The Jena Campaign - 1806

SPECIAL CAMPAIGN SERIES No. 7

THE

JENA CAMPAIGN

1806

By

COLONEL F. N. MAUDE, C.B.

(Late R.E.)

This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING

Text originally published in 1909 under the same title.

© Pickle Partners Publishing 2011, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION 21

Influence of Battle of Jena on modern history .— Humanizing effect of military training — Relation between Kings and peoples prior to French Revolution — Aim of the King to benefit his people — Analogy between his system and that of an Army — Reaction after the Thirty Years' War — France during the eighteenth century — Prussia and Frederick the Great — Revolt of all classes against corruption of the Law — Gustave le Bon's Psychologie des Foules — Mistake of the Princes of Europe at period of French Revolution and its effect — Armies of the Coalition on French soil — An unparalleled problem — Scharnhorst's appreciation of it — Worth of the methods and principles of Prussian and English Armies. — Danger of our need of national unanimity — The Will of the Nation — True worth of a Nation's unanimity — Result of the pursuit of wealth and cult of self —The Peace-party's idea of War — The essence of a soldier's contract. —The true meaning of our duty to our country 21

CHAPTER I 31

THE PRUSSIAN ARMY BEFORE JENA 31

THE PRUSSIAN ARMY BEFORE JENA .  — State of Armies of Western Europe before French Revolution — Effect of topographical surroundings —Idea underlying Prussian tactics — Cavalry superiority the primary condition of success — The same in Wars of Frederick the Great — Seven Years' War and Prussian Infantry  — Divergence between French and Prussian practice — Recruit of Frederick the Great's epoch — Perfection of Frederick's drill — Intensity of fire — The Battle of Prague and St. Privat — Contrasting old and modern fire discipline and rate of fire — The old drill masters were right — The essence of Frederick's line tactics — Also of Napoleon's — Their radical difference — The fault which wrecked Prussia — The Seven Years' War and its effect on Prussia — Administration of Prussian regimental districts — What German Unity owes to Frederick the Great — Years succeeding the Seven Years' War. — Ingratitude of civilians towards the Army — Effect of French Revolution — The Ober Kriegs Collegium — The combined Units — The Prussian Cavalry — Prussian Artillery — Engineers and Infantry — Mistaken condemnation of pre-Jena methods — This method identical with British Methods of 1800-1806— The Infantry attack — Fatal peace-practice — Weakness of Line Troops in Seven Years' War — Growth of Light Infantry — Third rank condemned as useless — Third rank as skirmishers – Justification for obedience and accuracy of movement — The final stage of attack —Principle of halt to fire — Fire power of the Line 31

CHAPTER II 53

THE FRENCH ARMY BEFORE JENA 53

THE FRENCH ARMY BEFORE JENA  — The Old Royal Army of France — Origin of French attack formation — Our own experience since 1870 — Resistance of the old school — French attacks seen from the front — French struggle to attain fire discipline — French Leaders' lack of experience — Reasons for abandoning Fredrickian Line system — Strength of French Army — Formation of Volunteer Battalions in 1791 — Confusion in the early levies — The Regular Army in 1792 — Dumouriez's troops at the Battle of Jemappes Amalgamation of Volunteers — Effect of Dumouriez's defeat at Neerwinden — Paralysation of France — Reaction, and better recruiting — Jourdan's Law of Conscription — Details of the Demi Brigades and Amalgams — Crowd-leaders — The art of command — Confidence between men and officers — Contrast between French and Austrian staff work — Secret of French mobility — Carnot's strategy — Captain Colin's study of Napoleon — Napoleon's methods in 1796 — Crisis of Marengo — Cavalry Screen and Ulm Campaign — He finds out true use of Cavalry —The Cavalry screen cannot hold — The Grand Army at Boulogne and in Holland — The bond of comradeship—its real strength 53

CHAPTER III 73

PRUSSIAN MOVEMENTS UP TO OCT. 13. 73

PRUSSIAN MOVEMENTS UP TO OCTOBER 13 —The proximate cause of Jena Campaign — Prussian vacillation — Alliance of Russia and Prussia at Potsdam, November, 1805 — Character of Haugwitz — Treaty of December 15, 1805— Haugwitz and the Treaty — The act of Treachery — Napoleon's refusal to ratify Treaty — Did Napoleon desire war? —The French Secret Service — Want of Prussian preparation — Clausewitz gives résumé of Prussia's military resources  — Duke Carl of Brunswick — Prince Hohenlohe and Von Rüchel — Organization of Divisions — Personality of the King of Prussia — The Ober Kriegs Collegium (Army Council) — Massenbach — Mobilization of August — Napoleon's counter-arrangements —Duke of Brunswick and September 25—Clausewitz's criticisms of above — Brunswick's proposed offensive — Correctness of this appreciation — Hohenlohe and Massenbach's frenzy — Continuation of Clausewitz's comments — Pedantry of the General Staff — Hohenlohe and Massenbach's opinion of the Duke's proposal — Brunswick unloads responsibility — Assembly of the General Council on October 5 — Result of unmilitary constitution of the organ of Chief Command — Position of Prussian Army on October 6 — Clausewitz's comments — Clausewitz on flanking position — A bold step — Clausewitz's solution — The Saxons round Roda — News of French advance — Tauenzien's retreat — Müffling's report and the Duke of Brunswick — Hohenlohe moves to the Saale — October 9, Prince Louis' report — Position of Rüchel, Blücher, and Duke of Weimar —Tauenzien and Bernadotte — October 10  — Defeat of Saalfeld . — Death of Prince Louis — Hohenlohe's March from Kahla to Neustadt — General Grauwert's troops rally Tauenzien's defeated force — Confusion of orders —  October 11 — Dispositions  of Prussian Cavalry — Hohenlohe's change of quarters — Panic at Jena —  Dry rot of  distrust causes panic — October 12 — Appearance of Marshal Lannes — Report of Officer of Military train — Prince Hohenlohe's defence and Scharnhorst's orders — October 13 — Lettow Vorbeck's report — State of military minds in Germany — Negotiations between Commanders — Hohenlohe decides to attack Lannes — The Landgrafenberg — Massenbach and Hohenlohe — Hohenlohe marches to Dornburg — Hohenlohe's picnic — Movements of the principal Army — A criticism. 73

CHAPTER IV 118

FRENCH MOVEMENTS UP TO OCTOBER 13 118

FRENCH MOVEMENTS UP TO OCTOBER 13 — The Treaty of Pressburg, December 25 — Berthier and Napoleon's order of February 14 — The distribution of French troops — The French in cantonments — Napoleon's letters of September 5 — Centre of assembly—Bamberg — French ambassadors on September 12 — The Ambassador Laforest — Doubt of September 16 — Napoleon's Letters to the King of Holland — The Basic order, September 19 — The Routes de l'Armée — Movements of Soult, Davout, Berthier.—The Emperor reaches Mayence, September 28 —Anger with Berthier; loses his judgment — The Emperor's secrecy — Napoleon corrects mistake of the 24th — His treatment of his Marshals — Berthier's belated courier arrives — One of the record feats of the Emperor's life—his mental  fatigue — Letter to King of Holland, September 29 — French preparations—comments — Napoleon's letter to the Empress — Napoleon's mental exhaustion — His letter to Berthier of October 11 — He moves to Würzburg, October 2 — The Emperor's letter to Soult — His opinion of Prussian Cavalry — The Doctrine of the French Staff — Lord Lake's knowledge and use of it — Comments — October 5, Lannes and the V Corps — Positions of October 11 — The Emperor's perplexities on October  11 — The French are erratic — Plans from which the manoeuvre of Jena resulted — Napoleon plans the Battle of Jena — Bonnal's description  — Comments — Further Comments — Letter to Lannes — Comments —  Letter to Talleyrand — Gleam of true inspiration at Auma — October 13 — Secret of French mobility — Ordre, contreordre, désordre — Belated outpost reports, October 13 — Augereau's letter from Kahla — Davout's summing up — Murat's report of secret agent — Letter to Murat — Celebrated fourth bulletin of the Grand Army — Conduct of Lannes before Jena — Napoleon's four orders to his Marshals on October 13 — Note on the topography of the Landgrafenberg — Orders for the Battle — Comments — French preparations — Note on audibility of artillery fire — Marches of the Grand Army to the Battle of Jena 118

CHAPTER V 156

THE BATTLES OF JENA AND AUERSTADT 156

THE BATTLES OF JENA AND AUERSTADT — The night of the 13th —Comments — Prince Hohenlohe's dangerous mood; Tauenzien's report — Capture of Lutzeroda and Closewitz — Napoleon's strategic use of the fog — Holtzendorf's detachment — A succession of disasters — Vierzehnheiligen left undefended — Tauenzien's retreat on Klein Römstedt — French pursuit — The Emperor collects a heavy battery — The fog lifts 10 a.m., October 13 — Hohenlohe writes to Rüchel — Cavalry miss their opportunity — Reason for the interruption — Grawert's Division — Their advances — Lannes' Light Divisional Batteries — Hohenlohe's indecision — One of the most pitiful incidents in military history — Crisis of the Battle — The evil genius of the Prussian Army — Rüchel intervenes —  Massenbach's suggestion — A terrific fire-fight — Prince Hohenlohe's mistake — Comments — Abandoning Vierzehnheiligen — Comments — The Battle of Auerstadt — The Advance Guards take contact — Schmettau, Blücher, Davout — Davout's orders from Berthier — Confusion in departure of the Division; fog — Brunswick and Scharnhorst  — Schmettau's Division at Hassenhausen —  Wartensleben's Division — Blinding of the Duke of Brunswick  — Fortune deserts the Prussian Arms — Attack on Hassenhausen fails — The French assume the offensive  — Prussian Reserves — Kalckreuth and the Reserves  – Effects of Prince Hohenlohe's defeat —  Davout's force — Gudin's force  Schmettau's force; Friant's — Losses at Auerstadt  — Comment — Bernadotte's conduct  — Battle of Auerstadt . 156

CHAPTER VI 183

CONCLUSION AND COMMENTS 183

CONCLUSION AND COMMENTS — The new interpretation of the Napoleonic method — The essence of the Napoleonic doctrine — Example of October 11 — Comment  — Napoleon's mental unrest —  Original orders for the night of October 11-12  — Comment — If Lannes' Corps had been destroyed — Comment — Query as to an incompetent Staff — The marching discipline in French Army — Panic in Prussian Army — Comment — Description of Prussian panic — Comments  — Danger in the application of Napoleonic strategic conception —  Comments on this danger  — Manoeuvres of 1891 at Mulhausen — Comments —  The offensive, the best method — The endurance of punishment without retaliation — Essence of the Line conception — The resultant will-power of the crowd — Object of all drill-training  — Example—Behaviour of the 68th at Pei-ho Forts —  Our next great War — Scharnhorst's saying the incentive to Will 183

MAPS

A) Positions on the Evening of 11th October

B) Positions on the Night of 13th October

C) Auerstadt

D) Diagram showing the Relative Power of the Three Arms

E) Diagram showing the Rate of Fire, and Number of Bullets per Yard 

As these maps are A3 we have not been able to include them in this edition.

1) Positions of French and Prussian Armies, First Week in October, 1806

2) The battle of Jena.

3)Engagement of V Corps and Tauenzien.

4)The Situation at about 1 clock

CHARTS

As these maps are A3 we have not been able to include them in this edition.

1) The Principal Prussian Army

2) Hohenlohe’s Army

INTRODUCTION

Influence of Battle of Jena on modern history — Humanizing effect of military training — Relation between Kings and peoples prior to French Revolution — Aim of the King to benefit his people — Analogy between his system and that of an Army — Reaction after the Thirty Years' War — France during the eighteenth century — Prussia and Frederick the Great — Revolt of all classes against corruption of the Law — Gustave le Bon's Psychologie des Foules — Mistake of the Princes of Europe at period of French Revolution and its effect — Armies of the Coalition on French soil — An unparalleled problem — Scharnhorst's appreciation of it — Worth of the methods and principles of Prussian and English Armies. — Danger of our need of national unanimity — The Will of the Nation — True worth of a Nation's unanimity — Result of the pursuit of wealth and cult of self —The Peace-party's idea of War — The essence of a soldier's contract. —The true meaning of our duty to our country

THERE is no battle in modern history which has exerted so profound an influence on the progress of humanity as that fought out upon the plains overlooking Jena on October 14, 1806.

Here the old and the new school, absolute Monarchy and Democracy, both in their highest form of embodiment, met one another under fairly equal conditions, and as a consequence all Europe now stands as a series of armed camps, and even in far Japan and China, the dread of War and all that the word implies, is compelling men to undergo a training in truth, honour and self-denial which bids fair to prepare the field for a harvest of ethical fruits; a development far more wide-reaching than any dogmatic revelation has as yet attained.

This is all in the order of evolution. In the beginning, mankind had to learn in the hard school of experience the iron law of the pack, the curbing of the selfish instinct of self-preservation; then had to come the training of the intellect by the spread of book-learning and education which loosened the law of blind instinct; and now follows the training of the Will of the individual, to restrain the mind and to teach it how to apply its powers for the greatest good of our common humanity.

Left to itself, intellect threatened the foundation of all society, for alone it cannot prove the existence of any object better worth living for than self. The survival of the fittest is its last word, and since nothing more than our existence in this life can be intellectually demonstrated, socialism and anarchy, ultimately the rule of the super-man, was all that intellect had to hold out to us, and the unrestrained cult of this tyranny results in loss of sanity, not seldom in dangerous madness. But from this fate, the necessity which compels nearly two-thirds of the male inhabitants of Europe to submit to a systematic training of the Will, bids fair to save us; for through the Will and by its exercise, the individual is prepared to receive the knowledge of higher laws than those, the truth of which can be intellectually demonstrated. It may be that very few are as yet ripe to receive such knowledge or to be entrusted with the power it confers, but already it is quite evident to those with eyes to see, that the military training of the past century is humanizing whole populations in the most marked degree, and is proving, in those countries which have embraced it the most thoroughly—whether as volunteers, or by the compulsion of their own law—a, source of material prosperity and general comfort far beyond anything which the ordinary laws of supply and demand could have enabled the thinker to predict.

In the period prior to the French Revolution, the relation between Kings and their people were briefly these. Apart from any question of duty on either side, it was to the direct personal interest of the King to obtain for his people the best possible conditions for developing their own resources, either by the conquest of fresh countries with which they could trade unrestrictedly, or by specialization of their several functions of trade,