Joshua The Campaign Commander

JOSHUA

THE CAMPAIGN COMMANDER

JOSHUA

THE CAMPAIGN COMMANDER

MALCOLM JOHN FARRE

Copyright © 2017 Malcolm John Farre

Published by Malcolm John Farre Publishing at Smashwords

First edition 2017

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage or retrieval system without permission from the copyright holder.

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Two qualities are indispensable:

first, an intellect that,

even in the darkest hour,

retains some glimmerings

of the inner light

which leads to truth;

and second,

the courage

to follow this faint light

wherever it may lead.

* * *

We see, therefore,

that war is not merely an act of policy

but a true political instrument,

a continuation of political intercourse

carried on with other means.

What remains peculiar to war

is simply the peculiar nature of its means.

General Karl von Clausewitz (1832)

CONTENTS

Chapter 1. Introduction

Chapter 2. Principles of War

Chapter 3. Preparations

Chapter 4. Prelude To War

Chapter 5. Central Campaign

Chapter 6. Southern Campaign

Chapter 7. Northern Campaign

Chapter 8. The Campaign Commander

Chapter 9. Other Factors

Chapter 10. Conclusion

Bibliography

References

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The purpose of the Book of Joshua, if the commentaries in the Christian press and the internet are to be believed, remain by and large an enigma to biblical scholars. Many regard the book as a historical record of Joshua that was handed the leadership of the Israelites by Moses after 40 years of wandering, to finally lead God’s people into the Promised Land. Some argue that it drew a parallel between Joshua and the Messiah. Others regard the book as a historical record of the geographical distribution of the 12 tribes once they had defeated the local inhabitants and settled in the land. The singular fact arising from the commentaries was the near universal surprise and confusion as to the detail the author of the book had entered into when he recorded Joshua’s conflicts. It should have dropped the penny. No other single book of the Holy Bible so exclusively concentrates on the subject of war. It was, ironically, also the answer.

The Book Of Joshua Concerned The Conduct Of War.

However, it concerned more than just war. It was more than a historical record of Joshua’s battles; it was more than a historical record of the liberation of Canaan, and it was much more than a historical record of which region of Canaan the 12 tribes of Israel finally settled. An analysis of the Book of Joshua exposed a perspective beyond the theological and mainstream church interpretation thereof. It was first and foremost a commentary on the subject ‘the art of war’. It was, amongst other factors, a historical record of the conduct of war in the Bronze Age. However, the true value of the Book of Joshua is that it provides critical insight and comment by example as to the role and function of the Campaign Commander in war; the manner in which he exercised his duties and arranged his forces to address the challenges of warfare. One enigmatic fact boldly comes to the fore in the Book of Joshua; once Joshua had donned the mantle of Campaign Commander for the war to liberate Canaan, he was an astute and diligent adherent of the ancient Chinese Taoist principles of war, which is mirrored by the modern British principles of war.

Therein Was The Real Enigma Of The Book Of Joshua.

According to military history, Joshua should have had neither access nor knowledge thereof. Yet both the exodus conflicts and the Canaan campaign in particular confirmed his adherence to the principles. It also provided balance by recording the other side of the coin; flush from victory, his preparations for the next battle were clouded by overconfidence and, as a result, he had ignored crucial principles during the planning phase. He suffered the consequences and earned himself a divine rebuke.

Today, we can only speculate as to how and where Joshua gained access to the Chinese Taoist principles of war and who had so skilfully instructed him in the application thereof – or do we acknowledge the divine dimension thereto? The author of the Book of Joshua confirmed that, at least for the first Canaan battle, Joshua had received divine guidance. However, then God grew progressively quieter and less involved as Joshua’s experience mounted and his skills improved. For the military orientated mind, these facts made the Book of Joshua an intriguing read, for it embedded principles of war that, according to western hemisphere military history, would only first comprehensively be described in 1832 by General Klaus von Clausewitz. It raised a number of questions about Joshua, the Campaign Commander. Who was he? Where had he acquired these skills? The Holy Bible and history were by and large silent on these matters. Or were they?

Joshua’s conduct of the war of the liberation of Canaan was nothing short of brilliant and it is surprising that it has not received wider recognition amongst military historians. Much has been written on the campaigns of Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Julius Caesar and Genghis Khan, but references to Joshua and his battles represent the proverbial chicken’s teeth. The commentaries that do exist were predominantly written by theologians with no frame of reference or grasp of the military skills displayed by Joshua. During the course of the liberation of Canaan and the individual battles, Joshua time and time again demonstrated the textbook application of the principles of war. His planning and execution of both the campaign plan and the individual battles demonstrated an intimate knowledge of both the theory and the practical application of these principles.

Joshua’s war to liberate Canaan was a valuable historical reference as to the conduct of war in the Bronze Age. If we, modern man, want to know more about Joshua, we need to be familiar with the principles of war in order to establish, confirm and evaluate his skills as a Campaign Commander during the war to liberate Canaan. It is the only valid tool of adjudication that could be applied to Joshua.

This book will render a brief account of the historical circumstances and the manner they influenced each battle, and then extrapolate Joshua’s application of the principles of war and the manner in which the application had either influenced or altered the battlefield for the Israelites. Whilst the guiding hand of the divine in these matters is acknowledged, this book will deliberately attempt to consider these historical events from the human perspective alone. The reason thereto is one of respect; I do not consider myself qualified to adjudicate my God. In the final perspective, it shall be noted that, despite this perspective, a number of facts in Joshua’s history remain ‘enigmatic’, forcing acknowledgement that a higher intelligence must have guided events.

CHAPTER 2

Principles of War

Cain and Able was the first dispute recorded in the Holy Bible of man upon man that had escalated into physical violence and death. As man had evolved from the earliest days and grown in numbers, his disputes had similarly evolved and escalated from the personal via the tribal to the national, and, finally, in the past 400 years, to the global. The level of violence that accompanied his conflicts had similarly escalated from the personal dispute, involving only two individuals, to local conflicts, and, finally, to warfare and wars that now threaten man and his planet with annihilation.

Over time, as he became more experienced and began studying his past conflicts and wars, man recognised that his successful conflicts were more often than not underpinned by the unwitting adherence to a number of basic rules of warfare. In the eastern hemisphere, the Chinese general and military philosopher, Sun Tzu (circa 450 BC), published a comprehensive commentary titled The Art of War that stated successful armed conflict was underpinned by command’s adherence to and compliance with a series of basic rules of warfare, recording them as a guide to future military commanders.

Thomas Cleary, in his work The Art of War by Sun Tzu, expressed the opinion that Sun Tzu’s work was, in turn, based upon a series of much earlier works and philosophies, underpinned ‘with the ideas of great Taoist works such as I-Ching (The Book of Changes) and the Tao-te Ching (The Way and Its Power), but it reveals the fundamentals of Taoism as the ultimate source of all the traditional Chinese martial arts. Furthermore, while The Art of War is unmatched in its presentation of principle, the keys to the deepest levels of practice of its strategy depend on the psychological development in which Taoism specializes’.

The history of Taoism was fundamental to Chinese history. It was assumed to have originated in prehistoric China, and it exerted a powerful influence on Chinese culture. Taoism evolved in response to changing times, with its doctrine and practices continually being refined. The Taoist association with the martial arts can be traced back to Huángdì, the Yellow Emperor (2697–2597 BC). He is regarded as one of the major culture heroes of Chinese history and an important figure of Taoist military tradition. He is credited with having composed the Yinfu ching/Yinfu jing, a Taoist work traditionally given both martial and spiritual interpretations. In the Chinese tradition, Lao Tzu was regarded as the founder of modern Taoism, and was closely associated with ‘original’ Taoism. The major work attributed to him, Tao Te Ching, was dated to about 400 BC. However, Taoism predated Lao Tzu, as he himself referred to ‘Tao masters of antiquity’ in the Tao Te Ching.

In 1892, the French scholar, Albert Terrien de Lacouperie (1845–1894), published his book titled The Western Origin of the Early Chinese Civilization, from 2300 BC to 200 AD. He theorised that Chinese civilization had been founded about 4200 years earlier by Mesopotamian immigrants. He argued that Huángdì, the Yellow Emperor, was a Mesopotamian tribal leader who led a massive migration of his people into China in 2300 BC and founded what later became the Chinese civilization. European Sinologists rejected these theories, but, in 1900, two Japanese historians published a long summary that presented Lacouperie’s theories as the most advanced Western scholarship on China. Whilst Lacouperie’s theories remain controversial amongst European historians, the summary found support amongst Chinese scholars.

The facts confirmed a Chinese custom to update older documents and then to republish them. The Art of War was most likely preceded by more ancient Chinese studies on war, and The Art of War itself, despite its universal association with Sun Tzu, might itself be no more than an updated commentary of ancient Taoist philosophies on war and warfare. Despite the uncertainty as to its origins, some 2500 years after it was first written, The Art of War was as current as if it was written yesterday. As a result, The Art of War remained a source of study and reference at the world’s leading military academies.

In the Western military hemisphere, the development and recognition of a set of guiding principles took a more arduous route. Whilst it would be many centuries before an equivalent study to Sun Tzu’s The Art of War would appear in the West, the study of a number of ancient battles confirmed the inadvertent application of at least some of the principles. In 490 BC, at the Battle of Marathon, Miltiades, the Athenian commander, routed the invading Persian armies. Although there was no confirmation that Miltiades had access to similar guiding principles of war, a study of the manner in which he had positioned and manoeuvred his forces confirmed his understanding of the modern principles of ‘mass’ and ‘economy of force’.

The first credible academic work on the subject of establishing a generic theoretical guide on the subject of war that appeared in the western hemisphere was the General Rules for war published in 1521 by Machiavelli. It would be another hundred years before Henri, Duke of Rohan, published his Guides for War in 1644. It would then be another hundred years before the Marquis de Silva responded in 1778 with his Principles (for war), followed shortly by Henry Lloyd’s Rules (for war) in 1781, followed by his second work, Axioms (for war) later in the same year. In 1805, Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini published his Maxims for War, Volume 1, followed by his Didactic Resume and, finally, Maxims for War, Volume 2. Having studied Napoleon’s strategies, Jomini stated, There exist a small number of fundamental principles of war the application of which has been in almost all time crowned with success. He concluded that Napoleon had proven that an army usually succeeded when it operated against its enemy’s lines of communication, massed its force against a fraction of the enemy’s, attacked the enemy’s weakest point in force, and attacked the enemy speedily at the right place and time.

In the mid-1800s, there was a brief, but erroneous, belief that Napoleon Bonaparte had pioneered the Principles of War during the Napoleonic War (1805–1815). This erroneous belief was the result of the 1831 English translation of the incomplete French edition of Napoleon’s Military Maxims, published in 1827 by General Burnod. Napoleon himself made no secret of the fact that he was a student of famous military generals of the past and that their actions greatly influenced his thoughts. It was, thus, reasonable to conclude that, with his many successful campaigns, Napoleon affirmed already established valid principles, rather than first establishing them.

It was against the background of the earlier published works that General Karl von Clausewitz published his On War in 1832. It was the first comprehensive study amongst western hemisphere nations on the subject of war. Von Clausewitz must have had access to and been influenced by the earlier published works. What set him apart from his forebears, as a first amongst the European military officers and philosophers, was that he acknowledged the political dimension as an integral dimension to war and assimilated it into his study. On War was recognised for its ground-breaking theories and was soon an essential part of the training of every professional European military officer. It remained a valid study and reference.

The carnage on the western front between 1914 and 1916 was brought about by the industrial revolution. The inefficiency, waste and inconclusive results brought about by the dominance of the machine gun on the battlefield convinced military theorists that a new approach was called for. The mechanisation of warfare demanded a critical review of Von Clausewitz’s theories and principles to bring them into the modern era. In 1916, General JFC Fuller of the British Army published a military journal article titled The Principles of War, with Reference to the Campaigns of 1914–1915. It updated Von Clausewitz’s principles and was the first detailed explanation of eight of the modern principles of war. Ill-considered criticism during the 1930s led to the deletion of the Principles of War from both American and British Military doctrine. The Second World War brought about a quick reversal of these decisions.

The intrinsic value of The Art of War and On War, although thousands of miles and thousands of years apart, was that both identified similar tried and tested basic rules of warfare. As the US Army Field Manual FM 3-0 confirmed, ‘although the strategic environment and operational concepts have changed, soldiers remain the centrepiece and foundation of the army’. Since the two references were first published, the theories, rules and principles advocated therein had time and time again been validated. Many books, articles and other reference material have since been published, analysing both the similarities and discrepancies between Sun Tzu’s and Clausewitz’s works. The fact to acknowledge is that the underlying core principles in the two works were the same. Two generals, both in time and culture, thousands of years removed from each other and completely oblivious to each other’s experiences, had analysed warfare and had come to the same conclusions and identified the same principles.

Studies of military history confirm that, when one armed force applied the principles of war against an equal or superior opposing armed force that neglected the principles, the latter was likely to suffer defeat. As a result, the armed forces of the major leading military powers today near universally subscribe to a nationally approved set of basic rules of warfare derived from the principles advocated in The Art of War and On War. Some armed forces subscribe to more, some to less, and the terminology may differ, but the core principles are the same. In theory, the principles are independent. In practice, they were interdependent in application. No one principle could be considered without due consideration of the others. It was for a commander to integrate their application in his planning. In practice, Principle I: Selection and Maintenance of the Aim, had to be the primary, for the remaining principles were ‘in support’ thereof. It was imperative that command recognised that the principles of war were not a checklist for victory, but served as a guide to campaign planning and to evaluate potential courses of action. Even valid principles were no substitute for sound, professional judgement, but to ignore them completely was to court unwarranted risk.

The study of Joshua as the Campaign Commander, and his battles to liberate Canaan for the settlement of the Israelites, as reference, would primarily use the ten principles of war subscribed to by the armed forces of the United Kingdom, and the principles of Sun Tzu as recorded in his The Art of War. These principles will be supplemented by the nine principles of war subscribed to by the US Army Field Manual FM 3-0, dated 27 February 2008. There are terminology differences between the United Kingdom and US Army principles, but, apart from this fact, the two are effectively mirror copies.

Copies of all three references are readily available on the internet.

PRINCIPLE I: SELECTION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE AIM

Definition. A single, unambiguous aim is the keystone of successful military operations. Selection and maintenance of the aim is regarded as the master principle of war.

The ‘aim’ is the single most important tenant of the principles of war. It is the ‘what do I want to achieve?’ principle. Every one of the remaining principles is, in essence, ‘in support of’ this principle. For this reason, the formulation and definition thereof was critical and the exclusive domain of command. Only command could define the ‘aim’, for, in theory at least, only command had access to the bigger picture and command decided upon the desired outcome.

An astute commander would ensure that