Everand Logo

Welcome to Everand!

  • Discover millions of ebooks, audiobooks, and so much more with a free trial

    Only $11.99/month after trial. Cancel anytime.

    1956 Suez Crisis And The United Nations
    1956 Suez Crisis And The United Nations
    1956 Suez Crisis And The United Nations
    Ebook157 pages1 hour

    1956 Suez Crisis And The United Nations

    By Major Jean-Marc Pierre

    ()

    Read preview

    About this ebook

    The 1956 Suez Crisis is the first example of a pre-emptive strike after World War II. The episode provides lessons about the lengths to which nations will go to secure their interests and the limits of the United Nation’s influence. How the UN uses its power is the point of contention. In 1956, Great Britain, France, and Israel believed the organization would protect their security interests through the unbiased maintenance of international law. Yet, as common in the Cold War, UN action was hampered. A war began and ended with a cease-fire in fifty-five hours. Three militarily superior armies won their tactical fights but were strategically defeated. Most notably, the influence of global authority shifted to the superpowers. Through all this, the UN changed its mission and purpose. The primary question therefore is did the UN resolve the 1956 Suez Crisis? Resolution had to include a status quo ante bellum, the return to the existing system before the war, or the recognition of a new international Regime. The UN’s ability to resolve such crises directly affects its legitimacy in the international community.
    LanguageEnglish
    PublisherTannenberg Publishing
    Release dateAug 15, 2014
    ISBN9781782896081
    1956 Suez Crisis And The United Nations

    Related to 1956 Suez Crisis And The United Nations

    Related ebooks

    Wars & Military For You

    View More
    View More

    Related podcast episodes

    Related articles

    • Article

      How Drones Change The Risks That Nations Are Willing To Take

      Jun 2, 2020

      In “The Drone Age,” Michael J. Boyle provides moral clarity on the question of drone technology, and tops it off with a word of warning.

      3 min read

    • Article

      Burning Ambition

      Mar 31, 2020

      Burning Ambition
      12 min read

    • Article

      1994–95 First Chechen War

      Jul 12, 2022

      1994–95 First Chechen War
      1 min read

    • Article

      Leyte Gulf

      Oct 6, 2022

      Leyte Gulf
      12 min read

    • Article

      Nigeria Definitives 1953

      Sep 9, 2022

      Nigeria Definitives 1953
      4 min read

    • Article

      What Is Nato Really For?

      May 13, 2022

      What Is Nato Really For?
      15 min read

    • Article

      Why Eritrea Won’t Leave Ethiopia

      Jul 20, 2021

      When U.S. Sen. Chris Coons visited Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and met Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in March, the United States’ top demand was that Abiy should order the withdrawal of Eritrean troops from the Tigray region. After four months of denials that

      6 min read

    • Article

      Battle Of Leyte Gulf

      Oct 6, 2022

      Battle Of Leyte Gulf
      1 min read

    • Article

      Valley Of Tears

      Apr 18, 2019

      As the commander of one of Israel’s tank battalions during the four-day battle, Avigdor Kahalani’s book provides a unique blow-by-blow experience of the battle from his perspective, as well as the men under his command. Although first-hand accounts s

      1 min read

    • Article

      VERSAILLES WINNERS & LOSERS

      Jul 11, 2019

      VERSAILLES WINNERS & LOSERS
      5 min read

    • Article

      Indonesian Insurgency

      Dec 22, 2020

      Indonesian Insurgency
      1 min read

    • Article

      Rotten At The Core

      Apr 16, 2020

      For more than four decades, Paul Preston has produced voluminous and incisive work on the history of Spain. As the leading British historian in the field, he has written on the Second Republic (1931–36), the Civil War (1936–39), the Franco dictatorsh

      2 min read

    • Article

      The New Frontier

      Apr 14, 2022

      The New Frontier
      3 min read

    • Article

      Carriers at War

      Apr 5, 2022

      Carriers at War
      1 min read

    • Article

      Adrian Helmet

      Dec 22, 2022

      Adrian Helmet
      1 min read

    • Article

      ASSASSINATION & EXECUTION

      Aug 3, 2023

      ASSASSINATION & EXECUTION
      3 min read

    • Article

      Cuban Independence

      Jan 1, 2023

      Cuban Independence
      3 min read

    • Article

      What If…

      Aug 3, 2023

      What If…
      3 min read

    • Article

      Picking Fights With Puritans

      Mar 26, 2019

      Picking Fights With Puritans
      3 min read

    • Article

      AFTER the WAR

      Apr 22, 2022

      AFTER the WAR
      14 min read

    • Article

      An Iron Curtain

      May 12, 2022

      From 1945 onward the challenge of rebuilding a devastated Europe was so vast that US President Harry Truman’s administration struggled to devise a strategy for the continent, which by 1946 had 60 million refugees, with 14 million displaced in Germany

      3 min read

    Related categories

    Reviews for 1956 Suez Crisis And The United Nations

    0 ratings

    0 ratings0 reviews

    What did you think?

    Tap to rate

    Review must be at least 10 words

      Book preview

      1956 Suez Crisis And The United Nations - Major Jean-Marc Pierre

       This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING—www.picklepartnerspublishing.com

      To join our mailing list for new titles or for issues with our books – picklepublishing@gmail.com

      Or on Facebook

      Text originally published in 2004 under the same title.

      © Pickle Partners Publishing 2014, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

      Publisher’s Note

      Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

      We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

      THE 1956 SUEZ CRISIS AND THE UNITED NATIONS

      BY

      MAJ JEAN-MARC PIERRE

      TABLE OF CONTENTS

      Contents

      TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

      ABSTRACT 5

      ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 6

      ILLUSTRATIONS 7

      TABLES 7

      CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION 9

      General Introduction 9

      Background 10

      Historic Overview 11

      The Research Question 14

      Scope 14

      Assumptions 14

      Limitations 16

      Delimitations 16

      Significance of the Study 16

      Summary 18

      CHAPTER 2 — LITERATURE REVIEW 19

      Introduction 19

      Primary Legal Sources of 1956 Regime 19

      1888 Convention of Constantinople 19

      The United Nations Charter 19

      Related UN Resolutions 20

      Other Primary Sources 21

      Autobiographies 21

      Secondary Sources 22

      Histories of the Crisis 22

      Literature on the UN 23

      Summary of Literature 24

      CHAPTER 3 — Methodology 25

      Introduction to the Research Methodology 25

      The Regime 25

      The State 28

      Construction of the Methodology 29

      The Integrated Elasticity Model 29

      The D1 Curve 30

      The D2 Curve 30

      The D3 Curve 31

      The D4 Curve 31

      The D5 Curve 31

      The Complex Elasticity Model 32

      Conclusion 32

      CHAPTER 4 — HISTORICAL SETTING 34

      Strategic Value and Interests 34

      British Strategic Interests 36

      French Strategic Interests 37

      Israeli Strategic Interests 39

      Soviet Strategic Interests 41

      American Strategic Interests 42

      The United Nations Strategic Interest 43

      Events Leading To the Crisis 43

      Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser 43

      Soviet Arms for the Arabs 44

      Suez Canal Nationalization 45

      Conclusion 47

      CHAPTER 5 — STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 48

      Introduction 48

      Analysis of the Events 48

      The Coalition 48

      Negotiations 50

      The Hammarskjold Compromise 51

      The Collusion 54

      The Invasion 55

      The Fallout 58

      The United Nations Enforcement Force (UNEF) 61

      Conclusion 62

      CHAPTER 6 — CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 63

      Introduction 63

      Importance of the International Regime 63

      Reaction to the Suez Crisis 65

      Resolution of the Suez Crisis 66

      Recommendations 66

      1. Resolve Disputes Before a Catalyst to War Emerges 66

      2. Restructure the UN for Future Wars 66

      3. Enforce UN Resolutions 67

      4. Nations Must Develop Both Hard And Soft Power 68

      Summary 68

      REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 69

      ACRONYMS 70

      REFERENCES 71

      ABSTRACT

      THE 1956 SUEZ CRISIS AND THE UNITED NATIONS, by MAJ Jean-Marc Pierre.

      The 1956 Suez Crisis is the first example of a preemptive strike after World War II. The episode provides lessons about the lengths to which nations will go to secure their interests and the limits of the United Nation’s influence. How the UN uses its power is the point of contention. In 1956, Great Britain, France, and Israel believed the organization would protect their security interests through the unbiased maintenance of international law. Yet, as common in the Cold War, UN action was hampered. A war began and ended with a cease-fire in fifty-five hours. Three militarily superior armies won their tactical fights but were strategically defeated. Most notably, the influence of global authority shifted to the superpowers. Through all this, the UN changed its mission and purpose. The primary question therefore is did the UN resolve the 1956 Suez Crisis? Resolution had to include a status quo ante bellum, the return to the existing system before the war, or the recognition of a new international Regime. The UN’s ability to resolve such crises directly affects its legitimacy in the international community.

      ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

      This thesis is dedicated to my wife, Jean Gwendolyn, and to all those who serve to keep the United States of America a free, safe, and prosperous nation.

      ILLUSTRATIONS

      Figure 1. Egypt, 1956

      Figure 2. Venn Diagram

      Figure 3. Time-Series Graph

      Figure 4. The Integrated Elasticity Model

      Figure 5. The Complex Elasticity Model

      Figure 6. The Interoceanic Routes Used by the British and the French to Travel from Their Homeports to Their Colonies or Interests When Using the Cape of Good Hope and the Suez Canal

      Figure 7. 1955 World Oil Production

      Figure 8. Middle East Oil Shipments West of Suez

      Figure 9. 1955 European Oil Imports from the Middle East

      Figure 10. 1955 Oil Imports Using the Suez Canal

      Figure 11. Elasticity during the 1956 Suez Nationalization

      Figure 12. Analysis of the UN Actions during the 1956 Crisis

      Figure 13. American and Soviet Reaction to Operation Musketeer

      TABLES

      Table 1. 1955 Oil Production

      Table 2. 1955 Oil Shipments to West

      Table 3. 1955 European Oil Imports from the Middle East

      CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION

      General Introduction

      For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat -most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack. (Bush 2002, 15)

      In an interview at the end of 2003, United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan reflected on the challenges facing the UN following Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The United States (US)-led war to overthrow Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein ended over twelve years of diplomacy since the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Kofi Annan assumed that the circumstances by which the OIF coalition went to war, the American doctrine of preemptive war, put the UN at its most significant crossroad since 1945.

      By 2003, Iraq had violated seventeen UN resolutions, had expelled UN weapons inspectors, and had funded suicide bombings in Israel. The administration of President George W. Bush, fresh from its victory in Afghanistan and armed with the 2002 National Security Strategy, was determined to enforce the UN resolutions. The UN’s response to the looming war, mused Annan, crippled its effectiveness in dealing with other longstanding disputes and possibly its credibility as an organization that worked by consensus: Those who are opposed to war could not understand that we could not stop the war and those who were for the war were upset that we did not support it. He further demurred that preemptive war was never mentioned in the [UN] Charter and [was] something the organization had never dealt with before (Annan interviewed by Shawn, December 2003).

      Contrary to Mr. Annan’s assertions, the UN had precedents of unsanctioned preemptive strikes from which to refer. For example, preemption was the casus belli (reason for war) in the Arab-Israeli War (1967), Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999). The first preemptive strike in the postmodern era, however, was in the Suez Crisis in 1956 when a British, French, and Israeli coalition launched an attack into Egypt to depose Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser, like Saddam Hussein of Iraq, was an authoritarian dictator who seized power through a coup d’état. Both men sponsored cross border terrorism against Israel. Both men routinely violated UN resolutions. Both faced strikes when opposing parties no longer found utility in diplomacy. The 1956 war and OIF are reminders that political disputes can digress into open conflict. As Carl Von Clausewitz famously said in his treatise, On War, War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means (Clausewitz 1976, 69).

      It will be event in this study that when the Tripartite Coalition (just like the OIF Coalition) could not achieve their political ends through the diplomatic channels, open warfare became their only recourse. Unlike the failed Operation Musketeer,

      Enjoying the preview?
      Page 1 of 1