Operational Encirclements: Can The United States Military Decisively Follow Through?
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To accomplish this examination, this monograph conducts an analysis of four historical case studies: The Argentan-Falaise Pocket, the Battle of Ia Drang, Doctrinal Revolution from 1986-2001, and Operation Anaconda. The analysis identifies the U.S. military has placed an over reliance on firepower to replace the maneuver of ground combat units. Secondly, this monograph also argues the U.S. military has placed too much emphasis on technology. This belief in technology has reduced the number of ground combat units employed in offensive operations. Additionally, U.S. military doctrine historically has not provided the foundation necessary to support and encourage the planning and execution of encirclement operations. These deficiencies together have prevented the U.S. military from capitalizing on the decisive nature resulting from the speed and shock of correctly executed encirclement operations.
Major Scott Thomas
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Operational Encirclements - Major Scott Thomas
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Text originally published in 2009 under the same title.
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OPERATIONAL ENCIRCLEMENTS: CAN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY DECISIVELY FOLLOW THROUGH?
BY
MAJ SCOTT THOMAS, US ARMY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS 4
ABSTRACT 5
INTRODUCTION 6
THE ARGENTAN-FALAISE POCKET 12
THE BATTLE OF THE IA DRANG VALLEY 18
DOCTRINAL REVOLUTION 1986-2001 23
OPERATION ANACONDA 28
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 33
APPENDIX 1 36
APPENDIX 2 37
APPENDIX 3 38
APPENDIX 4 39
REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 41
BIBLIOGRAPHY 42
Books and Articles 42
Doctrine, Reports, and Monographs 44
Personal Interview 45
ABSTRACT
This study is a historical analysis of how encirclement operations have been and still are important offensive operations. These operations need to be given priority in planning and execution by the United States Military. Encirclement operations have proven to be decisive military operations throughout history; regardless of the composition and disposition of the enemy encircled. The U.S. military has maintained the decisive edge on the battlefield for over sixty years. Even with the benefits of technology, air supremacy, firepower, mobility, and maneuver, the U.S. military has not yet been completely successful in planning and executing encirclement operations. Today the U.S. military is arguably the best equipped and trained force in history. Even with this professional force, it is questionable whether the U.S. military could successfully execute an encirclement operation. Therefore this monograph provides a historical examination as to why the U.S. military has been unable to reap the benefits of the offensive maneuver of encirclement.
To accomplish this examination, this monograph conducts an analysis of four historical case studies: The Argentan-Falaise Pocket, the Battle of Ia Drang, Doctrinal Revolution from 1986-2001, and Operation Anaconda. The analysis identifies the U.S. military has placed an over reliance on firepower to replace the maneuver of ground combat units. Secondly, this monograph also argues the U.S. military has placed too much emphasis on technology. This belief in technology has reduced the number of ground combat units employed in offensive operations. Additionally, U.S. military doctrine historically has not provided the foundation necessary to support and encourage the planning and execution of encirclement operations. These deficiencies together have prevented the U.S. military from capitalizing on the decisive nature resulting from the speed and shock of correctly executed encirclement operations.
This paper concludes the Army must acknowledge and amend its doctrine to reflect the encirclement operation as a stand-alone form of offensive maneuver. Furthermore, encirclement operations are not just a result of a pursuit or exploitation operation. Encirclement operations can and should be planned as an independent operation. Prioritizing these operations by making them an independent mission will ensure U.S. forces have the resources and combat power needed to ensure success on the battlefield.
INTRODUCTION
When the enemy is driven back, we have failed, and when he is cut off, encircled and dispersed, we have succeeded.
{1}—Field Marshal Prince Aleksander V. Suvorov
The ultimate objective of successfully maneuvering to achieve an operational encirclement around one’s enemy has been an integral part of warfare since the Carthaginian commander Hannibal Barca encircled and destroyed a Roman army numbering over 80,000 soldiers in the Battle of Cannae in 216 B.C.{2} The Battle of Cannae along with numerous other battles throughout history provide ample record attesting to the decisive effect achieved by armies that skillfully maneuvered and successfully encircled their enemy. During World War II, outmaneuvering the enemy to accomplish a successful operational encirclement became one of the trademark characteristics defining success or failure for both the major allied and axis powers. The Soviet military during the course of World War II conducted numerous operational encirclements destroying over 200 division sized formations.{3} Historical battles provide a stout testament to the decisive effect encirclement operations have had on the outcome of military operations.
Achieving these bold operations has always heavily depended on the encircling force’s ability