State Power, Agrarian Policies and Peasant Welfare: Politics of Agricultural Marketing and Commodity Boards in Nigeria

Contents

Dedication

Acknowledgements

Preface

List Of Maps

List Of Tables

Abbreviations

Chapter I:   Introduction The State, Capital Accumulation And Peasants

Nationalist Movements And Political Promises

Statement Of The Research Problem

Development And The Peasantry

Propositions To Be Investigated

Significance Of The Study

Synopsis Of The Chapters

Chapter II:   Research Design And Methodology

2.1 Research Design And Methodology

2.2 Objective Versus Subjective Approaches

2.3 Population Of Interest

2.4 Data Collection Procedures

2.5 Sampling The Peasants

2.6 Problems Encountered And Attempted Solutions

2.7 Modes Of Analysis

Chapter III:   State Power, Agrarian Policies And Peasant Welfare: A Framework For Analysis

Neutrality And Common Good State

Corporativism And The Common Good State

Dependent Or Autonomous State

Dependence And Relative Autonomy: Neo-Marxist Approaches To State And State Power

State Autonomy: State Centered Approaches To The State And State Power

The State And State Power In Post-Colonial Societies

The Overdeveloped State Debate

The Overdeveloped Post-Colonial State And Social Classes

The Post-Colonial State And Cultural Pluralism

Irrational State And Rational Peasants

The State As Relay

State And The Peasantry: A Post-Structural Perspective

Conclusion

Chapter IV:   Colonialism, Peasants And Order

Introduction

The Colonial State, The Peasantry And Social Order

Peasant-State Relations In Nigeria Before World War Ii

Colonial Economic Crisis And State Action

Conclusion

Chapter V:   The State, Legitimatization And The Peasantry: Expropriation And Social Transportation

Introduction

The State, Price Stabilization And The Peasantry: Extraction And Accumulation Of Peasant Surpluses

The State, National Development And The Peasantry: Surplus Appropriation And Social Transformation

Conclusion

Chapter VI:   Oil, Peasants And Regimes: Bureaucratic Influence And State Policy

Introduction

Persistent State Intervention, Oil Boom And The Crisis Of Peasant Production

Alternative Explanation Of The Nigerian Agricultural Crisis

The State, The New Nigerian Commodity Boards, And The Peasantry: Continuity And Change

Basis For The Survival Of The Boards Since 1977

Operations Of The New Nigerian Commodity Boards: From Surpluses To Deficits

The New Search For Alliances: The Commodity Boards, Crop Producers And The Local Processors

Conclusion

Chapter VII:   State Regulation, Peasant Perceptions And Rural Stratification: Gwer Division (Benue State), Nigeria

Introduction:

Research Context And Setting: Basic Information About Gwer Division

State Regulation, Peasant Perception And Rural Stratification: Data Analysis And Discussion

Peasant Perceptions Of Inequality In The Boards’ Policies And Around Them

Peasant Perceptions Of The Other (Non-Marketing) Functions Of The Boards

Social Constraints And Economic Rationality: Peasant Household Marketing Decisions

Surviving With The Boards: Continuity And Change In Peasant Crop Production

Peasant Perspectives On Their Duties And Rights Regarding The State In Gwer Division

State Regulation And Rural Stratification

Research Findings In Comparative Perspective

Conclusion

Chapter VIII:   State Power, Agrarian Policies And Peasant Welfare: A Conclusion

Towards A Search For The More Encompassing Approach To The State

Recapitulation

Policy Implications

Suggestion For Future Research

Bibliography

Appendix I

Appendix Ii

Appendix Iii

Appendix Iv

About The Author

About The Book

DEDICATION

This book is dedicated to the peasants in Nigeria. It is they who have towed under the colonial and post-colonial era up to date, to generate the wealth and ‘surpluses’ being unfairly and unfortunately appropriated by the State, dominant classes and groups for national development and capital accumulation to the total exclusion and impoverishment of the peasants.

May this book inspire you and your children to come to the realization that the responsibility for safeguarding peasant interest and welfare lies with you! It remains to be seen whether you would take the necessary actions that would drastically advance your interests and welfare vis a vis the state bureaucrats, dominant classes and groups.

It is also dedicated to my late mother, Mama Nyinwoo Mou and late Father, Pa Mou Anye Adagi. Even though you have long been gone, your love and counsel sustain me daily, for which I am ever grateful.

Acknowledgements

Accomplishing any task in life, small or big, requires God moving other men and women to make contributions to it. This book has not been an exception. It is impossible to even mention all the persons who helped me in the course of writing this book.

My departure from the University of Jos, Nigeria to the University of Wisconsin-Madison, U.S.A., where this book was written, required the approval of several people. I am grateful to the then Head of Department of Political Science, University of Jos, Professor J. Isawa Elaigwu and the then Dean of Social Sciences, Professor Justin Tseayo, who recommended my application for release to the then Registrar of the University, Mr. George Korgba and the then Vice-Chancellor, Professor E. Emovon who gave their kind approval.

My deepest appreciation goes also to Professors Crawford Young; Fred Hayward and Murray Edelman of the Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, U.S.A. and Professor Jan Vansina of the African Studies Programme of the same university. They all read the entire manuscript and made useful suggestions. I believe their inputs have greatly improved the quality of this book.

During the field work in Nigeria, the following friends and relatives provided assistance in one way or the other, for which I am grateful: Professors Oga Ajene, Oculi Okelo, Tony Edoh and Tar Adejir of the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. Benjamin I. Adamu of the Central Bank of Nigeria and Solomon Ubah and Emmanuel Agum who were General Managers with the Nigerian Marketing and Commodity Boards provided great assistance with data collection and offered me free accommodation in their houses or guest houses.

In preparing this final manuscript for publication, my Special Assistant, Joseph Wanshe and my son Truth Tine Mou, did the proofreading and final touches. It was also they who advised its simultaneous publication as a paperback and e-book with AuthorHouse Publishing, U.S.A. I am grateful for their time and efforts.

I am also very thankful for the contributions of the wonderful team at AuthorHouse Publishing Company in Bloomington, Indiana, U.S.A., especially my Publishing Consultant, Cesar Lambo and Check-in Coordinator, Valerie Raines.

As with every book I have ever written, my wife Mimidoo Osewe Mou and our Children have always shown support, love and understanding that made it easy for me to write. For this, I am very grateful to them. The ultimate gratitude for this book, however, goes to God. It is His Empowerment and Divine Direction that made it all possible. May His Grace over my life endure forever and ever in Jesus’ Name, Amen.

Dan Mou,

Aso Rock Villa,

Abuja, Nigeria

Dec., 2013.

Preface

The role of the state in Nigeria, as in most other African countries, has become a subject of intense debate. This is not altogether surprising given the extensive involvement of these states in their economies and societies, generally, to promote capital accumulation, reason of state and national development. The agricultural sector, for instance, has been subjected to state regulation and control. Yet the historical basis for such policies or state actions in Africa is far from being clearly understood or even comprehensively theorized. The political economy, the structures, agents and interests underlying such policies have not been effectively and comprehensively investigated.

This book attempts to identify and explain the politico-historical forces that underlie agrarian policies in one African country—Nigeria. It also examines the impact of these policies on different social classes and groups, especially the peasantry. To provide a substantive basis for this discussion, it focused specifically on the Agricultural Marketing and Commodity Boards in Nigeria from 1945-1985. These boards are examined as state agencies and actions that have direct implications for different classes and groups. Peasant welfare and productivity are used as the main dependent variables. State actions or agrarian policies are considered as the major independent variables: Interactive variables include social classes, cultural plural groups, external environments. international actors and other issues such as technology, population, drought. research and extension. The impacts of these variables on the peasantry are assumed to be conditioned by or even determined by state action.

One of the major findings of this book is that a great rift exists between policy statements and policy outcomes. It is erroneous for anyone to assume that publicly stated policies are implemented as originally intended. Whatever the alleged noble intention of state policies, that by itself is not sufficient evidence to conclude that the outcomes of such policies will be realized as originally intended. This is because policy proclamations are often not implemented as intended. In the process of implementation, the original goals could be obstructed, distorted, diverted or even inverted by the prevailing structures, agents and interests. Thus, concrete investigations of specific social formations are needed to establish whatever correlation (or lack of it) that exists between policy proclamations and implementation.

In the case of Nigeria, this book shows that the agrarian policies were not implemented in a social vacuum. The various social classes and groups contested every step of the agrarian policies right from their agenda setting to actual implementation. Consequently, the contestations affected drastically the policies and outcomes in such a way that the original goals were lost. In short, it reveals that those who benefited from the activities of the Agricultural Marketing and Commodity Boards in Nigeria were not the ones who were officially proclaimed as the policy targets.

This book demonstrates, however, how official proclamations are not independent of the policies but are part and parcel of them. Without such governmental promises, it would be impossible to secure the cooperation. docility and quiescence of subordinate classes and groups. These policies had negative impact on the citizens’ most cherished interests and welfare.

The Agricultural Marketing and Commodity Boards in Nigeria utilized such legitimization symbols as price stabilization and national development during the colonial and post-colonial eras. These legitimized symbols served as psychological distractions and rewards to the peasantry while simultaneously allowing the state to promote capital accumulation. These accumulations were then utilized to expand state bureaucracies and nurture domestic capitalism in Nigeria. During the colonial era, the accumulations were expatriated to Britain to foster post-war reconstruction.

When examining the consequences of state intervention (both during and after colonial rule) in the marketing of peasant crops, the book shows, both objectively and subjectively, that the results have been fundamentally negative. The problem encompasses more than the issue of free markets. Thus, much of what is conventionally stated as being in Peasants interests—such as price stabilization and national development—are mere political language to prevent or minimize peasant revolts. The Boards, this book reveals, had consistently worked against the interests of the peasantry since their establishment.

Regardless of whether the Boards procedures led to national development, this worthy goal was irrelevant to the reality of peasant interests and welfare. It was the peasantry who produced the surpluses prior to the oil boom in Nigeria. Enriched by the author’s experience in administrative execution of Nigerian State agrarian policies, the book incorporates both subjective and objective perspectives. It concludes with policy recommendations and suggestions for future research. Basically then, this book is simultaneously an earnest effort in theoretical exposition and a concrete investigation of and reflections on agrarian policies in Nigeria.

Dan Mou

Aso Rock Villa,

Abuja, Nigeria.

December, 2013

List of Maps

1.   Railway Networks in Nigeria and the 19 States of the Federation. Today Nigeria has 36 States and a Federal Capital Territory, Abuja (See Map).

2.   Agricultural Zones of Nigeria

3.   Benue State of Nigeria Showing LGAs at the time the research was undertaken.

4.   Gwer Local Government Showing District Areas (Clans)

5.   Special Distribution of Population in Nigeria

6.   Agricultural Development Projects in Nigeria, 1982

List of Tables

1.1   Sub-Saharan Africa-PL-480 Food Assistance

1.2   Estimated Population of Nigeria

1.3   Imports of Principal Food Commodities, 1970-78

1.4   Agricultural and Petroleum Exports, 1960-1980

2.1   Total Population, Taxable Male Adults and Selected Respondents by Clan in Gwer Division Of Benue State, Nigeria

4.1   Quantity (in tons) and Percentage Increase in Nigeria Principal Exports 1900-1930

4.2   Percentage Fall in the Unit Value of Major Nigerian Exports, 1929 to 1934

4.3   Firms Share of Produce Trade

5.1   Nigeria: Producer Prices as Percentage of World Prices.

5.2   Levies on the Producers of West African Exports Under Statutory Marketing, 1949-1951

5.3   Commodity and Percentage of Producers Income Withdrawn by the Marketing Boards, 1947-1962

5.4   Accumulation by Nigerian Commodity Boards, 1947-1934

5.5   Total Transfer of Assets from Nigerian Commodity Marketing Boards to Nigerian Regional Marketing Boards

5.6   Total Accumulation by Nigerian Regional Marketing Boards, 1954-61.

5.7   Disposal of Funds of Nigerian Commodity Marketing Boards Cumulative Grants, Investment and Loans Outstanding, 1947-54

5.8   Disposal of Nigerian Regional Marketing Board Funds: Grants, Investment and Loans Outstanding, 1955-61

5.9   Sectoral Distribution of Total Gainful Employment 1975

5.10   Value of Industrial Investment in Nigeria by National Origin in 1964

5.11   Commercial Banks Operating in Nigeria by Nationality, 1964

6.1   Public Investment Programs by Sector, 1955-80

6.2   Nigerian Exports, 1958-1979

6.3   Consumer Price Index: All Items and Food 1966-1977.

6.4   Acreage, Yield and Production of Major Food Crops, 1969/70 to 1974/75

6.5   Nigerian Food Imports, 1970-1980

6.6a   Sources of Nigeria’s Food Imports in 1967, 1970 and 1973

6.61,   Sources of Nigeria’s Grain Imports, 1980-84

6.7   Commodity Boards’ Purchases, 1977-1983

6.8   Loans Granted to Commodity Boards from 1976/77 to 1983/84

6.9   Ratio of Purchase to Output in Percentage

6.10   Estimates of Price Support for Commodity Boards Operations in Respect of Local Sales

6.11a 1979/80 Distribution of Inputs to States

6.11.b 1980/81 Seed and Chemical Distribution to States

6.11c 1981/82 Seed and Chemical Distribution to States

6.12a Purchases Figures

6.12b Sales Figures

7.1   Farmers Cooperative Unions in Benue State Produce Purchases and Produce Purchases Advances

7.2   Peasants Households Production Strategy and the Reasons for It

7.3   Farm Land Adequacy and Methods of Acquisition by the Peasants

7.4   Profession Before or at the Time of Turning to Farming

7.5   Sources of Income Outside of Farming

7.6   Working on Neighbors Farms for Some Income

7.7   Loans to Gwer Peasants Towards Crop Production

7.8   Peasant Perceptions and Reasons for Their Sale or Non-Sale of Crops to the Boards

7.9   Peasant Perceptions of Cheating by the Buying Agents and Local Produce Buyers

7.10   Peasants Perceptions of State Regulation of Agricultural Prices and their Reasons

7.11   Peasant Perceptions Regarding Selling their Produce in the Open Market

7.12   Peasant Perceptions Concerning the Differential Impact of Civilian and Military Regimes on the Boards’ Prices for their Produce

7.13   Peasants’ Perceptions Concerning the Differential Impacts of the Boards on Them and How the LBAs are Chosen

7.14   Peasant Perception of Class Differences and Class Advantages in Dealing with the Boards

7.15   Peasants Attitudes Toward the Abolition of the Boards

7.16   Peasants Perceptions of the Other Functions of the Boards

7.17   Peasants Preference for Who Should be the Price Setter for their Produce and the Reasons for it

7.18   The Actual Sale Times at Which Peasants Sold their Produce

7.19   Peasant Perceptions of Preferable Sale Times and the Reasons Why they Sold Other Times

7.20   Continuity and Change in Peasant Crop Production

7.21   Peasant Perceptions of their Duties and Rights Regarding the State

7.22   Relationship Between Appointment as Local Buying Agents and Support for State Regulation

7.23   Relationship between Appointment as LGAs and Selling to the Boards

7.24   Relationship between Appointment as Local Buying Agents and Big Farmer Status

7.25   Relationship between Appointment as Local Buying Agents and Belief that It Benefits those Appointed

7.26   Relationship between Appointment as LBAS and Non-Farm Income

7.27   Relationship between Appointment as LBA and Belief that it Benefits those Appointed More

Abbreviations

Chapter I

Introduction

The State, Capital Accumulation and Peasants

Chapter I

Introduction

The State, Capital Accumulation and Peasants

The history and politics of African societies since independence, broadly speaking, do not present a hopeless case, despite what the current crises of development and mass starvation would lead us to believe.¹ Of course, for the majority of Africans, particularly the peasantry and urban poor, life continues full of frustrated aspirations.² But for the few elites, there is no question that there have been significant improvements in their material conditions, status and power unparalleled in African history.³ This seems generally true of the whole continent regardless of how we define significant improvements. This phenomenon appears well-captured by Richard Joseph’s phraseology of affluence and underdevelopment.⁴ As Joseph observes, it is intriguing to see the extent of affluence that exists amidst extreme poverty in most African countries.⁵ This was not anticipated at independence.

Nationalist Movements and Political Promises

By the l930s, nationalism had begun to grow in West Africa. From the second World War onwards, nationalist movements became more intensive and the order of the day.⁶ Africans were promised by their nationalist leaders that political independence would usher in solutions to social, political and economic problems, that there would be a fuller life for everyone. As Kwame Nkrumah, a leading African nationalist of his time, put it: seek ye first the political kingdom, and all else shall be added unto you.⁷ A lot was promised, yet so little was realized or even realizable. This has probably been due to the paucity of resources in certain cases, lack of proper foresight and reckless policy-making in others with resources (potential and actual); and, above all, the immensity of the problems Africans inherited at independence.⁸ Thus, disillusionment was bound to set in, at least for the majority.

By the late 1950s, some of the imperialist powers began to concede formal independence to some African nations. In the wake of the euphoria that came with that degree of independence, the masses were led to believe that a rosy future lay just ahead. Crawford Young recaptures this mood eloquently:

Nationalism was acquiring its aura of invincibility; in this mood of impending political triumph intellectuals were beginning the quest for a definition of the economic and social purposes of independence. The unanticipated speed with which formal colonialism was crumbling opened exhilarating vistas; if the once—omnipotent imperial occupant could be defeated by the forces of liberation, surely the lesser dragons of poverty, ignorance, and disease could be put to rout. The moral energies so effectively mobilized in anti-colonial struggle could now be directed toward the goal of development. All that was needed was a valid blueprint for the future . . .⁹

Post-independence national development plans preambles were based on broad egalitarian precepts which were often an extension of the nationalist rhetoric of the independence struggle.¹⁰ They included: commitment to equal opportunities and greater equality in the standard of living, development of opportunities in industry, education, health and full employment. Agriculture was to receive the highest priority since the majority of people were involved in it for their livelihood and prosperity. At this moment, it was easily forgotten that political language, in all its elegance and fancy, is merely words that succeed and policies that fail.¹¹

These promises fired the imagination of different sections of the African populations, especially the urban population which it was assumed, stood directly to gain from independence. But when it came to fulfilling these promises, it became clear that a gulf separated reality from expectation. Within a few years after independence, the hopes had collapsed. For the bulk of African population, disillusionment had set in.

Today, hindsight shows that political independence was not a panacea for the provision of life in abundance for everyone. A new African elite, it seems, had simply stepped into the place vacated by the former colonial masters. The lot of the masses has not improved as fast as they were led to expect. In some instances, it has degenerated.¹²

Agriculture, on which the greatest percentage of the people depend, is largely ignored although official rhetoric does not admit it. Per capita output from the agricultural sector for most African countries is fast declining or stagnating¹³ The overwhelming dependence on this sector, however, has remained quite high. Robert H. Bates estimates, for instance, that:

In most African economies, agriculture generates nearly 50 percent of the gross domestic product and employs more than 70 percent of the labor force. Agriculture produces nearly one-third of Africa’s merchandise exports. Prior to the discovery of oil in Africa, it provided nearly two-thirds.¹⁴

Urbanization is currently very high. Part of the explanation for this, as this study will attempt to show, stems from the nature of agrarian policies pursued since independence. These policies have combined to make rural Africa unattractive both in economic and social sense. Christopher L. Delgado and John W. Mellor have noted, for example:

Urbanization has occurred at the rate of 6.5% per annum over the 1960s and 1970s. As of 1979, 17 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s labor force was in the urban service sector, compared with 71 percent in agriculture . . . Rapid migration of labor to urban areas and consequent labor shortage in agriculture results from very low productivity in agriculture and very high urban wages . . . . Overall rural-urban income disparities on the continent typically range between 1:4 and 1:9, compared with many countries in Asia with ratios of 1:2 to 1:2.5¹⁵

Yet elementary and secondary school drop-outs are daily deserting the rural areas for the towns in search of jobs which are seldom available.¹⁶ The new political elites are incapable of tackling post-independence socio-economic problems. In some African countries, coupled with the prolonged drought, and civil strife (sometimes externally masterminded), there has since been mass starvation. People are starving to death on the streets (see map of Africa below). In some cases these countries have had to rely heavily on food aid from countries such as the United States with all the political, strategic, and economic consequences that are normally associated with such aid in the contemporary world system (see Table 1.1). Neither are they able to provide moral and civic leadership.¹⁷ As is to be expected, the political machinery set up at independence in most African countries has crumbled. Political instability and civil violence continue as exemplified by the numerous military coups and counter coups, even though democracy is now making strong inroads into the continent as well.¹⁸

Recent official studies have revealed equally gloomy statistics.¹⁹ Rates of economic growth (are) less encouraging, falling mainly toward the lower end of the 3-6% range. With population burgeoning at an average 2.5%, per capita G.N.P. growth overall averaged out at 1.7% for the oil importers, substantially below the 4.1% for the industrialized nations and the 3.5% for the developing world. These were meager results for a population so desperately poor (average per capita GNP for 46 developing African countries had reached only $153 in 1968) . . .²⁰

The Berg Report came up with equally distressing statistics. The 1970s, it showed, failed to sustain the pace of growth that existed between 1960-1970 in Africa. Per capita income in Sub-saharan Africa in the 1970s dropped to -0.4 percent for oil-importing countries. Thus, aggregate figures for the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa showed only a minimal positive growth of 0.8 percent; but even this is due mainly to the 2.6 percent achieved by oil-exporting African countries.²¹ Further, current accounts deficits for Sub-Saharan African countries instead jumped from $1.5 billion in 1970 to $8 billion in 1980. In addition to these deficits, external indebtedness sprang up from $6 billion to $32 billion within roughly the same period.²²

Why has there been such a divergence between expectation and performance? Could this be because of the nature of the policies adopted and implemented by African States? In short, how is state power being used in Africa? What has been the impact of these state policies on different sectors of the economy, groups and classes?

For assessing the impact of state policies on the different sectors, groups and classes, these statistics are not quite illuminating. That is to say, a disaggregation of these data or collection of new data appears needed for studying not just development but issues of inequality or exploitations in Africa. Despite the advances in technology and data processing procedures, official and mainstream research data is still collected in such crude neo-classical economic aggregates and averages as Gross National Product, Income per Capita, National Income, et. In short, it is now commonplace in the development literature on Africa to talk of per capita income for, say, Sub-Saharan Africa as if it was one country. Such data actually tell little about the relative position of different groups and classes. What do such statistics tell about peasant welfare vis-a-vis the other groups or classes in Africa, for instance? While such data may be useful for other purposes, it would seem to underestimate the real conditions of the majority in these societies. At worst, they actually appear to mystify the extent of inequalities or exploitation through state policies of different sectors, groups or classes in Africa.

Statement of the Research Problem

This study, however, is concerned only with Nigeria. Even then, it limits itself to an examination of the relationship between state power, agrarian policies and peasant welfare.²³ To the extent that the majority of Nigerians still live in rural areas and pursue peasant agriculture, one would seem justified in focusing on this sector. Despite several years of independence, Nigeria is still basically an agrarian society.

Moreover, most of the food and cash crops in Nigeria, except where they have been imported, are still provided by these peasants. Plantation agriculture is almost non-existent in Nigeria. Government farms exist on a limited scale. These are run by parastatals such as the River Basic Authorities and the Agricultural Ministries (sometimes in conjunction with international donor agencies). However, their share of national agricultural output is quite minimal. The government policy of encouraging plantation agriculture has led to forceful takeover of peasants’ plots for rich individuals and companies to start large-scale plantation farming. While this is succeeding rapidly in dislocating peasants and creating laborers out of them (leading them to work on others’ farms), they are yet to demonstrate their impact on food and cash crops production in Nigeria.

Meanwhile, the population is growing rapidly. Even though there are no reliable figures, (the only acceptable census figures In Nigeria being those of 1963), estimates are high (see Table 1.2). This has since led to substantial food import bills for the nation, the recent figures of which are now regarded as national secrets (see Table 1.3). Thus, whether or not there will be enough food in Nigeria or cash crops for exports depends on what happens to the peasantry and peasant agriculture. Given that agriculture is needed to provide raw materials to industries and food to the teeming urban population, it can reasonably be asserted that Nigeria’s overall development depends on this sector, and not on oil as it is conventionally assumed. Oil is basically a wasting asset, especially if the revenues from it are not properly appropriated or reinvested in other sectors (see Table 1.4). A study examining the agricultural sector, therefore, focuses squarely on Nigeria’s developmental problems and prospects.

To provide a substantive basis for this study, I have specifically focused on the Agricultural Marketing and Commodity Boards in Nigeria. These are 1945-1985 state agencies and policies that have direct implications for peasant welfare. Our research question is: what is the relationship between state power, agrarian policies and peasant welfare? To the extent that we are focusing specifically on the Agricultural Marketing and Commodity Boards in Nigeria and their Impact on peasant welfare, our research question can be stated even more directly:

what is the nature of the activities of the Agricultural Marketing and Commodity Boards; and what impact do they have on peasant welfare and rural agriculture on which it depends? A study of the Agricultural Marketing and Commodity Boards in Nigeria investigates all of these issues of inequality and exploitation. For under a capitalist setting, what happens to the income of the groups or classes, be they workers or peasant producers, directly affects their welfare. For in the absence of sufficient revenue, basic household requirements of clothing, food and shelter will be difficult to come by. Not even rural inhabitants in Nigeria can now claim to be far removed from the forces of capitalism where they now have to buy and sell to survive. The moral economy of the peasant promoting self-sufficiency is now not readily available. Moreover, health, education, nutrition, transportation and similar goods must, under a capitalist ideology, be paid for: thus, income is critical in determining who gets what and when; hence, the relevance of the Agricultural Marketing and Commodity Boards in determining peasant welfare. We might add that this, in recent times, has become even more compelling as the Nigerian government backs off from subsidizing very basic services. It is therefore necessary that we investigate the extractive, allocative, regulatory and legitimization influences and processes of these policies. As we proceed, it will become possible to learn what happens to the surpluses thereby extracted from the peasants, if in fact, there are any.

Development and the Peasantry

Studies of the peasantry and peasant agriculture are, of course, no longer new. By the peasantry here we mean small-cultivators, sharecroppers and tenant cultivators who at least have a piece of land on which to undertake their production—whether this is held individually or collectively. Where they have been dispossessed of their land, we will qualify them as landless peasants.

In Africa these studies, influenced by different perspectives, have proved eminently helpful for our understanding of African societies and politics. However, it is our view that most of these studies do not regard peasant welfare or rural poverty as a dependent variable to be explained. Instead, the focus has been On either growth, development, or both.²⁴ Put differently, with the attainment of political independence, the African world has been plagued with many models of development. Even though a detailed discussion of these models is not intended here,²⁵ they can be summarized under two main schools of thought. Subsequent intellectual discourse on development, such as growth with equity,²⁶ basic needs approach,²⁷ integrated rural development,²⁸ modes of production,²⁹ and rural-urban differentiation,³⁰ it is our view are actually efforts from these two major paradigms. Consequently, we will argue, they also exhibit the same limitations, vis., a failure to examine the African state and the dynamics of public policies that stem from it. Hence, they cannot address clearly the impact of these policies on peasant welfare, which is our concern. ³¹

The first is the modernization school, which derives its origins from the tradition of free enterprise economics of the Western World, particularly under the influences of the following: Adam Smith’s invisible hand; Ricardo’s comparative advantage; and Lord Keynes general theory of employment, interest, and money; Boeke’s dual economy; and finally Rostow’s stages of economic growth. From the perspective of this school, the underdevelopment situation in which the developing countries find themselves is said to have been typically caused by endogenous factors. These endogenous factors include lack of capital, lack of technical know-how, and other inputs that are presumed to have led to the development of the now industrialized world. In addition, there were, the argument goes, certain cultural and sociological factors within the developing countries that were constraining the development process from following its historical route as it occurred, early on, in the now-developed economies.³² The developing countries were thus likened, by this school, to Rostow’s traditional society whose structure is developed within limited production functions, based on pre-Newtonian science and technology, and on pre-Newtonian attitudes towards the physical world³³

The policy prescriptions from the modernization paradigm were equally obvious. To meet aspirations of both leaders and the masses of the newly independent African states was to raise the per capita income as an indicator, according to this school, of the living standards in these countries. This meant, then, emphasizing capital accumulation as the major factor governing the rate of development. Hence, phrases like minimum rate of investment, practical rate of investments, absorptive capacity, and capital-output ratio become commonplace among the elite of the newly independent African states.³⁴ The capital-output ratio became the yardstick for measuring the rate of economic growth in that it was used to estimate the amount of investment required for a certain rate of growth in income, and consequent rate of growth in per capita income.

To achieve this rate of growth in income, a development strategy that focused on the growth of the industrial sector was to be adopted.³⁵ Hence industrialization became synonymous with modernization. With industry as the leading sector of the economy, it was logical that all resources be directed toward it. Direct formation of capital was to be achieved through savings by consuming less domestically, and/or by obtaining foreign capital through foreign aid.³⁶ In addition, direct formation of capital was also to take place by transferring investable surplus of what was thought to be underemployed labor from agriculture to industry without a drop in agricultural output, since marginal product of labor in agriculture was believed to be zero.³⁷ The Agricultural Marketing and Commodity Boards under study here are part of these efforts at national accumulation for the sake of industrialization or modernization. These studies, especially in the l950s and 1960s, influenced the thinking and policy formulations towards the peasantry and peasant agriculture. These policies, in turn, continue to have significant impact on peasant welfare and lives. A recent volume on these subjects in Africa concurs with our introductory remarks by suggesting that benefits have accrued only to a small minority, with the rest of the population continuing to live in poverty or experiencing further impoverishment.³⁸

In Nigeria, this perception seems confirmed by survey researchers as well. In their study of the extent of alienation of different socioeconomic groups in Nigeria, Beckett and O’Connell have found that 72.7 percent of sampled university students located peasants in the category of suffering and exploitation’, while only 3.2 percent placed workers in this category.³⁹ Whatever the misgivings of such methodology for studying groups or class suffering and exploitation, these findings are, nonetheless, suggestive of the actual situation.

If all these observations are indeed correct, they suggest that there is still much about the peasant situation in Africa that we are not aware of. There is dire need for further investigation (with the aim not just of describing, but also of trying to account for) these policies and their impact on peasant welfare directly. It must not be assumed that the benefits of growth and development will somehow trickle down to the rural areas and improve peasant welfare.

This leads to the second paradigm, directly opposed to the modernization school. The second is the dependency—world system school⁴⁰ that stems from Marxist-Leninist ideology, though with the obvious hangover of Julius Boeke’s dual-economy model.⁴¹ The central thesis of this school is articulated by the underdevelopment-world system theory advanced by Andre Gunder Frank.⁴²