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On Victory and Defeat: From On War
On Victory and Defeat: From On War
On Victory and Defeat: From On War
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On Victory and Defeat: From On War

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The seemingly endless wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have renewed the age-old debate over what constitutes military victory. Will the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan be seen as a sign of victory or defeat? Although the nature of warfare has changed dramatically since Clausewitz's On War was first written, this selection from his classic work remains an invaluable source of insight for understanding what it means to achieve victory in war and how to recognize defeat.


Princeton Shorts are brief selections excerpted from influential Princeton University Press publications produced exclusively in eBook format. They are selected with the firm belief that while the original work remains an important and enduring product, sometimes we can all benefit from a quick take on a topic worthy of a longer book.


In a world where every second counts, how better to stay up-to speed on current events and digest the kernels of wisdom found in the great works of the past? Princeton Shorts enables you to be an instant expert in a world where information is everywhere but quality is at a premium. On Victory and Defeat does just that.

LanguageEnglish
Release dateJun 1, 1989
ISBN9781400841158
On Victory and Defeat: From On War

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  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    Hard to read! But smart. Reallll smart.
  • Rating: 5 out of 5 stars
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    A classic.
  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
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    Brilliant strategist. Was ahead of his time, yet, subsequent strategies at war colleges would not develop for fear of orthodoxy.

Book preview

On Victory and Defeat - Carl von Clausewitz

2

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

The Culminating Point of Victory

¹

It is not possible in every war for the victor to overthrow his enemy completely. Often even victory has a culminating point. This has been amply demonstrated by experience. Because the matter is particularly important in military theory and forms the keystone for most plans of campaign, and because its surface is distorted by apparent contradictions, like the dazzling effect of brilliant colors, we shall examine it more closely and seek out its inner logic.

Victory normally results from the superiority of one side; from a greater aggregate of physical and psychological strength. This superiority is certainly augmented by the victory, otherwise it would not be so coveted or command so high a price. That is an automatic consequence of victory itself. Its effects exert a similar influence, but only up to a point. That point may be reached quickly—at times so quickly that the total consequences of a victorious battle may be limited to an increase in psychological superiority alone. We now propose to examine how that comes about.

As a war unfolds, armies are constantly faced with some factors that increase their strength and with others that reduce it. The question therefore is one of superiority. Every reduction in strength on one side can be considered as an increase on the other. It follows that this two-way process is to be found in attack as well as in defense.

What we have to do is examine the principal cause of this change in one of these instances, and so at the same time determine the other.

In an advance, the principal causes of additional strength are:

1. The losses suffered by the defending forces are usually heavier than those of the attacker.

2. The defender’s loss of fixed assets such as magazines, depots, bridges, and the like, is not experienced by the attacker.

3. The defender’s loss of ground, and therefore of resources, from the time we enter his territory.

4. The attacker benefits from the use of some of these resources; in other words, he can live at the enemy’s expense.

5. The enemy loses his inner cohesion and the smooth functioning of all components of his force.

6. Some allies are lost to the defender, others turn to the invader.

7. Finally, the defender is discouraged, and so to some extent disarmed.

The causes of loss in strength for an invading army are:

1. The invader has to besiege, assault or observe the enemy’s fortresses; while the defender, if he has previously been doing the same, will now add the units so employed to his main force.

2. The moment an invader enters enemy territory, the nature of the operational theater changes. It becomes hostile. It must be garrisoned, for the invader can control it only to the extent that he has done so; but this creates difficulties for the entire machine, which will inevitably weaken its effectiveness.

3. The invader moves away from his sources of supply, while the defender moves closer to his own. This causes delay in the replacement of his forces.

4. The danger threatening the defender will bring allies to his aid.

5. Finally, the defender, being in real danger, makes the greater effort, whereas the efforts of the victor slacken off.

All these advantages and disadvantages may coexist; they can meet, so to speak, and pursue their ways in opposite directions. Only the last meet as true opposites: they cannot

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