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Nicomachean Ethics (Translated by W. D. Ross with an Introduction by R. W. Browne)
Nicomachean Ethics (Translated by W. D. Ross with an Introduction by R. W. Browne)
Nicomachean Ethics (Translated by W. D. Ross with an Introduction by R. W. Browne)
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Nicomachean Ethics (Translated by W. D. Ross with an Introduction by R. W. Browne)

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Composed of ten books and based upon Aristotle’s own notes from his lectures at the Lyceum, “Nicomachean Ethics” holds a pre-eminent place amongst the ancient treatises on moral philosophy. As opposed to other pre-Socratic works, “Nicomachean Ethics” moves beyond the purely theoretical analysis of moral philosophy by examining its practical application. Aristotelian ethics is concerned with how an individual should best live their life and at its core asserts the idea that the most virtuous life will be the happiest one. By living well, in balance with one’s environment, eschewing excess, guiding one’s life by reason, Aristotle argues, is the path towards the most virtuous and thus the happiest life. Aristotle’s ethical philosophy had a profound influence on ancient civilization, an influence that was sustained until the rise of Christianity which contradicted the premise of Aristotelian ethics by asserting that the most virtuous life was to be achieved instead by living an austere life of sacrifice devoted to God. This edition follows the translation of W. D. Ross and includes an introduction by R. W. Browne.
LanguageEnglish
Release dateJan 1, 2017
ISBN9781420953657
Nicomachean Ethics (Translated by W. D. Ross with an Introduction by R. W. Browne)
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Aristotle

Aristotle was an ancient Greek philosopher and scientist whose works have profoundly influenced philosophical discourse and scientific investigation from the later Greek period through to modern times. A student of Plato, Aristotle’s writings cover such disparate topics as physics, zoology, logic, aesthetics, and politics, and as one of the earliest proponents of empiricism, Aristotle advanced the belief that people’s knowledge is based on their perceptions. In addition to his own research and writings, Aristotle served as tutor to Alexander the Great, and established a library at the Lyceum. Although it is believed that only a small fraction of his original writings have survived, works such as The Art of Rhetoric, Nicomachean Ethics, Poetics, and Metaphysics have preserved Aristotle’s legacy and influence through the ages.

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Rating: 3.8818182510389607 out of 5 stars
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  • Rating: 2 out of 5 stars
    2/5
    Eh, at least its not Plato. I read this as context/ground for Aristotle's more socially-oriented works.
  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    Comprehensive and well reasoned. Except in those few spots where it strains to use the "golden mean" approach to virtue ethics or suffers from outdated views, this important work has largely stood the test of time.
  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    A good translation. Aristotle is a surprisingly more brutal slog than I thought, given how those who pat down his depths into more accessible writing made it sound. Next up, I'll be reading the essay by this translator, reading a book by an Aristotle fan, then maybe another book about Aristotle, then diving into an older translation.
  • Rating: 5 out of 5 stars
    5/5
    This is Aristotle's classic guide to ethics including the golden mean, the nature of friendship and other topics. While it is more a set of lecture notes than a polished philosophical treatise it still demonstrates the power of the mind of the man behind it. In the first part he focuses on defining the nature of the highest good for human beings. That is the good at which all things aim (1094a3). This highest good is "happiness" by which is meaqnt both "living well" and "doing well" (1095a18); that, more specifically, happiness is "an activitiy of the soul [which] consists in action performed in conjunction with the rational element" (1098a13), "in conformity with excellence or virtue" (1098a15), "in a complete life" 91098a16).As he does for other subjects Aristotle approaches ethics in an organized and scientific manner with an initial emphasis on definitions such as: what is the good, virtue, justice and moral excellence? He does this with an expectation of only that level of precision that is appropriate for the subject at hand. Over the course of the middle section of the treatise the reader is introduced to the concept of the 'golden mean' by which virtues are discussed with regard to extremes (eg. courage vs. rashness) which allow for a middle ground or mean between the extremes. In book seven he discusses moral strength and weakness, and he follows this in book eight with an analysis of the nature and importance of friendship and the need for it. He makes the case that:"The perfect form of friendship is that between good men who are alike in excellence or virtue. For these friends wish alike for one an other's good because they are good men, and the are good per se, (that is, their goodness is something intrinsic, not incidental). Those who wish for their friends' good for their friends' sake are friends in the truest sense since their attitude is determined by what their friends are and not by incidental considerations."(1156b, 6-12)The ethics culminates in a argument for the supreme importance of contemplation. He says,"But a wise man is able to study even by himself, and the wiser he is the more is he able to do it. . . study (contemplation) seems to be the only activity which is loved for its own sake."(1177a, 33- 1177b, 1)The ethical principles, the method of demonstration and the sheer power of the ideas presented here make this a valuable guide even as we approach the twenty-first century.
  • Rating: 3 out of 5 stars
    3/5
    Aristotle vs. Plato

    Having just finished and enjoyed Plato's complete works, I find this book a bit annoying and uninspiring in comparison. Aristotle seems to take every opportunity to "correct" Plato, when in fact he is only attacking a strawman. His arguments, sometimes self-contradictory, often support and clarify Plato's ideas, albeit using his own terminology.

    Aristotle seems to have great difficulty appreciating or understanding Plato’s abstractions (from species to genus, from the individual instances to the common patterns, i.e. Idea or Form). This is the cause of the majority of his attacks against Plato, as “piety requires us to honour truth above our friends.” How very noble of him!

    I don't know whether the Academy and Aristotle's Lyceum charged their students fees. If not, there were no financial incentives in disparaging their rival. If it was purely intellectual rivalry, using straw man is often a sign of an inferior intellect or character. Since both Plato and Aristotle believed that the intellect was the best part of man or the true man, to attack and destroy another's ideas would be equivalent to murder (or Freudian parricide).

    However, it could also be true that Aristotle was formulating his own philosophy through engagement with Plato's ideas, and intellectual competitions and debates help facilitate the development of sound ideas. Since this is the first book by Aristotle that I've read, it's very likely that I'm not giving him his due here. It may take some time to switch from Plato to Aristotle's way of thinking.

    A Champion of Mediocrity

    Aristotle's definitions of good, virtue and happiness are unsatisfactory to me. Good is "that at which all things aim". All people aim at happiness (or pleasure), therefore happiness is the supreme good. But, what exactly is happiness or pleasure? How can one hit his aim if he can't discern what he is aiming at? If virtue is "the mean between deficiency and excess", what is the difference between virtue and mediocrity?

    "Pleasure perfects activity not as the formed state that issues in that activity perfects it, by being immanent in it, but as a sort of supervening [culminating] perfection, like the bloom that graces the flower of youth." How can a fleeting thing that lacks permanence be the object of a lifelong pursuit?

    In the end, Aristotle agrees with Plato, perhaps begrudgingly as it was dictated by reason, that happiness is contemplation of the divine, which is pleasant, self-sufficient and continuous. He insists on making a distinction between activity and state, but in this instance the distinction is unclear to me.

    An Acute Observer of Human Nature

    There are a few things I do appreciate in this book. Aristotle's joie de vivre (his delight in learning, being alive and active), his insights into human nature, his clear and penetrating psychological portrayal of various character traits and the dynamic relationships or transactions between human beings. He also introduced me to Pythagorean's fascinating mathematical representation of equality, A:B = B:C and A-M = M -C.
  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    One of the most accessible works of Aristotle or ancient philosophy in general, but also one of the most practical, because its subject is ethics, or how to live one's life.
  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    The metaphors and language of this were difficult and if I hadn't been assigned this, I probably would not have slogged through it, but I'm glad I did. After parsing through and re-reading this, it's really quite brilliant, and simple. Of course I can't blame Aristotle too harshly, this is a transcription of student lecture notes, and then probably several translations later, it's what we read in English class, so the message does get through, it just takes a labyrinthine path to get there.
  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    I read the Nichomachean Ethics portion of the bookI spent a long time with this book, and consulted the Masterpieces of World Philosophy, and another book by Johnathan Lear on the issue, to come to some understanding. The project of grounding ethics in a rational pursuit of the greatest happiness is much more attractive than obtaining moral authority from revelation. Aristotle advances the idea that the good is that at which all things aim, and for man the good is happiness. Happiness is defined as the realization of man's essential nature, that is, rational thought, since that is man's differentiating feature from animals. The good for man is the activity of the soul in accord with reason. To act in accord with reason is generally to choose the mean between extremes of conduct; to be courageous is neither to be rash or cowardly. Some acts, however, are absolutely bad, such as murder. The good life involves friendship, preferably of the kind that is the mutual association of free souls without regard to usefulness or pleasure. The highest good, however, because it needs the fewest external goods and most resembles the state of the gods, is contemplationAristotle is difficult going in translation, and not all of the book, especially about continence and incontinence, made sense to me. I was pleased by the rational development of arguments, and the patient consideration of all alternatives.
  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    This is a hard slog but rewarding to the serious thinker.
  • Rating: 5 out of 5 stars
    5/5
    A true revelation for me. I've never read anything from Aristotle before, and I spent quite a lot of time reading papers and websites about the book to better understand it. I guess in a way I always thought about virtues as something boring conservatives talk about, so Aristotles perspective was really new and exciting for me. Also interesting to read in the context of gender (what Aristotle thinks a real man (tm) should be like).
  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    Shows almost all types of human character.
  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    So simple, so straightforward, so much sense. Quoting the translator's comments [unfortunately, name or edition unknown]: "Happiness for Aristotle is the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. Virtue is shown in the deliberate choice of actions as part of a worked-out plan of life, a plan which takes a middle course between excess and deficiency. This is the famous doctrine of the golden mean -- courage, for example, is a mean between cowardice and rashness, and justice between a man's getting more or less than his due. The supreme happiness, according to Aristotle, is to be found in a life of philosophical contemplation; but this is only possible for the few, and a secondary kind of happiness is available in a virtuous life of political activity." From introduction: "One is that it is the life of pleasure; but the life which aims at pleasure, regardless of the source from which it is derived, is worthy of beasts rather than of men. The political life aims at honour, but honour depends more on him who gives it than on him who gets it. The life of money-making cannot be regarded as an end in itself. There remains a fourth life, the contemplative life; and here he sounds the note which resounds in the final book." It really is in the last part of the last Book X that he brings this point out, but the rest of the work is a logical build-up toward that.
  • Rating: 3 out of 5 stars
    3/5
    Bourgeois before the bourgeoisie.
  • Rating: 3 out of 5 stars
    3/5
    Aristotle's Ethics by Penguin classics looks deceptively like a paperback novel. It is nothing of the kind, being a densely packed philosophical treatise on the nature of humankind and our relationships with others.The book, a translation of the Nichomachean Ethics and not Aristotle's earlier Eudemian Ethics, may seem slightly mistitled to a modern audience. It deals primarily with analysis of character and what good character is and is not. Discussion of ethical issues and moral judgments of right and wrong are largely missing. The reader is expected to develop their behaviour towards others by perfecting their own character. For example, courage in its various forms is discussed but the practical application of courage is not. Much of Aristotle's thesis appears obvious to our modern minds but it is important to remember that Aristotle was systematizing his description of human nature in an effort to understand it. Unfortunately this makes for a rather dry read.The book also contains a lengthy introduction by Jonathan Barnes. While it is accessible to the general audience, a background in philosophy would be useful to really understand the issues he addresses. There is also a preface by Hugh Tredennick who explains why this new translation is needed - primarily for readability. Between J.A.K. Thompson (the translator), Barnes and Treddennick we appear to have the crème de la crème of Cambridge and Oxford Aristotaleans involved in this little book. The introduction has a substantial bibliography in its own right and the book includes 10 brief appendices which provide background on the philosophical ideas in the text. These are critical to understanding the book if you aren't widely read in the early Greek philosophers. A glossary of Greek words and an index of names proceeds a general index. Footnotes are brief and unobtrusive but usually helpful.For couch philosophers and serious students looking for an inexpensive edition of the Nichomachean ethics, this is definitely the version for you. It has surprisingly good scholarly resources for such a slim volume. If, however, you had heard that Aristotle was Alexander the Great's tutor and are trying to conquer the business world this probably won't give you many pointers.
  • Rating: 5 out of 5 stars
    5/5
    The vagueries of textual survival have left us with few specimens of Aristotle's prose at its finest. It's equally possible that Aristotle was not as exquisite a writer as his teacher Plato. In either case, this is one of the more cohesive of Aristotle's works, and even so it's somewhat repetitive and tedious. But Aristotle's ethical system is more humane: I'd rather live in his world than in Plato's Republic.

    In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle writes about friendship, happiness, and virtue in terms that have had a seminal influence on all subsequent ethical discourse in European philosophy. It creates a parallel system to Biblical ethics in shaping Western ideals of the good. So, a dull but vitally important work.

    This particular translation is readable and well-annotated.
  • Rating: 5 out of 5 stars
    5/5
    Plato and Aristotle between them not only laid the foundations for Western philosophy, many would argue they divided it neatly between them: Plato the one who with his "Allegory of the Cave" gave birth to the idea of an existence beyond our senses, giving a rational gloss to mysticism. Aristotle, the father of logic and a scientist, with a this-world orientation. There's a famous fresco by Raphael, "The School of Athens," where that's illustrated, where the figure meant to be Plato points to the sky--the heavens--while Aristotle points to the ground--to this Earth. If you're going to ask me which school I belong to--at least as so categorized, Aristotle wins, hands down. Yet if you ask me which philosopher I found a joy to read, which a slog--well, Plato wins.Unfortunately, much of Aristotle's works were lost, and what remains I've seen described as not his polished material, but "lecture notes." Plato's dialogues are like little plays, and reading them often are, I daresay, fun. Yes, really. So it was disappointing not to find Aristotle as lively a read. This is dry stuff. But then there are the ideas, which fully earn the five stars. Back when I was introduced to ethics in school, about the only two choices we were given was Utilitarianism--the "greatest good for the greatest number" or Kant and his "categorical imperative" with examples contrasting them such as, under Utilitarianism, if torture leads to good for the greatest number, then by all means, let the water boarding begin! Under the categorical imperative, on the other hand, rules... well, rule. It doesn't matter if there's a ticking atomic bomb, you don't use torture. You're not supposed to care about practical consequences, to yourself or others. What's left out of both philosophies is the individual and his or her happiness. But that's not left out with Aristotle. For him ethics is practical and about the pursuit of happiness. It's for that and from that virtues flow. It's in our personal interest to be virtuous, to practice habits of character that lead to a good life for a human being. Those ethics that appeal and resonate to me come from this school of thought. It's philosophy for human beings, on a human level. So, Plato for style--Aristotle for substance. For me, anyway.

    1 person found this helpful

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Nicomachean Ethics (Translated by W. D. Ross with an Introduction by R. W. Browne) - Aristotle

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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

By ARISTOTLE

Translated by W. D. ROSS

Introduction by R. W. BROWNE

Nicomachean Ethics

By Aristotle

Translated by W. D. Ross

Introduction by R. W. Browne

Print ISBN 13: 978-1-4209-5364-0

eBook ISBN 13: 978-1-4209-5365-7

This edition copyright © 2016. Digireads.com Publishing.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other noncommercial uses permitted by copyright law.

Cover Image: Portrait of Aristotle by Francesco Hayez, c. 1811, Venice Academy of Fine Art.

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

BOOK I

BOOK II

BOOK III

BOOK IV

BOOK V

BOOK VI

BOOK VII

BOOK VIII

BOOK IX

BOOK X

Introduction

Ethics, according to the theory of Aristotle, formed but a subdivision of the great and comprehensive science of politics. Man is a political or social being; that science, therefore, which professed to investigate the subject of human good, would study the nature of man, not only as an individual, but also in his relation to his fellows, as a member of a family, and as a member of a state, or political community.

Aristotle, therefore, following out this view, divides politics into three parts: Ethics, Economics, and Politics strictly so called. Ethics, therefore, or the science of individual good, must be the ground-work of the rest; families and states are composed of individuals; unless, therefore, the parts be good, the whole cannot be perfect. The development, therefore, of the principles of man’s moral nature must necessarily precede, and be an introduction to an investigation of the principles of human society. This is the place which ethical science occupies in Aristotle’s system: it is the introduction to politics, or the science of social life.

It is plain, from these considerations, that ethics, according to Aristotle, form a subdivision of a great practical subject; he does not therefore consider it necessary to examine into the abstract nature of good, but only to pursue the investigation so far as it relates to man. So utterly unconnected with his subject does he consider any ideal or absolute standard of good, that he even denies that the knowledge or contemplation of it can be in any way useful to the study of that good which falls within the province of human nature, and is therefore attainable by man. In this, as well as in many other respects, the practical nature of his mind is strongly contrasted with the poetical idealism of his great master Plato.

The foundation of Aristotle’s system of ethics is deeply laid in his psychological system. On the nature of the human soul the whole fabric is built up, and depends for its support. According to our author, we are born with a natural capacity, for receiving virtuous impressions, and for forming virtuous habits: and his conception of the nature of this capacity is so high a one, that he does not hesitate to term it natural virtue. We are endowed with a moral sense, a perception of moral beauty and excellence, and with an acuteness on practical subjects, which, when cultivated, is improved into prudence, or moral wisdom. From all these considerations, therefore, it is plain that, according to Aristotle, virtue is the law under which we are born, the law of nature, that law which, if we would attain to happiness, we are bound to fulfill. Happiness, in its highest and purest sense, is our being’s end and aim; and this is an energy or activity of the soul according to the law of virtue: an energy of the purest of the capacities of the soul, of that capacity which is proper and peculiar to man alone; namely, intellect or reason. Designed, then, as man is for virtuous energies, endowed with capacities for moral action, with a natural taste and appreciation for that which is morally beautiful, with a natural disposition or instinct, as it were, to good acts; virtue, and therefore happiness, becomes possible and attainable. Had this not been the case, all moral instruction would be useless. That for which nature had not given man a capacity would have been beyond his reach; for that which exists by nature can never by custom be made to be otherwise.

But this natural disposition or bias is, according to Aristotle, a mere potentiality; it is possessed, but not active, not energizing. It is necessary that it should be directed by the will, and that the will in its turn should be directed to a right end by deliberate preference; i.e. by moral principle. From his belief in the existence of this natural capacity, and this bias or inclination towards virtue, and moreover from his believing that man was a free and voluntary agent, Aristotle necessarily holds the responsibility of man. Man has power over his individual actions to do or to abstain. By repeated acts, habits are formed either of virtue or vice; and, therefore, for his whole character when formed, as well as for each act which contributes to its formation, man is responsible. Not that men have always power over their acts, when their character is formed; but what he contends for is, that they have power over them whilst their moral character is in process of formation; and that, therefore, they must, in all reason, be held responsible for the permanent effects which their conduct in particular acts has produced, and which they must at every step have seen gradually resulting.

What then is virtue? In the solution of that part of this question which has not already been answered, the practical nature of Aristotle’s mind is exhibited in an eminent degree. It has been seen that it is a habit, that it is based upon the natural capacities of the human soul, that it is formed and established by a voluntary agent acting under the guidance of deliberate preference or moral principle. But to these conditions it is also necessary to add, what is the end or object at which the habit is to aim.

Experience then, that great practical guide in human affairs, teaches us what that end is. An induction of instances shows that it is a mean between excess and defect; not, indeed, an absolute mean, but a relative one; that is, one relative to the internal moral constitution, and to the external circumstances and condition, of the moral agents. Of this relative mean, each man must judge for himself by the light of his conscience, and his moral sense, purified by moral discipline, and enlightened by education. The moral philosopher can only lay down general principles for man’s guidance, and each individual man must do the rest. The casuist may profess to be more particular, he may profess to lay down accurate special rules of conduct, which will meet every individual case, but his professions will be unfulfilled: he will, from the very nature of the subject, which, being a moral one, will not admit of mathematical exactness, fail of making morals a definite and exact science. There must, and will always be, room left for the moral sense and practical wisdom of each individual, to exercise in each case of moral action its judicial functions. If, in this case, or in any other, you deal with men in this way, you are dealing with them as children; and, therefore, according to Aristotle’s views, as being incapable of perfect moral action.

The discussion of these virtues or mean states, both moral and intellectual, forms, it will be found, a very important portion of this treatise. We shall find, amongst them, many virtues which belong to man in his political rather than in his individual character:—magnificence, that virtue of the rich, which to an Athenian mind appeared nearly akin to patriotism:—the social qualities, which we should scarcely in these days formally elevate into the rank of virtues, but which, nevertheless, practically, we value almost as highly, and which contribute so much to the happiness of every-day life:—justice, not only that universal justice which implies the doing to every one according to the laws of God and man, and therefore is synonymous with virtue, but also that particular virtue which is more especially exercised by one who is entrusted by the constitution of his country with administrative or executive authority:—and, lastly, friendship, that law of sympathy, and concord, and love between the good and virtuous, clearly and inseparably connected with—nay, based upon, originating in, and springing out of—a reasonable self-love, which is not, indeed, strictly speaking, a virtue, but indispensable to virtue and human happiness.

Friendship is a subject on which the mind of Greece especially loved to dwell. It pervades many of her historical and poetical traditions; it is interwoven with many of her best institutions, her holiest recollections. In one of its forms, that of hospitality, it was the bond which united Greeks in one vast family, as it were, even in times of bitter hostility. No Greek, therefore, could have considered that a moral philosopher had fully accomplished his task, and finished his work, if the discussion of this subject had not formed part of his treatise. And when we find that Aristotle places friendship so high, as to say that its existence would supersede and render unnecessary even justice, and that the true friend loves his friend for that friend’s sake, and for that motive alone, it seems to approach in some degree to the Christian ride of charity, which teaches us to love our neighbor as ourselves,—to that love which, based on principle, and not merely on instinct, is on divine authority said to be the fulfilling of the law.

In the practical consideration of each individual virtue, Aristotle necessarily treats of moral and intellectual virtue separately from each other; but we must not suppose, for that reason, that he thought they could exist separately. According to his view, moral virtue implies the due regulation of our moral nature, with all its appetites, instincts, and passions; and this state only exists when they are subordinate to the dominion and control of the reasoning faculties. Again, the reason does not act with all the vigor of which it is naturally capable, unless our moral nature is in a well-regulated state. Hence the different parts of human nature reciprocally act and react upon each other, every good resolution carried into effect, every act of self-control and moral discipline, increases the vigor of the pure, reason, and renders the highest faculty of our nature more and more able to perform its work. Again, the more powerful the reason becomes, the fewer external obstacles, such as vice presents to its energies, the intellect meets with, the more effectually does it influence the moral nature, and strengthen, confirm, and render permanent the moral habits. Thus continence is gradually improved into temperance; and if human nature were capable of attaining perfection, man would attain to that ideal standard which Aristotle terms heroic virtue.

But this is above human nature, and is impossible to attain, just as its opposite, brutality, is never found, so long as human nature continues in its normal condition, but only in cases where bodily mutilation, or moral perversion, or the influence of barbarism, has so far degraded the human being, that he may be considered as having entirely ceased to be a man.

There is another important subject connected with morals of which it was absolutely necessary for Aristotle to treat fully. Pleasure, as a motive to action, had been so interwoven with other philosophical systems, that the disciple of the Aristotelian ethical philosophy could not be content without the place which it ought to occupy being accurately defined. Pleasure, then, had been held by Plato and others to be a motion or a generation, and therefore of a transitory or transient nature: this Aristotle denies, and affirms it to be a whole, indivisible, complete, perfect, giving a perfection, a finish, as it were, to an energy; being, as he says in order to illustrate its nature, what the bloom is to youth. But if so, pleasure must be active, energetic; it cannot be simply rest: and yet the testimony of mankind, if we observe what they propose to themselves as pleasure, would be in favor of the notion of its being rest, in some sense or other. How, then, were these apparent inconsistencies to be reconciled? In the following manner. It is rest as regards the body, but energy as regards the mind. It is an activity of the soul—not a mere animal activity. This distinction enables us to mark the difference between true and false pleasures. Those which are consequent upon the mere activity of our corporeal nature are low and unreal; those which attend upon the energies of our intellectual nature are true and perfect, and worthy of the dignity of man.

But as happiness is an energy or activity of the soul according to its highest excellence, and that this must be that which is the characteristic property of man, namely, pure intellectual excellence, it is evident that contemplative happiness is superior to every other kind, and constitutes the chief good of man. Although happiness must be sought for and arrived at by the formation of habits of practical virtue, still all other virtues must be pursued with a view to the final gratification of our intellectual nature; the end of the cultivation of all virtue is to fit us for the pure and unmixed enjoyment of contemplation. Contemplative enjoyment is the most perfect, most permanent, and most independent of external helps and appliances.

If, then, after all that has been said respecting moral practical virtue, contemplation is the end and object of man, his chief good, his highest happiness, why has Aristotle said so much of the practical nature of human happiness? why has he attributed so much importance to the formation of the moral character? why has he left the subject of contemplative happiness to be briefly discussed at the very conclusion of his treatise?

The answer to these questions is plain. Until the moral character is formed, man is unfit, not only for the enjoyment, but also for forming a correct conception and appreciation of the happiness which is derived from contemplation. Place before his eyes in the commencement of his search after happiness intellectual contemplation, as the end at which he is aiming, and he would neither be able to understand its nature, nor estimate its value. It is by the gradual perfection of our moral nature, and by this method only, that we are brought into that state in which the intellectual principle is able to act purely and uninterruptedly. The improvement of our moral and intellectual faculties will go on parallel to one another. Every evil habit conquered, every good habit formed, will remove an obstacle to the energy of the intellect, and assist in invigorating its nature. Begin with contemplation, and we shall neither find subjects for it, of a nature sufficiently exalted to insure real happiness, nor be in a condition to derive happiness from such subjects, if suggested to us. Begin with moral training, and we shall attain higher capacities for intellectual happiness, whether derived from the contemplation of abstract truth, or of the perfection and attributes of the Deity.{1} The Christian philosopher will easily understand the value of this method of teaching; for he knows that it is revealed to us, that in divine things moral training is the way to intellectual cultivation, that the heart is the way to the understanding—If any man will do God’s will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God. (St. John vii. 17.) It is plain that, in this respect, the way which the heathen moralist has pointed out to the attainment of happiness is that which is most in accordance with the principles of human nature, and therefore with the laws of Him who is both the author of revelation, and of the moral constitution of man.

It only remains now to point out how Aristotle connects the subject of ethics with that of which he considers it a subordinate division; namely, politics. The idea of a state implies a human society united together upon just, moral, and reasonable principles. These principles are developed and displayed in its institutions; its end and object is the greatest good of the body corporate; and, therefore, so far as it can be attained consistently with this primary end, the greatest good of each family and individual. Now, on the morality of the individual members, the morality, and therefore the welfare and happiness, of the body depends; for as in a state, i.e. a free state, the source of power is ultimately the people, on the moral tone of the people, the character of the institutions framed by their representatives must depend. Hence a state must recognize the moral culture and education of the people as a duty. Private systems of education may, doubtless, possess some advantages, such as their superior capability of being molded and adapted to the particular circumstances of individual cases, but still they are inferior to a public one, in uniformity, in the power of enforcing their authority, and in producing great and extensive results. As, therefore, the elements of moral virtue must be inculcated and implanted by moral education, the individual has a right to demand that provision be made for this by well-regulated public institutions, and, in order to attain such institutions, the science of politics or social life must be investigated or systematized. But besides, in order even to secure the advantages of private education, whatever these advantages may be, it is necessary that every one who would conduct and administer such a system efficiently should study the general political principles of education, and thus Endeavour to fit himself for legislating respecting them. On all accounts, therefore, the study of morals is not complete, unless that of politics is superadded, and the latter study should be pursued, not only by the statesman, but by the private citizen.

The above general outline of Aristotle’s ethical system, in which the several parts are designedly not presented to the view in the order in which he has treated them, but displayed in their relative bearings upon each other, will, it is hoped, be sufficient to prepare the mind of the student for the accurate analysis of each chapter separately which follow.

R. W. BROWNE (1850)

Book I

1

Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities. Now, as there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity—as bridle-making and the other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and every military action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall under yet others—in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former that the latter are pursued. It makes no difference whether the activities themselves are the ends of the actions, or something else apart from the activities, as in the case of the sciences just mentioned.

2

If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right? If so, we must try, in outline at least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or capacities it is the object. It would seem to belong to the most authoritative art and that which is most truly the master art. And politics appears to be of this nature; for it is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens should learn and up to what point they should learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man. For even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events something greater and more complete whether to attain or to preserve; though it is worth while to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for city-states. These, then, are the ends at which our inquiry aims, since it is political science, in one sense of that term.

3

Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. Now fine and just actions, which political science investigates, admit of much variety and fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be thought to exist only by convention, and not by nature. And goods also give rise to a similar fluctuation because they bring harm to many people; for before now men have been undone by reason of their wealth, and others by reason of their courage. We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premises to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with premises of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit, therefore, should each type of statement be received; for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.

Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a good judge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject is a good judge of that subject, and the man who has received an all-round education is a good judge in general. Hence a young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at is not knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether he is young in years or youthful in character; the defect does not depend on time, but on his living, and pursuing each successive object, as passion directs. For to such persons, as to the incontinent, knowledge brings no profit; but to those who desire and act in accordance with a rational principle knowledge about such matters will be of great benefit.

These remarks about the student, the sort of treatment to be expected, and the purpose of the inquiry, may be taken as our preface.

4

Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we say political science aims at and what is the highest of all goods achievable by action. Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well and doing well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honor; they differ, however, from one another—and often even the same man identifies it with different things, with health when he is ill, with wealth when he is poor; but, conscious of their ignorance, they admire those who proclaim some great ideal that is above their comprehension. Now some thought that apart from these many goods there is another which is self-subsistent and causes the goodness of all these as well. To examine all the opinions that have been held were perhaps somewhat fruitless; enough to examine those that are most prevalent or that seem to be arguable.

Let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference between arguments from and those to the first principles. For Plato, too, was right in raising this question and asking, as he used to do, ‘are we on the way from or to the first principles?’ There is a difference, as there is in a race-course between the course from the judges to the turning-point and the way back. For, while we must begin with what is known, things are objects of knowledge in two senses—some to us, some without qualification. Presumably, then, we must begin with things known to

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