Operation Ersatz

Operation Ersatz

By David R. Lema

Copyright © 2011 by David R. Lema

Published by David R. Lema & Associates

Smashwords Edition

Copyright © 2011 by David R. Lema

All rights reserved.

This book may not be reproduced in whole or in part by any means whatsoever without permission.

David R. Lema & Associates

P. O. Box 2104, Elk Grove, CA 95759-2104

info@drlema.com

ISBN: 978-0-615-47811-1

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Table of Contents

The Prologue

The Plan

The Interview

The Discovery

The Kidnapping

The Rescue

The Epilogue

The Prologue

Since 1989, with the formation of al Qaeda, nations around the world have fallen victim to horrific terrorist attacks orchestrated by this relatively small band of ill-guided Islamic extremists. While selectively targeted for capture or elimination by a number of countries over the years, al Qaeda continued to operate worldwide almost unabated until the attacks of September 11, 2001.

With those attacks, a dramatically new tactical focus emerged with the commitment by the United States of an unprecedented level of military might, intelligence gathering resources, financial forensics, preparedness actions and diplomatic energy, all initially aimed at discovering and thwarting future al Qaeda initiatives but ultimately at destroying the organization in its entirety. For the last ten years, progress against al Qaeda has been slow, methodical and clearly effective, yet they continue to execute attacks against America and her allies.

The difficulties in completely destroying al Qaeda are numerous and frustrating and are ample evidence of the strategic design of the organization’s operating parameters as set out in the initial meeting of the al Qaeda Shura Council in 1989 in Pakistan. Anticipating a broad range of counter efforts by the West, the Council agreed on two guiding principals: 1. Put in place a uniquely designed set of orders which delegate command-and-control over future attack initiatives should any or all of the Shura Council be captured, killed or otherwise be incommunicado, and 2. Launch a number of loosely defined attack initiatives that could evolve to execution without necessarily needing the further approval of the Council or its leadership. Both principals, once initiated, were intended to provide al Qaeda with a fail-safe system to continue operations beyond the involvement of the Shura Council or any one individual.

Efforts to track and eliminate al Qaeda leadership have been very effective, but because of the distributed nature of subsequent decision-making within the organization, the tactic of ‘cutting off the head of the snake’ has been an ineffective method of totally stopping al Qaeda attacks. Further, at the conclusion of the initial al Qaeda Shura Council, each organizing member left the session with broad authority to independently architect and launch a range of highly ambitious schemes for waging Jihad on the Western World – principally the United States and allies. A handful of these plans were new but most were based on well-know tactics of conflict dating back to early history. The biggest challenge for al Qaeda was to update these tactics with modern methods and temper them with current political realities. All of this would take al Qaeda years to develop.

This is the story of one such al Qaeda attack plan. This plan leveraged the remnants of a World War II tactic – undermine the monetary stability of your foe with a flood of counterfeit bills. The seeds of this modern-day plot against the United States were envisioned and brought to the threshold of fruition in 1944 by both the Nazi’s in Europe and by the Japanese in the Philippines. Both Axis powers printed varying numbers of counterfeit US $100 bills and the plates were thought to have been destroyed toward the end of the war. Through a circuitous and sinister chain of events, the plates were secreted away in 1945, updated throughout the years and ended up in the hands of al Qaeda operatives in 1989. Acquisition of the plates by al Qaeda set in motion the launch, again in the Philippines, of a plan they deemed critical to the success of their Jihad.

The Philippines were purposefully chosen as ground zero for the al Qaeda counterfeiting operation for reasons both practical and notorious. First, they clearly wanted to take maximum advantage of their growing presence in the Philippines and second, they wanted the impact of their operation to be even more bitter to America since they would be emulating the actions of General Douglas MacArthur who, in 1943, had nearly 10 million counterfeit bills of Japanese currency printed and circulated in the Philippines as a way to fund the Filipino guerillas. The Japanese returned the favor during their occupation of the Philippines. al Qaeda was merely repeating the tactic.

While United States resources around the world became aware of and were racing to close in on the al Qaeda counterfeiting operation, it was an American research team from the University of California, San Diego who, while working to document the personal recollections of U.S. World War II veterans, stumbled upon the al Qaeda operation in 2002. Initially their discovery put them in grave jeopardy but the research team and their associates doggedly, albeit unwillingly, went to work in unorthodox ways to stop the plan in its tracks.

The Plan

1

Peshawar, Pakistan, February 9, 1989, 1:30 p.m.

For Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, time had flown by during the first and only face-to-face meeting of the entire al Qaeda Shura Council. In addition to the self-proclaimed al Qaeda Emir, Osama bin Laden the others in attendance were Mohammed Atef, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Saif al-Adel, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah and Abu Faraj al-Yemeni. All were seasoned warriors in the fight against non-Muslims invading their lands - most recently seeing battle in Afghanistan against the Soviet occupation.

As Abdullah exited the modest home in a non-descript neighborhood of Peshawar he tried to suppress his mind’s focus on the discussions of the meeting in favor of concentrating on quietly making his way to the international airport.

I will have time to digest the discussions and plans once I safely reach my next destination, he told himself. Right now, I have to leave this meeting with no trace.

It was paramount that all attendees leave the meeting without detection. From this day forward, security and confidentiality became the driving factors of their daily lives. Abdullah knew that for the effects of the plans crafted at this meeting to have the maximum desired results the element of surprise had to be protected above all else.

Combining surprise with unimaginable attacks will bring our enemies to their knees, he thought to himself.

Abdullah was excited about his assignments. As he made his way to the main boulevard of Peshawar to catch a Tuk Tuk to the city’s market he smiled broadly with satisfaction. After many years of fighting the infidels he was finally part of a powerful Jihad that would, without a doubt in his mind, bring the ultimate victory.

The plans were grand yet achievable, complicated yet manageable, tactical yet potentially viral. The brilliance behind the overarching strategy made Abdullah feel stunned with reverence for the al Qaeda leadership. He sat in silence as the Tuk Tuk wended its way to the market.

He was mesmerized by the day’s events not noticing the sights and sounds of the city he was leaving. Nor did he notice the stranger who had been closely following him as the stranger’s Tuk Tuk pulled next to Abdullah at an intersection. Abdullah paid no attention as the stranger retrieved a revolver from his knapsack and hid it in his loose sleeve for the moment.

After nearly an hour of fighting traffic and an untold number of stops Abdullah finally exited the Tuk Tuk at the market. The stranger also exited his Tuk Tuk at the market and began walking directly behind. Abdullah had taken three steps when he felt a sharp pain in his lower left back immediately above his kidney. A man’s voice told him to walk straight ahead and not look back.

His first instinct was to turn and confront his attacker but he quickly sensed that the man held a gun tight to his back. As a seasoned fighter he knew that his best option now was to obey his attacker while looking for an opening to defend himself in a way that gave him greater odds of survival.

As the two men walked into the main part of the market a small child dashed across Abdullah’s path causing him to stumble a bit and creating a gap between him and his attacker’s gun. In an instant he whirled around with a sweeping motion of his arm which knocked the gun to the ground.

His eyes met the eyes of his attacker. To his shock, Abdullah knew the man. He was Saif al-Adel, security chief for al Qaeda who dove for and retrieved the gun before anyone in the market could notice.

For a moment Abdullah stood frozen in place. He couldn’t comprehend why al-Adel was attacking him. His hesitation had allowed al-Adel to again hold the gun. This time however, it wasn’t pointed at Abdullah. al-Adel had quickly stashed it in his knapsack. What was pointed toward Abdullah was a keen piercing stare which sent a cold chill down his spine.

Slowly and firmly al-Adel spoke. My friend he began, you must be more observant. Not only could an unknown attacker have killed or captured you, but you compromised my security by ignorantly nearing me on the street. Next time I will not hesitate to shoot you myself. With that, al-Adel turned and disappeared into the crowed market.

Abdullah couldn’t move. He had never before been so filled with terror. As he regained his self-control he thanked Allah for the valuable lessons. He assured himself that he would never again be caught unexpectedly. He also, now more than ever, appreciated the impact of a surprise, unimaginable attack. He vowed to make those the trademarks of his plans.

2

Peshawar, Pakistan, February 26, 1989, 4:00 p.m.

The meeting in the Marco Polo Dining Room in the Pearl Continental Hotel was the first between Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah and Abu Faraj al-Yemeni since the Shura Council meeting and their first with Ahmed Said Khadr. Khadr was a Canadian who was well-known for his understanding of Western business operations and his ability to raise large sums of money. The meeting had been arranged by Ayman al-Zawahiri, one of the co-founders and leaders of al Qaeda, and was intended to discuss ideas for disrupting business operation of the western world.

As each man separately made his way through the palace-like lobby to a back table in the restaurant, each was careful to notice anyone else who had interest in them. Satisfied that they were not being watched, they briefly greeted each other and ordered tea before getting to the business at hand. They briefly discussed how they would handle Khadr and agreed that they would be cautious and untrusting.

Within minutes Khadr joined them at their table. Al-Yemeni kept the introductions to a minimum and was rather abrupt with Khadr, by purpose. Khadr would learn very little about the two men and even less about their specific intentions. Al-Yemeni fully intended that Khadr would find himself in an unfriendly circumstance as his way of assuring that they received Khadr’s best thinking and most loyal commitment. Khadr had to know that either of the two men would kill him without hesitation and at any time. Intimidation was a great leverage over any man.

The discussions proceeded slowly and cautiously by both sides until al-Yemeni, tired of Khadr’s game of cat and mouse, threatened to kill Khadr right where he sat unless he swore allegiance with the fight against western enemies and began to offer insight and advice on how the battle could be taken to the them. Pushed to the human limits of terror, Khadr reacted with certainty of his commitment and began to freely and openly discuss vulnerabilities of the western business world.

After a long discussion of the technology and financial aspects of the west, all parties began to reach their capacity for more interaction. Al-Yemeni orchestrated the end of the meeting by assuring Khadr that he and Abdullah were very pleased with how the meeting had progressed and assured Khadr that the Emir would learn of Khadr’s value to the cause.

Khadr rose from the table with slightly wobbly legs. He straightened himself by leaning against the edge of the table before slowly exiting the dining room. Even though the meeting ended on a positive note, he couldn’t shake the vision of al-Yemeni’s threat to kill him where he sat. When he reached the lobby he fought the urge to break into a dash for the outside fearing that he was being watched by those who would kill him instantly.

Khadr walked a couple of blocks to the main intersection, hailed a Tuk Tuk and, disappeared into the center of Peshawar city knowing he needed to be fully prepared to produce results for Abdullah and al-Yemeni at their next meeting.

As Khadr left the dining room, the two Shura Council members reviewed their next steps. The meeting had gone very well and they were both anxious to make progress of formulating plans that would bring great harm to their enemies.

I see one very solid idea beginning to arise from our discussions with Khadr concerning the computer systems of our enemies, said al-Yemeni. Before we proceed I would like to discuss with Emir bin Laden. Do you agree?

I agree, replied Abdullah. And I also have another idea that came to me as we listened to Khadr describe western business operations. Could I describe it to you to see if we should inform the Emir of this as well?

Of course my brother, replied al-Yemeni with more curiosity than conviction at the unexpected confidence of Abdullah. Al-Yemeni knew that neither of them was particularly well-versed in western business ways. They were experts in warfare not the subtleties of business practices, which is why they met with Khadr who was very knowledgeable of the business world of the West.

In preparation for today’s meeting, Abdullah began, I sought the input and advice of Jamal Khalifa. I first met him in Afghanistan during the war with the Soviet Union and remembered something he shared with me at that time.

al-Yemeni too had met Khalifa in Afghanistan. He knew that Khalifa was married to one of bin Laden’s sisters and that he had made trips to the U.S. and the Philippines working with the CIA and the Pakistani ISI recruiting fighters and raising funds for the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. al-Yemeni also knew that bin Laden expected Khalifa to continue in these efforts of expanding the fight against all of their Western enemies now that the war with the Soviets was over.

So, what did you learn from Khalifa that gives you an idea for another plan? asked al Yemeni.

I remembered, began Abdullah, that Khalifa had mentioned a contact in Iran who had seen printing plates of the American $100 bill in Iran. It was told that these plates were crafted with such exactness that few could tell the difference between a real bill and a counterfeit one. My thinking is that if I can acquire these plates, which is the most difficult part of my plan, we could launch an operation to print millions of dollars of counterfeit U.S. money. The printing presses, the paper, the ink and the expertise at printing, I’m sure, will be much easier to obtain.

Your idea, asked al-Yemeni, is to print U.S. money as a way to raise funds?

Yes, replied Abdullah. Done correctly, such a plan would give our cause great momentum. Not only would we be able to use the proceeds to fund our operations but, if we can produce large enough amounts of their money, we will weaken the value of their currency. We can steal their money without actually stealing anything.

Abdullah had captured al-Yemeni’s attention. He sat silent for several moments deep in thought and processing the potential of Abdullah’s idea.

I see the advantages of such a plan, but I also see many obstacles for its implementation, offered al-Yemeni. I don’t know a lot about counterfeiting my friend but I do know that you need to be very precise in your printing techniques if you want your plan to succeed. Do you have any idea how the printing might be done?

Yes, my friend, began Abdullah, I have very good ideas on how to put my plan into action. He then began to relate to al-Yemeni the beginning details of his plan.

Al-Yemeni had heard enough. Since he had already resolved himself to push forward with a plan focused on the computer systems of the West he needed to hear no more from Abdullah. But no matter how he tried to get him to stop, Abdullah blathered on.

Becoming impatient with his colleague, al-Yemeni sighed loudly – enough so that Abdullah paused in mid-thought, shaken by al-Yemeni’s brashness.

Another sneak attack by a brother thought Abdullah, deeply disturbed at the rudeness of al-Yemeni.

Sensing the frustration of Abdullah, al-Yemeni offered his apologies.

I’m sorry my friend. I meant no disrespect. It is just that I have heard so much today that I need to take time to organize my thoughts and get prepared to brief the Emir on our initial plans, offered al-Yemeni. I fully support your idea and will include it in my call to bin Laden.

Satisfied that al-Yemeni was being genuine, Abdullah stopped talking about his plan and sat back and waited for al-Yemeni to lay out the next steps.

Al-Yemeni was sure that Abdullah would either be able to put all the details of his plan together or he would fail miserably. Either way, al-Yemeni had determined that he would offer no more advice or assistance to Abdullah on his effort. He intended to focus all of his attention on his own plan to disrupt the computer system operations of their Western enemies.

I think you have a sound idea and good thinking on putting your plan into action, said al-Yemeni. I believe we need to concentrate each of our energies on our separate plans. Thus, while you pursue your counterfeiting idea I will take on the computer system plan. We will meet again when each has brought our plans to the next level of implementation.

Very well, said Abdullah. Would you like to hear the name I propose for the counterfeiting plan?

Pushed to the very limit of patience al-Yemeni replied with as much restraint as he could gather. Why of course, let me hear the name.

Ersatz, replied Abdullah. It’s a German word meaning substitute or not the original. Since the money we print will be substituted for real American money, why not call the plan what it is?

As he thought about the name for Abdullah’s operation, al-Yemeni warmed to the idea.

Operation Ersatz, said al-Yemeni. I like the name. Although, while the money we make will be ‘not real’ we will be making a very real problem for our enemies. I will let the Emir know of our plans and the name of your operation as well. I’m sure he will be very pleased with our progress.

al-Yemeni resolved that he would concentrate heavily to think of a name for his plan that would rival the creative name Abdullah proposed for his plan. Osama bin Laden later accepted al-Yemeni’s proposed name for his plan: Operation 1420. Since the heart of the plan, which targeted strategic computer applications, was to take advantage of international efforts to remediate computer code during preparations for the anticipated date-change problems at year 2000, he thought that using the Islamic Calendar date of 1420 was ingenious. After all 1420 is when the year 2000 begins on the Gregorian calendar.

3

Islamabad, Pakistan, June 16, 1989, 8:30 a.m.

Having received approval for the counterfeiting operation from Osama bin Laden, Abdullah and al-Yemeni wasted no time in setting up their operation. Toward that end, bin Laden facilitated a meeting between the two and Abdurajik Janjalani, who was a close affiliate of bin Laden from the war in Afghanistan against the Soviets.

Janjalani was a native of Isabela City on the Philippine island of Basilan. He had been an early organizer of the Moro National Liberation Front who fought for creation of an autonomous Muslim region in the southern part of the Philippines. Although a resolution to the conflict was expected on August 1st with legislation officially creating the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, Janjalani wanted to continue fighting for the extremist cause.

About to return to his homeland from Afghanistan, Janjalani and bin Laden agreed that while there was soon to be a Muslim victory in the Philippines, Janjalani should carry on with the larger fight against Western enemies. Toward that end, bin Laden funded the startup of an al Qaeda offshoot group in the Philippines with $6 million in seed money organized and managed by bin Laden’s brother-in-law Jamal Khalifa. Janjalani was slated to be the leader of the new group.

Janjalani’s band of terrorists would come to be known as Abu Sayyaf. The mission of the group was to carry out large scale attacks, bombings, kidnapping and assignations in the Philippines while providing support and assistance to other al Qaeda efforts around the globe. In addition, bin Laden asked Janjalani to meet with Abdullah and al-Yemeni to discuss a new plan.

With