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U.N. Success in Expediting Arms Trafficking
U.N. Success in Expediting Arms Trafficking
U.N. Success in Expediting Arms Trafficking
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U.N. Success in Expediting Arms Trafficking

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The list had already been in existence. The International Atomic Energy Agency had previously developed a list of inventories associated with the development and production of nuclear weapons – this is known as INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a.

The INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a list of inventories was intended as a caution against distribution of assets noted in the document – especially distribution to countries supporting international terrorist groups, or having been noted as attempting to develop nuclear weapons capacity.

Of course the list wasn't ignored; naturally it is put to good use as the definitive model template from which Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons associated assets are to be expedited by the United Nations.
Security Council Resolution 2231 (which includes the JCPOA) documents the official United Nations procedure for how Iranian access to nuclear weapons associated inventories is to be facilitated.

The text of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action details how much of the plot is to be carried out – and ongoing Security Council Progress Reports on the project keep us informed, at six-month intervals, of the continuing success of the ongoing undertaking.
This writing confirms all that. And explains in further clarifying detail how the activity, functionally, is carried out.
The text of the JCPOA underplays that the International Atomic Energy Agency is prevented, under the plan, from verifying that the INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventory packages procured by Iran under United Nations sponsorship are not being diverted for use in nuclear weapons development and, or manufacture.

This writing, however, explains how the Security Council's Resolution 2231; Annex A:JCPOA plan prevents IAEA the verification measures required by treaty – and confirms, from IAEA Board of Governors Reports, that inspections of Iranian procured inventories are not being performed, have never been performed.

The source documentation provided in this book is not classified – it is there for any Citizen to review.
Nevertheless, U.S. politicians aren't talking about it too much – in any kind of an honest manner; that is; this regardless of what facts are publicly announced by the United Nations Security Council.

This short writing doesn't address the ongoing promotional political mythology and prevarication surrounding the issue; my other books do that.
The objective of this writing is to present the documented mechanics of how the policy of facilitating arms acquisitions is being carried out.

LanguageEnglish
Release dateJan 15, 2018
ISBN9781370145720
U.N. Success in Expediting Arms Trafficking
Author

Jean-Marc Lebouquin

Jean-Marc LeBouquin is an U.S. Citizen native to deep southern Louisiana. He professes no political party affiliations or loyalties, and qualifies himself as an independent who values foremost the United States Constitution; and is skeptical of unsubstantiated boastful claims Washington partisan politicians make in favor of promoting themselves and the fundraising political party machines that support their re-election campaigns.

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    U.N. Success in Expediting Arms Trafficking - Jean-Marc Lebouquin

    U.N. Success in Expediting Arms Trafficking

    Jean Marc LeBouquin

    Security Council Procedure Expediting Nuclear Weapons Associated Assets to One Exclusively Favored Nation

    Copyright © January 11, 2018 Jean-Marc LeBouquin – illustrations under same copyright.

    License Notes:

    Smashwords Edition

    Smashwords Edition, License Notes:

    This ebook is licensed for your personal enjoyment only. This book may not be re-sold in part or in whole. Although it is listed as free of charge, it should not given away to other people – or expropriated for the work of others without permission. If you would like to share this book with another person, please indicate to the recipient where it is found on the internet so that the recipient may download it for them self. There is one exception, if you have a friend who does not have internet access, then you may share.

    Naturally, use the discretion of your consideration and judgment.

    Thank you for your very kind regard.

    Table of Contents

    U.N. Success In Expediting Arms Trafficking

    Chapter 1 – Brief Introduction

    Chapter 2 – Appendix – Excerpt of the contents of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a inventory list. (Nuclear weapons associated inventories Iran is entitled to acquire under Resolution 2231.)

    Chapter 3 – Appendix – IAEA Statement of Purpose: INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a.

    Chapter 4 – Appendix – The Procurement Working Group and its mandate to expedite Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories

    Chapter 5 – Appendix – Secrecy arrangement concerning Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories

    Chapter 6 – Appendix – The Procurement Working Group mandate to prohibit the International Atomic Energy Agency from discovering, investigating, or reporting on Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated assets listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a – this in violation of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT); Article III; first clause

    Chapter 7 – Appendix – Part of how the IAEA is prevented by the Security Council's JCPOA from reviewing "Activities Which Could Contribute to The Design And Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device"

    Chapter 8 – Appendix – Official United Nations six-month releases informing of Procurement Working Group activities, noting the quantities of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventories acquired by Iran

    Chapter 9 – Appendix – Excerpt of inventory listed on Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex.

    Chapter 9B – Appendix – How (why) the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex was renamed "S/2015/546"

    Chapter 10 – Appendix – Interrelation of Parts – An Example of How INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a Listed Inventories Complement Inventories Noted on the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex.

    Chapter 11 – Appendix – Documenting the Obama Administration's Intransigent refusal to transmit Security Council Resolution 2231 to the 114th Congress

    Chapter 12 – Appendix – Presentation and explanation of Charter of the United Nations Article 25

    Chapter 13 – Appendix – The Vote Adopting Resolution 2231

    Chapter 14 – Appendix – Sham Dispute Resolution Mechanism

    * * * * *

    Chapter 1 – Brief Introduction

    THE LIST had already been in existence. The International Atomic Energy Agency had previously developed a list of dual use and exclusively nuclear weapons dedicated inventories associated with the development and production of nuclear weapons known as INFCIRC/254/Rev.##/Part 2a series – which has been updated with several revisions throughout the years.

    The INFCIRC/254/Rev. No. ##/Part 2a list of inventories was originally intended as a caution against distribution of the assets noted in the document – specifically intended to caution against distribution of listed items to countries known to support or sponsor international terrorist groups, or having been noted as attempting to develop nuclear weapons capacity.

    United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) – has co-opted the list to a more pragmatic political purpose.

    The INFCIRC/254/Rev.##/Part 2a (INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 and subsequent revisions numbers) series of nuclear weapons associated inventories has been enshrined in that Security Council resolution as the definitive shopping list template from which the Iranian Government is to select the nuclear weapons associated assets it wants to procure under United Nations sponsorship.

    Security Council Resolution 2231 (which includes the JCPOA) documents the official United Nations procedure for how Iranian access to nuclear weapons associated inventories is to be facilitated; details how Iranian procurement of said materiel is carried out.

    Ongoing Security Council Progress Reports on the project keep us informed, at six-month intervals, of the continuing success of the undertaking.

    This writing, throughout its chapters explains the process in detail.

    THOSE FAIRLY WELL VERSED in the history of the press in Europe and the United States throughout the last few centuries of the modern era are familiar with how often and easily the news-media is subverted to political ends. The period of the last five years serves as dramatic example of the extreme.

    Over the last five years press in the United States, and Europe as well, has maintained the pretence that Barack Obama's Iran nuclear deal is comprised only of the "Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action" (JCPOA) agreed to in Vienna on July 14, 2015.

    The imbecile press simply refuses to acknowledge that the JCPOA is only a part of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231.

    Security Council Resolution 2231 is the entire nuclear deal; but for the institutional press to acknowledge this; the conglomerate amalgamation of Entities would have to acknowledge the contents of that Security Council resolution and what has actually been agreed to in Obama's Iran nuclear deal – and what has been transpiring over the last five years.

    For example; under Obama's Iran nuclear deal the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is prohibited from investigating or verifying any aspect of Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.##/Part 2a listed inventory packages procured by Iran. The IAEA is also entirely excluded from any knowledge of what Iran has procured off the list.

    This writing explains, among other things; how the Security Council's Resolution 2231; Annex A:JCPOA plan prevents IAEA the verification measures required by treaty – and confirms, from IAEA Board of Governors Reports, that inspections of Iranian procured inventories are not being performed.

    The United Nations Security Council itself publishes its own progress reports documenting, to the extent which the United Nations will allow for, how far this United Nations Security Council project has been carried out throughout the year 2017; and that the practice of the United Nations bureaucracy policy in expediting this effective proliferation of nuclear weapons is intended to be carried on into the indefinite future.

    This writing is a reference guide intended to accompany other books I've written on this topic. As a reference guide it covers the various malign aspects of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 in discrete chapters.

    Aspects of the weapon sales project discussed in this book include:

    Identification of the list of nuclear weapons associated inventories from which the United Nations pledges to expedite procurement of to the benefit of the discretion of use ultimately to be decided upon by the Sovereign Government of Iran.

    Sampling of that above mentioned list of inventories.

    The original intention, Statement of Purpose, of that list; which had been established by the International Atomic

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