India and Taiwan: From Benign Neglect to Pragmatism

The Republic of China: How the British were outmanoeuvred in diplomacy over the question of Tibet

B. R. Deepak

Tibet, from the very beginning of 20th century was a bone of contention between China and the British. In order to open Tibet for trade, and more so to check the Russian advance, Britain invaded Tibet in 1904, and forced Lhasa Convention on Tibet. Xinhai Revolution or the Revolution of 1911 led by Sun Yat-sen overthrew the Manchus in an armed rebellion.¹ The Chinese garrison at Lhasa had revolted and deposed the last Manchu Amban² in Tibet. The killing of Zhao Erfeng, a Han Chinese bannerman Amban, and brain behind the Chinese expansion in eastern Tibet in December 1911 proved to be a signal for widespread revolt. According to Liu (1921: 540), the Tibetans under the influence of Kalon (the commander of the Tibetan forces in east) declared independence and in March, Tibetan forces at Kelunbu were first to raise the banner of revolt. Following this the entire Tibetan region was engulfed in revolt. The Chinese forces stationed in Outer and Inner Tibet were either subdued or forced to surrender their weapons and leave Tibet. Liu also goes on to say that in late June, Tibetan forces invaded Sichuan and occupied Batang, Litang and Daqianlu. In Chamdo, the Chinese garrison under Peng Rishi destroyed the Chamdo monastery.³

After the fall of the Qing Dynasty, and subsequent expulsion of the Chinese military and other civil officials from Lhasa, the Tibetans under the Dalai Lama exercised de facto independence for the next 39 years. China under the Republicans however, declined to accept this status of Tibet and tried to exert its control on Tibet in one way or another from time to time. The British on their part worked closely with the Tibetan government but were outmanoeuvred by the Chinese in diplomacy.

The Republican government under Yuan Shikai was reluctant to discontinue the Manchu policy of establishing Ambans in Tibet, albeit under a new name, the Administrator of Tibet. In September 1913, it sent orders to Zhong Ying to replace Lian Yu as Amban (Lamb 1966: 381). The presence of Zhong Ying, who was the commander of the Chinese expeditionary forces to Lhasa in 1910, infuriated the Tibetans and fighting broke out yet again. A truce agreement was signed in the presence of the Nepalese resident on December 14, 1913, and Zhong Ying finally retreated from Lhasa to the Indian borders. While still in Chumbi Valley, he received orders from China to stay back in Tibet. Finally, Lu Xingzhi, who the British considered a Chinese spy (Lamb 1966: 398-400), was appointed as Administrator of Tibet but was never permitted to enter Lhasa. Meanwhile, Lian Yu had reached Peking and incited the rulers of Peking against Zhong Ying, blaming him for the Chinese disaster in Tibet. Zhong Ying was finally executed in 1915 by Yuan Shikai government for his crimes in Tibet.

1.   The Simla Conference

After Tibet proclaimed independence, the British did not recognise it as an independent state but changed its policy of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet to one of autonomous Tibet. The British were probably not in position to recognise Tibetan independence due to the existing treaties with China. Another reason could be the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 that had reinforced the Chinese suzerainty in Tibet, which is often cited by the British historians as a reason for their non-intervention in Tibet. However, other factors such as the collapse of the Chinese control in Tibet after the Revolution of 1911, the Dalai Lama’s support for the British during his exile in Darjeeling (1910-13), the financial difficulties of Yuan’s government, provincial disorder as well as international recognition for the nascent ROC, and the increased Japanese interest in Tibet might have forced the British policy makers to pressure China into accepting the status of Tibet.

It may be recalled at this moment that the main aim of the British was to create a buffer between China and the British dominions along Himalayan states at first instance, and subsequently establish a protectorate over Tibet. The British policy change was hastened by the Chinese pronouncements of forging the union of five races,⁴ the preparations of a military expedition from Sichuan to Lhasa, and the Chinese proposal to carve a province (Xikang) out of eastern Tibet (Richardson 1998: 541-2; Richardson 1962: 104-5; Lamb 1966: 427). Moreover, the British were apprehensive about Mongolia and Xinjiang falling into the hands of the Russians, hence their desire for at least establishing their control in Tibet. The Russo-Mongolian Treaty of 1912, which accepted Chinese suzerainty in Mongolia but agreed to preserve Mongolian autonomy, further encouraged the British to design and apply the same scheme of things in Tibet on one hand and make the Russians accept the British position in Tibet in exchange for the British accepting the Russian position in Mongolia on the other. Thus the British strategy in real terms was to redefine the status of Tibet to its own advantage and confirm this by a tripartite agreement between the Chinese, the Tibetans and themselves.

The Chinese on their part wanted to reassert their control on Tibet, which they had lost in the wake of 1911 revolution. The Tibetans obviously wanted to assert independence over the entire Tibetan population, including Kham and Amdo in eastern Tibet, and wanted the Chinese to evacuate these places. In order to realise the British ambitions in Tibet, Sir John Jordan, the British Minister in Beijing, made the first move on 17 August 1912. Jordan presented a five point memorandum to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, protesting against the Chinese military intervention in eastern Tibet and demanding that:

1.   China should not intervene in the internal affairs of Tibet.

2.   As a suzerain, China is free to station a resident in Tibet but not forces.

3.   The policy of the Chinese government of incorporating Tibet as a province of China should be repudiated.

4.   If the Chinese government does not give a written acceptance of points 1-3, Great Britain would not recognise the Republic of China.

5.   Great Britain would close all its borders to Chinese until China made a declaration to the effect of above-mentioned demands.⁵

The Chinese government was baffled. They did not accept these proposals when they replied to Jordan’s proposals on 23 December 1912. China declared that it would not convert Tibet into a province of China but reserved the right to dispatch troops to Lhasa for fulfilling the treaty obligations and maintaining peace; it further asserted that there was no need to conclude a fresh treaty as the old treaties were still in place (Wang 1998: 27; Li 1956: 133; Lamb 1966: 462). Citing article II of the Sino-Indian Convention of 1906 (The government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet) and the indemnity cleared by China on behalf of Tibet in 1908, it stated that China had exerted its control over Tibet (Liu 1921: 541; Li 1956: 131-2).

Moreover, the reply asked why did not the British protest when China sent Zhao Erfeng with expeditionary forces into Tibet in 1910-11? According to the Chinese, the question of Tibet was settled between the British and Chinese by the Convention of 1906. Not only this, in 1907 the Anglo-Russian Convention on Tibet also recognised Chinese suzerainty in Tibet. However, due to disturbances in many Chinese provinces and other weaknesses, the Chinese government repudiated its initial policy of sending expeditionary forces to Lhasa and reluctantly agreed to participate in a conference in London. The British on their part insisted on Tibetan participation and the venue was fixed at Darjeeling (Liu 1921: 542). The Chinese chose Wen Zongyao as its plenipotentiary but Wen refused to go to India. Wen opined that the Chinese would be better off if the negotiations were held in London not in India. Yuan Shikai then named Zhang Yintang, but the British had not forgotten his participation in the negotiations for the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906. Therefore, Zhang was not acceptable to the British. Yuan chose yet another person, Chen Yifan (Ivan Chen), who had been Counsellor at the Chinese Legation in London and was acceptable to the British (Lamb 1966: 470; Li 1956: 135). The British appointed Sir Henry McMahon, the Indian Foreign Secretary, to be assisted by Charles Bell. The Tibetans selected Lonchen Shatra, a senior minister in the Dalai Lama government. The Chinese were reluctant to accept Shatra’s status as a plenipotentiary and suggested he be an adjoint to the Chinese representative [as was the case during 1908 Trade Regulations negotiations], but the British insisted for equal status. With British insistence the venue was also shifted from Darjeeling to Simla.

Tripartite negotiations began on 13 October 1913 at Simla with Henry McMahon in the Chair. The Chinese scholars are of the view that Sir Charles Bell had already discussed with Lonchen Shatra the agenda of the conference, and had actively conspired the disintegration of China and flared up Tibetan independence (Wang 1998: 27-8; Li 1956: 135). They accuse the British of extending hospitality to the Tibetans and conducting many rounds of talks with them even before the arrival of Chen Yifan in Simla and beginning of the Simla Conference. The British on their part blamed China for procrastination and postponement, and uphold that since the Conference was planned to start on 1 July 1913, the Chinese plenipotentiary appeared very reluctant to leave China and asked for postponement (Lamb 1966: 474; Bell 1926: 152).

During the negotiations, Lonchen Shatra, the Tibetan plenipotentiary, submitted a proposal consisting of six demands. The proposal apart from declaring Tibet an independent state, questioned the validity of Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906; it also claimed territory in Kham (eastern Tibet) that was recently conquered by Zhao Erfeng and also demanded that Daqianlu and Kokonor [Qinghai] be returned to Tibet. The Chinese historians (Liu 1921: 571) point out yet another demand: that the British troops be stationed at Lhasa temporarily and Tibet put under British supervision, though Lamb and other British writers do not mention this point. Obviously, Tibetan territorial claims in eastern Tibet were not acceptable to the Chinese. In the words of Bell (1926: 152), It should be stated that all these districts form part of Tibet, but some of them have been brought more or less under Chinese control during the last two hundred years. The Chinese counter proposal envisaged that Tibet be regarded as an integral part of China; China undertake not to convert Tibet into a province; China retain the right to appoint an Amban at Lhasa with 2,600 soldiers; Tibet should have no relation with foreign countries except through the Chinese; the Tibetan boundary should be fixed at Giamda, just 100 miles from Lhasa [the line was suggested by Fu Songmu after Zhao Erfeng’s conquest in the eastern Tibet] (Liu 1921: 572-3; Lamb 1966: 479-80; Richardson 1962, 108). According to the British (Lamb 1966: 280; Richardson 1962: 108), the documentary evidence produced by the Tibetan delegate at Simla Conference far outweighed the Chinese claim for territory, Chen had with him little more than a pamphlet by Fu Songmu on the campaigns of Zhao Erfeng and a few European works on Tibet. It can be discerned from the accounts of Sir Charles Bell (1926: 153) that the Tibetans were undoubtedly instructed by the British to be prepared for any documentary