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The Collected Works of Spinoza, Volume I
The Collected Works of Spinoza, Volume I
The Collected Works of Spinoza, Volume I
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The Collected Works of Spinoza, Volume I

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The Collected Works of Spinoza provides, for the first time in English, a truly satisfactory edition of all of Spinoza's writings, with accurate and readable translations, based on the best critical editions of the original-language texts, done by a scholar who has published extensively on the philosopher's work.


This first volume contains Spinoza's single most important work, the Ethics, and four earlier works: the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, the Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being, Descartes' "Principles of Philosophy," and Metaphysical Thoughts. Also included are Spinoza's letters from the periods when these works were being written.


The elaborate editorial apparatus—including prefaces, notes, glossary, and indexes—assists the reader in understanding one of the world's most fascinating, but also most difficult, philosophers. Of particular interest is the glossary-index, which provides extensive commentary on Spinoza's technical vocabulary.


A milestone of scholarship more than forty-five years in the making, The Collected Works of Spinoza is an essential edition for anyone with a serious interest in Spinoza or the history of philosophy.

LanguageEnglish
Release dateJun 13, 2016
ISBN9781400883820
The Collected Works of Spinoza, Volume I

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    The Collected Works of Spinoza, Volume I - Benedictus de Spinoza

    The Collected Works of Spinoza

    Eerfte Deel

    Der

    Z E D E K U N S T.

    V  A  N    G  O  D.

    B E P A L I N G E N.

    I. Y aoorzaak van zich zelf verfta ik het geen, welks bwezentheit cwezentlijkheit dinfluit; of het geen, welks natuur niet anders, dan ewezentlijk, bevat kan worden.

    II. Datding, ’t welk door een ander van de zelfde natuur fbepaalt kan worden, word in zijn ggeflacht heindig gezegt. Tot een voorbeelt; het ilighaam word eindig gezegt; om dat wy altijt een ander, dat groter is, bevatten. Dus word ook een kdenking door een andere bepaalt. Maar ’t lighaam word door geen denking, noch de denking door enig lighaam bepaalt.

    III. By lzelfftandigheit verfta ik ’t geen, dat in zich is, en door zich bevat word: dat is, welks mbevatting niet de bevatting van een anderding, van ’t welk het ngevormt moet worden, behoeft.

    IV. By otoeëigening verfta ik ’t geen, dat het pverftant wegens de qzelfftandigheit, alshaar rwezentheit fftellende, tbevat.

    V. By uwijze verfta ik wd’aandoeningen der xzelfftandigheit, ofdit, ’t welk in iets anders is, daar door het ook bevat word.

    VI. By God verfta ik een ywezend, zvolftrektelijk aonëindig : dat is, een bzelfftandigheit, die uit conëindige toeëigeningen dbeftaat, van de welken yder een eeuwige onëindige ewezentheit uitdrukt.

    a Canfa fai.

    b Effentia.

    c Exiftentia.

    d Involvere.

    e Exiftens.

    f Terminare.

    g Genus.

    h Finita.

    i Corpus.

    k Cogitatie.

    l Subftantia.

    m Conceptus.

    n Formare.

    o Attributum.

    p Intellectus.

    q Subftantia.

    r Effentia.

    f Conflituens.

    t Concipere.

    u Modus.

    w Affectiones.

    x Subftantia.

    y Ens.

    z Abfolutè.

    a Infinitum.

    b Subftantia.

    c Attributa infinite.

    d Conflare.

    e Effentia.

    f VER–

    THE

    Collected Works

    OF

    SPINOZA

    Edited and Translated by Edwin Curley

    Copyright © 1985 by Princeton University Press

    Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street,

    Princeton, New Jersey 08540

    In the United Kingdom: Princeton University

    Press, Chichester, West Sussex

    All Rights Reserved

    Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

    Spinoza, Benedictus de, 1632-1677.

    The collected works of Spinoza.

    Includes bibliographies and index.

    1. Philosophy—Collected works.

    I. Curley, E. M. (Edwin M.), 1937- . II. Title.

    B3958    1984    199′.492    84-11716

    ISBN 0-691-07222-1 (v. 1 : alk. paper)

    This book has been composed in Linotron Janson type

    Princeton University books are printed on acid-free paper

    and meet the guidelines for permanence and durability of the

    Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the

    Council on Library Resources

    Printed in the United States of America by

    Princeton Academic Press

    Second printing, with corrections, 1988

    10

    ISBN-13: 978-0-691-07222-7 (cloth)

    ISBN-10: 0-691-07222-1 (cloth)

    ALL OUR knowledge of Scripture must be sought from Scripture itself alone.… The universal rule for interpreting Scripture is that we must attribute nothing to Scripture as its teaching which we have not seen most clearly on the basis of an historical inquiry. The kind of historical inquiry I mean must … I. take account of the nature and properties of the language in which the books of Scripture were written … II. collect the doctrines of each book and so organize them that we can readily find all those that bear on the same topic; and next, note all those which are ambiguous or obscure or which seem contradictory … finally, III. tell the circumstances and fate of all the prophetic books of which we have any record: the life, dispositions and intentions of the author of each book, who he was, when and on what occasion he wrote, to whom and in what language; how the book was first received, into whose hands it fell, how many different readings there are of the text, who first accepted it as sacred, and finally how all the books now agreed to be sacred were united into one.

    Theological-Political Treatise, vii (III/99-101)

    Contents

    GENERAL PREFACE   ix

    SHORT TITLES AND ABBREVIATIONS   xix

    Earliest Works

    Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect   3

    EDITORIAL PREFACE   3

    THE TREATISE   7

    Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being   46

    EDITORIAL PREFACE   46

    A SHORT OUTLINE OF THE TREATISE   53

    THE TREATISE   59

    Letters: August 1661–August 1663

    EDITORIAL PREFACE   159

    LETTERS 1-16   163-216

    The Expositor of Descartes

    EDITORIAL PREFACE   221

    Parts I and II of Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy   224

    Appendix Containing Metaphysical Thoughts   299

    Letters: July 1664–September 1665

    EDITORIAL PREFACE   349

    LETTERS 17-28   352-397

    The Metaphysical Moralist

    EDITORIAL PREFACE   401

    Ethics   408

    Glossary-Index

    PREFACE   621

    ENGLISH-LATIN-DUTCH   624

    LATIN-DUTCH-ENGLISH   661

    DUTCH-LATIN-ENGLISH   702

    PROPER NAMES   717

    BIBLICAL AND TALMUDIC REFERENCES   719

    REFERENCE LIST   721

    General Preface

    THIS IS the first installment of what is intended to be a two-volume edition of the complete works of Spinoza, with new translations. The project is one I have been working on, intermittently, for some fourteen years now. My aim in undertaking it has not been primarily to provide English readers with translations better than the existing ones, though I would hope, of course, to have done that. My goal, however, has been more to make available a truly satisfactory edition, in translation, of Spinoza’s work. Let me enumerate the features I regard as required in a satisfactory edition.

    1. That it should provide good translations is only the most obvious, though no doubt the most important, requirement. No one should underestimate the difficulty of meeting it. By a good translation I understand one which is accurate wherever it is a question of simple accuracy, shows good judgment where the situation calls for something more than accuracy, maintains as much consistency as possible in the treatment of technical terms, leaves interpretation to the commentators, so far as this is possible,¹ and, finally, is as clear and readable as fidelity to the text will allow. Anyone may be excused for thinking it enough just to provide good translations. Often we have had to settle for rather less.

    2. Still, we have a right to expect more of a truly satisfactory edition. One further requirement is that its translations should be based on a good critical edition of the original texts. Of the works presented in this volume, only two, Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy and the Metaphysical Thoughts, were published during Spinoza’s lifetime. The Ethics, the Treatise on the Intellect, and most of the letters were first published in the Opera posthuma (OP) shortly after Spinoza’s death in 1677. The Short Treatise was discovered only in the nineteenth century, in what is generally presumed to be a Dutch translation of a lost Latin original. Inevitably these works raise many textual problems.

    The first editor to produce a genuinely critical edition of the original texts was Gebhardt, whose four-volume edition of Spinoza’s Opera appeared in 1925.² One reason Gebhardt’s work was a landmark in Spinoza scholarship is that before him no editor had systematically compared the Latin text of works like the Ethics and the Treatise on the Intellect with the contemporary Dutch translations which appeared in the other posthumous edition of 1677, De Nagelate Schriften van B.D.S. (NS). Since the translator³ of the NS appears to have been working, in part at least, from a manuscript copy, rather than from the printed text of the OP, a comparison of the two versions often helps to establish the text in doubtful cases. To see the importance of this, one need only consider how many references the geometric method forces Spinoza to make to previous axioms, definitions, propositions, etc., and how easy it is for mistakes in such references to go undetected in proofreading. But a close study of the NS translations can be useful in many ways.⁴

    One of the principal initial reasons for undertaking this project was to provide translations based on the Gebhardt edition. When I began, Spinoza’s masterwork, the Ethics, had never been translated into English from Gebhardt’s text, though other, lesser works had been. Existing translations were based on inferior nineteenth-century editions. And though Wolf’s excellent translation of the Short Treatise had been based on a careful study of the original manuscripts, there was no doubt that his work had been superseded by Gebhardt’s.

    During the time I have been working on this project, much has happened. We do now have an English translation of the Ethics based on the Gebhardt text.⁵ But while Gebhardt’s remains the best available complete edition of the texts, it has, in its turn, been superseded, to some extent at least, by a number of recent scholarly works. Of the developments relevant to this volume, the most notable are that: 1) in 1977 the Wereldbibliotheek published, as the first installment in a new Dutch edition of the complete works, an edition of the correspondence, undertaken by Professors Akkerman, Hubbeling, and Westerbrink (AHW); although this edition presents all the letters in Dutch, the editors have taken great pains to get an exact text, and their work must be treated as the equivalent of a new critical edition; 2) in 1982, the third installment of the Wereldbibliotheek series contained a new critical edition, by Professor Mignini (Mignini 1), of that most troublesome of all Spinozistic texts, the Short Treatise; Mignini’s conclusions, as presented in the apparatus of his edition and in two long articles (Mignini 2, 3), will no doubt be controversial, but there can also be no doubt that he has shed a very different light on this work; and finally 3), Professor Akkerman is preparing a new critical edition of the Ethics, which will contain the many emendations of the text suggested by the extensive critique of Gebhardt’s editorial work which he published in 1980 (Akkerman 2); it is clear that Akkerman has greatly illuminated the text of the Ethics and that his new edition will be a significant improvement on Gebhardt’s. Further details of the advances made by recent textual research will be found in the prefaces to the works concerned and in the notes.

    3. After the quality of the translation and of the text translated, perhaps the next most important requirement in a satisfactory edition is that it should be as comprehensive as possible. There is no doubt that the Ethics is the definitive expression of Spinoza’s mature thought in metaphysics, epistemology, psychology, and ethics. But its elliptical style makes it an often cryptic text, which imposes great demands on the reader. Ideally, it should be read in the context of the whole of the Spinozistic corpus. Even if we do not apply to Spinoza’s own work all of his principles for the interpretation of Scripture,⁶ it remains true that the other Spinozistic texts constitute our most important data for the interpretation of the Ethics. A satisfactory edition would not omit any that might be of use to the perplexed, so that they might readily find all those passages that bear on the same topic.

    4. A corollary of this is that it is, if not a requirement, at least extremely desirable that all the translations be by the same hand. If we are to compare discussions of the same topic in different works (or in different passages of the same work), then it is essential that technical terms be treated consistently, an unlikely result if different translators are at work. The problem of comparison is compounded by the fact that the works are sometimes in different languages in the original.

    Consider, for example, the term admiratio in the Ethics. This has been variously rendered by astonishment (White) and wonder (Elwes). The translator of the Ethics in the Nagelate Schriften used verwondering, a term which also occurs in the Short Treatise, where Wolf rendered it by surprise. None of the three English translations is unreasonable, but their variety obscures the fact that a discussion of verwondering in the Short Treatise is concerned with the same topic as a discussion of admiratio in the Ethics.

    The Dutch gebeurlijk (= contingens) provides another example. This comes out as accidental in Wolf, whereas its Latin equivalent is translated by contingent in Elwes and White. A good student, of course, will probably guess that what Spinoza says about the accidental in one work bears on what he says about the contingent in another. But a better student will worry that perhaps some subtle distinction is intended. And he may also be puzzled by the fact that Spinoza seems sometimes to imply that there are accidents and sometimes to deny it; his puzzlement might be relieved if he checked the original, where he would discover that Wolf uses accidental for toevallig in the one context, and for gebeurlijk in the other. But he also might not know what to make of that information. The complexities of the Glossary-Index are intended to give the reader some appreciation of the Latin and Dutch realities which lie behind the English appearances.

    5. If the Spinozistic corpus is to be seen in its proper perspective, it is also desirable, if not essential, that the works be arranged in chronological order. Spinoza’s writings span a period of some twenty years. It is inevitable that over the course of that length of time Spinoza would change his mind about something. I think in fact that he changed his views about quite a number of things, and that a chronological arrangement should help to bring that out.⁷ Spinoza scholars have often sought to unfold the latent processes of thought that lay behind the geometrical method. If we are not satisfied with literary romances masquerading as scientific history, we may find some value in examining the works that actually did lead up to the Ethics.

    To some extent my arrangement of the texts is arbitrary. The decision which will probably be most surprising to nonspecialists seems to me eminently defensible. The Ethics was first published after Spinoza’s death in 1677. The Theological-Political Treatise was first published in 1670. But we know from the correspondence that a substantial manuscript of the Ethics was in existence by the middle of 1665. We do not know how much revision that manuscript may have undergone in the next twelve years before it was published, but it seems best to treat the Ethics as coming before the Theological-Political Treatise and to see a shift in Spinoza’s interests in the late 1660s.

    More controversial among specialists, no doubt, will be my decision to present the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect before the Short Treatise, which until very recently has invariably been thought to be Spinoza’s earliest work. Now, however, Mignini has challenged that assumption, arguing with considerable force that the Treatise on the Intellect is earlier, not only in its date of composition, but also in the stage of development it represents. I am inclined to agree with that judgment, at least as regards the date of composition. To me the correspondence makes it clear that the Treatise on the Intellect must have been written before September 1661, and that Spinoza was still working on a manuscript of the Short Treatise, which he then had thoughts of publishing, early in 1662.

    6. Finally, it seems to me that a satisfactory edition of Spinoza’s works ought to contain a good deal more in the way of scholarly aid than English readers are accustomed to find in editions of modern philosophers. Students of modern philosophy must generally settle for much less help than students of ancient philosophy are used to.⁹ At a minimum a satisfactory edition should have: a thorough index;¹⁰ prefaces to each work indicating something of that work’s history and special problems; notes that call attention to the more significant variant readings, ambiguities, obscurities, apparent contradictions, and debates among the commentators; and some systematic way of warning the reader about terms that may be difficult to render into English.¹¹ To make it easier for readers to consult the original and to trace references in secondary sources, it should adopt a standard pagination based on the Gebhardt edition.

    Such is the kind of edition I have aimed at producing. Whether I have succeeded is for others to judge. But I should like to forestall two possible criticisms. First, it has not been my intention to produce a translation and commentary. Desirable as that might be, it seemed to me that it was more important, at this stage in the history of Spinoza studies, to present as much of the primary text as possible, as well as possible, and that I could not produce as comprehensive an edition as I would like to if I attempted to note every passage that is ambiguous, obscure, or apparently contradictory. If I am to produce a comprehensive edition in which all the work is by the same hand, I must try to complete it in my lifetime, and there is no way of knowing how long that may be. My notes also do not attempt much cross-referencing. The index should make notes of that kind largely superfluous. Second, I recognize that it would have been very desirable to have the original texts on the facing pages. Perhaps someday it will be possible to produce an edition using these translations (or some of them) and having that feature. But for now it seems more important to make the translations available in as inexpensive a format as possible.

    Let me close by commenting on certain formal features of the translation and on certain peculiarities of the Latin language, which is most often the language of the texts translated in this volume. I have generally tried to be faithful to the capitalization of the Gebhardt edition, which reflects that of the original editions. I do this, not because I think the use of the capitals in those editions has any philosophical significance, but simply out of deference to those scholars who do attach significance to matters of capitalization. I incline to the view that the use of capitals in works like the Opera posthuma probably reflects the tastes of Spinoza’s printers rather than his own considered preferences. Certainly the autographs of Spinoza’s letters suggest that. But it seemed to me that it would do no harm to accommodate the views of those with whom I differ on this point.

    As for punctuation and paragraphing, on the other hand, I have taken considerable liberties, breaking up long sentences and long paragraphs whenever it seemed to me that to do so would make Spinoza’s argument clearer. This necessarily involves a certain element of interpretation, but it seemed to me that the potential gain in intelligibility justified the risk. I have also interpolated occasional section numbers, phrases, and terms, in square brackets and without explanation, where they seemed helpful. Square brackets are also used, with an explanation, to indicate textual variations and doubtful passages. This happens quite frequently with footnotes in the Short Treatise. I have used italics to indicate those occasions when or represents sive or seu. Generally,¹² sive and seu mark an equivalance, rather than an alternative. Lettered notes are Spinoza’s; numbered notes are mine.

    This is perhaps the proper place to warn readers who have no Latin at all about certain features of that language. There are no articles, definite or indefinite, in classical Latin.¹³ So whenever the translation of a Latin passage has either a definite or an indefinite article, the reader should be aware that this involves an element of interpretation on the part of the translator. Sometimes, of course, it will be quite clear which should be used. Sometimes it will not matter philosophically. But sometimes it both matters and is not clear. The NS are of some help here, to the extent that one thinks it likely that Spinoza carefully reviewed those translations. But I am not sure how much weight to attach to their usage.

    A related matter concerns the use of personal pronouns. It is sometimes observed that the use of personal pronouns is less common in Latin than in English, since the subject of the verb is often implicit in the verb ending. And often when personal pronouns are used, the masculine and neuter forms are the same. So unless a translator is prepared to violate the conventions of English, his translation is much more likely than the Latin original to convey the impression that God is being thought of as a person (and a male person at that). This would certainly be a mistaken impression, but I know no good way to remove it.

    IT REMAINS only for me to acknowledge my indebtedness to the many persons and institutions who have helped to bring this project to its present stage. First, I must thank the Institute of Advanced Studies of the Australian National University in Canberra, where the bulk of the work was done, under virtually ideal conditions. I am equally indebted to Professor John Passmore, who was the head of the Philosophy Department during most of my years in Australia, who encouraged this project, commented critically on a draft translation of the Ethics, and provided me with a model of historical scholarship which has sustained my spirits through many hours of hard work. I should like to dedicate this edition to him, and only hope that he will be pleased with the finished product.

    Many others have been extremely kind and helpful in many ways: Hermann de Dijn (who read a draft translation of the Short Treatise with great care), Jonathan Bennett (who provided me over the years with innumerable excellent suggestions about my translation of the Ethics), Paul Eisenberg (who shared with me a copy of his own meticulous translation of the Treatise on the Intellect and commented helpfully on the whole project), Frederick Copleston (who gave me some very useful comments on the Metaphysical Thoughts), Fokke Akkerman (who communicated to me the emendations to be incorporated in his forthcoming critical edition of the Ethics), G. van Suchtelen and F. Mignini (who made available to me a prepublication copy of the new critical edition of the Short Treatise), Marie Boas Hall and Thomas Falco (who answered queries that I had about the correspondence between Spinoza and Oldenburg), and Stephen Voss, Margaret Wilson, Alan Donagan, and Genevieve Lloyd (all of whom made constructive suggestions of one kind or another about certain aspects of the translation).

    Of previous translators and editors whose works I have consulted, I am indebted most, of course, to Gebhardt, but also to Abraham Wolf, for his translations of the Short Treatise and the Correspondence; to Charles Appuhn, Roland Caillois, Madeleine Francès, and Robert Misrahi, for their excellent French translations of the works; to Fokke Akkerman, H. G. Hubbeling, and A. G. Westerbrink, whose recent Dutch edition of the correspondence is a major contribution to Spinoza studies. I have also found Professor Giancotti Boscherini’s Spinoza Lexicon a tremendously valuable tool.

    I should also like to thank Sandy Thatcher of the Princeton University Press, for his initial interest in this project and his patient prodding over the years; Jean Norman, for her research assistance; and Isabel Sheaffe, Anna van der Vliet, and Audrey Thiel, for their secretarial assistance.

    In spite of all the help I have received, and my own best efforts to avoid error, I am sure that mistakes must remain. As Spinoza himself remarks, nullus liber unquam sine mendis repertus est. (III/149) I would ask readers who detect anything that needs correction—typographical or translation errors, omissions from the index or from other scholarly aids—to send me notice of it, c/o the Princeton University Press.

    ¹ I have tried, in general, to avoid tendentious translations, leaving it to the Glossary-Index to make most of the necessary explanations. Sometimes, however, a translator can hardly avoid taking a stand on disputed issues (e.g., in E ID4). Where it has seemed to me that important questions of interpretation might depend on the translation adopted, I have tried to indicate this in the notes.

    ² Spinoza Opera, ed. C. Gebhardt, 4 vols. (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925). In view of Spinoza’s role in the development of contemporary standards of historical scholarship, it is ironic that this task was so long neglected.

    ³ Or translators. Gebhardt assumed that there was just one translator, Glazemaker, and that he began his work well before Spinoza’s death (see Gebhardt II/315). The NS translations are generally careful and were already in the press five months after Spinoza’s death (21 February 1677). But as Joachim (2, 3) pointed out, the evidence for ascribing the translations to Glazemaker is not very strong. And Thijssen-Schoute (1, 10) suggested (on the strength of Letter 28) that others may have collaborated. If two or more translators did collaborate on the work, then we need not postulate that they started work long before Spinoza’s death, though probably portions of the NS translations of the Ethics date from the mid-1660s.

    I think the treatment of technical terms in the NS confirms the hypothesis of more than one translator. Interesting in this connection is the treatment of mens and anima. As Giancotti Boscherini points out (1, 131), the Dutch translator of the Ethics almost invariably uses ziel for both mens and anima. In the other works he has abandoned such uniformity and uses, predominantly, geest for mens and ziel for anima (which, as Giancotti Boscherini notes, is Glazemaker’s regular policy in his translation of Descartes’ Regulae). To me this would suggest that different translators were at work on different parts of the NS and that Glazemaker was probably not the translator of the Ethics. A recent and very thorough examination of this issue by Akkerman (2, 77-214) concludes that Balling probably translated E I-II and that Glazemaker was the translator of E III-V.

    ⁴ A good example is E IP28S (II/70/1-15). See particularly editorial note 59. I must add, however, that I think Gebhardt sometimes regards an appeal to the NS as more decisive than it really is. Cf. E IP29D (II/70/26) and editorial note 63.

    It is, of course, often difficult to know what to make of a variation. Even in the case of Descartes’ Principles and the Metaphysical Thoughts, where the translations appeared during Spinoza’s lifetime and with his approval (cf. Letter 21), a variation may reflect a revision in which we should see Spinoza’s hand (cf. I/257), an exercise in free translation (Akkerman 2, 106-107, gives numerous examples), or a mistake (cf. I/270/18-20). In the case of the Treatise on the Intellect and the Ethics we cannot be sure that the translations had his approval.

    ⁵ By Samuel Shirley, published by Hackett Publishing Co., 1982.

    ⁶ Cf. the Theological-Political Treatise, vii (III/99-101). No doubt Spinoza thought these rules applied only to works which, like Scripture, are inherently obscure, not to works which, like Euclid’s geometry, are inherently intelligible (III/111). No doubt, also, he would have classed his own work with Euclid’s. But three hundred years of Spinoza scholarship have amply demonstrated that he was too optimistic about the intelligibility of his work.

    ⁷ My model here is Alquié’s superb edition of Descartes’ works.

    ⁸ See the prefaces to the Ethics and to Letters 17-28 and the discussions in Freudenthal 5, 1:147ff. and Giancotti Boscherini 2, I, xx-xxii.

    ⁹ Though things are changing for the better. We might note here the new translation of Leibniz’s New Essays by Bennett and Remnant (Cambridge), the new edition of Locke’s Essay by Nidditch (Oxford), and the translations of Leibniz’s Discourse on Metaphysics, Correspondence with Arnauld, and Correspondence with Clarke, published by Manchester University Press.

    ¹⁰ Pollock, in introducing the index to his Spinoza, aptly cites the following lovely remark, attributed by Henry Wheatley to John Baynes: The man who publishes a book without an index ought to be damned ten miles beyond Hell, where the Devil could not get for stinging nettles.

    ¹¹ For more on this theme, see the Glossary-Index.

    ¹² But not, I think, invariably. Cf., for example, II/57/13,79/23. Sometimes Spinoza uses aut or vel where we would expect sive. Cf. II/51/23, 52/8, 146/2.

    ¹³ In medieval Latin, however, ille came to be used as a definite article and there appear to be some traces of that usage in Spinoza. Cf. II/89/4. Analogously, it seems to me that aliqui is sometimes best rendered by the indefinite article, e.g. at II/50/25, 28, 30, 31, 34 and II/83/31. In the latter case, this may have some philosophic significance, since that passage provides us with a gloss on one of the central propositions of Part I of the Ethics (P16).

    Spinoza’s Latin has sometimes been stigmatized as that of the late medieval scholastics. No doubt much of the technical vocabulary is borrowed from the scholastics. But the reader will find a juster appreciation of Spinoza’s Latin in Akkerman 2, 1-35.

    Short Titles and Abbreviations

    PAGE references to Gebhardt’s edition Spinoza Opera (4 vols. [Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925]), will be made in the following form: I/611 = volume I, page 611. Frequently I will use the Gebhardt pagination, including line numbers, to refer to passages in Spinoza’s text, thus II/37/5-9 = volume II, pages 37, lines 5-9. These volume, page, and line numbers are given in the margins of the translation to make it easier to consult the original and to trace references in secondary sources.

    I also adopt the following system of short titles and abbreviations, for use whenever it seems preferable not to use the Gebhardt volume, page, and line numbers:

    So PP ID5 = Descartes’ Principles, Part I, Definition 5. E IP8S2 = Ethics, Part I, proposition 8, scholium 2. KV II, xxv, 1 refers to Part II, chapter xxv, section 1 of the Short Treatise. TdIE, 101 refers to section 101 of the Treatise on the Intellect. It should be understood that the division of the Short Treatise and the Treatise on the Intellect into sections is the work of later editors (Sigwart and Bruder, respectively).

    As for works other than Spinoza’s, I generally refer to the Adam and Tannery edition of Descartes’ works as AT, to Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy as the Principles, and to the Latin translation of his Passions of the Soul as PA. Secondary sources are identified by the author’s name, a number if there is more than one work by the same author in the reference list, a volume number, if necessary, and the page number. The reference list may be found at the back of the book.

    Earliest Works

    Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect

    EDITORIAL PREFACE

    THE Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (TdIE), a short, difficult, but fascinating discourse on method, was first published in Spinoza’s Opera posthuma in 1677. But as the editors of that collection tell us in their preface, both its style and its content show it to be one of Spinoza’s earliest works. If the reference in Letter 6 to a whole short work (integrum opusculum) is indeed to this treatise, as scholars have generally assumed,¹ then a draft of it must have existed at least by early in 1662, and quite likely Spinoza wrote it before that.²

    Various forward references in Spinoza’s notes to this treatise indicate that at some stage of his work on it Spinoza conceived it as introductory to another work, to be called (perhaps) Philosophy, a work which would have discussed in a systematic way topics in philosophical theology (II/29, n. z), philosophy of mind (II/15, n. o), epistemology (II/14, nn. k and l), ethics (II/6, n. a; II/7, n. b; II/8, n. c), and perhaps much else (cf. II/9, n. d). Some of the references suggest a work more like the Short Treatise than the Ethics,³ and Gebhardt argued that the short work referred to in Letter 6 was a two-part work, with the TdIE as a methodological prolegomenon to the more systematic KV. According to Gebhardt (I/407), the Latin original of the KV was already in existence when Spinoza began writing the TdIE around the time of Letter 6. But if what I have suggested above is correct (see n. 2), then Gebhardt must be wrong at least about the date of composition of the TdIE. Mignini would argue that Gebhardt is wrong also in thinking that the TdIE was an integral part of the short work Spinoza refers to in Letter 6. Emphasizing the incompleteness of our text of the TdIE, he contends that it could not have been correctly described in Letter 6 as having been composed and that it is earlier than the KV, not merely in date of composition, but also in the stage of the development of Spinoza’s thought that it represents.⁴ If Mignini’s arguments for the priority of the TdIE are not conclusive, he has, I think, at least established that there is no reason to regard the KV as the earlier work.⁵ So at this stage the position would seem to be that, if the TdIE is not in fact earlier that the KV, it was probably written at about the same time as the KV and as an introduction to it.

    In its importance for the study of the development of Spinoza’s thought, the Treatise on the Intellect invites comparison with Descartes’ Regulae. Both are early, unfinished works that show the direction of their author’s thought at a formative stage, that indicate the problems concerning him and the solutions he was inclined toward. Both discuss certain important themes more fully than does any work their author later published. But both works also need to be read with the consciousness that the lines of thought presented in them may not have proved ultimately to be satisfactory to the author.

    For example, some have argued that in this treatise Spinoza has not fully emancipated himself from Descartes on the distinction between will and intellect,⁶ and it seems clear that he does tend to confuse mind and intellect.⁷ I would argue that the discussion of the four kinds of knowledge is not clearly thought out.⁸ And Joachim has suggested that the whole work may have been intended only to present a popular, imprecise exposition of Spinoza’s thought on these topics.⁹

    The most important question, perhaps, is whether the whole concept of method, as Spinoza here presents it, is not incoherent, and so doomed to failure.¹⁰ On the one hand, the truth is supposed to require no sign, and having a true idea is supposed to be sufficient to remove doubt (§ 36); on the other, the method is supposed, among other things, to teach us what a true idea is, and how to distinguish it from other perceptions (§ 37).

    But whatever reservations we may have about the doctrine of this work, it is clear that in the main it continued to satisfy Spinoza for some years. A letter to Bouwmeester in 1666 (Letter 37) repeats some of the Treatise’s main themes—that the intellect, unlike the body, is not subject to chance, external causes, but has the power of forming clear and distinct ideas; that it is necessary above all to distinguish between the intellect and the imagination (this being identified with distinguishing between true ideas and all the rest, the false, fictitious and doubtful). And an interchange with Tschirnhaus in 1675 (Letters 59 and 60) indicates that Spinoza had communicated something similar to him informally, and had given Tschirnhaus some reason to expect that before long he would publish his treatise on method.

    Naturally, then, there have been a variety of suggestions as to why the Treatise never was published in Spinoza’s lifetime. The editors of the Opera posthuma remark that the importance of the topic, the deep contemplations and extensive knowledge it required, made Spinoza’s progress with it very slow. Appuhn suggests that Spinoza broke off the composition because he could not see any satisfactory solution to the problems raised at the end (§§ 102-103, 106-110), and that he did not return to finish it because he came to think it more important to concentrate on his other works on moral and political philosophy (the Ethics, the Theological-Political Treatise, and the Political Treatise). Koyré, on the other hand, tends to emphasize the difficulty raised in § 46 (see the note to II/18/1-2). Ironically, Joachim’s excellent commentary on this work itself remained unfinished at his death because he was unable to resolve to his satisfaction the problem of how Spinoza meant to conclude the Treatise.

    If the character of this work as unfinished, highly problematic, and only posthumously published invites comparison with Descartes’ Regulae, the apparently autobiographical character of the opening sections equally invites comparison with the Discourse on Method. The tone of the two works is quite different, of course. The dissatisfaction Descartes presents as leading him to philosophy is with the uncertainty of the learning that had been imparted to him as a student. Spinoza’s dissatisfaction is with the insufficiency of the ends men commonly pursue.

    Of course scholars have doubted whether these opening passages should be taken as strictly autobiographical (just as they have doubted the accuracy of Descartes’ account of his life in the Discourse). As Koyré remarks (Koyré 2, xix), the theme de vero bono et de contemptu mundi is as old as the world itself. Various Stoic authors (e.g., Marcus Aurelius and Seneca) have been cited. And Elbogen calls attention to the work of a medieval Jewish author, Shem Tov Falaquera, whose Ha-Mevak-kesh similarly offers knowledge as the path to salvation. However that may be, it remains, as Koyré also remarks, highly significant that Spinoza should begin a treatise on method by reflecting on the true good.

    The paragraph numbers in brackets are those introduced by Bruder and are included for ease in making and following references. Lettered footnotes are Spinoza’s, numbered footnotes are mine. I have adopted the lettering of Gebhardt’s edition, though (even allowing for differences in the Latin alphabet) it is not entirely consecutive.

    [II/4] NOTICE TO THE READER

    ¹

    THIS Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect etc., which we give you here, kind reader, in its unfinished [NS: and defective] state, was written by the author many years ago now. He always intended to finish it. But hindered by other occupations, and finally snatched away by death, he was unable to bring it to the desired conclusion. But since it contains many excellent and useful things, which—we have no doubt—will be of great benefit to anyone sincerely seeking the truth, we did not wish to deprive you of them. And so that you would be aware of, and find less difficult to excuse, the many things that are still obscure, rough, and unpolished, we wished to warn you of them. Farewell.

    [II/5] Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect [5] and on the way by which it is best directed toward the true knowledge of things

    ²

    [1] AFTER experience had taught me that all the things which regularly occur in ordinary life are empty and futile, and I saw that all the [10] things which were the cause or object of my fear had nothing of good or bad in themselves, except insofar as [my] mind was moved by them, I resolved at last to try to find out whether there was anything which would be the true good, capable of communicating itself, and which alone would affect the mind, all others being rejected—whether there [15] was something which, once found and acquired, would continuously give me the greatest joy, to eternity.

    [2] I say that I resolved at last—for at first glance it seemed ill-advised to be willing to lose something certain for something then uncertain. I saw, of course, the advantages that honor and wealth bring, and that I would be forced to abstain from seeking them, if I wished to devote [20] myself seriously to something new and different; and if by chance the greatest happiness lay in them, I saw that I should have to do without it. But if it did not lie in them, and I devoted my energies only to acquiring them, then I would equally go without it.

    [3] So I wondered whether perhaps it would be possible to reach my new goal—or at least the certainty of attaining it—without changing [25] the conduct and plan of life which I shared with other men. Often I tried this, but in vain. For most things which present themselves in life, and which, to judge from their actions, men think to be the highest [II/6] good, may be reduced to these three: wealth, honor, and sensual pleasure.³ The mind is so distracted by these three that it cannot give the slightest thought to any other good.

    [4] For as far as sensual pleasure is concerned, the mind is so caught up in it, as if at peace in a [true] good, that it is quite prevented from thinking of anything else. But after the enjoyment of sensual pleasure [5] is past, the greatest sadness follows. If this does not completely engross, still it thoroughly confuses and dulls the mind.

    The mind is also distracted not a little by the pursuit of honors and wealth, particularly when the lattera is sought only for its own sake, because it is assumed to be the highest good. [5] But the mind is far [10] more distracted by honor. For this is always assumed to be good through itself and the ultimate end toward which everything is directed.

    Nor do honor and wealth have, as sensual pleasure does, repentance as a natural consequence. The more each of these is possessed, the more joy is increased, and hence the more we are spurred on to increase [15] them. But if our hopes should chance to be frustrated, we experience the greatest sadness. And finally, honor has this great disadvantage: to pursue it, we must direct our lives according to other men’s powers of understanding—fleeing what they commonly flee and [20] seeking what they commonly seek.

    [6] Since I saw that all of these things stood in the way of my working toward this new goal, indeed were so opposed to it that one or the other must be given up, I was forced to ask what would be more useful to me. For as I say, I seemed to be willing to lose the [25] certain good for the uncertain one. But after I had considered the matter a little, I first found that, if I devoted myself to this new plan of life, and gave up the old, I would be giving up a good by its nature uncertain (as we can clearly infer from what has been said) for one uncertain not by its nature (for I was seeking a permanent good) but only in respect to its attainment.

    [30] [7] By persistent meditation, however, I came to the conclusion that, if only I could resolve, wholeheartedly,⁴ [to change my plan of life], I would be giving up certain evils for a certain good. For I saw that I [II/7] was in the greatest danger, and that I was forced to seek a remedy with all my strength, however uncertain it might be—like a man suffering from a fatal illness, who, foreseeing certain death unless he employs a remedy, is forced to seek it, however uncertain, with all [5] his strength. For all his hope lies there. But all those things men ordinarily strive for, not only provide no remedy to preserve our being, but in fact hinder that preservation, often cause the destruction of those who possess them,b and always cause the destruction of those who are possessed by them.⁵

    [10] [8] There are a great many examples of people who have suffered persecution to the death on account of their wealth, or have exposed themselves to so many dangers to acquire wealth that they have at last paid the penalty for their folly with their life. Nor are there fewer examples of people who, to attain or defend honor, have suffered most [15] miserably. And there are innumerable examples of people who have hastened their death through too much sensual pleasure.

    [9] Furthermore, these evils seemed to have arisen from the fact that all happiness or unhappiness was placed in the quality of the object to which we cling with love. For strife will never arise on account of [20] what is not loved, nor will there be sadness if it perishes, nor envy if it is possessed by another, nor fear, nor hatred—in a word, no disturbances of the mind. Indeed, all these happen only in the love of those things that can perish, as all the things we have just spoken of can do.

    [10] But love toward the eternal and infinite thing feeds the mind [25] with a joy entirely exempt from sadness.⁶ This is greatly to be desired, and to be sought with all our strength.

    But not without reason did I use these words if only I could resolve in earnest.⁷ For though I perceived these things [NS: this evil] so clearly in my mind, I still could not, on that account, put aside all greed, [30] desire for sensual pleasure and love of esteem.

    [11] I saw this, however: that so long as the mind was turned toward these thoughts, it was turned away from those things, and was thinking seriously about the new goal. That was a great comfort to me. For I saw that those evils would not refuse to yield to remedies. And [II/8] although in the beginning these intervals were rare, and lasted a very short time, nevertheless, after the true good became more and more known to me, the intervals became more frequent and longer—especially after I saw that the acquisition of money, sensual pleasure, and [5] esteem are only obstacles so long as they are sought for their own sakes, and not as means to other things. But if they are sought as means, then they will have a limit, and will not be obstacles at all. On the contrary, they will be of great use in attaining the end on account of which they are sought, as we shall show in its place.

    [10] [12] Here I shall only say briefly what I understand by the true good, and at the same time, what the highest good is. To understand this properly, it must be noted that good and bad are said of things only in a certain respect, so that one and the same thing can be called both good and bad according to different respects. The same applies [15] to perfect and imperfect. For nothing, considered in its own nature, will be called perfect or imperfect, especially after we have recognized that everything that happens happens according to the eternal order, and according to certain laws of Nature.

    [13] But since human weakness does not grasp that order by its own thought, and meanwhile man conceives a human nature much stronger [20] and more enduring⁸ than his own, and at the same time sees that nothing prevents his acquiring such a nature, he is spurred to seek means that will lead him to such a perfection. Whatever can be a means to his attaining it is called a true good; but the highest good is to arrive—together with other individuals if possible—at the enjoyment [25] of such a nature. What that nature is we shall show in its proper place: that it is the knowledgec of the union that the mind has with the whole of Nature.⁹

    [14] This, then, is the end I aim at: to acquire such a nature, and to strive that many acquire it with me. That is, it is part of my happiness [30] to take pains that many others may understand as I understand, so that their intellect and desire agree entirely with my intellect and desire. To do this it is necessary,d first to understand as much of Nature [II/9] as suffices for acquiring such a nature; next, to form a society of the kind that is desirable, so that as many as possible may attain it as easily and surely as possible.

    [15] Third, attention must be paid to Moral Philosophy and to Instruction [5] concerning the Education of children. Because Health is no small means to achieving this end, fourthly, the whole of Medicine must be worked out. And because many difficult things are rendered easy by ingenuity, and we can gain much time and convenience in this life, fifthly, Mechanics is in no way to be despised.

    [10] [16] But before anything else we must devise a way of healing the intellect, and purifying it, as much as we can in the beginning, so that it understands things successfully, without error and as well as possible.¹⁰ Everyone will now be able to see that I wish to direct all the sciences toward one ende and goal, viz. that we should achieve, as we [15] have said, the highest human perfection. So anything in the sciences which does nothing to advance us toward our goal must be rejected as useless—in a word, all our activities and thoughts are to be directed to this end.

    [17] But while we pursue this end, and devote ourselves to bringing [20] the intellect back¹¹ to the right path, it is necessary to live. So we are forced, before we do anything else, to assume certain rules of living as good:

    1. To speak according to the power of understanding of ordinary people, and do whatever does not interfere with our attaining our [25] purpose. For we can gain a considerable advantage, if we yield as much to their understanding as we can. In this way, they will give a favorable hearing to the truth.

    2. To enjoy pleasures just so far as suffices for safeguarding our health.

    [30] 3. Finally, to seek money, or anything else, just so far as suffices for sustaining life and health, and conforming to those customs of the community that do not conflict with our aim.

    [18] Having laid down these rules, I come now to what must be [35] done first, before all else: emending¹² the intellect and rendering it [II/10] capable of understanding things in the way the attainment of our end requires. To do this, the order we naturally have requires me to survey here all the modes of perceiving which I have had up to now for affirming or denying something without doubt, so that I may choose [5] the best of all, and at the same time begin to know my powers and the nature that I desire to perfect.

    [19] If I consider them accurately, I can reduce them all to four¹³ main kinds:

    1. There is the Perception we have from report or from some [10] conventional sign.¹⁴

    2. There is the Perception we have from random experience,¹⁵ that is, from experience that is not determined by the intellect. But it has this name only because it comes to us by chance, and we have no other experiment that opposes it. So it remains with [15] us unshaken.

    3. There is the Perception that we have when the essence of a thing is inferred from another thing, but not adequately. This happens, either fwhen we infer the cause from some effect, or when something is inferred from some universal, which some property always accompanies.¹⁷

    [20] 4. Finally, there is the Perception we have when a thing is perceived through its essence alone, or through knowledge of its proximate cause.

    [20] I shall illustrate all of these with examples. I know only from report my date of birth, and who my parents were, and similar things, which I have never doubted. By random experience I know that I [25] shall die, for I affirm this because I have seen others like me die, even though they had not all lived the same length of time and did not all die of the same illness. Again, I also know by random experience that [II/11] oil is capable of feeding fire, and that water is capable of putting it out. I know also that the dog is a barking animal, and man a rational one. And in this way I know almost all the things that are useful in life.

    [21] But we infer [one thing]¹⁸ from another in this way: after we [5] clearly perceive that we feel such a body, and no other, then, I say, we infer clearly that the soul is unitedg to the body, which union is the cause of such a sensation; but we cannot understand absolutely from this whath that sensation and union are. Or after we have come to know the nature of vision, and that it has the property that we see [10] one and the same thing as smaller when we look at it from a great distance than when we look at it from close up, we infer that the sun is larger than it appears to be, and other things of the same kind.²⁰

    [22] Finally, a thing is perceived through its essence alone when, from the fact that I know something, I know what it is to know something, [15] or from the fact that I know the essence of the soul, I know that it is united to the body. By the same kind of knowledge, we know that two and three are five, and that if two lines are parallel to a third line, they are also parallel to each other, etc. But the things I have so far been able to know by this kind of knowledge have been very few.

    [20] [23] That you may understand all these things better, I shall use only one example. Suppose there are three numbers. Someone is seeking a fourth, which is to the third as the second is to the first. Here merchants will usually say that they know what to do to find the fourth number, because they have not yet forgotten that procedure [25] which they simply heard from their teachers, without any demonstration.

    [II/12] Others will construct a universal axiom from an experience with simple numbers, where the fourth number is evident through itself—as in the numbers 2, 4, 3, and 6. Here they find by trial that if the second is multiplied by the third, and the product then divided by the first, the result is 6. Since they see that this produces the same number [5] which they knew to be the proportional number without this procedure, they infer that the procedure is always a good way to find the fourth number in the proportion.

    [24] But Mathematicians know, by the force of the demonstration of Proposition 19 in Book VII of Euclid, which ²¹ numbers are proportional to one another, from the nature of proportion, and its property, [10] viz. that the product of the first and fourth numbers is equal to the product of the second and third. Nevertheless, they do not see the adequate proportionality of the given numbers. And if they do, they see it not by the force of that Proposition, but intuitively, [NS: or] without going through any procedure.

    [25] To choose the best mode of perceiving from these, we are required [15] to enumerate briefly the means necessary to attain our end:

    1.²² To know exactly our nature, which we desire to perfect, and at the same time,

    2. [To know] as much of the nature of things as is necessary,

    (a) to infer rightly from it the differences, agreements and [20] oppositions of things,

    (b) to conceive rightly what they can undergo and what they cannot,

    (c) to compare [the nature of things] with the nature and power of man.

    This done, the highest perfection man can reach will easily manifest itself.

    [25] [26] Having considered these requirements, let us see which mode of perceiving we ought to choose.

    As for the first, it is evident in itself that from report—apart from the fact that it is a very uncertain thing—we do not perceive any essence of a thing, as is clear from our example. And since the existence [30] of any singular thing²³ is not known unless its essence is known (as we shall see afterwards), we can clearly infer from this that all the certainty we have from report is to be excluded from the sciences. For no one will ever be able to be affected by simple report, unless his own intellect has gone before.

    [II/13] [27] As for the second,i again, no one should be said to have the idea of that²⁴ proportion which he is seeking. Apart from the fact that it is a very uncertain thing, and without end, in this way no one will ever perceive anything in natural things except accidents. But these [5] are never understood clearly unless their essences are known first. So that also is to be excluded.

    [28] Concerning the third, on the other hand, we can, in a sense, say that we have an idea of the thing, and that we can also make inferences without danger of error. But still, it will not through itself [10] be the means of our reaching our perfection.

    [29] Only the fourth mode comprehends the adequate essence of the thing and is without danger of error. For that reason, it is what we must chiefly use. So we shall take care to explain how it is to be used, that we may understand unknown things by this kind of knowledge [15] and do so as directly as possible; [30] [NS: i.e.] after we know what Knowledge is necessary for us, we must teach the Way and Method by which we may achieve this kind of knowledge of the things that are to be known.

    To do this, the first thing we must consider is that there is no infinite regress here. That is, to find the best Method of seeking the [20] truth, there is no need of another Method to seek the Method of seeking the truth, or of a third Method to seek the second, and so on, to infinity. For in that way we would never arrive at knowledge of the truth, or indeed at any knowledge.

    Matters here stand as they do with corporeal tools,²⁵ where someone [25] might argue in the same way. For to forge iron a hammer is needed; and to have a hammer, it must be made; for this another hammer, and other tools are needed; and to have these tools too, other tools will be needed, and so on to infinity; in this way someone might try, in vain, to prove that men have no power of forging iron.

    [30] [31] But just as men, in the beginning, were able to make the easiest things with the tools they were born with (however laboriously and imperfectly), and once these had been made, made other, more difficult things with less labor and more perfectly, and so, proceeding [II/14] gradually from the simplest works to tools, and from tools to other works and tools, reached the point where they accomplished so many and so difficult things with little labor, in the same way the intellect, by its inborn power,k makes intellectual tools for itself, by which it [5] acquires other powers for other intellectual works,l and from these works still other tools, or the power of searching further, and so proceeds by stages, until it reaches the pinnacle of wisdom.

    [32] It will be easy to see that this is the situation of the intellect, provided we understand what the Method of seeking the truth is, and [10] what those inborn tools are, which it requires only²⁶ to make other tools from them, so as to advance further. To show this, I proceed as follows.

    [33]

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