On Evil

Preface

WHEN ONE CONSIDERS HOW TO PUT the topic of evil into some sort of focus, a number of questions immediately arise. It seems, first of all, that the topic should not be just evil, or evil alone, but good and evil inasmuch as however one treats the latter he is bound to consider the former, for in some basic and initially unspecified sense, evil appears to derive from good both in understanding and reality. True though this is, there is still some legitimate sense in which one can consider evil itself, and Thomas Aquinas must have had some such approach in mind when he entitled one of his major disputed questions simply De Malo (On Evil). Another initial question concerns what sort of evil one has in mind when discussing it. The most basic sense would seem to be moral evil, as indeed it is for Aquinas, but perhaps a more obvious sense is physical evils. We also speak readily of economic evils, social evils, political evils, and a host of other evils which may or may not be reducible to more generic kinds. A further, though allied, question is in what domain of knowledge is moral evil most fully and comprehensively treated: in theology or in philosophy; and if in philosophy, in metaphysics or in moral philosophy; or in some branch of knowledge other than theology or philosophy. No doubt a universal, thoroughgoing, comprehensive treatment would have to include all the relevant approaches and distinctive kinds of evil, but it would seem desirable to concentrate on moral evil, for it is in terms of such evil that the persistent problem of evil arises; and this seems to be dealt with most fully in theology and philosophy.

Apart from this initial cluster of questions, which could be added to readily, one point emerges vividly. However understood, the topic of moral evil has occupied the probing intellect of mankind from the earliest recorded times to the very present. There is no need to dwell on the many references in the Bible. Among the ancient Greeks, Plato and Aristotle in varying degrees explored the topic, as did the Stoics. Plotinus is a major contributor. The most influential author, during his own lifetime and especially afterwards, has been St. Augustine; St. Thomas in the Middle Ages relied heavily on him, and in modern times a writer as unlikely as Camus acknowledges him. And from the beginning of the modern era to the present, writers have dealt with the problem with constant concern; to mention only a few: Hobbes, Montaigne, Spinoza, Pascal, Locke, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and Freud. In this century, particularly within the last several decades, a number of British and American writers have continued to treat the topic as well as raise the difficult issues surrounding it.

At the risk of some simplification, we can specify a general twofold approach to the question of moral evil: a theological and a philosophical approach. The theological approach is taken not only by theologians in a formal sense but by any writer who in varying degrees takes into account both the Bible and revelation (excluding, for convenience, those religious-minded persons apart from the Judaeo-Christian tradition). The philosophical approach can be divided into those who make use of philosophical analysis within a theological context (Aquinas would be an instance) and those who discuss moral evil philosophically apart from any religious or theological orientation, or even in opposition to one (some contemporary philosophers would be instances). Let us, then, consider several major points St. Thomas develops as both a philosopher and theologian; his treatment of them may turn out to be helpful to a contemporary analysis of evil as well as past considerations of it.

Aquinas wastes no time in wondering about the reality of evil; its reality is evident at once. The first question he raises in his treatise is not whether evil is real or exists, but what sort of existence or reality it has. To put this in another way, the first long question with its five articles, investigates such questions as what evil is, what is the relation of evil to good, what kinds of evil there are, and what causes evil; there is no question which merely asks: Does evil exist?

The precise wording of the first article in Question I is, An malum sit aliquid, that is, Whether evil is something? What exactly is meant here? The thrust of the question seems to be the following: Is evil a thing or a being of some kind that exists of itself (per se), i.e., that exists independently? So understood Thomas would answer negatively, but let us paraphrase the first article to see why he argues in this way and how satisfactory his response is to the fundamental question raised.

There are two ways of speaking about evil just as there are two ways of speaking about white. For in one way when white is said it can be taken to mean that which is the subject of whiteness, e.g. a man, a fence, etc.; in another way white can be taken to mean the white as such, i.e. whiteness, the quality itself. In so speaking about white we recognize that while white does exist in some subject, the white itself is not a subject, not a thing, at least unqualifiedly; its existence is dependent on something else. Likewise in one way evil can be taken to mean that which is the subject of evil; in another way, it can be taken to mean the evil itself. In the first way, we can speak of evil as something, for a subject, a distinct thing, can thus be called evil, as our use of language manifests. But as to why we call the subject evil, we have to note exactly what we mean by evil; for Thomas the very notion of evil is the privation itself of a particular good. We must note the precision of a particular good. It is not sufficient to speak of evil merely as a privation of good. A privation of good alone is a misleading phrase that can be erroneously understood. Evil is not simply and merely the lack of something. It is a privation of something specific, the lack of a distinct and particular good which ought to be present in a subject capable by nature of having it. With this precision, St. Thomas preserves a point dear to him and to Augustine: the denial of two radically opposed subsistent principles of good and evil—the Manichean heresy; at the same time, the reality of evil is fully acknowledged. The basic distinction is thus reiterated, now with a more telling analogy, in this summarizing paragraph: Hence I say that evil is not something, i.e., a distinct or separate thing, but that to which evil happens is a distinct thing inasmuch as evil is the lack in a thing of some particular good. Thus blindness itself is not a distinct, i.e., a separate thing, but that to which being blind happens is a distinct thing. Thus blindness does not exist apart from this or that subject: the blindness did not exist apart from Homer, yet Homer was really blind.

So evil is real enough even though not having independent existence. This brings us to the second article in Question I: Whether evil exists in good? Since evil does not have independent existence, the manner of its existence needs to be specified.

Ironically, but properly, evil is in the good thing, it exists or inheres in it. In order to avoid understanding this in a simplistic fashion, we have to take into account that we can speak of good in three ways.

In one way, the very perfection a thing has is called good. To call a man a good logician is to refer to the perfection of reasoning in a man, and although this is not a good of man simply, we do speak of it as a good of the mind of man. Secondly, we can speak of a good man, and then we refer to the perfection of a man himself, i.e. a virtuous man as to his character and not just a particular perfection a man has, such as good vision. Thirdly, the subject of any and all good qualities can be called good, and here we refer to the subject as good, i.e. the subject as being in potentiality to various perfections; and thus man, or more precisely the soul as the subject of various powers and activities, is called good.

It is in this third way that we specify how evil exists in good, not in the good as it has this or that perfection but in a subject which is good inasmuch as it is in potentiality to, or capable of having, some perfection. For we have seen that the very meaning of evil is the privation of a particular perfection a particular subject ought to have. Thus we can say summarily that this privation, this evil, exists only in a thing as subject to potentiality, where potentiality in this context implies a thing’s being deprived of some characteristic it is designed by nature to have and yet does not have, and where the sort of existence evil has refers to its inherence in a subject precisely to the extent that the subject remains only in potentiality to some or other good. Accordingly, then, the subject in which evil exists is good but good only qualifiedly; it can be good in this particular respect but in fact it is unmistakably and really evil as lacking this or that particular good—and so acts or functions.

One final precision here. While it is clear that evil inheres in good inasmuch as being-in-potentiality is called good, still there is a good in which evil cannot inhere, the good as perfection. Such complete good is set apart and wholly distinct from evil. And it is in this way that we see how good can exist apart from evil and hence have independent existence, whereas it is not possible for evil to have existence apart from good. Accordingly, as St. Thomas carefully phrases the point: If there is some good which is pure act having no admixture of potentiality, such as God is, in such a good evil can in no way exist. It is only that good which is made up of a subject and a perfection that can be destroyed by evil, inasmuch as the perfection can be lost and the subject remains.

To summarize the foregoing matter: Moral evil is a privation, a deprival, a lack. It is not just any sort of privation, but a distinctive kind, which deprives a subject of this or that good deliberately, and directly brings about the reality of disorder. Although such evil is not subsistent, it is existent. It exists in a subject which, as such, is good and yet also potentially evil which, in some particular respect, becomes actually evil through the subject’s being actually deprived of some characteristic, some good, which it ought to have. This is an analysis of moral evil, though applicable, with qualification, to any evil. Unless some sort of analysis such as this is made of evil, what is called the problem of evil, or any of the difficulties connected with the reality of evil, cannot be fruitfully investigated. Problems about evil have to presuppose what evil is.

Accordingly, there would appear to be only three possible approaches to what evil is or consists in. One is the denial of the reality of evil. This is the view that the phenomenal world—the world directly experienced—is an illusion, and so also are the attendant evils of such a phenomenal world. This view is expressed, for example, in Hinduism and revived in the more recent religion called Christian Science.

A second approach attaches equal reality and subsistence to both good and evil. In ancient Zoroastrianism there were opposed good and evil deities. In Mani, the source for Manicheism, a dualism is consistently maintained which rejects any possibility of reducing the origins of good and evil to one and the same source. Evil is as completely an independent principle as good is and tends to be identified with matter (darkness) while good is identified with spirit (light). Contemporary satanism is something of a branching off from Manicheism except that the devil himself is the subsistent evil principle and in fact is worshipped in the manner that God is, extending to a simulation of the same sort of religious practices.

The third approach has to strike some balance between these two extremes and achieve, although it is somewhat misleading to express it in this way, some sort of combination of a monism and a dualism, a monism with respect one supreme good being and a dualism with respect to there being some real distinction between good and evil. It is along these lines that St. Thomas moves, and the gist of his analysis is that there can be both the reality of disorder and the unflawed existence of God as wholly good; the development of the notion of evil as a privation of this or that particular good safeguards the complete goodness of God on the one hand, and the coming to be of evil on the other.

What other viable approach can there be? Indeed whether God exists or not, evil seems explicable only in terms of the real disorder of privation. Without some such clear and consistent analysis of the nature of evil, the problem of evil will be a problem even as to what it means. Yet if God is assumed not to exist, there will not be much left of the problem of evil; evil will be only a fact one has to live with and try to cope with. In such a perspective, the problem of evil will be hard to formulate, let alone resolve.

But there certainly is a problem of evil, and it becomes more acute precisely in proportion as the existence of a good and omnipotent God is accepted. This problem is usually expressed in some such form as this: If God is omnipotent, He must be able to prevent evil; if He is wholly good, He must be able to prevent evil; but evil exists; therefore God is either not omnipotent or not wholly good. In other words, the question is whether there is in fact an inconsistency or contradiction in asserting: (1) God is omnipotent, (2) God is wholly good, (3) evil exists. That there is a contradiction or an inconsistency in holding all three propositions is certainly not explicit or self-evident and, indeed, would have to be shown. A theist, on the other hand, has the task of showing that and why there is no inconsistency or contradiction in this set of propositions; yet even if he is successful, it does not thereby follow that the problem of evil is wholly resolved.

In the question II On Evil, Aquinas does not explicitly present the problem of evil in the terms stated above, presumably because as a theologian he sees no contradiction, explicit or implicit, in the existence of God as made manifest in Christian revelation and the existence of evil. However he is aware of the fact that the juncture of the existence of God and the existence of evil requires giving as much explanation as possible. And he has some philosophically relevant things to say in this regard.

Question III is on the cause of sin, i.e., moral evil. The first article asks whether God is the cause of sin? The body of this article begins with the statement that someone is the cause of sin in two ways: either because he himself sins or because he causes someone else to sin. God is not the cause of sin in the first way, for this occurs when someone in acting does not attain the end for which he acts, which occurs from a deficiency of the active principle. For example, if a grammarian speaks or writes incorrectly, this is due to a deficiency of the art, at least if he intends to write correctly. But in God the active principle cannot be deficient because His power is infinite, nor can His will fail to attain its proper end because His will, which is identical with His nature, is the supreme good which is the ultimate end and first rule of all wills; hence His will naturally adheres to the supreme good and cannot depart from it. So God cannot be the cause of sin in that He himself sins. Nor can God be the cause of sin by causing others to sin. For sin as it is properly so called in moral matters consists in a turning away of the created will from the ultimate end, and it is impossible that God should cause anyone’s will to be turned away from the ultimate end, which in fact is Himself. This highly abbreviated and condensed version of what Aquinas says is spelled out more fully in the body of the article and in the numerous objections and replies accompanying the article. There is room for only one objection and the reply to it (all told there are eighteen objections and replies).

4. Whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause of its effect. But free will, of which God is the cause, is the cause of sin. Therefore God is the cause of sin.

Reply to 4. The effect of an effect, inasmuch as it is such, is referred to the cause. But if something proceeds from an effect not inasmuch as it is such, this is not referable to the cause. For example, the movement of the leg is caused by the motive power of the animal which moves the leg, but the limp does not come from the leg as it is moved by the motive power, but as the leg is defective in receiving the influence of the motive power by reason of its own defect; and hence the limping is not caused by the motive power. Similarly, then, sin is caused by the free will according as it turns away from God, and consequently it does not follow that God is the cause of sin, although He is the cause of free will.

Further elaboration would be welcome. Hence in the next article, Aquinas asks Whether the action of sin is from God? Here again, at the risk of over-simplification let us try to summarize Thomas’s response to the question. The act of sin has to come from God. One reason for this (Aquinas gives others) is that all the movements of secondary causes must be caused by the first cause as mover. God in fact is the first mover in respect to all movements, both spiritual and corporeal. Hence, since the act of sinning is a movement of the free will, the act of sinning, as an act, is from God. This position is clear and straightforward, and necessary to maintain if God as the ultimate and first cause as mover is to mean anything significant. But the movement from the first mover is not received uniformly in all movable things, but in each according to its mode. Some things are moved but do not move themselves (inanimate things); others are moved and also move themselves (animals and human beings). And again, in one way there results from the influence of the heavenly body (e.g. the sun) the sprouting of a plant in which the reproductive power is not defective but productive of a perfect shoot; in another way, the sprouting of a plant in which the reproductive power is defective, producing a useless shoot. Hence when a thing is properly disposed to receive the movement of the first mover, a perfect action in accord with the intention of the first mover follows; but if a thing is not properly disposed and suited to receive the movement of the first mover, an imperfect (an inordinate or disordered) action follows, and then whatever action is present on that occasion is referred to the first mover as its cause, but whatever defect is present is not referred to the first mover as its cause because a defect of this kind in the action results from the fact that the agent in question departs or deviates from the ordering of the first mover (the example of limping is referred to again). Accordingly, since God is the first principle of the movement of all things, some are so moved by Him that they also move or act themselves, e.g., those having free will; and if they are properly disposed and rightly ordered to receive the movement by which they are moved by God, good actions will follow which are wholly referred to God as the cause. But if they depart from a right ordering, inordinate or disordered action, i.e. the act of sin or moral fault, will follow and then whatever action is present is referred to God as its cause, but whatever deordination or deformity is present does not have God as its cause, but only the free will of man. Hence we say that the act of sin is from God, but the sin is not from God.

What has been shown so far and what has not? What is shown, to put it modestly, is that there is no inconsistency, let alone contradiction, in holding the existence of a good and omnipotent God and also the existence of evil. But what remains to be considered is whether or not there is a contradiction in maintaining that God might have made human beings who would in fact always choose what is right and never sin or commit a fault.

Indeed, a position often advanced by contemporary authors is that there was an option for God to effect the better possibility of making human beings who in choosing freely would always choose what is right and hence never sin, and that this is what an omnipotent and wholly good God would do. But such a position seems in fact to be inconsistent and even implicitly contradictory. For it is not naturally possible for God to create human beings having a rational nature and a free will who always choose what is right and never commit a fault or a sin. Indeed, Aquinas says in effect that no rational nature can always perform actions that never depart from what is good. This is possible only for a being in whom is found in a natural and immutable manner the universal and perfect nature of good. This is possible only for God Who alone has a free will which is naturally incapable of sin and confirmed in good, which is not possible for a creature. Human nature is naturally fallible. Although the ability to sin is not a necessary property of free will, still it does follow de facto upon free will as it exists in a created and finite nature. One is therefore inclined to say that to be what a human being is, is to be capable of committing sin, and at times to do so because of the finite, fallible nature man has; and this follows from the way free judgment and choice functions, given that nature. In an earlier work (the Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard), St. Thomas tends to regard the position that human nature is incapable of sin as implying a contradiction (est enim contradictionis implicatio).

From every relevant and natural point of view, it seems clear that to say a human being is incapable of sin or fault amounts to speaking of an imaginary being. We have italicized natural because of course there is a human being to whom this rule or principle does not apply, namely, Christ Who has a created finite nature, is truly a human being with a free will, yet as a man could not sin. But we are not talking here about Christ, the God-man, nor is Thomas, but rather about ourselves as human beings, who can and do sin. And in fact man does exercise choice fallibly. This does not indicate any imperfection in divine power, or detract from God’s omnipotence and goodness, since any created nature, such as our’s, is and has to be less than the creator, and thereby finite, limited, and fallible. Let us try to see this in another way.

In the third article of Question I, Aquinas asks whether good is the cause of evil. In the course of arguing that evil as evil cannot have a proper or per se cause but nevertheless must have a cause in some way, since evil does not have subsistent or independent existence, that therefore good is the cause of evil either inasmuch as some good is deficient or inasmuch as the evil caused comes about indirectly or incidentally. Then after showing that this is obvious in natural things, he applies this to the will as the cause of evil. The will is the cause of evil in both ways—in one way incidentally inasmuch the will is moved to a thing good in some respect but joined with what is simply evil, and in another way inasmuch as the will is a deficient good. Hence in the will we must consider beforehand some defect previous to the defective choice. And here he shows the need of a rule for the actions of a created will.

In all things of which one ought to be the rule and measure of the other, the good in the thing ruled and measured results from the fact that it is ruled and conformed to the rule and measure; but the evil from the fact that it is not ruled or measured. For example, if an craftsman ought to cut a piece of wood straight according to some rule, if he does not cut it straight, which is to cut it badly, this faulty cutting will be caused from this defect, that the craftsman was working without a rule and measure. In a similar way, pleasure and everything else in human affairs ought to be measured and regulated according to the rule of reason and divine law; hence non-use of the rule of reason and divine law is presupposed in the will before its disordered choice.

There is no need to seek a cause of this non-use of the aforesaid rule, for the very liberty of the will, thanks to which it can act or not act, suffices for this. And the very fact of not actually giving heed to such a rule, considered in itself, is not evil, neither a fault nor a penalty, because the soul is not bound, nor can it always actually give heed to a rule of this kind But it first takes on the nature of fault when, without actual consideration of the rule, it proceeds to such a choice. Just as the craftsman does no wrong in not always having in hand a measure but in proceeding to cut without using the measure; likewise, the fault of the will does not consist in not actually giving heed to the rule of reason and divine law but in proceeding to choose without using the rule or measure.

The point of this passage is that a finite being—and there is no escaping our finite nature—needs to act in conformity with some rule or measure, which follows precisely from being finite. It is amply evident from our experience that our life of pleasure and sensual activity in general needs some sort of moderation and direction, i.e., a rule or measure. A well-ordered person recognizes that reason offers such guidance. Reason, in turn, needs direction and guidance, i.e., a rule and measure, and this comes from the fundamental moral precepts, which is what natural law is all about, and also, for the believing Christian, from the doctrines and precepts revealed by God. The pertinent point in Thomas’s analysis is that it accrues to a finite human being that it can use or not use a rule or measure. If the human being were his own rule or measure, he could not proceed to act without the rule, since he would be the rule; but this applies only to God Who alone is His own rule, and this is why God cannot sin and why man can and does. But still a further precision in Aquinas: Prior to a disordered choice in the will there is presupposed a non-use of the rule (of reason and divine law). Such non-use is possible because use or non-use is what liberty of the will is or means in a finite will. Nevertheless, not attending to such a rule is, as such, not evil nor a fault (the finite being is not that actual). Evil or fault, however, arises when a finite being in terms of not accepting the rule or measure thus proceeds to choose and act (this also applies to the angels). This analysis of human freedom of the will, allied with others Aquinas provides, shows that, naturally speaking, it is not possible for God to create a finite being incapable of sinning or committing some kind of fault. The sort of contradiction involved (quasi quaedam contradictionis implicatio) is that God, in effect, would have to create God, i.e., God, Who is His own rule, would have to create a being who in that same sense is his own rule, which is just what a finite being cannot be.

There are a number of other questions, of course. that arise about the problem of evil which no one (including Thomas) pretends to resolve completely. Although it now seems quite defensible to hold that God cannot create a being incapable of sinning both for the reasons just given and also because (without arguing it out here) to create beings capable of moral good entails creating beings capable of moral evil in that God cannot give creatures the freedom to do evil (as delineated above) and simultaneously prevent them from doing so—but not withstanding all this, suppose in some sense God can eliminate evil. Would the world be better off for it? It certainly is not necessarily true that a created universe in which evil does not occur would be better than one created in which evil is present. The extreme case would be to create a universe without intelligent, free agents at all. St. Thomas would not think this option worth considering. Nor would St. Augustine, to whom Aquinas so often refers, and who remarked in a relevant passage that just as a runaway horse is better than a stone which cannot run away, so a creature is more excellent that sins by free will than one which does not because it has no free will.

Suppose this is granted still, as Boethius so poignantly asked: If there be a God, from whence so many evils? For a theist there is indeed a difficult task of trying to reconcile God’s goodness, not only with the fact of evil (this seems not so difficult), but with so much evil and with such widespread evil (which is difficult). As a theologian St. Thomas has some suggestive answers ranging from the role and influence of original sin to the way God can draw good out of evil, starting with O felix culpa. This may not cut much ice from the purely philosophical point of view, although even here Aristotle has some relevant remarks on the tendency of human beings to follow their senses rather than reason, which offers some not wholly irrelevant evidence, on another level, for the doctrine of original sin. One can also cite how and to what extent the existence of certain evils occasion (not cause) the existence of a variety of goods not otherwise possible, for it is not an idle remark that human beings are frequently at their best when facing and overcoming evils. Nor is it beside the point to cite a number of moral virtues which develop only in the face of evil—provided this point is not crudely put as it is in some contemporary literature to the effect that evil has to be willed and committed in order that such good exist; hence the distinction between occasion and cause.

Nevertheless, it still remains true that no one can adequately explain the extent of evil in relation to God’s goodness, but, in the last analysis, this is not the substantive issue, at least theoretically. That God is good and omnipotent and that evil exists are both defensible propositions and are not inconsistent; the amount of evil is, in part, the history of human action and, theologically, falls under God’s providence, not as causing evil but as shaping, i.e., ordering, the evil done by man to providential ends, for it is also remains true that it takes greater power to bring good out of evil (caused by others) than out of good alone.

St. Thomas has much more to say on all the foregoing matters as well as on the many other questions he raises and discusses. It is hoped that what has been presented in this brief, summary essay will motivate the reader to investigate fully all Aquinas has to offer on this difficult, involved, and ever-intriguing topic of evil. The length of the work and the thoroughness of the treatment constitute eloquent testimony of the importance and concern of St. Thomas in regard this topic.

It has not been definitely established when St. Thomas, during his relatively short life (1225 or 1226–1274), wrote the disputed questions, De Malo (On Evil). Nonetheless, the differing views of scholars are confined to the period between 1263 and 1272. The most plausible view seems to be that Thomas began the work after March 1266 in Rome and finished it in Viterbo after November 22, 1267, and before 1269; the latter year is known to be the time when he was working on the I–IIae of the Summa Theologiae. On this matter, consult James A. Weisheipl, O.P., Friar Thomas D’Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Work (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1974). A new edition of this book with corrigenda and addenda has been issued by the Catholic University Press (1983).

The format of these disputed questions should be kept in mind. They were, in the first instance, oral disputations, and only subsequently appeared in the written form in which we now have them. The oral procedure seems to have been the following. Thomas, officially designated as the master, would hold a series of public disputations during the academic year. He would designate the number of articles each question would contain. On the day of the actual disputation, an assistant of Thomas’s, officially designated as a bachelor, would function as a respondent. His task was to respond to objections from the audience to the particular issue or topic being discussed. This assistant may also have provided the arguments which appear On the Contrary. The following day, after considering all the points raised pro and con, the master would then give his resolution or determination to the question (primarily in the Response, but also in the replies to the proposed objections). This ended the oral debate. At a later time, the master (i.e., Aquinas) would edit and document the oral debate and then this final version was given to the university stationer so that copies could be ordered (cf. again Weisheipl’s Friar Thomas D’Aquino for the source of the above remarks and further details). It is the edited, written version of the text that has come down to us.

The Latin text used for this translation is Leonine critical edition of De Malo published by the Leonine Commission in 1982. A modest number of clarifying and explanatory footnotes have been supplied but have been held to a minimum because of the length of the work. Otherwise footnotes are references to sources. Titles of works referred to in the text and in the footnotes are given in English unless the works are not translated into English or are not generally known or referred to by the English title. The Vulgate version of the Bible is quoted because of its use by St. Thomas. But it should be kept in mind that the numbering of the Psalms in the Vulgate and the Hebrew text followed by, e.g., the King James’s translators, differ as follows:

In regard to references that are less familiar, which appear in the footnotes, the Leonine index of names of the authors and their works can be consulted. The bibliography of the Leonine edition is given at the end of the Leonine edition for those scholars who may wish to consult it.

We have added an appendix of the English translations of works cited or referred to in the translation.

Regarding footnote abbreviations:

This translation is a joint effort by my wife and myself. In effect we both translated the entire work, having frequently what could be described as executive sessions, often vigorous in character, by way of arriving at a final version. The general aim has been to combine accuracy of translation with readability in English, although for the most part we have made accuracy of the translation the final determinant. We also had a first draft of a translation by Rev. C. I. Litzinger, O.P., left unfinished by his death, which was of great help in making the translation.

We both acknowledge with gratitude the role of Professor Roderick M. Chisholm of Brown University in the realization of this translation. It was Professor Chisholm who originally urged us to do the translation, and he was an unfailing source of encouragement in carrying it out.

John A. Oesterle

To the above, I wish to add my acknowledgment of the great debt of gratitude I owe to Professor Ralph M. McInerny for his infinite patience and assistance in revising the first typed translation which was done from the Marietti edition, and left to me upon John’s death and in the present translation of the Critical Leonine edition.

Jean T. Oesterle

Question I

On Evil

Article 1¹

Whether Evil Is Something?²

It seems that it is, for the following reasons.

1. Everything created is something. But evil is something created, as is said in Isaias (5, 6–7), "… I am the Lord making peace and creating evil Therefore evil is something.

2. Since contraries belong to the same genus,³ each of the contraries is something. But evil is contrary to good, according to Ecclesiasticus (33, 15), Good is set against evil. Therefore evil is something.

3. But it was argued that evil considered abstractly is not a contrary but a privation, however an evil considered concretely⁴ is a contrary and is something. But counter to this: nothing is contrary to another according to that in which it agrees with it, for black is not contrary to white according as it is a color. But according to that which underlies good, evil concurs with good; therefore according to this, evil is not opposed to good, but rather under the very aspect in which it is evil. Evil, then, precisely as evil is something.

4. Opposition of form and privation is also found in natural things. Yet it is not said that evil is contrary to good in natural things, but only in moral matters because evil and good, as contraries, include by implication virtue and vice.⁵ Therefore the contrariety of evil and good is not taken according to the opposition of privation and possession of a quality.⁶

5. Dionysius⁷ and Damascene⁸ say that evil is like darkness. But darkness is contrary to light, as is said in Book II On the Soul.⁹ Therefore evil is contrary to good and not merely the privation of good.

6. Furthermore,¹⁰ Augustine says¹¹ that what once exists never entirely falls into non-being. If then air is illuminated by the sun, that light caused in the air does not wholly cease to be; nor can it be said that it is gathered again into its source; consequently something of it, which is like an imperfect disposition, remains in the subject, and this is called darkness. Therefore darkness is something contrary to light and not merely a privation. And the same reasoning applies to evil and good. Consequently evil is not merely the privation of good, but the contrary of good.

7. Between the privation and the possession of a quality there is no intermediate in a subject admitting of them.¹² But between good and evil there is something intermediate, nor are all things either good or evil, as is said in the Categories.¹³ Therefore good and evil are not opposed as privative opposites, but as contraries,¹⁴ between which there can be an intermediate. And so evil is something.

8. Moreover,¹⁵ everything that corrupts, acts. But evil, precisely as evil, corrupts, as Dionysius says.¹⁶ Therefore evil, precisely as evil, acts. But nothing acts except inasmuch as it is something.¹⁷ Therefore evil, precisely as evil, is something.

9. But it was argued that to corrupt, i.e., to deteriorate is not to act but the lack or want of action. But counter to this: corruption is a movement or change. Therefore corruptionis a movement. But movement is an action. Therefore corruption is an action.

10. Furthermore,¹⁸ corruption is natural just as generation is, as the Philosopher says in Book V of the Physics.¹⁹ But in any natural motion, something is per se intended by the mover’s nature; therefore in corruption something is per se intended by the corrupter’s nature. But to corrupt is proper to evil, as Dionysius says.²⁰ Therefore evil has a nature intending some end.

11. What is not something cannot be a genus because there are no species of non-being, as the Philosopher says.²¹ But evil is a genus, for it is said in the Categories that good and evil are not in a genus, but are themselves genera of other things.²² Therefore evil is something.

12. That which is not something cannot be a constitutive difference²³ because each of the differences of any genus must have being and be one, as is said in Book III of the Metaphysics.²⁴ But good and evil are differences constitutive of virtue and vice. Therefore evil is something.

13. Besides,²⁵ that which is not something cannot vary in degree. But evil varies in degree, for murder is a greater evil than adultery. Nor can it be said that the evil is greater inasmuch as it corrupts a greater good, since corruption of good is an effect of evil, and the cause does not vary in degree on account of the effect, but the reverse. Therefore evil is something.

14. Everything that has being by having its own place is something. But evil is a thing of this kind, for Augustine says that even evil, when regulated and put in its own place, serves to enhance our admiration of the good.²⁶ Nor can it be said that this is to be understood of evil on the part of the good in which the evil exists, since evil enhances our admiration of the good by opposition to it, according as two opposites stand out more clearly when the two are put side by side.²⁷ Therefore evil, as evil, is something.

15. The Philosopher says²⁸ that every change is either from subject to subject or from subject to non-subject or from non-subject to subject, and he designates as subject that which is affirmatively expressed. But when someone is changed from good to evil, he is not changed from subject to non-subject, nor from non-subject to subject because these changes are generation and corruption; therefore he is changed from subject to subject, and so it appears that evil is something positively existing.

16. Moreover²⁹ the Philosopher says³⁰ the corruption of one thing is the generation of something else. But evil, as evil, is corruptive according to Dionysius;³¹ therefore evil, as evil, is generative of something. And so evil must be something because everything that is generated, is generated from something.

17. Good is characterized as desirable because good is what all things desire, as is said in Book I of the Ethics;³² and by the same reasoning evil is characterized as a thing to be avoided. But something negatively signified may be naturally desired, and something affirmatively signified may be naturally shunned, as the sheep naturally flees from the presence of the wolf and desires its absence.³³ Therefore good is not something any more than evil is.

18. Punishment as such is just; and what is just is good; therefore punishment as such is something good.³⁴ Yet punishment as such is something evil; for evil is divided into punishment and fault.³⁵ Therefore some evil, as such, is good; but every good is something. Consequently evil as such is something.

19. If goodness were not something, nothing would be good; therefore similarly, if evil itself (malitia) is not something, nothing is evil. But it is obvious that many evils exist. Therefore evil itself is something.

20. But it was argued that evil is not a natural or a moral entity, but a conceptual being, i.e., something as known by the mind. But counter to this: the Philosopher says in Book VI of the Metaphysics³⁶ that good and evil are in things, but true and false in the intellect. Therefore evil is not merely a being of reason, i.e., a being that exists only in the mind, but is something in the things of nature.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine says³⁷ that evil has no positive nature, but the lack of good has received this name.

2. In the Gospel of John (1, 3) it is said, All things were made by Him. But evil, as Augustine says,³⁸ was not made by the Word. Therefore evil is not something.

3. In the same place (John 1, 3) it is added, Without him was made nothing, i.e., sin, because sin is nothing and men become nothing when they sin, as the Gloss of Augustine³⁹ says in the same place; and by the same reasoning any other evil is nothing. Therefore evil is not something.

Response:

Just as the color white is spoken of in two ways, so also is evil. For in one way when white is said, it can refer to that which is the subject of whiteness; in another way to the whiteness itself, namely, the accident or quality itself. And likewise when evil is said, it can refer to that which is the subject of evil, and this is something; in another way, it can refer to the evil itself, and this is not something but is the privation of some particular good.

In order to show this, we must consider that good properly speaking is something inasmuch as it is desirable, for according to the Philosopher,⁴⁰ they have best defined good who say that good is that which all things desire. But that which is opposed to good is called evil; hence evil must be that which is opposed to the desirable as such. But it is impossible for this to be something, which is evident for three reasons.

First, because the desirable has the nature of an end or goal, and the order of ends corresponds to the order of agents. For the higher and more universal the agent, the more is the end for the sake of which it acts a more universal good; for every agent acts for an end⁴¹ and for the sake of some good. This is obvious in human affairs, for the ruler of a city intends a particular good which is the good of the city. But the king, who is his superior, intends a universal good, the peace of the whole kingdom. Since then in agent or efficient causes an infinite regression is not possible,⁴² but one must arrive at a first cause which is the universal cause of being, there must also be some universal good to which all goods are reduced, i.e., referred; and this cannot be other than that very one that is the first and universal agent because, since the desirable moves the appetite, and the first mover must be unmoved,⁴³ it follows necessarily that the first and universal agent is itself the first and universal desirable thing, that is, the first and universal good, which brings about all things on account of the desire or love of itself. Therefore just as whatever is numbered among the things that are must have its origin from the first and universal cause of being, so whatever is among the things that are must have its origin from the first and universal good. But what originates from the first and universal good cannot be other than a particular good, just as what originates from the first and universal cause of being is a particular being. Everything then that is numbered among the things that are must be a particular good. Hence it cannot according as it is a particular being be opposed to good. Consequently it remains that evil according as it is evil is not numbered among the things that are, but is a privation of some particular good, inhering in a particular good.

Secondly, this likewise is evident from this, that whatever is numbered among the things that are has an inclination and desire for something befitting itself. But whatever has the nature of desirable has the nature of good. Therefore whatever is numbered among the things that are has an affinity with some good; but evil as such does not have an affinity with good but is opposed to it; evil then is not numbered among the things that are. But if evil were a real thing, it would desire nothing nor would it be desired by anything. Consequently it would not have any action nor any motion because nothing acts or is moved except on account of a desire of an end.

Thirdly, the same point is evident from the fact that being itself especially has the nature of desirable; hence we see that each thing naturally desires to preserve its being, and not only flees from things destructive of its being but resists them with all its might;⁴⁴ so accordingly, being itself, inasmuch as it is desirable, is good. Therefore evil, which is universally opposed to good, must be opposed also to being itself. But what is opposed to being cannot be a thing.

Consequently I say that evil is not a thing; but that to which evil happens is a thing, inasmuch as evil deprives of only some particular good; thus for instance, blindness itself is not a thing, but that to which blindness happens is a thing.

Reply to 1. Something is said to be evil in two ways; in one way simply, in another way in some particular respect. And that is called evil simply, which is in itself evil; and this is inasmuch as a thing is deprived of some particular good that pertains to its due or proper perfection, as sickness in an animal is an evil because it deprives it of the equilibrium of humors⁴⁵ which is required for the well-being of the animal. But that is said to be evil in some respect, which is not evil in itself but to something else because, namely, it is not deprived of some good that belongs to its own due perfection but that belongs to the due perfection of another, as in fire there is a privation of water’s form which does not belong to the due perfection of fire but to the due perfection of water; hence fire is not of itself evil but is evil to water. And likewise the order of justice has as an adjunct the privation of a particular good of a transgressor, inasmuch as the order of justice requires that a transgressor be deprived of a good he desires. So accordingly, the punishment itself is good simply, but an evil to this person. And God is said to create this evil and to make peace because the desire of the transgressor does not cooperate with the punishment, but the desire of the recipient of peace does cooperate with peace; but to create is to make something with nothing presupposed. And therefore it is clear that evil is said to be created not inasmuch as it is evil but inasmuch as it is good simply and evil only in a certain respect.

Reply to 2. Good and evil are properly opposed as privation and possession of a quality because, as Simplicius says,⁴⁶ those things are properly called contraries, each of which is something in keeping with nature, for example hot and cold, white and black; but those of which one is in conformity with nature and the other a departure from nature are not properly opposed as contraries but as privation and possession of a quality. But privation is twofold: one of which consists of an actual loss of being, like death or blindness; the other which consists of a gradual loss of being, like sickness which is a process leading to death or ophthalmia, which is a process leading to blindness. And privations of this latter kind are sometimes called contraries, inasmuch as they still retain something of that which is being lost; and in this way evil is called a contrary, since it does not deprive of all good, but something of the good remains.

Reply to 3. If black were not to retain something of the nature of color, it could not be contrary to white because contraries must be in the same genus.⁴⁷ Therefore, although that in which white agrees with black may not suffice for the notion of contraries, nevertheless without this there could not be contrariety; and similarly, although that in which evil concurs with good may not suffice for the notion of contrariety, nevertheless without this there could not be contrariety.

Reply to 4. The reason why evil is more properly called contrary to good in moral matters than in natural things is that moral acts depend on the will, and the object of the will is good and evil. But every act is denominated and receives its species from its object.⁴⁸ So accordingly, the act of the will, inasmuch as it turns to evil, receives the nature and name of evil; and this evil is properly contrary to good. And this contrariety passes on from acts to habits, inasmuch as acts and habits are akin to one another.

Reply to 5. Darkness is not the contrary of light but the privation. However Aristotle frequently uses the name contrary for privation because he himself says that privation is in a certain way a contrary,⁴⁹ and that the first contrariety is privation and form.⁵⁰

Reply to 6. With the arrival of darkness, nothing remains of light, but only the potentiality to light remains, which is not darkness but its subject. For thus even before the air was illuminated it was only in potentiality to light. And properly speaking it is not light that is, or comes to be, or ceases to be, but rather by virtue of the light, air is said to be illuminated or to become illuminated or to cease to be illuminated.

Reply to 7. As Simplicius says,⁵¹ there is something intermediate between evil and good as it is taken in moral matters, for instance an indifferent act is midway between a virtuous act and a vicious act.

Reply to 8. Evil taken abstractly, i.e., evil itself, is said to corrupt, not indeed actively but formally, namely, inasmuch as it is the corruption itself of good, as also blindness is said to corrupt sight, inasmuch as blindness is the corruption or privation itself of sight. But that which is evil, if it is evil simply, i.e., in itself, so corrupts or actively and effectively makes the thing corrupt not by acting but by dis-acting, i.e., by failing to act,⁵² by reason of a deficiency of active power, as for example defective seed generates defectively and produces a monstrosity,⁵³ which is a corruption of the natural order. But that which is not simply and in itself evil, by its active power brings about complete corruption, not simply but of some one thing [e.g., as fire corrupts water].

Reply to 9. To corrupt after the manner of a formal cause is not to move or to act but to be corrupt; but to corrupt actively is to move and to act, in such a way however that whatever is there of action or motion pertains to the power of good, but what is there of defect pertains to evil in whatever way evil be taken; for example, whatever motion there is in lameness comes from the power of walking, but the motion’s lack of straightness and uniformity comes from the crookedness of the leg bone⁵⁴; also fire generates fire inasmuch as it has such a form, but it corrupts water inasmuch as such a privation is an adjunct of this form.

Reply to 10. The corruption that comes about from that which is simply and in itself evil cannot be natural, but rather is a lapse from nature; but the corruption that comes about from that which is evil with reference to something else can be according to nature, for example that fire corrupts water. And then what it intends is good simply, namely, the form of fire, but what is intended principally is the being (esse) of generated fire, and secondarily the non-being of water, inasmuch as this is required for the being of fire.

Reply to 11. That statement of the Philosopher presents a difficulty because if good and evil are not in a genus but are themselves genera, the distinction of the ten categories comes to naught. And therefore, as Simplicius says,⁵⁵ some have offered the solution that this statement of the Philosopher is to be understood in such a way that good and evil are genera of contraries, i.e., of virtue and vice, but are not in a contrary genus but in quality. But this explanation does not seem proper because this third member does not differ from the first member the Philosopher stated, namely, that certain contraries are in one genus. Hence Porphyry⁵⁶ stated that certain contraries are univocal; and these are either in one proximate genus, as white and black in the genus of color, which is the first member of the division Aristotle makes,⁵⁷ or they are in contrary proximate genera, as chastity and lust, which are under virtue and vice respectively, which is the second member⁵⁸ of the division; but others are equivocal, such as good, which is found in all genera, as is being and likewise evil. And therefore he said that good and evil are neither in one genus nor in many genera, but they themselves are genera, according as that which transcends genera can be called a genus, like being and one. However Iamblicus⁵⁹ gives two other solutions. One of which is that good and evil are called genera of contraries, inasmuch as one of the contraries is defective in respect to the other, as black in respect to white and bitter in respect to sweet; and thus all contraries are so to speak reduced to good and evil, inasmuch as every defect pertains to the notion of evil. Hence also in Book I of the Physics⁶⁰ it is said