Beyond the Crises: Zimbabwe�s Prospects for Transformation

industries.

Introduction

Tendai Murisa and Tendai Chikweche

Zimbabwe, a Southern African country with a population of about 13.5 million people, has featured regularly in regional and international public conversations since the 1950s on settler colonialism, decolonisation, independence (the politics of reconciliation), contested land redistribution and severe economic collapse. The country is currently in the midst of an economic recovery process after more than 15 years of a debilitating crisis during which it went from being a case study of a semi-industrialised country to a state of economic collapse, a meltdown characterised by record runaway inflation and a serious shortage of basic goods. Whilst the causes of the crisis remains a topic of debate, its negative impact on our politics, the economy and the general social fabric (inclusive of welfare and social services delivery) cannot be disputed. The ongoing recovery of sectors such as tourism and mining accounted for the partial economic recovery. However, this has since stalled and there is evidence of increasing social and economic challenges in the era of the multiple currency regime. These developments and national electoral politics have ensured continued focus and attention on Zimbabwe.

Characterisations of the country’s politics and development trajectory mostly depend on the narrator. In essence any discussion on Zimbabwe has mostly been ‘contested terrain’.¹ Debate is essential for a healthy democracy, and in this spirit we also aim to make a contribution to the legion of ideas on national development (inclusive of the ideas for economic development, politics, social and cultural well-being) through a process of thinking aloud about what needs to be done to shape the future of the country. This is mostly a daunting task especially for those of us who have mostly been trained and equipped with skills to reflect on what has taken place and rarely to project into the future. We are not spiritual sages of any sort, although there is always a temptation to seek for clairvoyance skills given the tumultuous nature of the desired change. Gatsheni-Ndlovu (2013:262) has also aptly observed that such an endeavor is common beyond the grouping behind this book. He remarks that Zimbabweans (in general) like other human beings from across the world do not tire of trying to make sense of their murky present with a view to prescribing the mysterious future. We join others in this endeavour but our approach is based on the belief that recent experiences and trends provide a sound footing for us in terms of clues and forecasting the opportunities and challenges that are likely to shape the country’s future. Unlike economists, we do not adhere to the ceteris paribus (things being constant/equal) principle but rather we seek to also anticipate the upheavals associated with human life.

The chapters in this entire volume focus on different aspects of re-imagining our politics social and economic justice processes. Our goal is to initiate a broad discussion on key tenets of these key pillars of human development with a view to suggesting possible future directions of potential practical solutions and policy development for the inclusive attainment of political processes, social and economic justice for Zimbabweans. The book provides a non-prescriptive broad framework for a political, social and economic transformation agenda. In this way we connect with those who had to bear arms for the liberation of Zimbabwe, noting that whilst political independence, in terms of universal suffrage, has been attained we have not made giant strides towards the achievement of creating inclusive processes for political participation, social and economic justice. For us, social and economic justice means, inclusive, equitable, dignified, non-discriminatory and democratic access to the means of production and other public goods such as health and education. We are wary of limiting what we are referring to as social and economic justice as development. For us development is too broad a notion which at times seems to be used to denote almost everything to do with change in society. This often includes even processes and programs that often eventually leave communities worse off but are still positioned as part of development. To us development is dangerously close to a vacuous concept lacking substantive meaning if it is not properly qualified thus instead we prefer to work with a more encompassing framework of politicall and socio-economic transformation.

Furthermore, we see a need to reposition the state especially in the aftermath of the waning influence of the Washington Consensus. Despite the euphoria over what has been referred to in the media as ‘Africa rising’, the evidence suggests an increase in inequality, further marginalisation of communities given the absence of the state from process of re-allocating benefits from increased economic activities. Market players, especially multinationals, have had very limited impact on achievement of social and economic justice except maybe in the creation of formal sector jobs. Even then the social conditions of work and the wages offered have not promoted dignity. Thus instead of advocating for a replacement of the state with the market we see the need for a new understanding of how the state (especially in the periphery) should be at the centre of development. From the outset we identify with the thinking that the subordinate manner in which Zimbabwe (and indeed the entire global South) is inserted into the global economy either as a producer or consumer of global goods has a significant effect on production, accumulation and consumption patterns (see Moyo and Yeros, 2005 for a more detailed discussion on centre-periphery relations) which in turn also negatively affect achievement of social and economic justice.

Present-day Zimbabwe is a result of both her brutal colonial past and post-independence history. These historical moments have shaped in profound ways the manner in which not only accumulation, consumption and welfare are organised, but also the public policy regime defining the terms of accessing public goods. Mamdani’s (1996) characterisation of citizens and subjects in post-colonial Africa is not far off the mark in describing the state-society relations. Zimbabwe, whether under sanctions or as full participant in the global economy, is not isolated from events taking place within Africa and also within the developed regions. Our future is ultimately shaped by how we deal with the legacies of the past and the realities and challenges of today and ultimately it is the responsibility of each Zimbabwean to play his or her role in contributing towards the Zimbabwe we desire. The narratives defining our present are very polarised for many reasons but what is certain is that we are living in a moment of uncertainty and crisis, not only as a nation but as a civilisation. Gatsheni-Ndlovu (2013:240) has appropriately described it thus: ‘what is at stake and in crisis is the idea of progress itself ’.

ZIMBABWE SINCE 2000: A MULTIFACETED CRISIS

The turn of the century coincided with Zimbabwe’s worst economic performance crisis. It was characterised by a 40% decline in GDP (World Bank, 2006), a rate of inflation that had been rising since 2000 and reached its highest at more than 1,500% in 2008 (CSO, 2008) and acute foreign currency shortages. The economic meltdown has also been associated with the shrinking of industrial activity, through the closure of many manufacturing concerns and downsizing of some, and consequent high unemployment rates (estimated to be in the range of 70% of the total labour force). The economic decline affected the social reproduction capacities of both urban and rural households. Formal sector urban employment shrunk from 3.6 million in 2003 to 480,000 in 2008 (Mail and Guardian, 18 January 2009) and even those who managed to retain their jobs were in most cases receiving wages that are below the poverty datum line, mostly eroded by the hyperinflationary environment.

There are various explanations for the emergence of the crisis. Some identify the roots of the crisis in the IMF and World Bank-led economic reform programmes adopted in 1990 (Moyo, 2001; Yeros, 2002; Moyo and Yeros, 2005b; Murisa, 2008), while others (Hammar et al., 2003; Richardson, 2005) emphasise the ‘mismanagement’ of the economy, corruption and the inappropriate manner in which land reform (popularly referred to as fast track) was executed by the GoZ and the consequent loss of property rights. These two supposedly opposing viewpoints are complementary and only provide a more comprehensive picture when analysed as two sides of the same coin.

More critically, the initial causes of the crisis are to be found in the process of decolonisation, especially the conditionalities of the Lancaster House Agreement which limited the possibility of a sweeping land redistribution process in the first decade of independence. The reformist approach promoted by the Lancaster House Agreement and also religiously pursued by the new ZANU (PF) government contributed towards an enclave like form of economic development in which only a minority benefited from the peace dividend of independence. The failure on the government’s part to come up with an effective framework for equitable development based on significant redistributive land reforms ensured that the majority of the population remained very vulnerable to poverty. Furthermore, government’s increased social expenditure, especially in the area of education and health delivery, was not complemented by an increase in government revenues but was highly dependent on government borrowing. The government financed most of its social reforms through domestic and international borrowing (Bond, 1998). The economic reforms of the 1990s were partially imposed on the government as part of a strategy to reduce social expenditure but instead they contributed towards the shrinking of most sectors of industry, in the process fuelling urban to rural migration, which also renewed demands for land redistribution (Moyo, 2000).

Foreign funding continued to trickle in during most of the 1990s. In fact the last balance of payment (BoP) support of US$193 million dollars from the IMF was received in August 1999 (ICG, 2004:67). From that time until the end of 2009 Zimbabwe did not receive any support from the IMF. Most of the World Bank-supported infrastructure development projects came to an end towards the end of the 1990s. The World Bank (2006:4) acknowledged that ‘isolation from the global economy’ was one of the major causes of the crisis.

Besides the structural constraints and isolation from international finance there has been significant economic mismanagement by the ZANU (PF) government. One of the major highlights was when in 1988 the then Prime Minister (Robert Mugabe) had to assemble a commission of inquiry under the chairmanship of Judge Wilson Sandura to investigate allegations of impropriety in the use of a ministerial car vehicle scheme. The allegations were that cabinet ministers were buying cars at a very low cost through the scheme and selling them on the open market. The commission’s report named five cabinet ministers who had abused the scheme and they were forced to resign (Sandura Report, 1987). This is one of the few proven examples that demonstrate the corrupt practices of ZANU (PF) elites although there are many more incidences that have been reported in the press. In the divorce case between the then Minister of Local Government and Housing his ex-wife’s affidavit showed a list of more than 50 properties spread around the country owned by the Minister. The process of land redistribution has also been marred by allegations of multiple farm ownership amongst ZANU (PF) elites.

In the post-2000 period, one of the most salient areas where principles of public finance management have been violated in the country was the manner in which the central bank was given considerable policy space to run the economy in an effort to respond to the crisis and also to ensure that the state could continue to provide support to critical sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing. From 2003 to 2008 the central bank was engaged in what it termed ‘quasi-fiscal’ activities which entailed unchecked² expenditure in a number of agrarian reform programmes and economic recovery programmes. This form of government expenditure did not go through the normal channels of the budget-making process, such as prior consultations and seeking approval from Parliament. In the era of hyperinflation, these quasi-fiscal activities became more important than the national budget allocations which were swallowed by inflation within two months of announcement, thereby reducing every government department and programme to dependence upon an unelected authority. The 2006 World Bank report on Zimbabwe correctly cited ‘weak and incoherent macroeconomic management frameworks, frequent droughts, an unfavorable policy environment and the disruptive effects of the fast track land reform programme as contributing factors to the crisis’ (World Bank, 2006:4-5).

Some of the causes of the economic crisis are to be found within the political landscape. The ZANU (PF) dominated regime has since the late 1990s, especially after the abandonment of ESAP and the military intervention in the DRC, been under close scrutiny by the international community. Its intolerance of dissent and handling of the opposition and civil society based political and human rights activists have earned the country’s leader, President Robert Mugabe, the title of ‘dictator’ and at one time he was equated to Milosevic (Yeros, 2002).

The manner in which land was compulsorily acquired from 1997 onwards affected the confidence of would-be investors as it destroyed one of the sacred values of neoliberal economic management, the sanctity of property rights. In response to compulsory land acquisition and other politically related human rights violations the US government passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Recovery Act (ZIDERA) in 2001. The Act effectively empowers the US to use its voting rights and influence (as the main donor) in multilateral lending agencies, such as the IMF, World Bank, and African Development Bank, to veto any applications by Zimbabwe for finance (Hondora, 2008:1).

The opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was during the same period able to sustain the agenda for democratic change in Zimbabwe on the international agenda. At times the description of the social and economic conditions have been characterised by hyperbole to suggest ‘catastrophic collapse and ruin’. The haemorrhaging of bilateral aid and BoP support has had a broader negative effect on economic growth and social service delivery.

The effect of political conflict on the economy has also contributed towards other dimensions of the crisis within the local political and social arena. Ever since the constitutional referendum of 2000 there has been hardening of political positions bordering on intolerance and impunity on the part of the state. The political contest has been constructed through the dichotomy of either a radical nationalist redistributive project carried out as a form of historical redress in the face of neoliberal orthodoxy, or a breakdown of the norms of liberal governance through the machinations of an authoritarian political figure (Raftopolous, 2005:10). The social dimensions of the crisis have been the most visible and the impact has been devastating on the majority of the ordinary working people (see Murisa and Nyaguse in this volume).

OUTLINING A CASE FOR ZIMBABWE’S QUEST FOR INCLUSIVE TRANSFORMATION

The contributions in this book exhaustively analyse trends from the previous ten years (others go back 50 years) to develop a comprehensive picture of the country’s political and socio-economic development landscape in order to set a transformation agenda for Zimbabwe in the short and medium term. The authors attempt to accomplish this goal by using different approaches, including agenda setting based on best practice elsewhere, trend analysis and modeling. Admittedly human life is very dynamic and it is very difficult to predict what will be before the end of the day but there is also sufficient reason to believe that there are moments, trends, cycles and behaviours that if properly analysed, understood and repeated can contribute towards a certain form of change or predictable outcome. Besides, there are some significant aspects of life that can be predicted, such as demographic trends and climate change, which help us plan better.

In fact the whole idea behind strategic planning that has become so popular within (for-profit and non-profit) organisations, government departments and agencies is predicated on the fact that there are certain aspects/elements of life that have relative constant levels. In Zimbabwe’s case the dynamics of change itself can provide a context that can be used to inform how we want to influence the processes for a better Zimbabwe. For instance the predictability of changes in climate suggests scope for modeling agriculture production (see Ndebele-Murisa and Mubaya in this book). In areas such as politics, employment and social service delivery we focus on qualitative questions on what is desirable and the chapters that follow have focused on a critique of what exists and through discussions of cases of best practice from elsewhere have developed compelling arguments on what can be and how it can be achieved. We also identify with Wallerstein (1991) and Gatsheni-Ndlovu (2013) that it is the responsibility of scholars and scientists to rethink issues by challenging existing paradigms of progress. Contributors to this book have, besides making important policy and strategy recommendations, also taken what we call a second glance at an issue and the usual set of actions deployed to resolve them as part of an out-of-the-box kind of thinking. However this has not been easy – we are what we have learnt over the years as Quijano (2007:167) observed, ‘African intellectual and liberation initiatives have found it very difficult to unthink the epistemologies created by others’.

Although not bound by the ceteris paribus rule, there are some assumptions we make about the external environment. Firstly we anticipate that the new constitution has resolved or created foundations for resolving some of the obvious questions of (i) distribution of political power but will not necessarily entrench the envisaged democratic ideal without citizens making concerted efforts for its achievement, (ii) will formalise the restructuring of key contested terrain such as land relations but that does not suggest the end of grassroots demands for land – these are a function of an underperforming formal economy but does it mean the resolution of gender based hierarchies and conflicts (see Mutopo in this volume). Secondly we foresee a situation of potential change of relations with the West entailing the removal of sanctions and also rehabilitation of the country into international financial and commodity circuits with its attendant challenges. There is currently no coherent alternative economic development ideology. There is evidence of piecemeal attempts to address the issue of sanctions, which has resulted in lifting of sanctions on some corporate entities and individuals. Moreover, there is a more open approach of debating the sanctions questions within key blocs such as the European Union.

The ZANU (PF) driven radical nationalism over natural resources and other sectors of the economy as detailed within the Zim-Asset strategy needs broader buy in from other stakeholders. More importantly it needs to address the ‘elephant in the room’ – the role of the national bourgeoisie in development. There is no doubt that Zimbabwe is one of the (if not the only) African country that has gone through significant transformation of the economy starting with the fast-track land reform program culminating with the prioritisation of local ownership in other productive sectors especially mining. However what is still missing is a discussion or a charter that clarifies the vision of the new national bourgeoisie created through state policy. To what extent is this class progressive or does it mimic multinational business practices of extracting value without re-investing in the country preferring instead to keep proceeds in off-shore zones? The objectives of the indigenisation programme are in principle noble and could potentially contribute to national development if they are implemented in a coherent and inclusive manner. However the opaqueness of the transfer of assets and the manner in which political elites are at the centre of the majority of the indigenisation deals has created the impression that this could be another strategy to perpetuate enclave-like structures of ownership. The process is currently fraught with high levels of corrupt tendencies within the state elite responsible for rolling out the policy to an extent that it can actually be detrimental to broader economic growth and perpetuate the colonially established enclave-like forms of accumulation. Benefits from such a programme should include increased tax revenues, jobs and an overall qualitative improvement to social conditions based on the increase in the number of economic actors and also their capacity utilisation levels. However for this to take place there is need for a patriotic national bourgeoisie that is strategic in terms of investment and is not engaged in the externalisation of resources and above all realises its critical role in national development.

Also, for us, the current indigenisation programme in its entirety does not question the broader tenets of neoliberal capitalism but seeks to narrowly change the face of the capitalist class from being mostly white and multi-national to being black and national. It seems to be driven by an idea that reinsertion into global capitalism is a means to an end and the process can be handled in a better way now that there is broader ownership of the means of production (see Murisa and Mujeyi). The subordinate nature of that re-insertion is not problematised and even the contradictions within capitalism are not adequately treated. There must be a better way of indigenisation, Chikweche and Mujeyi tackle this challenge in their chapter on the informal economy and entrepreneurship models, which addresses some of the ways in which this can be done. Thirdly we anticipate that migration (both outwards and inwards) will continue and we optimistically anticipate that Zimbabwe will see some of her skilled personnel returning home as we have seen in India, Ghana and to a less extent in the Caribbean islands. However it is important to also point out that the return will not necessarily be based upon improved conditions of service that match standards in the West or South Africa but it will most likely be based on the pull of the idea of ‘home’. Such an idea is difficult to define but experiences from India have shown that professionals have accepted lower salaries than they were commanding in the US just to return home. There will also be a demographic dividend in the process – as migrants begin to reach retirement age they will also decide to return to their home country. The challenge will be in the re-integration of the returnees, especially the highly skilled individuals into the economy. Labour regimes need to re-visit the concept of flexible working hours to accommodate these skills that may not necessarily need a fulltime job but can make contributions in higher education, health delivery and also other development sectors crippled by the brain drain.

Fourthly we also expect certain variables about our political and social existence to remain the same; calls for a separatist government in Matabeleland (Umthwakazi) albeit in a very mild form, increased tensions between civil society and government (the stuff of politics). Other variables include the emergence of new political parties (significantly, breakaways from within the MDC) and controversially, increased dependency on our southern neighbor (South Africa) for manufactured goods and other specialised services in areas such as health delivery. Whilst politics in our country has been very conservative (compared to North Africa for instance) the increasing levels of youth unemployment for example, especially amongst graduates from the tertiary institutions may radicalise demands from the bottom, especially around employment opportunities and access to basic services such as water and housing. There are also some changes that we do not discuss exhaustively, firstly because we have confined ourselves to what we have been studying for the past decade – models for social and economic transformation and related various sub-sectors and even then the book’s scope does not address other topics such as the role of culture, the arts and spirituality in asserting identity and helping in defining a moral compass for our leadership and the general population. Complimentary to our contribution we also acknowledge the knowledge contributions that have been made by others (see for instance Bond and Manyanya, 2002; Moyo and Yeros, 2005; Hammar et al., 2003; Alexander, 2006; Moyo et al., 2009; Scoones et al., 2010) especially in the analysis of our history, politics, and civil society.

Furthermore we recognise that the envisaged transformation will require a new moral compass and compact based on the obvious need to shun corruption and promote integrity around a negotiated set of values. A good place to start will be a discussion on how we can integrate values of Ubuntu/Hunhu into our everyday lives especially amongst those entrusted with public office. Related to the call for a values-based re-awakening is the need to understand the role of religion, especially the Christian church in its various forms. It remains the most dominant religious body but unfortunately there are few instances where its role as an agent of socio-economic development is adequately analysed. Its impact on welfare as a form of philanthropy has been widely noted but its influence on the citizen in terms of encouraging integrity and instilling a Calvinist-like work ethic and developing resilience through the social networks that emerge from association has not been subjected to critical scholarly analysis.

Whilst still on the church, it is worth noting that the mobilising potential of the church, especially during the period of the crisis, could be one of the reasons why Zimbabwe managed to avert a political crisis in the form of a revolt. In the coming period the church (especially the charismatic/ Pentecostal formations) will potentially play a much more significant role beyond it’s widely appreciated philanthropic posture but will also influence the economic transformation. The dominant message within these churches has been one of hope, staying the course no matter the circumstances, economic empowerment and transformation,³ and in the past decades some of the major business actors (banking, retail and telecommunications) have been established by actors rooted within the church. The recognition of the multiplicity of the role of the church leads to calls for a more co-operative and inclusive approach to development which involves other stakeholders such as business, civil society, and government.

An approach that acknowledges the different strengths each of these stakeholders potentially contributes to an inclusive socio-economic transformation agenda rather than one that rigidly partitions roles and adopts a ‘keep your hands off my turf ’ attitude. Furthermore the church has the capacity and scope to extend its influence into the political arena in a more significant way. Whilst currently individual politicians from across the political divide have seen the need to engage with the church by seeking for prayer and also soliciting for their endorsement we foresee (based on experiences from elsewhere) the potential for the emergence of a more coherently organised grouping from the church that will make a direct demand for power.

We also remain alert to the fact that the arts sector (especially music) has also not been spared of the changes that have taken place since the turn of the century. The short-lived policy of 100% local content on radio channels spurred the emergence of what is commonly referred to as ‘urban grooves’, a fusion of hip-hop and variations of sungura, leading to a new but still sub-terrain urban movement of repositioning identities especially of the millenials. Despite the obvious growth of the number of musicians, especially amongst the youth, it has also led to the growth of a new consciousness of what we will call being ‘Zimbabwean’ and deeper social commentary on urban life. The ‘new’ urban music has contributed towards the congealing of a new political culture amongst the youth and one may also argue that it is part of a new form of urban culture and agency. There are very few studies that have focused on the influence of new music on politics but anecdotal evidence does show that ZANU (PF) has at certain times tried to influence the messaging within this genre but we are currently not certain about the impact on voting patterns or political party allegiance. Economically there is an opportunity for the growth of Zimbabwe’s own arts industry incorporating music and movies which will obviously create upstream and downstream opportunities.

COLLAPSE OF THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA

The concept of development, in terms of its definition, agenda, processes and strategies has historically always been imposed by the powerful in society. The development discourse remains a contested terrain, lacking consensus on the definition of the essence of development. Rather than dwell on the definition debates, others have focused on indicators or indexes such as levels of unemployment, exchange rates, levels of foreign direct investment into a country, the ease of doing business as an attempt to show progress from underdevelopment towards development. The cited indicators have undoubtedly a valid purpose but religiously applying them to our situations may be limiting. Whilst our roots are in the field of political economy, we propose to introduce an explicit local-level analytical concern in studying Zimbabwe’s potential for social and economic transformation. The debates on ‘the national question’ in Zimbabwe have mostly been influenced by the political economy framework in which local patterns of existence are viewed as linked to and having been shaped by the wider framework of the global capitalist economy (Nuijten, 1992:199). These studies clarified in a very systematic manner the exploitative nature of the different forms and stages of capitalism. Studies such as Arrighi’s (1973) essay on the political economy of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), through an analysis of shifts and realignments among the various sectors of capital, were able to comprehensively explain how capital functioned and exploited the various underclasses. The most recent and comprehensive analysis of post-independence Zimbabwe within the tradition of political economy is by Moyo and Yeros (2005) although it mostly focuses on the land and agrarian question. To their credit they also systematically analysed grassroots-based politics especially in terms of land occupations and other visible forms of protest.

However most of the discourses on the national question tended to overlook localised forms of economic and social responses. They have been preoccupied with the expansion of the capitalist economy and the labour relations that emerge. Alternative organic forms of economic accumulation, especially the manner in which social organisations (networks) affect economic accumulation and their relevance to local level politics, are rarely a part of research enquiry. Another trend, but less dominant, has been to focus on the informal sector, small to medium scale enterprise in purely economic narratives without examining the social relations that underpin the exchanges within these spaces and also what they suggest in terms of the broader development path. Related to this trend has been the manner in which suggestions of a peasant-based form of economic take off in the Chayanovian sense were rare, remain unwelcome and are seen as utopia. Instead the majority of both left and right-leaning scholars does not see a future for small-scale based forms of accumulation and instead remain steeped in identifying processes of accelerating proletarianisation based on migration into either urban centres, mines or large-scale commercial farms.

Entrepreneurship as a model of development was sidelined well into the post-independence era and in the process the logic of formal sector employment continued to receive unequivocal policy support as the only stable economic domain for stable accumulation and livelihood. Even currently the measure of employment or unemployment remains the most important if not the only measure of well-being despite the obvious existence of other sites of economic production. As yet there are very few systematic studies into the contribution of the informal sector, the nascent small and medium scale enterprises to overall national development especially as it affects employment, livelihood security and also a sense of well-being in Zimbabwe. Establishment of enterprises in these sectors is seen as manifestation of failure to secure a job in the more lucrative formal sector. Even post-independence government policies have been weak in integrating and supporting what is commonly referred to as the informal despite the fact that there is a significant section of the population earning a livelihood from this zone (see Chikweche and Mujeyi in this volume).

The weak analysis and theorisation of what development should look like within a post-colonial state such as Zimbabwe has contributed to what others (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999) describe as a challenge of ‘maldevelopment’. Given the paucity in the analysis even the most devoted left scholars have had to depend on literature steeped within a modernisation/systems approach in order to get a more comprehensive understanding of Zimbabwe’s development challenge. However such an approach has limitations especially when we begin the project of redefining the development landscape through social and economic justice lens. Also in its current pure form the political economy is paralyzing in the sense that it gives the impression that unless the progressive working class takes over the means of production and the state there can be no equitable development. Especially in a context of uneven capitalist penetration such as the one confronting most of Africa where there is no pure proletariat or peasantry class but rather the majority combine incomes from the two economic zones (the urban and the rural) to an extent that the most dominant household type is semi-proletariat in nature (see Moyo and Yeros, 2005 and O’Laughlin, 2000). Besides the absence of a pure working class is also the evident weakness of a national capitalist sector that is able to accumulate and reinvest within the country. The nascent post-independence national capitalist sector, despite its close links with the state, has not taken over the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy but rather remains very peripheral and is mostly comprador in nature, serving as a proxy for international capital.

In the meantime, the collapse of the Washington Consensus⁴, at the international level, has potentially created room for rethinking paths of development. We have argued elsewhere that:

...this is a period of systemic uncertainty and the reconfiguring of the global economic architecture provide greater scope than hitherto available to pilot and embed approaches which prudently leverage market and other mechanisms to deliver more predictable social and economic progress for the poor, and society in general, thus socio-politically de-risking our world (Murisa, 2008 & 2011).

However it is critical to note that within the euphoria of the collapse of the ‘Washington Consensus’ attention did not necessarily turn to Marx’s writings but rather it was to Keynes the father of the interventionist capitalist state. Thus whilst the ‘Washington Consensus’ has been buried, a new consensus is most probably not going to be driven by the radical left or radical nationalism but rather it will mostly likely be based on a compromise between the G8 group of countries, China and India in their individual capacities and in their collective participation as part of the BRICS group of emerging economic super-powers. Whilst on the surface, the BRICS group has emerged as a potential influencer of an alternative global consensus the informal and often contradictory nature of the alliance diminish its potential role to bring about transformative change to global accumulation. It may be premature to dismiss the BRICS coalition and its agenda but if it does not adequately integrate its own interest within the other bigger economies within Africa (such as Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya), Asia (Indonesia and Malaysia), and Latin America (Mexico, and Chile) its influence may be limited and it may fail to radically restructure the current North-South cleavages that characterise neo-liberal capitalism.

INTERNAL INCONSISTENCIES AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

In the meantime, the African perspective of what development is or should be has also been inadequately expressed. Currently there is no comprehensive body of knowledge of what this framework/philosophy should look like, especially given the fact that Africa is itself made up of many countries with different backgrounds and experiences. In our perspective we recognise the need for Africans to rather than only cite causes of underdevelopment such as the slave trade, colonialism and neocolonialism, to also acknowledge the role they have played in systematically aiding the current status quo. In other words the problem of Africa’s poverty or under-development for instance is not just due to colonialism, structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), skewed trade patterns, inadequate aid – although these have contributed to underdevelopment in a significant way. It is also due to our own ineptitude and lack of initiative. For instance the urgency and imperative for regional integration has been made since the 1960s but we do not seem anywhere close to the realisation of Nkrumah’s Africa must unite dream. Rather, Pan-Africanism has been reduced to grand speeches with no consequent program of action. Currently our national systems of governance are characterised by inefficiencies, corruption and ineffective systems of administration. As Africans we have also had a negative effect on development due to the manner in which we have been slow in designing viable solutions and in the process allowed external actors, especially multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF, to craft solutions to resolve our own underdevelopment. In many instances our knee-jerk reaction has been about complaining and rarely about crafting solutions. Despite the rhetoric within development agencies on participation, there is a remarkable exclusion of a broad range of Africans in the design and implementation of many ‘development’ initiatives. An inclusive approach and process, which not only considers a broad array of participants but also embraces respect for citizens and promotes a responsible and mutually beneficial spirit of collective decision-making and action is overdue.

What if we focus on designing inclusive growth-focused solutions? Where shall we start: maybe by identifying the low-hanging fruits? We have been tillers of land for generations: what if we harness that knowledge and combine with modern technology to improve food availability as our priority for the next 10 years? What if we followed that up by focusing on the path of least resistance in terms of addressing the higher order development questions? Maybe devote more energy towards improving the participation of locals in agricultural value chains. Related to this question is agreeing to the obvious fact that the state has not necessarily been a reliable partner for development. Rather it has been used as an instrument of accumulation and also of coercion by the governing class. Maybe we need a new state and not necessarily new actors in the state but rather one that is based on a new set of shared values and negotiations between the rulers and the ruled (see Murisa chapter 10). What if national entrepreneurship is the missing link to Zimbabwe’s development? There is a need to find ways of deeper engagement with the national capitalist class in terms of their development obligations. What if we take a different approach to exploitation of Africa’s natural resources which if not appropriately used can turn to be the proverbial curse instead of being a panacea to Africa’s and in this case Zimbabwe’s development challenges. Currently, tiny Zimbabwe ranks amongst the top ten African countries with the highest levels of illicit financial outflows through corruption, smuggling and multinational mispricing. We can do better.

The discussion of an African centred development theory can never be exhausted within a few paragraphs such as these. Our goal rather is to provoke a more systematic rethinking amongst Zimbabwe scholars (hopefully beyond regime change mantra) and policy practitioners on what can work and how it can be applied. In summary, for us socio-economic development is a holistic concept concerned with the economy, politics, social and cultural well-being. We believe that development should be people focused and should address questions such as how much people earn, how educated their children become, how healthy they are and how long they live. Prosperity, the result of development, is measured in several ways including the levels of access to decent jobs and sufficient incomes, adequate access to health facilities, housing, affordable education and longevity of life. In this book we propose a multi-pronged approach towards development that considers combinations of agriculture based livelihoods and incomes, equitable access and utilisation of natural resources (and the benefits thereof ), rebuilding of medium scale industries that take advantage of technology as potentially the more sustainable route towards inclusive development. Values of integrity, equity, transparency, tolerance and care for one another are at the centre of this line of thinking. What if all we need is a mindset shift?

RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES

There has been flurry of alternative ideas ever since but we note two tendencies that can potentially advance Zimbabwe’s equitable development agenda. The first one is the need for rethinking the state. Under the liberalisation agenda of the Washington Consensus the mantra was around reducing/limiting the role of the state. We are however convinced that in countries in the periphery such as Zimbabwe where the capitalist sector remains highly underdeveloped and dominated by colluding monopolies the state needs to take a more central planning role in the organisation of the economy. This could be achieved through a variety of institutional mechanisms that ensure citizens have access to all the necessities of life and also that nurture the development of a national capitalist sector focused on national development. We are also alert to the fact that currently the state is highly undependable for a variety of reasons ranging from unpredictability in terms of policy positions and also the penchant amongst government based elites for private accumulation by abusing powers derived from state institutions. Even then we need to reform the state to work for the greater good rather than throw it away. There is an emerging consensus amongst scholars based in the global South for a democratic developmental state. Such a state should have autonomous policy space, based on the apparent consensus that development requires some significant levels of autonomy. We also realise and acknowledge the fact that autonomy requires a new conciliatory foundation, together with effective planning bureaucracies (Edigheji, 2010).

Alongside this new developmental state consensus there is emerging an appreciation that whilst globalisation is inevitable there is a need to ensure that questions of social reproduction are