Napoleon and Waterloo: The Emperor’s Campaign with the Armée Du Nord, 1815 [Revised Edition]

This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING—www.pp-publishing.com

To join our mailing list for new titles or for issues with our books—picklepublishing@gmail.com

Or on Facebook

Text originally published in 1914 under the same title.

© Pickle Partners Publishing 2016, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

NAPOLEON AND WATERLOO:

THE EMPEROR’S CAMPAIGN WITH THE ARMÉE DU NORD, 1815

BY

A. F. BECKE

Plutôt maintenant que demain, plutôt demain qu’après.—JEANNE D’ARC

Activité, activité, vitesse! Je me recommande à vous.—NAPOLÉON

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 5

DEDICATION 9

LIST OF MAPS AND SKETCHES 10

Map 1 11

Map 2 12

Map 3 13

Map 4 14

Map 5 15

Sketch A 17

Sketch B 18

Sketch C 19

Sketch D 20

Sketch E 21

Sketch F 22

PREFACE TO THE REVISED EDITION 23

NAPOLEON’S PLAN FOR THE DEFENCE OF FRANCE IN 1815 31

THE ALLIED PLAN FOR 1815 36

NOTE.—THE NAPOLEONIC STRATEGY 37

CHAPTER II—THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE ALLIES IN BELGIUM IN MID-JUNE 40

CHAPTER III—FIRST PHASE OF THE CAMPAIGN: ASSEMBLY OF THE ARMÉE DU NORD: 7TH-13TH JUNE 45

CHAPTER IV—THE FRENCH ASSEMBLY AROUND BEAUMONT: 14TH JUNE 51

CHAPTER V—SECOND PHASE: THE PASSAGE OF THE SAMBRE AND THE SEPARATION OF THE ALLIES: 15TH JUNE 55

CHAPTER VI—15TH JUNE: THE SEPARATION OF THE ALLIES 58

CHAPTER VII—16TH JUNE: FEELING FOR THE ALLIES AND PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS—NAPOLEON’S PLAN OF CAMPAIGN IN BELGIUM 67

CHAPTER VIII—THIRD PHASE: THE OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE PRUSSIAN ARMY—MARSHAL NEY’S ADVANCE AND THE ACTION OF QUATRE BRAS 75

CHAPTER IX—THE BATTLE OF LIGNY—THE BATTLEFIELD; AND PRELIMINARY DISPOSITIONS 91

THE BATTLEFIELD 91

PRELIMINARY DISPOSITIONS 92

CHAPTER X—THE BATTLE OF LIGNY 97

1ST PHASE: LE COMBAT D’USURE OR PREPARATORY COMBAT: 2.30 P.M.-5 P.M. 97

THE FRENCH ATTACK THE VILLAGES 97

CHAPTER XI—THE BATTLE OF LIGNY 100

2ND PHASE: D’ERLON APPROACHES THE BATTLEFIELD AND THEN WITHDRAWS 100

BLÜCHER’S COUNTERATTACK: 5 P.M.-7.30 P.M. 100

CHAPTER XII—THE BATTLE OF LIGNY 105

3RD PHASE: NAPOLEON’S DECISIVE ATTACK AND THE DEFEAT OF THE PRUSSIANS: 7.30 p.m.-9 p.m. 105

THE ATTACK OF THE GUARD 105

THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE DECISION 109

NOTE.—NAPOLEON AND D’ERLON’S CORPS ON THE 16TH JUNE 112

CHAPTER XIII—17TH JUNE: EARLY DISPOSITIONS 116

COURSES OPEN TO NAPOLEON ON THE 17TH 118

CHAPTER XIV—FOURTH PHASE: THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE TO FIND AND NEUTRALIZE BLÜCHER; AND THE OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE ANGLO-DUTCH ARMY 124

NAPOLEON’S AND NEY’S ADVANCE 126

CHAPTER XV—MARSHAL GROUCHY ON THE 17TH JUNE 134

THE PRUSSIAN MOVEMENT 137

CHAPTER XVI—NAPOLEON’S PLANS FOR THE 18TH JUNE 139

CHAPTER XVII—THE PLANS OF THE ALLIES FOR THE 18TH JUNE 145

(A) WELLINGTON’S PLANS 145

WELLINGTON’S DETACHMENT AT HAL 148

THE WATERLOO BATTLEFIELD 149

(B) THE PRUSSIAN PLANS 150

1ST PHASE: FROM 11.30 A.M. THE ATTACK ON HOUGOUMONT; AND THE APPEARANCE OF THE PRUSSIANS 154

2ND PHASE: FROM 1.30 P.M. D’ERLON’S ATTACK ON WELLINGTON’S LEFT CENTRE 159

CHAPTER XX—THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 164

3RD PHASE: FROM 3.30 P.M. ATTACK OF WELLINGTON’S POSITION CULMINATING IN THE FRENCH CAVALRY CHARGES; AND THE OPENING OF BLÜCHER’S ATTACK AGAINST NAPOLEON’S RIGHT 164

NOTE.—THE LEGEND OF THE HOLLOW WAY 172

CHAPTER XXI—THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 173

4TH PHASE: FROM 6 P.M. CAPTURE OF LA HAYE SAINTE 173

CHAPTER XXII—THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 178

5TH PHASE: FROM 7 P.M. ‘THE LAST MADNESS OF DESPAIR’: THE ATTACK OF THE IMPERIAL GUARD. FAILURE; AND THE ROUT OF THE ARMÉE DU NORD 178

CHAPTER XXIII—THE PURSUIT—AFTER 9.15 P.M. 189

CHAPTER XXIV—SOME COMMENTS ON WATERLOO 191

THE FIGHTING QUALITIES OF THE BRITISH AND KING’S GERMAN LEGION TROOPS IN 1815 191

THE HOUR AT WHICH THE BATTLE BEGAN 193

THE ATTACK OF THE MIDDLE GUARD 194

SHOULD NAPOLEON HAVE BROKEN OFF THE FIGHT WHEN BÜLOW’S APPROACH WAS SIGNALLED? AND THE COURSE HE MIGHT HAVE ADOPTED 195

CHAPTER XXV—MARSHAL GROUCHY ON THE 18TH JUNE 197

CHAPTER XXVI—THE ACTION OF WAVRE, 18TH JUNE 203

CHAPTER XXVII—19TH JUNE: THE CONCLUSION OF THE ACTION OF WAVRE 208

MARSHAL GROUCHY HEARS THE RESULT OF THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO AND OPENS AN IMMEDIATE RETREAT 208

CHAPTER XXVIII—MARSHAL GROUCHY’S RETREAT TO FRANCE VIA NAMUR 211

20TH JUNE 212

CHAPTER XXX—AND LAST—NAPOLEON IN 1815 218

APPENDIX I—COMPOSITION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE OPPOSING FORCES 224

(A) L’ARMÉE DU NORD—(JUNE 1815) 224

(B) THE PRUSSIAN ARMY 230

(C) THE ANGLO-DUTCH ARMY 232

NOTE (i)—THE PRESENT-DAY (1935) DESIGNATIONS OF THE WATERLOO R.H.A TROOPS AND FIELD BRIGADES, R.A. 237

NOTE (ii)—‘BROWN BESS’ AND THE BAKER RIFLE 238

NOTE (iii)—LOSSES IN THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN 238

APPENDIX II—DOCUMENTS 239

NO. 1—LEFÈBVRE-DESNOËTTES’ REPORT TO NEY, 15TH JUNE 239

NO. 2—NAPOLEON TO NEY, 16TH JUNE 240

NO. 3—WELLINGTON TO BLÜCHER, 16TH JUNE 241

NO. 4—NEY TO SOULT, 10 P.M., 16TH JUNE 241

NO. 5—NAPOLEON’S ATTACK ORDERS, 11 A.M., 18TH JUNE 242

NO. 6—SOULT TO GROUCHY, 1 P.M., 18TH JUNE 243

BOOKS CONSULTED AND USED 244

MAPS 246

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 247

DEDICATION

DÉDIÉ

À LA MÉMOIRE

DE S. M. L’EMPEREUR

NAPOLÉON

L’EMPEREUR DES BATAILLES

LIST OF MAPS AND SKETCHES

1. MAP OF PART OF FRANCE AND BELGIUM, 1815. THE CONCENTRATION OF THE ARMÉE DU NORD, 7TH-14TH JUNE, 1815.

2. CANTONMENTS OF THE ARMÉE DU NORD ON THE NIGHT OF THE 15TH-6TH JUNE. THE ARMÉE DU NORD DISPOSED IN ‘TWO WINGS AND A RESERVE.’

3. THE ACTION OF QUATRE BRAS (2 p.m.); AND THE BATTLE OF LIGNY (2.30 p.m.), 16TH JUNE, 1815.

4. THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO, 18TH JUNE, 1815

5. THE ACTION OF WAVRE, 18TH JUNE, 1815.

SKETCHES

A. WELLINGTON’S CANTONMENTS JUNE, 1815.

B. WELLINGTON’S ORDERS, 15TH JUNE.

C. WELLINGTON’S AFTER-ORDERS, 15TH JUNE.

D. ANGLO-DUTCH CONCENTRATION, 16TH JUNE.

E. THE END IN SIGHT, 17TH JUNE.

F. BRITISH R.H.A. TROOPS AND FIELD BRIGADIERS R.A., 7 p.m., 18TH JUNE.

Map 1

Map 2

Map 3

Map 4

Map 5

Sketch A

Sketch B

Sketch C

Sketch D

Sketch E

Sketch F

PREFACE TO THE REVISED EDITION

THIS can claim to be a new study of the Waterloo Campaign. Twenty-one eventful years have passed since I published a detailed and very fully documented work on this subject; which is now out of print. The time seems to be ripe for this book to be brought up to date and presented in a single volume, the arrangement of which should make it easier for both the general reader and the student to follow the campaign in its entirety. Nothing essential has been sacrificed by compression; the proportions have been preserved, and the human element in the story remains. Six new sketches are given, in order to show graphically certain situations and dispositions which previously required many pages of print to describe. Nearly all the footnotes have been eliminated, by incorporating in the text the essential information which they contained.

Of the books on the Waterloo Campaign which have appeared since 1914, I would especially mention M. E. Lenient’s La solution des énigmes de Waterloo. Although I cannot agree with some of the author’s conclusions, yet I consider that he has suggested the most likely solution of the baffling mystery of ‘the pencil note’, which was the cause of D’Erlon’s fruitless manœuvres on the 16th June. I have adopted M. Lenient’s theory when dealing with this episode.

When I was revising this study, it seemed to me that no useful purpose would be served by imagining that the opponents in the Waterloo Campaign were provided with all the most modern weapons and equipment, and then attempt to criticize or reconstruct the manœuvres and engagements on this assumption. In such circumstances the Campaign, as we know it, could not have been fought. That, however, is far from saying that it is too antiquated and out of date to be of any interest for present-day study. The interest of past campaigns lies in the study of human nature, which changes far more slowly than armaments; and the Waterloo Campaign provides an absorbing study of commanders of all ranks faced with unexpected situations, and the reaction of their minds to the varying strains which they underwent during the operations. For an inquiry of this description, few campaigns will ever be out of date.

In this book I have concentrated on following the working of Napoleon’s plan, the employment of their detachments by Marshals Ney and Grouchy, and the fortunes of the Armée du Nord. In addition, the handling of the Allied Armies is given in sufficient detail to allow the reader to comprehend the manœuvres of the Emperor and of his two lieutenants.

It is thirty years since I first began to analyse the Waterloo Campaign seriously; nevertheless I am still convinced that it is impossible to appreciate Napoleon’s movements in Belgium, unless one clearly understands Napoleon’s plan of organizing the Armée du Nord in ‘two Wings and a Reserve’ which he outlined in his letter of the 16th June to Marshal Ney. This simple but masterly arrangement must be grasped before anyone can venture to criticize the Emperor’s operations in Belgium.

As far as possible in this study, events are judged as they presented themselves at the time. Several critics, knowing the overwhelming disaster which overtook the mighty Emperor and his devoted Army on the fatal field of la Belle Alliance, have evolved many, and often quite fictitious, reasons for that failure. The correct method, however, of writing history is that of Michelet: ‘Acts must be judged as they present themselves, day by day and hour by hour. Criticism, forgetful and harsh, too often condemns beginnings which are laudable, having in view the end which it knows, and which it has in sight at the outset. We do not choose to know this end. Whatever this man may do tomorrow, we note for his advantage the good work which he does today. The end will come soon enough.’

Further, in studying Napoleon, one is always made only too acutely conscious that genius, such as he possessed, requires genius to measure it. One has constantly to remind oneself that things must have looked very different to the Emperor on his dizzy height, from what they now appear to an ordinary mortal below. Probably many of Napoleon’s accusers would have been far giddier than he.

Keeping this in mind, I have dedicated this study of Napoleon’s Campaign with the Armée du Nord in 1815, to the memory of the most famous of all Artillerymen. I am convinced that the deathless honour which is his in France is only the shadow of the Splendour of his worldwide fame.

A. F. B.

PUTNEY, 1936.

CHAPTER I—NAPOLEON’S RETURN FROM ELBA AND THE OPENING EVENTS OF THE HUNDRED DAYS

(Map 1; Sketch A)

It is impossible to bear the torch of truth through the throng without singeing somebody’s beard.—LICHTENBERG.

NAPOLEON’S campaign in Belgium with the Armée du Nord lacked the dazzling brilliance of the First Consul’s operations in 1800, had not the grand resistless sweep of the manœuvre of Ulm, did not end in a glorious crowning triumph like Austerlitz; yet, despite the final disaster, it has an interest entirely its own, exhibiting, as it does, Napoleon’s system of advancing in mass.

No useful purpose can be served by comparing what happened in 1815 with what occurred in 1914-18. In an interminable mutual siege, like the Great War, in which the opposing sides were nearly equal in numbers, the blunders committed by one side were often cancelled by mistakes which the opponents made in their turn. On the other hand, in a war of manœuvre, like 1815, which was bound to be of short duration, and with one side heavily outnumbered by its opponents, there was no time or opportunity for the weaker to recover from any errors which might be made.

In 1815, the Emperor, his lieutenants, and his troops had to surpass themselves, if victory was once more to crown the Eagle Standards of France.

‘With the violets in the spring’ the Emperor returned. Whilst he was at Elba Napoleon had kept in touch with public feeling, and early in 1815 he deemed that the time had arrived when he could reseat himself on the Imperial Throne. So on the 27th February Napoleon, with a small, devoted band of followers (1,000 strong with four cannon) and accompanied by Bertrand, Drouot, and Cambronne, set sail for the southern shores of France. On the 1st March these adventurers landed in the Gulf of Juan, near Cannes. Masséna at Marseille was at once warned by semaphore, but the news only reached Paris on the 5th and London on the 9th.

Napoleon’s small escort sufficed to act as a bodyguard to safeguard him from arrest by the local gendarmerie and protect him from the too officious zeal of some unsympathetic or over-zealous battalion leader, for any more serious operation it was useless. For his advance on Paris Napoleon purposely avoided the easy route through Marseille, where Masséna would have been encountered, and took the more difficult road over the French Alps past Grenoble and Lyon. By adopting this route he expected to take his enemies by surprise, and make it extremely difficult for them to intercept him before he gained Grenoble. Advancing with amazing rapidity, even over the difficult country which he encountered in his first marches, the speed of his advance took his opponents’ breath away and they failed to combine and oppose his progress.

The critical moment in the adventure was on the 7th March, when Napoleon’s advanced guard struck into the Royalist troops at Lafrey, a small village 15 miles from Grenoble. Napoleon, however, rose to the occasion and dominated the whole scene, and his personal conquest of the 5th Regiment of the Line showed the hold which he still retained over his old soldiers. The men’s muskets were levelled to fire, but Napoleon, alone and on foot, advanced to within pistol range and addressed the soldiers in ringing words: ‘Soldiers of the Fifth of the Line, do you remember me?’ There was a volley of assent; and the clear, strong voice continued: ‘If there is in your ranks a single soldier who would kill his Emperor, let him fire. Here am I!’ Napoleon’s calmness, confidence, and magnificent audacity triumphed and overcame all ideas of resistance at this moment of pressing danger. The test was too severe for the troops. Instead of being greeted by a volley of lead, Napoleon was welcomed by a ringing cry of homage, ‘Vive l’Empereur!’ Ranks were broken, white cockades torn off and trampled underfoot, shakos raised on bayonets; and the soldiers, precipitating themselves on their Emperor surrounded him, and in their idolatry sought to touch even the skirts of his overcoat. Acclaimed by his soldiers Napoleon had become a power to reckon with. At one bound he passed from the role of adventurer and stood on the very steps of the Throne itself.

As in his progress to Paris on his return from his Egyptian expedition in 1799, all along his way to the capital there was the same wild and unrestrained outburst of enthusiasm and excitement directly the well-known figure of the Emperor was sighted. He charmed all with whom he came in contact by his unfailing tact and faultless demeanour, and his march to Paris became a triumph.

On the 14th March, near Auxerre, Napoleon encountered Marshal Ney. The Marshal had told Louis XVIII that he would bring Napoleon back to Paris ‘in an iron cage’. But Ney soon found the temptation to join his former master was too strong to be resisted, and with his whole force he went over to the other side and joined his Emperor without firing a shot. Even so the Marshal did not make his final surrender until he had abundant proofs of the feeling pervading the Army. As he said: ‘How could I hope to stay the incoming ocean merely with my own hands?’

Ever onward from steeple to steeple the Eagle continued his irresistible flight; and on the 20th March, the very day which he had foretold, Napoleon reached Paris to find that the Bourbons had fled. The Emperor realized that the time for preparation was short, and on the very evening of his return he started to reorganize the machinery of the Empire. The Cabinet, as announced, contained two distinct surprises. Marshal Davout was appointed Minister of War, though so fitted for high and independent command with the Grand Army in the field; and Fouché figured once more as the Minister of Police.

Napoleon, during his brief reign at Elba, had undoubtedly heard of the dissensions in the Allied Congress at Vienna and probably reckoned that his return would further widen the existing breaches between the Allies. In this he was doomed to be disappointed. The Allies, appreciating the danger which threatened them after Napoleon had regained the throne of France, determined to sink their differences and work together until their common enemy had been utterly crushed.

It was on the 13th March that the Allied Congress in Vienna settled Napoleon’s fate by issuing a solemn and somewhat turgid declaration that Napoleon Bonaparte, the enemy and disturber of the peace of the world, was forthwith to be handed over to the vengeance of Europe. The four Great Powers—Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain—each pledged themselves to put 150,000 men in the field, and keep them under arms until Bonaparte should have been rendered absolutely incapable of stirring up further trouble.

By diplomacy the Emperor attempted to gain the time requisite to set his military house in order, and he despatched accredited representatives to Austria and to Great Britain. Could these two Powers be persuaded to stand aside, even for a time, then Prussia could be overrun. Russia could be dealt with, once Prussia was struck down. It was not to be. Neither ‘Papa François’ nor the Prince Regent would listen to Napoleon’s pacific protestation. Thus war was made by the pen; it was left to the sword to bring peace.

Faced with inevitable war the task which confronted Napoleon was an Herculean one. The Army, which he had taken over from Louis XVIII, numbered at most 100,000 men, and it was quite insufficient for the defence of France against the masses of the Seventh Coalition. Nor was the Army in an efficient condition to take the field: the clothing was in a bad state, the cavalry was deficient, the artillery lacked horses, harness, and ammunition, the infantry, as well as the cavalry, were below strength, no reserve of muskets or bayonets was in existence, and cartridges were not available in sufficient numbers for a serious campaign.

On the 13th May the Emperor wrote to Marshal Davout and demanded a detailed report of the breadth of the Condé canals, of the Scheldt near Mons, and the Sambre near Charleroi, and the same of the Bruges canal, Brussels canal, and the Meuse near Maastricht. Napoleon also asked for the number of pontoons which would be necessary to bridge each river or canal, and the number of pontoon or field-service wagons available in Paris; and the date on which they could be massed between Avesnes and Laon. The Emperor, with his thoughts already concentrated on Belgium, was collecting information about the natural obstacles which an advance would have to encounter. But he did not rest content with collecting information. He ordered third, fourth, and fifth battalions to be raised for the various regiments and the old well-known numbers, associated with many a triumph, were given back. All men on furlough were recalled, and 200 battalions of the National Guard were raised, marched off to the fortresses assigned to them, and clothed, armed, and completed after arrival. The fortresses and the coast defences were overhauled and put in order. Twenty veteran battalions were formed to stiffen the National Guard levies, serve as training battalions for them, and encourage the inhabitants. In the short available time, everything that energy and determination could do, was done and was done well.

On reviewing the situation the Emperor decided that although, broadly speaking, he was on the defensive, yet he was free to choose the nature of his operations. At the beginning of April he could have taken the offensive with all the available strength he could collect, and, marching at once into Belgium, have achieved some measure of success. But this course had several grave disadvantages: the Allies would have moved up Armies which would have speedily crushed the force which France could place in the field at this period, and the Emperor, fully engaged in operations in the field, could not have devoted the necessary time and energy to consolidating his power, reorganizing his Army, and rallying his people. By opening an immediate offensive Napoleon would have put himself in the wrong with the French Nation, who believed it was still possible to preserve peace. Such measures, too, would falsify any pacific protestations which the Emperor might wish to address to the Allies. So he held his hand.

On the 1st June the Emperor had a spectacular display called, as in former times (1790), the ‘Champ de Mai’. The meeting was inaugurated with a civil ceremony, in which Napoleon, clad in gorgeous silken raiment, was almost unrecognizable. Fortunately the day concluded with the presentation of Eagles to the various regiments by the Emperor himself, now dressed in uniform. He stirred his men to the depths of their feelings by recalling former glories in which they had shared. To the Guard, who advanced last of all, he addressed these impressive words: ‘You, Soldiers of the Imperial Guard, you swear to surpass your previous exploits in this campaign which is about to open; and you will die rather than permit the foreigner to dictate his terms to your country.’ The civil part of the function was a failure, but the second phase provided an imposing pageant.

To return to the general situation. The Emperor stood alone to meet the oncoming tide of invasion. He did not possess any ally, whose skilfully led army might be utilized to contain a large force of the Coalition in some secondary and unimportant theatre of operations. His situation was aggravated by the fact that the whole of France’s long land boundary did not march for a single mile with any neutral power. Danger, too, was near at hand. The Anglo-Dutch and Prussian Armies were concentrating in Belgium and menaced France from this quarter.

When Napoleon returned from Elba he possessed one supporter on whose service he could reckon—his brother-in-law, Joachim Murat, King of Naples. Before he left Elba Napoleon warned Murat to prepare the Neapolitan Army, so as to be ready for any eventuality. But Murat was on no account to take the initiative and open hostilities, he was to play a waiting game. If the Austrian forces did press on, Murat was advised to draw back and avoid a decisive engagement as long as possible.

Murat’s own position at this time was by no means secure, and his unreliable Army had little fighting value and was unlikely to stand the strain of a serious action. If it was defeated it would certainly dissolve. So long as Murat remained at the head of an undefeated Army the Emperor need not detach French troops to secure France’s south-eastern boundary; and, well handled, Murat’s Army might have been of incalculable assistance. Unfortunately Murat was not an Ally on whom the Emperor could depend, as although ‘in battle perhaps the bravest man in the world, yet, left to himself, Murat was without judgment’.

Murat considered that prompt action on his part would tend to secure his crown; and, hearing that Napoleon had landed in France, he declared war on the Allies (15th March) before Napoleon was in any position to assist him. As soon as his Army was ready to take the field, Murat pushed forward a strong detachment (about 10,000-12,000 men) to Rome, whilst he himself marched at the head of the main Army (some 30,000 strong) along the Adriatic coast road. Had the King halted at Ancona the Austrians could not have advanced along the Po valley with this formidable collection of men on their left flank. But this was not Murat’s method; and he decided to take the initiative and destroy the Austrians, before they could concentrate sufficient forces to deal with him.

At first Murat achieved a slight success. He advanced against Bologna, pushed the Austrians out of the city and half-way to Mantua. Then he halted, instead of massing his whole force and attacking boldly. He had shot his bolt, and shortly afterwards he decided to fall back. This retreat upset the moral of his Army.

On the 2nd May, however, Murat turned at Tolentino and attacked Bianchi. The opposing forces were: Austrians, about 11,000 (including 1,000 horse) and 28 guns; Neapolitans, 28,000 (including 3,500 horse) and 35 guns. The fighting proceeded with fluctuating results until darkness fell, and Murat determined to attack again next morning. In this attack, Murat at first gained a temporary success and drove back the Austrian advanced troops; but the final Neapolitan attack was checked. Bianchi then launched two squadrons and a regiment of infantry in a vigorous counterattack, and the Neapolitans were overthrown and withdrew in considerable disorder followed by Bianchi. Under the pressure of pursuit the Neapolitan Army broke up and fled in small bodies to the eastward, leaving its impedimenta in the power of the Whitecoats. In these operations the Neapolitans lost about 4,000 men, though the Austrian casualty list did not exceed 800. Later, in the retreat, the demoralized Neapolitans deserted in thousands.

The result of Murat’s premature campaign was most inopportune. The greater proportion of the Austrian forces in this subsidiary theatre were released at once for a closer and more direct attack on France, and Frimont began to concentrate in Lombardy. Murat fled to reunite his fortunes with Napoleon, but in this hope he was disappointed. Napoleon, furious at the light-hearted manner in which the King had opened and conducted his campaign, could not forgive its miserable failure. He refused to see Murat and would not consent to give him a command in the Armée du Nord. It was an unfortunate decision since it wronged France. ‘At Waterloo Murat might have given us the victory. It required but little to break three or four English squares; and Murat was the best cavalry officer in the world.’

Henceforward the Emperor stood alone. Not only was he without an ally he could not even reckon on any state remaining neutral, and the odds which he had to face were tremendous. The Emperor, however, made the most of the short breathing space which was accorded to him. He established his Government and raised fresh armies from the war-weary, but far from sterile soil of France. Unhappily for him the internal affairs of France were complicated by a revolt in the disturbed district of La Vendée, and this insurrection was still smouldering.

Before the middle of June the Emperor had organized his Armies as follows:

1. The Armée du Nord{1} (to operate in Belgium):

2. The Guard (20,000), Cavalry Reserve (13,500), and the I (20.000), II (25,000), III (17,000), IV (15,500), and VI (10,500) Corps, with 370 guns;

3. On the Upper Rhine (covering Alsace): Generals Rapp (V Corps) and Lecourbe (23,000);

4. Covering the Italian frontier: Marshals Suchet and Brune (15,500);

5. Masking the Pyrenean defiles against Spain: Generals Clausel and Decaen (8,000); and

6. Quelling the Vendéan insurrection: General Lamarque (10.000).

Map 1.—The actual distribution of the various Corps facilitated a concentration on the Franco-Belgian or on the Rhine frontier. In either case the VI Corps, Cavalry Reserve, and Guard could be pushed up to the concentration point.

The Armies of the Seventh Coalition, however, were in distinctly better case than the French. They had the moral of their conquest in 1814 to strengthen them; and the Allied Armies, which had made the campaign in France, had not yet been disbanded. During May the Allies decided to close in on the French frontiers with five main Armies:

Map 1.—1. Anglo-Dutch Army, about 110,000 strong, was cantoned in Belgium to the west of the Brussels-Charleroi road. It was under the command of Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington (who had reached Brussels from Vienna on the 5th April); and it was to cross the Franco-Belgian boundary to the south-west of Mons.

2. Prussian Army, about 117,000 strong, was cantoned in Belgium between the Charleroi-Brussels road and Liège (under Field-Marshal Prince Blücher von Wahlstatt); it was to cross the Franco-Belgian frontier to the south-west of Namur.

3. Russian Army, 150,000 (under Barclay de Tolly), was to cross the Middle Rhine and advance in the second line, acting as Reserve Army. It was still far distant from the French frontier.

4. Austrian Army, 210,000 (under Prince Schwartzenberg), was to cross the Upper Rhine and advance in conjunction with Wellington’s and Blücher’s forces. In June this Army also was out of striking distance of the French frontier.

5. Austrian Army of Italy, 75,000 (under Frimont), was to debouch across the Alps with Lyon as its objective.

Both flanks rested on the sea and were secured by the fleets of Great Britain.

Their numerous wars against Napoleon had taught the Allies something. Of all the commanders, none realized more clearly than Blücher that only in unity was safety to be found when operating as part of an Allied Army. Consequently in the campaign in Belgium, opposed to the resolute old Prussian Field-Marshal and his loyal ally, Wellington, Napoleon found jealousy, intrigue, and incapacity playing a far smaller part than he expected.

To sum up the situation. On the one side France was standing alone, without the aid of any external allies, and she was unable to place in the field more than 200,000 men to safeguard herself from violation. On the other side were gathering the armed hosts of Europe—Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain—the Seventh Coalition. The Generalissimo directed 1,000,000 men, and behind this host were adequate reserves. The alliance was welded together by the gold of England.

Unfortunately for France, there were grave differences between the power exercised by Napoleon in the earlier years of the Empire and the power which he wielded in 1815. On his return from Elba Napoleon hesitated for some time before he reintroduced ‘Conscription’, and not until early in June was Marshal Davout ordered to send out the instructions for levying the class for 1815. As it happened France was resigned to war and there was no difficulty in collecting the conscripts.

There was another serious difference between the Emperor of 1815 and the Napoleon of 1805, or even of 1809. No longer were Napoleon and the State synonymous terms. Within a very short space of time the Chamber virtually became the State;