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    Confederate High Command At Shiloh
    Confederate High Command At Shiloh
    Confederate High Command At Shiloh
    Ebook114 pages1 hour

    Confederate High Command At Shiloh

    By Major Thomas K. Hall

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    This is a study of the actions of the senior Confederate commanders at the battle of Shiloh. The senior commander, General Albert Sidney Johnston and his second in command, General Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard, did not come to a complete agreement on how to fight the battle. This disconnect between the two generals was the main reason for the South’s failure to achieve victory. The research method consisted of comparing the official records to other sources. These sources included books, biographies, telephone interviews, and one unpublished paper from the Shiloh National Military Park Library. Official records sometimes did not survive the test of scrutiny, particularly General Braxton Bragg’s assertion of actions at the close of April 6. The most important lesson that a student of military history can learn from this study is that commanders at all levels must ensure that the commander’s intent is clearly understood. Failure to do so almost guarantees confusion up and down the chain of command which will, most likely, result in defeat.
    LanguageEnglish
    PublisherGolden Springs Publishing
    Release dateAug 15, 2014
    ISBN9781782895190
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      Book preview

      Confederate High Command At Shiloh - Major Thomas K. Hall

       This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING—www.picklepartnerspublishing.com

      To join our mailing list for new titles or for issues with our books – picklepublishing@gmail.com

      Or on Facebook

      Text originally published in 1972 under the same title.

      © Pickle Partners Publishing 2013, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

      Publisher’s Note

      Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

      We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

      THE CONFEDERATE HIGH COMMAND AT SHILOH

      by

      THOMAS K. HALL, MAJ, USA

      B.S., Georgia College, Milledgeville, Georgia, 1983

      TABLE OF CONTENTS

      Contents

      TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

      ABSTRACT 5

      LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 6

      CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION 7

      Scope 8

      Importance 8

      Primary/Secondary Questions 9

      Literature Review 10

      CHAPTER 2 — JANUARY 18-MARCH 5, 1862 11

      CHAPTER 3 — MARCH 5-APRIL 5, 1862 17

      Special Order Number 8 19

      The Council of War 23

      CHAPTER 4 — APRIL 6, 1862, 4:55-11:30 A.M. 26

      The Real Lost Opportunity 30

      CHAPTER 5 — APRIL 6,1862, 11:30-5:30 P.M. 37

      The Death of Albert Sidney Johnston 42

      Collapse of The Hornet’s Nest 44

      CHAPTER 6 — APRIL 6, 1862, 5:30 P.M.-APRIL 7, 1862, 2:30 A.M. 49

      CHAPTER 7 — CONCLUSION 55

      Why did Beauregard Change Johnston’s Plan and Why Did Johnston Allow It? 55

      Why Did Braxton Bragg Waste So Much Time and Manpower Making Futile Frontal Assaults at the Hornet’s Nest? 55

      Did Beauregard Throw Away Victory By Not Ordering One More Assault on the End of April? 56

      Why Was Nathan Bedford Forrest’s Critical Intelligence Concerning Union Reinforcements Ignored? 56

      Epilogue 56

      REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 58

      APPENDIX — ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY 59

      Books 62

      Periodicals 62

      Government Documents 62

      Unpublished Interviews 63

      Unpublished Paper 63

      ABSTRACT

      THE CONFEDERATE HIGH COMMAND AT SHILOH by MAJ Thomas K. Hall, USA.

      This is a study of the actions of the senior Confederate commanders at the battle of Shiloh. The senior commander, General Albert Sidney Johnston and his second in command General Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard did not come to a complete agreement on to how to fight the battle. This disconnect between the two generals was the main reason for the South’s failure to achieve victory.

      The research method consisted of comparing the Official Records to other sources. These sources included books, biographies, telephone interviews, and one unpublished paper from the Shiloh National Military Park library. Official Records sometimes did not survive the test of scrutiny, particularly General Braxton Bragg’s assertion of actions at the close of April 6.

      The most important lesson that a student of military history can learn from this study is that commanders at all levels must ensure that the commander’s intent is clearly understood. Failure to do so almost guarantees confusion up and down the chain of command which will, most likely, result in defeat.

      LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

      Western Theater, Spring 1862

      Route of Confederate Advance on Pittsburg Landing

      Confederate Armies Advance on Federal Positions

      Hornet’s Nest

      Collapse of the Hornet’s Nest

      Grant’s Last Line

      CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION

      The commander’s intent is the single unifying focus for all subordinate elements.— Field Manual 100-5

      This will be a study of the Confederate high command at the Battle of Shiloh. With the possible exception of Chickamauga, Shiloh was the most critical battle fought in the western theater. A Confederate victory would have stopped Union General Ulysses’ S. Grant’s drive in the west. Also, a Confederate victory would have likely ruined the careers of Grant and General William T. Sherman thus depriving the Union of those who would later prove to be their best commanders.

      Shiloh resulted in the South’s attempt to defeat Grant before his forces could link up with General Don Carlos Buell’s forces, moving his down from Nashville, and capture the critical railroad juncture of Corinth, Mississippi. The Confederates, under Albert Sidney Johnston, numbered almost 44,000. Grant’s forces at Pittsburgh Landing, Tennessee, only numbered around 40,000.{1} The South, for a change, enjoyed a slight numerical superiority going into a major battle. The Union was completely unaware that an attack was pending. They did not entrench, and worse, they camped with their backs to the Tennessee River. The Union was a perfect target. It should have been a great victory for the South.

      It was anything but a victory. A confusing route of march from Corinth, Mississippi to Shiloh, a stubborn Union stand at what would be labeled the Hornet’s Nest, and, most importantly of all, confusion in the highest levels of the Confederate command doomed the Southern cause.

      The confusion centered on the two senior commanders on the Southern side. Albert Sidney Johnston, the overall commander, and his second in command, P. G. T. Beauregard worked at odds with each other from the time that Beauregard entered the western theater. Johnston specified an attack formation that divided the battlefield into sectors among his four corps. He stated in a memorandum dated, April 3, 1862, that his intent was to turn the Union left into the Owl Creek and away from its base of supplies.{2} The order that Beauregard penned gave the corps commanders a different attack formation and did not mention trying to turn the Union left.{3} The flawed order of battle was the main reason why the South failed at Shiloh. The two senior commanders were working towards different goals: Johnston wanted the main effort on the Confederate right; Beauregard spread the troops out all over the field with no particular main effort. It is safe to assume that any military strategist would agree that confusion in command is a formula for defeat.

      When the South did attack on the morning of April 6th, confusion was the order of the day. Beauregard formed the attack with the four corps lined up behind each other. The result was units becoming intermingled with one another resulting in a complete breakdown of any semblance of command and control. commanders, from regiment all the way to division, wound up commanding whatever troops happened to be closest to them.

      The South at Shiloh was its own worst

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