Water Policy Science and Politics: An Indian Perspective

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Chapter 1

Introduction

M. Dinesh Kumar

Abstract

This chapter introduces the book Water Policy, Science and Politics: An Indian Perspective. In this chapter, we discuss the dominant views that characterize the water policy debate in India, analyze the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the national and state water policies, and present a conceptual framework that helps analyzing the policy-making process in the water sector internationally, particularly one that explains the increasing choice of certain paradigms and ideas in the water management sector. The framework includes certain additional aspects that characterize the political processes that are unique to water policy making in India. They are increasing the influence of civil society, which upholds certain views on water on policy forums, academic-bureaucrat-politician nexus, spreading of falsehood, and poor application of social sciences in water management. Finally, the contents of the remaining 16 chapters of the volume are outlined chapterwise.

Keywords

Water policy; National and state water policies; Civil society; Academic-bureaucrat-politician nexus; Social sciences; Water management paradigm

1.1 Context

This book is about the interface between the three domains, that is, science, politics, and policy making in India’s water sector. Its key message is about how politics becomes central to policy making in the country’s water sector, and scientific data and information relating water resource status, development, use, and management are collected, analyzed, interpreted, and put in the public domain by various interest groups in the academics, civil society, and water administration in a manner that suits certain political interests. It exposes many problems with the types, analysis, and interpretation of the data that formed the basis for certain key reforms, policy changes, and projects in the interrelated sectors of water, agriculture, energy, and environment.

Issues concerning water have always been a part of the political discourse in independent India, as it serves as basic input for the survival of the people and their socioeconomic development and an environmental good (Iyer, 2005, 2011; Kumar and Pandit, 2016). It is quite imperative that access to and control over water resources is politically contested (Roth et al., 2005). This political discourse had included themes as varied as the technologies for harnessing water (large dams vs. small dams), agricultural development (irrigation vs. rainfed), investments in water resources development (public vs. private), water pricing (actual cost of production vs. subsidized price), basic paradigms for water resources development and management—centralized versus decentralized government and management of water supplies especially for irrigation and drinking water, role of communities in water management—(Kumar and Pandit, 2016), and institutional reforms in the water sector. This political discourse is not only between political parties and movements but also between state and union governments, between government and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and groups, and between government and academia and even between academic groups.

In water policy making, which is an outcome of such political processes, science has often been a casualty (Molle, 2008). The growing influence of civil society groups with strong ideological positions and the increasing presence of academics and researchers, who peddle falsehood, in the policy forums, and the academic-bureaucrat-politician nexus have become the defining feature of this process. There is little attention being paid to hydrologic sciences, climate science, economics, and other social science disciplines that are critical to designing sustainable systems for water management. This applies to overall water resources development strategy, strategies for irrigation development, agricultural development and poverty reduction strategies for backward regions, pricing of water and subsidies, energy pricing in agricultural sector, institutions for managing water supplies, and long-term strategies for dealing with floods and droughts.

The book would discuss the nature of the political discourse on water management in India, what characterizes this discourse, and how this discourse had influenced the process of framing water-related policies that produce certain outcomes in terms of policies, strategies, paradigms, and activities. It provides a framework to explain how certain paradigms and ideas are pursued in the water resources development and management sector internationally, using several of the concepts evolved in the recent past (Molle, 2008; Molle et al., 2008; Whitty and Dercon, 2013). While these paradigms and ideas also find resonance in India’s water policy debates, certain unique characteristics are encountered in the policy-making process in India. They are explained by four distinct phenomena: (i) the academic-bureaucrat-politician nexus; (ii) the increasing presence of academic who spreads falsehood in policy forums; (iii) the growing influence of the civil society groups on policy makers; and (iv) the poor application of social sciences in policy formulation, producing certain policy outcomes that are not supported by sufficient scientific evidence. As a result, the policy outcomes and paradigms in the water and related sectors are also unique. The volume presents several cases from the interrelated sectors of water resources, water supplies, energy, and climate, including some of the most controversial ones to illustrate these phenomena, and discusses how the science has become a casualty in the design of various government programs, projects, schemes, and strategies for these sectors. The book also suggests technical, institutional, legal, and policy alternatives for addressing the problems in the water management sector and specific areas such as irrigation, watershed management, rural and urban water supply, climate mitigation and adaptation, and flood control.

In this chapter, we discuss the dominant views that characterize the water policy debate in India, analyze the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the national and state water policies, and present a conceptual framework to explain the increasing choice of certain paradigms and ideas in the water management sector internationally. The framework includes certain additional aspects that characterize the political processes that are unique to water policy making in India. Finally, the contents of the volume are discussed chapterwise.

1.2 India’ Water Policy: Growing Debate

India poses a unique challenge to water resource managers and policy makers with great spatial heterogeneities in hydrologic regimes, geohydrologic environments, climates, physiographic conditions, and socioecological and cultural environments. The complex socioecology of water in the country is evident from the following facts: The mean annual rainfall in the country varies from as low as 100 mm in Jaisalmer of western Rajasthan to 11,700 mm in Cherrapunji of Meghalaya; the country’s river systems include one of the most complex and mightiest river systems of the world, that is, Brahmaputra, to several hundreds of marginalized ephemeral streams that see flows only for a few hours in the whole year; its groundwater resources include the richest Gangetic alluvium to some of the lowest yielding hard-rock aquifers in the plateau; its human habitations extend from mountainous sub-Himalayan region to the coastal plains; its farming systems include one of the most productive farming systems of the world (in Punjab) to one which is least productive (eastern India); its agricultural withdrawal of groundwater is as high as 1280 m³ per capita per annum in water-scarce Punjab to as low as 130 m³ per capita per annum in water-rich Bihar; and its urban areas include large metros with 30,000 plus persons per square kilometer, to towns that are sparsely populated with less than 1000 persons per square kilometer. The country has provinces that have human development index as high as some of the eastern European countries (such as Kerala) to those that have very low indicators of human development and comparable with some of the East African countries. All these make water management decisions extremely complex not only at the national level but also at the regional and local level.

Given the scenario, a water policy for the country, which aims at sustainable, efficient, equitable, and harmonious use of water, should not try to prescribe what should be the water management action for a given situation. Instead, it should guide the water resource and service managers to take appropriate policy decisions to fit the socioecological context of their geographic areas of operation. The guiding principle for policy formulation should be that the policy document should provide the framework for decision-making about water management, rather than rigid rules and dogmatic norms. Therefore, the policy objectives and criteria for decision-making are important and not the action.¹ However, India’s water policy debate is largely driven by often diametrically opposite views on policy actions and is often characterized by ideological positions on several fundamental issues (see Iyer, 2011).

The following are some of the dominant view that characterizes the debate: (1) who should have ownership of and control over natural resources, especially water resources (the national government or the state governments or the local communities); (2) who can govern and manage water resources (i.e., whether the professionally managed centralized agencies of the state or institutions of local self-governance or local communities); (3) the ideal scale at which water can be managed (i.e., whether at the local level in the village or watershed or at the river basin level or at the subnational or national level); (4) which technology should be used to augment water supplies, whether large water storage/diversion systems or small water harvesting structures; (5) whether water should be treated as a social good or economic good; (6) whether water should be treated as a public good or a private good; and (7) how to regulate water use, whether through top-down state regulations or through social regulation by local communities.

For instance, the fiercest opposition to privatization of water supply services in India comes from those who believe that water should be treated both as a social good and a public good. They believe that privatization of water services would eventually lead to commodification of water with private utilities increasing their profit margins through monopolistic prices, seriously jeopardizing the goal of equitable access and depriving the poor communities of the water for their basic survival. The suggestions for larger institutional reforms such as instituting water rights are also met with similar opposition by these groups, which claim that it would lead to complete privatization of water. They instead advocate community management of water resources and water services, without ever prescribing what should be the basis or norm for the allocation of water across users within the community and where the legal sanctity for such allocation mechanisms could come from (Iyer, 2011; Shah, 2013).

On the other hand, the proponents of water supply privatization also have too little to show that it is the only alternative model available to achieve greater affordability of water and improved efficiency of the utilities (Biswas and Tortajada, 2003).

The main opposition to building of large dams comes from certain civil society groups that view democracy as one where the communities are the ultimate owners of natural resources, and all the powers for taking decisions regarding their development and use should be vested with them or by village-level local self-governments. They perceive the state as an aggressor (Kumar and Pandit, 2016), which leads to the untenable position that water development technologies, which require the involvement of arms of the state for execution, be it large dams with canals or mega water supply projects, are considered detrimental because of the human displacement and ecological destruction, which ultimately lead to social conflicts. They opine that a major transformation of our thinking about water is needed; as according to them, the legal, institutional, and procedural changes would not work to resolve such conflicts beyond a point without such a transformation (see Iyer, 2005).²

Some believe that decisions to build large irrigation/multipurpose projects are part of electoral politics to win voters and are often outcomes of the politician-bureaucrat-technocrat-consultant-contractor nexus (see Bosshard, 2004; Iyer, 2005), which breed corruption. The other points of contention are the absence of mechanisms to compensate for those who are displaced by reservoirs and canals, the unscientific criteria followed for evaluating the cost of large water projects (Shah and Kumar, 2008), and the shoddy rehabilitation carried out in large schemes in the past (Kumar and Pandit, 2016). As noted by Kumar and Pandit (2016), the latter are valid concerns, though the recent experience in the case of the multipurpose Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) in addressing the rehabilitation issues has been positive (Jagadeesan and Kumar, 2015).

Corruption is a major concern in all public works in India and needs to be tackled through concerted efforts. But as noted by Kumar and Pandit (2016), the corruption argument is not used against decentralized water conservation projects implemented by village Panchayats under MGNREGA, which are often characterized by rampant corruption, nepotism, and favoritism, leading to bad planning decisions, poor designs, poor siting of structures, and inferior quality of construction (World Bank, 2011). They ignore the fact that achieving transparency and accountability in such activities in rural areas is next to impossible, as one cannot even properly estimate the amount of earthwork involved (see, e.g., Ambasta et al., 2008). Instead, the operational guidelines for the implementation of MGNREGA were revised, and the new guidelines were supposed to have come out with mechanisms for eliminating the scope of corruption (see Shah, 2012), though nothing much has changed on the ground. The belief is that the Panchayats would always act in the interests of the communities and are relatively corruption-free, and even if it is not so, enough checks and balance could be created at the local level to protect the community interests.

On the other hand, the proponents of these models of water resources development, which involve building of large reservoirs in water-rich catchments and canal systems for transfer of water to water-scarce regions, still do not employ criteria for evaluating such projects, which are comprehensive enough to capture all costs and benefits (Shah and Kumar, 2008), while resettlement and rehabilitation remain as contentious issues for many large projects.

1.3 Ineffective National and State Water Policies

India had its first National Water Policy in 1987, the second one in 2002 and the third one in 2012. All these policy documents highlighted the importance of provision of water for basic survival needs and had given top most priority to drinking water (water for human needs) in water allocation decisions. However, neither did these policies prescribe nor these policies were followed by creation of rules and norms and institutional mechanisms for ensuring water allocation for ensuring drinking water security. The water policies of the provincial governments also give top most priority to drinking water. However, when it comes to norms and institutional mechanisms for water allocation, nothing really exists on the ground. Once drought is declared in a district, the district collectors have the power to freeze surface reservoirs for making the water available for drinking purpose. However, the existing laws are inadequate to deal with groundwater, as the de facto rights in groundwater are still attached to land ownership rights. No state government has so far been able to effectively regulate groundwater mining for irrigation during droughts and earmark wells for drinking water supply.

An important prescription in the water policy documents of 2002 (Government of India, 2002) and 2012 (Government of India, 2012) is the need for taking the river basin as the unit for planning of water resources, in order to promote sustainable water resources development. However, so far, no attempts were made to implement this idea, and various agencies concerned with water resources development and management in India continue to act independently in a sectoral and segmented manner.

The resource assessment and planning of groundwater and surface-water resources are carried out separately (by the respective agencies concerned both at the central level and state level), without caring for their interconnectedness. The hydraulic interconnectedness of surface water and groundwater is not considered in the water allocation decisions of interstate water dispute tribunals (Ranade, 2005). Studies have shown that intensive use of groundwater in the upper catchments of river basins results in reduced streamflows, as excessive groundwater draft reduces the lean season flows (base flow) (Kumar, 2010).

Similarly, the wing of Water Resources Department of various state governments, which carry out catchment-wise assessment of surface-water potential and plan large and medium irrigation/multipurpose water projects, does not take cognizance of the myriad of minor irrigation and watershed development projects that are being planned within these catchments by the Minor Irrigation Department and Watershed Development Agency, respectively, and vice versa (Kumar, 2010). Such uncoordinated planning leads to overappropriation of the resource at the basin level. Intensive watershed development and desilting of tanks, etc. causes reduce inflows into reservoir downstream (Batchelor et al., 2003). In summary, the policies have not resulted in any organizational restructuring within India’s water administration for coordinated basin-wide planning of water resources.

The water policies of 2002 and 2012 did recognize the need to treat water as an economic good and that the pricing of water to reflect its scarcity value. Yet, no state government is willing to charge for water supplied from public irrigation schemes on volumetric basis. The water cess charged on the basis of crop area and crop type is heavily subsidized, not even covering the full operation and maintenance costs of the schemes (Kumar, 2017). In very few cities and towns in India, the municipalities/corporations or the autonomous water utilities charge for water supplies on volumetric basis and that too not all domestic water connections are metered (Asian Development Bank, 2007; Kumar, 2014b). This is in spite of the growing evidence of the price elasticity of domestic water demand from other parts of the world (Hoffman et al., 2006) and the importance of water pricing in managing demand. Water prices that are not based on actual volumetric consumption leave no incentive among the consumers to use water efficiently and reduce