Defining Defense: The 1985 Military Budget
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About this ebook
The issues of the defense budget, national security, and American foreign policy have become increasingly contested in today's political environment. In this booklet, former Pentagon analyst Earl C. Ravenal, professor of international relations at Georgetown University, offers a unique reassesment of what American security means in an uncontrollable world. Ravenal takes us beyond the superficial critiques of the U.S. military budget to show how the Pentagon's budget is related to worldwide commitments, and how such alliances pose real dangers for American security in the years ahead. Ravenal defends a noninterventionist foreign policy as a realistic alternative to our bipartisan policy of global entanglements, as well as a means of making substantial reductions in our military spending. He carfully dissects the Reagan administration's 1985 budget request, and advances a profound challenge to today's conventional wisdom in foreign policy and defense.
Earl C. Ravenal
Earl C. Ravenal, distinguished senior fellow in foreign policy studies, is professor emeritus of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. He is an expert on NATO, defense strategy, and the defense budget. He is the author of Designing Defense for a New World Order.
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Defining Defense - Earl C. Ravenal
The Dimensions of the Problem
The salient feature of the first four federal budgets of the Reagan administration has been the vast increase in defense spending. In terms of budget authority—all the funds that are authorized to be spent, though not necessarily in the same year—this administration increased defense spending from 1981 to 1982 by 20 percent, to $211 billion; and from 1982 to 1983 by another 14 percent, to $240 billion. For 1984, Congress granted the administration another 8 percent rise, to $258 billion. And for 1985, the administration is requesting another 18 percent, to $305 billion.
These figures can be put in stark relief against present and projected total budget deficits. The administration's official figures are: for 1982, $110.7 billion; for 1983, $195 billion; for 1984, $184 billion; and for 1985, $180.4 billion. Privately, David Stockman, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, foresees a deficit for 1985 of more than $200 billion, if certain anticipated spending cuts and tax increases are not approved. Some economists have forecast even steeper deficits to follow. For example, Rudolph G. Penner, Director of the Congressional Budget Office, expects federal budget shortfalls rising to $280 billion in 1989; and Michael K. Evans forecasts $330 billion by 1988.¹
Actually, the precision of these figures—or their stability over weeks and months of forecasting—is not the point. The point is their order of magnitude and the kind of problems they represent. For the predicament in which America finds itself is not a thing of one or two awkward or painful budgetary seasons. It is a dilemma of historic magnitude and import: nothing less than the situation of a mature imperial
power, beset by multiple political and military challenges in the world but unable to generate sufficient resources for the defense of its extensive global perimeter. The term imperial
is neutral and generic, not pejorative. Empires, throughout history, have performed certain functions. They fulfill them or they falter and fail. Or their societies and leaders may appraise their situations and adjust their foreign policies to fit their capabilities and their true needs and values.
The defense budget must be seen in the context of the larger economic choices. In other words, we must examine what it even means for a nation—not an individual person but a complex social-economic-political system—to choose
a foreign or military policy. It cannot be an act of pure willfulness. Foreign and, derivatively, military policy are compressed between requirements that arise from our position in the international system (such things as threats
and challenges
) and the constraints that arise from our domestic system (constraints on resources and support). Requirements can be thought of as demands. Resources and support can be considered as supply factors. It is characteristic of foreign policy bureaucrats, and their chorus among the foreign policy community,
to devote preemptive attention to factors on the demand side, without reference to the other side of the equation. Obviously, a foreign policy that is lopsidedly responsive to threats and challenges, and that incurs such pressures through its multiplication of foreign commitments and its assumption of foreign interests, will experience more of the domestic constraints that are latent in any social and economic system.
When we consider these contraints of resources and support, we see that a certain model
is presented, within which any government must operate. Faced with large deficits, an administration (such as the Reagan administration now) finds its choices limited to five:
1. It could seek to make up the deficits by ordering more taxes. But this would betray crucial promises it made to important constituencies.
2. It could reduce the deficits by making further cuts in domestic programs. But this attempt, commendable to the extent that it has been pursued by the Reagan administration, has run into the area of diminishing budgetary returns for political effort expended.
3. It could try to finance the deficits by borrowing from the banking system—in effect, printing money (as the Federal Reserve System did on a large scale from the late summer of 1982 at least to the spring of 1983). But this behavior, if resumed, would rekindle the fires of inflation.
4. It could borrow in the ordinary credit markets. And so the Reagan administration has done to a large extent.² But this has the effect of raising interest rates and crowding out industrial recovery and renewal. Up to now, the latter effect has been mitigated by a massive influx of foreign capital, attracted by the high interest rates themselves; but that factor can shift rapidly.
5. Or, of course, the administration could cut its defense program.
These choices can be made, and they can be mixed, but they cannot be evaded or transcended. It is only in terms of these implicit choices that the question—can the country afford its foreign policy?—can be answered.
Let us concentrate on the case for higher taxes. Most arguments for the affordability
of high defense spending are implicit arguments for more taxation. Couldn't the nation decide
to assume the burden of substantially increased taxes (and perhaps also that moral equivalent of taxation, conscription)? One article puts the matter