Balance Sheet: The Iraq War and U.S. National Security

Balance Sheet

The Iraq War and U.S. National Security

John S. Duffield

Peter J. Dombrowski

Stanford University Press

Stanford, California

© 2009 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Balance sheet : the Iraq War and U.S. national security / edited by John S. Duffield and Peter J. Dombrowski.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

9780804772044

1. Iraq War, 2003--Influence. 2. National security--United States. 3. United States--Foreign relations--21st century. I. Duffield, John S. II. Dombrowski, Peter J., 1963-

DS79.76.B3517 2009

956.7044’32--dc22

2009012529

Typeset by Bruce Lundquist in 10/14Minion

Special discounts for bulk quantities of Stanford Security Series are available to corporations, professional associations, and other organizations. For details and discount information, contact the special sales department of Stanford University Press.

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To Mom, Dad, Mary Ann, and Joe

J.S.D.

To Ann and JoJo

P.J.D

Table of Contents

Title Page

Copyright Page

Dedication

CONTRIBUTORS

PREFACE

1 - TOWARD A BALANCE SHEET

2 - THE IRAQ WAR AND THE WAR ON TERROR

3 - THE IRAQ WAR AND THE FAILURE OF U.S. COUNTERPROLIFERATION STRATEGY

4 - THE IRAQ WAR AND AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

5 - THE IRAQ WAR AND THE STATE OF THE U.S. MILITARY

6 - THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COSTS OF THE IRAQ WAR

7 - THE IRAQ WAR AND U.S. PUBLIC OPINION

8 - ARE WE SAFER NOW?

NOTES

INDEX

CONTRIBUTORS

John S. Duffield is professor of political science at Georgia State University in Atlanta. He is the author of Over a Barrel: The Costs of U.S. Foreign Oil Dependence (Stanford University Press, 2008); World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification (Stanford University Press, 1998); and Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Force Posture (Stanford University Press, 1995), as well as numerous other publications on international politics, institutions, and security. His current research focuses on the politics of energy security in the United States and other industrialized countries.

Peter J. Dombrowski is chairperson of the Strategic Research Department at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He is the author of nearly forty articles, monographs, book chapters, and government reports. His most recent book, coauthored with Eugene Gholz, is Buying Military Transformation: Technological Innovation and the Defense Industry (Columbia University Press, 2006). Other publications include Guns and Butter: The Political Economy of the New International Security Environment (Lynne Rienner, 2005); Naval Power in the Twenty-first Century: A Naval War College Review Reader (Naval War College Press, 2005); Policy Responses to the Globalization of American Banking (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996); and with Andrew Ross and Eugene Gholz, Military Transformation and the Defense Industry After Next (Naval War College Press, 2002).

Joseph Cirincione is the president of the Ploughshares Fund. He is the author of Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (Columbia University Press, 2007). Previously, he served as senior vice president for national security and international policy at the Center for American Progress and as director for nonproliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for eight years. He worked for nine years in the U.S. House of Representatives as a professional staff member of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Government Operations and served as staff director of the bipartisan Military Reform Caucus. He teaches at the Georgetown University Graduate School of Foreign Service and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

F. Gregory Gause III is professor of political science at the University of Vermont and served as director of the university’s Middle East Studies Program from 1998 to 2008. He was previously on the faculty of Columbia University (1987–95) and served as fellow for Arab and Islamic studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (1993–94). He is the author of Oil Monarchies (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994) and is currently completing a book on the international politics of the Persian Gulf region since 1971.

Michael E. O’Hanlon is Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy and The Sydney Stein, Jr. Chair at the Brookings Institution. He specializes in U.S. national security policy and is senior author of the Iraq Index. A former defense budget analyst who advised members of Congress on military spending, he specializes in Iraq, North Korea, homeland security, the use of military force, and other defense issues. He was also director of Opportunity 08.

Clay Ramsay, director of research at the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) and a fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, cofounded PIPA in 1992. He regularly appears in the U.S. and international media providing analysis of public opinion. With a background in history and psychology, he has focused on the study of ideology and mass psychology. He received his PhD in history from Stanford University, has taught at Oberlin College, and is the author of The Ideology of the Great Fear (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991). He is a faculty member of the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland.

Steven Simon is Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He previously served as a senior analyst at the Rand Corporation (2003–6), deputy director and Carol Dean Senior Fellow in U.S. Security Studies at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (1999–2003), and director for global issues and senior director for transnational threats on the National Security Council (1994–99). He is the coauthor of The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House, 2002) and The Next Attack (Times Books, 2005). His current work examines the consequences of the American intervention in Iraq, Muslim/non-Muslim relations, and the role of religion in U.S. foreign policy.

Thomas G. Weiss is Presidential Professor of Political Science at The CUNY Graduate Center and Director of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, where he is codirector of the United Nations Intellectual History Project. He is president of the International Studies Association (2009–10) and chairperson of the Academic Council on the UN System (2006–9). He was editor of Global Governance, research director of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, research professor at Brown University’s Watson Institute for International Studies, executive director of the Academic Council on the UN System and of the International Peace Academy, a member of the UN secretariat, and a consultant to several public and private agencies. He has written or edited some thirty-five books and one hundred fifty articles and book chapters about multilateral approaches to international peace and security, humanitarian action, and sustainable development. His latest book is What’s Wrong with the United Nations and How to Fix It (Polity Press, 2009).

PREFACE

Some projects take a long time to come to fruition, and this one is no exception. Its origins date to the summer of 2003. That is when we first thought of conducting a comprehensive assessment of the impact of the Iraq War on U.S. national security, to be published around the first anniversary of the invasion. In retrospect, the notion of such a quick assessment so soon after the war began seems naive in the extreme. Nevertheless, that perhaps unrealistic initial inspiration laid much of the groundwork for the book you are now reading.

Although John Duffield came up with the initial idea and elaborated a clear vision for the volume, he immediately reached out to Peter Dombrowski, whom he knew could bring a wealth of relevant knowledge and experience to the project. Together, we developed a chapter outline that is very similar to the one contained in this book and began to contact potential contributors, several of whom are represented in these pages. For perhaps obvious reasons, however, it proved difficult to recruit a full complement of authors who would be willing and able to write chapters under such fluid circumstances and on such a short deadline. So we thanked those who had agreed to participate and moved on.

Then the idea returned at an opportune moment in the summer of 2007. John was able to take advantage of a meeting already scheduled with a representative of Stanford University Press to float the concept. This led to an exchange with Dr. Geoffrey R. H. Burn, the director and acquisitions editor of the press, who immediately took an interest in the project. The timing could not have been better. Despite his heavy responsibilities as chair of the Strategic Research Department at the Naval War College, Peter was once again available and willing to serve as coeditor. The press quickly reviewed a proposal and extended a generous advance contract. With the backing of the press, we were quickly able to assemble a world-class set of contributors.

Although many of those to whom we are indebted are apparent in the preceding paragraphs, we would nevertheless like to extend explicit thanks:

To the chapter authors, a veritable who’s who of U.S. national security experts. That we were able to secure the participation of such an accomplished and knowledgeable group is testament to the importance of the topic.

To Dr. Geoffrey Burn, for making available the full resources of his dynamic university press. It is impossible to imagine a more helpful or supportive sponsor.

To Jessica Walsh, Mariana Raykov, Alexandria Giardino, and others at the press, who helped smooth the path from proposal to production.

In addition, John would like to express his gratitude to Peter, without whose partnership he would not have moved forward on this project; to Raluca Miller and Alla Manukyan, my graduate research assistants at Georgia State University (he is especially grateful to Alla for promptly and effectively handling what must have seemed like an unending series of mini-projects related to the book); and to his wife, Cheryl Eschbach, for encouraging him every step of the way. John dedicates his share of the book to his parents, Richard and Mary Rose Duffield, his mother-in-law, Mary Ann Eschbach, and his father-in-law, Joseph Eschbach, who passed away in September 2007 just as the project was getting underway. Joe was unstinting in his love and always took an interest in my work. I miss him greatly.

Peter would like to thank his wife Ann Martino who has patiently stood beside him through this project like all the others, and his daughter Johanna who someday will write a book or two of her own.

J.S.D.

Decatur, Georgia

P.J.D.

Newport, Rhode Island

1

TOWARD A BALANCE SHEET

What, Why, and How

John S. Duffield and Peter J. Dombrowski

I think that is where we must begin, by considering the overall security of this nation.... Iraq is an important piece of that overall equation, but it is only a piece.

Rep. Ike Skelton, Chairman of the House Armed Services

Committee, September 10, 2007¹

It is an iron law of warfare that the unintended consequences, for good and bad, are as important—if not more so—than the intended. Because these consequences take time to work themselves through, the long-term reputations of wars rarely reflect the first reviews.

Sir Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War Studies,

King’s College, London²

PURPOSE

In mid-March 2003, the Bush administration took the United States to war with Iraq. Members of the administration believed, or at least claimed, that the war would yield substantial benefits for U.S. national security at little cost. By deposing Saddam Hussein, the United States would eliminate a major threat to its vital interests. Among other things, the invasion would remove a regime that was hostile to the United States and its regional allies, including Israel, and that possessed, or would soon possess, nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, it would end the need to maintain the politically unpopular and increasingly expensive policy of containment using a porous sanctions regime and complex no-fly zones. In addition, attacking Iraq would open another front in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), albeit an increasingly controversial one that many would later judge unnecessary. In the place of Saddam’s despotic regime, moreover, a democracy would be erected that could serve as a model for the rest of the region. Regional security for the United States, its allies, and friends would be further improved because a democratic Iraq would lead to a virtuous and reinforcing cycle. Not least important, a relatively small amount of American combat forces operating for a limited period in-country would win a swift victory, and the costs of rebuilding Iraq would be paid for largely out of the country’s oil revenues.

Initially, events seemed to support the administration’s arguments. U.S. and other coalition forces quickly overcame organized resistance. Within weeks, they had defeated the Iraqi army, captured Baghdad, and driven Saddam Hussein into hiding. At the beginning of May, President Bush declared the end of major combat operations.

Even this opening phase of the war was not without costs, however. The administration’s insistence on using force strained relations with a number of major allies, and the invasion caused much anger throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds. Within Iraq itself, thousands of innocent civilians died, and much of the country was plunged into chaos.

As the quick initial victory turned into a prolonged occupation in the face of a fierce insurgency, both U.S. casualties and financial outlays steadily mounted.³ Success proved to be much more elusive and expensive than the Bush administration had foreseen, or had been willing to admit. Nearly six years after the war began, the United States continued to maintain fifteen combat brigades and approximately 140,000 military personnel in Iraq. As of late 2008, the war’s ultimate outcome remained uncertain.

Has the Iraq War been worthwhile? Has it made the United States safer? This book provides a comprehensive assessment of the consequences of the Iraq War for the national security of the United States. It is aimed in particular at those who have not already made up their minds about the ultimate merits of the Iraq War or wish to ground their opinions in a clearer understanding of what effects the war has actually had. What in fact have been the overall costs and benefits of the Iraq War to U.S. national security? Answering this question is a necessary first step in the process of drawing conclusions about the wisdom of the war as well as devising new policies toward Iraq and beyond.

JUSTIFICATIONS

Why is it important to prepare such a balance sheet, and why now? We recognize that a number of people may regard such an assessment as either unnecessary or irrelevant. Some made up their minds about the wisdom of the war long ago, although they may fundamentally disagree on whether it has been worthwhile. For members of the Bush administration and its supporters, the war, despite the many difficulties and challenges, has been a success, at least in terms of national security objectives.⁴ Whatever the costs, they have been greatly outweighed by the benefits, such as the deposing of Saddam Hussein and the establishment of democratic institutions in the heart of the Middle East. As Vice President Richard Cheney declared in Baghdad on the fifth anniversary of the start of the war, it has been a successful endeavor and well worth the effort.⁵

For many critics of the Bush administration’s policy toward Iraq, the war has been an unmitigated disaster. As the Atlanta Journal-Constitution editorialized, It seems fair to conclude that after five years of war, the sacrifice of almost 4,000 American lives and the expenditure of an estimated $1 trillion and counting, we have accomplished absolutely nothing in Iraq.⁶ Whatever the ultimate outcome, it could never justify the human toll (in Iraqi as well as American lives) and the vast sums of money, perhaps as much as several trillion dollars or more, that will have been spent in the end.⁷

For die-hard proponents and opponents of the war alike, there is little point in conducting any further analysis. Still others may no longer be interested in thinking about the war, or they would simply rather avoid addressing the question of whether it has improved U.S. national security. Such strategic considerations often seem insensitive in the face of personal costs and private responses to the events of the war. Do I know anyone who has served in Iraq? Do I know anyone who has been killed or seriously wounded? How do the economic costs of the war affect my personal finances today or in the future? Do I feel that that the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib was moral and ethical? How can I support the Iraq War when news accounts suggest that the reasons given for undertaking the war were exaggerated or even false?

In many respects, moreover, the Iraq War is a distant event growing evermore remote as the awe-inspiring fireworks of the initial invasion recede into memory. There has been no mass mobilization, no tax increases, and no rationing of consumer goods as in many other major conflicts. Political rallies against the war, while prominent before the invasion and sporadically thereafter, have received less and less national attention. News coverage of the war itself has faded, especially given the Bush administration’s policy of minimizing access to stories that might inflame public opinion—no pictures of bodies returning to Dover, Delaware, and few means of covering the front lines short of being officially embedded with American military units.⁸ By mid-2008 CBS no longer maintained a single full-time correspondent in Iraq. Nor were the other major TV news outlets much more engaged, with several employing a single correspondent to cover multiple countries in the Middle East. The result is that the big three news networks spent only 181 minutes of prime time covering Iraq in the first six months of 2008.⁹ Yet, the Iraq War, including the decision to go to war, the prosecution of the war, and its wider effects, will shape national security policy for many years to come.

The Importance of Conducting an Assessment

We strongly believe, and we think most people would agree, that there is considerable value in this book’s enterprise. Our justification begins with a simple proposition: the independent evaluation of public policies is vital to the health of representative democracies such as the United States. One of the hallmarks of representative democracy is the accountability of political leaders. The people in whom sovereignty ultimately resides must be able to hold their elected officials accountable for their actions—or inaction. And in order to hold their leaders accountable, the people must be able to evaluate the performance of those leaders, even in the face of possible efforts by leaders to hide or distort the truth in order to advance their personal and partisan agendas. This in turn requires that the people have access to reliable and adequate, if incomplete, information and analysis about the alternatives available to their leaders, the choices made by leaders among those alternatives, and the consequences of those actions. Where the meaning of the available information is not readily apparent, independent experts can play a valuable role in helping to provide reasonable interpretations.

This proposition is relevant to all public policies. But it should be particularly germane to policies that are especially costly or consequential. The Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq falls squarely in this category. Few would deny that it was one of most significant U.S. foreign policy decisions since World War Two, if not the entire history of the United States. It is comparable in importance, if not more so, to the U.S. intervention in the Korean War, the escalation in (and subsequent withdrawal from) Vietnam, and U.S. participation in the 1990–91 Gulf War. The Iraq War will clearly have far-reaching and what are likely to be long-lasting repercussions for the United States.

Not only that, but the Iraq War was in many respects a war of choice. Notwithstanding the alarming scenarios painted by members of the Bush administration, they had considerable leeway as to whether, when, and how to invade Iraq. The United States was not forced by circumstances beyond its control to act the way it did, when it did. In addition, a large number of Americans believed that a war was not necessary to address the threat posed by Iraq, or that war was at least premature.¹⁰ Given the discretionary nature of the decision, it is all the more important to evaluate its consequences.

Why Now?

A secondary question concerns the timing of this appraisal. Some may agree in principle with the need to evaluate the consequences of the war, but they might ask whether this is the appropriate time.

In particular, some may feel that it is still too soon to render any useful judgment. Certainly, the situation within Iraq itself remains in flux. It is too early to tell what the ultimate political outcome will be.¹¹ Will the recently created political institutions remain in place and grow steadily in strength and legitimacy? Or will they be replaced by others, for example, a less centralized federal structure? Or could the whole country yet descend into all-out civil war?

In addition, some of the broader consequences of the war are still playing out. For example, what overall impact will the war have on the greater Middle East? Will it ultimately help to advance the cause of democracy and peace in the region? Or could it foment conflict and instability? And what will be the longer-term consequences for world energy markets?

Admittedly, it may never be possible to provide a definitive assessment of the costs and benefits of the Iraq War. Indeed, history is likely to render multiple, conflicting judgments. But that does not mean that there is no point in attempting to address this issue now. To the contrary, we would suggest several reasons for doing so.

First, more than half a decade after the war began, we are in fact beginning to be able to discern the broader impact. To be sure, many questions remain, but a number of the consequences can already be identified and measured, even if they have not fully worked themselves out. Thus regardless of the ultimate outcome within Iraq itself, it may not be too soon to begin to render an overall assessment. Certainly, it would be damning if, even assuming a favorable political result in Iraq, the costs were already judged to outweigh the potential benefits. Moreover, there are analytical risks associated with waiting longer. It is already difficult enough to isolate the effects of the Iraq War on some aspects of the security environment, such as U.S. alliance relations, Iran’s nuclear policy, or world energy markets. As time passes, an increasing number of other developments are likely to intervene and impinge, complicating such an assessment.

A third reason follows from the peculiarities of the U.S. political system, specifically the presidential election cycle. Because of the American political calendar, this is a particularly useful time to evaluate the overall impact of the war. The arrival of a new administration in Washington, DC, in January 2009 represents the first opportunity since the war began for a complete rethinking of American strategy in Iraq as well as U.S. national security policy more generally. An important component of that review should be consideration of the full range of consequences of alternative courses of action. Not only will the new policymakers want to know what effects the various options are likely to have on the situation within Iraq, but they will also want to be aware of the wider potential implications of different choices.

What Others Have Written

The broad assessment of the consequences of the Iraq War envisioned by this book might not be worth conducting if a similar analysis had already been carried out. But, surprisingly, given the importance of the topic, no single comprehensive study exists.

To be sure, there has been a huge outpouring of books on various aspects of the Iraq War, including a number of outstanding analyses.¹² Among the most common topics are the causes of and reasons for the war, the conduct of the war’s military operations, the management (and mismanagement) of the occupation, and the resulting developments within Iraq.¹³ With regard to the broader consequences of the war, there have been a number of detailed analyses of the economic costs and of the impact on the U.S. military. The former in particular have provoked considerable debate, with estimates ranging as high as three trillion dollars or more in the long term.¹⁴

So far, however, relatively little has been written on the overall impact of the war in the way we intend. At this writing, only a few published works come close to fitting the bill. One is an edited volume by Rick Fawn and Raymond Hinnebusch on the causes and consequences of the Iraq War.¹⁵ Yet even the section it devotes to the consequences is limited to a handful of short chapters running a mere seventy pages. Another is a chapter by Steven Miller in an edited book that is primarily concerned with globalization, national self-determination, and terrorism.¹⁶ Although Miller does an excellent job of identifying many of the relevant consequences, his analysis is necessarily limited by his work’s short length and the time at which he wrote, just three years after the war began. A third is a recent book by Peter Galbraith, who draws on his experience as a diplomat to address the consequences of Iraq for U.S. national security and the Middle East.¹⁷ He does not, however, consider the implications of the war for the instruments of American power, such as the U.S. military or the fiscal health of the nation, or for other U.S. policies, such as for dealing with terrorism. Thus still missing—and needed—is a comprehensive, up-to-date assessment of the costs and benefits of the war, especially those that extend beyond the situation in Iraq itself. This book seeks to fill this significant hole in the literature on the war.

OUR APPROACH

Assuming the value of a broad assessment at this time, how should such an undertaking be conducted? We begin by addressing the issue of scope and then turn to the question of method.

What Is—and Is Not—Covered

Ideally, any comprehensive evaluation of the Iraq War would lay out all the relevant costs and benefits to the U.S. government and its people. It might even look more closely at the distribution of costs and benefits within the various governmental departments and agencies as well as among the American people, from the families of military personnel to the ordinary taxpayer. Often, however, discussions about the war have been framed primarily, if not exclusively, in terms of developments within Iraq and the direct costs of the war to the United States. How much has the war reduced the threat posed by Iraq to the United States and its vital interests? What have been the human and economic costs? What steps should the United States take there next in order to produce the best possible outcome, and what additional burdens should it be willing to bear?

While answering these questions is vital to a comprehensive assessment of the conflict, that approach is insufficient. We must also examine the broader, often overlooked, consequences of the war. To examine the war in isolation from the wide sweep of American public policies would be a serious error. Although what happens in Iraq is crucial, it is also essential to consider the full range of effects, especially those that have a bearing on U.S. national security.

We offer three further reasons for this position. First, it should be obvious by now that the war has had repercussions that extend far beyond the borders of Iraq. This is especially true of U.S. national security, few aspects of which would seem to be untouched. Arguably, the Afghan war, U.S. alliance relations, the stability of the Middle East, the health of the American military, and the war on terror have all been greatly affected by the war. In other areas, such as energy security and U.S. efforts to promote democracy, the effects may not yet be so apparent or easy to identify, but they could well be significant. One can at least say at this stage, however, that the Bush administration’s rhetorical support for democracy has not been matched with resources, in part because of the costs associated with Iraq.¹⁸ Thus whatever the ultimate outcome within Iraq itself, the consequences for U.S. national security are sure to be far reaching and long lasting.

A second reason for a comprehensive assessment concerns the rationales for the war that were offered by members of the Bush administration and its supporters. A number of these revolved around the particular threats posed by Iraq, including Saddam Hussein’s alleged ties to global terrorist groups like al Qaeda, his efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and his willingness to threaten or use force against his neighbors in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. But the war has often been justified in terms of the broader contributions it would make to U.S. national security. For example, U.S. policy in Iraq has often been linked with the war on terror. As President Bush himself noted while announcing the end of