Salvation through the Gutters: Deviance and Identity

SALVATION

THROUGH

THE GUTTERS

Deviance

and Transcendence

S. Giora Shoham

Faculty of Law Tel-Aviv University

Harrow and Heston Publishers

New York

© 2012 S. Giora Shoham

Harrow and Heston Publishers

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

Contents

Acknowledgments

Introduction

Ego and Its Shadow

I. BEATITUDE THROUGH SIN

1. The Origins: Biopsychology of Birth

2. Myths

3. Quest for Nonbeing

4. To Break the Covenant is to Confirm it

II. ASSERTION BY NEGATION

5. Paradise Lost

6. Ontological Loneliness

7. Assault on Cognition

8. Waiver of Sanity

III. REJECTION OF AUTHORITY

9. Petrified Ego

10. Rites of Passage

11. Solidarity and Beyond

12. Impossibility of Dialogue

13. The Stare of Medusa

About the Author

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my secretary, Mrs. Sheila Bahat, for her devoted and meticulous work as well as Mr. Anthony Grahame who has made the volume look much better than it could have been without him.

Salvation Through The Gutters

I love those who do not know how to live except in perishing, for they are those going beyond.

Friedrich Nietzsche: Thus Spake Zarathustra

Introduction

This volume is both a sequel to earlier works and a turning point in the author's preoccupation with social deviance over the last two decades. It was initiated by the rather innovative (at that time) assertion that crime is mostly a learned and normal behavior. Except for some forms of insanity, compulsion neuroses, and sexual aberrations, crime was related to social pressures. Biologic factors as well as structural personality defects were largely excluded or ignored, and crime was regarded as a particular case of the wider syndrome of deviation from social norms (1).

During a study of prostitution in Israel, it occurred to me that the role of the group's reaction to an individual's behavior in the genesis of deviance has been underrated. The symbolic-interactionist contention that human behavior out of its cultural context is neutral seemed to be clearly upheld. The tagging, the labeling, the commendable attributes, or the derogatory stigmata were found to be the crucial factors in identifying an act as bad or good, conforming or deviant. This led to the formulation of the stigma theory of crime and deviance (2). The last volume in this trilogy on deviance was The Sociology of the Absurd (3), dealing with value deviation as a predisposition to social deviance. The following model emerged:

Value deviation + deviant behavior + social stigma      social deviance

The rather simplistic interpretation of this model is that stigma, deviant behavior, and value deviation are interrelated and are linked to social deviance in a descending order of significance.

This model seemed to dominate my orientation as a kind of e = me² of social deviance, until Michael Denis Rohan set fire to the Mosque of El-Aqsa in Jerusalem. To claim that Rohan acted as he did because he was insane is rather facile and simplistic. Of course he was mad, but to label him as psychotic explains little. One may build a complicated model using all the grim factors in Rohan's life as raw material: his cruel disciplinarian father, his cold and mentally deranged mother, his retarded sister and truant brother, and the choice pedagogue who ordered the five-year-old Denis to climb into the trash basket while his classmates watched and jeered. Rohan would have had to be utterly maladjusted to his environment to grow up to be a successful businessman or a university lecturer. Evidently this profile predisposed him to a subsequent morbid and deviant career. The cause causans that triggered Rohan's behavior remains to be elucidated. Egocentric faith in the Bible and the gospel as preached by the Radio Church of God stands forth in answer to our question. The processes through which Rohan had audial hallucinations, finally believing himself to be the branch spoken of by Zecharia, are no doubt crucial and wholly in the realm of psychopathology. However, of no less importance for the explanation of the contents of his deviant behavior is his fundamentalist adoption of the biblical prophecies and his equating of the Resurrection of the Temple with ultimate salvation. Rohan visited the Temple Mount and found El-Aqsa there. How can the Temple be rebuilt if the Mosque looms in its place? Thus the Mosque had to be destroyed, erased, burned down to make way for salvation. These are solid Aristotelian inferences based on the Bible as literal truth. Rohan's case, with all its bizarre improbabilities, may support the contention that any model of deviance that excludes faith and other transcendental factors is bound to be incomplete.

A striking instance of a transcendentally motivated compulsive deviant is that of Jacob Frank, the eighteenth century Jewish false Messiah who preached to his followers; 1 did not come into this world to lift you up but rather to cast you down to the bottom of the abyss. Further than this it is impossible to descend. The descent into the abyss requires not only the rejection of all religions and conventions, but also the commission of 'strange acts' and this in turn demands the voluntary abasement of one's own sense of self, so that libertinism and the achievement of that state of utter shamelessness leads to a state in which all laws and religions are annihilated (3a).

Another factor of direct relevance is the ontological assertion and the fusion of self with some transcendental ultimates experienced by deviants while performing an irreversible act. The point of no return of a murder and the finality of an act of arson are such instances. Genet beautifies the act of murder by a trinity of moral vigor, freedom, and fulfilment. The murderer displays moral vigor by accepting his destiny. Green-eyes, one of Genet's heroes, feels relaxed and calm after the murder that would lead him eventually to the guillotine, because the confusion about his identity has finally been clarified: He is a murderer. The liberating sense of freedom is incidental to the dispersion of the ambiguity enshrouding one's self-image. By taking a life, one delineates personal social contours and gets in touch with eternity. Genet preached that the ritual of murder should have the solemnity of a black mass. Manson, to judge by the Tate murders in Hollywood, also felt that the proper ceremony of murder is through a rite of hatred.

Transcendental and ontological anchors are gained through the finality of murder or the magnanimity of fire. Genet, the bastard, the foundling, finds ultimate meaning through his criminal Kirie and his trinity of theft, homosexuality, and betrayal. Manson, the illegitimate child, lifelong truant, and unsuccessful song writer, finds new identity in preaching the gospel of murder to his harem.

The current conception of psychosis not as a disease entity but as a flaw of interaction makes the boundaries between the mad and the fanatic-eccentric quite blurred. Rohan is no doubt an extreme case, but he differs in quantity and not in nature from the millions of fundamentalists and Bible belters who take the Scriptures literally. Rohan's case, with all its bizarre improbability, triggered the realization that any model of deviance that excludes faith in transcendental powers is bound to be incomplete, because faith is universal. It is submitted that, conceptually, religion is rather tolerant of ambiguity. For a Spaniard crossing himself while a plane takes off, God is a witchdnctor. Per contra, for an Eliade, God is an ethereal abstraction: a longing for a perfect beginning. The belief in God and the ever-after is a narrow segment of the human encounter with transcendence. Of wider relevance is the fact that our whole conception of reality—things, flora, fauna, and other human beings out there—is of necessity based on faith. Thus we make our distinction between good and bad. This makes transcendence a vital component in the explanation not only of sin or piety, but also of deviance or crime.

The ontological prodding into the self is another domain that has been neglected by the students of deviance. If a person comes to the conclusion that existence is empty, devoid of reality and meaning, he or she might assert existence by a negative act, such as murder or suicide, that has a basic ontological significance. Such acts have been widely explored by novelists and dramatists but very little by behavioral and social scientists. Here again, our master model of deviance has been found deficient insofar as it excluded the playing of evil roles as an act of self-definition. The gist of our contention is that the sociopsychological expositions are necessary but not sufficient for the explanation of all modes and types of deviance. For some types and on some levels of analysis the ontological and transcendental correlates of deviance are quite relevant and sometimes crucial. In addition, the self-concept of an individual as a conformist or deviant may be related to many levels of cognition. When a person identifies with criminal roles or deviant images, he or she might try to explain the reason for this internally. Such a person might also try to rationalize or assert the deviant stance vis-à-vis the prevailing norms in society. These attempts are in many cases logical, ethical, or affective, but in other cases they might involve ontological introspections and transcendental assertions. As a matter of conjecture we may presume that a person would rarely resort to sociological or psychological theories of deviance for self-explanation; these are either unknown or they leave one cold. More probably, the person would try and find out why he or she is different from others, why others regard him or her as an outcast, as an outsider, as bad. The person might also look for ultimate meanings of the events in which he or she participates. When these prove to be puzzling or evasive, the person might conclude that they are as important as the fact of a conviction or prison sentence. The language and form of these metaphysical and ontological introspections are not relevant. The defrocked priest would holler at heaven and his tormentors: wide malunt? whereas the petty pimp would eulogize this f ... world with four-letter words, but the message is the same.

This book attempts to add two components to our master model of deviance. One is the inherent ontological conception of self, and the second is the outermost conception of transcendence. The end product might be

Self-concept + value deviance + deviant behavior + social stigma

+ transcendental projections → social deviance

For those with a passion for ranking and scaling, we should point out that the components of our model should not be taken as continua. Rather, it would be fruitful to regard the model as a three-dimensional space, wherein each component occupies a separate plane. (This is not unlike the multidimensional scalogram of Guttman and Lingoc.)

Participation and Separation

The ontological and transcendental aspects of deviance and conformity may be related to the processes that lead toward or away from congruence. Moreover, the intrinsic meaning of deviance (or, for that matter, conformity) connotes a moving away from or toward a given source of norms or a frame of reference. The transcendental point of vantage involves, no doubt, a higher level of generalization and abstraction than other levels of analyses.

Thus we propose participation and separation as the main conceptual vectors. Participation means the identification of ego with a person (persons), an object, or a symbolic construct outside itself, and striving to lose the separate identity by fusion with this other object or symbol. Separation, of course, is the opposite vector, but the movement between these two extremes is more likely to be on different planes of the same space than along a unidimensional continuum.

Of special interest is the fact that the subjective feeling of separation—ego as an ontological entity, distinct from environment—is a specific human quality. Other animals do not possess the ontological feeling of the individuum. This sui generis quality of the homo sapiens, the ability to sense separateness, has been subject to diametrically opposite value judgments: Schachtel regarded the activity affect leading to the elaborate interaction of ego with the objects around it as an ever-recurring pleasure (4). This interaction is not feasible if ego is not ontologically separate. We, on the other hand, tread in the elegiac path of Freud, Heidegger, and Eliade, where the coagulating of ego's distinct identity is through painful encounters with obstacles, impediments, and conflicts. Unifications are temporary, and the desire for a blissful remerger of the individual and its entourage is a perennial longing expressed in religion, art, and philosophy but never fully attained in reality. Our use of these opposing vectors of unification-fusion and separation-isolation is extensive. We propose to trace them in the following chapters from their biopsychological origins to their effect on the eventual bifurcation to conformity and deviance. First, the process of birth: This abrupt propulsion from cushioned self-sufficiency into the strife and struggles of life outside the womb is a major crisis, undoubtedly recorded by the newborn's psyche. This is in addition to any physical pressures that the process of birth itself might have on the cranium and the resultant impressionistic effects on the various layers of the brain. Indeed, we do not follow the birth trauma theorists, who stress the variability of birth-related physical violence as a due to personality pathologies (5). We build our premises on the separating effects of birth, which are universal. They initiate the opposite vector of participation, which is also inevitable and serves as a directional driving force that may culminate in institutionalized or deviant behavior. Participation differs from libidinal energy, because the latter is not channeled and it radiates in all directions. Participation is therefore a harnessing frame that may drive a diverse assortment of psychic energy toward union with given objects or symbols.

The fetus at birth is physiologically and psychologically capable of recording the colossal crises incidental to its birth, but how do we show that it was indeed shocked into a lifelong quest for congruity and unification? The rather problematic answer is that we rely on some universal myths. Jung relied heavily on myths as clues for the identification of his archetypes and as the raw material for his collective unconscious (6). Anthropologists assure us that myths are realities and record not only events of nature (7), but also some processes of personality development common to specific groups or to the whole race. Freud's analogy between the Oedipal process and the Fall from Grace has become a pedestrian cliché; less known is his comparison between Paradise and the state of contented bliss within the womb.

We follow this tradition by learning the psychic effects of birth from the Kabbalistic cosmogonic myth of the breaking of the vessels. This process, which was incidental to the creation of the world, is compared to the breakthrough of birth, the deepest convulsion of the organism, which, incidentally, is also accompanied by the externalization of what might be described as waste products (8). This breaking of the vessels released, inter aiia, the kelippot—the forces of evil. Birth, the prime event of separation, is incidental to the cathartic release of vile forces of evil.

In the following chapters we trace some Gnostic and other myths that equate birth with evil, but in this primary survey we pass on to the second process of separation: the crystallization of an individual ego by the molding of the ego boundary.

The infant shrieks and kicks its way into the world but still feels itself part and parcel of its entourage. However, this pantheistic bliss is gradually destroyed by the bumps and grinds suffered from the harsh realities of hunger, thirst, discomfort, physical violence from hard objects in the surroundings, and a mother who is mostly loving but sometimes nagging, apathetic, hysterical, or overprotective. All this shoves, cajoles, and pushes the infant into coagulating a separate identity: to leave the common fold of unity with environment and crystallize an I. This individual self knows that it is not part of and with everything, but vis-à-vis its surroundings and opposite everyone. This realization of oneself through being forced to leave once more the security of engulfing togetherness is registered by the sprouting psyche as a Fall from Grace. Why we are being pushed out is the great imponderable, the existence of which we take as given. The theme of this work is the fact of the Geworfenheit and the opposing lifelong vector to overcome it.

The knowledge of oneself as a separate entity is projected into mythology as original sin. The process of separation continues in full force as a corollary of socialization until one reaches, in Erickson's terms, one's ego identity, which is the postadolescent's adjustment to the mandates of the normative system of society (9). The making of the responsible person, the stable human being, is achieved by constant indoctrination by the various socialization agencies, family, school, church, and so on. These convey the harsh realities of life and urge one to grow up with the help of some rigorous initiation rites. The child spreads out its arms to embrace with naive eagerness every person, object, and beast. It exposes thereby its soft body and tender psyche to physical injuries and mental blows. These make the child shrink with fright and pain. In due course, the scar tissue of experience and learning covers the sores and wounds. The child becomes less vulnerable, but also less sensitive, and it is more reluctant to expose itself with loving embraces to its environment. This is the lore of the rape of innocence by life. The end product is separation of the alienated human who is basically lonely. The sneer of the tough guy, who walks and needs nobody, is the folklore counterpart to the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. He knows that in this rat-race everyone is to oneself. The mythological counterpart of socialization is the chastisement of the Titans by the jealous Gods. Sisyphus, Prometheus, and Tantalus were towed back into line by stern justice with no saving grace. They were subjected to continuous and cyclic drudgery, pain, and frustration, but, what is more, they were doing their own time alone and by themselves.

A linguistic support for our conceptualization is the source of the word crisis, which is the Greek !midis and Sanskrit root kri. Literally, it means to separate and part. Division, partition, and separation are therefore equivalent to crises, disruptions,.and bad times. Moreover, the word Icpivw, which also connotes separation and partition, is the source of the Latin crimen. The separated, those who left the fold, the engulfing womb of the ecclesia, are therefore the criminals, the outsiders, the outlaws, the deviants, the bad.

We may as well revive in this work the original meaning of crisis to denote the critical nature of separation. In Hebrew we also have the same philological connotation. Crisis—num/0er in Hebrew—comes from shevira, which is semantically synonymous with separation. The evil power, which is metaphysically equivalent to Satan, is named in Aramaic Sitra Aclutra, which means literally the other side. Otherness is, of course, semantically close to separateness. The strain to overcome the separating and dividing pressures never leaves the human individual. The striving to partake in a pantheistic whole is ever present, and it takes many forms: If one avenue toward it's realization becomes blocked, it surges out from another channel.

Sometimes this quest for congruity is directed against the limiting and dividing presence of the body itself. This necessitates the coming to grips with various homeostatic and defense mechanisms of the organism. The Indian and Buddhist mystics achieved varying measures of freedom from the body through mental control and contemplation, whereas the early christian Origen found it more expedient to castrate himself.

Socialization, however, goes on with varying degrees of intensity throughout life. The balanced and responsible citizen and, for that matter, the good party member, are pigeon-holed products, who are geared toward mechanical solidarity with one another but are emotionally and ontologically lonely. The inner vector of participation is still there. It makes the subjective Dasein feel as the channel through which all creation flows. It also tries to reach in every direction and melt some of the partitions around it, so that it may experience a fusion of being with persons and things. This, no doubt, is rare and evasive even for a short time, but a prolonged meaningful participation borders on the miraculous.

Indeed, our vectors seem to be diametrically opposed to the corresponding sociologistic solidarity and existentialistic individuality. However, the contrast is largely semantic and not intrinsic. The Durkheimean conception of solidarity, being the end product of successful socialization within the group, is the epitome of separation. The leveling forces of indoctrination, the bumper effects of pushing back into place, of towing into line, are allocations of separate wishes for human beings to dwell in physical proximity but ontological distance. On the other hand, the subjective awareness of existence, which is by definition a property of the individual, can break its loneliness only by aligning itself to a similar entity, the embrace of a pour soi with a pour soi, a Dasein with a Dasein. Most existentialists claim that this communication is ontologically impossible, but ego strives to find a meaningful link with others. This urge was in it from the beginning, from the time it was one with everything, from the time it was partaking in a pantheistic whole, from the time it was God.

These vectors of participation and separation have been studied in materially and semantically different contexts. Freud, Rank, Sullivan, Levy-Bruhl, Eliade, Schachtel, and many others have dealt with these vectors, but in a rather different way from that proposed here. However, it would be proper to point out the specific conceptual meaning of participation and separation in contradistinction to similar concepts in the literature.

Freud's earlier conceptualization of the pleasure principle is rather similar to our conception of the participation vector. For Freud, human pleasure consists in the release of energy, which leads to a return to a contented homeostasis—the overcoming of an irritation which leads to inactivity, quietism, to the suspended animation of regressus ad uterum. Indeed, the pleasure principle may be regarded as a mechanism of participation insofar as its homeostatic sequel is the desired goal of relative contentedness. However, in a later work Freud contrasted Thanatos, the death instinct, with Eros, the life force, which he regarded as the principle of unification (10). At this point the similarity between the vectors proposed here and the two principal vectors of Freud ceases, because participation, for us, always means the striving to attain unity with groups, people, entities, and symbols from which ego has been separated. One longs to discard the burden of responsibilities that the norms of society cast on the adult. Ego longs to waive its ego identity and be embraced by the relative freedom from responsibility within the family. It wishes to attain the pantheistic fusion with its environment before an ego boundary is forced on it through interaction with its mother and other members of the family, but primarily ego wishes to regain its blissful nonexistence in the womb. In addition, Freud conceived the pleasure principle and the reality principle, Eros and Thanatos, as two embattled entities rather like the two opposing deities in dualistic creeds, who fight each other the moment the infant is born.

To us the separation of birth is a catastrophe that ego strives to overcome all its life. One is thrown into a gushing stream, and one spends the rest of life swimming frantically against the torrent: Sisyphus pushing his stone to the peak, which is nowhere in sight and which he never reaches.

Finally, Freud confined his conceptualization of the pleasure principle to the strain process, which leads to catharsis and release of energy, while focusing on ego alone. Per contra, our participation is an interaction between ego, alter, flora, fauna, and other objects and symbols in ego's entourage. Freud took ego as his unit of analysis, whereas for us participation is a strenuous dialogue in which the loss of separate identity is ego's coveted participation. The Greeks saw sleep and death as twin brothers—sleep brings recurring rejuvenation in the mornings—but the real prize is Thanatos—complete loss of separate identity. For Freud, Eros is in constant conflict with Thanatos, for us Eros (unification) is Thanatos.

Otto Rank (11) also based his birth trauma theories on the separation processes, starting from birth and proceeding to subsequent separations from the sphere of influence of the mother, the family, the community, and so on. The opposite vector is union with the back-to-the-womb urge. For the male this urge is literally expressed in sex, whereas for the female it is achieved through identification. The Rankian hypothesis of the regressus ad uterum urge finds its pragmatic application in the modern cushioned houses, the deep wall-to-wall carpeting, and the softening of sharp corners and angles.

However, Rank's basic value judgments are rather different from ours, and the direction of his vectors is diametrically opposite to ours. For him the separation from the fold of the mother and the cushioning shelter of the family toward gaining independence and facing reality is good, whereas the urge for union, for regressus ad uterum is an urge for nonbeing, for death, which to Rank is bad. We, of course, do not necessarily share this value judgment. Moreover, for Rank the fear of death catapults the individual away from his or her urge for union, whereas, according to our conceptualization, the individual longs for participation but is obstructed in his or her efforts for union by all the separating pressures that operate on him or her: The separation-bound interaction with his or her mother, which culminates in the ego boundary, and the separating normative mandates within the family and other socializing agencies, which end with ego identity. We hold, unlike the Rankian conceptualization, that the striving of the individual for union presses him or her to overcome the separating factors of reality and individuality. Per contra, society and the relevant others mold for the individual a separate existence, which is continually resented. The individual, however, longs for the dissolution of his or her separate identity, for union with its entourage, for the bliss of nonbeing.

Sullivan spoke of two absolutes, which he denoted as absolute euphoria and absolute tension: Absolute euphoria can be defined as a state of utter well-being. The nearest approach to anything like it, that there is any reason for believing one can observe, might occur when a very young infant is in a state of deep sleep. Absolute tension might be defined as the maximum possible deviation from absolute euphoria. The nearest approach to absolute tension that one observes is the rather uncommon and always relatively transient state of terror (12).

Sullivan's conceptualization may indeed be complementary to ours. Euphoria is one attribute of the process of participation, and tension is an attribute of the process of separation. Our vectors describe movements of the individual as related to some biologic, psychological, and sociological developmental stages, whereas Sullivan ascribes two opposing effects, which would accompany those movements. The emotions described by Sullivan occupy only a segment of the state of mind of the individual, who moves along the vector of separation or strives to regain participation.

Levy-Bruhl spoke of the participation mystique of the primitive with his or her environment, that is, the pantheistic feeling of togetherness that a human imputes to the flora, fauna, and inanimate objects (13). This is indeed close to our conceptualization, but its usage by Levy-Bruhl is different. We envision participation as the constant driving force that operates on the individual from the very moment of birth, whereas participation mystique is merely one institutionalized result of our underlying vector toward unification.

Mircea Eliade describes the longing for the beginning as the primeval urge of the human race, which he gleaned from his comparative studies of myths. He also relied on Freud in his description of the blissful state of the infant before it was weaned (14). Eliade's stress of the human longing for primordial bliss is rather similar to our vector of participation, insofar as we relate Eliade's quest for the perfect origin to our urge for nonbeing through union (15). However, our concept differs from that of Eliade insofar as we do not regard the vector of participation as a regressus ad uterum in order to be reborn subsequently (16), because, according to our conceptualization, the negation of the separate entity of the individual is by itself the blissful end of nonbeing. Rebirth would therefore be the same catastrophe as the original event of separation. One has the recorded memory of one's original geworfenheit; one does not wish to experience it again. We do not share Eliade's contention that ego's motivation to revisit its formative years is to retrieve its past and to gain mastery over its origins. We maintain that the vector of participation aims towards annihilating the atomical and artificial existence of the individual ego. The quest for the natal village or quarter, the longing for the lost familial fold, and the striving for the pantheistic togetherness of the preweaning period are merely some of the later manifestations of the lust for suspended animation in the womb and the quest of the finality of nonbeing.

Schachtel spoke of embeddedness, which is the contented and cuddled absorption by the womb, the mother, and the family; and activity effect, which is accompanied by the anxiety of emerging from embeddedness (17). There are some similarities in our concept and that of Schachtel, but the divergences are more profound. The main component of his embeddedness is ego's homeostatic passivity, the sloppy slumber of not doing. Our participation, per contra, is a tumultuous struggle upstream to reach the promised land of nonbeing by overcoming the gushing waves of separation. For Schachtel openness toward the world is the result of emerging from embeddedness; for us, to embrace the world means to embrace and be embraced by it through the melting of partitions, that is, by participation. For Schachtel embeddedness is synonymous with stagnation and conformity (p. 45); for us the separating effects of the social norms bring stagnating conformity. It is obvious therefore that, although semantically our conceptualization is similar to that of Schachtel, he assigned different values to his concepts. His vectors and our vectors move in diametrically opposite directions.

As we have demonstrated, the dichotomy of unifying and separating forces, pushing ego in opposite directions, are well known and well documented in the behavioral sciences and psychiatry. The innovation here is the utilization of these vectors to explain the transcendental and ontological manifestation of deviance.

The first developmental stage that guides our analysis is birth, which, in its enormity as far as the individual is concerned, would have its parallel in metaphysics in the cosmogony. The crystallization of the separate ego is the ontological coagulation of the ego boundary, whereas the interaction of ego with its fellow human beings would culminate in the ethical and affective ego identity. Our developmental trinity is naturally different from that of the Freudians and the symbolic interactionists. This stems from our greater reliance on ontological and metaphysical parameters.

We have traced the various pressures toward separation in each developmental phase: Each stimulus for the