only capable of defeating consuetudinary adversaries against whom bombs, tanks, and missiles are the only weapons necessary. Rather, it is imperative that we envision and forge a versatile force, one capable of deterring or vanquishing any enemy, no matter how strong, yet one that is able to impose our will in complex, often illusive situations that demand restraint. Non-lethal weapons must be a part of the inventory.

Law enforcement agencies continue to use the term less-than-lethal when talking about weapons that incapacitate. While many note the merging of missions, currently law enforcement focus is somewhat different from the military, and their mandate for use of force is much more restrictive. They can use deadly force only to protect life. However, there are many circumstances under which physical force must be employed to take charge of a situation; protecting property, for example, or controlling a person in custody. Police are painfully aware that their actions will be carefully scrutinized whenever they use force. Therefore, tolerance for unintended fatalities approaches zero. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) describes its less-than-lethal research and development initiatives in very broad terms, covering the entire life cycle of crime from commission of a felony through conviction and long-term incarceration. Thus, the technologies developed under NIJ range from smart weapons and protective equipment to systems that can be employed in dispersing prison riots.

Non-lethal weapons are not a panacea. In conjunction with lethal weapons, they provide military commanders with additional options but do not restrict the old ones. The same is true for law enforcement agencies. This book is not about a peace movement or handcuffing the police. It is about the difficulties and realities of force application in future conflicts and for use on the streets of America. What it means is that military forces and law enforcement agencies, both tasked with maintaining peace, are valiantly attempting to do their jobs while limiting the use of force necessary to accomplish those missions. These missions point to the urgent need for more and better non-lethal weapons alternatives.

Part I

THE RATIONALE

It was late September 1996, and the autumn sun warmed the gently rolling hills of the Italian countryside as about 150 representatives of NATO countries met to discuss non-lethal weapons. San Piero a Grado, an Italian Navy research and development center located just north of Pisa, hosted the meeting—the first of its kind—and I had been invited to open the session on technology. My message was simple: The technology necessary for non-lethal weapons either exists or could be developed in a relatively short time. The real issue was for military officers to set requirements and state the capabilities they needed. NATO soldiers who had been engaged in peace-support operations in Bosnia and other countries were now providing the real-world context for those requirements.

To understand non-lethal weapons, it is essential to understand the situations our militaries and law enforcement agencies will face in the future. If you believe that wars and crime will be the same as they have been in the past, then there is little need for non-lethal weapons. The very nature of conflict is changing. Soldiers and law enforcement officials will be challenged by circumstances almost unimaginable two decades ago. To accomplish their missions, they will need a wide variety of options for use of force. Non-lethal weapons must be part of their arsenal.

Therefore, Part I of this book describes in some detail how the future is likely to evolve. It provides the foundation for contemplating the force options that will be necessary and the rationale for the development and deployment of non-lethal weapons. Some non-lethal weapons exist. More are needed—now. Here’s why.

1

WHY ARE WE DOING THIS?

Nothing is harder than armed struggle.

—Sun Tzu (Chou Dynasty)

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the notion of non-lethal warfare has been hotly debated in military circles. The shift from bipolar confrontation, in which national survival was the driving force, to a geopolitically complex world requiring regional stability and engendering transient, pragmatic relationships requires us to rethink the whole notion of national security.

In the bygone era of the Cold War, Western military forces were structured to fight the most dreaded of all battles: war in Central Europe. Our national security policy, articulated in National Security Directive NSC-68, was containment and deterrence. It was oriented solely on countering the Soviets. That thinking was dominated by the strategic triad of nuclear weapons systems: long-range, stealthy bombers; precision-targeted, underground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles; and highly survivable submarines armed with sea-launched ballistic missiles. These forces were to hold the Soviet empire in check and ensure our survival through a policy known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). MAD meant that if a nuclear war erupted, we would destroy each other, and probably the world. To work, it depended on rational adversaries who would not risk total destruction of civilization as we know it.

However, plans had been drafted on both sides that could allow a war of massive forces without crossing the nuclear threshold. Therefore, in addition to these strategic forces, the United States and its NATO allies developed and maintained large conventional military forces comprised of modern ships, airplanes, tanks, and artillery. The driving factor was to have sufficient forces to meet a Russian and Warsaw Pact invasion head-on, stop their advance, and be able to restore the boundaries to their pre-war state. Since we always assumed the Soviets were developing new and better fighting systems, our development efforts were designed to meet threats twenty years down the road.

The Soviets were known to rely heavily on armored forces; thus, their tanks were of keen interest to us. In the early 1980s studies were conducted and reports published stating that there was a significant armor gap between the West and the Soviets. Urgent action was required, and a major armor/anti-armor initiative was undertaken. While we knew their new T-82 was being fielded but didn’t know its characteristics, we hypothesized about the next generations, dubbed Future Soviet Tank (FST) I and II, respectively. Shortly after I retired from the army in 1988, there was even talk about FST-III. It was the perceived high-tech, future Soviet threat that was used to justify the development of most new systems. That was the focus and raison d’être of all military research and development.

We structured our military forces assuming that if we could defeat the Soviets in Central Europe, any other military engagement could be considered a lesser-included case. That means our forces would be able to defeat any other adversary. Of course, the American experience in Vietnam unequivocally demonstrated the problems with that thinking. Heavy forces could not fight well in jungles and were seasonally restricted in the rice paddies. Air and sea power provided extensive firepower but couldn’t occupy and hold the territory. Politically (but not militarily) defeated, we abandoned Vietnam. The psychological impact of our experience in Southeast Asia would shape the military leadership for decades to come. Most of all, the military leadership wanted troops to be employed only when clear military objectives could be established, and the support of both the people and elected political officials was firmly behind