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“Double Canister at Ten Yards”: The Federal Artillery and the Repulse of Pickett’s Charge, July 3, 1863
“Double Canister at Ten Yards”: The Federal Artillery and the Repulse of Pickett’s Charge, July 3, 1863
“Double Canister at Ten Yards”: The Federal Artillery and the Repulse of Pickett’s Charge, July 3, 1863
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“Double Canister at Ten Yards”: The Federal Artillery and the Repulse of Pickett’s Charge, July 3, 1863

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Gettysburg is one of the most famous and studied battles of history, and Pickett’s Charge, its climax on the third day, continues to fascinate a new generation of readers. Most accounts of the grand assault focus on General Robert E. Lee’s reasons for making the charge, its preparation, organization, and ultimate failure. Author David Shultz, however, in “Double Canister at Ten Yards”: The Federal Artillery and the Repulse of Pickett’s Charge, July 3, 1863, focuses his examination on how and why the Union long-arm beat back the Confederate foot soldiers.

After two days of heavy fighting on July 1 and 2, 1863, the commander of the Army of the Potomac, Maj. General George G. Meade, correctly surmised General Lee would remain on the offensive on July 3 and strike the Union center on Cemetery Ridge. Meade informed Maj. Gen. Winfield Hancock, whose infantry lined the ridge, that his sector would bear the brunt on the morrow and to prepare accordingly. Meade also warned to his capable chief of artillery, Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt, and tasked him with preparing his guns to deal with the approaching assault.

Shultz, who has studied Gettysburg for decades and walked every yard of its hallowed ground, uses official reports, letters, diaries, and other accounts to meticulously explain how Hunt and his officers and men worked tirelessly that night and well into July 3 to organize a lethal package of orchestrated destruction to greet Lee’s vaunted infantry in an effort that would be hailed by many historians as “The High Water Mark of the Confederacy.” The war witnessed many large scale assaults and artillery bombardments, but no example of defensive gunnery was more destructive than the ring of direct frontal and full-flank enfilading fire Hunt’s batteries unleashed upon Lee’s assaulting columns. The iron rain broke and drove back the massed attack within a short time, leaving a fraction of the attacking force to cross the Emmitsburg Road to scale the deadly Ridge.

“Double Canister at Ten Yards” will change the way you look at Pickett’s Charge, and leave you wondering yet again why an officer as experienced and gifted as General Lee ordered it in the first place.
LanguageEnglish
Release dateFeb 15, 2017
ISBN9781940669496
“Double Canister at Ten Yards”: The Federal Artillery and the Repulse of Pickett’s Charge, July 3, 1863
Author

David Schultz

David L. Shultz is the author of many articles concerning the Battle of Gettysburg, and several books including Guide to Pennsylvania Troops at Gettysburg, The Battle Between the Farm Lanes: Hancock Saves the Union Center, and the co-author (with Scott Mingus Sr.) of The Second Day at Gettysburg: The Attack and Defense of Cemetery Ridge, July 2, 1863 (Savas Beatie, 2016). He is currently working on an extensive and comprehensive tactical study on the artillery at Gettysburg.

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    Book preview

    “Double Canister at Ten Yards” - David Schultz

    Double Canister at Ten Yards

    The Federal Artillery and the Repulse of Pickett’s Charge

    David Shultz

    Savas Beatie

    California

    © 2017 by David Shultz

    All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

    Originally published under the same title by Rank and File Publications in 1995.

    Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

    Names: Shultz, Dave, author.

    Title: Double Canister at Ten Yards: The Federal Artillery and the Repulse

    of Pickett’s Charge / David Shultz.

    Description: [1st Savas Beatie edition]. | El Dorado Hills, CA : Savas Beatie, 2016. |

    Includes bibliographical references and index.

    Identifiers: LCCN 2015028766| ISBN 9781611212723 (pbk.) |

    ISBN 9781940669496 (ebk.)

    Subjects: LCSH: Gettysburg, Battle of, Gettysburg, Pa., 1863. | Hunt, Henry

    Jackson, 1819-1889. | United States—History—Civil War, 1861-1865

    —Artillery operations.

    Classification: LCC E475.53 .S555 2016 | DDC 973.7/349—dc23

    LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015028766

    ISBN: 978-1-61121-272-3

    First edition, first printing

    Published by

    Savas Beatie LLC

    989 Governor Drive, Suite 102

    El Dorado Hills, CA 95762

    Phone: 916-941-6896

    (E-mail) sales@savasbeatie.com

    Digital version published by Savas Publishing

    ISBN: 978-1-94066-949-6

    eISBN: 978-1-94066-949-6

    Mobi ISBN: 978-1-94066-949-6

    Savas Beatie titles are available at special discounts for bulk purchases in the United States by corporations, institutions, and other organizations. For more details, please contact Special Sales, P.O. Box 4527, El Dorado Hills, CA 95762, or you may e-mail us at sales@savasbeatie.com, or visit our website at www.savasbeatie.com for additional information.

    Dedicated to my friends,

    Richard Rollins

    and

    Charles H. Hathaway (1927 - 2016)

    (Gettysburg Licensed Battlefield Guide, Badge No. 41, from 1989 - 2016)

    Henry Jackson Hunt, the Army of the Potomac’s brilliant chief of artillery.

    National Archives

    Table of Contents

    Foreword

    Introduction

    Chapter 1: General Hunt Sets Up a Gun Line

    Chapter 2: One More Inspection

    Chapter 3: The Cannonade

    Chapter 4: Meade’s Headquarters and Cemetery Hill

    Chapter 5: The Lure

    Chapter 6: Cemetery Ridge

    Chapter 7: The Charge Begins

    Chapter 8: Little Round Top and McGilvery’s Line

    Chapter 9: The Angle

    Chapter 10: Reinforcements

    Chapter 11: Repulse

    Chapter 12: More Reinforcements

    Chapter 13: Victory

    Postscript: Aftermath

    Order of Battle

    Endnotes

    Foreword

    The role played by the Union artillery at the Battle of Gettysburg has been long neglected. In many other Civil War battles, Union guns were unable to function effectively because so much of the fighting took place in heavily wooded mountainous and rolling terrain with much of it separated by wide rivers. This was not the case on most of the field at Gettysburg, where the high ground and open vistas occupied by Union forces made it an artillerist’s dream.

    The artillery that performed so well on July 3, 1863, was under the overall command of Brigadier General Henry J. Hunt, the Army of the Potomac’s Chief of Artillery. The guns included those of Major Thomas W. Osborn, Eleventh Corps Artillery Brigade, Colonel S. Charles Wainwright, First Corps Artillery Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Freeman McGilvery, First Volunteer Artillery Brigade, Reserve Artillery, and Captain John G. Hazard, Second Corps Artillery Brigade. Their full role and the full credit due them for their work this day is routinely overlooked. With Shultz’s work, this is no longer the case.

    Utilizing the natural terrain, superior positioning and an abundance of ordnance and material, Hunt’s three West-facing groups of artillery were able to centralize a consolidated crossfire that was more destructive than that atop Malvern Hill the year before. One wonders what the outcome might have been without the excellent work of the men who manned these guns.

    Although this work is detailed, it is only an overview with much more to come, for Shultz is finalizing a magnificent comprehensive study of the role of artillery during the entire Gettysburg Campaign.

    That, too, is long overdue.

    Charles Hathaway

    Gettysburg Licensed Battlefield Guide (retired)

    Introduction

    July 3, 1863:

    The High Water Mark

    See ’em! See ’em! shouted Brevet Brigadier General Henry J. Hunt as he emptied his Army Colt into the mass of gray and butternut-clad soldiers storming over and through the stone wall. It was nearing 3:45 p.m. on Friday, July 3, 1863. The Army of the Potomac, commanded by Major General George G. Meade, and the Army of Northern Virginia, commanded by General Robert E. Lee, were in the horrific climax of a bloody three-day death struggle at Gettysburg. The Confederate assault against the Federal line on Cemetery Ridge this day would last less than one hour, but it would signal what many refer to as the turning point in America’s bloody Civil War, or as noted on the tablet presently located below the canopy of oaks that make up the Copse of Trees, The High Water Mark of the Confederacy. ¹

    Henry Jackson Hunt, the forty-four year old Chief of Artillery for the Army of the Potomac, stood in the stirrups discharging his revolver amid the chaos and mayhem. He had just ridden up through all the confusion to the position of Captain Andrew Cowan’s 1st New York Independent battery just south of the small grove we now call the Copse of Trees. Cowan had five-three-inch Ordnance Rifles posted to the left of the trees; his remaining gun was posted to their right. As Cowan’s guns discharged their last load of double canister, Hunt’s horse, Bill, was shot. Hunt had no time to clear the saddle, and rider and horse hit the ground, pinning Hunt by one leg.

    As Cowan began to prolonge (drag by hand using ropes) his five rifles to the rear, Rebels swarmed over the stone wall, passing Hunt and paying him no mind, for Cowan’s battery seemed the better prize. As Hunt struggled to free himself of Bill, two of Cowan’s cannoneers ran forward to help. They jerked Hunt to his feet and quickly disappeared back over the ridge. Hunt stood dazed, but unhurt. He noticed that Cowan’s battery, partially concealed by its own smoke, was disappearing back over the ridge as Yankee reinforcements converged on the thicket. ²

    As far north as Hunt could see, Confederate battle flags were soaring over the wall. Seeing no general officer around him, Hunt attempted to take control of the chaos around him. He watched as one Federal infantryman was blown a dozen feet into the air and cart wheeled ten feet back by an exploding Confederate shell. For a moment, Hunt was bewildered by the confusion and ferocity around him. Soon the wild screaming and incessant musketry began to die down. He heard cheering to the north; the sound moved south down the Union line, toward the Copse of Trees. The Rebels were giving ground as the blue line, on impulse and without orders, suddenly rushed forward.

    The few Rebels east of the wall who were not prisoners were either dead or wounded. As the surviving Confederates retreated across the Emmitsburg Road and beyond, Hunt realized the Union defense of Cemetery Ridge had succeeded, and the magnificent Confederate charge had failed.

    Chapter 1

    General Hunt Sets Up a Gun Line

    About 4:30 a.m. on July 3, 1863, General Henry J. Hunt slowly arose from a three-hour nap as his chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Edward R. Warner, handed him a cup of hot black coffee. Hunt was a career artilleryman. Born in 1819 on a U.S. Army post in Michigan into a family whose history spanned two centuries of military service, he had decided at an early age that he, too, would choose the army as a career. ¹

    Hunt graduated from West Point in 1839, ranking 19th in his class of 31 cadets. When the war broke out he was breveted major and from there quickly rose up the ranks. Between Bull Run and Chancellorsville he became well-known throughout the army for his coolness under fire, and at Malvern Hill in 1862 his handling of the artillery contributed materially to victory. Thoroughly professional, he was quick to criticize those who seemed to lack his commitment and effectiveness, especially politically appointed officers. As Hunt thanked Warner for the refreshing breakfast, a loud report showed that Federal artillery along the Baltimore Pike had opened the day’s battle by firing on the enemy around the base of Culp’s Hill. Hunt had spent most of the night placing and rebuilding batteries that had been wrecked in the fight on July 2. Hunt stated, The night of July 2nd was spent devoted in great part to repairing damages, replenishing the ammunition chests, and reducing and reorganizing such batteries as had lost so many men, equipment and horses, as to be unable efficiently to work the full number of guns assigned. . . . By daylight the next morning this duty had been performed as good as possible, and, when it was found impossible to reorganize, the batteries were withdrawn and replaced by others from the Artillery Reserve. The work was completed by daylight of the 3rd.²

    Hunt knew on the evening of July 2 that the battle was not over. Like most of the other general officers in the Army of the Potomac, he believed that another day of battle was just beginning, and he had a good deal of work yet to do. For the next several hours Hunt organized and prepared his defensive line. By 1:00 p.m. he had 175 guns in line covering the entire Federal position, including 132 between Little Round Top and Cemetery Hill. He had 95 more waiting just behind the middle of the lines, readily available for immediate action.³

    Hunt organized his weapons in good Napoleonic fashion into three distinct artillery groups that could concentrate their fire to hit any enemy force that might approach the Cemetery Ridge line. Any infantry attack would be subject to either defilade (direct) or enfilade (flank or side) fire. An attack against the center of the line, which was predicted the previous evening by the commander of the army, Major General George Gordon Meade, would be the focus of a storm of shot and shell from all sides.

    The three artillery groups were as follows:

    1. The Southern Cemetery Ridge line (now often referred to as McGilvery’s line) extended some 600 to 700 yards south from where the Pennsylvania monument now stands. Controlled

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