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    Rommel’s Desert Campaigns, February 1941-September 1942: A Study In Operational Level Weakness [Illustrated Edition]
    Rommel’s Desert Campaigns, February 1941-September 1942: A Study In Operational Level Weakness [Illustrated Edition]
    Rommel’s Desert Campaigns, February 1941-September 1942: A Study In Operational Level Weakness [Illustrated Edition]
    Ebook219 pages29 minutes

    Rommel’s Desert Campaigns, February 1941-September 1942: A Study In Operational Level Weakness [Illustrated Edition]

    By Major Donald E. Kirkland

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    About this ebook

    Includes the War in North Africa Illustration Pack - 112 photos/illustrations and 21 maps.
    This study is a historical analysis to determine why Rommel’s tactical success on the battlefield could not accomplish strategic objectives in North Africa. Rommel’s operations are reviewed from his arrival in North Africa in February 1941 through his last offensive to destroy the British Eighth Army at Alamein in August-September 1942. The study compares his ability to conduct tactical operations with his apparent inability to plan and execute actions at the operational level of war. Rommel’s problems with operational planning are addressed within the scope of campaign planning principles set forth in FM 100-5, Operations, (Final Draft). His planning is expressly judged on how he shaped his operational plans by using the concepts of aims, resources, constraints, and restrictions to conform to strategic guidance. Rommel’s tactical execution is contrasted with his operational performance. This comparison is based on the AirLand Battle tenets of agility, initiative, depth, and synchronization. The study concludes that Rommel’s failure lies in planning operations that exceeded his resources and conducting needless operations that resulted in the loss of the initiative at the decisive point. Rommel’s plans exceeded the strategic objectives desired by the theater strategists. His execution was ultimately defeated by his quest for tactical victories without regard to how they contributed to achieving campaign objectives. Rommel’s weakness at the operational level led to failure to sequence tactical victories to achieve campaign goals. This failure illustrates the importance of understanding how operational art orchestrates tactical activities to achieve strategic objectives within a theater of operations.
    LanguageEnglish
    PublisherLucknow Books
    Release dateAug 15, 2014
    ISBN9781782894216
    Rommel’s Desert Campaigns, February 1941-September 1942: A Study In Operational Level Weakness [Illustrated Edition]

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      Book preview

      Rommel’s Desert Campaigns, February 1941-September 1942 - Major Donald E. Kirkland

      Kirkland.

      TABLE OF CONTENTS

      Contents

      TABLE OF CONTENTS

      ABSTRACT

      INTRODUCTION

      THE DESERT CAMPAIGN OVERVIEW

      ROMMEL’S WEAKNESS AS AN OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

      CONCLUSION

      REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER

      BIBLIOGRAPHY

      FIELD MANUALS

      BOOKS

      DOCUMENTS

      ILLUSTRATIONS

      MAPS

      Sources

      ABSTRACT

      ROMMEL'S DESERT CAMPAIGNS, FEBRUARY 1941-SEPTEMBER 1942: A STUDY IN OPERATIONAL WEAKNESS, by Major Donald E. Kirkland, USA.

      This study is a historical analysis to determine why Rommel’s tactical success on the battlefield could not accomplish strategic objectives in North Africa. Rommel’s operations are reviewed from his arrival in North Africa in February 1941 through his last offensive to destroy the British Eighth Army at Alamein in August-September 1942. The study compares his ability to conduct tactical operations with his apparent inability to plan and execute actions at the operational level of war. Rommel’s problems with operational planning are addressed within the scope of campaign planning principles set forth in FM 100-5, Operations, (Final Draft). His planning is expressly judged on how he shaped his operational plans by using the concepts of aims, resources, constraints, and restrictions to conform to strategic guidance. Rommel’s tactical execution is contrasted with his operational performance. This comparison is based on the AirLand Battle tenets of agility, initiative, depth, and synchronization.

      The study concludes that Rommel's failure lies in planning operations that exceeded his resources and conducting needless operations that resulted in the loss of the initiative at the decisive point. Rommel’s plans exceeded the strategic objectives desired by the theater strategists. His execution was ultimately defeated by his quest for tactical victories without regard to how they contributed to achieving campaign objectives.

      Rommel’s weakness at the operational level led to failure to sequence tactical victories to achieve campaign goals. This failure illustrates the importance of understanding how operational art orchestrates tactical activities to achieve strategic objectives within a theater of operations.

      INTRODUCTION

      Field Marshall Erwin Rommel – the Desert Fox. Perhaps no other general in World War II commanded such respect from friend and foe alike. His legendary exploits in North Africa prompted one of his opponents, General Sir Claude Auchinleck, to dispatch a memo to his senior subordinates reminding them that Rommel was no superhuman. The memo further warned of the danger to morale if the British troops continued to view Rommel as having almost supernatural powers.¹ The British Prime Minister, considering the appalling defeats inflicted by Rommel on the British Army, still referred to him in Parliament as a daring and skillful opponent and a great general,² At the beginning of the war he was a newly promoted general officer and commandant of the Fuhrer’s field headquarters. Three years later he was a Field Marshal, threatening to destroy the last British field army opposing the European Axis.

      Rommel described his style of warfare as ...the art of concentrating [one’s] strength at one point, forcing a breakthrough, rolling up and securing the flanks on either side, and then penetrating like lightning, before the enemy has had time to react, deep into his rear.³ These principles, used so effectively by Rommel on the desert battlefields, constitute the tenets of agility, initiative, depth and synchronization in the U.S. Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine as they apply to fighting and winning battles and engagements.

      Despite Rommel’s tactical victories, his campaigns did not result in the achievement of German or Italian strategic objectives in North Africa. This failure was not due to the fortunes of war, but rather to Rommel’s inability to plan and execute a campaign designed to achieve the desired national objectives. This resulted in unexploited tactical successes and costly engagements with no operational purpose. It eventually forced Rommel into accepting battles of attrition which left him too weak to exploit if he won, and which effectively finished the campaign if he lost.

      As an operational planner, Rommel failed to implement the strategic

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