Railroads of Nevada and Eastern California: Volume 3: More on the Northern Roads

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CENTRAL PACIFIC RAILROAD

Much has been written about the Central Pacific Railroad, yet much of the story has remained untold. In this chapter, some of the lesser-known segments of its history are recorded. A general account of its construction across Nevada will be found in volume 1 of this series.

Small-town newspaper editors in the nineteenth century held fierce determination in promoting their own villages. The management of any prospective railroad, in their opinion, would be held grossly delinquent if the tracks did not reach their communities. For example, outlying newsmen regularly condemned the Central Pacific’s Donner Pass route, publicizing any mishap or snow blockade, concluding with the claim that had the railroad been routed through their town, the difficulty would have been avoided.

Donner Pass formed one of the five routes seriously considered, as Theodore Judah, chief engineer of the Central Pacific RR explained in his July 1863 report. With Sacramento as the western terminal, he described barometrical reconnaissance of five routes across the Sierra Nevada as follows:

1. Via Folsom, Greenwood, and Georgetown

2. Via Auburn and Illinoistown, Dutch Flat and Donner Pass

3. Via Nevada [City] and Henness Pass

4. Via Downieville and Yuba Gap

5. Via Oroville, Bidwell’s Bar, Middle [Fork of the] Feather River, and Beckwourth’s Pass

Perhaps the loudest outcry emanated from newspapermen in Quincy, the county seat of Plumas County, north of Donner Pass. The most logical course, they contended, included a fork of the Feather River and Beckwourth Pass. Judah did not agree.

In his description of the Oroville route, Judah noted that it passed through Bidwell’s Bar, then followed the Middle Fork of the Feather River, passing Nelson’s Point, Jim Beckwourth’s house at the western edge of the Sierra Valley, before surmounting Beckwourth’s Pass. From there, it went up Long Valley and Pea Vine Valley to Fuller’s Crossing on the Truckee, the present site of Reno and 283 miles from Sacramento. Side excursions permitted observations of the divide between the North and Middle Forks of the Feather River and Spring Garden Ranch. Nothing was said about the North Fork; perhaps its greater length removed it from consideration. Judah recognized, The advantages of this [last mentioned] route consist in its low grades and a lower altitude of the summit than upon the other routes. But it also presents disadvantages, which render it next to impossible for us to avail ourselves of its advantages in this respect.

Judah estimated the distance to the future site of Reno from Sacramento to be eighty miles longer than via Donner Pass. Perhaps the most negative aspect was that Bald Rock Canon . . . is a rocky gorge in the [Middle Fork of the] Feather river, rising with smooth granite sides, almost perpendicular, being 3,000 feet high upon the north side, and 2,500 on the South side, the length of this canon being about 1½ miles. Though less severe, the same general condition prevailed for the next fifty miles to Nelson’s Point. Judah concluded his remarks on the Feather River passage: The route is reluctantly placed among the list of those denominated unavailable for Pacific Railroad purposes. The additional 80 miles would have increased the government-bond aid by $3.84 million ($48,000 per mile in mountain territory) and would have invited more criticism.

Turning to the organizers, the usual accounts of the construction center so much on the driving force of Collis P. Huntington, Leland Stanford, Charles Crocker, and Mark Hopkins—conveniently packaged as the Big Four—that the contributions of others are brushed aside. Without diminishing the accomplishments of the Big Four, there were others who merit attention. Stanford’s brother Charles was an investor, and Crocker’s older brother proved a major figure. A. N. Towne was another.

Edwin Bryant Crocker (1818–1875), born in Upstate New York, graduated from Rensselaer Institute. For a short time, he engaged in railway surveying until his parents took him to Indiana in 1836. He read law and practiced in South Bend, and Sacramento after moving there in 1852. Prior to the reorganization of the California Supreme Court in 1863, Edwin Crocker briefly served on this tribunal. Becoming counsel of the Central Pacific, his letters to Huntington in New York provide lucid accounts of construction progress that Collis passed on to eastern investors in the railroad. Huntington leaned on Judge Crocker for answers to problems and new ideas. Responding to an inquiry in January 1867 when the tracks had reached Cisco on the west side of the summit, E. B. Crocker suggested six possible extensions of the railroad. One line would run north of what became Winnemucca to Boise City and the Salmon River in Idaho. From the same starting point, another extension would take a northwesterly course to Eugene City, Oregon, with a connection to Portland. His suggestions included branch lines to mining towns such as Austin and Aurora and the two Virginia Cities, one in Nevada and the other in Montana. The line to Aurora, Nevada, and down California’s Owens Valley formed part of a connection with the projected Atlantic and Pacific Railroad around the site of future Needles, and, in the opposite direction, he envisioned a railroad from Sacramento to Clear Lake, terminating at Humboldt Bay.

Again in the summer of 1867, the judge wrote he felt quite confident that we shall lay a continuous line to the Truckee [River] this year. He noted that the labor force was down from the previous year and that the payroll did not exceed three thousand, excluding teamsters, foremen, and so forth. This number was a far cry, he observed, from the general impression of twelve thousand men tackling the grade. By September, the force was increasing, but the grasp of winter precluded CP rails from reaching the Truckee River until the next spring.

In his own way, Huntington was just as busy in New York as his western associates. Besides the main task of raising money, he also purchased rail, locomotives, and supplies and then arranged for ships to convey these essentials to the Pacific Coast. From time to time, his routine was shattered when he received a hurried call to come to Washington to spur or stem some legislation. Always keeping a wary eye on the Union Pacific (UP) crowd, he was delighted to write the judge that he sold $2 million in CP bonds at 98, while the UP had to sell theirs at 90!

Huntington aimed to meet the Union Pacific in Weber Canyon in Utah, some thirty miles east of Ogden. In his letters written in 1868, he frequently found some way to move from an unrelated topic to the importance of reaching Weber Canyon. In April of that year, shortly before the first locomotive whistled at the site of future Reno, Huntington wrote Judge Crocker, We all slept too long but will sleep no more until we get to Weber Canon. Two months earlier he had told Stanford that reaching Salt Lake by the end of the year and the Wasatch Range soon thereafter stood as possible goals, "and I am well satisfied we can do it if we make up our minds to do it. Tell Charlie to let out a link. That summer he wrote Charlie, So work on as though Heaven was before and Hell behind you."

Adding to Huntington’s frustrations was the difficulty to secure sufficient iron rail. All of the rail mills were overrun with orders for rail replacements in the spring of 1868, as ten times the normal broken rails had occurred during the cold winter. Technical difficulties at the mills compounded the problem. At the Danville Mill, two weeks were lost when the main shaft broke, while, at another mill, replacing a broken roller suspended operations for ten days. The Spuyten Devil Mill, which had been rolling 75 tons a day for the Central Pacific, suffered a fire in April, closing the plant for two months.

Transportation offered more challenges. A good sailing ship, such as the Ellen Austin, could be expected to sail around Cape Horn and arrive in San Francisco in 140 days. When it left in the spring of 1868, it carried 1,932 tons of rail, spikes, and splice bars—twice the load most ships carried. The Panama route provided a costly alternative for shipping rail and locomotives to be used only for meeting urgent needs.

Huntington sought other ways to speed shipments to California. In one case, he instructed Hopkins to pay the master of the Pactolus the promised bonus of $250 in currency if the shipload of rails reached San Francisco in 125 days, but the absence of further comment leaves the outcome in doubt. Various causes delayed shipments. The Helvetia returned in April 1868 after two weeks with its top masts out and leaking very badly. When repairs took longer than expected, the cargo was transferred to another ship. After losing sails and shipping a heavy sea that stove in bulwarks, the Calhoun limped into port at Rio de Janeiro for several weeks of repairs. A second ship also paused at Rio for repairs, but the size of the cargo on the Calhoun—2,000 tons of rails and fittings for 20 miles of track—made the delay particularly annoying. Adding to the frustrations was the breaking of the main balance wheel at the Scranton mill and a nine-day strike at other mills. To Huntington these events suggested that it does seem as though the Devil was amongst our iron.

The rail delivery delays and the many miles of grading necessary to reach Weber Canyon brought the realization to reluctant Central Pacific men that they could not reach the canyon before the Union Pacific. The absence of continued CP railroad ownership to coal resources for locomotive fuel beyond the Wasatch Range also proved a disappointment.

In the later winter months of 1868, two parallel roadbeds marched across northern Utah for some distance. Finally, Promontory (Summit) became the meeting point with the Golden Spike amid appropriate ceremonies on May 10, 1869. Actually, the last spike was fabricated from iron. After difficult negotiations, the Union Pacific sold 72.51 miles of railroad to the CP, bringing the latter’s ownership to Union Jct., 5 miles north (railroad-west) of Ogden. The UP leased the intervening 5 miles to the CP for 999 years.

Some Problems in Central Pacific’s Early Operations

Though the Big Four worked as a unit, friction ranged among the principals. Crocker and Huntington seemed to be at odds more than once. For example, as the Central Pacific construction approached the finish line, Huntington turned more critical of Charles Crocker’s management of the railroad, calling it a miserable failure. Crocker stood ready to rescind his role; in a letter written shortly after the last spike, Crocker reminded old Collis that he had "frequently expressed a willingness to resign & urged all to use their judgment without regard to me. But as I have failed to notice or hear of any diprecation [sic] on the part of Stanford or Hopkins of the sentiments you have so freely expressed. Still, Crocker believed that the two associates were in sympathy with Huntington, and therefore my position becomes very unpleasant and irksome." Crocker told Huntington that he had given the power of attorney to his brother to sell out completely, if necessary.

Crocker sought a diversion from his labors, and Mrs. Crocker wanted to go shopping in New York. So, on May 24, after having cast aside the mantle of superintendent, the Crocker family including two children departed for the East Coast. While in New York, Crocker conferred with Huntington, which apparently eased the tensions.

Crocker was not alone in his desire to travel; Huntington found himself besieged with requests for passes. Letters would begin with an amiable reference to a California sojourn and close with a request for a pass over the railroad. Members of Congress received favorable consideration, but most others were disappointed.

Although it appeared Huntington had managed to provide necessary funds through the sale of railroad and government-aid bonds, matters turned critical at the end of May 1869. Mark Hopkins, acting as treasurer, telegraphed Huntington for an immediate one hundred thousand dollars, to be followed by three hundred thousand dollars ten days later and still another two hundred thousand on June 15. I don’t see how we can get along with less, Hopkins declared, and then explained that the company had been behind in its payments for the past two months. Not only a lot of finishing-up work east of Wadsworth remained to be done, but the Big Four also stood committed to complete the rail link between Sacramento and San Francisco Bay.

The associates had spent five years of stressful work building the Central Pacific Railroad but now were tired. Top management suffered a severe blow when paralysis struck E. B. Crocker’s right side while discussing business with Governor Stanford in San Francisco. The judge made some recovery within a week, but Hopkins expressed the thought that the judge’s days of mental labor are over. Although E. B. Crocker now had little to do with railroad operations, improved health enabled him to go to Europe for a prolonged stay the following year. While there he purchased many art objects for his gallery in Sacramento later bearing his name.

The New Superintendent

The associates recognized the need for a superintendent, but, except for Huntington, their isolation on the Pacific Coast made knowledge of other railroad candidates impossible. So the responsibility fell upon Huntington to discover the proper man for the task. Of course, he received unsolicited advice from the others; Hopkins wrote him that the man should have had more railroad experience than any or all of us and we could well afford to pay a large salary. Stanford concurred, and Crocker told him to get one as soon as possible.

Hopkins battered Huntington with telegrams seeking money, as payrolls lagged far behind. When funds finally arrived in Sacramento, Hopkins reported that as of July 24, 1869, the remittance would clear up the May payrolls and the most pressing June bills but not the June payrolls. When master mechanic E. F. Perkins, formerly of the Vermont Central, advised there was no immediate need for two engines at the builder’s plant in Schenectady, New York, Huntington had them sold to garner a little more cash.

In the West, Charles Crocker, assistant general superintendent John Corning, and E. F. Perkins traveled to Promontory by daylight to determine where forces could be reduced. All twenty-seven gravel trains that had been distributing ballast on the track for several months were discontinued at the end of July 1869 with a considerable payroll savings.

Alban Nelson Towne

Huntington’s letters, lightly sprinkled with advice that likely candidates for the general superintendent’s position were forthcoming, kept his California associates guessing. After many inquiries, he focused on Alban Nelson Towne of Chicago. Towne had grown up in the best of Yankee traditions. Born in 1829 in Charlton (Dresser Hill), Massachusetts, he divided his time between school and work, so at maturity he had developed two trades: shoe making and painting. His first job paid him all of eight dollars a month plus board. An unrewarding venture in a small business caused him to go to Illinois in 1855 and sign up as a freight brakeman for the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad. Except for a brief interim in a supervisory position on the Chicago and Great Eastern Railway (Pennsylvania Railroad), he remained with the Burlington, advancing to assistant superintendent.

Responding to an invitation, Towne visited Huntington in New York on August 5, 1869. Offered the position of general superintendent of the Central Pacific at a modest salary, Towne returned to Chicago and wrote Huntington that he could not sever my connection with this road to accept the great responsibility at a salary of less than $13,000 per annum. After the rejection of his second offer, Huntington wired Towne on August 17 that he would meet the salary demanded. Rather than replying immediately, Towne kept his prospective new employer dangling until he could confer with his boss, James F. Joy, president of the Burlington. Finally, on August 20, Towne telegraphed Huntington, Your proposition read and accepted. Four days later, the California partners received Huntington’s telegram about the new appointment; at almost the same time, they read the same news in the Sacramento Union, plus the additional advice of Towne’s $13,000 annual salary.

Spurred on by the publicity of the exorbitant salary, the reaction was negative. Crocker refused to consent to the appointment until he knew more about the man. Stanford felt that any one of several assistants will be about as good as any we can import. Even mild-mannered Mark Hopkins told Huntington, We concur that he had better not come out here.

Doubts about Towne’s experience and the unwanted publicity threatened Towne’s acceptance by the associates. After all, the Burlington, consisting of lines to cities in its corporate title plus a few branches, measured only 386 miles, about half the length of the Central Pacific. For those times, the salary proved immense; Towne’s superior earned just $10,000, and the president of the Burlington received just a trifle more.

Recognizing the hostile reception confronting his new man, Huntington considered the matter before deciding to introduce Towne personally to his associates. The two men left Chicago on the night of September 6 and, pausing along the way, did not reach Sacramento until two weeks later. One can imagine the hours Huntington devoted to coaching his protégé as their trains rumbled westward. During his California visit of several weeks, Huntington mollified Crocker, Stanford, and Hopkins, and Towne moved into his new assignment.

In his new post, Towne demonstrated that he had a good grasp of his responsibilities. While carefully informing Huntington by letter and telegram, he showed proper deference to the views of the other partners. Reflecting increased confidence in his abilities as the Central Pacific expanded, Towne moved up to the general manager’s position three years later. He proved to be a dedicated man with so few vacations during the next twenty-six years that they proved newsworthy. On one occasion, he did take extended leaves for health reasons.

Snow Problems Disrupt Operations

Winter weather sometimes resulted in reduced operating receipts. Mark Hopkins, writing on January 1, 1872, after acknowledging receipt the day before of Huntington’s letter, no. 677 of December 16, said, The delay we suppose is on the Union Pacific. No trains on our road have been behind time. Although Hopkins estimated a revenue loss of $1.5 million, Towne believed it would be much more. Hopkins went on to say:

After having expended immense sums of money to construct our own road so thoroughly that every bridge, culvert & embankment stands the test of the most severe & long continued storm known here for years—and having constructed numbers of the most formidable snow plows known to any Rail Road service & stationed them at all exposed points, with a double supply of locomotives & men under orders to keep the road open at any cost—and having at great cost housed in our track, side tracks, wood & water houses, round houses, repair shops & forges for tempory [sic] repairs & provided houses to feed & lodge 250 extra men at each of three different places . . . so as to be prepared for the very worst . . . it is discouraging that . . . our effort is thwarted by the lack of an earnest purpose of the Union Pacific to keep that road open between Cheyenne and Omaha.

Hopkins added that the CP ballasted their plows with several tons of dead weight in the stern & six, seven or eight of the most powerful locomotives behind them. In his opinion, he understood the UP policy was to wait for storms to end before clearing, but in no case to put more than two locomotives behind a snow plow. He wrote, After being blocked for a week with snow . . . they request that we will send them drawings [of our snowplows]. . . . [W]e sent them complete working plans, & drawings—also photographs.

The difficulties continued. On February 3, 1872, Towne wrote Huntington:

If I were easily discouraged, I don’t know but I would be about ready to give up the ghost.

The Union Pacific blockade is very materially injuring the through business of the line. I have offered to send Mr. Sickels one of our heavy snowplows, which, I am satisfied, would clear his road of snow. . . . He replied that they have 25 engines now in the ditch, caused by running them behind snowplows—which were of a very inferior character, which was the cause of their trouble—very unlike our snow plows.

And when the New York Herald corrected an erroneous report in Harper’s Weekly attributing the snow blockade to the Central Pacific, Towne moved quickly to forward the clipping to Huntington. Still, the CP was not immune to stoppages because of slides; while the Union Pacific was in trouble, a snowslide destroyed part of a snowshed near Emigrant Gap, California, which delayed a passenger train for thirty-six hours.

In 1868, the Big Four began to gain control of the Southern Pacific Railroad, which held congressional authority to build from San Francisco to the southeast corner of California. For some years, the major portion of the SP RR was leased to the Central Pacific; during that period, the SP RR extended its rails from San Francisco to Los Angeles, then across Arizona and New Mexico. Through affiliated companies, the Big Four secured railroads to New Orleans to form the Sunset Route. The CP lease ended in 1885 following the formation of the Southern Pacific Company in 1884 as a holding company of the various railroads constituting the Big Four empire. It also operated the railroads west of El Paso, including the Central Pacific. Its ramifications will unfold later in this text.

In the latter part of October 1873, the CP moved its general offices from Sacramento to San Francisco. In a letter of November 8, 1873, Mark Hopkins, now in San Francisco, wrote Huntington, After months of delay we are now located in our new office building, corner of Townsend and Fourth Street, San Francisco. The building has cost double what I supposed it would when we resolved to build it. But it is thoroughly built, convenient for our business. (The Southern Pacific Railroad secretary’s office was at the corner of Market and New Montgomery Streets at that time.)

A. N. Towne took up quarters at the Palace Hotel, then a practice of a number of businessmen. In November 1888, after the death of Charles Crocker, Towne became vice president of the Southern Pacific Company and also served on its board. About two years later he moved to 1101 California Street, just across the street from the Nob Hill residence of Charles Crocker. Towne’s work continued as before until July 16, 1895, when he died of a heart attack.

The San Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906 ravaged an important part of the city without regard to financial or social position. Among the countless structures lost was the SP general office building at Fourth and Townsend as well as the palatial structures on Nob Hill. Of the former Towne house, only the Ionic columns forming the entrance survived. Known as the Portals of the Past, these columns now stand by Lloyd Lake in San Francisco’s Golden Gate Park.

Central Pacific Operating Divisions

Early operating timetables reflected the expansion of the Central Pacific Railroad. With its timetable number 28 of June 16, 1868, the CP opened its line to Reno with a pair of passenger trains. By today’s standards, the twenty-three hours required for the 154-mile trip between Sacramento and Reno would scarcely merit the fast-trip description, even though it outpaced travel by oxcart.

The operating timetable offered a few instructions such as: If trains are not met at the regular meeting place, approach sidings carefully, until they are met. At the top of the timetable, In case of uncertainty, always take the Safe Side, appeared in large letters.

During the construction of the Central Pacific, the line between Winnemucca and Deeth (180 miles) formed the Humboldt Division in February 1869. A month later, the district shortened to Carlin (121 miles) became the Shoshone Division. On May 17, a week after driving the Golden Spike, a pocket Central Pacific timetable appeared. The 742 miles between Sacramento and Ogden were divided into five CP sections and a UP section as follows:

With the acquisition of the trackage to Ogden, timetables underwent revisions. The list of stations dated March 1, 1879, showed a different set of divisions:

Southern Pacific (Pacific System) adopted a new form on July 1, 1892, and each division timetable became number 1. At that time, the number of divisions was further reduced:

The list of stations for January 1, 1901, showed only the Sacramento and Salt Lake Divisions, with Wadsworth as the dividing point, and, when the railroad opened Lucin Cutoff, Sparks replaced Wadsworth as the connection between the two divisions. Since then, the former Carson and Colorado Railway and the Nevada-California-Oregon (N-C-O) Railway joined the Salt Lake Division.¹

Central Pacific placed its motive-power department in Sacramento. A. J. Stevens held the post of general master mechanic in 1879. Roundhouses were located in Rocklin and Truckee, California; Wadsworth, Winnemucca, Carlin, and Wells, Nevada; as well as Terrace and Ogden, Utah. Additionally, machine shops at Wadsworth, Carlin, and Terrace met the needs of the mechanical