Operational Raids: Cavalry In The Vicksburg Campaign, 1862-1863
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Some of the conclusions that can be drawn from this investigation are: the use of cavalry had evolved to large, independent units for separate operations; the operational benefit of cavalry was demonstrated first by the Confederacy, then refined and used by the Federals during the Vicksburg Campaign; the synchronization and orchestration of units from different commands against a common target produced significant benefits; and sufficiently strong units, capable of self-sustainment, can be detached from the main body of an army to operate behind enemy lines to destroy the enemy Infrastructure.
The study concludes that operational raids can be a significant economical operation to attack an enemy center of gravity without using the bulk of the army. The historical examples from the Vicksburg Campaign can be compared to today’s force structure to show that capability is limited for the modem commander.
Captain Paul C. Jussel
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Operational Raids - Captain Paul C. Jussel
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Text originally published in 2005 under the same title.
© Pickle Partners Publishing 2015, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.
Publisher’s Note
Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.
We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.
OPERATIONAL RAIDS: CAVALRY IN THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN, 1862-1863
by
Captain Paul C. Jussel, USA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS 4
ABSTRACT 5
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 6
CHAPTER 1 7
CHAPTER 2 10
CHAPTER 3 16
CHAPTER 4 26
CHAPTER 5 36
APPENDIX 1—CONFEDERATE AND UNION CAVALRY, ORDER OF BATTLE, DECEMBER, 1862 46
APPENDIX 2—CONFEDERATE AND UNION CAVALRY, ORDER OF BATTLE, APRIL, 1863 48
REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 49
BIBLIOGRAPHY 51
BOOKS 51
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS 53
PERIODICALS AND ARTICLES 53
UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS 54
ABSTRACT
This study is a historical analysis of the cavalry raids led by Confederate Major Generals Earl Van Dorn and Nathan Bedford Forrest in December 1862 and Union Colonel Benjamin Grierson in April 1863. Each raid is examined in detail based on the historical data available and focuses on the operational concerns and considerations of Union and Confederate commanders.
Some of the conclusions that can be drawn from this investigation are: the use of cavalry had evolved to large, independent units for separate operations; the operational benefit of cavalry was demonstrated first by the Confederacy, then refined and used by the Federals during the Vicksburg Campaign; the synchronization and orchestration of units from different commands against a common target produced significant benefits; and sufficiently strong units, capable of self-sustainment, can be detached from the main body of an army to operate behind enemy lines to destroy the enemy Infrastructure.
The study concludes that operational raids can be a significant economical operation to attack an enemy center of gravity without using the bulk of the army. The historical examples from the Vicksburg Campaign can be compared to today’s force structure to show that capability is limited for the modem commander.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Though it may seem commonplace and quaint, I must acknowledge the patience of my wife and son who, for seemingly countless hours, rarely saw their husband and father. The Dungeon was a dark place to work, but their good humor made it all worthwhile. Thanks for everything.
CHAPTER 1
AirLand Battle doctrine stresses the need for initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization. Initiative implies not only taking action within the commander’s intent, but also forcing the enemy to conform to our operational purpose and tempo.
Agility concerns the physical ability to react faster than the enemy can, as well as the mental capability to understand changing situations and create a new plan or scheme based on the new circumstances: Depth, the extension of operations in space, time, and resources,
and synchronization, the arrangement of battlefield activities in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive point,
complement the other tenets to produce the conditions that lead to our intended end state—battlefield victory.{1}
Yet victory is not possible without the clear and purposeful application of a nation’s resources against the enemy’s source of strength and will: his center of gravity. The application of power in a particular area, a theater of war or theater of operations, must be coordinated at a high level, a level the US Army currently terms operational
. The operational level of war concerns the orchestration of all available forces in a coordinated effort, a campaign, against the enemy’s center of gravity. Within the overall framework of a campaign, many ways and means exist to attack the enemy’s center of gravity; one of them is a raid on a vulnerable supply base or line of communication. The raid, as an operational mission, is a very efficient and effective method of attacking the weak link of a numerically superior enemy. In an economy of force role, with the appropriate priority, a small number of highly trained soldiers or a relatively small unit can successfully perform the mission.
By definition, a raid is designed to confuse the enemy
or to destroy his installations.
{2} Though currently limited in scope to a small scale operation, large units can perform this mission successfully. History is replete with examples of large armies being stymied in their efforts by a far smaller force raiding into its rear and destroying its support system. From the American Civil War, Major General Philip Sheridan’s Trevilian Station Raid, launched In June, 1864 with 8000 men in two divisions, is an example. Its purpose was twofold. Sheridan was first tasked to destroy the supply lines from the Shenandoah Valley to the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia stationed around Richmond. His secondary mission was to draw the majority of the Confederate cavalry away from the main army to allow the Union Army of the Potomac to cross the James River unmolested. Though failing in the first task, Sheridan succeeded in the second task.{3} This operational raid focused not only on the logistical lifelines, but also on the Confederate instrument of operational influence, the cavalry. The real Federal success lay in the control of the Confederate cavalry; they had to ride to the beat set by Sheridan’s troopers.
Another example was when Major General James Wilson, with over 13,000 troopers organized into three divisions, rode into the untouched Confederate farmland of Alabama and Georgia in March and April, 1865.{4} This raid destroyed