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Finland's War of Choice: The Troubled German-Finnish Coalition in World War II
Unavailable
Finland's War of Choice: The Troubled German-Finnish Coalition in World War II
Unavailable
Finland's War of Choice: The Troubled German-Finnish Coalition in World War II
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Finland's War of Choice: The Troubled German-Finnish Coalition in World War II

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A selection of the Military Book Club.

This book describes the odd coalition between Germany and Finland in World War II, and their joint military operations from 1941 to 1945. This is a topic often missing in English, though in stark contrast to the numerous books on the shorter and less bloody Winter War. That conflict represented a gallant fight of a democratic “David” against a totalitarian “Goliath” that caught the imagination of the world. The story of Finland fighting alongside a “Goliath” of its own has not brought pride to that nation and was a period many Finns would rather forget.

The prologue of this book brings the reader up to speed by briefly examining the difficult history of Finland, from its separation from the Soviet Union in 1917 to its isolation after being bludgeoned in 1939–40. It then examines both Finnish and German motives for forming a coalition against the USSR, and how—as logical as a common enemy would seem—the lack of true planning and preparation would doom the alliance.

This book posits that it was mind-boggling how the highly professional German General Staff allowed itself to accept the militarily unsound and shaky coalition that resulted. The war aims were not discussed or harmonized, there were no campaign plans with tasks and missions spelled out past the initial assault, no effective main effort established, inadequate force levels, and an unsound command structure with various headquarters. Practically every rule in the book was broken. The objective of linking up with the Finns in the Leningrad area was an important factor in Hitler opting for three main drives into the Soviet Union rather than an earlier OKH plan that called for only two.

After describing the operations during and after Barbarossa, this book describes how the Finnish theater became a blind ally for the Germans. Their strongest and best army was trapped both operationally and geographically in central and northern Finland, making virtually no contribution to the war effort. The Germans could not bring to bear enough forces to accomplish their objectives without substantial Finnish assistance, and that was not forthcoming.

The final chapters deal with the Soviet counteroffensive against the Finns in 1944. The Finns lost all their gains and quickly concluded a separate armistice. This left the German forces in Finland to simply vacate the territory, fighting between the Finns and Soviets alike as they tried to return to the main war. Jointly suffering 291,000 casualties, the only consolation was that the coalition had inflicted some 830,000 on the Soviets.

In this book, Henrik Lunde, a former US Special Operations colonel, and the renowned author of Hitler’s Pre-emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940, once again fills a profound gap in our understanding of World War II.
LanguageEnglish
PublisherCasemate
Release dateFeb 22, 2011
ISBN9781612000374
Unavailable
Finland's War of Choice: The Troubled German-Finnish Coalition in World War II

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  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    My relationship with Casemate Books is a mixed one, as for every worthwhile book approaching the quality of, say, the Kansas or Texas A&M operations, there seems to be two potboilers that mostly exist to sponge up the buying budgets of the public libraries of America. Having gotten that off my chest, this is one of the worthwhile books, as the author concentrates on the high strategy and operations of the so-called "Continuation War," in the process cutting through Finnish obfuscation about their real agenda in this conflict. Basically, it would appear that Finnish society had its own version of expansionist politics, and if this appetite could be opportunistically sated so much the better; who doesn't want to be on the side of the winners? Such is the state of official denial in Finland, that Lunde has to tease out hints of this agenda as to what responsible Finnish leaders were thinking at the time from German accounts of the alliance, but the evidence is good that this was never merely about undoing of the results of the "Winter War." However, the Finns always tried to limited their liability in this adventure, so total disaster was staved off in the end (as compared, say, to the results of Hungarian or Romanian military adventurism).While I have no real complaints about this book (apart from some clunky production values), one particular instance illustrates the limits of this study: In the collection of the photos there is a collective image of a group of Finish politicians on trial for war crimes and no real explanation is offered in the epilog. It all begs the questions of what crimes and whose court? This is not to mention the question of how Carl Mannerheim should be assessed in regards to the other military adventurers in politics of the Interwar Period; there's a rich topic there for someone with really good linguistic skills and a knack for synthesis.
  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    The Continuation War is the ugly younger brother of the famous Winter War. Stalin's foolish invasion and partial annexation of Finland had made his flank less secure and created much bad blood. So much in fact, that Finland joined Nazi Germany's planning of Operation Barbarossa, Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union. Finnish and German officers jointly planned their offensives. Finland's army officially delayed its participation in the attack for a week, so that it could claim victim status and "shoot back". During my visit to the Mannerheim Museum in Helsinki a few years ago, they actively denied Finnish cooperation in the German attack. This book clearly presents the case that the Finnish generals and politicians knew. "Plausible deniability" is not plausible.Finnish strategic thinking about the war was seriously flawed, because the permanent recovery of its lost territory rested on the Nazis winning the war. Any other outcome would pit tiny Finland against the Russian behemoth. Finland tried to fight a limited war in a total war environment which frustrated both the Germans and the Allied. The Germans approached the war in the North with much muddled thinking too. For Hitler and the Wehrmacht, the Continuation War ranked third, well behind the main attack on Russia and the defense of Norway (and Swedish resources). Constrained by scarce logistical capabilities up north, the Germans never achieved the critical mass necessary to cut the crucial Soviet supply line to the ice-free harbor of Murmansk. Even the available forces in the far north were split to three tasks of defending Norway, attacking Murmansk and cutting the railroad further south. Instead of a Schwerpunkt, the German forces were frittered away and contained by the Soviets who could rely on reinforcements via their strategic rail line.In the southern part, the Finns recovered their lost territories but refrained from cutting off Leningrad from the north. The stalemate resulted in a drôle de guerre, while both sides waited for a decision in the main theater. As the Soviets prevailed, the Finns had to pay the price. The newly freed up Soviet forces quickly convinced the Finns to negotiate and surrender in 1944. In retaliation, the retreating Germans inflicted widespread destruction of civilian property and infrastructure in the north. Finland's war of choice turned out to have been indeed an unfortunate decision.This book offers a good, staff study-like overview of the war with a heavy focus on the German actors. I would have preferred a more balanced approach, giving the Finns and the Soviets more space. Often it remains unclear how much of the Soviet forces were actually opposing the German forces listed, making a assessment harder than necessary. The maps could also have been a bit more detailed. Overall, still a worthy introduction to this unnecessary war in the cold north.