Sadowa [Illustrated Edition]

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Text originally published in 1907 under the same title.

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Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

SADOWA — A STUDY

BY

GENERAL H. BONNAL

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH BY C. F. ATKINSON

LIEUTENANT, 1ST V.B. ROYAL FUSILIERS (CITY OF LONDON REGIMENT)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

PREFACE 5

TRANSLATOR’S NOTE 6

INTRODUCTORY 7

CHAPTER I — MOBILIZATION AND CONCENTRATION OF THE PRUSSIANS 11

I — CAUSES AND PRELIMINARIES OF THE WAR 11

II — EVENTS FROM THE 3RD TO THE 30TH OF MAY 14

III — EVENTS FROM THE 1ST TO THE 18TH OF JUNE 20

CHAPTER II — THE PREPARATION OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE 27

CHAPTER III — MARCHES AND COMBATS 33

I — OPERATIONS OF PRINCE FREDERICK CHARLES 33

II 40

III — JUNE 30TH 49

CHAPTER IV — PREPARATION OF THE DECISIVE BATTLE 51

I — JULY 1ST 51

II — JULY 2ND 54

PART II — THE BATTLE OF SADOWA  JULY 3rd, 1866 70

INTRODUCTORY 70

CHAPTER I — FIRST PHASE (3 a.m. to 8 a.m.) 72

1. — I. ARMY. 72

2. — ARMY OF THE ELBE. 74

3. — II. ARMY. 75

CHAPTER II — SECOND PHASE (8 a.m. to 11 a.m.) 76

1. — I. ARMY. 76

2. — ARMY OF THE ELBE. 83

3. — II. ARMY. 85

CHAPTER III — THIRD PHASE (11 a.m. to 8 p.m.) 87

1. — I. ARMY. 87

2. — ARMY OF THE ELBE. 90

3. — II. ARMY. 94

CHAPTER IV. — FOURTH PHASE (3 p.m. - to 8 p.m.) 102

1. — I. ARMY. 102

2. — ARMY OF THE ELBE. 105

3. — II. ARMY. 108

CHAPTER V — CONCLUSIONS 113

1. — CAUSES OF THE VICTORY OF SADOWA. 113

2. — THE STRATEGY OF THE PRUSSIAN GENERAL STAFF IN 1866. 116

3. — CONSEQUENCES OF THE VICTORY OF  SADOWA. 118

APPENDICES 120

I — BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 120

III — NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY EMPLOYED 123

IV — NOTE ON ORGANIZATION 124

MAPS 126

Map 34. — GENERAL MAP OF THE AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN WAR 1866. 126

Map 35. — SITUATION ON 20 JUNE, 1866, AND MOLTKE'S PLAN. 127

Map 36. — SITUATION ON 21 JUNE, 1866. 128

Map 37. — SITUATION ON 22 JUNE, 1866. 129

Map 38. — SITUATION ON 23 JUNE, 1866. 130

Map 39. — SITUATION ON 25 JUNE, 1866. 131

Map 40. — SITUATION ON 26 JUNE, 1866. 132

Map 41. — ENGAGEMENT AT ZANGENSALZA — 27 June, 1866. 133

Map 42. — SITUATION ON THE EVENING OF 27 JUNE, 1866. 134

Map 43. — OPERATIONS TO INCLUDE 27 JUNE, 1866. 135

Map 44. — SCHEME FOR THE PRUSSIAN ADVANCE BASED ON MOLTKE'S PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. 136

Map 45. — ENGAGEMENT AT NACHOD, 27 JUNE. 137

Map 46. — ENGAGEMENT AT TRATENAU, 27 JUNE. 138

Map 47. — ENGAGEMENT AT SKALITZ, 28 JUNE. 139

Map 48. — ENGAGEMENT AT BURKERSDORF, 28 JUNE. 140

Map 49. — OPERATIONS FROM 28 JUNE TO THE NIGHT OF 30 JUNE. 141

Map 50. — ENGAGEMENT AT SCHWEINSCHADEL, 29 JUNE. 142

Map 51. — ENGAGEMENT AT GITSCHIN, 29 JUNE. 143

Map 52. — PROBABLE SITUATION ON THE EVENING OF 1 JULY, IF MOLTKE'S DIRECTIONS (TELEGRAM IN THE NIGHT OF 30 JUNE-1 JULY, OCCASIONED BY THE CHANGES IN THE SITUATION THAT DAY) HAD BEEN FOLLOWED. 144

Map 53. — LOCATION OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMIES ON 1-2 JULY. PLAN OF THE PRUSSIAN MOVEMENTS ON 3 JULY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH MOLTKE'S INSTRUCTIONS. 145

Map 54. — GENERAL MAP OF THE BATTLE OF KÖNIGGRATZ  3 July, 1866. 146

Map 55. — BATTLE OF KÖNIGGRATZ —Movements during forenoon. 147

Map 56. — BATTLE OF KÖNIGGRATZ  — Situation in the afternoon. 148

Map 57. — BATTLE OF KÖNIGGRATZ  — Situation in the evening. 149

Map 58. —SITUATION IN THE EVENING OF 13 JULY, 1866. 150

Map 59. — SITUATION AT OLMÜTZ ON THE EVENING OF 14 JULY, 1866. 151

Map 60. — ENGAGEMENT AT TUBITSCHAU, 15 JULY, 1866. 152

Map 61. — SITUATION OF THE PRUSSIANS ON THE EVENING OF 15 JULY, 1866. AND RETREAT OF THE AUSTRIAN NORTHERN ARMY DOWN THE VALLEY OF THE WAAG. 153

Map 62. — SITUATION ON THE EVENING OF 21 JULY, 1866. 154

PREFACE

THE present strategical study which we offer to the military reader under the title Sadowa is a résumé, written in 1894, of a number of lectures delivered to the officers of the Staff College.{1} The original maps and sketches have been simplified, and the arrangement of the text revised; the text itself has not, however, been altered.

This study is not concerned with modifications, present and past, in armament, but has as its special object the doctrine of the Prussian General Staff in 1866, personified by its chief, von Moltke. This doctrine marks a stage in the evolution accomplished in fifty years through the tireless labours of chosen officers, whose intellectual activity, thanks to the teaching of Clausewitz, was constantly nourished at the very source of the Napoleonic art of war.

For all that, the doctrine of the Great General Staff of 1866 is not proof against criticism. The remarks which, in the present work, accompany the orders and dispositions of the Prussian armies justify the conclusion that, if the direction of these armies demonstrated its superiority in many respects, it was by no means free from errors of omission and commission.

There's many a slip 'twist the cup and the lip.

H. BONNAL.

BEAUVAIS,

December 20th, 1900.

TRANSLATOR’S NOTE

GENERAL BONNAL, in his preface, draws special attention to the fact that this study is concerned primarily with the strategical doctrine of the Prussian Great General Staff in 1866, and with the results of this doctrine when applied in the field.

No further reference, therefore, is made to the operations of the Austrians than is required to illustrate those of the Prussians. The Austrian doctrine and staff work, indeed, present a most interesting study, especially in the domain of what has come to be called military psychology, but they belong to a different order of ideas, and the violent contrasts which would necessarily result from an attempt to compare the two doctrines would serve only to drive the student back from his immediate purpose. He would, in fact, have to begin his study of 1866 with the Seven Years' War, and, starting from the point when the rival doctrines were identical, laboriously search out the most elusive of all historical facts—the moral and mental facts determining the direction and force of progress, and the causes of differentiation, in each case.

It is preferable, therefore, to accept the fact that the doctrines have diverged, and to assume, and work from, the standpoint of one side only. An attempt to view events alternately from two widely different standpoints would necessarily be unsatisfactory. In the present case there are many familiar landmarks—it will be noted that the author does not think it necessary by way of introduction to enlarge upon the Prussian system —to direct the student to the single standpoint he wishes to take up.

The present work is called, not an account, but a study, of the campaign of 1866. The object of the author is by no means attained by the mere statement of the Prussian doctrine. A study implies criticism, and criticism requires a criterion. Nearly twenty years of research in the archives of the Napoleonic period have provided the material for this criterion—the new French theory of strategy—as worked out by General Langlois, Colonel Foch, and others, but above all by General Bonnal, in the series L'Esprit de la Guerre Moderne (see Appendix II.). Sadowa forms part of this series, and must therefore be considered as a study of a particular campaign, not only upon its own merits, but also in the light of a definite theory.

As a matter of course, the new science has its new terminology. Hence the translator's chief difficulty, for in the volume now offered to the reader a specific example of the theory referred to is, I believe, presented for the first time in English, and even in French the technical terms do not seem to be crystallized.

My English equivalents, therefore, may best be described as tentative. A note on this subject will be found at the end of the volume. I have also added a bibliographical note on the literature of the Bohemian campaign, and some data as to the organization and marching depth of the various Prussian and Austrian Corps of troops.

C. F. A.

LONDON,

April, 1907.

INTRODUCTORY

AFTER Waterloo, the war of masses, introduced by Napoleon in 1812, was set aside by the very men who had taken part in it, and Europe reverted to standing armies, relatively weak in numbers, but thoroughly organized and exceedingly well disciplined, thanks to long service.

There was, however, one exception. Prussia kept and improved the methods of recruiting and organization which had enabled her to play a predominant part in the military and political events of 1813-1815.

Up to 1860 the Prussian army on mobilization was composed half of active troops, half of Landwehr. This organization, well suited for a national war, could not but be disappointing in a purely political contest, and thus it came about that when, in 1850, wishing to impose her will on Austria in the settlement of the Elbe Duchies dispute{2}, Prussia ordered a general mobilization, it failed completely, and she had to accept the humiliating convention dictated by Austria at Olmütz. After this experience it was thought inadvisable to count upon Landwehr troops for the first operations of a campaign, the necessity of which was not fully apparent to the people at large. Consequently Prince William, when he became Regent in 1860,{3} at once set on foot a scheme for the reorganization of the army by which, in theory, the troops actually with the colours and their reserves were to carry out operations, strictly so called, while the Landwehr guarded the lines of communication and formed divisions and corps in second line as required.

For fifty years —from Waterloo to Sadowa—Russia was not involved in any serious wars.{4}

In 1849 two Prussian corps under Prince William, the future German Emperor, re-established order in the Grand Duchy of Baden and in the Bavarian Palatinate. This expedition cost them 100 lives in all, which did not prevent the King of Prussia{5} from issuing to the troops a commemorative medal with the inscription Faithful unto death. The execution{6} against Denmark in 1864 was carried out by Prussian and Austrian forces, but the honours of the campaign belong only to the heroic defenders of Düppel.

It must be borne in mind, therefore, that the war of 1866 was prepared, undertaken, and carried out by leaders{7} and troops absolutely without war experience.

Yet even so, and in spite of numerous and grave errors, which will appear in the sequel, the Prussian army manoeuvred, fought, and won a decisive victory, for it acted in conformity with the Napoleonic principles of war that other European armies had ceased to follow, and had even totally forgotten. This priceless advantage the Prussian army owed to its Great General Staff, a school for the higher branches of the science of war.

Still, though it showed itself thus superior at a time when the military sciences were at their nadir, the Prussian General Staff had been affected not a little by the depressing views of strategy and tactics which resulted from secondary operations and from expeditions carried out, between 1880 and 1859, by the troops of other European powers.

But, if the true principles of la grande guerre were, in a measure, obscured in the Prussian Staff by the specious arguments of a new school, which looked for success solely in the quality of the troops and in the superiority of their armament, the Prussian army, ever on the watch for improvements, did not fail to profit by the results achieved, in the way of developing the individual efficiency of the soldier by the French in Algeria, in the Crimea, and in Italy. Development of individual initiative, physical training, and marksmanship—which had been special to the French army towards the end of the July monarchy—received after 1850 ever-increasing attention in the Prussian service.

The excellent regulations of 1848, which canonized the tactics of the company column, only began to bear full fruit when Prince William, as Regent, gave company commanders the greatest possible. independence.

The adoption of the needle-gun in 1848 was a fortunate innovation which was destined to revolutionize infantry tactics.

Finally, King William—above all things an infantryman—gave his whole energy, as soon as he succeeded to power, to the task of developing in the Prussian infantry the qualities of dash, boldness, intelligence, individual initiative, discipline, and endurance, which made it excellent in spite of the native dulness of the recruits.

The King was powerfully assisted in his reforms by an incomparable corps of officers, incomparable not, indeed, so much in respect of intelligence or general education, as in respect of training, character, self-respect, and professional knowledge. He had, further, the merit of discovering and of rightly employing four personalities of the first order—Bismarck, Moltke, Manteuffel, and Roon.

Of Bismarck nothing need here be said.

Moltke, appointed Chief of the Great General Staff in 1857, at the age of fifty-seven and while still a Major-General in rank, continued the doctrine of Clausewitz,{8} and was a surpassing teacher.

Manteuffel, as Chief of the Military Cabinet of the King,{9} brought to the task of selecting officers for the higher posts a degree of insight and of firmness which quickly produced excellent results.

Lastly, Roon, the Minister for War; advanced the organization of the Prussian army to such perfection as to compel universal admiration.{10}

***

Moltke was the soul of the strategic operations of the Prussians in 1866, and of those of the Germans in 1870. In peace, his function was to train good staff officers by indoctrinating them, at the military academy and on the Great General Staff itself, with a sound practical method and with principles of warfare deduced from concrete examples. In war it was his duty to advise the Sovereign, and to impress on the operations, in his name, a character of the greatest activity. Study of the events of 1866 and 1870-1871 from the Prussian point of view brings to light the doctrines which were preached by Moltke, and circulated in the army through the medium of the General Staff officers,{11} just as the arterial blood is sent forth from the heart to traverse and to nourish every part of the living organism.

Moltke has defined exactly his mission as Chief of the General Staff in war, in the following words, which he wrote at the head of his narrative of the Italian war of 1859:{12}

Great captains have no need of counsel. They study the questions which arise, themselves decide them, and their entourage has only to execute their decisions.

But such Generals are stars of the first magnitude, who scarcely appear once in a century.

"In the great majority of cases the leader of an army cannot dispense with advice. This advice may in many cases be the outcome of the deliberations of a small number of men qualified by abilities and experience to be sound judges of the situation. But in this small number one, and only one, opinion