Democracy, Citizenship, and the Internet

Democracy, Citizenship, and the Internet

Hercules Bantas

A Reluctant Geek Academic Guide

Published by The Reluctant Geek

Melbourne, Australia

Copyright Hercules Bantas 2010

Author's Notes

Complete in one package, nine Reluctant Geek Guides covering deliberative democracy, citizenship, and the internet. In this compilation, you will find: Deliberative Democracy Basics, John Rawls and Deliberative Democracy, Jurgen Habermas and Deliberative Democracy, John Dryzek and Deliberative Democracy, Citizen Power and the Internet, The Propaganda Model and the Internet: Smashing the Gateway, Ricoeur's Hermeneutic Arc and the Internet: The Changing Narrative Landscape, Democracy and Postmodern Identity, and Democracy and the Internet.

Table of Contents

Deliberative Democracy

Rawls and Deliberative Democracy

Habermas and Deliberative Democracy

Dryzek's Deliberative Democracy Theory

Citizen Power and the Internet

The Propaganda Model and the Internet

Ricoeur's Arc and the Internet

Democracy and Postmodern Identity

Democracy and the Internet

Deliberative Democracy

To label a democratic theory as 'deliberative' is to say that it has, at its core, the exercise of public reason through the political deliberations of citizens. This is because deliberative theories of democracy focus on communication rather than preference aggregation, which is not to say that these theories abandon voting and elections all together. Rather, a deliberative democracy is a democracy in which citizens make decisions and solve political problems through some sort of deliberative process, which may or may not involve elections and voting.

Most theories of deliberative democracy would have deliberative elements introduced to an existing political system, utilising existing social and political institutions such as churches, corporations, unions, parties, lobby groups, courts, and parliaments. This would mean that rather than simply counting votes, citizens would be encouraged to participate in public deliberation in order to solve political problems (Stokes, 2002, p. 40), and most theories of deliberative democracy associate legitimacy of the law with the exercise of public reason. The following review considers the various starting points and problems addressed by diverse theories of deliberative democracy, concludes on the similarities and differences between them, and constructs a spectrum of issues addressed by theories of deliberative democracy.

John Rawls is a well-known proponent of liberal thought, who has set out a deliberative theory in his book The Law of Peoples (Rawls, 1999). He articulates his theory of deliberation in order to try to solve problems of legitimacy in law by equating the legislative process with public deliberation on matters of political import. He uses the idea of public reason as the focus of his theory, arguing that ‘...in public reason comprehensive doctrines of truth or right [are] replaced by an idea of the politically reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 132). He argues that there are three elements of deliberative democracy: the idea of public reason; a framework of constitutional institutions; and a general willingness by citizens to realise the ideal of public reason (1999, p. 139). His theory restricts political deliberation to political elites, such as elected officials and judges on constitutional courts, as well as confining public deliberation to a subsection of the public sphere.

Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson present an alternate liberal conception of deliberative democracy. Their iteration of deliberative democracy sets out to solve the problem of ruling elites making political decisions that have serious ramifications for the state but that have not been through a process of legitimisation by the polity. They start from an observation that in many liberal-democratic countries there is an increasing cynicism about politics and politicians among citizens who feel less represented by elites who are less accountable for their decisions. They base their theory of deliberative democracy on the assumption that citizens are not passive individuals or subjects of government. Rather, they are autonomous agents capable of taking part in the governance of their society (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004, p. 3). They outline four characteristics of a deliberative democracy:

Reasons for acting need to be justifiable, and should be acceptable by free and reasonable people seeking fair terms of co-operation

Public debate

Binding decisions that can be changed with the passage of time

A dynamic process that aims at justifiable decisions, but does not guarantee them

Using these four characteristics, they propose the following definition of deliberative democracy,

...a form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their representatives), justify decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to challenge in the future (2004, p. 7)

Like Rawls, they maintain the institutions of liberal democracy and use deliberation as the tool to solve political problems.

Habermas bases his deliberative democracy theory on critical theory, although he has been criticised by some commentators for straying too far into liberal territory (Dryzek, 2000, p. 27). Habermas uses communicative reason to establish a constitutional framework for his theory and to combine a procedural system of democracy with his theory of discourse ethics. Habermas (1996) articulates most of his deliberative theory in his book Between Facts and Norms, and the title of the text hints at his motivation. He attempts to overcome fissures between his normative political theory of discourse ethics and real-world political practices. The discourse principle is integral to discourse ethics and it requires that all affected by a decision be entitled to participate in the deliberation about what to do. This means that for some nation-wide political problems, all citizens in the state are entitled to participate in the deliberation. He argues that political power has its origin in deliberations in the public sphere. The democratic practice of voting transforms public opinion in the public sphere into communicative power. Legislation is the mechanism that then transforms communicative power into administrative power. A critically enabled public sphere, free from institutional interference is central to his theory of deliberative democracy.

Warren argues that the proceduralism of Habermas’s theory of deliberative democracy differs from the liberal account by imposing constraints on ‘the medium’ rather than ‘the substance’ of political decision-making (Warren, 2002, p. 196). Where liberal theorists argue that the topics for deliberation should be ‘reasonable’ or ‘morally neutral’, deliberative proceduralism uses law to block the forces of coercive power and money (2002, p. 196).

Joshua Cohen proposes a more radical theory of deliberative democracy. He begins with a critique of Rawls’s deliberative theories, and attempts to solve many of the inconsistencies he finds. He argues that in order for a deliberative democracy to exist and function effectively, the institutions of that democracy must support deliberative activity. He formulates the ‘ideal deliberative procedure’ that will highlight the properties that these democratic institutions should embody (Cohen, 1997, p. 73). He argues that there are three general aspects to any deliberation: an agenda, proposed alternative solutions to the problems on the agenda, and settling on a solution. Democratic legitimacy requires outcomes that are the result of free and reasoned agreement amongst equals.

The discursive theories of Dryzek are not limited to the nation state, and he describes a democratic polity that is transnational in nature. His theory centres on communicative action in a transnational public sphere that ‘...is an informal, communicative realm that can be contrasted with the constitutional exercise of authority (though of course it can influence the latter)’ (Dryzek, 2006, p. 154). Dryzek’s theory attempts to solve problems presented by divergent conceptions of democracy and the bias towards liberal ideology that he argues exists within deliberative thought. He bases his arguments in critical theory and develops a conception of deliberative democracy that is not dependant on liberal institutions. Deliberations in this transnational public sphere do not lead directly to legislation, but rather they influence and construct international outcomes through mechanisms such as citizen mobilisation, protest actions, and similar political activities. These activities usually spring from a politicised civil society that ‘...consists of self-limiting political associations oriented by a relationship with the state, but not seeking any share in state power’ (Dryzek, 2000, p. 100).

Deliberative democracy is a label used to describe a range of democratic theories that utilise citizen deliberation and communication in order to solve political problems. The theories of Rawls, Habermas, and Dryzek are a good example of this disparity. In the spectrum of theories discussed above, starting at the liberal Rawls and moving in order to the radical Dryzek, they represent a range of public spheres and citizen rights and obligations. Rawls uses existing political institutions to host political deliberation, but limits political deliberation to a small section of the public sphere and a fraction of the population. Habermas re-orients constitutionalism and law making by building a case for basic rights using communicative reason. His theory requires a critically enabled public sphere that can host deliberations involving, potentially, all citizens in the state. Finally, Dryzek proposes a theory that crosses national borders, instead utilizing a transnational public sphere to influence and construct political outcomes wherever needed. Dryzek’s theory requires communication forums and channels that can accommodate deliberation over long distances in real time.

Bibliography

Cohen, J. Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy. In Deliberative Democracy, edited by J. Bohman and W. Rehg. Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1997.

Dryzek, John. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

—. Deliberative Global Politics: Discourse and Democracy in a Divided World. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006.

Gutmann, A., and D. Thompson. Why Deliberative Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.

Habermas, Jürgen. Between Fact and Norms. Translated by William Rehg. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996.

Rawls, John. The Law Of The Peoples. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.

Stokes, G. Democracy and Citizenship. In Democratic Theory Today: Challenges for the 21st Century, edited by A. Carter and G. Stokes. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002.

Warren, M. Deliberative Democracy. In Democratic Theory Today: Challenges for the 21st Century, edited by A. Carter and G. Stokes. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002.

Rawls and Deliberative Democracy

Rawls's deliberative democracy theory draws heavily from liberal political thought. He argues that the deliberative process need only apply to problems of a constitutional nature or of fundamental political importance. This restriction requires that only citizens who are involved in constitutional or governmental matters be included in political deliberation- namely, judges in courts of law, political candidates, or government officials. Consequently, Rawls's deliberative democracy theory encourages a passive form of citizenship in that the majority of citizens exercise political power only periodically, during government elections.

An Ideal Constitutional Democracy

Rawls’s deliberative democracy theory derives from his conception of an ideal constitutional democracy. He articulates his theory of deliberative democracy when he attempts to answer the question, ‘what would a reasonably just constitutional democracy be like under reasonably favourable historical conditions?’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 11) He labels this ideal a ‘realistic utopia’ and argues that a deliberative democracy and a well-ordered constitutional democracy are one and the same,

Here I am concerned only with a well-ordered constitutional democracy- a term I used at the outset- understood also as a deliberative democracy. The definitive idea for deliberative democracy is the idea of deliberation itself. When citizens deliberate, they exchange views and debate their supporting reasons concerning public political questions. They suppose that their political opinions may be revised by discussion with other citizens; and therefore these opinions are not simply a fixed outcome of their existing private or non-political interests. It is at this point that public reason is crucial, for it characterises such citizens’ reasoning concerning constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice (1999, p. 137).

Three elements form the core of Rawls’s theory. The first and defining element is the idea of public reason, which establishes a common principle for deliberation. The second is a constitutional framework that establishes the necessary regulatory institutions. The third, a general acceptance of the idea of public reason, establishes a foundation of commonality within pluralistic societies. In addition, Rawls argues that the only way to assure a deliberative democracy is to meet a further three conditions (1999, p. 139). First, the funding of elections must be public. Second, there should be allowances made for orderly and public deliberation of the issues under consideration. These deliberations should not depend upon funding that could taint the deliberation, whether public or private. Third, Rawls argues that the public should be educated in the basic processes and procedures of constitutional democracy, and have access to information about problems requiring political deliberation. By arguing that a deliberative democracy is an ideal constitutional democracy, Rawls adopts a liberal orientation for his deliberative democracy theory, and establishes structures and institutions usable by citizens who are rational individuals.

Rawls uses the principle of reciprocity, which describes the relationship between free and equal individuals who are also reasonable and rational, to establish the liberal foundations of his theory

A citizen engages in public reason, then, when he or she deliberates within a framework of what he or she regards as the most reasonable political conception of justice, a conception that expresses political values that others, as free and equal citizens might also reasonably be expected reasonably to endorse. Each of us must have principles and guidelines to which we appeal in such a way that this criterion is satisfied (1999, p. 140).

He argues that a family of political conceptions of justice, all of which have three main characteristics, gives the content of public reason. The first characteristic is comprised of the rights, freedoms and opportunities usually associated with a constitutional democracy. The second is the appropriate level of protection for those rights, freedoms and opportunities from conceptions of the general good. The third is the means by which all citizens can access these rights, freedoms and opportunities. Therefore, if citizens are free and equal and the society is just, an individual citizen is engaging in public reason when that citizen sincerely believes he or she is acting within a framework that he or she can reasonably consider fair and just, and that others, also free and equal citizens, could reasonably be expected to endorse. Citizens within Rawls’s deliberative democracy, therefore, have rights, freedoms and protections that support political deliberation. However, the problem of large pluralistic societies means that Rawls needs to introduce measures that can account for irreconcilable differences between individuals and groups within the polity.

The Idea of Public Reason

In order to establish a commonality between participants in political deliberation within a community, Rawls introduces the ‘idea of public reason’. At its most fundamental, the idea of public reason establishes the basic moral and political values that exist between citizens and government, and between citizens and other citizens

The idea of public reason specifies at the deepest level the basic moral and political values that are to determine constitutional government’s relation to its citizens and their relation to one another. In short, it concerns how the politcal relation is to be understood. Those who reject constitutional democracy with its criterion of reciprocity will of course reject the very idea of public reason. For them the political relation may be that of friend or foe, to those of a particular religious or secular community or those who are not; or it may be a relentless struggle to win the world for the whole truth. Political liberalism does not engage those who think this way. The zeal to embody the whole truth in politics is incompatible with an idea of public reason that belongs with democratic citizenship (1999, p. 132).

Citizens involved in political deliberation, or judging those who are involved in political deliberation, use the idea of public reason as the ‘source’ of their reason. Essentially, the idea of public reason is to replace any other doctrine of truth or right when the individual is involved in political deliberation. The commonality achieved by the idea of public reason, therefore, is the commonality of citizenship. Individuals involved in conducting or judging political deliberation do so in their capacity as citizens, and deliberation becomes an activity undertaken in this capacity. While the idea of public reason replaces other doctrines of truth or right when the individual is involved in political deliberation, it does not mean that other doctrines of truth or right cannot inform or influence the idea of public reason. For example, the former Australian Health Minister and now leader of the Australian Liberal Party, Mr Tony Abbot, is a Catholic, but if he is involved in political deliberation and wishes to adhere to the idea of public reason, he must adopt the reasoning of the Australian public. This does not mean that his faith cannot inform his reasoning on a number of levels, nor does it mean that he must totally abandon all his notions of truth and right that stem from it when he is involved in political deliberation. Rather, it means that he must enter political deliberation in his capacity as a citizen. The 2005 debate about abortion and the drug RU-486 in Australia, in which Mr Abbott was involved, is a good example of interplay between the idea of public reason and individually held beliefs. As a Catholic, Mr Abbott has an ideological opposition to abortion. As a citizen of Australia, however, he accepts that abortions are legal within certain limitations. He may argue in the public arena against the legality of abortions, and his Catholic faith may inform his arguments but his faith must be secondary in his reasoning while involved in public, political deliberation. The idea of public reason, therefore, governs the content and method of political deliberation in Rawls deliberative theory and it serves a collective need, despite the fact that moral and ideological makeup of the individual informs it.

There are five aspects to fulfil if the idea of public reason serving collective needs is to remain coherent. These aspects cover processes ranging from deliberation, to legislation, and enforcement of laws within a well-run constitutional democracy (1999, p. 133). The first of the aspects is that the idea of public reason only applies to deliberations that are of constitutional importance or are about fundamental issues of political importance. Therefore, most issues about the day-to-day running of the state do not require public deliberation. For example, questions about the best way to administer the collection of taxation revenue by the state, while important to many citizens, is not an issue of constitutional or political importance. However, the question of whether or not Australia should become a republic is an issue of constitutional importance and, in Rawls’s deliberative democracy, would be relevant to political deliberation.

The second aspect restricts political deliberation to judges, government officials and candidates for public office. Therefore, deliberation between citizens that do not hold one of these offices does not constitute political deliberation relevant to the government of the state. For example, discussions in the public domain about whether or not Australia should become a republic are only relevant to the idea of public reason if government officials or political candidates conduct them. If, for example, the National Director of the Australian Republic Movement (http://www.republic.org.au/homepagehtml.htm) and the convenor of Australians for Constitutional Monarchy (http://www.norepublic.com.au/) were to debate the issue of an Australian republic in a public arena, the debate would not be relevant to the idea of public reason because neither are government officials nor political candidates.

The third aspect relates to the family of political conceptions of justice, and ensures that a constitution that defines and protects the liberty of the individual governs the leadership of the state. The fourth is the application of these conceptions of justice to discussions of coercive norms, and their enactment in the form of legitimate law for a democratic people, ensuring there are appropriate sanctions and necessary coercive power is applied. Citizens who question whether the idea of public reason satisfies the principle of reciprocity fulfil the fifth, and final, aspect of public reason that serves collective needs coherently. Rawls also restricts the idea of public reason to particular forums that he labels the ‘public political forum’, and limits the members of the polity that can participate in its formulation.

After the idea of public reason, the second element forming the core of Rawls’s notion of deliberative democracy is that of a public political forum.

The Public Political Forum

Public reason is restricted to political deliberation within what Rawls refers to as the public political forum. There are three distinct arenas within this public political forum, and each arena is associated with a particular segment of democratic government and the citizens involved with that segment,

It is imperative to realise that