1915 Campaign in France, The Battles of Aubers Ridge, Festubert and Loos

1915 CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE

THE BATTLES OF AUBERS

RIDGE, FESTUBERT & LOOS

Considered in relation to the Field Service Regulations

These notes and sketches have been compiled from official sources and from information received from those who took part in the battles.

BY

A. KEARSEY, D.S.O., O.B.E., p.s.c.

LATE LIEUTENANT-COLONEL, GENERAL STAFF

SECOND EDITION

CONTENTS

   INTRODUCTION

I. APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION BEFORE THE BATTLE OF AUBERS RIDGE

APPRECIATION OF THE

SITUATION BEFORE THE BATTLE OF FESTUBERT

APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION BEFORE THE BATTLE OF LOOS

II. BATTLE OF AUBERS RIDGE (ILLUSTRATING F.S.R.)

III. BATTLE OF FESTUBERT (ILLUSTRATING F.S.R.)

IV. BATTLE OF LOOS (ILLUSTRATING F.S.R.)

V. DIARY OF EVENTS

Four sketches compiled from official maps by kind permission of His Majesty’s Stationery Office.

BATTLE OF AUBERS RIDGE, MAY 9TH, 1915

BATTLE OF FESTUBERT, MAY 15TH–25TH, 1915

GENERAL SITUATION, SEPTEMBER 25TH, 1915

BATTLE OF LOOS, SEPTEMBER 25TH–OCTOBER 8TH, 1915

INDEX

PRESS OPINIONS.

"Cavalry Journal," October, 1929.

1915 CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE comprises appreciations of the situation at various dates, diaries of events, and narratives of battles, with copious references to F.S.R. A number of simple sketch maps facilitate the comprehension of the operation dealt with."

"Fighting Forces," October, 1929.

This book should prove of unquestioned value and real interest to Army officers. The author has succeeded admirably in his aim. We can strongly recommend this useful little book.

INTRODUCTION.

IT is hoped that this unofficial work, compiled from official despatches and from notes received from those who took part in the actions, may prove helpful to those who have not had the time for extensive research, and who consequently may be glad to have the main points presented to them in a concise form.

This work is the result of a very great deal of study and also of personal experience on the Western Front. The author’s endeavour has been to make comments with judgment and impartiality.

These lines, written by Charles Nodier, appear to apply to the situations in this book, as they ring with a gay challenge, bidding us surmount the peace and war difficulties, which we had to deal with in the preparation for the 1914 campaign and in the 1915 battles:—

Que Dieu daigne vous donner à tous

       Mes bons amis

Tout ce qu’il faut de patience

       Pour supporter la vie,

D’amour et de bienveillance,

Pour la rendre douce et utile,

       Et de gaieté

       Pour s’en moquer.

These difficulties are described in Volume IV, Military Operations, with a sympathy that makes the volume most interesting reading, and with a candour that makes it most instructive. Very clearly the author brings out the point that the limited results obtained at Festubert and Loos were due to our inexperienced and partly trained troops having the severe handicap of less heavy guns, bombs, trench warfare equipment and material than the enemy opposed to them. It is also shown how we had to defer to the wishes of the French G.Q.C. to carry out offensive operations in difficult country and under unfavourable tactical conditions.

The reasons for our failure at Fromelles and Rue de Bois on May 9th and for the more encouraging results at Festubert between May 15th and 25th are clearly brought out. One main reason appears to have been that we had to postpone our offensive operations after the Neuve Chapelle battle, and that then until May 9th the Germans turned their light field defences into semi-permanent fortifications. We had not a sufficient quantity of effective heavy H.E. shell to destroy them.

Then, in the account of the Battle of Loos, the author points out that we based our plan on the possibilities attainable by the use of gas, and that, though this failed on some parts of the line, a considerable success was achieved, but it was not exploited adequately, as the 21st and 24th Divisions in general reserve were too far back and the delay in assigning them definitely to the First Army caused the favourable moment for their employment to be lost. In addition, the Germans, since the commencement of our offensive at the Battle of Aubers Ridge, had constructed a stronger second line than the one which we had been unable to capture on May 9th. This line was protected by a thick belt of wire, and it was out of range from our trenches. Only near Cité St. Elie and in front of Haisnes were any parts of it captured, and these could not be maintained.

Further instructive comments are made on the renewal of frontal assaults at places where there had been a repulse when outflanking movements would have been more effective. The difficulties of maintaining direction in the attack, of arranging for the collection and transmission of information, of leadership and of staff work in new commands are clearly shown.

This is only a summary of what readers will find poignantly interesting in Volume IV, Military Operations.

1915 CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE.

CHAPTER I.

APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION BEFORE THE BATTLE OF AUBERS RIDGE, FOUGHT ON MAY 9TH, 1915.

GENERAL SITUATION.—From April 22nd, 1915, the Second Battle of Ypres was being fought, and it was continued until the result of our offensive operations were felt by the Germans in the vicinity of Festubert.

In this second Ypres battle we were able to hold a salient round Ypres, but we suffered heavily from the enemy’s poisoned gas and from their superior numbers of high explosive shell and machine guns; but they gained no special advantage in their position.

The result of the battle was that a more effective policy was being demanded by the public for the supply of war material. Our heavy casualties at the battle of Ypres it was thought were the result of insufficient preparation and forethought. The urgent need for ammunition had not been foreseen, and indeed it would have been difficult for our Defence Committee to have visualized the necessity for such a vast expenditure.

There was a growing demand for organization on economical and scientific lines for war. Our peace organization was not suited to deal with the war machine of a powerful industrial people who concentrated on what they considered would enable them to fulfil their ambitions.

They still were able to get their supplies from neutral countries, as we had not turned to account our great advantage of sea power in making a complete blockade. Our strength in war consists in our power and right to prevent our enemies from obtaining sea supplies while we and our friends do receive them.

The military importance of sea communications and sea transport was not yet realized, and that by not exercising our rights on the sea we were prolonging the war. We did not apparently consider that when nations are fighting on land all available power should be used to shorten and win a war.

The heavy transport of the world is still carried on the surface of the sea, so the sea communications are consequently vulnerable, and if controlled by the British Navy will be the point at which Great Britain can strike a decisive blow against her enemies.

This blow we withheld for some time, and in consequence the war was protracted, and we had to suffer on land from the new devices of poison gas, which the enemy were able to construct from material received from across the communications which we could have dominated.

War must be a choice of evils, and it is said that our complete blockade would cause suffering to innocent civilians, but it would have been more merciful to all concerned had we shortened the war by early drastic action which we could have justly taken, instead of allowing it to be prolonged and consequently adding to the casualties of the civilians, who had to be trained for war and brought into the trenches.

Our heavy casualty list included all sections of the community taken from their work in civil life to face the modern inventions of the German mechanics and scientists. We had at hand a powerful weapon, which was more certain than any other, and though by using our sea power we might have made the civilians of hostile nations hungry, yet we should have been able to accomplish the object of our declaration of war without the loss of life and destruction entailed by protracting it for four years and three months. It must be the basis of all our war policy that we maintain at all costs an effective control of the surface of the sea.

This problem with the supply of ammunition and with the adapting of our economic system to the changing situation at home and in Europe, it was felt by the public, were not being completely realized by those responsible for the conduct of operations.

The Germans had foreseen the necessity for heavy and mobile artillery supplied with great quantities of high explosive ammunition. Their organization included all their military and industrial resources, and they had evolved plans to make full use of all their power.

On the other hand the general feeling was that we were inclined to carry out the policy that had been evolved in past wars, and that our men in contact with the enemy were suffering owing to lack of preparation and prevision. In war, if there is lack of forethought and insight there will be heavy casualties, just as in the economical world, if there is a lack of thought and adaptability, there will be loss of money.

Our casualties had been very heavy. The leading of the troops in the actual operations had been beyond reproach, but there was a growing feeling that every endeavour should be made to co-operate all the resources of the nation to save unnecessary loss in the field and to give the troops at least an equal chance with gases, shells, bullets, and grenades in the fight with Germany.

A system it was now seen was required for dealing with this war. Our previous system of party politics had enabled men to reach lucrative positions if they cultivated powers of argument and fluency of speech, but the present crisis required men of administrative ability, who could look beyond the triumph in debate to the solution of important and difficult problems, which would enable us to save life and to shorten the war.

We had realized from the Battle of Neuve Chapelle the necessity of high explosive shells and the great efforts made by Germany to obtain them for the protection of her 1,400 miles of front in Europe and for the reinforcement of Turkey. We had more than a million men training in England; the French, too, had new armies ready and her ammunition supply had been enormously increased.

The German position outside Europe was not too satisfactory.

The Japanese had captured her Asiatic possession—Tsingtau. Her Pacific possessions had been taken from her. General Botha had overrun German South-West Africa. The important parts of the Cameroons had been captured. Togoland was now in our hands. There was complete unity of purpose among the Allies, who had agreed to make definite peace together on terms to which all agreed, nor was there any relaxation of effort among any of the people of the countries engaged in the war. There was a strong feeling, which the heavy casualties at the Battle of Ypres did much to foster, that the effort and resolution of the nation must be backed up by a governing body that was not only efficient, but, in addition, able