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    The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940
    The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940
    The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940
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    The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940

    By Robert A. Doughty

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    An engaging narrative of the small-unit actions near Sedan during the 1940 campaign for France.
    LanguageEnglish
    PublisherStackpole Books
    Release dateSep 15, 2014
    ISBN9780811760706
    The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940
    Author

    Robert A. Doughty

    Brigadier General Robert Doughty retired in July 2005 after forty years of service in the U.S. Army. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1965 and received his Ph.D. from Kansas University in 1979. His awards and decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, Silver Star, and Combat Infantry Badge. He served as the Head of the Department of History at the U.S. Military Academy from 1985 until 2005. He is the author of numerous articles and books and currently is working on a paper about Franco-American relations during World War I.

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      Book preview

      The Breaking Point - Robert A. Doughty

      Army

      Preface

      Fifty years after the fall of France, an investigation of the 1940 campaign seems in order. The timing is particularly opportune, for the French have made available their rather extensive archives relating to the fighting in 1940. Though a great deal of important material was destroyed in the chaotic days of the six-week campaign, the French made an intensive effort in subsequent years to collect materials relating to the campaign. As a result of these efforts, they now have more than 2,000 cartons of documents relating to 1939–40.

      Perhaps more importantly, the French made an intensive effort shortly after 16 May 1940 to accumulate personal statements and after-action reports from individuals involved in the fighting around Sedan. Some were completed as early as 18 May; others were completed much later. The reports include statements from most of the battalion, regimental, and division commanders involved in the fighting around Sedan. They also include reports from many platoon and company commanders, as well as key staff officers. Altogether, these reports provide a wealth of information—sometimes contradictory, sometimes obviously false, but always useful—about the fighting around Sedan and permit an unusually detailed analysis of the battle.

      Additionally, a remarkable amount of material about the campaign is available in German archives. Shortly after the May–June campaign, the German Army collected after-action reports from commanders at all levels in the XIXth Panzer Corps. While these reports are less detailed and emotional than the French reports, they also provide a wealth of information about the battle. The existence of the German after-action reports for the 1940 campaign is fortunate, for many of the archives for the army were destroyed in a bombing raid and ensuing fire on 27–28 February 1942. Some of those remaining from the 1940 campaign were singed or partially destroyed in the fire.

      When the French reports are combined with the German reports, they agree to a surprising extent. Despite the chaos and misconceptions that usually exist on battlefields, the most important differences pertain to time.

      In short, the combination of the French and German reports permits an almost unique opportunity to examine this important campaign in detail. And the campaign itself offers numerous examples of the complexities of modern warfare.

      During the course of my research and writing, I have benefited from the assistance of a number of friends and colleagues. Among those who have provided encouragement and insights during my sabbatical in Pennsylvania were Robert F. Frank, Harold Nelson, Ted Crackel, Jay Luvaas, Charles R. Shrader, Rod Paschall, and Roger Spiller. At West Point, my debts are too numerous to list, but I am particularly appreciative for the support and advice of Colonel Paul Miles. I am also grateful for the confidence and friendship of Brigadier Generals Roy K. Flint and William A. Stofft.

      General Robert Bassac graciously allowed me to conduct research at the Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre in Paris. Key assistance with German materials came from Major (Dr.) Karl Frieser of the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt. Without Dr. Frieser's generous suggestions, my discussion of the Germans in the 1940 campaign would have suffered significantly. Captain Robert J. Edwards willingly assisted me with the translation of German materials. Special thanks are due to Mr. Edward J. Krasnoborski of the Department of History at West Point for having completed the maps.

      As usual, however, my greatest debt is to my family—Diane, Mike, and Kevin—for their patience and toleration.

      While it is difficult to exaggerate the value of the assistance of those I have mentioned and others, I alone am responsible for the text. The opinions expressed in this book do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, or the U.S. Military Academy. Any errors in fact or interpretation are solely my own.

      Introduction

      On 14 May 1940, the day after the Germans crossed the Meuse River at Sedan and while heavy fighting was still ongoing to the south, General Heinz Guderian, commander of the XIXth Panzer Corps, visited some of the high ground overlooking the area where his soldiers had crossed the Meuse. As he surveyed the strongly defensible terrain, the remarkable success of the German attack struck him almost as a miracle. ¹ The advance across the forests and hills of the Ardennes, the crossing of the Meuse, and the seizure of high ground on the far side of the river had occurred so rapidly and so smoothly that its stunning success seemed almost miraculous to Guderian.

      The German miracle, however, was based less on supernatural forces than it was on sound military preparation. Ultimately, Germany won the campaign because her military forces were better led, had a sounder strategy, and had developed more viable tactical and operational-level doctrines. And France lost because her leaders tried to manage rather than lead, her strategy was ill conceived and based on fallacious assumptions, and her tactical and operational-level doctrines were inadequate for the mobile war Germany thrust upon her. What seemed to be almost a miracle at the time in fact came from a better prepared force rapidly overwhelming an inadequately prepared force.

      Although the fighting around Sedan had an enormous and immediate effect on the history of the world because of the fall of France, it has continued to affect world history because of the myths that surround it. One of the most important of these myths pertains to the nature of the blitzkrieg, or lightning warfare. Immediately after the unexpected collapse of France, military leaders and analysts tended to portray the campaign as the classic example of the blitzkrieg. They marveled at how effortlessly German tanks moved through the dense forests of the Ardennes, punched through the decadent French defenders, and rolled almost unopposed toward the English Channel. Almost in unison, they declared that the main feature of this new mode of warfare was the shock action of devastatingly effective tanks and airplanes—aided by mobility, speed, and surprise.

      Perhaps the earliest example of portraying the 1940 campaign as something fundamentally new came from President Franklin D. Roosevelt in an address to a joint session of the Senate and House of Representatives on 16 May 1940. In his remarks, the president said:

      Motorized armies can now sweep through enemy territories at the rate of 200 miles a day. Parachute troops are dropped from airplanes in large numbers behind enemy lines. Troops are landed from planes in open fields, on wide highways, and at local civil airports.

      We have seen the treacherous use of the fifth column by which persons supposed to be peaceful visitors were actually a part of an enemy unit of occupation. Lightning attacks, capable of destroying airplane factories and munition works hundreds of miles behind the lines, are part of the new technique of modern war.

      The element of surprise which has ever been an important tactic in warfare has become the more dangerous because of the amazing speed with which modern equipment can reach and attack the enemy's country.²

      By emphasizing the revolutionary nature of blitzkrieg warfare, President Roosevelt sought to alert Americans to the threat emerging in Europe, but he unwittingly cooperated with German propagandists in distorting the actual nature of the fighting in 1940. In fact, the blitzkrieg and its success in 1940 rested upon techniques and procedures as old as warfare.

      A key component of the myth surrounding the blitzkrieg pertains to the role and dominance of the tank, for most military observers saw the campaign of 1940 in terms of its having decisively demonstrated the importance of the tank. This assessment came partially from the feeble attempts by some of the French participants to explain the swift collapse of France, but it also came from the conscious efforts of the Germans after June 1940 to portray their army as invincible and thus as an army to avoid. The polished propaganda machine of Nazi Germany energetically publicized the rapid sweep of the tanks across France and the terrible offensive power possessed by them. Although one must acknowledge the important role played by the tanks, their contributions would have been significantly less without the remarkable performance of the German infantry. In fact, the fighting around Sedan was more a victory for the German infantryman than for the tanker.

      To add to the misunderstanding of the campaign, French veterans of the 1940 campaign frequently complained of the supposed superiority of German weapons and equipment. Though deficiencies in weapons and equipment did affect France's performance, her army possessed materiel that was roughly equivalent to Germany's in quantity and in quality. The Allies and Germany had about the same number of tanks, and France probably had the best tank with her SOMUA S-35. Similarly, France had excellent antitank weapons. Her 25mm gun, which was her main antitank weapon, could penetrate the main armor plating on all German tanks except for a few Mark IVs that had additional armor plating added to their front slope. The only area of the army in which France had a distinct deficiency was in her woefully small number of antitank mines. The main area in which Germany had a clear advantage was in the superiority of the Luftwaffe, but she also had advantages in her more extensive use of radios, in her longer-range 105mm howitzers, and in her excellent 88mm antiaircraft weapon, which could double as an antitank gun. Nevertheless, Germany's small advantages in materiel did not provide the margin that assured her victory.³ The key difference between the two countries was not the weapons themselves, but how the weapons were employed.

      Another myth to emerge from the battle was the importance of the dive bomber for providing close support to ground forces. For those British and American leaders who recognized the superiority of the German Luftwaffe, the specter of diving airplanes with screaming, howling noises exercised a remarkable influence over their development of aircraft in the period immediately following the battle. For reasons that are more psychological and emotional than scientific, the Allies were captivated by the specter of aircraft unleashing bombs on point targets and providing support to mobile forces that artillery could not provide. In fact, the dive bombers did have a powerful effect on poorly armed and inadequately prepared troops who were vulnerable to their psychological effects, but they rarely destroyed an armored vehicle or a bunker. More importantly, the overwhelming German advantage in the air failed to isolate the Sedan battlefield and prevent the French from reinforcing the threatened sector.

      Then too, the collapse of the French defensive effort at Sedan convinced many military observers that the French soldiers of 1940 were not worthy sons of their fathers who had died willingly and by the thousands in the infernos of World War I. The panic of the 55th Division and the subsequent collapse of its defensive efforts seemed to come from a rotten core of French will and morale that somehow was linked to the contradictions and cracks in French society, decaying aspects that later became so apparent under the Vichy Regime. In fact, the failure of the 55th Division came from its poor training, its poor preparation for battle, and its poor leadership. The problems of units who suffered from a lack of cohesion were magnified by an inadequate doctrine that encouraged the sort of leadership habits that contributed to the collapse in 1940. By emphasizing numbers and combat-power ratios and paying insufficient attention to cohesion and small-unit leadership, French military leaders in the Sedan region weakened their units rather than strengthening them. Burdened by the task of digging trenches and building bunkers, they neglected to train their soldiers adequately and to inculcate in them a will to fight.

      Despite the pervasiveness of the myths surrounding the defeat of France, the reasons for her failure are to be found elsewhere. As can be seen in the 10–16 May campaign that culminated in the breakout of the XIXth Panzer Corps southwest of Sedan, France's failures stem partially from her own inadequacies and partially from the ability of the Germans to concentrate overwhelming combat power at the decisive point. As I have previously written, the Germans outfought the French tactically and outsmarted them strategically.⁴ French Army doctrine was unsuited and inadequate for the war Germany was prepared to fight in 1940, and the strategy of rushing forward into Belgium was particularly vulnerable to the German attack through the Ardennes. Adding to France's difficulties, her army and its leaders lacked the proper flexibility and responsiveness to reply to the unexpected. Whatever the advantages for the Germans, however, the campaign was not a walk through the sun for them. General Guderian acknowledged this when he described the German success as almost a miracle.

      By focusing on the battles fought by the German XIXth Panzer Corps between 10 and 16 May, this book seeks to investigate the inadequacy of the French military response and the superiority of the German response. Also, the book seeks to investigate the battle of 10–16 May 1940 as a complete campaign, from beginning to end with all its turns and twists. For modern mechanized warfare, a study of the deep attack of the German XIXth Panzer Corps and the attempts by the French to defend against it offers one of the finest opportunities available to study the operational level of war and to analyze a deep attack by a corps, as well as a prepared defense by a corps. Because the terrain remains relatively undeveloped and remarkably unchanged, the battlefield also provides a marvelous opportunity for detailed analysis on the ground, or for what the U.S. Army now calls a staff ride.

      Thus, by focusing on the XIXth Panzer Corps and its opponents, this book examines the experience of a finite number of French and German units and analyzes a single campaign in detail. Such an analysis should provide insights into the different approaches of the two countries toward leadership, tactics, operations, and strategy. The reader, however, should not forget that the XIXth Panzer Corps was only one of three Panzer corps that crossed the Meuse in the Dinant, Monthermé, and Sedan areas.

      To enable the reader to follow the intricacies of the campaign, I have chosen to separate the German actions from the French reactions. While I present both sides, to include aspects of the Belgian experience, I devote greater attention to the French than to the Germans. The reasons for this reside partially in my greater interest in the French, but it is also influenced by the nature of the campaign. Since the Germans have the initiative, the French must react to their actions. Therefore, the French chapters delve deeper into issues relating to the operational and strategic levels of war.

      CHAPTER 1

      Strategy and Doctrine

      The fighting that occurred near Sedan between 10–16 May 1940 was shaped by the competing strategies of France and Germany. To halt the Germans, France relied on a defensive strategy. While holding along the fortifications of the Maginot Line on the northeastern frontier, and while placing a minimum number of forces along the Ardennes, she planned on rushing forward into northern and central Belgium and occupying strong defensive positions. By fighting from prepared, entrenched positions, she thought she could halt the main German attack, which—she believed—would come through the broad avenue of approach extending from Maastricht, to Gembloux, to Mons. After weakening the enemy and building up her own and her allies’ forces, she intended to resume the offensive and achieve victory.

      To concentrate her forces against France's weakest point, Germany relied on a daring offensive strategy. By attacking northern Belgium and the Netherlands with a minimum number of forces, she sought to deceive the French and convince them that the main attack was coming à la Schlieffen in 1914 through northern and central Belgium. When France moved into northern and central Belgium, Germany intended to deliver the decisive blow with a heavy Panzer force through the center of the French forces along the Ardennes. The distinguished British historian, B. H. Liddell Hart, has aptly described the operations against northern Belgium and the Netherlands as serving, like a matador's cloak, to distract the attention of the French from the deadly thrust that was coming through the Ardennes.¹

      Tragically for France and her allies, her strategy played directly into the hands of the Germans. After pushing some of her most modern and mobile forces forward into northern and central Belgium, she could not respond adequately to the gaping hole ripped in her lines between Dinant and Sedan by three German corps. The result was a disaster for France and her allies.

      FRENCH STRATEGY

      The goal of France's strategy was the avoidance of defeat, rather than the immediate gaining of victory. She believed victory could be hers only if she first managed to defend herself successfully against a German attack. When France developed her military strategy after World War I, almost all her senior military leaders agreed on the necessity to defend the national territory by placing fortifications along the northeastern frontier and by establishing a forward defense in Belgium. While the experiences of World War I and the terrible damages to France's countryside had a significant effect on her decisions, the realities of geography and the possibility of an attaque brusquée (surprise attack) from Germany dominated her thinking.

      France's approach to protecting her frontiers was greatly influenced by her misfortune of having a major portion of her natural resources and industrial capacity near her frontiers and thus within easy striking distance of the Germans. This vulnerability contributed to her adoption of a strategy emphasizing defense of this crucial war-making capability. To defeat the more heavily industrialized and populated German state, she accepted the requirement for a total war and the complete mobilization of all the nation's resources. If the area along her frontiers, which contained a large portion of her industry, natural resources, and population, were lost to an invading enemy, her mobilization would be seriously disrupted and her ability to wage a total war would be eliminated. French military strategy had to be functional within this important constraint.

      Clearly, misfortune had placed a significant portion of French economic wealth and potential dangerously close to the German threat. Within a triangle formed by Dunkirk, Strasbourg, and Paris, France had about 75 percent of her coal and 95 percent of her iron-ore production. And most of her heavy industry lay within that same triangle. Drawing another triangle between Paris, Lille, and Rouen would encompass nine-tenths of the factories producing French cloth in the 1930s and four-fifths of the factories producing woolen goods. In that same area France manufactured most of her chemical products, all her automobiles, and all her aircraft. France recognized that coal, iron, and factories are the basis for the materiel side of total warfare. She also knew that her war-making capability would be seriously weakened even if she managed to hold the enemy along the same lines where the Germans had been halted in 1914. If the Germans launched an unexpected attack and seized a significant portion of the territory containing the bulk of her natural resources, the war could be lost in a matter of days.²

      At the same time a major portion of France's population resided near the natural resource and industrial centers. The problem of manpower for the French armed forces had long been a source of gloom. From the time of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71, the ratio of Frenchmen to Germans progressively declined. In the late 1860s the Germans slightly outnumbered the French in numbers of men aged twenty to thirty-four who were in the prime period of their lives for military service. By 1910 the Germans had increased their advantage to a ratio of 1.6 to 1. By 1939 the Germans had more than twice as many men of military age.³ For manpower reasons as well as patriotic ones the Frenchmen living along the frontiers could not be relinquished to the enemy.

      The most important discussions over the strategy for defending France's frontiers occurred in the 1920s in the Superior Council of War, which was composed primarily of the senior generals in the army. The council exercised a remarkable influence over the construction of the Maginot Line and the decision to establish a forward defense in northern and central Belgium. As did much of the political leadership, members of the council also believed that France had to be on the defensive initially and that fortifications would strengthen her defenses and enable her to overcome the manpower advantages of Germany. Fortifications would enable the comparatively smaller number of France's soldiers to fight more effectively. France and her allies would go on the offensive as soon as they had amassed sufficient forces and resources to defeat Germany. Such a military strategy, in the council's view, enabled France to overcome the significant disadvantages she had relative to Germany.

      In its May 1920 meeting, the first deliberations after the war on the problem of the frontiers, the Superior Council of War concluded that northern and central Belgium remained the major route of invasion.⁴ The French assumed that construction of fortifications in the northeast would encourage the Germans to divert their attack toward Belgium, and thus to attempt another version of the 1914 Schlieffen Plan. The likelihood of that occurring was heightened by the previous German violation of Belgian neutrality, the absence of geographic obstacles, and the location of a large network of roads and railways running directly toward Paris. Throughout the interwar period, the High Command did not deviate from this perception and demonstrated an unswerving preference to fight on Belgian soil in the north, rather than on French. The French leaders vividly remembered the disastrous destruction of precious agricultural, industrial, and mining resources in the World War I fighting. None wished for that to occur again.

      When the Superior Council of War met in May 1920, it also addressed the question of fortifications on the frontiers. While the session demonstrated a lack of consensus among the army's leaders about the function, form, and location of fortifications for defending the frontier, almost all agreed that some type of fortifications was needed. By mid-1922, the council was split between those who wanted a continuous line of defensive works along the frontier, reminiscent of the trench and barbed wire system of World War I, and those who wanted fortified regions that could act as centers of resistance to facilitate offensive actions or defensive maneuvers. Following five years of debate and discussions, the council adopted on 12 October 1927 the concept of deep underground fortresses in key parts of the terrain with smaller blockhouses and other obstacles along other parts of the frontier.⁵ Shortly thereafter, the French began building the massive fortifications on the northeastern frontier that became known as the Maginot Line.

      As they constructed the massive fortifications, the French decided not to extend them west across the face of the Ardennes. Throughout the interwar period, the French perception of the Ardennes remained unchanged. With its heavy forests and steep hills, particularly in Luxembourg and along the Semois River in Belgium, the Ardennes was a significant obstacle to the rapid movement of large forces, particularly motorized and mechanized ones. When Marshal Philippe Pétain appeared before the Senate Army commission in March 1934, he reflected the views of the military when he emphasized that this sector was not dangerous.⁶ In comparison to the vulnerable resources on the northeastern frontiers and the absence of easily defensible terrain on the northern frontier, the Ardennes seemed to require less defensive preparation. From beginning to end, the French High Command treated the Ardennes sector as simply the connecting sector between the northeastern and northern frontiers.

      By September 1939 the broad outlines of France's military strategy had been drawn and had been decisively influenced by geographic, resource, and manpower considerations. While holding on the right, she would move into Belgium and establish a forward defense. How far she would push forward, however, depended upon luck and circumstances beyond her control. Those circumstances became particularly problematic in 1936 following Belgium's renouncing of her alliance with France. When Belgium assumed her neutral status, she was reluctant to enter into open agreements or arrangements with France, but she nevertheless permitted an extremely limited amount of cooperation to occur. Unfortunately, this limited cooperation pertained primarily to providing France information about her fortifications. By May 1940 France and Belgium had secretly exchanged information about the basic outlines of their war plans, but they had done very little to coordinate the details of these plans, particularly if Germany moved west through Luxembourg and eastern Belgium.⁷

      Despite her grave concerns about her neutral neighbor, France planned on rushing forward and establishing a defensive position in northern and central Belgium. She assumed that Germany would violate Belgium's neutrality first and thus provide a basis for her entry into Belgium, or that the neutral nation would appeal for aid shortly before a German invasion. Therefore, she concentrated her most mobile forces along the border of western Belgium and prepared them to move forward rapidly. After these forces entered Belgium, France wanted them to avoid an encounter battle. That is, she wanted them to occupy a defensive position that could halt the German advance, and she wanted them to occupy this position before the Germans arrived.

      If Belgium appealed for aid prior to an enemy invasion, French forces could possibly join the Belgians in defending their border with Germany. If not, the French had three other lines along which they could defend. The first of these, which was the farthest forward, ran from the French border at Givet along the Namur-Dyle, River-Antwerp line. The plan for placing troops along this line eventually became known as Plan D, or the Dyle Plan. The second alternative was to defend farther to the rear along the French frontier to Condé, through Tournai along the Escaut River to Ghent, and then either directly to the North Sea at Zeebrugge, or alternatively along the Scheldt (Escaut) River to Antwerp. The plan for placing troops farther to the rear along the Tournai-Escaut River-Antwerp line eventually became known as Plan E, or the Escaut Plan. The final alternative was to defend along the entire French border to Dunkirk. Of these three alternatives, a defense along the Namur-Dyle River-Antwerp line would be about seventy or eighty kilometers shorter than the other two.⁸

      During the first weeks of the war, General Maurice Gamelin (the commander of French forces) preferred to be cautious and prepared to implement the Escaut Plan. Following the rapid and deep thrusts of German forces into Poland in September 1939, France's military leaders were deeply concerned about whether her mobile forces could reach and occupy their designated defensive positions in Belgium before the arrival of highly mobile German mechanized forces. Less than a month after the beginning of the war in 1939, the French High Command issued a directive to the commander of Army Group 1 that specified his mission and that placed the first priority on assuring the integrity of the national territory and defending without withdrawing the position of resistance organized along the frontier…. The directive also noted that Army Group 1 could be authorized to enter into Belgium and to occupy a defensive position along the Escaut River.⁹

      On 24 October a directive from Gamelin described the two main alternatives for occupying positions in Belgium, one along the Escaut and the other along the Dyle River. The directive explained that an advance beyond the Escaut could be considered only if French forces had time to reach prepared positions before coming under attack or if they arrived in time to prepare positions before a German attack.¹⁰ Thus, for the first weeks of the war, France favored moving no farther than the Escaut line.

      Only after it became apparent that the Belgians were strengthening their defenses along the Ardennes Canal and were improving the readiness of their forces did Gamelin become more optimistic about being able to send French forces farther into Belgium.¹¹ During late October and early November, Gamelin concluded that the Allied forces could move forward successfully to the Dyle line. He favored the more ambitious strategy despite the suggestion of caution from General Alphonse Georges, the commander of the northern and northeastern frontiers, about the difficulties of reaching the Dyle line before the Germans attacked. Georges’ concerns were not new, since the High Command had discussed the point on several occasions in peacetime.

      While the British initially expressed reservations about any move into Belgium, Gamelin discussed his plan with their top-ranking officers and managed to gain their consent. After detailed analysis and discussions, formal adoption of Plan D occurred on 9 November during a meeting of the Allied generals at Vincennes. In its meeting on 17 November, the Supreme War Council concluded that it was essential to hold the Dyle line. On that same day, Gamelin sent out a directive that provided details about the occupation of the Dyle line from Antwerp, to Louvain, to Wavre, across the Gembloux Gap to Namur, to Givet.¹²

      Thus, by the middle of November, the Allies considered the Dyle line to be the most likely position to be occupied by their forces in Belgium. During the next four months, as the Dutch and Belgians improved their defenses, as the British Expeditionary Force slowly increased in size, and as the French forces became better equipped and trained and gained confidence in themselves, Gamelin's eyes began to look farther toward Holland.

      While adoption of Plan D was still being discussed by Allied officials, Gamelin began considering the possibility of moving into the Netherlands toward Breda. His concerns revolved around the strategic importance of the Netherlands. By sparing the Dutch from German conquest, the Allies could retain the ten Dutch divisions, secure North Sea communications, and deny the Germans an easy staging area for the launching of an offensive against Great Britain.¹³ By securing the mouth of the Scheldt (Escaut), the Allies could also move supplies by ship into Antwerp. The possibility of linking up with Dutch forces along the Scheldt (Escaut) River, or pushing across the river into Dutch territory, however, was an extreme variation of Plan D.

      On 8 November Gamelin sent out a directive that for the first time mentioned the possibility of a German invasion of the Netherlands. The directive emphasized the importance of preventing the bypassing of Antwerp on the west by pushing forces to the south bank of the mouth of the Scheldt (Escaut). To accomplish this, Gamelin strengthened the left wing of Army Group 1 with the Seventh Army, which apparently moved into position in December. Prior to its being placed on the far left flank of the Allied forces, the Seventh Army—which included some of France's most mobile and capable divisions—had served as part of the General Reserve behind the forces designated to move forward into Belgium. According to its new mission, in addition to occupying the south bank of the Scheldt (Escaut), the Seventh Army would—after receiving orders to do so—move into Holland and secure the mouth of the river by occupying the peninsula on the northern bank of its mouth.¹⁴ This was the first formal indication that the Holland Hypothesis was a possibility.

      Despite concerns in the High Command, Gamelin decided about two months before the German attack that the Dyle Plan and the Holland Hypothesis would include the advance of French troops toward Breda, which was soon known as the Breda Variant. He wanted French forces to linkup with Dutch forces along the Scheldt (Escaut) River or to make the linkup by pushing across the river into Dutch territory. On 12 March 1940 he issued a directive to Georges that coupled the Seventh Army's mission on the left flank with the Dyle maneuver and made the move into the Netherlands almost automatic. Georges, in turn, issued a directive to General Gaston Billotte, the Army Group 1 commander, which explained that if the order were given to move into Holland, the left flank of Army Group 1 would move into Holland as far as Tilburg, or as a minimum, as far as Breda.¹⁵

      Thus, on order, the French Seventh Army was supposed to occupy a bridgehead between the Belgians in the south and the Dutch in the north. To reach this position, the Seventh Army would have to move past the Belgians along the Albert Canal and then pivot east. While carrying out the risky Breda maneuver, the Seventh Army would have to travel about 175 kilometers; the Germans would have to travel about 90 kilometers to reach Breda.

      During the last two months before the German invasion, the only modification to this plan came on 16 April when another directive addressed the question of the Germans attacking the Netherlands and leaving Belgium alone. The major substantive change was a modification of the area to be occupied by the Seventh Army, but the directive noted, In this case, the Belgians may be hostile or passive. The key point, however, had been included in Georges’ directive on 20 March. It explained, If circumstances are favorable, our positions will be pushed to the Albert Canal. It is only in the case where the enemy has largely preceded us in Belgium that the Escaut hypothesis will be followed.¹⁶

      In making the decision about the Breda Variant and concomitantly weakening his reserves and his ability to concentrate forces elsewhere, Gamelin personally took the final step in the long evolutionary process in which the military hierarchy decided how to defend France's frontiers. Studies by the French military about sending forces toward Breda elicited strong objections from several high-ranking officers, but none were as prophetic as those voiced by General Georges. He emphasized the danger of committing most of France's mobile forces against a diversion when the main German attack could come through the French center. He also asked that the Seventh Army be replaced by a corps with two divisions and that the field army be returned to the General Reserve.¹⁷

      As Gamelin's confidence in his forces had increased, he had allowed himself to be seduced by a grand strategic design of questionable value despite the objections of several of France's most senior and important generals. In return for the possible addition of ten Dutch divisions to the Allied cause and for the possible denial of the Scheldt (Escaut) estuary to the Germans, Gamelin sacrificed a significant portion of his strategic reserve and severely weakened the French ability to reply to an unexpected German move. That he would take such a risk must be attributed to his confidence in the ability of the French and Allied forces to halt the Germans. Additionally, Gamelin committed himself to the Breda Variant, even though staff talks were not conducted between France and the two neutral countries of Belgium and Holland, and even though Gamelin was uncertain of the response of the two countries. Neither country was willing to enter into detailed military cooperation with the Allies until Germany actually entered their territory.

      Because of his having designed the Breda Variant, Gamelin must personally bear responsibility for the riskiest aspects of the ultimately disastrous French strategy. Though he had made his way to the highest echelons of the French Army by being cautious and rarely taking chances, he chose a highly risky alternative when the destiny of his country and its allies depended on his judgment. The irony is that the French strategy was a conservative strategy, except for the Breda Variant. Had the Germans known that Gamelin was going to squander a significant portion of his reserves, they would have entered the campaign with greater confidence.

      By May 1940 the French and British were poised to carry out the Allied strategy. Army Group 1 had responsibility for the area between the English Channel and the western edge of the Maginot Line. The Seventh Army, B.E.F., First Army, and Ninth Army prepared to move forward and occupy the Dyle line, while the Second Army remained in position. After arriving at the Dyle line, the Seventh Army would occupy the area west of Antwerp and, if ordered, would move into Holland. After resisting a German attack, the Belgians were expected to fall back from the Albert Canal and occupy the river line between Antwerp and Louvain. To their right, the B.E.F. would have the most favorable situation, for the British were supposed to defend the river line between Louvain and Wavre, a distance of about twenty kilometers, with nine divisions. To their right, the First Army occupied what the French considered the most dangerous avenue of approach: the Gembloux Gap. This ancient invasion route included the area between the Dyle River and Namur. The avenue of approach through the Gembloux Gap ran along the northern bank of the Sambre River between Masstricht and Mons, had few natural obstacles, and aimed directly at Paris. The First Army had ten divisions to defend its front of about thirty-five kilometers between Wavre and Namur. To its right, the Ninth Army was supposed to move forward between the First Army and the Second Army and occupy positions south of Namur along the Meuse River.

      To the right of the Ninth Army, the Second Army was the easternmost field army in Army Group 1 and had responsibility for the area between Pont à Bar (six kilometers west of Sedan) and Longuyon. Its eastern sector included a portion of the Maginot Line. The western boundary of the Second Army served as the hinge for the advance of the other field armies in Army Group 1 into Belgium.

      French military leaders believed the Second and Ninth armies occupied the least dangerous sectors in Army Group 1. Both armies had ideal defensive terrain to occupy along the left bank of the Meuse River. To their front was difficult terrain that would require substantial effort and time—the French assumed—for an invading force to cross.

      Behind Army Group 1, French reserves were relatively small. After committing the seven divisions in the Seventh Army (one light mechanized division, two motorized divisions, and four infantry divisions) to the extreme left flank of Army Group 1, the French had seven divisions behind the Second and Ninth armies that could be used as reserves for that sector of the front. Others, such as the 14th Infantry Division, could also be moved west from behind the Maginot Line. Except for the 53rd Infantry Division, however, the divisions behind the Second and Ninth armies tended to be south or north of the hinge between the armies. The placement of the reserves demonstrates the lack of concern by the High Command for the hinge between the Second and Ninth armies. It also demonstrates the concern of the High Command with the possibility of a German attack coming around the flank of the Maginot Line and turning southeast through the so-called Stenay Gap. Most of the reserves behind the Second Army were located so they could respond to this possibility.

      Much to the surprise of the French High Command, the German XIXth Panzer Corps turned west on 14 May in the area behind the hinge after crossing the Meuse River at Sedan on the 13th. If the seven divisions of the Seventh Army had been available on the 13th and 14th and had been committed in front of the German forces, the entire course of the war may have been different.

      On the morning of the 13th, however, the Seventh Army pushed the main body of its forces into Holland, the 1st Light Mechanized Division having established a screening force at Tilburg on the 11th. The main body did not reach Breda, for the Germans quickly pushed back the French covering force and attacked the French as they attempted to move northeast toward Breda. By the end of the day, the Seventh Army managed to hold a line between Bergen op Zoom (thirty kilometers northwest of Antwerp) and Turnhout (thirty-five kilometers northeast of Antwerp) and thereby protected the estuary of the Scheldt (Escaut).¹⁸ However, the French never really established contact with the Dutch, for by the end of the 13th, the Dutch had been overwhelmed and had pulled back into Fortress Holland, the large peninsula that includes Rotterdam, Utrecht, and Amsterdam.

      Unfortunately for France, she had wasted a significant portion of her mobile reserves by sending them toward Holland. With minimum reserves behind her long line of defenses between the English Channel and the Rhine River, and with her most capable forces being located behind the Maginot Line or being pushed forward into Belgium and Holland, her strategy proved to be particularly vulnerable to a German attack through the Ardennes. While General Georges played the primary role in placing individual divisions behind the main line of French defenses, General Gamelin personally devised the Breda Variant and forced his subordinates to accept it. Consequently, the responsibility for the primary weakness of that strategy must be borne by him.

      GERMAN MILITARY STRATEGY

      In sharp contrast to the French, the German strategy in May 1940 sought a swift, decisive victory by the launching of a massive attack through the Ardennes. The initial plans for the war against the Allies, however, differed dramatically from the final plan that ultimately yielded victory in 1940.

      During the fight against Poland in September 1939, the Germans assumed a defensive position along the French and Belgian borders in the west to permit the concentration of forces in the east. After the swift victory, however, much of the military hierarchy preferred to remain on the defensive in the west. In particular, the senior leaders of the Army believed their forces were not ready for a difficult campaign against the Allies. The possibility of remaining on the defensive and seeking a diplomatic solution to the war appealed to the military hierarchy, which had a high estimate of the military capabilities of the Allies, particularly of the French. General Franz Halder, the Chief of the Army's General Staff, noted in his diaries: Techniques of Polish campaign no recipe for the West. No good against a well-knit Army.¹⁹

      Despite the reservations of German military leaders, the quick victory over Poland convinced Hitler that a similar campaign could yield victory in the west. On 10 October, Hitler met with his generals and read them a memorandum, a copy of which was given to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and to the commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The memorandum is remarkable, for it is a clear statement of Hitler's aims and his views on military strategy. In the document Hitler stated, The German war aim is the final military dispatch of the West, that is, destruction of the power and ability of the Western Powers ever again to be able to oppose the…consolidation and further development of the German people in Europe.²⁰ According to Hitler, the main

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