Arracourt - September 1944

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Text originally published in 1982 under the same title.

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Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

ARRACOURT—SEPTEMBER 1944

By

Major Richard H. Barnes, USA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

ABSTRACT 5

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 6

LIST OF MAPS—ARRACOURT 7

INTRODUCTION 8

CHAPTER 1 — BACKGROUND 9

Strategic Objectives 9

Area of Operations 19

Opposing Forces 22

Personnel 26

Logistical Support 27

Leadership 28

Command and Control 28

Morale 30

Intelligence 30

U.S. Tactics 32

Training 33

CHAPTER 2 — THE ADVANCE OF CCA TO ARRACOURT AND THE LUNEVILLE DIVERSION 34

CHAPTER 3 — FIRST ARRACOURT TANK BATTLE, 19-22 SEPTEMBER 1944 50

The German Attack—18 September 52

22 September 68

CHAPTER 4 — The Battle Continues 24-29 September 73

CHAPTER 5 — SIGNIFICANCE OF ARRACOURT 98

Lessons Learned. 103

APPENDIX 1 — GERMAN LAND COMMAND IN THE WEST 106

APPENDIX 2 — ORGANIC AND ATTACHED UNITS OF THE FOURTH ARMORED DIVISION 107

APPENDIX 3 — TABLES OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT (TO&E’s) OF FIFTH PANZER ARMY DIVISIONS 109

APPENDIX 4 — FIFTH PANZER ARMY ORDER OF BATTLE 112

APPENDIX 5 — TANKS USED AT ARRACOURT* 114

U.S. TANKS 114

GERMAN TANKS 114

BIBLIOGRAPHY 115

BOOKS 115

PERIODICAL ARTICLES 116

LETTERS 117

DOCUMENTS 117

PUBLISHED 117

UNPUBLISHED 118

MISCELLANEOUS 122

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 123

ABSTRACT

This battle study investigates operational and tactical considerations of the battles of Arracourt, which took place in September 1944 as the 4th Armored Division of Patton’s Third Army clashed with the Fifth German Panzer Army in the French province of Lorraine on the U.S. drive to the German West Wall.

By examining detailed German and American unit histories, logs, and summaries, as well as personal papers, this study illuminates differences and similarities in reporting the U.S. penetration from the Nancy Bridgehead to Arracourt, the German offensive at Lunéville as a prelude to Arracourt, and the two German offensives at Arracourt, as the Fifth Panzer Army attempted to link up with a German unit cut off at Nancy.

Arracourt exemplifies penetration and mobile defense and illustrates the demand for good intelligence and flexible command and control. It shows the inherent risks of piecemeal commitment of reserves, the need for timely orders and good logistical support, as well as the tactical advantages of air superiority.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I received much help in the preparation of this thesis. I gratefully acknowledge the able assistance of my thesis committee. COL William A. Stofft, chairman, guided me through the entire project from initial research through the subsequent stages of writing and editing. LTC Kenneth A. Steadman provided valuable insights into the tactical and intelligence aspects of the battle. Dr. Roger J. Spiller enabled me to maintain my focus on the central problem and directed me to pertinent literature and reports.

I gathered much of the primary source material outside of Fort Leavenworth. I am grateful to John Slonaker and Dennis Vetock of the Military History Institute at Carlisle and to Herbert Pankratz of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS, for selflessly locating pertinent documents for me. George Wagner of the Modern History Branch of the National Archives located four microfilm rolls of captured German documents, which formed the backbone of this study.

Gathering information and writing it down is only the beginning; it must be presented in such a way as to be understandable to the reader. I am indebted to LTC David M. Glantz of the Combat Studies Institute, who carefully reviewed the manuscript and checked for inconsistencies. Marjorie Christine Collier-Trevino and Greg Smith of the Media Support Center expertly prepared the maps. The typists of the Word Processing Center carried out the tedious business of typing and retyping the manuscript. Elizabeth R. Snoke and Alice M. McCart painstakingly arranged and edited the notes and bibliography.

I am indebted to GEN Bruce C. Clarke for his valuable letters and other pertinent literature. Samuel Schenker, Secretary-Treasurer of the 4th Armored Division Association, provided names and addresses of former members of the Division who served at Arracourt. I am also indebted to the following who provided key insights for this study: Thomas J. Cooke, William A. Dwight, Thomas J. Evans, Lawrence E. Fleischman, GEN Paul D. Harkins, Charles L. Kimsey, Kenneth R. Lamison, Merwin A. Marston, MG Delk M. Oden, Robert M. Parker, and James Turner.

Most of all, I acknowledge the contribution of my wife Linda, without whose moral support, advice and devotion I could never have completed this project.

LIST OF MAPS—ARRACOURT

CHAPTER 1—BACKGROUND

Map 1—Broad vs Narrow Front

Map 2—German Eastern and Western Front

Map 3—Allied and German Forces in Western Europe, September 1944

Map 4—Lorraine

Map 5—Arracourt Area of Operations

CHAPTER 2 ADVANCE OF CCA TO ARRACOURT AND THE LUNEVILLE DIVERSION

Map 6—Mission of 4th Armored Division

Map 7—Route of CCA, 4th Armored Division, 13-14 September 1944

Map 8—37th Tank Battalion attack on 16 September to assist CCB over Canal

Map 9—CCR to Lunéville, 15-18 September 1944

Map 10—Battle of Lunéville—18 September 1944

CHAPTER 3—FIRST ARRACOURT BATTLE (19-22 SEPTEMBER 1944)

Map 11—Disposition of 4th Armored Division, 18/19 September 1944

Map 12—Disposition of CCA, 4th Armored Division, 18/19 September 1944

Map 13—LVIXI Panzer Corps Attack, 19 September 1944

Map 14—CCA Operations on 20 September 1944

Map 15—CCA Operations on 21 September 1944

Map 16—111th Panzer Brigade Attack, 22 September 1944

Map 17—Unit Positions on 22/23 September 1944

CHAPTER 4—THE BATTLE CONTINUES (25-29 SEPTEMBER 1944)

Map 18—LVIII Panzer Corps attack—25 September 1944

Map 19—Movement of CCB to Arracourt, 25/26 September 1944

Map 20—Redraw battle lines, 25-26 September 1944

Map 21—11th Panzer Division Attack on Arracourt Salient, 27-29 September 1944

Map 22—Disposition of forces an 30 September 1944

INTRODUCTION

The area around Arracourt, a small farming town of Lorraine, France, was the site of a series of battles in September 1944, fought by the 4th Armored Division, spearheading Patton’s Third Army six week race across France into Germany against Germany’s Fifth Panzer Army. Over extended supply lines and critical fuel shortages forced the 4th Armored Division to halt two weeks at the Moselle, thereby gaining time for Fifth Panzer Army to strengthen its defenses, maneuver into position, and launch a series of bitter attacks against the assembled American forces.

This study examines the tactics both sides used at Arracourt, tactics set against a backdrop of the Allied broad front strategy and the dominant personalities of Montgomery, Patton, Wood, and Clarke. Chapter 1 provides the strategic and operational context for the battles at Arracourt. Chapter 2 outlines the 4th Armored Division’s breaching of strong German positions at Dieulouard, the subsequent advance to Arracourt by CCA of the 4th Armored Division, CCB’s and CCR’s Moselle crossing south of Nancy, CCB’s advance to Fresnes (north of Arracourt), and CCR’s battle at Lunéville as a prelude to Arracourt. The focus then shifts to Arracourt, as elements of Fifth Panzer Army, attempting to link up with a Nancy-based unit, attacked the Arracourt salient in two phases (19-22 September in Chapter 3 and 25-29 September in Chapter 4), where the Allied victory ultimately forced the Germans to go on the defensive. Chapter 5 assesses the significance of the battles and the lessons learned.

The detailed German and American unit histories, logs and summaries, and personal diaries and letters illuminate differences and similarities in reporting the same incidents. German microfilm records show the Germans’ careful planning, their unflinching obedience to orders, and their ability to launch an attack in spite of severe manpower, tank, ammunition, equipment, and other shortages. And they did this when morale was low in the mud and fog of September in France. The American records show that the 4th Armored Division innovatively used tanks (at night, concealed by smoke, with tank destroyers), carefully applied tanks, artillery, infantry, and air support in combined arms operations and adapted to the flexibility requirements of offensive and defensive combat operations.

Arracourt illustrates the demand for good intelligence and flexible command and control. It shows the inherent risks of piecemeal commitment of reserves, the need for timely orders and good logistical support, and the tactical advantages of air superiority.

Arracourt was a critical battle in Patton’s drive to Germany. The carefully orchestrated tank, artillery, infantry, and air power tied sufficient German forces to allow Montgomery’s 21st Army Group to attack in the north. Arracourt denied the Germans a successful counterattack, prevented their regaining any lost ground, and then became a bastion from which Third Army launched its Ardennes winter offensive in November 1944. A brilliant example of the 360-degree mobile defense, Arracourt is a model in defensive tactics and combined operations for the future.

CHAPTER 1 — BACKGROUND

The battles of Arracourt during September 1944 were part of Patton’s Lorraine Campaign. The U.S. 4th Armored Division not only spearheaded an advance through France in its drive to Germany, but also conducted a mobile defense against major German counterattacks. Employing both traditional fire and maneuver tactics and some newly recycled techniques, units at Arracourt clashed in the greatest tank battle on the Western front.{1}

Strategic Objectives

Arracourt must be studied in both its strategic and tactical contexts. The Allied military strategy in Western Europe was to advance through France along two principal avenues of approach and defeat German forces (see map 1).{2} The main avenue of approach was given to British Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery’s 21st Army Group.{3} He was to invade Germany through the low countries and capture the Ruhr industrial area from the north. General Courtney Hodges’ First Army was to make a Rhine crossing and capture the southern Ruhr area along the northern avenue while General George S. Patton’s Third Army was to move along the secondary avenue of approach, cross the Moselle River near Nancy, advance through Alsace-Lorraine and make Rhine crossings in the area of Mannheim and Mainz.{4} Thus, 12th Army Group, commanded by Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, was split along both avenues of approach. This broad front advance had not been planned from the outset. During early August 1944 Montgomery and Bradley debated the pro and cons of a two-pronged or single-thrust advance. Montgomery proposed that the Allies concentrate all strength on a drive through the low countries by way of Amiens and Brussels over a path almost twice as long as the route through Alsace-Lorraine.{5}

Map 1-Broad vs Narrow Front

The Allies needed strong forces in the north where Montgomery’s 21st Army Group still faced German divisions isolated along the English Channel at the port of Calais. If Montgomery could move quickly, he could capture Antwerp and the channel ports and seize the Belgian air fields, which would be used for short-range fighter support of heavy bombers engaged in daylight raids. In addition, such a move by Montgomery would clear the rocket belt from which the Germans were consistently harassing London.{6}

Bradley argued for a modified double thrust whereby the Third Army in the south would carry the 12th Army Group past Metz’s fortifications and penetrate the as yet unmanned defenses of the West Wall.{7} If the southern thrust went all the way to the Rhine, it would deprive the Germans of the industrially important Saar basin. Additionally, it would force them to spread their resources over a wider area, thereby reducing resistance to both advances.

On 23 August Eisenhower decided tentatively in favor of the single thrust: Montgomery making the main effort along the channel coast; Bradley supporting the British effort with all nine divisions of the First Army; and only the Third Army in the south with First Army having first priority on supplies. Bradley vigorously opposed the decision, and in a directive issued on 29 August Eisenhower amended the plan, leaving control of First Army under Bradley.{8}

On 2 September Eisenhower went to Versailles to meet with Bradley, Hodges, and Patton to plan their advances. At Versailles, Patton convinced Eisenhower that the opportunities on his front were too good to pass up, and the supreme commander agreed to allocate additional gasoline stocks to Third Army. In addition, he shifted the direction of First Army’s advance from northeast to due east, resuming the broad front advance.

Two days later, SHEAF found that Montgomery was moving easily after capturing Brussels and the port of Antwerp intact. So they decided not to stop Patton’s