A History Of The British Army – Vol. V – (1803-1807)

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Text originally published in 1910 under the same title.

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Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

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A HISTORY OF

THE BRITISH ARMY

BY

THE HON. J. W FORTESCUE,

SECOND PART CONTINUED-FROM THE RENEWAL OF THE WAR TO THE EVACUATION OF RIO DE LA PLATA

VOL. V

1803-1807

Quae Caret Ora Cruore Nostro?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 2

PREFATORY NOTE 10

ERRATA 10

MAPS AND PLANS 11

BOOK XIII 12

CHAPTER I — INDIA — 1802-1803 12

EAST INDIES — French Limits under the Treaty of Amiens — Designs of Bonaparte in the East Indies — The Mahrattas threaten British Power in India — Divisions among the Mahratta Chiefs — Treaty of Bassein and its Results — British Force assembled under Sir Arthur Wellesley — Sir Arthur Wellesley’s Supply System — His Troops occupy Poona and restore the Peishwa — Dilatory Negotiations with Scindia — Wellesley’s Preparations for War — His Impatience for Action — The Viceroy’s Plans for the Campaign — Position of the Troops under Generals Wellesley and Stevenson — Storm of Ahmednuggur — Stevenson’s Irresolution in face of the Enemy — Manoeuvres of the Contending Armies — Wellesley separates from Stevenson — Strength of the Mahratta Army encamped at Assaye — Wellesley’s Force for the Attack — Battle of Assaye — Losses in the Action on both Sides — Pursuit of the Mahrattas after Assaye—Pursuit of the Rajah of Berar by Wellesley — Armistice with Scindia agreed upon — Battle of Argaum — Description of the Fort of Gawilghur — Storm of Gawilghur — Operations against Cuttack — Treaty with the Rajah of Berar. 12

1802 12

1803 12

CHAPTER II — INDIA — 1803 39

THE EAST INDIES — Lake’s Plan of Campaign against the Mahrattas — Dispositions of Lake’s Forces — March of the Army to Aligarh — Assault and Capture of Aligarh — Mishap of the British at Shokoabad — Perron quits Scindia’s Service — Battle of Delhi — Losses of the British — Capture of Agra by the British — Lake’s Pursuit of the Mahrattas under Abaji — Battle of Laswaree — Heavy Losses of the British — Criticism of the Action — The Rajah of Bhurtpore and Others conclude Alliances with the British — Capture of Baroach by Woodington — Treaties of Peace with Scindia and Ragogee. 39

1803 39

CHAPTER III — INDIA — 1803-1804 53

THE EAST INDIES —Threatening Attitude of Holkar towards the British — Relations of Lake and Holkar — Remarkable March of Sir Arthur Wellesley against Freebooters — Sir Arthur Wellesley’s Preparations for War with Holkar — His Instructions to Murray in Guzerat — Pursuit of Holkar by Lake and Monson —Capture of Rampoora —Lake retires with the Main Army to Cawnpore — Ill Success of British Operations in Bundelcund — Monson pursues Holkar southward — Feebleness of Murray — Retreat of Murray and of Monson without effecting a Junction —Monson’s Disastrous Retreat to Agra — Arthur Wellesley’s Criticism of the Retreat — His Organisation of a Transport-Service — Comparison of Lake and Wellesley as Generals. 53

1803 53

1804 54

CHAPTER IV— INDIA — 1804-1805 66

THE EAST INDIES — Consequences of the Disaster to Monson’s Force — March of Holkar northward to Muttra — Lake’s Army for Operations against Holkar —Vain Attempts of Lake to force a General Action — Successful Defence of Delhi against Mahrattas — Pursuit of Holkar by Lake — Rout of Holkar’s Cavalry at Furruckabad — And of his Infantry at Deig — Losses of British and Mahrattas at Deig — March of Lake upon Deig — Siege and Capture of the Fortress of Deig — Description of the Fortress of Bhurtpore —First Assault upon Bhurtpore by Lake’s Army — Insufficiency of Lake’s Force for the Operations — Second Assault upon Bhurtpore — Meer Khan’s Capture of a Convoy going to Deig — Lake successfully brings in a larger Convoy — Pursuit of Meer Khan through Rohilcund by Major-general Smith — Further Operations of Murray about Ujjein —Progress of the Siege of Bhurtpore — Third Assault upon Bhurtpore — Fourth Assault upon Bhurtpore — Lake retreats from before Bhurtpore — Successes of the British against Holkar — Treaty between British and the Rajah of Bhurtpore — Renewal of Troubles with Scindia — Lord Wellesley is replaced by Lord Cornwallis as Viceroy — Character and Policy of Cornwallis — Lake’s Final Pursuit of Holkar to the North — Treaty between the British and Holkar — Character and Criticism of Lake. 66

1804 66

1805 76

CHAPTER V — CEYLON — 1796-1805 94

CEYLON — Relations of Dutch Settlers with King of Kandy — Unsuccessful Beginnings of the British Administration in Ceylon — Overtures of the First Adigar to Governor North — North attempts to negotiate a Treaty — Desire of the Kandians for Independence — Garrison of Ceylon in 1803. — Plan of Campaign for an Attack on Kandy — March of Macdowall’s Column to Kandy — Moottoo Sawmy accepted as King of Kandy by Macdowall — Failure of the British to capture the Fugitive King at Hangaramkatty — Difficulties of North and Macdowall — Negotiations of North with the First Adigar — Return of Macdowall’s Force to Colombo — Garrison of Kandy attacked by Fever — Failure of the Negotiations — Ravages of Fever throughout Ceylon — British Garrison at Kandy isolated — The Kandians attack the City — The British evacuate Kandy under a Convention — Their Retreat arrested by the Kandians— Massacre of the Captured British Garrison — Unsuccessful Attacks on various British Posts — North appeals to India for Reinforcements — Further Raids of the Kandians upon British Posts — North’s System of Counter-raids — Squabbles among the British in Ceylon ; Resignation of North — Governor Maitland restores Discipline — His Negotiations for the escape of Davie — Davie’s Letters and Fate. 94

1796 94

1798 95

1799 95

1800 95

1802 96

1803 96

1804 107

1805 108

CHAPTER VI — ENGLAND/WEST INDIES -1802-1804 112

ENGLAND— The Militia Act of 1802 — Military Estimates and Establishment in 1802 — Bonaparte annexes Piedmont and Parma — French Intervention in Switzerland — Strained Relations between England and France — British Naval and Military Estimates in December 1802 — C. J. Fox proposes a Reduction of the Military Forces — Bonaparte’s Threats against England — England declares War, May 1803 — The First Consul orders the Detention of all Englishmen then in France — THE WEST INDIES — British Successes against the French Fleet at St. Domingo — Demoralisation of the French Officers in the West Indies — Recapture of Guadeloupe by the French — Mutiny of the Eighth West India Regiment at Dominica — British Forces in the West Indies at the Outbreak of War — Capture of St. Lucia by the British — Capture of Tobago — Difficulties of the Commander-in-chief in the West Indies — Plans of Ministers for Capture of Dutch Colonies — Demerara and Essequibo surrender to the British — Capture of Surinam by the British — Admiral Duckworth attacks Curaçoa without Success — Review of the Operations in the West Indies 112

1802 112

1803 120

1804 124

CHAPTER VII — ENGLAND — 1803-1804 129

ENGLAND — Weakness of the French Fleet at the Declaration of War — The French invade Hanover — Bonaparte lays the Foundation of the Continental System — His Plans for the Creation of a Flotilla to invade England — Dispositions of the British Fleets — Possibilities of a British Offensive Movement — Provisions of the Militia Act of 1802 — Evils of the Volunteer System under Pitt — The Volunteer Act of 1802 — The Government’s Unsatisfactory Treatment of Volunteers — Serious Condition of the Militia ; further Militia Acts — Parliamentary Criticism of Addington’s Defensive Policy — The First Defence Act — New Regulations for Volunteers ; the June Allowances — The Additional Force Act creates the Army of Reserve — Criticism of the Act — The Levy en Masse Act — Additional Regulations for Volunteers; the August Allowances — The Billetting Act, and its Consequences — Difficulties of Ministers with regard to Volunteers — Yorke’s Attempts to settle Disputed Points — Summary of Addington’s Defensive Measures — Rise in the Price of Substitutes — Confusion in the Volunteer Force — Question of the Volunteers’ Right of Resignation — Difficulty of Arming the Volunteers — Criticism of the Volunteer Force — Napoleon’s Scheme for the Invasion of England — Impracticability of this Scheme — Serious Shortage in all Divisions of the British Forces — The Volunteer Consolidation Act, 1804 — Craufurd’s Wholesale Condemnation of the Volunteer System — Question of Pay and the New Volunteers — The Volunteers on Permanent Duty — Yorke’s Measures for the Augmentation of the Regular Army — Last Occasion of raising Men for Rank — Ill-success of this Method of Recruiting — Pitt’s Attack on the Government leads to Addington’s Resignation. 129

1803 129

1804 144

CHAPTER VIII — ENGLAND/WEST INDIES/THE MEDITERRANEAN/EUROPE -1804-1805 149

ENGLAND — Formation of Pitt's New Ministry — The Volunteer Consolidation Bill becomes Law — Pitt's Scheme for the Maintenance of the Regular Army — His Permanent Additional Force Bill — Criticism of the Bill in Parliament — Organisation of Land-transport Service in Britain — Plans for the Fortification of the Country — Dumouriez's Schemes of Defence — Napoleon's Difficulties with his Flotilla — British Attack on Boulogne; the Stone Expedition — Feebleness of the French Navy — Napoleon's New Plans of Invasion — British Design for an Attack on Ferrol — Spain declares War on England — Napoleon's Plans for a Raid upon the West Indian Islands  — Failure of Pitt's Additional Force Act — Bill for Enlistment from the Militia into the Army — Napoleon's Allies among the European States — Objects of Pitt's Foreign Policy; Beginning of the Third Coalition —  Efforts of Napoleon to check the Formation of a Coalition — Treaty between England and Russia — Counter-actions of Napoleon in Italy, Holland, and Portugal — THE WEST INDIES — Missiessy's Raid upon the West Indies — French Attack on Roseau in Dominica — Gallant Defence of the Island by Prevost — Further Operations of Missiessy; his Return to Europe — Anxiety in the British West Indies — Napoleon's Final Plan for a West Indian Raid preparatory to Invasion of England — Unsuccessful Organisation of the Invading Flotilla. — THE MEDITERRANEAN — Anxiety of British Ministers with regard to Egypt and Sicily — Instructions to Craig on Appointment to the Mediterranean Command —  Escape of Villeneuve and the French Fleet from Toulon — Craig and his Force take Refuge in Lisbon — THE WEST INDIES — Villeneuve sails for Martinique; Nelson in Pursuit — Plans for Defence of the British West Indian Islands — Admiral Ganteaume fails to escape from Brest — Villeneuve arrives at Martinique — Nelson and General Myers pursue the French Fleet — Villeneuve's Operations in the West Indies; his Return to Europe —   British Preparations to reinforce the Troops in the West Indies — Napoleon's Wild Orders to his Naval Commanders — EUROPE — Arrival of Villeneuve in Europe; Indecisive Action with Calder — Napoleon's New Orders to Villeneuve — The Emperor gives up his Plan of Invasion; the March to Ulm — Discussion of Napoleon's Scheme for Invasion of England. 149

1804 149

1805 155

CHAPTER IX — THE MEDITERRANEAN/EXPEDITION TO ELBE - 1805-1806 173

THE MEDITERRANEAN — Pitt's Scheme of Operations for the Troops of the Allies — Weakness of the British Force despatched to the Mediterranean — Craig's Force reaches Malta — Proposed Co-operation of Craig with the Russian Force under General Lascy — Lascy's Plan of Campaign; Craig's Criticism of the Scheme — Craig's Objections thereto — Reinforcement of the French around Naples — Treacherous Behaviour of the Neapolitan Court — Disasters to the Austrians on the Danube culminate in the Capitulation at Ulm — The United Forces of British and Russians land at Naples  — Disposition of the Allied Forces about Naples  — Craig and the Archduke Charles — The Campaign of the Danube ended by the Battle of Austerlitz — Critical Position of Lascy — Lascy's Proposal for the Defence of Calabria negatived by Craig  —  The Neapolitan Court attempts to prevent the Retreat of the British to Sicily — Criticism of Craig's Expedition  — Pitt's Further Plans for Military Operations — Formation of the King's German Legion — Possible Spheres of Offensive Action against Napoleon — Napoleon's Efforts to gain Prussia — Russia claims Prussia's Alliance — Frederick William's Ultimatum to Napoleon — Convention of Britain with Sweden and Russia — EXPEDITION TO THE ELBE  — Proposed Campaign for Recovery of Hanover — The First Division of Troops sails from England — Harrowby's Mission to Berlin — Dispositions of the French and Prussians in Hanover  — Squabbles of the King of Sweden with the Russian Commander — Dispositions of the British and Russians in North Germany — The British reinforced and placed under Command of Cathcart — Plans of the Allies for the Invasion of Holland — Instructions to Cathcart  — Napoleon's Reception of Prussia's Ultimatum — His Counter-ultimatum after Austerlitz; Treaty of Schönbrunn  — Further Reinforcement of the British Troops in Germany — Effect of the Defeat at Austerlitz upon Members of the  Coalition — Difficulties of Cathcart's Position  — Upon News of the Treaty of Schönbrunn he re-embarks his Force — Criticism of the Expedition to the Weser — Weakness of Pitt's Military Policy — Death and Character of Pitt. 173

1805 173

1806 180

1805 180

1806 191

CHAPTER X — ENGLAND/CAPE OF GOOD HOPE/SOUTH AMERICA/ EUROPE - 1806- 195

ENGLAND — The Ministry of All the Talents — Failure of the Additional Force Act — Windham proposes his Short Service Scheme — Opinions of General Officers with regard to the Scheme — Windham's Training Act — CAPE OF GOOD HOPE— Expedition to the Cape under Sir David Baird — Difficulties of the Dutch Commander — Successful Action against the Dutch — British Occupation of Capetown ; Acquisition of Cape Colony — SOUTH AMERICA — Character of Sir Home Popham — Relations of the Adventurer Miranda with British Ministers — Popham's Scheme for the Capture of Buenos Ayres — Beresford and Popham start upon the Expedition — Popham's Idea of capturing Monte Video abandoned — Action between Beresford and the Spanish Colonists — British Occupation of Buenos Ayres — Difficult Position of Beresford;—Unsettled Condition of the Colony— EUROPE — Results of the Victory of Austerlitz in Europe — Frederick William attempts further negotiations with Napoleon — New Treaty arranged between Talleyrand and Haugwitz — Aims of Napoleon's Policy — Negotiations of Talleyrand and Lord Yarmouth — Anger in England over the Treachery of Prussia — Naval War between England and Prussia — Fox's Negotiations with Russia — The Russians seize Cattaro; — Anger of Napoleon — Treaty arranged between d'Oubril and Talleyrand at Paris — Napoleon proclaims the Confederation of the Rhine —  Napoleon's Negotiations with England come to naught — Eagerness in Prussia for War with Napoleon — Attitude of Frederick William. 195

1806 195

CHAPTER XI — THE MEDITERRANEAN 213

THE MEDITERRANEAN — Disembarkation of British Forces in Sicily — Advance of the French to the Straits of Messina — Weakness of the Neapolitan Government and Forces  — Windham’s scheme of Operations on the Adriatic Coast — Plans of Sir John Stuart for the Defence of Sicily —Character of Sir Sidney Smith — Defects of the French Force at Naples  — The Defence of Gaete — Sidney Smith captures Capri  — Plans of Stuart and Smith for a Descent upon Calabria — Relations of Sidney Smith with the Court of Naples — Stuart's Force for the Expedition to Calabria — Disembarkation of the British at St. Euphemia — Squabbles of Stuart and Sidney Smith — Reynier leads the French northwards against Stuart — Battle of Maida — Failure of Stuart to follow up his Victory — Arrival of Sidney Smith at St. Euphemia — Losses of the British and of the French at Maida — Further Operations of Stuart and Smith — Smith incites the Calabrese to Insurrection — British Successes in Southern Italy — Discreditable Behaviour of Sir Sidney Smith — Surrender of Gaeta to the French — Return of Stuart to Sicily; his Lack of Initiative — The British harass the Retreat of Reynier's Army — Result of Stuart's Expedition — General Fox appointed to command in the Mediterranean  — Unsatisfactory Position of Affairs in Italy and Sicily — Projected British Expedition to Portugal — Overthrow of Prussia at Jena. 213

1806 213

CHAPTER XII 237

SOUTH AMERICA — Reinforcements sent by Baird to Buenos Ayres — Attack of the Spanish Colonists upon the British — Beresford obliged to capitulate — The Capitulation repudiated by the Colonists; and the British carried as Prisoners into the Interior —  News of the Original Capture of Buenos Ayres reaches England — Despatch of Auchmuty with Reinforcements for Beresford — Criticism of the Action of Ministers with regard to this Expedition — The British occupy Maldonado  —  Windham's Extraordinary Scheme for the Reduction of Chile — Lord Grenville's Plan for an Attack upon Mexico — Despatch of Craufurd on the Chilean Expedition — He receives New Directions to proceed to Buenos Ayres — Arrival of Auchmuty in La Plata — Siege and Capture of Monte Video —  Attitude of the Colonists towards a British Occupation — General Whitelocke appointed to command in La Plata — Instructions to Whitelocke; he arrives in South America — Arrival of Craufurd at Monte Video — Attack of the Colonists on the British Garrison at Colonia —  Difficulties of the Campaign; Choice of a Place of Disembarkation — Choice of a Line of March — Question of Transport — Choice of a Time for the Attack on Buenos Ayres — Evacuation of Colonia by the British — Whitelocke's Mistakes in the Choice of Troops for Service 237

1806 237

1807 243

CHAPTER XIII 255

SOUTH AMERICA — Gower leads the Advanced Guard — Passage of the Troops through the Swamp — Difficulties of the Commissariat — Lack of Communication between the several Corps of the Army — Lack of Supplies — March of the British upon Buenos Ayres — First Attack upon the Suburbs of the Town by Craufurd — False Dispositions of the Spaniards — March of the Main Body of the British under Whitelocke — Gower's Plan of Attack, accepted by Whitelocke —  Whitelocke's Known Objections to the General Principles of the Scheme — Bourke's Objections to the Plan — Description of the Town of Buenos Ayres — Dispositions of the British Troops for the Attack — Obscurity of the General Instructions to Officers — Preparations of the Spaniards for Defence — The Attack on Buenos Ayres — Whitelocke's Ignorance of the Course of Events — A Truce arranged with the Spanish Commander — Summary of the Position of the British — The British agree to evacuate the Province — Reception in England of the News of Failure — Trial of Whitelocke by Court-martial — Discussion of the Charges against the General. 255

1807 255

PREFATORY NOTE

In order to save space, no authorities have been quoted in the text for statements concerning the recruiting, strength, and establishment of the Army, or concerning the Militia and Volunteers at large: such authorities being set forth at length in the author’s supplementary volume, The County Lieutenancies and the Army, 1803-1814 (Macmillan, 1909)

Since it has become necessary in the present volume frequently to designate French and Occasionally other foreign Regiments by their number, such number are printed in the text in aerobic numerals, to distinguish them from the British Regiments, whose number are printed in full. Thus the Thirty-First signifies a British Regiment: but the 31st a French or other foreign Regiment

ERRATA

Page 41, line 21, for Halting there for a day read Halting there for two days.

Page 144, note. Since this note was printed. The situation of the fort has been ascertained, and is inserted in the map

Page 201, line 6 from foot, for act of the 27th of may read 11th of June.

Page 292, line 17 from foot, for on the 13th of December the Treaty read on the 15th of December the Treaty

MAPS AND PLANS

(MAPS at the end, in the order shown by the numbers.)

1. Assaye.

2. Argaum.

3. Gawilghur.

4. Aligarh.

5. Delhi.

6. Laswaree.

7. Deig.

8. India, Campaigns of Wellesley and Lake.

9. Ceylon (two Maps on one sheet).

10. Surinam River.

11. Dominica.

12. Southern Italy and Sicily, Maida, Capri.

13. North Germany and Denmark.

14. Cape Colony.

15. Rio dc la Plata, Monte Video, Whitelocke’s March.

16. Buenos Ayres.

17. Europe, Peace of Tilsit.

BOOK XIII

CHAPTER I — INDIA — 1802-1803

EAST INDIES — French Limits under the Treaty of Amiens — Designs of Bonaparte in the East Indies — The Mahrattas threaten British Power in India — Divisions among the Mahratta Chiefs — Treaty of Bassein and its Results — British Force assembled under Sir Arthur Wellesley — Sir Arthur Wellesley’s Supply System — His Troops occupy Poona and restore the Peishwa — Dilatory Negotiations with Scindia — Wellesley’s Preparations for War — His Impatience for Action — The Viceroy’s Plans for the Campaign — Position of the Troops under Generals Wellesley and Stevenson — Storm of Ahmednuggur — Stevenson’s Irresolution in face of the Enemy — Manoeuvres of the Contending Armies — Wellesley separates from Stevenson — Strength of the Mahratta Army encamped at Assaye — Wellesley’s Force for the Attack — Battle of Assaye — Losses in the Action on both Sides — Pursuit of the Mahrattas after Assaye—Pursuit of the Rajah of Berar by Wellesley — Armistice with Scindia agreed upon — Battle of Argaum — Description of the Fort of Gawilghur — Storm of Gawilghur — Operations against Cuttack — Treaty with the Rajah of Berar.

1802

In Europe the Treaty of Amiens brought at least a truce; but east and west, in India and the Antilles, it brought not peace but the sword. The First Consul had gained what he sought—a short breathing-space upon honourable terms. The boundaries of France had been enlarged eastward to the Rhine, and northward to the Dutch frontier. Holland itself, under the name of the Batavian Republic, was subservient to her; and the greater part of Northern Italy was either actually French territory or dominated by French influence. The French Republic within her new limits now counted a population of forty million souls; and with all these vast acquisitions in Europe she still retained the Colonial Empire of the Monarchy. Her East Indian settlements were, under the Treaty, to be restored; in the West Indies Martinique and Tobago were to be again hers, as also was St. Domingo if she could obtain possession of it. Finally, at her head was the man who, after twice raising her from deep depression to dazzling glory, had restored law and order, confidence and credit, and, still insatiable in energy and ambition, was maturing his designs for the conquest of a great empire over sea.

The conquest of his dreams was that of India, and, as a means to that end, of Egypt. Nelson had turned his first expedition to the valley of the Nile into a disaster, and Sidney Smith and Abercromby had deepened the disaster into a humiliation. His vaunting letter to Tippoo from Cairo had also received a crushing answer in the storming of Seringapatam and the overthrow of Hyder Ali’s dynasty in Mysore. But still the man clung to his vision of the tricolour flying supreme in the Mediterranean, and of French domination substituted for English in India. Thus it was in September 1802 he sent General Sébastiani to Algiers, Egypt, Syria, and the Ionian Islands with orders to take note of every military detail, and to sound the disposition of the natives.

1803

In January 1803 Sébastiani returned with a bombastic report that the capture of Egypt would be child’s play, and that the Ionian Islands were only waiting for an opportunity to declare themselves French. Meanwhile, to undermine still further British power in the East, Bonaparte had appointed in June 1802 two even more formidable agents. The first was Cavaignac, an old member of the Convention, who was charged with a mission to the Imaum of Muscat. The second was General Decaen, who bitterly hated the English, and thirsted for the chance of meeting them in the field. In title Decaen was merely Commander-in-Chief of the small French force in the East Indies, entrusted with the special duty of receiving back the captured French settlements from the British; and the troops that were to accompany him were no more than a garrison for those settlements, little exceeding one thousand men{1} But the Consul’s secret instructions showed designs of far wider extent. While acting always with carefully simulated gentleness and simplicity, Decaen was to inquire as to the strength and disposition of the British forces, and as to the natives that were most impatient of British rule. He was to think out in every detail the best method of carrying on a war of several campaigns in India, even without command of the sea; and, above all, he was to find a suitable base, with a port which could be defended against a hostile fleet. Your mission (so ended the document) is, for military and political purposes, one of observation...but the First Consul, if you faithfully fulfil his instructions, may perhaps be able to put you in a position to gain the great glory which prolongs the memory of men beyond the lapse of centuries.

The date of these secret instructions was the 15th of January 1803, and in them occurs the expression, unless war breaks out before the end of September 1804, which, elucidated by parallel passages in Napoleon’s correspondence, shows that he was reckoning upon that time, and no earlier, for the renewal of hostilities. Evidently he counted upon choosing his own moment for aggression, with such a man as Addington in charge of England; but even if he had reckoned truly herein, which, as events were to prove, he did not, he overlooked the presence in India of Lord Wellesley and his brother Arthur. The destruction of Tippoo Sahib’s power in Mysore had at last brought the British and the Mahrattas face to face; and no man of any foresight could doubt that before long there would be a desperate struggle between them for the mastery of India. The refusal of the Mahrattas to take their share in the partition of Mysore had sufficiently shown their jealousy and unfriendly feeling over the British successes in that province; and, divided though they were among themselves, they had begun to realise generally that their chances of supremacy were lost unless they could drive the British from the country. But this was not all. The French officer, Perron, though nominally no more than a commander in Scindia’s service, was actually his vicegerent in the north, and, while holding the deposed Emperor Shah Alum in durance, used the imperial name to dignify and strengthen his own authority. So great was his power and so wide its range that he had already seen visions of an independent sovereignty, and he was known to have corresponded with the French Directory with the object of obtaining the support of the Republic. Thus Wellesley was threatened with a resurrection of French rivalry in India, and that not under the feeble direction of Bourbon kings, but under the active and indefatigable impulse of Bonaparte. To the British Viceroy, therefore, the power of the Mahrattas signified the power of France. Apart from France he was willing to live at peace with them, if by any chance a central authority could be established strong enough to bind the entire Mahratta Confederacy to fulfil a friendly treaty. Then the British dominions would be delivered from continual anarchy upon their frontiers. But while Perron and his compatriots remained in Scindia’s service, there could be no trust and no security.

Nevertheless Wellesley’s first essay was towards curbing the unruly Mahratta chiefs by restoring the authority of the Peishwa. Since 1798 internal dissensions had brought the whole Confederacy into confusion. In that year a family dispute had driven Scindia into collision with the Rajah of Kolapore, who was already at war with the Peishwa, Baji Rao; whereupon Scindia’s rival, Jeswunt Rao Holkar, seized the opportunity to ravage his territory. Perron was fully engaged with the menace of an Afghan invasion in the north, so was unable to help his master; and Scindia and the Peishwa together had much ado to check the advance of the Rajah of Kolapore upon Poona. In the midst of the troubles, however, Scindia fell at variance with the Peishwa, first over the property of the latter’s chief minister, Nana Farnavese, who died in March 1800; and secondly, over the permission granted by Baji Rao for British troops to follow Doondia Wao into Mahratta Territory. Meanwhile Holkar’s depredations became so serious that Scindia found himself obliged to repair to Malwa to check them. In July 1801 Holkar won two decided successes, and, though completely defeated at Indore in October, soon recovered himself and advanced upon Poona. The combined armies of Scindia and the Peishwa strove to repel him, but were utterly routed before the city itself on the 25th of October 1802. Baji Rao thereupon fled to the coast, taking refuge in a British ship, which conveyed him to Bassein; and there on the 31st of December he signed a treaty whereby he threw himself upon the protection of the British Government, and concluded with it an offensive and defensive alliance. Scindia likewise invoked British help to save the Mahratta Confederacy from entire dissolution; and hence Wellesley found himself virtually the arbiter of the fortunes of the descendants of Sivajee. But, as he himself said, a principal object of the treaty was to prevent the sovereign power of the Mahratta States, or the power of any great branch of the Mahratta Empire, from passing into the hands of France.{2}

The treaty of Bassein was accepted by the Peishwa in all sincerity, for the unhappy man felt a genuine liking for the British, and was as loath to be a tool of Scindia as of Holkar. Wellesley, therefore, lost no time in assembling a powerful force at Hurryhur on the northern border of Mysore, with the double object of parrying any invasion by hostile Mahrattas and of escorting the Peishwa to his capital at Poona. In taking this step he desired and expected a peaceful solution of all difficulties.{3} Scindia was the chief whose views were most likely to be adverse to the treaty, and whose hostility was most to be apprehended; and when in March Perron asked leave to pass through British territory to Calcutta in order to embark for Europe, Wellesley heaved a sigh of relief. For it seemed as though at least one dangerous element of strife, interested alike in Scindia’s and Bonaparte’s ascendancy, might be quietly eliminated.

Nor was the promise of a peaceful end to all troubles belied upon the march of the army from Hurryhur. Arthur Wellesley had wisely been appointed to command it, and the fame of his recent campaign against Doondia Wao was sufficient to ensure him at least a fearful deference. But the young General knew already that if deference was to be turned to friendship in an alien territory, his force must never be a burden upon the inhabitants. There must be no excesses, no plunder, no marauding, but strict discipline and, as a first means to that end, an efficient system of supply. It was this last which occupied his attention from the first moment when he was ordered to move to Hurryhur. The only mode, he wrote, by which we can inspire either our allies or our enemies with respect for our operations will be to show them that the army can move with ease and celerity at all times and in all situations. His letters of this period teem with calculations as to supplies and the cattle that are to draw them; and the famous draft-bullocks of Mysore, which had been taken after Tippoo’s death into the Company’s service, figure prominently as one of the chief factors in his army’s efficiency. There was every prospect of difficulty, for the rainfall in the country adjoining the Western Ghauts had been scanty during the previous season. Forage was hardly obtainable; the crops had failed; the stricken districts were face to face with famine; even water was wanting in many tanks and streams where generally it had been abundant. Yet all these obstacles were overcome by his unflagging industry. All superfluous baggage was ruthlessly cut off, and the march from Seringapatam to Hurryhur was accomplished without injury or fatigue to the cattle; whereas the bullocks of other detachments, under commanders of higher rank, fell down in hundreds. Finally, when on the 12th of March he crossed the Toombuddra into Mahratta territory, he was received as a friend and a deliverer, and joined by all the local chieftains on his march to Poona.{4}

Jeswunt Rao Holkar, who was still in possession of the Mahratta capital, retired upon the news of his advance; but Arthur Wellesley continued to move steadily northward, and by the 1st of April had crossed the Kistna at Erroor, with his cattle still in perfect condition despite the length of his march. At the same time Colonel Stevenson with the subsidiary forces of the Nizam was marching westward from Hyderabad to join him; and on the 15th of April the two forces opened communication with each other at Ecklaus on the Neera River, some eighty miles east and south of their destination. By that time Holkar had reached Chandore, nearly twice that distance to north of Poona, leaving only Amrut Rao, a pretender to the Mahratta throne, with fifteen hundred men to hold the city; and Wellesley, judging it unnecessary to lead a large force against so paltry an enemy, decided to extend Stevenson’s troops over a wider front for convenience of forage. Three days later came intelligence that Amrut Rao was preparing to burn and plunder Poona, whereupon Wellesley started with his cavalry on the morning of the 19th, and though delayed for six hours by the difficulty of getting his light guns through the Little Bhore Ghaut, rode into the Peishwa’s capital on the morning of the 20th, having traversed sixty miles in thirty-two hours. Amrut Rao withdrew in haste at the news of his approach; the inhabitants, who had been driven from their homes by Holkar, hurried back to welcome the British General; the British infantry arrived to increase their confidence on the and on the 13th of May Baji Rao was escorted into the city and reseated with great ceremony upon the throne.{5}

So far all had gone well. The Peishwa had been reinstated, but it remained to be seen whether his authority could be re-established; and various symptoms indicated that the prospect was not altogether promising. In the first place, Perron had not left India, as had been expected; and in the second, Wellesley, on the 30th of May, had received despatches from the British Government forbidding him to restore the French and Dutch possessions in India until further orders, all stipulations of the Treaty of Amiens notwithstanding.{6} This pointed to the near prospect of a renewal of hostilities with France, an event which was not likely to foster a pacific disposition in Scindia. Nevertheless, despite the untowardness of the outlook, the Viceroy did not seek to precipitate a war before the French could take part in it. Long and dreary negotiations followed for week upon week after the occupation of Poona. Scindia had admitted that the Treaty of Bassein was not injurious to him, nor to any of the Mahratta feudatory chieftains; but he none the less insisted that Ragogee Bhonsla, the Rajah of Berar, should join him to discuss the question. The place of meeting was to be on the frontier of the Nizam’s dominions; and as the Rajah was to bring with him as escort the whole of his army, the pretended consultation became in reality a serious menace to a faithful ally of the British. Scindia, in fact, told Colonel Collins, the British resident, that upon the Rajah’s arrival he would inform him whether the issue was to be peace or war; but still Lord Wellesley forbore to take offence. The armies of the two chieftains duly effected their junction near the Ajunta Ghaut, on the Nizam’s north-western boundary, on the 3rd of June; but several days passed, and still no decision was announced to Collins. On the 12th of June he demanded his dismissal, but consented to stay upon being pressed by Scindia;{7} and after this the Mahratta chiefs continued to play the game of procrastination for two whole months, Collins frequently threatening to take his leave, and as frequently postponing his departure. The time thus gained was employed by them in endeavouring to persuade Holkar to join them in war against the British; and their motive was so transparent as to be secret to no one. Arthur Wellesley in wrath wrote repeated letters to Collins to cut the negotiations short, but without effect. Reiterated representations were made to Scindia and his ally to withdraw their troops, but were utterly thrown away upon them; and the negotiations dragged on and on through June and July, as though they would have no ending.

Throughout this period of suspense Arthur Wellesley waited with almost feverish impatience. He had laid all his plans with the express object of fighting the Mahrattas during the rainy season, when the rivers would be high; and he had many months before ordered the preparation of boats and pontoons, which would enable him to pass these rivers at any time and place, whereas his enemies would be dependent on fords which, in time of flood, would be impracticable. With this advantage and with his transport efficiently organised, he felt confident of success. Scindia might fight pitched battles and Holkar might pursue the more dangerous guerilla warfare which was traditional with the Mahrattas, but the young General was prepared to cope with either. British infantry would be too much even for Perron’s best battalions; and the Mysore bullocks would enable him to follow Holkar so swiftly that, even though he were not overtaken, that wily chieftain would find little time for mischief, and would see his following dwindle daily from sheer lack of plunder.

Two circumstances, for a time, reconciled Arthur Wellesley to some delay in June, namely the loss of a great number of bullocks from bad forage and exposure,{8} and the failure of the authorities at Bombay to produce the boats for which he had asked. This latter was, in fact, the beginning of a long series of differences with the Governor of Bombay, Mr. Duncan, who for some reason was singularly obstructive to the whole of the General’s arrangements. Recognising the difficulty of acting from a base five hundred miles distant at Seringapatam, Arthur Wellesley had, as early as January, procured the formation of a large depôt on the coast, which should be at once within easy reach of Bombay by water and close to the mouth of the Ghaut that leads to Poona; but he could obtain no cattle to draw the supplies from the depôt to his camp, and the army was in great straits for food. Duncan had promised him a number of bullocks by the end of May; but not one of them had arrived. He had undertaken to send up pontoons, but contrived to despatch them in weather which broke down all the carriages after one march. Very early Wellesley, giving up the Governor of Bombay in despair, sought for an advanced base of his own making. His eye fell upon the fortress of Ahmednuggur, just twenty miles north of his camp; and inquiry soon showed that he had seen a right. It is full of everything we want; he wrote on the 16th of June, the property of this country is lodged there. The capture of that place will retrieve our immediate distresses and will give everybody spirits. From that day forward information as to Ahmednuggur was eagerly gathered; and the General fully decided that the capture of the fort must be the first operation of the war, if war there should be.{9} But the favourable months kept slipping away without the slightest apparent approach to a decision, and at last in the middle of July Arthur Wellesley’s patience gave way. Collins was still pressing Scindia to withdraw his army to Hindostan; but Scindia showed not a sign of yielding. We ought, wrote the General, in effect, to have insisted on his retiring in Since that time six valuable weeks have elapsed. We have gained nothing; on the contrary, we have consumed our resources. Holkar is still north of the Taptee and, even if his intentions be hostile to us, cannot join Scindia for some time. The swelling of the rivers still protects our frontier and exposes that of the enemy. Every day’s delay deprives us of this advantage, and therefore no time should be lost. An amusingly insolent rejoinder of the Mahratta chiefs to a reiterated request for the withdrawal of their armies at last brought matters to a crisis. On the 3rd of August Collins quitted Scindia’s camp, and the fate of the Mahratta Empire was committed to the hazard of war.

The Viceroy’s plans for the campaign had for some time been matured, and he had resolved to carry the war into every part of the enemy’s dominions. The principal forces to be faced were the joint armies of Scindia and of the Rajah of Berar in the Deccan, and the main army of Scindia commanded by Perron in the north. The former, which still lay about the Ajunta Ghaut, numbered in all about fifty thousand men with one hundred and ninety guns: of this force thirty-eight thousand were cavalry, ten thousand five hundred regular infantry, and a thousand rocket-men and matchlock-men. In the north Perron, who had fixed his headquarters at Coel, about fifty miles north of Agra, was at the head of about thirty-five thousand men, including from sixteen to twenty thousand horse, with a very large and well-appointed train of artillery.

To oppose these hosts there were formed two principal armies: the northern under General Gerard Lake, the hero of Linselles in 1793 and the obedient tool of Dublin Castle in 1798; the southern under Arthur Wellesley. Lake’s headquarters were at Cawnpore, and the troops under his immediate command numbered ten thousand five hundred men, including three regiments of British cavalry and one battalion of British infantry. In addition to this force, between three and four thousand men were assembled near Allahabad for the invasion of Bundelcund; about two thousand more were collected at Mirzapore to cover the city and province of Benares, while other detachments guarded the frontier from Mirzapore over three hundred miles eastward and southward to Midnapore.

Arthur Wellesley’s charge was the greater and more onerous. First, on the eastern coast a force of close upon five thousand men, including about six hundred European troops, was assembled at Ganjam under Lieutenant-colonel Harcourt to invade the province of Cuttack and the possessions of the Rajah of Berar. This column was to act independently. Secondly, on the west there were in Guzerat and Surat nearly three thousand British and nearly four thousand native infantry, affording, after all garrisons had been provided for, a field-force of rather more than four thousand men.{10} This was parted into two divisions, each about two thousand strong, the first being posted north of the Nerbudda at Baroda, and the second south of the Taptee between Surat and Songhur. Arthur Wellesley had particularly insisted upon the importance of Songhur itself, which lies fifty miles to eastward of Surat and commands a Ghaut which leads down to that city.{11} Both divisions were designed to operate eastward against Holkar, if he should declare war, and in any case to capture Baroach and the possessions of Scindia in their vicinity. Both were placed, at Arthur Wellesley’s request, under the command of Colonel John Murray, and he had reason to regret his choice both then and later. For this was the Murray who, having done good service as Baird’s Quartermaster-general in Egypt, was destined in the Peninsula to wreck Wellesley’s plans at the passage of the Douro, and to bring himself to disgrace at Tarragona.

Thirdly, there was the army under Arthur Wellesley’s personal command, just over eleven thousand strong, including over sixteen hundred Europeans, but exclusive of some five thousand Mysore and Mahratta horse. In addition to this force, and forming almost a part of it, was the Hyderabad contingent under Colonel Stevenson, numbering over nine thousand men, of whom nine hundred were Europeans. Wellesley’s headquarters at the outbreak