Air Commandos Against Japan: Allied Special Operations in World War II Burma

Architects of the Air Commandos: John Alison, Orde Wingate, and Phil Cochran

The latest edition of this work has been brought to publication with the generous assistance of Marguerite and Gerry Lenfest.

Naval Institute Press

291 Wood Road

Annapolis, MD 21402

© 2008 by the Estate of William T. Y’Blood

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

ISBN 978-1-61251-579-3 (eBook)

The Library of Congress has cataloged the hardcover edition as follows:

Y’Blood, William T., 1937–2006

Air commandos against Japan : Allied special operations in World War II Burma / William T. Y’Blood.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. United States. Army Air Forces. Air Commando Group, 1st. 2. United States. Army Air Forces. Air Commando Group, 2nd. 3. United States. Army Air Forces. Air Commando Group, 3rd. 4. World War, 1939–1945—Aerial operations, American. 5. World War, 1939–1945—Campaigns—Burma. 6. World War, 1939–1945—Regimental histories—United States. 7. World War, 1939–1945—Commando operations—Burma. 8. Special forces (Military science)—United States—History. I. Title.

D790.254.Y35 2008

940.54’867309591—dc22

2008023338

Print editions meet the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper).

15141312111098987654321

First printing

Contents

Preface

Acronyms

PART ONEAny Place . . .

1st Air Commando Group

CHAPTER 1. The Man and the Men

CHAPTER 2. Project 9

CHAPTER 3. A Cacophony of Plans

CHAPTER 4. Strangers in a Strange Land

CHAPTER 5. First Blood

CHAPTER 6. Into the Darkness

CHAPTER 7. Into the Light

CHAPTER 8. Rebirth

CHAPTER 9. Mission Accomplished

PART TWO. . . Any Time . . .

2nd Air Commando Group

CHAPTER 10. And Then There Were Two

CHAPTER 11. A Far-Ranging War

CHAPTER 12. Filling the Game Bag

CHAPTER 13. Mandalay Was in the Other Direction

PART THREE. . . Anywhere

3rd Air Commando Group

CHAPTER 14. Across the Broad Pacific

CHAPTER 15. The Zebras Are Loose

CHAPTER 16. Behind Enemy Lines

Epilogue

Note on Sources

Notes

Bibliography

Index

Preface

Before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, American war planners considered campaigns against the three Axis partners and assigned defeating Germany the highest priority. As the Axis’ aggression grew these plans merged into the Rainbow series for war against a coalition of enemies. The United States would defend the Western hemisphere and fight Japan, while Britain and France battled Germany and Italy. After the fall of France in May 1940, the United States planned to join Britain in defeating Germany while containing Japan. Once Germany was beaten the Allies would direct their attention against Japan. Although never formally ratified, the defeat of Germany first became the unofficial policy of the Allies during World War II.

Regarded as a backwater by many, the China–Burma–India (CBI) theater was vitally important to the Allies because it tied down 1 million Japanese troops to ensure China’s isolation. Had Japan prevailed over the British in India and Burma, those Japanese forces might have been redeployed to fight elsewhere in the Pacific. By 1943 the Japanese controlled northern and central Burma, cutting Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Chinese forces and Maj. Gen. Claire Chennault’s 1st American Volunteer Group, the Flying Tigers, off from their supplies coming through Indian ports. Meanwhile, an airlift known as the Hump Route was begun in late 1942 to fly supplies from Ledo in Assam, five hundred miles over the Himalayas.

In December 1942 the Allies launched an offensive in Burma (the Arakan campaign), but it was beaten back. Outnumbered and outgunned, the British could not hope to match the Japanese in conventional warfare. Moreover, the jungle terrain and adverse weather also favored the Japanese. Enter Britain’s legendary but quirky Brigadier General Orde C. Wingate, an expert in irregular warfare. Wingate developed the concept of Long-Range Penetration Groups (LRPGs) to disrupt the enemy’s lines of communication. Such groups, he suggested, offered a greater opportunity of mystifying and misleading the enemy than any other form of warfare; and should be used as an essential part of a plan of conquest to create a situation leading to the advance of the Allies’ main forces.¹ Wingate had organized the 77th Indian Brigade, a three-thousand-man force of British, Gurkha, and Burmese troops called Chindits (a corruption of chinthe) after the mythical creatures who guarded Burma’s Buddhist temples. On February 12, 1943, Wingate launched Operation Longcloth, the objective of which was to penetrate Japanese lines.

Transported by air two hundred miles behind the Japanese, this raiding group wreaked havoc with its hit-and-run tactics, sabotaging transportation, especially cutting the Mandalay–Myitkyina railway line, and otherwise disrupting Japanese lines of communication. But British air resources came up short and failed to provide the support needed, including supplies, reinforcements, and medical evacuation. As a result, nearly 800 members of Wingate’s force were killed, and of the 2,200 who came back to India, only 600 returned to combat duty. Nonetheless, the operation marked the first instance of taking the fight to the Japanese, and it, thereby, boosted British morale.

Prime Minister Winston Churchill, an admirer of Wingate’s tactics, invited Wingate to outline his plans to Allied political and military leaders meeting in August 1943 at the Quadrant Conference in Quebec. Among those present at the briefings were President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Gen. George C. Marshall, and Gen. Henry H. Hap Arnold, commanding general of the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF). Arnold did not have to be convinced that Wingate needed American air support. He believed in air power’s potential to support guerilla warfare and had coined the term air commandos. Arnold offered to provide Wingate with many more aircraft than the Briton could have imagined.

Called to the Pentagon for reassignment, Lt. Col. John R. Alison and Lt. Col. Philip G. Cochran expected to go to where the action was—Europe. But Arnold had other plans for them. He recruited the two hotshot fighter pilots to organize, train, equip, and command the composite air force that would support Wingate. When Cochran and Alison first arrived in India in November 1943, their mission, called Project 9, presumably had top priority. Arnold told them only to be creative. To hell with the paperwork, Arnold said. Go out and fight.² On top of everything, Cochran and Alison had to complete their mission within six months so as to avoid operations during Burma’s rainy season, which lasted from May to October. Thus, the Japanese would not have time to counterattack before the monsoons inundated the combatants.

Sixty-four years later Maj. Gen. Johnny Alison, USAF (Ret.), recalled with amazement how he and Cochran created the 1st Air Commandos. At first, many supply and personnel officers simply refused to cooperate, telling Alison, Everybody has a number-one priority. Only after the he and Cochran obtained letters signed by Arnold himself did the two airmen get their equipment, including a variety of aircraft for their composite air force—fighters, bombers, transports, gliders, and even experimental helicopters. In all they assembled an air commando force of more than five hundred men and some 350 aircraft. There were no manuals on how to establish air commandos, but Alison knew he would succeed. As a member of Chennault’s Flying Tigers, Alison had flown over the Japanese lines many times.

The Chindits doubted the Americans’ ability to deliver, but lacking an alternative, they adopted a wait-and-see attitude. The British and Americans trained together and devised a masterful plan to invade Burma called Operation Thursday. On the night of March 5, 1944, using C-47s towing some eighty gliders, the 1st Air Commandos delivered 539 troops and about 66,000 pounds of supplies 250 miles behind Japanese lines. During the following week, additional transports flown by the Troop Carrier Command and the Royal Air Force (RAF) airlifted some 9,000 more troops and 500,000 pounds of supplies. These included some 3,000 American troops commanded by Brig. Gen. Frank D. Merrill, Merrill’s Marauders, under Lt. Gen. Joseph Vinegar Joe Stilwell.

Even after Wingate was killed in a plane crash on March 24, Stilwell was able to advance. Operation Thursday resulted in relatively light casualties for the Allies. Only five Allied aircraft were lost in 1,500 fighter sorties, and one bomber went down in 500 sorties. Liaison aircraft evacuated 2,200 soldiers without a single combat loss. Japan’s Fifteenth Army, consisting of 100,000 troops, counterattacked across the Chindwin River and reached Imphal, India before being driven back. By July 1944 the Allies’ stiff resistance, heavy casualties, and the onset of the monsoons forced the Japanese to retreat.

Although the air commandos were primarily involved in air transport, they were also instrumental in defeating Japanese air assets. They owned Burma’s skies and were the first in the USAAF to use aerial rockets. In a March 1944 message Gen. George Stratemeyer congratulated the 1st Air Commando Group (1st ACG) for having obliterated nearly one-fifth of the known Japanese air force in Burma.³ In just four months the air commandos destroyed ninety Japanese planes for the loss of four fighters, mounting attacks on bridges, rail facilities, and targets of opportunity.

Operation Thursday proved so successful that Arnold directed forming the 2nd Air Commando Group and 3rd Air Commando Group. News of the operation prompted Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was engaged in the final planning for the D-day invasion, to summon Alison to England so that he could learn about Arnold’s experience in the use of gliders.

Thereafter, the Allies mounted more offensives in Burma, fought through the monsoons, and drove the Japanese to Mandalay, which fell on March 29, 1945. The air commandos were used throughout Burma, and some units fought on in the Philippines and in Thailand, carrying out the Don Muang raid. Several military leaders, who had doubted that the commandos would succeed, reversed themselves and tried to incorporate the air commandos into their commands.

Ironically, the air commandos were in great demand when Allied fortunes were down. But as the war turned in the Allies’ favor, the demand for the air commandos’ specialization dissipated.

William T. Tom Y’Blood completed this history shortly before his death in November 2006. He was a dedicated historian and meticulous researcher of many military history topics, including the World War II air commandos. While he focused on the three main characters—Wingate, Alison, and Cochran—he also accorded appropriate recognition to a great many other air commandos.

Tom certainly intended to acknowledge all of the individuals who helped him in the research and writing of this book. The best we can do in that regard is to mention his colleagues at the Air Force Historical Studies Office at Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. (Priscilla Jones, Yvonne Kinkaid, Roger Miller, George Watson, Richard Wolf, and Herman Wolk); the staff at the Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama (Joseph Caver and Archie Difante); and the history staff at the Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Florida (Herbert A. Mason Jr. and Cindy Scharf).

JACOB NEUFELD

FORMER DIRECTOR, AIR FORCE

HISTORICAL STUDIES OFFICE

Note: My husband died in November 2006 just after completing the manuscript for this book. It would not have been published without the dedication and hard work of his friend and colleague, Jack Neufeld, who took the rough draft and crafted it into a fine book. Thank you so much, Jack. Carolyn Y’Blood

Acronyms

PART ONE

Any Place . . .

1st Air Commando Group

Chapter 1

The Man and the Men

For what seemed the thousandth time, the slight, prematurely balding U.S. Army Air Forces officer striding toward the imposing bulk of the recently completed Pentagon wondered why he had been ordered so urgently to report to USAAF headquarters. Lt. Col. John R. Alison was unaware that his old friend, Lt. Col. Philip G. Cochran, was at this time wondering the same thing about himself. What would draw these two men together and lead to the creation of one of the most unique organizations in U.S. Air Force history did not spring from a USAAF need. Rather, it originated with the British and, more specifically, one officer, Orde C. Wingate. Yet the organization that was formed to support Wingate—the Air Commandos—might never have been born but for the vision of an exceptional American officer, Gen. Henry H. Hap Arnold, the commanding general of the USAAF. ¹

Wingate was one of those eccentric, extraordinary individuals who seem to turn up regularly in British history. He was not particularly impressive physically except for icy blue eyes that could bore a hole through a person. The laser beam of his daemonic stare is how one author described this feature of Wingate.² Although often somewhat unkempt in appearance, he also exhibited a certain stiffness. A man of extravagant mood swings who to some even appeared insane, Wingate could at one moment be ecstatic, wherein all he ever wanted or needed was at hand, and at the next moment he could be wallowing in the depths of despair and wondering why his God had forsaken him.³ Prone to mumbling, Wingate was given to long, rambling monologues replete with, to many listeners, mind-numbingly obscure references. He did not suffer fools gladly and did not hesitate to criticize anyone who disagreed with him or did not measure up to his standards. Naturally, his eccentricities and combative nature made him unpopular with many of his contemporaries. Yet for all his bizarre behavior, Wingate had an innate ability to persuade. It was a strength that carried him far.

Orde Wingate came naturally to the military profession. He was born in India, where his father had been a colonel in the British army. An uncle had served as governor general of the Sudan, following Maj. Gen. (later Field Marshal) Horatio Herbert, Lord Kitchener. A distant cousin, to Wingate’s dismay, was T. E. Lawrence—Lawrence of Arabia. Wingate believed Lawrence had been a poor soldier and, perhaps worse in Wingate’s estimation, one who had taken too much pleasure in his cult status.⁴ But Wingate never really became part of the British military establishment. He was both a zealot and pro-Zionist, traits not popular in the British army of the time. Serving in Palestine as an intelligence officer in 1938, Wingate organized formations of Jewish settlers leavened with a small number of British soldiers to combat increasingly aggressive raids by Fascist-funded Arabs against Jewish kibbutzim and the important oil pipelines threading through the region. These Special Night Squads were spectacularly successful and earned Wingate a Distinguished Service Order (DSO). They also earned him a swift boot out of Palestine because of his increasingly indiscreet support of the Jews. Thereafter, his passport was stamped, The bearer of this passport should not be allowed to enter Palestine.⁵

Thus, when World War II started Wingate was languishing in England, not quite a pariah but an officer whom British leaders wished to keep under tight control. His expertise in irregular warfare, however, once again became invaluable when Italy attacked Ethiopia (then more commonly known as Abysinia) in 1940. The Italians vastly outnumbered the British in the region by 10 to 1 (400,000 to 40,000 men), and normal methods of combat would not work against these numbers. The British High Command sent Wingate to Abyssinia to establish an irregular force. Utilizing a group of only about 3,000 Abyssinian and Sudanese regulars, Abyssinian guerrillas, and a handful of British troops, Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) Wingate’s Gideon Force routed 36,000 Italians and restored the Abyssinian leader, Haile Selassie, to his throne.

The campaign in Abyssinia and his usual quarrels with superiors and other officers, though, almost cost Wingate his life. He returned to Cairo in June 1941 considerably fatigued from the stress of the campaign and suffering from cerebral malaria. To combat the disease, he was taking great overdoses of Atabrine. (The Egyptian doctor who prescribed the medicine did not inform Wingate that it was a strong depressant, particularly if too much of the drug was taken.) A month after arriving in Cairo, fighting the malaria and the effects of excess amounts of Atabrine, but also depressed and seething with resentment over real and imagined affronts, Wingate attempted to cut his throat. His life was saved by an officer in an adjoining room who heard him crash to the floor. Wingate’s suicide attempt left him with a scar extending from ear to ear, a rasping voice, and an odd mannerism. Forever afterward, when Wingate turned his head, he had to turn his shoulders also.⁶ It appeared that his military career was over, but, perhaps in keeping with his deeply held religious beliefs, a guardian angel appeared in the form of General Sir Archibald Wavell, the commander in chief of the British forces in India since mid-1941.

Wavell knew Wingate from duty in Palestine and from when he had commanded British troops in Abyssinia. He had been impressed with Wingate’s efforts in both places. Now, in early 1942, the Far East was ablaze as the seemingly unstoppable Japanese forces seized more and more territory. Faced with a rapidly deteriorating situation in Burma as the Japanese pressed toward the border with India, Wavell decided that the situation required unorthodox measures. The general sent for Wingate in the hope that the younger man could devise plans to stop or slow the Japanese advance in Burma. After arriving in India in mid-March 1942, now-Colonel Wingate threw himself into the task with his customary zeal. Promoted to brigadier in June and with the assistance of Major Michael Calvert, another young officer also versed in irregular warfare, Wingate soon envisioned a long-range penetration (LRP) force operating behind enemy lines. Although he was not alone in conceiving this idea, Wingate was able to capture the imagination of the public and of some of the military in a way others could not. Such a force would be lightly armed but highly mobile. Unlike most others who studied LRP operations, Wingate realized from the beginning that aircraft would be vital to the success of his force’s operations. Because of the nature of LRP operations, aircraft would be used both for logistical support and for fire support in lieu of artillery. It was this realization of the importance of aircraft that led to the formation of the Air Commandos.

After obtaining Wavell’s approval, Wingate assembled the 77th Indian Infantry Brigade, consisting of British and Gurkha troops, plus some Burmese. The men Wingate gathered were men who were available at the time; they were neither handpicked nor even particularly well trained. The formations that made up the brigade bore such prosaic designations as 142nd Commando Company or 3/2 Gurkha Rifles. Wingate had in mind a more colorful name. A conversation with a Burmese officer provided the name, though not quite accurately. The officer mentioned a "chinthe, the half-lion, half-bird stone creature that guards Burmese temples. Wingate misunderstood the pronunciation, hearing it instead as chindit." Nonetheless, the name Chindit stuck to become one of the more famous appellations in military history.⁷

Wingate’s first LRP expedition, Operation Longcloth, began in mid-February 1943. Initially, the Chindits were intended to be used against Japanese lines of communications and in conjunction with an amphibious landing in Arakan, Burma, by a larger British force. When this operation was canceled, Wavell decided to use the Chindits independently in northern Burma. They were to destroy enemy supply depots, cut the railway line between Mandalay and Myitkyina, and in general create as much havoc as possible. Royal Air Force aircraft would keep Wingate’s force supplied. Still, with no major conventional operation to coincide with their actions, the Chindits were on their own.

The first elements of Wingate’s force began crossing the Chindwin River late on February 13. At this time the river, which lies about 20 miles inside Burma from the India border, was the front line. Operations over the next eight weeks took a fearful toll. Some 3,000 men began the trek; just 2,200 returned to India, most in late April and early May. Only a handful of the wounded could be airlifted out; the rest had to be left behind. Few of the unevacuated injured survived. Having to leave so many of their comrades behind had a devastating impact on the morale of Wingate’s men and left a lasting memory with Wingate himself. Many of the returnees were emaciated. The tortuous march of between 750 and 1,000 miles through dense, inhospitable jungle and across roaring rivers, and the sharp, close-in clashes with the enemy sapped their strength. Of those who came back, many had contracted beriberi and malaria; some were starving. During the last weeks of the operation, despite the tremendous efforts of the RAF, food had become pitifully meager. The Chindits were incapable of further action and would remain so for some time. Of the 2,200 men who came back to India, only about 600 would return to active duty. Yet, operating with what was an inadequate number of aircraft, Wingate had demonstrated the future of jungle warfare.⁸

Wingate’s men inflicted some damage on the Japanese and gained valuable information about the enemy and the terrain. Of no less importance, the quality of the British and Indian troops was tested in the crucible of the Burmese jungle. However, because the operation had no follow-up, the Japanese repaired the damage quickly. Made more aware of their vulnerability in northern Burma, the Japanese moved to strengthen their forces in the area. If Longcloth had not made as much of a military impact as had been desired, it certainly had a great impact on morale, both military and civilian, for the ensuing publicity portrayed Longcloth as much more successful than it actually was. Of course Wingate, as the operation’s commander, also benefited from the publicity. One of those whose morale rose considerably upon hearing of the operation was British Prime Minister Winston Churchill.

Churchill, who could be brutal in his treatment of military commanders, had a soft spot in his heart for those he viewed as daring or unconventional. His romantic notions were sometimes shattered or, fortunately more often, turned by his senior military advisers toward more realistic avenues. Wingate appealed to Churchill’s capricious nature as one of those iconoclasts who often seized his interest. In fact, Churchill toyed for a time with the idea of making Wingate commander of the entire army in India.⁹ Desperately seeking some ray of sunshine to break through the darkness of defeat shrouding Burma and the Far East, Churchill delighted in the good publicity concerning Longcloth, and he summoned Wingate to London.

The prime minister was about to attend the Quadrant Conference in Quebec with President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Like most of these wartime conferences, Quadrant, held from August 17 to 24, 1943, dealt with many subjects, chief among them the European theater.¹⁰ Other operations, like those in the China–Burma–India (CBI) theater, had to be considered, however. Unlike talks involving the Pacific, which was an American ocean and which the British usually regarded as their ally’s preserve, those regarding the CBI invariably entailed differing viewpoints. In the CBI, the plans of the United States, Britain, and China were a Gordian knot of conflicting interests.

At the Trident Conference three months earlier, the American and British contingents had debated a number of objectives for the CBI, such as enlarging the air route to China, including placing more USAAF units in the theater; limiting offensive operations in Burma during 1943 until after the rainy season; starting an all-out offensive to push the Japanese from Burma after the 1944 monsoon ended in November; and interdicting Japanese sea routes in the theater.¹¹ These discourses resulted in tentative decisions only, and it was left to Quadrant to finalize them.

Churchill knew that the CBI would be discussed at Quadrant, and he believed that a talk with Wingate could help him prepare for the conference. Their first meeting was short because Wingate arrived on August 4, the day before Churchill sailed for Quebec aboard the Queen Mary, which had been pressed into service as a fast troopship. Churchill heard enough from Wingate, however, to impulsively invite him to join the British entourage to Quadrant. In Quebec, Wingate could present his ideas to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). Still wearing the stained jungle battle dress he had left India in, Wingate joined Churchill’s party.

On the 8th, Wingate met with the British chiefs of staff to discuss forthcoming operations in Burma and to present his case for LRP operations. His presentation was well received for, as Roosevelt biographer Eric Larrabee noted, Wingate was trading in that most attractive and elusive of military commodities, the lure of a conspicuous victory that did not require lavish resources.¹² The chiefs of staff directed Wingate to proffer his proposals in a formal memorandum.¹³ Upon his arrival in Quebec on the 10th, Wingate submitted to the British chiefs of staff a memorandum titled Forces of Long-Range Penetration: Future Development and Employment in Burma, which outlined his views on proposed operations in Burma. In this brief paper of only five pages and a pair of single-page annexes, Wingate described the principles of long-range penetration, how Long-Range Penetration Groups would be used, and the forces required for LRPG operations. LRPGs were used, he wrote, to secure two main objectives: to disrupt the enemy’s communications and rear area installations, and to drive home the strategic air offensive. Such groups offered greater opportunity of mystifying and misleading the enemy than any other form of warfare. LRPGs should be used, Wingate continued, as an essential part of a plan of conquest to create a situation leading to the advance of our main forces.¹⁴

As to the employment of the LRPGs, Wingate initially proposed using three brigades: one from China against the Mandalay–Lashio–Mandalay–Bhamo line of communications, a second from India against the Shwebo–Myitkina railway, and a third operating from the Chin Hills against the Kalewa–Kalemyo line of communications. All three operations would occur simultaneously, and the LRPGs would be effective for approximately three months before they would require replacements and replenishment. Wingate also believed that an offensive in the Arakan to coincide with the LRPG operations would be advantageous to the success of both operations.¹⁵

He went on to discuss what he viewed as the tasks of the main forces following the disruption of the enemy’s interior economy by his groups. The Chinese forces were to occupy Bhamo and Lashio. Troops of the IV Corps were to occupy the Katha–Indaw airfield and Pinebu to the west. Finally, the Chinese–American force would advance from Ledo to Mytikina, taking care not to develop a threat to Myitkina before the LRPGs were operating in the area so that a certain amount of panic could be generated among the enemy.¹⁶

Because of the monsoon’s effect on operations, timing was extremely critical. If the attacks could be launched just prior to the onset of the monsoon, the Japanese might not have enough time to recover and counterattack before the monsoon struck and put everything underwater. Wingate gauged February 15 to be the suitable date for his LRPGs to begin crossing the three Rubicons of the Salween River, the Chindwin River, and the Myittha River.¹⁷

Wingate also correctly foresaw a Japanese counteroffensive, which he believed was most likely in the IV Corps area in front of Imphal, India. If the Japanese did attack, a pair of LRPGs would be available if they were not yet committed elsewhere. This, however, would naturally cause the main plan to be modified.¹⁸

In his memorandum Wingate noted that the British were then forming two small LRPGs in India. These two units needed to be enlarged and reorganized, and four more LRPGs needed to be created before the monsoons began in May. At least two additional groups could be raised during the rainy season. Each group would consist of eight columns of between 400 and 500 men per column. Given these numbers, it was obvious such a force would not be small. From the 3,000 men he had used in Longcloth, Wingate now envisioned a force of 26,383 personnel.¹⁹ Although he still planned an overland campaign using mules and a few jeeps, Wingate realized that air support was essential to the success of his LRPGs. He insisted that RAF personnel be attached to each column to direct aircraft for supply drops and for close support.

Wingate requested a relatively modest twelve to twenty DC-3s (C-47s) to drop supplies. He was a bit more desirous of bombers, soliciting one bomber squadron per LRPG. If all eight groups were raised, the number of bombers requested would have totaled between 96 and 160 aircraft. Interestingly, he also discerned the importance of a recent development, the helicopter. Wingate saw the helicopter as the most suitable type of aircraft for use in the closely restricted spaces of the jungle. He did not, however, mention gliders.²⁰

Hoping to stimulate Roosevelt’s interest in the CBI theater, Churchill introduced Wingate to the president. This meeting was not particularly successful, for Roosevelt was not taken with the dour Briton. Discussions Wingate had with two of Roosevelt’s top military advisers on August 17, however, had a more salutary effect. Both Gen. George C. Marshall, the Army chief of staff, and Hap Arnold, the commanding general of the AAF, listened closely to Wingate. His proposals for offensive LRPG operations proved quite persuasive. Marshall, in fact, suggested using American troops for one of the LRPG columns. His interest in this matter led to the establishment of a unit known as Galahad, which later became better known as Merrill’s Marauders.²¹

Wingate also piqued Arnold’s interest, for the American already had an idea that fit neatly with Wingate’s concepts. In May 1942 Maj. Gen. George C. Kenney, then commanding the Fourth Air Force, wrote Arnold proposing an Air Blitz Unit. This unit would consist of a P-39 squadron, another squadron of B-25s, two transport squadrons, an airdrome defense unit, and an aircraft warning unit. Its total complement would be 503 men. Kenney saw the unit as ideal for North Africa or the Middle East.²²

Arnold was interested in Kenney’s proposal, replying, The necessity for offensive air forces which are capable of advancing by ‘fire and movement’ has long presented a problem to me. He went on to say that logistics and the concurrent problem of keeping up with rapidly advancing forces caused great concern. Although concurring with Kenney on the desirability of an Air Blitz Unit, Arnold had to reject it because it was impossible at that time to divert the necessary forces to man the unit. He went on to say, however, that he was of the opinion that with certain organization changes, we will have a special section who can handle such matters soon.²³

A few days later, Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter, in a memo to the commanding general of the Eighth Air Force that was then headquartered at Bolling Field in Washington D.C., noted that Arnold had written on Kenney’s letter that "the Washington air representative of our Commando Division on General Spaats’ [sic] staff will get busy on this right away.²⁴ The Commando Division apparently disappeared into bureaucratic limbo, for the term never appeared again, but the comment planted the seeds of a special USAAF commando unit.

Although he had read Wingate’s memo, Arnold pressed him on what aircraft he needed. In his presentation, Wingate had mentioned light planes only obliquely, stating a need for a light transport—preferably helicopters—capable of landing and taking off in restricted spaces.²⁵ Now, reflecting on those men who had had to be left behind during Longcloth, Wingate requested light planes to fly out the wounded. Arnold’s reply stunned Wingate. Two hundred? Three hundred? The numbers flowed from Arnold. Unaccustomed to such largess in the British army, Wingate was wary. Arnold assured him that he was very serious. Surprised but relieved, Wingate left the meeting with renewed hope for the success of his LRPGs in Burma.²⁶

Meanwhile, the CCS and their planners wrestled with finalizing a plan for the defeat of Japan. The Americans still placed a high priority on keeping China in the war, a priority with which the British were not in full accord. Both countries held distinctly different views about China. At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, Adm. Ernest J. King, the U.S. chief of naval operations, stated that the key to our successful attack on the Japanese homeland is the geographical position and the manpower of China.²⁷ The United States thus wished to strengthen China. The British, on the other hand, still desirous of regaining and preserving control of their lost colonies in the Far East, were far more interested in the security of India and Burma and viewed a strong China as a probable threat to British colonialism.²⁸ Churchill, too, was not particularly thrilled about the possibility of getting bogged down in ground fighting in the Burmese jungle. Despite the fact that it really led nowhere, a thrust through Sumatra appealed more to Churchill’s combative spirit. These significantly differing viewpoints colored both countries’ strategic thinking concerning the Far East throughout the war.

The United States also intended to base B-29s in China, but the Americans were dissatisfied with what they perceived as British reluctance, despite supposed keen interest in that area, to commit to full-scale operations in Burma, operations the Americans considered essential for success in the CBI. Following Trident, the Americans decided to use Quadrant to pin down the British as to what they were actually willing to supply for a Burma campaign.

A major player in the evolution of CBI operations was Chiang Kai-shek. The Generalissimo, unfortunately, proved more adept at promising to take action against the Japanese than in actually carrying out his promise. Although his influence on CBI policy slowly waned following the Sextant Conference in Cairo in late 1943, Chiang Kai-shek retained enough influence to give both American and British planners severe indigestion as they struggled to formulate a coherent strategic policy for the CBI.

This strategic policy included the creation of a new command for Southeast Asia. The conduct of the war in Burma had troubled Churchill for some time prior to the conference. He was well aware that the Americans were dissatisfied with the progress of operations in the CBI. Perceiving Wavell to be a defeatist, the prime minister appointed him viceroy of India, a civilian post, following the Trident meetings. General Sir Claude Auchinleck became commander in chief for India. But Auchinleck would not have free rein in India and Burma. His job was limited to coordinating the defense of India proper and to the discipline, administration, and training of the Indian army and British forces in India.²⁹

Churchill had in mind a supreme commander, à la MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific, to exercise command in East Asia, which, presumably, would include China. Following the MacArthur model, the CCS would exercise general authority over grand strategy for the theater, but the British chiefs of staff would have jurisdiction over matters involving operational strategy. The British chiefs would also issue all instructions to the supreme commander. This official, who would be independent of and equal to Auchinleck, was to prosecute the war with utmost vigor. In turn, he would have a deputy supreme commander, a naval commander, an army commander, and two air commanders. Of the air commanders, one would be responsible for offensive air operations, and the other would handle air transport operations, primarily the routes across the Himalayas to China that were known as the Hump.³⁰

The Americans were not enamored of a command encompassing China, especially one led by a Briton. They pointed out that creating such an organization would encounter serious problems because a supreme commander already existed for China in the person of Chiang Kai-shek. Jealous of his prerogatives and suspicious of British motives, the Generalissimo would be a formidable foe to the formation of the command. Also, one MacArthur was already more than enough for the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to contemplate. They much preferred a command along the lines of Eisenhower in the Mediterranean, wherein the supreme commander was directly under the CCS. This was in keeping with U.S. policy that did not permit direct subordination to the British chiefs of staff of any command which embraced U.S. means for supporting China.³¹

Faced with this opposition, Churchill clarified the supreme commander’s authority and the area to be included in the new command. He eliminated China and selected an eastern boundary that ran along the Burma and Indochina borders with China, down the coasts of Indochina, Thailand, and Malaya to Sumatra, and thence followed an indirect path to longitude 110 degrees east. India would not be part of this command. The previous map shows the revised borders. Instead of being an East Asia command, it would now be known as the Southeast Asia Command (SEAC).³²

After a few false starts the British nominated Vice Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten as supreme commander of SEAC. Mountbatten certainly had the right connections, being a great-grandson of Queen Victoria and a cousin to King George VI, the reigning British monarch. He was also the uncle of Philip Mountbatten, who would become Queen Elizabeth II’s consort following the war. Unlike Wingate, the handsome and dashing Admiral Mountbatten, with a reputation as a playboy, cut a debonair figure in his tailored uniforms replete with many ribbons. Like Wingate, however, Mountbatten appealed to Churchill’s sense of adventure. Early in the war, Mountbatten commanded the 5th Destroyer Flotilla, with the destroyer HMS Kelly as his flagship. His tour on the Kelly was relatively brief and relatively unsuccessful, as his ship was sunk from underneath him, but his exploits drew tremendous publicity.

Looking for someone with panache and daring, Churchill had appointed Mountbatten chief of combined operations in April 1942. In this capacity, Mountbatten planned the famed, and disastrous, Dieppe raid in August 1942 and numerous other forays by the renowned British Commandos. He also was responsible for the development of the Mulberries, the artificial ports later used during the Normandy invasion. In the late summer of 1943, Churchill again called on the forty-three-year-old Mountbatten to apply his formidable and innovative abilities to bring order to the chaos that was the CBI. Mountbatten’s appointment as supreme commander of SEAC and his elevation to admiral were announced on August 24, 1943.³³ Two days later, Mountbatten was in Washington for further discussions on the CBI. He took this opportunity to see Arnold and to find out if the American had been joking when he offered Wingate several hundred light planes. To Mountbatten’s delight, Arnold reaffirmed that the planes would be made available. On the 28th, Mountbatten wrote Arnold, I was most impressed with the way [at Quadrant] you solved the problem of evacuating Wingate’s wounded by providing special aircraft with low landing speed. Many men will owe their lives to you in the coming months in Burma.³⁴

Upon his return to Washington, D.C., after Quadrant, Arnold quickly set about to establish an organization to support Wingate and began seeking a man to lead the promised unit. He directed his staff to submit names of promising candidates. Five names appeared on the list of candidates, but the list was swiftly pared to just two lieutenant colonels—Cochran and