March On Paris And The Battle Of The Marne 1914

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Text originally published in 1920 under the same title.

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THE

MARCH ON PARIS

AND THE

BATTLE OF THE MARNE

1914

BY

ALEXANDER VON KLUCK

GENERALOBERST

WITH PORTRAIT AND MAPS

AND

NOTES BY THE HISTORICAL SECTION (MILITARY BRANCH) OF THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 2

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

THE following review of events was completed on the 6th February, 1918. The books which have since been published on the period dealt with, such as Major Bircher's valuable contribution on the Battle of the Marne, that of Field-Marshal French (which appeared in the summer of 1919), and General Maurice's Forty Days in 1914, have not been taken into account. The temptation to enter into the controversies raised by General Baumgarten-Crusius's work has been avoided, although it undoubtedly contains facts of great importance; so also with the books of Field-Marshal von Bülow and General von Hausen. Only opinions formed at the time are recorded; those arrived at later have been omitted.

These limitations seem most necessary in order that the appreciation of the situation as it appeared to the headquarters of the First Army in 1914 may be recorded, unaffected by other influences. With this in view, the more important orders and documents have been reproduced verbatim in the text.

The point of view of the Army Commander as regards the dangers of a crossing of the Marne at the beginning of September, 1914, is set forth in the third part of this review. Major-General v. Nordenswan, a Swede, has made many apposite remarks in his book Strategisches aus dem Weltkriege, and has developed them as much as the information at his disposal allowed.

The mutual relations between the headquarters of the First and Second Armies were as helpful as possible. Where opinions differed each stood by its own, and it is for future historians to inquire which party had the greater reason on its side. The general situation after the necessary regrouping of the German Western Army seemed by no means unfavourable, inasmuch as the political and strategic objectives of the war became limited to taking the greatest possible advantage of the strategic weakness of the enemy. To discover where this lies is the principal duty of the supreme command in war.

VON KLUCK.

Generaloberst.

BERLIN,

February, 1920.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

GENERAL VON KLUCK

MAP OF THE BATTLE OF MONS, 23RD AND 24TH AUGUST,

MAP OF THE BATTLE OF SOLESMES—LE CATEAU

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Secret and other papers of the First Army Commander from 9th August to 15th September, 1914.

Memorandum by the Chief of the General Staff of the First Army of the operations during the same period, dated 29th May, 1915.

Despatches of Sir John French of 1914.

Die Schlachten an der Marne vom 6 bis 12 September, 1914. Mittle und Sohn, 1916. Author anonymous.

Hermann Stegemann. Der Krieg. First volume, 1917.

Colonel K. Egli. Zwei Jahre Weltkrieg. August, 1914, to August 1916.

Daily notes of the First Army Commander.

Die Marneschlacht. Professor Dr. Walter Kolbe. Rostock, 1917.

Strategisches aus dem Weltkrieg. V. Nordenswan, Major-General in the Swedish Army.

Stegemann's Weltkrieg und die Marneschlacht. Karl Bleibtreu.

Der Feldzug, 1914. Die Marneschlacht. Original in French by Major Gedel. 1916.

La Victoire de la Marne. Louis Madelin, in the Revue des deux mondes. September, 1916.

L'illustration of 11th September, 1915.

Je sais tout. Magasin de l'activité et de l'énergie nationales. 15th September, 1917.

NOTE ON VON KLUCK'S MILITARY  CAREER

ALEXANDER VON KLUCK was born on 20th May, 1846, at Münster in Westphalia, and was therefore two months younger than his rival, von Bülow. His father was a Government architect. He joined the 55th Infantry Regiment on 13th October, 1865, and a few months later took part in the Main Campaign of the war of 1866 as Fähnrich (probationary officer). He was promoted Second Lieutenant on 16th August, 1866. In this rank he served in the Franco-German War, and was wounded in the arm and body at the Battle of Colombey-Nouilly on the east side of Metz on 14th August, 1870, receiving the Iron Cross, 2nd Class. He was promoted Lieutenant in October, 1873, and married Baroness Fanny von Donop a year later. He became Captain in 1878, Major in 1887, Lieutenant-Colonel in 1893, commanding in the last rank an Infantry N.C.O. School for some time. In 1896 he was ennobled by the Kaiser, and given command of Landwehr District No. 1 Berlin. He was promoted Colonel in 1896, given command of the 24th Fusilier Regiment, and shortly afterwards promoted Major-General and made Commander of the 23rd Infantry Brigade. His next step to Lieutenant-General and Commander of the 37th Division came in April, 1902. He remained in this position four years, when he was advanced to General and the command of the V. Army Corps. On 1st October, 1913, he was made an Army Inspector, and on 27th January, 1914, promoted to the rank of Generaloberst.

It will be observed that, unlike von Bülow, he had no Staff service, and practically his whole career was spent with troops. On outbreak of war he was appointed Commander of the First Army. Early in 1915 he was, after being wounded, it is believed, relieved of his command and not re-employed in the field.

THE MARCH ON PARIS

INTRODUCTORY

THE following reflections are based on the daily notes of the Army Commander, the official documents, and other sources mentioned in the Bibliography. Their object, so far as the provisional state of historical investigation permits, is to explain and supplement the books and pamphlets already published. Of these, the first volume of Stegemann's history frequently unveils the secret motives of the higher command with striking perspicacity, and skilfully brings out the strategic coherence of the operations.

They are founded on a Memorandum by the commander of the First Army, the original of which was drafted by the Chief of the Staff. It was written during the position warfare on the Aisne in the winter months of 1914-1915, whilst the main events were still vivid in the memories of all those who had taken part in them. This Memorandum was completed and circulated to certain of the higher leaders for their comments, so that any doubts or contradictory reports as to the work and leading of the First Army might be finally disposed of, and the great achievements of all its corps, its cavalry corps, and their commanders placed definitively in their true light.

For the purpose of this Memorandum, the campaign was divided up into sections—Brussels, the Somme, the Grand Morin, the Ourcq, and the Aisne. Such a division seems suitable, and this review of those great times will practically conform to it.

The stage which historical research has reached up to that time (about April, 1915) is shown by the introduction to the Memorandum, which is therefore quoted verbatim:

This account of the operations of the First Army from the beginning of the advance until the position along the Aisne was occupied is based entirely on the records of Army Headquarters. It was possible to give an unbiased description of each situation, as it appeared to Army Headquarters, from the intelligence and operation reports in their possession at the time and in the light of which their decisions were formed. It was, however, not possible to consider and criticize these in their connection with the general situation as a whole; neither could the fighting of each corps be described by any means without bias in this respect, nor the results adequately appreciated. To do this it would have been necessary to examine the records .of the neighbouring armies and of Great Headquarters, as also those of corps and divisions, which were not available at Army Headquarters. The historical accuracy of the account given in this Memorandum has been concurred in by the corps commanders of the First Army, or, if they were not available, by General Staff officers of their staff.

The time now seems to have arrived to review the sources of information already available, in order to amplify them from the point of view of the commander, and to exhibit the documents, orders, and appreciations put aside at an earlier period owing to lack of time and space, and to place in a clearer light the events which took place on the western flank of the German Armies during August and September, 1914. At the same time, the Memorandum will gain imperishable value as a guide to assist in following the forward rush of the German Armies. A calm survey of the events is all the easier now that three years have elapsed since they took place.

CHAPTER I —  BRUSSELS—ANTWERP

ON the 2nd August, 1914, the first conference of the commander of the First Army with Generalmajor von Kuhl took place. The latter had been appointed his Chief of the Staff; he was formerly employed as Quartermaster-General in the western section of the Great General Staff at Berlin. He left the same day for Stettin, which was the place of assembly for First Army Headquarters, and the Army Commander followed the next day. On the 4th August the preliminary conferences between the Chief of the Staff and the Deputy Chief of the Staff with regard to the general work of the First Army Staff were concluded with complete unanimity. As the right flank of the German Armies in the west, the First Army had a most important part to play in the execution of a wide movement, probably of an enormous wheel through Belgium and Artois and perhaps into Picardy. It was evident that large tracts of country would have to be traversed with heavy fighting, and that many obstacles would have to be overcome. Rapidity of movement would be the primary condition of success in attaining the ultimate objective, which was to disperse first the Belgian Army, then the British Expeditionary Force, and finally to fall on the French Armies.

At the outset the order of battle of the First Army, included the II., III., and IV. Corps, the III. and IV, Reserve Corps, and the 10th, 11th, and 27th Landwehr Brigades; the IX. Corps was assigned to it shortly afterwards. There was no heavy artillery with the two Reserve Corps, and their establishment of machine-gun companies was most inadequate: the III. Reserve Corps had seven and the IV. Reserve Corps only four. The total strength of the First Army at that time was 142 battalions of infantry, 32 squadrons of cavalry, 110 batteries of artillery, and 21 pioneer companies. The important auxiliary units, such as ammunition columns, and the medical, supply, and communication troops, were quickly placed on a war footing. Under the able direction of the Chief of the Staff and his Deputy and of the Chiefs of the Medical and Supply Services, the task of forming the different Staffs, organizing their duties, and inculcating the spirit in which these would be carried out, went quietly forward; zeal and enthusiasm, already intense and glowing, were raised to the highest pitch.

By the evening of the 7th August the Staff of the Army was ready to leave Stettin by rail for Grevenbroich. The rail transport of the troops for the Western front was carried out with a remarkable punctuality. The civilian population and the troops vied with one another in patriotic demonstrations, and the food given to the troops by the population and by the indefatigable Red Cross workers considerably exceeded their needs.

The Staff settled down to hard work and an uninterrupted life of conferences, important decisions, and examination of intelligence; recreation was cut down to an absolute minimum. The composition of the Staff seemed a most happy one, and an eventful future proved that it was so.

The Chief of the Staff of the First Army, General-major von Kuhl, was a notable man, of most energetic character and wide views. Mentally and physically he was imperturbable, and, in addition to an extremely cultivated mind, he possessed a personal bravery on the battlefield which from time to time evoked a caution from the Army Commander.

Colonel von Bergmann, the Deputy Chief, who displayed an equal indifference to danger, and had an inexhaustible capacity for work, was conspicuous as a most careful guardian of that vital factor in the life of an army, the collective system of supply, ammunition replenishment, lines of communication work, and transport generally, besides being a sturdy protector of the interests of those services at Headquarters.

Colonel von Berendt, in his capacity as General commanding the artillery, gained the highest credit by the manner in which his arm of the service was employed in all the important fighting, both in open and in position warfare; he showed an exemplary personal bravery in all the battles and minor actions. To skilful use of his artillery were due some of the most brilliant successes in France, on the Vistula, on the Danube, in the Balkans, and in Northern Italy. It was his lot to take part in the most critical of the great struggles of the war.

Generalleutnant Telle was already well known to the Army Commander, both by his participation in the siege manœuvres at Posen in 1907 and as commander of the pioneers in the First Army Corps district, where his intelligent and conscientious work in many capacities had shown to the greatest advantage. Extremely active day and night and always looking ahead, it was due to him that, to the farthest bounds of his wide sphere of action, obstacles and hindrances were cleared away and blunders put right, no less in the period of open than in that of trench warfare, thus ensuring the primary conditions of carrying on a war of