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Mao Tse-Tung On Guerrilla Warfare
Mao Tse-Tung On Guerrilla Warfare
Mao Tse-Tung On Guerrilla Warfare
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Mao Tse-Tung On Guerrilla Warfare

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The Classic text on Communist Guerrilla warfare includes an excellent introduction by Brigadier General Samuel Griffith USMC who was also the translator.

“In 1937 Mao...wrote a succinct pamphlet that has become one of the most influential documents of our time....the first systematic analysis of guerilla warfare...The widespread applicability of Mao’s doctrine stems from his realization of the fundamental disparity between the agrarian, peasant-based society of China and that of pre-revolutionary Russia, or any urban society....he had to employ tactics and appeals appropriate to the peasant.”
LanguageEnglish
Release dateNov 6, 2015
ISBN9781786250926
Mao Tse-Tung On Guerrilla Warfare
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Mao Tse Tung

Mao Tse-Tung was a Chinese revolutionary, political theorist and Communist leader. He led the People's Republic of China (PRC) from its establishment in 1949 until his death in 1976.

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  • Rating: 3 out of 5 stars
    3/5
    This was a fascinating little book written as a pamphlet by Mao Zedong to aid in the destruction of the invading Japanese. I read this book immediately after finishing Sun Tzu's Art of War which made it easy to see the influence Tzu's work had on Mao. A good read if you are interested in military affairs.

  • Rating: 5 out of 5 stars
    5/5
    I can't believe I discovered this treasure in a Maryland antique store last week while visiting the Eastern Shore from Tennessee with my wife. As a long time student of the Vietnam conflicts and Ho Chi Mihn, and to a lesser degree, Mao Tse-Tung, I had heard of this classic guerrilla primer for some time, but I've never been able to find it. Until now. In hardback. And it was pricey. But worth it.Mao wrote this small book in 1937 while leading the Chinese Red Army guerrillas against the Japanese invaders. The book was later translated and published by the US military in 1940. My edition was re-translated and published in 1961 by Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, who wrote a most excellent introduction to the book. In fact, while short, it's so excellent, that when combined with Mao's text, I couldn't help but wonder what would have happened if the French and US governments and military had read the original first, and for the US later, this edition. They could have learned some lessons, taken some advice, maybe taken some pointers, and perhaps saved countless lives in futile efforts to take over a people. It's beyond idiotic. It's actually something I've long thought, dating back to Edward Lansdale's CIA efforts in 1950s Indochina and the conclusions he drew about probable guerrilla warfare the US would be facing if we were drawn into conflict there. Simply stunning how no one in charge ever listened to the experts, the "real" experts.Mao wrote this primer while allegedly on the "Long March," I believe it's called if I remember correctly, which would have put him under serious stress while doing so. It's quite comprehensive for such a small volume. It covers things such as what guerrilla warfare is, the history of guerrilla warfare, the relationship of guerrilla operations to regular army operations, the actual organization of guerrilla units and armies, political issues for guerrillas, and more. He writes quite convincingly of his firm belief that while the enemy may be technologically superior, they can't fight on all fronts at all times of day or night and eventually a long term war will wear them down and defeat them. Griffith, the translator, makes a point that both Ho Chi Mihn and Castro used this primer and this strategy successfully and it's hard to argue against its success.Mao writes of political goals for guerrillas. These include:1. Arousing and organizing the people.2. Achieving internal unification politically.3. Establishing bases.4. Equipping forces.5. Recovering national strength.6. Destroying enemy's national strength.7. Regaining lost territories.He also lists the essential requirements for all successful guerrilla operations:1. Retention of the initiative; alertness; carefully planned tactical attacks in a war of strategical defense; tactical speed in a war strategically protracted; tactical operations on exterior lines in a war conducted strategically on interior lines.2. Conduct of operations to complement those of the regular army.3. The establishment of bases.4. A clear understanding of the relationship that exists between the attack and the defense.5. The development of mobile operations.6. Correct command.One thing Mao makes clear is guerrilla warfare is to be an offensive-only operation. Strike and strike quickly, move fast, run away if you have to, run away a lot, hit from behind, from the flanks, at night, strike supply lines, get arms and supplies from your enemies. His original guerrillas had perhaps three rifles and a few pistols per unit. The rest had swords and spears. They had to wait until they had successfully attacked and defeated Japanese units and taken their equipment before they could arm themselves.Of course it's always important for guerrillas to win the hearts of the people, especially in China's case (and Vietnam's later), the peasants. Everyone -- even children -- can help out. Anyone can be militia, spy, courier, cook, medic, soldier, etc. It's imperative to politically educate the population so everyone will know why you're fighting and why it's important to fight. And why it's important to find and eradicate traitors.Griffith's introduction, as I mentioned, is short but excellent. He gives a brief overview of Mao himself, on the nature of revolutionary guerrilla war, on strategy, tactics, and logistics of such a war, and some conclusions. Among his conclusions are the notion that fighting such guerrillas is definitely a losing proposition for a conventional army and even counter-guerrilla tactics won't work! He even goes on to say that if any country or government were to try to aid a country or government fighting against a guerrilla army, it would be wise to ONLY offer advisers and equipment. Remember, he wrote this in 1961, about the time when America was starting to openly send advisers to South Vietnam. I guess he could foretell things. Pity no one in the US government read this or listened to him or took him or this book seriously. Cause he was right. We had no chance. And if you believe Mao -- and Griffith -- virtually any government or army fighting a conventional or counter-guerrilla protracted war against a "revolutionary" guerrilla army is pretty much destined to lose. Fact. Tragedy. Too much loss of life.This book was everything I'd hoped it would be. It was superb. It was a history, a strategy, a tactic, a warning -- it was fascinating. And to read it with the benefit of history's hindsight made it especially amazing. Mao wasn't right about everything. He couldn't be. But it seems to me that Ho picked Mao's brains and used what he could and improved upon everything to totally destroy the US effort in the war we lost against North Vietnam, a war that could have been avoided if we had only looked at history. This is a book I'm keeping in my library and will undoubtedly be reading again. It's quite short and easy to read. And it's most highly recommended.
  • Rating: 3 out of 5 stars
    3/5
    Mao's work breaks down guerrilla war into its component parts, with amazing detail. The translation is clear and strongly worded, yet concise and to the point.
  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    Writing during the Japanese occupation (the book was originally published in 1937), Mao focused mainly on strategy and organization, to which he took a relatively formal approach. There is no detailed discussion of tactics such as in Ernesto "Che" Guevara's Guerrilla Warfare. One of his central tenets is that guerrilla forces need to be used in conjunction with regular forces to achieve victory.Mao stated that political indoctrination was critical to success and political officers were included at the senior level of all units in his tables of organization. There is however no discussion of communism in this book. Apparently that subject was covered in other publications, leaving this one devoid of political rhetoric (except that directed at the Japanese).
  • Rating: 3 out of 5 stars
    3/5
    There is a good deal of rhetoric in this book, and not much of the how-to manual. Still the book itself is written to be useful in the struggle of the disorganized against the greedy and oppressive, and has had influence though mostly as a political artifact. The nature of Guerrilla Warfare is of, course improvisation and therefore it is hard to produce a manual for it. Fortunately it is slim, and Griffith's translation seems agile enough.

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Mao Tse-Tung On Guerrilla Warfare - Mao Tse Tung

This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING—www.picklepartnerspublishing.com

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Text originally published in 1989 under the same title.

© Pickle Partners Publishing 2014, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

Mao Tse-tung on Guerilla Warfare

Translated by Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, USMC (Retired)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

INTRODUCTION 5

I — THE NATURE OF REVOLUTIONARY GUERRILLA WAR 5

II — PROFILE OF A REVOLUTIONIST 10

III — STRATEGY, TACTICS, AND LOGISTICS IN REVOLUTIONARY WAR 14

IV — SOME CONCLUSIONS 18

YU CHI CHAN — (Guerrilla Warfare) 22

TRANSLATOR’S NOTE 22

A FURTHER NOTE 23

1 — WHAT IS GUERRILLA WARFARE? 24

2 — THE RELATION OF GUERRILLA HOSTILITIES TO REGULAR OPERATIONS 29

3 — GUERRILLA WARFARE IN HISTORY 33

4 — CAN VICTORY BE ATTAINED BY GUERRILLA OPERATIONS? 37

5 — ORGANIZATION FOR GUERRILLA WARFARE 39

How Guerrilla Units Are Originally Formed 39

THE METHOD OF ORGANIZING GUERRILLA REGIMES 42

EQUIPMENT OF GUERRILLAS 45

ELEMENTS OF THE GUERRILLA ARMY 46

6 — THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE 48

7 — THE STRATEGY OF GUERRILLA RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN 51

APPENDIX 61

NOTES 61

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 70

INTRODUCTION

I — THE NATURE OF REVOLUTIONARY GUERRILLA WAR

...the guerrilla campaigns being waged in China today are a page in history that has no precedent. Their influence will be confined not solely to China in her present anti-Japanese struggle, but will be world-wide. —Mao Tse-tung, Yu Chi Chan, 1937

At one end of the spectrum, ranks of electronic boxes buried deep in the earth hungrily consume data and spew out endless tapes. Scientists and engineers confer in air-conditioned offices; missiles are checked by intense men who move about them silently, almost reverently. In forty minutes, countdown begins.

At the other end of this spectrum, a tired man wearing a greasy felt hat, a tattered shirt, and soiled shorts is seated, his back against a tree. Barrel pressed between his knees, butt resting on the moist earth between sandaled feet, is a Browning automatic rifle. Hooked to his belt, two dirty canvas sacks—one holding three home-made bombs, the other four magazines loaded with .30-caliber ammunition. Draped around his neck, a sausage-like cloth tube with three days’ supply of rice. The man stands, raises a water bottle to his lips, rinses his mouth, spits out the water. He looks about him carefully, corks the bottle, slaps the stock of the Browning three times, pauses, slaps it again twice, and disappears silently into the shadows. In forty minutes, his group of fifteen men will occupy a previously prepared ambush.

It is probable that guerrilla war, nationalist and revolutionary in nature, will flare up in one or more of half a dozen countries during the next few years. These outbreaks may not initially be inspired, organized, or led by local Communists; indeed, it is probable that they will not be. But they will receive the moral support and vocal encouragement of international Communism, and where circumstances permit, expert advice and material assistance as well.

As early as November, 1949, we had this assurance from China’s Number Two Communist, Liu Shao-ch’i, when, speaking before the Australasian Trade Unions Conference in Peking, he prophesied that there would be other Asian revolutions that would follow the Chinese pattern. We paid no attention to this warning.

In December, 1960, delegates of eighty-one Communist and Workers’ Parties resolved that the tempo of wars of liberation should be stepped up. A month later (January 6, 1961), the Soviet Premier, an unimpeachable authority on national liberation wars, propounded an interesting series of questions to which he provided equally interesting answers:

Is there a likelihood of such wars recurring? Yes, there is. Are uprisings of this kind likely to recur? Yes, they are. But wars of this kind are popular uprisings. Is there the likelihood of conditions in other countries reaching the point where the cup of the popular patience overflows and they take to arms? Yes, there is such a likelihood. What is the attitude of the Marxists to such uprisings? A most favorable attitude....These uprisings are directed against the corrupt reactionary regimes, against the colonialists. The Communists support just wars of this kind wholeheartedly and without reservations.{1}

Implicit is the further assurance that any popular movement infiltrated and captured by the Communists will develop an anti-Western character definitely tinged, in our own hemisphere at least, with a distinctive anti-American coloration.

This should not surprise us if we remember that several hundred millions less fortunate than we have arrived, perhaps reluctantly, at the conclusion that the Western peoples are dedicated to the perpetuation of the political, social, and economic status quo. In the not too distant past, many of these millions looked hopefully to America, Britain, or France for help in the realization of their justifiable aspirations. But today many of them feel that these aims can be achieved only by a desperate revolutionary struggle that we will probably oppose. This is not a hypothesis; it is fact.

A potential revolutionary situation exists in any country where the government consistently fails in its obligation to ensure at least a minimally decent standard of life for the great majority of its citizens. If there also exists even the nucleus of a revolutionary party able to supply doctrine and organization, only one ingredient is needed: the instrument for violent revolutionary action.

In many countries, there are but two classes, the rich and the miserably poor. In these countries, the relatively small middle class—merchants, bankers, doctors, lawyers, engineers—lacks forceful leadership, is fragmented by unceasing factional quarrels, and is politically ineffective. Its program, which usually posits a socialized society and some form of liberal parliamentary democracy, is anathema to the exclusive and tightly knit possessing minority. It is also rejected by the frustrated intellectual youth, who move irrevocably toward violent revolution. To the illiterate and destitute, it represents a package of promises that experience tells them will never be fulfilled.

People who live at subsistence level want first things to be put first. They are not particularly interested in freedom of religion, freedom of the press, free enterprise as we understand it, or the secret ballot. Their needs are more basic: land, tools, fertilizers, something better than rags for their children, houses to replace their shacks, freedom from police oppression, medical attention, primary schools. Those who have known only poverty have begun to wonder why they should continue to wait passively for improvements. They see—and not always through Red-tinted glasses—examples of peoples who have changed the structure of their societies, and they ask, What have we to lose? When a great many people begin to ask themselves this question, a revolutionary guerrilla situation is incipient.

A revolutionary war is never confined within the bounds of military action. Because its purpose is to destroy an existing society and its institutions and to replace them with a completely new state structure, any revolutionary war is a unity of which the constituent parts, in varying importance, are military, political, economic, social, and psychological. For this reason, it is endowed with a dynamic quality and a dimension in depth that orthodox wars, whatever their scale, lack. This is particularly true of revolutionary guerrilla war, which is not susceptible to the type of superficial military treatment frequently

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