Everand Logo

Welcome to Everand!

  • Discover millions of ebooks, audiobooks, and so much more with a free trial

    Only $11.99/month after trial. Cancel anytime.

    Decision in the Ukraine: German Panzer Operations on the Eastern Front, Summer 1943
    Decision in the Ukraine: German Panzer Operations on the Eastern Front, Summer 1943
    Decision in the Ukraine: German Panzer Operations on the Eastern Front, Summer 1943
    Ebook852 pages10 hours

    Decision in the Ukraine: German Panzer Operations on the Eastern Front, Summer 1943

    By George M. Nipe Jr.

    3.5/5

    ()

    Read preview

    About this ebook

    Myth-busting account of the summer of 1943 on the Eastern Front, one of World War II's turning points.
    LanguageEnglish
    PublisherStackpole Books
    Release dateAug 1, 2012
    ISBN9780811748643
    Decision in the Ukraine: German Panzer Operations on the Eastern Front, Summer 1943

    Related to Decision in the Ukraine

    Titles in the series (59)

    View More
    View More

    Related ebooks

    Wars & Military For You

    View More
    View More

    Related podcast episodes

    Related articles

    • Article

      The Battle Of St Vith

      Feb 26, 2020

      The Battle Of St Vith
      6 min read

    • Article

      Cambrai Dawn Of The Tank Age

      Oct 30, 2017

      Cambrai Dawn Of The Tank Age
      13 min read

    • Article

      Clash On The Devil’s Bridge

      Jun 18, 2020

      Clash On The Devil’s Bridge
      7 min read

    • Article

      Battle Of Villers-bocage

      Jul 16, 2020

      Battle Of Villers-bocage
      7 min read

    • Article

      Tiger vs T-34

      Jul 12, 2018

      Tiger vs T-34
      9 min read

    • Article

      Battle For Kharkiv

      Apr 14, 2022

      Battle For Kharkiv
      1 min read

    • Article

      The Chenogne massacre

      Feb 26, 2020

      The Chenogne massacre
      3 min read

    • Article

      Ursula And Elna

      May 7, 2021

      Ursula And Elna
      5 min read

    • Article

      Panzerkampfwagen V Panther

      Jul 12, 2018

      Panzerkampfwagen V Panther
      3 min read

    • Article

      Russia

      Apr 18, 2019

      Russia
      8 min read

    • Article

      Operation Bodenplatte

      Feb 26, 2020

      Operation Bodenplatte
      2 min read

    • Article

      Wwii’s Forgotten V-2 Heist

      Jun 8, 2023

      Wwii’s Forgotten V-2 Heist
      6 min read

    • Article

      Restoring A Panther

      Aug 8, 2019

      Restoring A Panther
      3 min read

    • Article

      Is-3 Heavy Tank

      Dec 29, 2020

      Is-3 Heavy Tank
      3 min read

    • Article

      D-day Tank Operations

      Apr 18, 2019

      Unusual tanks are developed by the British 79th Armoured Division for the planned invasion of Normandy. Based on Churchill or Sherman tanks, these armoured vehicles can – among other things – demolish concrete structures, fill trenches, lay matting a

      2 min read

    • Article

      The Volkssturm

      Dec 4, 2020

      The Volkssturm
      5 min read

    • Article

      Spearhead To The Meuse

      Feb 26, 2020

      Spearhead To The Meuse
      2 min read

    • Article

      A Deadly Duel

      Feb 5, 2019

      A Deadly Duel
      6 min read

    • Article

      5 Best Books On Waterloo

      Oct 4, 2018

      Many books were released for the bicentennial of Waterloo, but few were as clearly written and as challenging as Glover’s monograph. Highlighting many myths about the battle, the author provides convincing evidence to support his version of the event

      1 min read

    • Article

      Panzerartillerie Firepower For The Panzer Divisions

      Apr 18, 2019

      Author Thomas Anderson Publisher Osprey Publishing Price £30 As the German Army formed their new doctrine of mobile warfare based around fast moving armoured columns (Blitzkrieg) in the 1930s, it became clear that artillery was going to be a major p

      1 min read

    • Article

      Last Stand Of The Waffen-ss

      Nov 24, 2022

      Last Stand Of The Waffen-ss
      12 min read

    • Article

      The Nazi Invasion Of Poland

      Aug 8, 2019

      The Nazi Invasion Of Poland
      1 min read

    • Article

      M10 & M10A1 TANK DESTROYER

      Mar 18, 2021

      M10 & M10A1 TANK DESTROYER
      1 min read

    Related categories

    Reviews for Decision in the Ukraine

    3.5/5

    5 ratings1 review

    What did you think?

    Tap to rate

    Review must be at least 10 words

    • 2/5
      (-) too centric on Post-WW2 German Analysis and Archives (build around Halder's, Mannstein's and Guderian's analysis of those);
      (--) expected to see ALL of the battles related to Ukraine - including Northern Ukraine; The battles in the south alone weren't decisive; The attack in the Briansk Front Sector, towards the Dniepr, was a huge blow for the Heer (just as example)
      (--) The Soviet Attack towards Orel during the Kursk battle was decisive, and fully omitted here;

    Book preview

    Decision in the Ukraine - George M. Nipe Jr.

    DECISION IN

    THE UKRAINE

    The Stackpole Military History Series

    THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

    Cavalry Raids of the Civil War

    Ghost, Thunderbolt, and Wizard

    In the Lion’s Mouth

    Pickett’s Charge

    Witness to Gettysburg

    WORLD WAR I

    Doughboy War

    WORLD WAR II

    After D-Day

    Airborne Combat

    Armor Battles of the Waffen-SS, 1943–45

    Armoured Guardsmen

    Army of the West

    Arnhem 1944

    Australian Commandos

    The B-24 in China

    Backwater War

    The Battle of France

    The Battle of Sicily

    Battle of the Bulge, Vol. 1

    Battle of the Bulge, Vol. 2

    Beyond the Beachhead

    Beyond Stalingrad

    The Black Bull

    Blitzkrieg Unleashed

    Blossoming Silk against the Rising Sun

    Bodenplatte

    The Brandenburger Commandos

    The Brigade

    Bringing the Thunder

    The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign

    Coast Watching in World War II

    Colossal Cracks

    Condor

    A Dangerous Assignment

    D-Day Bombers

    D-Day Deception

    D-Day to Berlin

    Decision in the Ukraine

    Destination Normandy

    Dive Bomber!

    A Drop Too Many

    Eagles of the Third Reich

    The Early Battles of Eighth Army

    Eastern Front Combat

    Europe in Flames

    Exit Rommel

    The Face of Courage

    Fist from the Sky

    Flying American Combat Aircraft of World War II

    For Europe

    Forging the Thunderbolt

    For the Homeland

    Fortress France

    The German Defeat in the East, 1944–45

    German Order of Battle, Vol. 1

    German Order of Battle, Vol. 2

    German Order of Battle, Vol. 3

    The Germans in Normandy

    Germany’s Panzer Arm in World War II

    GI Ingenuity

    Goodwood

    The Great Ships

    Grenadiers

    Guns against the Reich

    Hitler’s Nemesis

    Hold the Westwall

    Infantry Aces

    In the Fire of the Eastern Front

    Iron Arm

    Iron Knights

    Japanese Army Fighter Aces

    JG 26 Luftwaffe Fighter Wing War Diary, Vol. 1

    JG 26 Luftwaffe Fighter Wing War Diary, Vol. 2

    Kampfgruppe Peiper at the Battle of the Bulge

    The Key to the Bulge

    Knight’s Cross Panzers

    Kursk

    Luftwaffe Aces

    Luftwaffe Fighter Ace

    Luftwaffe Fighter-Bombers over Britain

    Luftwaffe Fighters and Bombers

    Massacre at Tobruk

    Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism?

    Messerschmitts over Sicily

    Michael Wittmann, Vol. 1

    Michael Wittmann, Vol. 2

    Mission 376

    Mountain Warriors

    The Nazi Rocketeers

    Night Flyer / Mosquito Pathfinder

    No Holding Back

    On the Canal

    Operation Mercury

    Packs On!

    Panzer Aces

    Panzer Aces II

    Panzer Aces III

    Panzer Commanders of the Western Front

    Panzergrenadier Aces

    Panzer Gunner

    The Panzer Legions

    Panzers in Normandy

    Panzers in Winter

    Panzer Wedge

    The Path to Blitzkrieg

    Penalty Strike

    Poland Betrayed

    Red Road from Stalingrad

    Red Star under the Baltic

    Retreat to the Reich

    Rommel’s Desert Commanders

    Rommel’s Desert War

    Rommel’s Lieutenants

    The Savage Sky

    Ship-Busters

    The Siege of Küstrin

    The Siegfried Line

    A Soldier in the Cockpit

    Soviet Blitzkrieg

    Stalin’s Keys to Victory

    Surviving Bataan and Beyond

    T-34 in Action

    Tank Tactics

    Tigers in the Mud

    Triumphant Fox

    The 12th SS, Vol. 1

    The 12th SS, Vol. 2

    Twilight of the Gods

    Typhoon Attack

    The War against Rommel’s Supply Lines

    War in the Aegean

    War of the White Death

    Winter Storm

    Wolfpack Warriors

    Zhukov at the Oder

    THE COLD WAR / VIETNAM

    Cyclops in the Jungle

    Expendable Warriors

    Fighting in Vietnam

    Flying American Combat Aircraft: The Cold War

    Here There Are Tigers

    Land with No Sun

    MiGs over North Vietnam

    Phantom Reflections

    Street without Joy

    Through the Valley

    Two One Pony

    WARS OF AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

    Never-Ending Conflict

    The Rhodesian War

    GENERAL MILITARY HISTORY

    Carriers in Combat

    Cavalry from Hoof to Track

    Desert Battles

    Guerrilla Warfare

    Ranger Dawn

    Sieges

    The Spartan Army

    DECISION IN

    THE UKRAINE

    German Panzer Operations

    on the Eastern Front, Summer 1943

    George M. Nipe Jr.

    STACKPOLE

    BOOKS

    Copyright © 1996 by J. J. Fedorowicz Publishing, Inc.

    Published in paperback in 2012 by

    STACKPOLE BOOKS

    5067 Ritter Road

    Mechanicsburg, PA 17055

    www.stackpolebooks.com

    Originally published by J. J. Fedorowicz Publishing in 1996. This edition published by arrangement with J. J. Fedorowicz Publishing. All rights reserved, including the right to reproduce this book or portions thereof in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. All inquiries should be addressed to J. J. Fedorowicz Publishing, 104 Browning Boulevard, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada R3K 0L7.

    Cover design by Tracy Patterson

    Printed in the United States of America

    10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

    Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

    Nipe, George M.

    Decision in the Ukraine: German Panzer operations on the Eastern Front, summer 1943 / George M. Nipe, Jr.

           p. cm.—(Stackpole military history series)

    Originally published: Winnipeg, Man., Canada: J.J. Fedorowicz Pub., c1996.

    Includes bibliographical references and index.

    ISBN 978-0-8117-1162-3

    1. World War, 1939–1945—Campaigns—Ukraine. 2. Germany. Heer.

    Panzer-Korps, III. 3. Waffen-SS. Panzer-Division Das Reich, 2. I. Title.

    D764.7.U5N57 2012

    940.54'2177—dc23

    2012012222

    eISBN 9780811748643

    Contents

    List of Maps

    Preface

    There were three great summer offensive campaigns mounted by the Germans during the Russo-German War. The first began in June of 1941 and culminated in the drive to capture Moscow, which came to a halt in December of that year in the face of winter conditions, declining German strength and Soviet counterattacks. In the following year, the 1942 offensive ended in the debacle of Stalingrad. The third and last great German summer offensive was known as Operation Citadel and took place in July 1943. After Citadel failed, the Russians launched a series of massive counterattacks all along the front, the most important of which were in southern Ukraine. The overwhelming strength of the Russian tank and infantry armies shattered the German lines. Attacks by hundreds of Soviet tanks followed massive artillery preparations and overran and destroyed whole divisions within a matter of days. The initial breakthroughs quickly resulted in the loss of Belgorod, and by the third week of August, after weeks of bitter fighting, the Germans abandoned Kharkov also.

    The Germans slowly retreated towards the Dnepr River, no longer strong enough to stop the relentless advance of the Soviet army. The casualties and weapon losses suffered by Heeresgruppe Süd (Army Group South) during and immediately after Citadel resulted in the eventual loss of of the entire region of southern and eastern Ukraine, a setback from which the Germans never recovered. The failure of the last great Eastern Front German offensive, during the summer of 1943, meant unavoidable defeat for Germany in World War II. It can be debated as to whether the Germans actually still had any remaining chance of winning the war by July of 1943. Some authors and former German officers alike believe that the war was lost at Stalingrad or even earlier, at Moscow. However, there can no doubt whatsoever that following the conclusion of Operation Citadel, Germany had absolutely no chance of reversing the Russian tide that eventually swept its shattered armies into the ruins of Germany.

    This book was written with three main objectives. The first of these is to study the operations of II. SS-Panzerkorps and III. Panzerkorps during three important battles that took place in southern Ukraine in the Heeresgruppe Süd sector from 5 July 1943 through August of that same year. The three battles are the 12–17 July battles around Prochorovka, the defense of the Mius River by General der Infanterie Karl Hollidt’s 6. Armee (formerly Armee-Abteilung Hollidt), and the fighting of III. Panzerkorps in the Bogodukhov sector during the fourth battle for Kharkov. The three battles are closely related events of the summer of 1943, and the relationship between them involves an interlocking mesh of Soviet and German strategic planning, hard-fought, bloody battles, Soviet military deception and decisions made by Adolf Hitler. The Mius battle is largely unknown, and the Bogodukhov fighting is dealt with briefly in most texts. The most famous of the three, Prochorovka, has been extensively mythologized. My second objective is to provide an accurate basic account of the battles around Prochorovka.

    I believe that Prochorovka has never been understood properly, first due to the failure to use available primary materials, namely the records of II. SS-Panzerkorps, and second to the acceptance of early, incorrect accounts of the battle. The number of SS panzers involved in the fighting and the tank losses of the three SS divisions that took part in the combat west of Prochorovka have been grossly exaggerated. German records very clearly show the numbers of tanks available to each division, and study of these primary sources result in some interesting conclusions regarding what actually happened in this sector on 12–17 July, 1943.

    The defensive fighting of Hollidt’s army at the Mius River is the second of the battles studied in this work. It can be considered to be a part of the larger battle of Kursk for several reasons that are not apparent in the study of either battle as essentially unrelated events. It is an almost unknown battle and is only briefly mentioned in many of the comprehensive accounts of the Eastern Front. The battle is closely linked with the outcome of Operation Citadel on the southern wing of Heeresgruppe Süd during the summer of 1943. The accounts of 6. Armee’s struggles at the Mius River clearly illustrate the problems of the German Army after the losses suffered during the campaigns of 1941–43. It was also the first of the post-Kursk counterattacks which characterized the combat operations of the Waffen SS panzer divisions during the remaining years of the war. For these reasons, it will be studied in greater detail than the fighting at Prochorovka.

    The third battle covered in this book took place immediately after the Mius battle ended, and it involved the combat operations of III. Panzerkorps against elements of five entire Soviet armies west of Kharkov. This complex series of thrusts, river crossings, mobile operations and counterattacks lasted from the first week of August until nearly the end of the month. The III. Panzerkorps was charged with stopping the attack of the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army, 1st Tank Army, 6th Army, 5th Guards Army, and 27th Army. Led by nearly 1,100 tanks of the two Soviet tank armies, this force tore a huge gap between 4. Panzerarmee and 8. Armee. The 8. Armee defended the northern approaches to the city and the section of front that extended south from the city, while 4. Panzerarmee defended the section of front west of Kharkov.

    The tired and weakened German panzer divisions of III. Panzerkorps were thrown into the gap and ordered to bring the massive Soviet offensive west of Kharkov to a halt. For three weeks, III. Panzerkorps, with only weak reinforcements, led by the aggressive attacks of 2. SS-Panzer-Division Das Reich and 3. SS-Panzer-Division Totenkopf, blunted repeated thrusts by the 1st Tank Army and the 5th Guards Tank Army, which were supported by infantry elements of three other Soviet armies. These battles, which were centered around the Merchik and Merla Rivers south of the town of Bogodukhov, provide interesting studies of the operations of Soviet mobile groups and the desperate actions that characterized the late war operations of German mobile divisions.

    Throughout the whole narrative, the hand of Adolf Hitler is evident. He made a series of decisions beginining with the conduct of Operation Citadel that decisively influenced the conduct of the war in the East. Hitler issued a series of orders affecting the use and positioning of panzer divisions after Prochorovka that were crucial to the outcome of Heeresgruppe Süd’s offensive around the Psel-Prochorovka area. These decisions are directly related to the failure of the Kursk offensive on the south flank of the salient and strategic developments that took place as late as August in the Bogodukhov area. The events of this time period and the decisions by Hitler influenced not only the war in the East, but the entire course of World War II.

    My third objective is to objectively study combat operations of the Waffen SS panzer divisions that fought in all of the above battles. The participation of Das Reich and Totenkopf provides one of the common threads that linked all three engagements. Misconceptions about the operations of the units of the Waffen SS, their combat record and their fighting qualities are common in many of the histories of the Eastern Front. Many writers have dismissed the accomplishments of these units and disparaged the military qualities of the SS combat units, either through ignorance or contempt for anything associated with the runic symbols of the SS.

    I have attempted to provide an account of the combat operations of a number of those divisions that qualify for elite status by any objective classification. It must be understood that there are literally no common standards or characteristics that can be applied to all Waffen SS divisions. There was an enormous variance in divisional organization, equipment and quality of leadership. While several of the earliest units were made up of truly magnificent human material, many of the later divisions had personnel of dubious or poor quality. By the end of 1943, even the elite divisions were receiving replacements of transferred Luftwaffe personnel with little or no training in ground warfare and Volksdeutsch recruits who did not share the motivation level of the original volunteers. There were SS divisions that never actually fought for any time as organized combat formations. Some were ill-equipped and undisciplined formations with little military value, although others, such as the Baltic divisions, fought fairly well. The last divisions to be established were little more than reinforced regiments made from training school staffs and support units cobbled together from whatever was available. There is almost no common ground between these formations and the panzer divisions of the Waffen SS that fought in southern Ukraine during the summer of 1943.

    In order to completely understand the military history of the Eastern Front during the summer of 1943, it is necessary to objectively understand the participation of the elite Waffen SS divisions in battles such as Prochorovka or Bogodukhov. However, these achievements have been ignored or minimized in the writings of former German Army officers and many postwar historians. I have presented the operations of the SS divisions during this period from an objective point of view in the hope that I might correct some of the myths and misconceptions regarding these fighting formations.

    Introduction: Germany Invades Russia, 22 June 1941

    On 22 June 1941, the German Army swept out of eastern Poland and into the Soviet Union. This was the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, Hitler’s invasion of his arch national enemy, Communist Russia. Three army groups (Heeresgruppen), led by the fast-moving panzer divisions and preceded by bombing and strafing planes of the Luftwaffe, quickly drove deep into Russian territory. In the center, Heeresgruppe Mitte, under command of Feldmarschall Fedor von Bock, pushed ahead rapidly, crossed the Dnepr and reached Smolensk by 16 July. On 5 August, Heeresgruppe Mitte eliminated a huge pocket of Soviet troops, capturing over 300,000 Russian soldiers. On the right flank, in the Ukraine, Feldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt’s Heeresgruppe Süd encountered stubborn resistance that delayed its advance. It was not until mid-July that Feldmarschall Walter von Reichenau’s 6. Armee broke through the Russian defenses, advancing to Kiev on 11 July. By early August, Heeresgruppe Süd forces encircled a huge pocket of Soviet troops at Uman, capturing hundreds of thousands of dispirited prisoners. With German armor at Pervomaisk, the Soviet South Front was forced to retreat east, leaving behind a covering force at Odessa. On the north flank, Heeresgruppe Nord, aided by a Finnish offensive that began on 11 July, was only seventy miles from Leningrad. To the left of this attack from the center of Heeresgruppe Nord, 18. Armee drove the Russians out of Estonia. Meanwhile, Generaloberst Ernst Busch’s 16. Armee advanced eastward on the left flank of Heeresgruppe Mitte.

    At this point in the war, when the Soviets fell back on all fronts, losing men and equipment at a rate that they could not sustain for long, it seemed to the world that Russia was about to fall victim to the German Army just as the western armies had in France. However, when the spearheads of the panzer divisions threatened to split Russia in half,the German armies were given new orders by Adolf Hitler. These orders changed the course of the war in the East just when it seemed that nothing would stop the Germans from capturing Moscow. In two directives issued in July 1941, Adolf Hitler diverted the panzer divisions of Heeresgruppe Mitte and sent them in attacks toward the flanking army groups on the north and south. With these orders, the dictator did what the Soviets could not do themselves, stop Heeresgruppe Mitte from advancing deeper into the heart of Russia and taking Moscow.

    When OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres, or the Army High Command) expressed their objections to weakening what they correctly saw as the decisive effort, a month-long series of arguments and discussions began which resulted in an operational pause in front of the Russian capital. When the advance was resumed, in the area east of Kiev, the Russian Southwest Front was encircled on 11 September, which resulted in the capture of 665,000 prisoners and tore a huge gap in the line. However, this success would not compensate for the loss of the window of opportunity that Heeresgruppe Mitte had in August. The Germans never again threatened Moscow.

    Hitler issued his next directive on September 6, detailing plans for the conduct of the war on the Eastern Front for the remainder of the year. This was the order for Operation Typhoon, Hitler’s plan for the resumption of the drive to capture Moscow. Fortunately for the Soviets, they had been given time to gather their strength in front of Moscow, where they now employed three entire fronts (the Russian equivalent of army groups) against Heeresgruppe Mitte. These were the West, Bryansk, and Reserve Fronts, and they now had more than a million and a quarter men to deploy between the Germans and the Russian capital.

    When the offensive began again in the center on 2 October, it seemed that the Germans were invincible once more. Bock’s panzer groups chopped through the Russian lines, cutting the Bryansk Front to pieces. Within days, the front was penetrated and encircled west of Vyazma, where once again the Russians lost over 600,000 prisoners. Stalin, alarmed at the destruction of his armies, brought General of the Army Georgi Zhukov to Moscow from Leningrad. At Leningrad, Zhukov had stabilized a crisis situation and prevented the capture of the ancient city. He took charge of the West and Reserve Fronts during the second week in October, immediately building up a defensive line around Mozhaiysk, throwing the survivors of the Bryansk Front, civilians and any warm bodies he could find into these positions. The population of Moscow was mobilized to build vast defensive works around the Russian capital while more reserves were brought up from troops stationed in the Russian far east. All efforts were made to gain time, time for the Russian winter to set in, slowing movement to a crawl and disabling men and machines that were not prepared for a Russian winter. Civilian and workers battalions were organized to man combat positions if trained troops were not available for commitment.

    On 14 October, the Germans captured Kalinin, lying just northwest of the capital, a victory which caused a frenzied reaction in Moscow and widespread civilian and government panic in the streets. Five days later, the capital was put under martial law and order was harshly re-established, while much of the government infrastructure and vital industry was evacuated to the east. The removal of industrial machinery in order to prevent it from falling into German hands, resulted in a drastic loss of production capacity during the months of September and October while the machinery was being relocated. War production dropped by 60 percent or more.¹ Foreign military attaches in the capital began to prepare for the loss of the city and sent out dispatches reporting that the fall of the capital was imminent. Hitler believed that the war with Russia was all but over and that the Russian army was finished due to military reasons, from the point of view of personnel and materiel, as well as for organizational reasons and that Russia was at the end of its tether.² Lend-Lease aid had not started to reach the Soviet Union in any quantities as President Franklin Roosevelt could not persuade the United States Congress that the survival of the Soviet Union was in the best interests of the U.S. It was not until 28 October when Congress decided that shipments of U.S. arms and material would be able to begin. The end appeared near for Stalin. Time appeared to have run out on the Soviets. At this dark hour, a strong traditional ally made its first appearance in support of the Russian army and nation during World War II.

    On 6 October, the first snow fell in the Heeresgruppe Mitte sector, signaling the onset of rasputitsa, the season of fall rains and mud. By mid-October, the movement of panzer divisions was limited to roads, which quickly turned into quagmires of mobility robbing mud. Supply shortages began to occur more frequently because of difficulty in transporting supplies by truck but also because wartime demands had already gone beyond the capacity of German industry. Not only were raw materials, particularly fuel and rubber, in short supply, but the German factories were further hamstrung by the removal of thousands of young workers conscripted to replace the enormous casualties sustained by the Germans in Russia. The troops began to suffer from exposure to the worsening cold and wet weather because they had not been issued winter uniforms and boots. The 9. Panzer-Division reported on 2 October 1941 that 30 percent of its shoes were unwearable, all socks were issued and there was a shortage of suitable underwear. The men of the Waffen SS divisions suffered less than the army because Himmler had decided to stockpile a supply of winter uniforms and large quantities of furs which were made into coats and vests.

    Hitler’s response to the reports of lack of proper winter supplies for the troops was to demand that I do not want to hear another word about the problem of supplying our troops in winter. . . . For there will be no winter campaign. . . . The army need only strike the Russians a few strong blows. . . . I expressly forbid anybody to speak of a winter campaign in my presence.³ On another disturbing development, the T-34 tank, capable of better cross-country performance than German tanks due to its wide tracks, began to appear in ever increasing numbers. The standard German 37mm antitank gun proved next to useless against the sloped frontal armor of the T-34. German troops were forced to use emergency tactics to destroy this new Russian weapon. The main armament of German tanks, the 37mm gun of the Panzer III and the short-barreled 75mm cannon of the Panzer IV, proved to be ineffective against the frontal armor of the T-34 and the even heavier KV-1 tanks. This deficiency forced the Germans to upgrade the Panzer III main gun to a longer barreled 50mm and to develop a higher velocity 75mm gun for the Panzer IV.

    Mired down by the rains, with the number of operational supply and combat vehicles declining at an alarming rate, Heeresgruppe Mitte came to a standstill, separated from the environs of Moscow by little more than thirty miles. It became apparent to the tired German fighting men, if not their supreme commander, that the Russians were not a beaten foe, fleeing in disorder, but were gaining strength each day and fighting with determination from well-prepared positions. Partisan bands created havoc behind the lines with ever increasing raids and supply disruptions. This in turn demanded that more troops be detailed to fighting this new threat, exacerbating the manpower problems of the frontline fighting divisions. The German Army had sustained casualties totalling 686,000 men by 1 November and its 136 divisions were the actual equivalent of only 83 full-strength divisions.

    On the Russian side, the view remained far from optimistic, however, in spite of the improving situation. Stalin knew that with the first onset of colder weather, the roads and countryside would be frozen, thus allowing German vehicles to move again for a period of time before the snows began to accumulate. The Stavka (Soviet High Command) had even begun formulating plans for the loss of the capital and the defense of a line east of Moscow. Stalin told the American ambassador that the loss of the Soviet industrial capacity resulting from a retreat to this line meant the destruction of 75 percent of the remaining factories of the Soviet Union.⁴

    In spite of this uncertain situation, Stalin was able to dramatically improve the defenses of the capital in the breathing space given him by Hitler. This was aided by the advantage of being able to operate on interior lines, with railroad nets available to supply the front lines and, just as importantly, provide parallel movement, thus facilitating movements of reserves to critical points. Stalin also massed the Soviet air force around Moscow, which was able to operate from a number of well-located air bases and had a strength of over 1,100 planes by 15 November. Siberian troops, well equipped for and experienced in winter fighting, began to arrive in ever increasing numbers. In an ominous development for the Germans, the West Front was ordered by Stalin to begin counterattacks, over Zhukov’ s objections. Zhukov preferred to remain on the defensive for the time. These attacks resulted in some success for the Russians against XII. and XIII. Armeekorps of 4. Panzerarmee and inflicted serious losses on the Germans; however, the Russian troops suffered severe casualties also.

    On 15 November, Heeresgruppe Mitte, prodded by Hitler into action, went over to the attack again and initially proved Stalin’s pessimism to have been well founded when LVI. Panzerkorps drove rapidly to the Volga River on the first day. The Russian 3rd Army’s front was penetrated by German panzer forces and the 16th Army’s front nearly collapsed. Its commander urgently requested to be allowed to retreat to a more defensible line but was personally ordered by Zhukov to stand, fight and die—if necessary, to the last man. The front held.

    At other points, the German attacks broke down after hard fighting against the strong Soviet positions and counterattacks from the fresh Siberian divisions. Continuing supply problems and the weakened state of the panzer divisions combined to take the steam out of the renewed attack. The German corps and army commanders, disturbed over their increasing lack of men, vehicles and fuel, began to bicker among themselves over who should take the blame for the lack of success of the attacks. This reflected the tenseness of the situation at the higher levels of command and was a sure sign of the lack of confidence in success and the growing realization that the orders being given from the highest levels did not take into consideration and realities of conditions at the front. In a telephone conversation with the OKH HQ, Bock stated this opinion to OKH commander Brauchitsch: I no longer have the forces necessary to encircle the enemy. . . . I am continually under the impression that our fighting power is being completely overestimated.⁵

    The attack was nevertheless continued and resulted in successes at several points in spite of the fatigue of the troops and additional tank losses. A bridgehead over the Volga Canal at Yakroma caused great concern to Zhukov and the advance of XXIV. Panzerkorps toward Kashira, a key supply center for the defense of Tula, brought a quick reaction. Zhukov personally ordered the commander of the 2nd Cavalry Corps to attack the German spearhead at Kashira and the resulting assault, well supported by Russian planes, forced 17. Panzer-Division, the division leading the attack, to fall back. The advance continued to make progress at other points. All attempts by the Germans to take Tula, however, subsequently failed, in spite of the almost complete envelopment of the town by 3 December. While the German divisions became weaker and weaker, with men and equipment falling to the winter or the harsh fighting, Russian reinforcements were arriving at the front continuously.

    In the first week of December 1941, time ran out for the German divisions fighting to gain the outskirts of Moscow. Already Russian counterattacks on a local scale had begun to probe the spearhead units of Heeresgruppe Mitte. On 29 November, Zhukov informed Stalin that the defensive phase of the battle for Moscow was over, with German strength declining to the point where the time had come to use the large reserves that had gathered for just this purpose. When the order to attack was given on 6 December, 41 percent of the entire Soviet army was concentrated in the defense of the capital, along with 40 percent of all the operational tanks then available to Stalin. This force attacked the Germans at an ideal moment. In addition to being exhausted, Heeresgruppe Mitte had vulnerable flanks which were extended and not prepared for defensive positions. This was due to the fact that the German command, out of touch with the conditions at the front, continually pushed Bock to offensive action. Hitler and the OKH did not even consider that the army group was not in any shape to accomplish much more. Any suggestion that the army group should withdraw to winter positions and await the spring met with lectures about the will necessary for mastering the situation.

    On 6 December, the Soviets launched their main counterattacks against the over-extended German spearheads. These attacks drove the Germans back at all points, with heavy casualties produced by several doomed attempts by the panzer divisions to close gaps they no longer had the strength to close. By 13 December, 6. Panzer-Division had less than 400 panzergrenadiers left and no tanks. Only days later, 7. Panzer-Division, Rommel’s once proud unit, had only 200 panzergrenadiers still in action. By the third week in December, the northern flank of Heeresgruppe Mitte had been driven back as much as sixty miles at some points. Kalinin was evacuated on the fourteenth, three days after Stalinogorsk had fallen. As early as 10 December, several units of the Soviet 10th Army had reached the banks of the Don River. Huge gaps in the line formed, sometimes twenty to thirty kilometers in width, which Bock had no divisions to close. Battalions and even companies were marched into the gaps with orders to attack the tide of Soviet troops. These doomed men, along with security detachments and police units, were thrown into the breakthrough areas and promptly disappeared. As the ragged, freezing German soldiers fought hordes of fresh Russian troops and ever increasing numbers of Soviet tanks, their little remaining confidence drained away. It became evident that there were no reserves to come to their rescue, and abandoned and destroyed heavy equipment became a common sight because of lack of fuel or prime movers. Thoughts of the horror of Napoleon’s rout and his army’s destruction while retreating from Russia were on the mind of many. Men froze to death while proper winter equipment remained at rear-area depots because there were not enough trains to move it forward. There was not sufficient rail capacity for even fuel, ammunition, or food, and so much of the available stocks of overcoats, woolen socks, gloves and blankets remained at the supply centers, far from the front. The rear area noncombatants had warm clothing in abundance, while the men at the front lost their fingers and toes due to frostbite.

    Hitler ordered Bock to hold his positions, to close and . . . hold ground . . . in the gaps by bringing up all the reserves. The fact that he thought there were sufficient reserves remaining to save the situation illustrated how out of touch with reality the high command was. On 15 December, after his own adjutant, Rudolf Schmundt, and Feldmarschall Walther von Brauchitsch personally reported on the desperate circumstances of Bock’s troops, Hitler finally took substantive action to help the army group. Several training and replacement divisions were ordered mobilized and sent to Russia, and five other divisions on occupation duty in the west were also moved east. Sig -nificantly, he ordered them to be provided with winter equipment before being sent to the front lines. There was still to be no retreat, however, and Hitler explained to Bock that if he retreated and left the heavy weapons behind due to lack of prime movers and fuel, then the army would be in the same situation a few days later, but without its abandoned artillery and equipment. Shortly afterwards, after becoming exasperated with unwanted facts and dismal reports from Bock, Hitler replaced him with Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge. Kluge, however, could not do better given the shortages of men, equipment and supplies.

    In the face of continued pressure against his army group, Kluge could not stem the Soviet tide, and Hitler was forced to allow limited withdrawals at one point or another. However, the order to withdraw the whole front to defensible positions was not immediately forthcoming, and the Russians continued to batter the German lines, breaking through at many places. During the last week in December,

    9. Armee’ s front was penetrated by the freshly committed Soviet 39th Army, and its defenses collapsed. On 31 December, 9. Armee’ s VI. Korps was crushed, opening a gap which the Soviets quickly exploited, evidence of improving Soviet flexibility in command and logistics. Only days later, the front of 4. Panzerarmee was also penetrated, a development which prompted its commander, Generalleutnant Erich Hoepner, to withdraw his XX. Armeekorps on his own responsibility, a decision which cost him his command.

    It was not until 15 January that Hitler, finally bowing to the inevitable, allowed Kluge freedom to withdraw his battered army group to a defensible line east of Yukhnov-Gzhatsk-Zubtsov. After extraordinary efforts by the men, the new front began to stabilize. A gap west of Rhzev was closed off when the Russians were momentarily short of reserves and could not maintain the penetration. Fighting continued for some time with the Soviets attempting to open the gap again and the Germans, by a superhuman effort, maintaining a cohesive front. On the north flank, a breakthrough between Heeresgruppe Mitte and Heeresgruppe Nord was brought to a halt near Velizh. Events in 4. Armee’s sector were also favorable, due primarily to the exhaustion of Russian reserves rather than German strength.

    Although the Russian counteroffensive slowed and eventually ground to a halt, the German eastern armies suffered losses that Germany could not entirely replace. The Germans suffered nearly a million casualties by the end of January 1942. The number of destroyed trucks, prime movers and other vehicles created a shortage of transport that would never be completely made good. From that time on, the Germans were faced by a shortage of vehicles which critically restricted the mobility of the infantry divisions, as most of the production of this type of vehicles had to be sent to the mobile divisions. The panzer and panzergrenadier divisions had to be kept operational at all costs. By the spring, the front stabilized in the Heeresgruppe Mitte sector. The Russian counteroffensives could not be sustained after suffering enormous losses of men and equipment at all points. Large numbers of Soviet forces were stalled while involved in siege of the small German pocket at Cholm and the much larger Demyansk encirclement.

    With the onset of warm weather, the critical axis of events shifted to the Ukraine, where the German Army once again went over to the offensive in 1942, a drive which culminated in General der Panzertruppen Friedrich von Paulus’s 6. Armee assault on Stalingrad. Hitler, who needed the oil of the Caucasus desperately, sent his armies and the armies of his allies, Italy and Rumania, pushing to the east. By 4 October, Panzerarmee units had pushed as far east as Astrakhan, which reconnaissance elements of 16. Panzergrenadier-Division actually reached. This was the farthest east any unit of the German Army penetrated during the war.

    In Stalingrad, 6. Armee became embroiled in brutally tough street fighting. The Russians defended each ruined house, each street corner and factory with fanatic determination. Trying to dig the Russians out of their holes cost the Germans dearly, as battalions shrank to company size and regiments could muster only the strength of a weak battalion. By early October, 6. Armee was reporting gains of two thirds of a block or about half of a worker’s settlement. Infantry losses increased, and replacements were not available in sufficient numbers, resulting in the average battalion having about seventy-five to eighty officers and men. On 6 October, the army reported that The army’s attack into Stalingrad had to be temporarily suspended (today) because of the exceptionally low infantry combat strength.⁶ While German strength dissipated, the Russian reserve forces were able to supply over 180 rifle divisions and 159 tank brigades to the frontline armies in the southern sector of the front from April to October 1942.

    Week after week, Paulus fed infantry and assault troops into the furnace of Stalingrad and saw them consumed without decisive success. Early in November, the fall rains stopped, and below-freezing temperatures were noted for the first time. Equally as ominous, the Russians began to counterattack the stalled German troops in the city with greater numbers of newly identified divisions. On 12 November, the commander of 6. Armee’s right flank neighbor, 4. Panzerarmee (General der Panzertruppen Hoth) reported large-scale Russian troop movements opposite his front. On the left flank, the 3rd Rumanian Army had shown such weakness that the Germans were forced to try to scrape together German troops to stiffen their resistance, even at a time of infantry shortage in 6. Armee itself.

    Six days later, the Southwest Front launched a counterattack that quickly broke through the 3rd Rumanian Army and drove south toward Kalach, a city about sixty miles west of Stalingrad. Simultaneously, the Stalingrad Front penetrated 4. Panzerarrnee’s front at a point defended by the Rumanian VI. Korps and drove north toward Kalach. Hoth soon found his army irrevocably split in half, with part of it pushed into Stalingrad and the remnants outside of the city fighting westward to avoid encirclement.

    On 20 November, Hitler created Heeresgruppe Don, placing Feldmarschall Erich von Manstein in command of the new army group that was to be comprised of Paulus’s 6. Armee, 4. Panzerarmee and the various Axis commands. This decision unified the command of the endangered armies and was a promising development. However, Hitler then issued orders that doomed Paulus’s 6. Armee. He commanded the army to fight for Stalingrad, regardless of the specter of encirclement. On 23 November, east of Kalach, the 4th Mechanized Corps met the 4th Tank Corps and the ring was closed around the Germans.

    The following battles, both inside the city and to the west, re -sulted in the destruction of 6. Armee and enormous losses to the Italian and Rumanian armies in the east. This victory set the stage for another series of Russian counterattacks that pushed the Germans back for hundreds of miles. However, the Russian spearheads, suffering from attrition and support deficiencies, were weakened considerably by this time.

    Heeresgruppe Don, now renamed Heeresgruppe Süd, struck back at the Russian advance southwest of Kharkov. In a stunning reversal, Manstein, counterattacking with XXXXVIII. Panzerkorps and II. SS-Panzerkorps, inflicted tremendous losses on the Russians and drove them back to the east, recapturing Kharkov. The familiar pattern of successful warm-weather German offensives seemed about to repeat itself in 1943 with the culmination of the Kharkov campaign’s successful end and the dry summer weather ahead. When the spring mud brought an operational pause to the Eastern Front, a huge Russian salient projected to the west from the Kursk area. The opportunities that the Kursk bulge presented to both sides and the subsequent fighting in and around it determined the course of the war in the summer of 1943.

    Terminology and Abbreviations

    Ihave kept the use of German terminology to a minimum; however, the following list will help clarify those terms that were used.

    CHAPTER 1

    Heeresgruppe Süd and Armee-Abteilung Hollidt: Retreat and Recovery in the Ukraine

    After the defeat of Feldmarschall Friedrich Paulus and his 6. Armee at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942–43, the subsequent defensive efforts of Heeresgruppe Don (later Heeresgruppe Süd), commanded by Feldmarschall Erich von Manstein, resulted in the tenuous stabilization of the southern flank of the Eastern Front. In light of the existing conditions, this achievement was remarkable in itself, but Manstein also conducted a simultaneous offensive drive attempting to relieve the Stalingrad garrison. Although the Stalin-grad relief effort was unsuccessful, Manstein did manage to patch together a coherent defensive line, thereby avoiding the collapse of the entire southern wing of the Eastern Front in the aftermath of the surrender of Paulus’s 6. Armee. That Manstein was able to accomplish this with worn-out divisions, short of both men and machines, attests both to his skill as a commander and the remarkable courage and stamina of the German soldier.¹ Manstein’s success was also due in no small part to the over-confidence of both the Soviet High Command (Stavka) and the leader of the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin. Stalin and his generals incorrectly believed that the Soviet army had sufficiently remedied the problems and many operational shortcomings that were evident in the first major counteroffensive after the German defeat before Moscow in the winter of 1941–42.

    The crisis of early 1943 in the south of Russia was a result of the offensive operations that the Soviets launched after Stalingrad. Subsequently, a bad situation was made much worse due to poor decisions made by the highest elements of the German leadership (Hitler). The Soviet counteroffensives penetrated the German lines in several places along Heeresgruppe B’s (Army Group B) front, which lay to the north of 1. Panzerarmee, then constituting the left wing of Heeresgruppe Don (soon to be renamed Heeresgruppe Süd). On 1. Panzerarmee’s right was Armee-Abteilung Hollidt, named for its commander, General der Infanterie Karl Hollidt. On 30 January 1943, Armee-Abteilung Hollidt manned a defensive line stretching from the Don River northeast to where the Donets intersected the Don and there bent back westward toward Voroshilovgrad.

    In order to restore a continuous line of defense, Manstein proposed to withdraw Hollidt’s army to more defensible positions on the west bank of the Mius River and there tie in the flanks of the army with 1. Panzerarmee on the north flank and rest the south flank on the coast. These plans were hindered by Hitler’s refusal to allow timely withdrawals and by the Russians, who followed up the surrender at Stalingrad with strong attempts to destroy the German troops west of the city.

    In the first weeks of 1943, several major Russian spearheads drove westward in both Heeresgruppe B’s and Heeresgruppe Don’s sectors. On the north flank of Heeresgruppe B’s front, the Soviet Voronezh Front, commanded by Lieutenant General F. I. Golikov, strove to encircle Kharkov with the 64th Army and 3rd Tank Army. Meanwhile, the Soviet 6th Army and 1st Guards Army of Lieutenant General N. F. Vatutin’s Southwest Front had crossed the Donets on either side of Izyum and then driven into the Dnepropetrovsk area, some 200 miles to the northwest of Armee-Abteilung Hollidt’s frontline defenses. To Hollidt’s immediate defensive front, his army was penetrated by elements of Mobile Group Popov; which was the operational armored formation of Vatutin’s Southwest Front. This armored group of four tank corps, three rifle divisions, two tank brigades, and attached support units was commanded by Lieutenant General M. M. Popov and was given the task of first deeply penetrating the German lines and then driving south to the Sea of Azov. The result was to be the severance of lines of communication and supply in Hollidt’s rear areas. This mobile operation and the resulting chaos would precede a general frontal advance by the Southwest Front with the ultimate goal being the destruction of Armee-Abteilung Hollidt.²

    Vatutin sent Popov’s tanks forward on 25 January in a drive toward Slavyansk and Pavlograd, far to the rear of Hollidt’s army. Elements of Popov’s 4th Tank Corps on the morning of 11 February captured the town of Krasnoarmeiskoye. This was a devastating blow to the Germans because it cut the Dnepropetrovsk–Mariupol railway, which was a critical line of communication for Heeresgruppe Don.³ Rail traffic could be directed to the south on the Zaporozhye–Stalino route, but that was a more circuitous path and was furthermore necessary for the supply of Heeresgruppe A in the Caucasus. Hoth’s 4. Panzerarmee, which was at that time deployed in the Kuban, also depended on this rail line. The capture of the rail line created a situation that could not be tolerated for long due to the overloading of the railroad and the resulting shortages.

    The Russian penetrations were also well to the west of the Mius River, which ran from the Gulf of Taganrog near Rostov to the north. There were old fortifications on the Mius’s western bank, built the previous winter, and it was to that position that Manstein had hoped to withdraw the right wing of Heeresgruppe Don. However, when Mobile Group Popov sliced deeply through the front and drove to a position well west of Hollidt, the situation threatened to end in another catastrophe. Hollidt’s army was threatened by encirclement and destruction before it had even reached the Mius position.

    This serious situation was created by Hitler’s refusal to allow the timely withdrawal of Manstein’s army group. The Führer’s order created the potential for a massive encirclement of German forces just weeks after the Stalingrad pocket surrendered. It was very clear to Manstein that the course of the war in the East depended on the prevention of the destruction of Heeresgruppe Süd. If it was allowed to become fragmented and destroyed, it would also doom the divisions of Heeresgruppe A to strangulation and destruction in the Caucasus. According to Manstein,

    The question henceforth was whether that winter would bring the decisive step towards Germany’s defeat in the East. Momentous and distressing though the Stalingrad disaster undoubtedly was, it could not, in terms of World War II, effect such a blow on its own, whereas the annihilation of the German Army’s entire southern wing might well have paved the way to an early victory over Germany.⁴

    Nor was Manstein in any doubt as to why the potentially fatal crisis on the southern wing of the Eastern Front had occurred at this time:

    There were two reasons why the Soviet High Command could hope to attain this goal in the south of the Eastern Front. One was the extraordinary numerical superiority of the Russian forces; the second was the favourable position it found itself in operationally as a result of the German errors of leadership associated with the name of Stalingrad.⁵

    Manstein was persistent in his efforts to persuade Hitler to allow him to withdraw Hollidt’s troops to the Mius line before they were cut off and annihilated. The critical nature of Manstein’s demands resulted in a conference with Hitler on 6 February, where, after hours of evasion and procrastination, the Führer finally gave in and allowed him to give the orders for withdrawal to the Mius position. Hollidt began to move his army on 8 February. The withdrawal was very aggressively and closely pursued by the Russians, who did not intend to let the Germans get settled into their old defensive positions unmolested. There was some doubt whether Hollidt could even reach, much less hold, the line because the pursuing Russians were literally on his heels.⁶ Manstein commented on this possibility during the meeting with Hitler and voiced the concern he felt at the time that the decision was too late. Hitler even tried to persuade Manstein to wait for the weather to change and bog down the Russians in spring mud, an argument that held no appeal to Manstein. Only after his absolute refusal to stake the fate of my army group on the hope of a quite unseasonable change of weather did Hitler finally relent and allow Hollidt to pull back toward the Mius River. Manstein wrote:

    Indeed, it was already doubtful—thanks to the delay in taking a decision—whether Armee-Abteilung Hollidt, now saddled with the defense of the whole front from the coastline to the Middle Donetz, would ever get back to the Mius in time. Consequently, I had to receive permission that very day to give up the eastern part of the Donetz area as far as the Mius.⁷

    On 17 February, Armee-Abteilung Hollidt successfully reached its new positions. It had been a near thing for the Germans, and the Soviets prepared to push across the river only a short time after Hollidt’s divisions settled into the Mius line. Early on the next day, Russian troops of Malenovsky’s Southern Front forced a crossing over the Mius at several points. The 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps pushed ahead quickly, and its tanks penetrated nearly eighteen miles deep into the depth of the German defenses.⁸ There it was halted by hastily organized concentric German counterattacks mounted by battle groups thrown together to meet the emergency situation. In spite of this dangerous development that threatened the integrity of the German defense, Malenovsky was not able to exploit the success of the 3rd Guards Mechanized due to a capricious local turn of the weather. A brief thaw made quick supply and reinforcement of the breakthrough unit temporarily impossible when the countryside turned into a sea of mud. This lucky change of weather allowed the Germans to attack the stalled Soviet tanks and infantrymen when they began to run out of fuel and ammunition. Before the Russians could resupply the spearhead elements, they were isolated, completely surrounded and destroyed.⁹ However, even if the weather had not turned against them, the Soviets would have ultimately been hard pressed to follow up the breakthrough of the 3rd Mechanized Corps with decisive reinforcement and supply due to a sudden development on the northern flank of Southern Front’s advance.

    THE MANSTEIN COUNTERATTACK AT KHARKOV

    West of Kharkov, begining on 21 February, Manstein put into execution a counterattack designed to regain the initiative for the Germans in the Heeresgruppe Süd sector. This was his Kharkov counterstroke, the end result of which was the reversal of the tide of Soviet success following Stalingrad. When the German attack began, due to over-confidence at the higher levels of the Soviet command, it was not immediately apparent to the Soviet commanders that the Germans had launched a large-scale counterattack. Because of this misreading of Manstein’s intentions, the situation was made worse for the Soviet units in the field. The Soviet command did not respond quickly or realistically to the beginning of the German counterattack. Intelligence regarding German troop movements and assembly of armor was misinterpreted or disregarded. In spite of the fact that German armor was massed in positions enabling them to cut off large elements of the Soviet spearheads, Russian divisional and corps commanders were urged to push their attacks deeper and faster. This occurred even as they reported that their divisions were depleted and too weakened by their losses to carry on.¹⁰ When Popov, on 21 February, found that his three tank corps had a total of thirty-seven tanks among them, he radioed a message to Vatutin requesting permission to withdraw. Vatutin ordered Popov to continue his mission directive and push on, rebuking him and explaining that a withdrawal contradicts the group’s mission and the existing conditions whereby the enemy at all costs hurries to withdraw his forces from the Donbas across the Dnepr.

    Overconfidence and blindness to reality at higher levels of Soviet command contributed significantly to the makings of a critical setback to the Russians in the spring of 1943. At that time, unknown to Vatutin, who habitually was unduly optimistic, disaster was already in the making, in the form of attacking concentrations of German armor.¹¹ The same combinations of unwarranted Soviet optimism and operational shortcomings had contributed to the spring reversals after the winter of 1941–42. The Russian command was so blinded as to what was actually happening in the field that it refused to believe evidence that should have sent up a red flag of warning. When aerial reconnaissance photos showed large columns of German armor and support units on the move into staging areas for the counterattack, the photos were interpreted as proof that the Germans were retreating out of the Donbas.¹² By the time their mistake was realized, the Soviets could do little but react desperately to escape Manstein’s trap. By then, it was too late for the men and machines of the Soviet advance formations.

    On the other hand, Manstein astutely launched his counterstroke at the right moment. In a correct assessment of the situation, it was evident to the Heeresgruppe Süd command that the Russian spear-heads had run out of steam due to attrition of men and machines and an increasing scarcity of fuel. After the overly ambitious advance across the Donets Basin, the Soviet logistical system failed. Soviet supply columns did not reach the mobile spearheads with fuel or ammunition in sufficient quantities. Tanks and other vehicles that broke down with mechanical problems were left unrepaired due to shortages of parts or lack of forward repair facilities. The advance was littered with a trail of abandoned and destroyed vehicles. Popov’s mobile formations were, as a result, running short of tanks. The armor that was still operational became immobilized by periodic shortages of fuel on occasion, which allowed the Germans to easily destroy stranded units.

    By 24 February, the Soviets finally began to realize what was about to happen to their advance spearhead formations. Vatutin, commander of the Southwest Front, then frantically canceled all offensive operations of Mobile Group Popov, although by that time the lead formations were too weakened to have driven much farther west in any event.¹³ Popov had correctly smelled

    Enjoying the preview?
    Page 1 of 1