Aftermath

review.

FOREWORD

by

Captain Maynard P. Longworth , B747-400

Tenerife, the worst accident in aviation history; like all pilots, Captain Van Zanten‘s decision to go for the take-off was only one of the many thousands of decisions he had made in his career. Rain, snow or fog obscuring the view of the entire runway was not uncommon and something he had experienced many times. He was thinking about many things; the delays, his inconvenienced passengers, the schedule, and the flight legs facing him after dropping his passengers just 25 minutes away.

Of course, he was 100% certain that the Pan Am aircraft was clear of the runway. As his aircraft was gaining speed, he was readying himself for the mental switch from visual to instruments as he would be climbing through the fog. The instant he saw the Pan Am aircraft looming into view directly ahead of him he knew, he knew right then and right there, he knew he was dead, he knew they were all dead……everything flashed through his mind… Instinctually, he pulled back on the yoke……but he knew…

No pilot would ever consider, for a moment, initiating a take-off unless he was absolutely certain the runway was clear. Van Zanten‘s decision to shove those power levers forward began a terrible and inevitable chain of horrendous events sending a enormous shock wave of loss and sorrow down through the decades.

His two children never saw their dad again. Consider the hundreds dead, each with many close friends, wives and children, relatives and associates, all suffering from this captain’s fateful decision. As the wrecked, tortured and doomed fuselage hurled itself toward its’ fiery destruction, he, in those last seconds, understood everything….

The survivors and relatives of the dead have to live for the rest of their lives with their losses and, every hour of every day, they remember and are, in this sense, forever damaged.. the changes are profound and permanent, deep scars in the psyche. AFTERMATH, speaks to these things……

In a way, the accumulated grief and loss of the aftermath eventually eclipses the enormity of the horrendous event itself …

PREFACE

I flew commercial airliners for 42 years, logging over 22,000 hours. During that time, I’ve trained literally, hundreds of pilots, both in actual aircraft and simulators. I’ve been an IP (Instructor Pilot) like Captain Van Zanten, for many of those years and have made it a point to study the mind-set of airline pilots.

I have flown over a hundred different aircraft and I’m rated and instructed in the following aircraft;

• DC-3

• CV-440, Convair 240, 340, 440

• DC-6, 7

• Boeing 707

• Boeing 727

• L-188 Lockheed Electra

• Astra Jet

In my view, almost all aviation accidents are caused by inadequate training, poor maintenance or mechanical failure. The majority however are caused by human error, by the pilot or by the controller. Of course, weather plays a role but that’s what we train for- how to survive in bad weather and how to avoid it.

Accidents in aircraft usually result in high loss of life. These aluminum tubes, moving at high rates of speed are relatively fragile compared to ‘cumulo-granite’ (rocks in clouds) and good old terra firma.

Most of us are familiar with the NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board). These are the guys that go to any accident site involving American aircraft immediately on notice. In Tenerife, on March 27, 1977, two 747’s collided on the runway. The NTSB team arrived the very next day. Their job is to study the evidence and determine the probable cause. Once their investigation is complete, they publish their findings in what they call a Blue Book.

There’s a string of coincidences involved in this tragedy that, one by one, lead the two aircraft, like lambs to slaughter into a no-win situation wherein death awaits them. Earnest Ghan, wrote a flying book called Fate Is The Hunter., in the case of Tenerife, it seems to me that death was indeed the hunter.

We will discuss this disturbing occurrence and focus our attention on what happened after the accident- the Aftermath.

Robert J. Firth

CHAPTER 1

Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect.

— Captain A. G. Lamplugh, British Aviation Insurance Group, London. c. early 1930's

The Tenerife airport disaster occurred on March 27, 1977 at 17:06:56 local time. Two 850,000 lb Boeing 747 passenger aircraft collided on the runway of Los Rodeos Airport (now known as Tenerife North Airport) on the Spanish island of Tenerife, one of the Canary Islands. On that fateful day, and at that moment in time, 583 human beings instantly ceased living. The carnage was spread over the tarmac in what was then and remains, the deadliest accident in aviation history.

KLM Flight 4805 and Pan Am Flight 1736 were, along with other aircraft, diverted to Tenerife from Gran Canaria Airport after some whacked out terrorist detonated a bomb there. The sick bastards called in a threat of a second bomb forcing the authorities to close the airport while they searched for the remaining bomb- which, in the end, turned out to be a hoax.

So many airplanes were diverted to the smaller Tenerife airport that the local controllers were forced to park many of them on the taxiways, thereby blocking them and further complicating the situation. While waiting for authorities to reopen Gran Canaria, a dense fog developed at Tenerife reducing visibility to a few hundred feet.

When Gran Canaria reopened about 4:00 in the afternoon, the parked aircraft blocking the taxiways at Tenerife required both 747s to back- taxi on the only runway in order to get into position for takeoff. Due to the fog, neither aircraft could see the other, nor could the controller in the tower see the runway or the two 747s. As the airport didn’t, at that time, have ground radar, the only means for the controller to identify the location of each airplane was via radio. As a result, several misunderstandings ensued, resulting in the KLM flight beginning its take off roll while Pan Am was still on the runway.

The KLM 747, more than three quarters of a million pounds of aluminum, engines, fuel and passengers, was almost at take-off sped, 120 + kts, when the pilot finally saw the Pan Am jumbo through the fog… 9 seconds away…dead ahead - still on the runway- no room to stop- no room for anything………

Van Zanten, the KLM Captain, hauled back on the yoke sending the giant aircraft skyward. He almost made it, another few seconds or less and he would have. The engines were at max power, pumping out almost 80,000 lbs of thrust or about 52,000 hp. The extreme deck angle drove the tail onto the runway, slowing the aircraft.

KLM smashed into the Pan Am aircraft, ripping out KLM’s right landing gear and spilling fuel everywhere. The resulting collision destroyed both aircraft, killing all 248 aboard the KLM flight and 335 out of 396 aboard the Pan Am aircraft. Sixty-one people aboard the Pan Am flight, including the pilots and flight engineer, miraculously survived the disaster.

As the accident occurred in Spanish territory, that nation was responsible for investigating the accident. Investigators from the Netherlands and the United States also participated. The investigation would reveal the primary cause of the accident to be that the captain of the KLM aircraft attempted to take-off without clearance from Air Traffic Control. (human error)

Throughout the writing of this book, I tried to place myself into the mind-set of Captain Van Zanten. I wanted to understand why did what he did and what I would do given the same situation. Do the same yourself. If you’re a pilot or, even if you’re not, consider carefully the circumstances and his actions; ask yourself- would you do the same?

The investigation showed that the KLM captain certainly (positively) did not intentionally initiate a take-off without clearance. I’m convinced, as were the investigators, that he fully believed he had clearance. Due to misunderstandings between his flight crew and ATC he believed the runway was clear- there can be absolutely no doubt about this!

Dutch investigators naturally would place greater emphasis on this than their American and Spanish counterparts, but ultimately, KLM had to admit that their Captain was responsible for the accident. In the end, KLM, and their insurers, financially compensated the victims. Money however, is little comfort when a loved one is killed in a senseless tragedy. There is no compensation for such losses and the pain never really goes away. Money just seems the only thing we humans can think of to give- but it is so hopelessly inadequate. Time does not actually cure, it just dulls the ache.

The accident had a huge influence on the industry, particularly in the area of communication. An increased emphasis was placed on using standardized phraseology in ATC communication by both controllers and pilots alike, thereby reducing the chance for misunderstandings. The idea is to make some changes that hopefully, will help avoid similar accidents.

As one of these changes, the word takeoff was removed from general usage, and is now only spoken by ATC when actually clearing an aircraft to take-off. Crew members are encouraged to challenge their captains when they believe something may be not correct. Captains are instructed to listen to their crew and evaluate all decisions in light of crew concerns. This concept would later be expanded into what is known today as Crew Resource Management. CRM training is now mandatory for all airline and used today by corporate pilots.

For both planes, Tenerife was an unscheduled stop. Their destination was Gran Canaria International Airport (also known as Las Palmas Airport), serving Las Palmas on the nearby island of Gran Canaria. Both are in the Canary Islands, an autonomous community of Spain located in the Atlantic Ocean off the west coast of Morocco.

Pan Am Flight 1736 had taken off from Los Angeles International Airport with an intermediate stop at New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport. The aircraft was a Boeing 747–121, registration N736PA. Of the 380 passengers, 14 had boarded in New York, where the crew was also changed. The new crew consisted of captain Victor Grubbs, First Officer Robert Bragg, and Flight Engineer George Warns; there were 13 other crew members. The same aircraft had operated the inaugural 747 commercial flight on January 22, 1970.

KLM Flight 4805, a charter flight for Holland International Travel Group from the Netherlands, had taken off four hours before from Amsterdam’s Schiphol airport. Its captain was Jacob Veldhuyzen van Zanten and the first officer was Klaas Meurs. The aircraft was a Boeing 747-206B, registration PH-BUF. The KLM jet had 14 crew members and 235 passengers, including 48 children and three infants. Most of the KLM passengers were Dutch; four Germans, two Austrians, and two Americans were also on the plane. Sadly, the 48 children never had a chance at life……they, as all the KLM passengers, were incinerated in their seats…

After the aircraft landed at Tenerife, a Dutch tour guide named Robina van Lanschot, who lived on the island in Puerto de la Cruz and wanted to see her boyfriend that night, chose not to re-board the 747, leaving 234 passengers on board. Fate, maybe!

Events on both planes had been routine until they approached the islands. Then, at 1:15 pm, a bomb (planted by the separatist Fuerzas Armadas Guanches), a pack of wild-eyed, scraggly-assed, miserable terrorists exploded in the terminal of Gran Canaria International Airport. (circumstance or coincidence one) It had been preceded by a phone call warning of the bomb, and soon after another call came in claiming a second bomb was at the airport. The civil aviation authorities closed that airport after the bomb detonated and diverted all of its incoming flights to Los Rodeos, including the two Boeing 747 aircraft involved in the disaster.

Upon contacting Gran Canaria airport, the Pan Am flight was informed of the temporary closure. Although the Pan Am crew indicated that they would prefer to circle in a holding pattern until landing clearance was given, the plane was diverted to Los Rodeos, along with the KLM flight. This led to the critical parking conditions at the smaller airport.

In all, at least five large aircraft were diverted to Los Rodeos, a regional airport that could not easily accommodate them. The airport had only one runway and one major taxiway parallel to it, as well as several small taxiways connecting the main taxiway and the runway. While waiting for Gran Canaria airport to reopen, the diverted aircraft took up so much space that they were parked on the long taxiway, meaning that it could not be used for taxiing. Instead, departing aircraft would have to taxi along the runway to position themselves for takeoff, a common procedure known as a runway back-taxi.

The Pan Am aircraft was ready to depart, but the KLM plane and a re-fuelling vehicle obstructed the taxiway to the active runway. The Pan Am aircraft was unable to maneuver around the fueling KLM to reach the runway and depart due to a lack of just 12 ft (3.7 m) of clearance.

Many coincidences in this terrible accident favored death such that, once events began to