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    The Republic
    The Republic
    The Republic
    Ebook454 pages10 hours

    The Republic

    By Plato and Simon Blackburn

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    About this ebook

    Packaged in handsome, affordable trade editions, Clydesdale Classics is a new series of essential works. From the musings of intellectuals such as Thomas Paine in Common Sense to the striking personal narrative of Harriet Jacobs in Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, this new series is a comprehensive collection of our intellectual history through the words of the exceptional few.

    Originating in approximately 380 BC, Republic is a Socratic dialogue written by famed Greek philosopher Plato. Often referred to as Plato’s masterwork, Republic’s central goal is to define the ideal state. By conceptualizing this model state, Greeks believed it would lead states formed with its principles in mind to function the most efficiently and fairly, striving toward justice and the greater good of society.

    This edition includes a foreword by British American philosopher and Plato expert Simon Blackburn. Widely read around the world by philosophy students and academics alike, Plato’s Republic is sure to pass on its invaluable lessons and enlighten the next generation of thinkers.
    LanguageEnglish
    PublisherClydesdale
    Release dateJan 2, 2018
    ISBN9781945186318
    Author

    Plato

    Plato, one of the most renowned ancient Greek philosophers, was born in 427 B.C. to an aristocratic and wealthy family, which played a prominent part in Athenian politics. Plato in conjunction his teacher, Socrates, and his pupil, Aristotle helped to lay the foundations of Western philosophy and culture. While primarily influenced by Socrates, Plato’s work was also affected by the philosophies of Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the Pythagoreans. Under the guidance of Socrates, Plato devoted himself to the pursuit of wisdom and upon Socrates’ death, joined a group of the Socratic disciples gathered at Megara. Later he travelled in Egypt, Magna Graecia, and Sicily. He returned to Athens and founded a school, known as the Academy, which seems to have been his home base for the remainder of his life. While thirty-five dialogues and thirteen letters have traditionally been ascribed to Plato, modern scholarship doubts the authenticity of some of them. His early dialogues are also known as the Socratic dialogues and include Apology, Crito, Euthyphro, and Protagoras. He followed these with his transitional dialogues: Gorgias, Meno , and Euthydemus . The Symposium and the Republic are considered the centerpieces of Plato's middle period and are considered some of his most revered work, and other middle dialogues include Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Theaetetus. Plato’s Laws is the best known dialogues of his late period. Plato died in 347 B.C.

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    Reviews for The Republic

    4/5

    2,225 ratings33 reviews

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    • 1/5
      I just didn't like it. There's nothing wrong with it, I just didn't really understand it, and wasn't really interested in what I did understand.
    • 5/5
      This particular version divides the dialogue into 10 chapters, though the division has varied over the years. While some commentary finds this to be the pinnacle of Plato's work, I find it less captivating than some of the others. (I'm sure there is some depth that I do not perceive, however the style means as much to me as the depth.) The key elements are brought out through the ongoing conversation regarding the hypothetical creation of an ideal state, all of which is done in pursuit of Socrate's attempt to define justice. The ideal state is composed of three groups of people. The commoners are still better educated than the citizens of other cities and limited in number via ejection. The guardians are chosen from the best children, raised in common, educated in only that which advances their status as guardian (good-bye Homer, and anything mourning death), mated based on ability and without marriage, and trained in combat from an early age. The most advanced of them also become philosopher-kings. All citizens are trained in varying degrees in only that which is deemed beneficial: gymnastics, mathematics, etc, though in each, only the desired elements are maintained. For example, only certain appropriate musical rhythms are permitted. Eventually we come to the point of justice, in which we find that these elements of the state are in harmony (the spirit and the mind; the peace and the aggression, the leadership and the philosophy). Socrates then brings us to the individual, for whom we find justice is defined as the same harmony of those elements within each person. It is both intriguing and somewhat dissapointing to find exact phrases later seen in the Wealth of Nations and perhaps the Federalist. For example, these early thinkers already proclaim "when there is an income-tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less on the same amount of the income." (p. 306, Book I) Later, they also convey a perfect understanding of the division of labor within a city. Then again, the quotations from Homer, such as "And the soul, with shrilling cry, passed like smoke beneath the earth." (Illiad) were borrowed by them and quite welcome (and referenced). Within all of the hypothesizing, a basic observation is made about the motivation of rich men vs. laborers. When ill, the carpenter sees a doctor. If advised that he must rest in order to recover, the carpenter does not because he cannot and so goes on and either lives or dies. Either way, he fulfills his purpose and does not waste away with a lingering death. Alternatively, the rich man has no occupation and can waste away. The other most memorable discussion concerned the progress through and traits of the major systems of government (dictatorship, democracy, etc.) I found the Republic to be an interesting discourse, containing some fascinating major points (about the soul, the motivations of men, and the organization of states) as well as some interesting sidetrips into other matters.
    • 4/5
      A good piece to just sit and reflect on.
    • 5/5
      I often wonder what I would have taken away from this book had I read it on my own, and not as the only subject of a semester-long seminar. I read and reread each chapter many times over, wrote papers on what I thought was meant, and then often had my eyes opened to an entirely different possibility when I heard others' views. I'd like to think I would have still gotten something out of it, but for me, I think that to really truly get the most out of this book, one should read it as part of a group, be it a class, a book club, a gathering of friends interested in politics/philosophy/history, etc. A work with so much depth, which can't/shouldn't be taken at face value, really benefits from discussion. Allan Bloom's translation/commentary is fascinating, and I would recommend picking up that version if you have the option. Though perhaps reading through it once first without the commentary, and then reconciling your own initial reactions with what others have said over time might prove to be more rewarding than having it spoon-fed upon initial read.
    • 3/5
      Rated: C+The New Lifetime Reading Plan: Number 12Guess I'm not a real fan of the Socratic dialogue. Seems like there could be more logic branches that the ones chosen. Anyhow, did appreciate three key concepts: 1) the uniqueness of the individual and the how that shapes ones vocation; 2) the cave and how perception shapes one's view of the truth; 3) The Myth of Er and the vision of how souls must choose their next lives ... "the unjust passing into the wild ..." and "... by the bank of the river of Indifference, whose water cannot be held in any vessel. All persons are compllled to drink a certain quantity of the water; but those who are not preserved by prudence drink more than the quantity, and each, as he drinks, forgets everything. When they had gone to rest and it was now midnight, there was a clap of thunder and an earthquake; and in a moment the souls were carried up to their birth, this way and that, like shooting stars."
    • 2/5
      I read this book because I thought I might find something of interest in this classic book. Well I did, but not enough to recommend it to anyone else. Much of it I found very unconvincing, the format, the arguement, the conclusions all unconvincing. The only parts that I would recommend were Part IV: The Philosopher Ruler, which is really more about the nature of reality and Part IX: Imperfect Societies, which I would rate at 4 stars and may even read again. If your interested in Philosophy, maybe read it, if your interested in history as I am, don't bother!
    • 5/5
      Plato's 'The Republic' is a timeless addition to any library. Molding philosophical ideals for centuries and influencing the creation of Political systems and ideologies that shape the modern world, 'The Republic' is a must for any serious philosopher.This edition of the famous Jowett translation is introduced by Francis R. Gemme and has very well informed and lucidly written notes by David Masson.
    • 4/5
      The writings of Plato have been one of the cornerstones of Western thought for two and a half millennia used for both secular and religious purposes, sometimes not as he intended. Republic is one, if not the, most famous piece of Plato’s philosophical/political writings and the translation by Robin Waterfield for Oxford World’s Classics adds to the debate that surrounds it.During a thorough 60+ page introduction to Plato’s text, Waterfield most significant translation is “morality” instead of “justice” for the Greek word dikaiosune because of the definition provided by Aristotle of the word. With this word decision and with her discussion of Plato’s complete disregard to politics, Republic turns from a work of political theory into one of philosophy concerned about the improvement of an individual’s life and not that of a Greek polis. Using the cultural terms and norms of his time, Plato sets out to express his belief that individuals can improve and better themselves outside the communal structure of Greek life. This was a radical notion given that individualism—especially as we know it today—was not a part of respectable Greek political life, the individual’s life was bound up in the community and if they went off on their own it was dangerous to the civic order and with the relationship with the gods (the charge against Socrates).While Plato’s overall thesis is thought-provoking, some of his supporting arguments via mathematics and his lack of details about how to improve one’s morality and thus goodness are detriments to Republic’s overall quality. Although later individuals, in particular early Christian fathers, would supplement Plato with their own supporting evidence for those in the 21st Century these elements can be stumbling blocks. Even though Waterfield’s translation provided to be very readable and her notes beyond satisfactory, the constant flipping to the back of the book to read them and provide myself with the context to what she was saying while at the particular place in the text was somewhat unhelpful but footnotes at the bottom of the pages might have been worse.Republic is one of the most significant pieces of Western literature and whether you approve of Waterfield’s translation or not, it is a very good was to look at a piece of text long-thought to mean one thing and see it as something completely different.
    • 3/5
      I'm not, as it happens, a Platonist. It's interesting to read The Republic -- it's worth doing, if you have any interest, particularly because Plato's ideas are so very very pervasive and have in fact endured and stuck in our society more than you'd think. The dialogues can be quite interesting; some of them are quite dramatic. But the logic to me is always dragged out too far and too long, and sometimes I just want to punch Socrates. I have major issues with Plato's analysis of art.

      Which all adds up to: worth reading, but I wish I could've read a summary instead.

      Edit: On reread, I found it somewhat more bearable. I still don't agree with the philosophy, but it's readable and the arguments are clear. I think some of them are more pedantic than accurate, but then we've established I think Plato's a twit.
    • 4/5
      I put off reading this book for quite a while because I had been given the impression that it was largely about politics, which I find particularly boring. As it turns out, this book isn't really about politics, but more about philosophy in general, with a good variety of things being discussed, from the nature of justice, goodness, how education should be done (not as boring as it sounds), and how the ideal state should be set up. It is fairly easy reading, as Plato does not use difficult words or complex reasoning, so would be an ideal introductory book for someone who has not read much philosophy before. I agree with a lot of what he writes, and his idealisations, as have other philosophers down the ages, who have been inspired too. A lot of it isn't politically correct, but he does have a lot of common sense, and was ahead of his time on things like equal rights for women. One of the things I like is his cynicism directed towards politicians, and people in general, but I think his reasoning can be simplistic and flawed in places. I don't think this would be worth reading again, but I am glad I have read it the once, and will probably look to acquire some of his dialogues before too long. This translation was by H.D.P. Lee.
    • 4/5
      Some interesting ideas and famous arguments. He seems to want to fit things (ideas) into his preconceived plan rather than having them make sense. I will have to read this again.
    • 3/5
      After thinking through the collection of Plato's Dialogues and the overviews Socrates and Plato, I went after The Republic. I found it less entertaining and interesting than Dialogues but more thought-provoking.

      Plato abhored democracy because people had wrong beliefs and would elect others with those wrong beliefs, leading the entire society astray. The Republic is the description of Plato's ideal city-state. Again, Socrates is the mouthpiece and scholars contend that Plato's later works reflect more of his ideas than his teacher's.

      The first books deal with the concept of justice. What is justice? Is it simply the interest of the stronger party (ie: might makes right)? Are our ideas of justice simply put upon us by the laws our rulers create, or is there some universal definition? Thrasymachus contends that it does not pay to be just; the unjust get head in life. We may respect justice more, so perhaps it's best to seem just but actually be unjust (does Machiavelli echo this in The Prince?). While the argument ends in a stalemate, Socrates eventually circles around later in The Republic to make a case that it's better to be just.

      Book III has interesting thoughts on God's character. Plato writes that God is unchangeable in nature, he cannot deceive or else that would mean he is not good. The Socratic/Platonic idea that the body is evil and troublesome (as seen in Plato's other dialogues) is elaborated on in this book. Socrates states that two lovers must not have sexual relations, because love is a pure feeling of truth whereas the body is base passions. While Socrates contends that the Greek cultural way of "love" between a man and a boy are vital to the boy's education, sexual intercourse must not enter into the relationship or it is not true love.

      Socrates moves into discussing who the rulers should be in the ideal state. They should be made up of those containing "gold and silver," whose parents see them as born to rule. Bronze and iron children, on the other hand, will be the working class and these differences will be rigidly enforced. Rulers themselves must receive no wages or hold private property, lest they abuse power; they should depend on the working class for their food and edification.


      Book IV elaborates on the lives of rulers. There can be physicians in the ideal state and these should work to kill off the weak and insane. Guardians should share wives and children in common.Socrates states that justice amounts to the health of the soul: a just soul is a soul with its parts arranged appropriately. Health is good, and it therefore pays to be just.

      In Book V Plato writes that the interchanging of jobs among the classes is injustice, "the greatest of all evils." A free society of freely interacting agents with individual freedom is anathema to Plato.

      In Book VI Plato writes that rulers/guardians' children should be separated and nursed away from the guardians from birth. Mothers should be brought in to nurse but never be allowed to know which child is theirs (sounds like Sparta?). This is because these children will engage in a life-long education and training to make them excellent rulers by their 50's.

      Philosophers get corrupted by politics since there is much demand for their skills, and rulers are willing to pay a high price to have them. Philosophy is also useless where society disagrees with the "right" ideals as known only by phililosophers, therefore philosophers are useless.

      Book VII is on education, the goal of which is to drag every man out of a "cave" of ignorance. The fact that a philosopher is reluctant to rule makes him the best ruler-- the best rulers rule out of duty and obligation instead of power and riches. Rulers should study mathematics from addition to geometry, not for commerce, but for making war and because learning about numbers upens up revelations to higher truth. Rulers will also study philosophical dialectic. Dialectic is powerful in the hands of those who misuse it, as many youths love to debate and stir up controversy rather than search out the truth.

      Books VIII and IX deal with political economy. Socrates compares the various types of government: timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. Timocracy is a society driven by honor and eventually the birth rate of the less-educated people outstrips that of the wise, so that civil war breaks out and leads to class divisions. Eventually, oligarchy arises where the right of rule is determined solely by wealth.Oligarchs fear the people and cannot make war because they dare not arm the masses to fight lest they be overthrown. The oligarchs' desire for more wealth leads to speculation, high-interest loans, and eventually greater concentration of power in the hands of a few. Those who lose their fortunes work with the masses to plot revenge.

      Democracy, then, springs from oligarchy- eventually a revolution overthros the oligarchs and people are made equal. Plato writes that from the outside, democracy appears to be the most attractive society but it's flawed because so many people are pursuing their endless passions. Eventually, this insatiable appetite causes people to neglect proper governing (including breeding at the right times, so eventually the progeny become weaker and weaker). "Drones," which are beggars and criminals deceive both the rich and poor into class warfare. The rich respond by limiting the freedom of the poor, and revolt ensues in which the chief "drone" becomes the populist tyrant. He kills all the good, enslaves the others, constantly makes war, and lives a lavish lifestyle. He panders to the other drones and they become his bodyguards.

      (Depressed yet?)

      The tyrranical man is the least-happy of all the rulers, he is also the most unjust. Therefore, it pays to be just. Only philosophers can determine who is right among the truth-loving, honor-loving, and profit-loving types of people. The philosopher, of course, says seeking truth and denying the body and its various passions is the best life and leads to the best afterlife.

      In Book X, Socrates regretfully bans potes from the ideal society. Poets imitate the worst part of people, appeal to the worst parts of men's souls.

      Book XI deals with the immortality of the soul. Socrates' earlier dialogue with Phaedo summed up much of his beliefs, but here it is reiterated that bodily damage cannot harm the soul unless it can be proved that it makes the soul meaner, kinder, etc. In the afterlife, the just and unjust will be rewarded accordingly. Where good works outweigh the bad, there is reward. Sins must be long-punished according to severity. It's from this chapter that one might see how the Roman Catholic church eventually developed a doctrine of Purgatory, by incorporating the (erroneous) ideas of Plato.

      This was a difficult book to work through but I'm glad I did it. It is one which I should probably read repeatedly, and really only in Greek if I want to get it.
    • 3/5
      a classique. allegory allegory everybody's coming to get me. i got out of the cave back in the mid 00's.
    • 5/5
      Some of the reviewers seem to me to completely fail to take into account: (1) The actual flow of the argument in The Republic (2) The historical context in which Plato wrote The RepublicFirstly, The Republic is a "city in speech" as Socrates calls it, not an actual political model, and the reason why Socrates embarks on this journey is to illuminate the virtuous soul. In the city-soul analogy Socrates compares the perfectly good city to the perfectly good individual, with a well-ordered soul. It's not clear whether this is a desirable city-state, and Socrates himself questions it in book 8. Secondly, I would suggest that people who are outraged are engaging in arrogant de-historicism. Plato was writing after the disastrous wars between the Athenians and the Spartans, which Athens lost, and tyranny ensued, and the early attempts at democracy put his mentor Socrates to death. Plato hadn't seen liberal democracy as we know it, and he wasn't writing for a modern state. Plato saw what civil unrest can lead to, and he hated it.But most importantly, The Republic is more a work of epistemology and metaphysics than one of social engineering, it's about being vs. becoming, things "in themselves" and Plato's theory of forms (or ideas). If you read it like a work of political philosophy and a blue-print for a state, then I think you've misunderstood it.For someone interested in philosophy; this is essential reading. Plato outlines ALL the questions which have plagued philosophers since then, and many of them aren't resolved. One can only marvel at the aristry and craft with which Plato has crafted this magnificent, extraordinary piece of work.
    • 3/5
      I read this book as I was working on my thesis. It was the summer of 08. I thought this book was ok and I found much material that I can use in my thesis; reflection from journals on a life of a musician / teacher. As Plato was also a teacher I found that I disagreed with him a little. His questions that he asked were not open ended, but were meant for others to see "his" answer. I teach in a different way in which I ask opened ended questions, and use the answers from my students as a learning opporunity to later reflect on. Over all the book was a pleasure to read, even though it was difficult at times to understand. However, philsophy is always difficult to someone who is not a philosopher.
    • 5/5
      Waterfield's version is an outstanding translation of the Republic. I had read this a few years ago in a "classic" translation, but was baffled by what seemed like a bizarre political theory and never thought about it any further. Waterfield's introduction and complete notes (like his translation of Herodotus) made Plato inspiring to me for the first time. I now realize what should have been obvious the first time around: the Republic is more than anything an invitation to thought, not the dogmatic philosophical treatise I thought I was reading before. This is a compelling examination about how an individual should live his life to the fullest. The issues that Plato raises and Waterfield clarifies in the book follow me around as I sit in my own house and walk in my own city.
    • 4/5
      Interesting and wordy. I'm pretty sure that Plato came up with the first dystopian society in history, as his ideal community sounds like the basic form of any futuristic world. Emotions are weeded out, the "best" are exalted while everyone else works, love is regulated, there are no such things as families... etcetera etcetera.One thing I'm not sure I like is that Plato writes as Socrates, but we'll never know if Socrates would've agreed with all these things. What if Plato is just putting things in Socrates's mouth? But I guess that's what you get when you don't write anything down (geez, Socrates).
    • 5/5
      Three things struck me about The Republic. The first is the incorporation of theology into philosophy. For all the goings on about religion in recent times and the apparent "victory" of science, Plato's philosophy begins and ends with Heraclitus' God. Almost none of the philosophy makes sense without the soul or a higher purpose for humans, and an intelligent deity that has ordered it all to be so. Second, The Republic is a handbook for politics. Hardly an idea has escaped tyrants or politicians. Parts of the work are basically a program for political action. Of course, the examples provided from ancient times are not necessarily the equivalent of the polis today, but there is certainly an element of prediction that cannot be ignored. And third, the art of translation has a significant influence on the readability of classic texts, and this translation by Desmond Lee is fascinating. Lee includes extensive notes throughout the text. Many of the notes relate to the various translations by others, and Lee often admits when he is not sure of his translation. After reading Benjamin Jowett's translation of Meno, I was disappointed with how annoying Socrates appeared in the dialogue. Nonetheless, the dialogue in The Republic is so contrived as to make me wonder why bother having the interjections from the audience (who always agree with Socrates even when the logic is obscure?). Of course, dialogue is a literary and political device, but the differences between the various translations are significant, as they are with Homer's epic poetry. My marginalia is too extensive to write up in this space, but I have kept notes on pedagogy, the reliance on God to make sense of the philosophy, numerous other readings to complete, and Plato's various ideas that make this work timeless. One quote relating to teaching struck a chord (p. 300):The teacher fears and panders to his pupils, who in turn despise their teachers and attendants.As did the many references to democracy leading to tyranny brought about by a popular champion. Once again, I find that a complete reading reveals so much of my education that did not make a direct link to the original source. The simile of the cave appears in almost any undergraduate degree in politics, but in such a cut-down version as to make the entire idea in relation to the simile of the Sun and the Line and the division of knowledge into its levels of "truth" disappear. It makes we wonder how much has been lost by perpetually drawing on secondary sources in education. Again, translation fascinates me and I regret not having learnt more than one language when I was young, so I can only trust that Lee's translation does the original work justice (no pun intended). If I had known the impact a complete reading of this work would have on me, I would have attempted it much earlier. Having said that, without having read Homer, Hesiod, Heraclitus, and the Stoics, I think much of The Republic would have gone straight over my head. I have since commenced reading The Laws while I am in sync with Platos' dialogue.
    • 3/5
      This book has some brilliant/famous parts, but it's mostly just a guy eloquently agreeing with himself. The allegory of the cave is terrific. The basic concept of a Socratic Dialogue is fascinating: far easier to read and follow than the typical philosophical prose, but also comical in some ways, at least in this book, as all the characters are flat and indistinguishable. "Why yes of course Socrates; truly; certainly; if you ask me, it could be no other way".
    • 4/5
      This will be an ongoing review I have to read parts of this for my Ethics class, and we were assigned part of it in week two. I'm not sure how much I'll enjoy it throughout the semester, but I did like what we read this week. Finished with what we are reading in this book for Ethics class, I enjoyed it and probably wouldn't have read this book if it weren't assigned reading. I may pick it up again at a later date and read the parts that we skipped. I'm glad I was given a reason to read this finally.
    • 4/5
      How do you rate a classic like this? It's worth reading if only because of its immense influence on the Western world. It's also a much more multivocal text than it's given credit for, as a brief perusal of the secondary literature will show. Is the city in speech a serious utopian project, even if only as a regulative ideal, or is it an elaborate send-up of the absurdity of utopianism? That's only one of the big interpretive puzzles readers of The Republic must face.

      On the Allan Bloom edition specifically - The extensive endnotes make this a very useful translation.
    • 5/5
      It's totalitarian, it's fearful, it's deceitful, it's violent, it censors the people and turn them into objects, its rhetorical, it advocates eugenics, and its egotististical--as Plato seems to ironically put Philosophers like himself in the master's throne. It's a horrific nightmare that betrays the author's master, Socrates. Why the five stars? Because it has managed to influence every nook and cranny of politics and its vicious underbelly-- it is essential for that reason. Anyone who has read The Republic knows the score.
    • 5/5
      butter than I expected. and a bit shocking...but I think most of those go to cultural differences and do NOTHING to expunge him as one of the world's first philosopher.
    • 5/5
      Plato's Republic is one of the world's most famous thought experiments. It is usually described as a treatise on justice in an ideal State, and while that is not incorrect, it is not the whole story. While the work is certainly of interest to students of philosophy and political science, it might also appeal to anyone interested in psychology and literature in general.The first thing one notices right off the bat is what a great writer Plato is. This great work of philosophy is presented as a conversation — seemingly without end! — which like other dialogues of Plato, engages the reader and draws him or her in with a surprising degree of wit and flare. We who are not philosophers per se might tend to think of philosophy as a dry and lifeless subject, but in Plato's hands, it can be quite fascinating and certainly never dull.The Republic is not an easy place to begin with Plato because of its sheer length and the scope of ideas it covers, but with some patience it is not an entirely bad place to begin, either.For whatever reason, reading ancient Greek literature in English translation seems to be fraught with difficulties. It may be because of the limited vocabulary available within the ancient language as compared to a polyglot language such as English with its agglomeration of words from literally everywhere. But word choice can make a huge difference in the tone and feel of the material.For example, as mentioned above, most modern translations of the Republic are concerned with "justice" in an ideal "state," which sounds rather remote, abstract and high-minded, leaving a perception of difficulty. Robin Waterfield has tried to be more precise in his translation. The Greek word dikaiosunē is usually translated as "justice," but Waterfield says the word "refers to something which encompasses all the various virtues and is almost synonymous with 'virtue' in general." In his translation the Republic is about "morality — what it is and how it fulfils one's life as a human being." Also, instead of "state," Waterfield has substituted the word "community." In combination, the idea of morality in the community brings the whole discussion down to a more personal level. I appreciated the change and the more personal tone of the entire work.At any rate, philosophy aside because I am singularly unqualified to utter even platitudes on the subject, I enjoyed reading Plato's Republic. It was a much different book than I was expecting. Of course, having recently read Eric Havelock's [Preface to Plato], I was reading with an agenda — namely, to see whether his assessment of the Republic was correct, and while I appreciate his perspective, I feel his agenda got in the way of presenting a complete picture. I also came away from this reading believing that many critics and commentators attribute more dogmatism to Plato than was really intended. The notion that he, through his mouthpiece Socrates, was setting up an ideal state, a sort of communist utopia, is an overstatement. While he did conclude that in his so-called ideal state the rulers would have no personal property and that they would be philosopher kings (and by implication queens), he also admitted many times throughout the discussion that "the community we've just been founding and describing can't be accommodated anywhere in the world, and therefore it rests at the level of ideas." Thus my initial suggestion that the Republic is a thought experiment, and the ideal state or community is a notion to be thought about and discussed but never to be realized. Something called "human nature" will prevent anything like it ever working in the real world. The ideal was created as a paradigm within which to explore the subject of whether a just or moral person is happier than an injust or immoral person, and incidentally, to try to define the nature of goodness. Socrates was only able to come up with various allegories to illustrate his points about what constitutes goodness, but he never delivered a definition as such.But that is in the nature of Plato's dialogues, which consist of many questions and few definitive answers. The pleasure in reading comes from the plethora of ideas that arise out of the conversations between Socrates and his interlocutors.In addition to the political level, Plato constantly reminds us that "We should bear in mind the equivalence of the community and the individual," and that a just society reflects the just or moral character of the individuals of whom it consists. What works at the community level he also tries to apply to the individual, not always successfully. The success of the community is dependent upon the education of its people and adherence to its customs. Education as discussed in the Republic applies to the rulers or "guardians," but in an open democratic society it must apply to everyone.The Republic is not by any means a quick read, and the more time spent, the more one will get out of it. Robin Waterfield's translation in the Oxford World Classics series is excellent in addition for its introduction and extensive notes which help to guide one through the many digressions and to pinpoint the salient ideas.
    • 5/5
      Read it as a powerful book in Major Theories of the State I course in Waikato University.
    • 3/5
      Kind of "the big one" as far as Plato goes. I would need to spend a lot more time on it to really appreciate its intricacies.
    • 5/5
      This famous piece of literature introduces readers to the Socratic method. Socrates was a famous Greek philosopher and his student Plato wrote about his method of teaching. Instead of informing or explaining things, Socrates would ask questions and open a dialogue with his students. He shared his philosophical view by asking questions and making his students reach the conclusions on their own. His political theories and observations are still relevant, though the book was written in 300 BC. In The Republic Socrates discusses the way to create a perfect society. They work their way through the different rules and regulations that society would need. They decide what their education would focus on and whether there would be equality between the sexes, etc. As they talk through all of the details of their society they come to the inevitable conclusion that it can never exist. Mankind is too flawed and even with the best of intentions, political leaders are corrupted by power. The other major issue up for debate is justice. Each man comes to the table with a slightly different view of how to define justice. Is justice helping your friends? Is it unjust to injure your enemies? These questions make the Athenians go round and round as they each add their opinions to the mix. This book also includes the famous allegory of the cave, which is discussed in every Philosophy 101 class. BOTTOM LINE: The arguments aren’t flawless, but it’s the style of arguing that makes this such a compelling read. I enjoyed every second of it and would highly recommend finding an audio version if you can.“The society we have described can never grow into a reality or see the light of day, and there will be no end to the troubles of states, or indeed, my dear Glaucon, of humanity itself, till philosophers become rulers in this world, or till those we now call kings and rulers really and truly become philosophers, and political power and philosophy thus come into the same hands.”“They agreed to avoid doing injustice in order to avoid suffering it. This is the origin of laws and contracts.”“Don’t you think this is why education in the arts is so powerful? Rhythm and harmony find their way to the inner part of the soul and establish themselves there, bringing grace to the well-educated.” 
    • 3/5
      The best thing about this particular edition is the excellent indexing of terms in the back.
    • 4/5
      On the whole a pretty good read for me. The ideas about different states and the people in those states really got my imagination going. At first I found it more funny that I though I would, and liked Socrates, but his antics did get tiresome for me half way or so. Sometimes a page turner, helping me excitedly develop some ideas... sometimes a slog, especially the tenth and final book, which I found a real low point as a finish. As other say, the winding arguments he makes by small admissions on the parts of his partners can get too ridiculous, too often - whether that's intentionally provocative or good or bad I didn't really feel much about. A few pages into chapter 8, in my edition being page 206... his manipulating numbers to prove that the timing of the birth leads to bad people... I couldn't even. Laughed.
    • 5/5
      i refer to this more often than is probably sane. one of my favourite books, ever, the transpation by bloom is the only one i consider worth the paper on which it is printed.

    Book preview

    The Republic - Plato

    BOOK I.

    I went down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon the son of Ariston, that I might offer up my prayers to the goddess (Bendis, the Thracian Artemis); and also because I wanted to see in what manner they would celebrate the festival, which was a new thing. I was delighted with the procession of the inhabitants; but that of the Thracians was equally, if not more, beautiful. When we had finished our prayers and viewed the spectacle, we turned in the direction of the city; and at that instant Polemarchus the son of Cephalus chanced to catch sight of us from a distance as we were starting on our way home and told his servant to run and bid us wait for him. The servant took hold of me by the cloak behind and said: Polemarchus desires you to wait.

    I turned round and asked him where his master was.

    There he is, said the youth, coming after you, if you will only wait.

    Certainly we will, said Glaucon; and in a few minutes Polemarchus appeared, and with him Adeimantus, Glaucon’s brother, Niceratus the son of Nicias, and several others who had been at the procession.

    Polemarchus said to me: I perceive, Socrates, that you and your companion are already on your way to the city.

    You are not far wrong, I said.

    But do you see, he rejoined, how many we are?

    Of course.

    And are you stronger than all these? for if not, you will have to remain where you are.

    May there not be the alternative, I said, that we may persuade you to let us go?

    But can you persuade us, if we refuse to listen to you? he said.

    Certainly not, replied Glaucon.

    Then we are not going to listen; of that you may be assured.

    Adeimantus added: Has no one told you of the torch-race on horseback in honour of the goddess which will take place in the evening?

    With horses! I replied: That is a novelty. Will horsemen carry torches and pass them one to another during the race?

    Yes, said Polemarchus, and not only so, but a festival will be celebrated at night, which you certainly ought to see. Let us rise soon after supper and see this festival; there will be a gathering of young men, and we will have a good talk. Stay then, and do not be perverse.

    Glaucon said: I suppose, since you insist, that we must.

    Very good, I replied.

    Accordingly we went with Polemarchus to his house; and there we found his brothers Lysias and Euthydemus, and with them Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian, Charmantides the Paeanian, and Cleitophon the son of Aristonymus. There too was Cephalus the father of Polemarchus, whom I had not seen for a long time, and I thought him very much aged. He was seated on a cushioned chair, and had a garland on his head, for he had been sacrificing in the court; and there were some other chairs in the room arranged in a semicircle, upon which we sat down by him. He saluted me eagerly, and then he said:

    You don’t come to see me, Socrates, as often as you ought: If I were still able to go and see you I would not ask you to come to me. But at my age I can hardly get to the city, and therefore you should come oftener to the Piraeus. For let me tell you, that the more the pleasures of the body fade away, the greater to me is the pleasure and charm of conversation. Do not then deny my request, but make our house your resort and keep company with these young men; we are old friends, and you will be quite at home with us.

    I replied: There is nothing which for my part I like better, Cephalus, than conversing with aged men; for I regard them as travellers who have gone a journey which I too may have to go, and of whom I ought to enquire, whether the way is smooth and easy, or rugged and difficult. And this is a question which I should like to ask of you who have arrived at that time which the poets call the ‘threshold of old age’—Is life harder towards the end, or what report do you give of it?

    I will tell you, Socrates, he said, what my own feeling is. Men of my age flock together; we are birds of a feather, as the old proverb says; and at our meetings the tale of my acquaintance commonly is—I cannot eat, I cannot drink; the pleasures of youth and love are fled away: there was a good time once, but now that is gone, and life is no longer life. Some complain of the slights which are put upon them by relations, and they will tell you sadly of how many evils their old age is the cause. But to me, Socrates, these complainers seem to blame that which is not really in fault. For if old age were the cause, I too being old, and every other old man, would have felt as they do. But this is not my own experience, nor that of others whom I have known. How well I remember the aged poet Sophocles, when in answer to the question, How does love suit with age, Sophocles,—are you still the man you were? Peace, he replied; most gladly have I escaped the thing of which you speak; I feel as if I had escaped from a mad and furious master. His words have often occurred to my mind since, and they seem as good to me now as at the time when he uttered them. For certainly old age has a great sense of calm and freedom; when the passions relax their hold, then, as Sophocles says, we are freed from the grasp not of one mad master only, but of many. The truth is, Socrates, that these regrets, and also the complaints about relations, are to be attributed to the same cause, which is not old age, but men’s characters and tempers; for he who is of a calm and happy nature will hardly feel the pressure of age, but to him who is of an opposite disposition youth and age are equally a burden.

    I listened in admiration, and wanting to draw him out, that he might go on—Yes, Cephalus, I said: but I rather suspect that people in general are not convinced by you when you speak thus; they think that old age sits lightly upon you, not because of your happy disposition, but because you are rich, and wealth is well known to be a great comforter.

    You are right, he replied; they are not convinced: and there is something in what they say; not, however, so much as they imagine. I might answer them as Themistocles answered the Seriphian who was abusing him and saying that he was famous, not for his own merits but because he was an Athenian: ‘If you had been a native of my country or I of yours, neither of us would have been famous.’ And to those who are not rich and are impatient of old age, the same reply may be made; for to the good poor man old age cannot be a light burden, nor can a bad rich man ever have peace with himself.

    May I ask, Cephalus, whether your fortune was for the most part inherited or acquired by you?

    Acquired! Socrates; do you want to know how much I acquired? In the art of making money I have been midway between my father and grandfather: for my grandfather, whose name I bear, doubled and trebled the value of his patrimony, that which he inherited being much what I possess now; but my father Lysanias reduced the property below what it is at present: and I shall be satisfied if I leave to these my sons not less but a little more than I received.

    That was why I asked you the question, I replied, because I see that you are indifferent about money, which is a characteristic rather of those who have inherited their fortunes than of those who have acquired them; the makers of fortunes have a second love of money as a creation of their own, resembling the affection of authors for their own poems, or of parents for their children, besides that natural love of it for the sake of use and profit which is common to them and all men. And hence they are very bad company, for they can talk about nothing but the praises of wealth.

    That is true, he said.

    Yes, that is very true, but may I ask another question?—What do you consider to be the greatest blessing which you have reaped from your wealth?

    One, he said, of which I could not expect easily to convince others. For let me tell you, Socrates, that when a man thinks himself to be near death, fears and cares enter into his mind which he never had before; the tales of a world below and the punishment which is exacted there of deeds done here were once a laughing matter to him, but now he is tormented with the thought that they may be true: either from the weakness of age, or because he is now drawing nearer to that other place, he has a clearer view of these things; suspicions and alarms crowd thickly upon him, and he begins to reflect and consider what wrongs he has done to others. And when he finds that the sum of his transgressions is great he will many a time like a child start up in his sleep for fear, and he is filled with dark forebodings. But to him who is conscious of no sin, sweet hope, as Pindar charmingly says, is the kind nurse of his age:

    ‘Hope,’ he says, ‘cherishes the soul of him who lives in justice and holiness, and is the nurse of his age and the companion of his journey;—hope which is mightiest to sway the restless soul of man.’

    How admirable are his words! And the great blessing of riches, I do not say to every man, but to a good man, is, that he has had no occasion to deceive or to defraud others, either intentionally or unintentionally; and when he departs to the world below he is not in any apprehension about offerings due to the gods or debts which he owes to men. Now to this peace of mind the possession of wealth greatly contributes; and therefore I say, that, setting one thing against another, of the many advantages which wealth has to give, to a man of sense this is in my opinion the greatest.

    Well said, Cephalus, I replied; but as concerning justice, what is it?—to speak the truth and to pay your debts—no more than this? And even to this are there not exceptions? Suppose that a friend when in his right mind has deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is not in his right mind, ought I to give them back to him? No one would say that I ought or that I should be right in doing so, any more than they would say that I ought always to speak the truth to one who is in his condition.

    You are quite right, he replied.

    But then, I said, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct definition of justice.

    Quite correct, Socrates, if Simonides is to be believed, said Polemarchus interposing.

    I fear, said Cephalus, that I must go now, for I have to look after the sacrifices, and I hand over the argument to Polemarchus and the company.

    Is not Polemarchus your heir? I said.

    To be sure, he answered, and went away laughing to the sacrifices.

    Tell me then, O thou heir of the argument, what did Simonides say, and according to you truly say, about justice?

    He said that the repayment of a debt is just, and in saying so he appears to me to be right.

    I should be sorry to doubt the word of such a wise and inspired man, but his meaning, though probably clear to you, is the reverse of clear to me. For he certainly does not mean, as we were just now saying, that I ought to return a deposit of arms or of anything else to one who asks for it when he is not in his right senses; and yet a deposit cannot be denied to be a debt.

    True.

    Then when the person who asks me is not in his right mind I am by no means to make the return?

    Certainly not.

    When Simonides said that the repayment of a debt was justice, he did not mean to include that case?

    Certainly not; for he thinks that a friend ought always to do good to a friend and never evil.

    You mean that the return of a deposit of gold which is to the injury of the receiver, if the two parties are friends, is not the repayment of a debt,—that is what you would imagine him to say?

    Yes.

    And are enemies also to receive what we owe to them?

    To be sure, he said, they are to receive what we owe them, and an enemy, as I take it, owes to an enemy that which is due or proper to him—that is to say, evil.

    Simonides, then, after the manner of poets, would seem to have spoken darkly of the nature of justice; for he really meant to say that justice is the giving to each man what is proper to him, and this he termed a debt.

    That must have been his meaning, he said.

    By heaven! I replied; and if we asked him what due or proper thing is given by medicine, and to whom, what answer do you think that he would make to us?

    He would surely reply that medicine gives drugs and meat and drink to human bodies.

    And what due or proper thing is given by cookery, and to what?

    Seasoning to food.

    And what is that which justice gives, and to whom?

    If, Socrates, we are to be guided at all by the analogy of the preceding instances, then justice is the art which gives good to friends and evil to enemies.

    That is his meaning then?

    I think so.

    And who is best able to do good to his friends and evil to his enemies in time of sickness?

    The physician.

    Or when they are on a voyage, amid the perils of the sea?

    The pilot.

    And in what sort of actions or with a view to what result is the just man most able to do harm to his enemy and good to his friend?

    In going to war against the one and in making alliances with the other.

    But when a man is well, my dear Polemarchus, there is no need of a physician?

    No.

    And he who is not on a voyage has no need of a pilot?

    No.

    Then in time of peace justice will be of no use?

    I am very far from thinking so.

    You think that justice may be of use in peace as well as in war?

    Yes.

    Like husbandry for the acquisition of corn?

    Yes.

    Or like shoemaking for the acquisition of shoes,—that is what you mean?

    Yes.

    And what similar use or power of acquisition has justice in time of peace?

    In contracts, Socrates, justice is of use.

    And by contracts you mean partnerships?

    Exactly.

    But is the just man or the skilful player a more useful and better partner at a game of draughts?

    The skilful player.

    And in the laying of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful or better partner than the builder?

    Quite the reverse.

    Then in what sort of partnership is the just man a better partner than the harp-player, as in playing the harp the harp-player is certainly a better partner than the just man?

    In a money partnership.

    Yes, Polemarchus, but surely not in the use of money; for you do not want a just man to be your counsellor in the purchase or sale of a horse; a man who is knowing about horses would be better for that, would he not?

    Certainly.

    And when you want to buy a ship, the shipwright or the pilot would be better?

    True.

    Then what is that joint use of silver or gold in which the just man is to be preferred?

    When you want a deposit to be kept safely.

    You mean when money is not wanted, but allowed to lie?

    Precisely.

    That is to say, justice is useful when money is useless?

    That is the inference.

    And when you want to keep a pruning-hook safe, then justice is useful to the individual and to the state; but when you want to use it, then the art of the vine-dresser?

    Clearly.

    And when you want to keep a shield or a lyre, and not to use them, you would say that justice is useful; but when you want to use them, then the art of the soldier or of the musician?

    Certainly.

    And so of all other things;—justice is useful when they are useless, and useless when they are useful?

    That is the inference.

    Then justice is not good for much. But let us consider this further point: Is not he who can best strike a blow in a boxing match or in any kind of fighting best able to ward off a blow?

    Certainly.

    And he who is most skilful in preventing or escaping from a disease is best able to create one?

    True.

    And he is the best guard of a camp who is best able to steal a march upon the enemy?

    Certainly.

    Then he who is a good keeper of anything is also a good thief?

    That, I suppose, is to be inferred.

    Then if the just man is good at keeping money, he is good at stealing it.

    That is implied in the argument.

    Then after all the just man has turned out to be a thief. And this is a lesson which I suspect you must have learnt out of Homer; for he, speaking of Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, who is a favourite of his, affirms that:

    ‘He was excellent above all men in theft and perjury.’

    And so, you and Homer and Simonides are agreed that justice is an art of theft; to be practised however ‘for the good of friends and for the harm of enemies,’—that was what you were saying?

    No, certainly not that, though I do not now know what I did say; but I still stand by the latter words.

    Well, there is another question: By friends and enemies do we mean those who are so really, or only in seeming?

    Surely, he said, a man may be expected to love those whom he thinks good, and to hate those whom he thinks evil.

    Yes, but do not persons often err about good and evil: many who are not good seem to be so, and conversely?

    That is true.

    Then to them the good will be enemies and the evil will be their friends? True.

    And in that case they will be right in doing good to the evil and evil to the good?

    Clearly.

    But the good are just and would not do an injustice?

    True.

    Then according to your argument it is just to injure those who do no wrong?

    Nay, Socrates; the doctrine is immoral.

    Then I suppose that we ought to do good to the just and harm to the unjust?

    I like that better.

    But see the consequence:—Many a man who is ignorant of human nature has friends who are bad friends, and in that case he ought to do harm to them; and he has good enemies whom he ought to benefit; but, if so, we shall be saying the very opposite of that which we affirmed to be the meaning of Simonides.

    Very true, he said: and I think that we had better correct an error into which we seem to have fallen in the use of the words ‘friend’ and ‘enemy.’

    What was the error, Polemarchus? I asked.

    We assumed that he is a friend who seems to be or who is thought good.

    And how is the error to be corrected?

    We should rather say that he is a friend who is, as well as seems, good; and that he who seems only, and is not good, only seems to be and is not a friend; and of an enemy the same may be said.

    You would argue that the good are our friends and the bad our enemies?

    Yes.

    And instead of saying simply as we did at first, that it is just to do good to our friends and harm to our enemies, we should further say: It is just to do good to our friends when they are good and harm to our enemies when they are evil?

    Yes, that appears to me to be the truth.

    But ought the just to injure any one at all?

    Undoubtedly he ought to injure those who are both wicked and his enemies.

    When horses are injured, are they improved or deteriorated?

    The latter.

    Deteriorated, that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, not of dogs?

    Yes, of horses.

    And dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs, and not of horses?

    Of course.

    And will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that which is the proper virtue of man?

    Certainly.

    And that human virtue is justice?

    To be sure.

    Then men who are injured are of necessity made unjust?

    That is the result.

    But can the musician by his art make men unmusical?

    Certainly not.

    Or the horseman by his art make them bad horsemen?

    Impossible.

    And can the just by justice make men unjust, or speaking generally, can the good by virtue make them bad?

    Assuredly not.

    Any more than heat can produce cold?

    It cannot.

    Or drought moisture?

    Clearly not.

    Nor can the good harm any one?

    Impossible.

    And the just is the good?

    Certainly.

    Then to injure a friend or any one else is not the act of a just man, but of the opposite, who is the unjust?

    I think that what you say is quite true, Socrates.

    Then if a man says that justice consists in the repayment of debts, and that good is the debt which a just man owes to his friends, and evil the debt which he owes to his enemies,—to say this is not wise; for it is not true, if, as has been clearly shown, the injuring of another can be in no case just.

    I agree with you, said Polemarchus.

    Then you and I are prepared to take up arms against any one who attributes such a saying to Simonides or Bias or Pittacus, or any other wise man or seer?

    I am quite ready to do battle at your side, he said.

    Shall I tell you whose I believe the saying to be?

    Whose?

    I believe that Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias the Theban, or some other rich and mighty man, who had a great opinion of his own power, was the first to say that justice is ‘doing good to your friends and harm to your enemies.’

    Most true, he said.

    Yes, I said; but if this definition of justice also breaks down, what other can be offered?

    Several times in the course of the discussion Thrasymachus had made an attempt to get the argument into his own hands, and had been put down by the rest of the company, who wanted to hear the end. But when Polemarchus and I had done speaking and there was a pause, he could no longer hold his peace; and, gathering himself up, he came at us like a wild beast, seeking to devour us. We were quite panic-stricken at the sight of him.

    He roared out to the whole company: What folly, Socrates, has taken possession of you all? And why, sillybillies, do you knock under to one another? I say that if you want really to know what justice is, you should not only ask but answer, and you should not seek honour to yourself from the refutation of an opponent, but have your own answer; for there is many a one who can ask and cannot answer. And now I will not have you say that justice is duty or advantage or profit or gain or interest, for this sort of nonsense will not do for me; I must have clearness and accuracy.

    I was panic-stricken at his words, and could not look at him without trembling. Indeed I believe that if I had not fixed my eye upon him, I should have been struck dumb: but when I saw his fury rising, I looked at him first, and was therefore able to reply to him.

    Thrasymachus, I said, with a quiver, don’t be hard upon us. Polemarchus and I may have been guilty of a little mistake in the argument, but I can assure you that the error was not intentional. If we were seeking for a piece of gold, you would not imagine that we were ‘knocking under to one another,’ and so losing our chance of finding it. And why, when we are seeking for justice, a thing more precious than many pieces of gold, do you say that we are weakly yielding to one another and not doing our utmost to get at the truth? Nay, my good friend, we are most willing and anxious to do so, but the fact is that we cannot. And if so, you people who know all things should pity us and not be angry with us.

    How characteristic of Socrates! he replied, with a bitter laugh;—that’s your ironical style! Did I not foresee—have I not already told you, that whatever he was asked he would refuse to answer, and try irony or any other shuffle, in order that he might avoid answering?

    You are a philosopher, Thrasymachus, I replied, and well know that if you ask a person what numbers make up twelve, taking care to prohibit him whom you ask from answering twice six, or three times four, or six times two, or four times three, ‘for this sort of nonsense will not do for me,’—then obviously, if that is your way of putting the question, no one can answer you. But suppose that he were to retort, ‘Thrasymachus, what do you mean? If one of these numbers which you interdict be the true answer to the question, am I falsely to say some other number which is not the right one?—is that your meaning?’—How would you answer him?

    Just as if the two cases were at all alike! he said.

    Why should they not be? I replied; and even if they are not, but only appear to be so to the person who is asked, ought he not to say what he thinks, whether you and I forbid him or not?

    I presume then that you are going to make one of the interdicted answers?

    I dare say that I may, notwithstanding the danger, if upon reflection I approve of any of them.

    But what if I give you an answer about justice other and better, he said, than any of these? What do you deserve to have done to you?

    Done to me!—as becomes the ignorant, I must learn from the wise—that is what I deserve to have done to me.

    What, and no payment! a pleasant notion!

    I will pay when I have the money, I replied.

    But you have, Socrates, said Glaucon: and you, Thrasymachus, need be under no anxiety about money, for we will all make a contribution for Socrates.

    Yes, he replied, and then Socrates will do as he always does—refuse to answer himself, but take and pull to pieces the answer of some one else.

    Why, my good friend, I said, how can any one answer who knows, and says that he knows, just nothing; and who, even if he has some faint notions of his own, is told by a man of authority not to utter them? The natural thing is, that the speaker should be some one like yourself who professes to know and can tell what he knows. Will you then kindly answer, for the edification of the company and of myself?

    Glaucon and the rest of the company joined in my request, and Thrasymachus, as any one might see, was in reality eager to speak; for he thought that he had an excellent answer, and would distinguish himself. But at first he affected to insist on my answering; at length he consented to begin. Behold, he said, the wisdom of Socrates; he refuses to teach himself, and goes about learning of others, to whom he never even says Thank you.

    That I learn of others, I replied, is quite true; but that I am ungrateful I wholly deny. Money I have none, and therefore I pay in praise, which is all I have; and how ready I am to praise any one who appears to me to speak well you will very soon find out when you answer; for I expect that you will answer well.

    Listen, then, he said; I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger. And now why do you not praise me? But of course you won’t.

    Let me first understand you, I replied. Justice, as you say, is the interest of the stronger. What, Thrasymachus, is the meaning of this? You cannot mean to say that because Polydamas, the pancratiast, is stronger than we are, and finds the eating of beef conducive to his bodily strength, that to eat beef is therefore equally for our good who are weaker than he is, and right and just for us?

    That’s abominable of you, Socrates; you take the words in the sense which is most damaging to the argument.

    Not at all, my good sir, I said; I am trying to understand them; and I wish that you would be a little clearer.

    Well, he said, have you never heard that forms of government differ; there are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies?

    Yes, I know.

    And the government is the ruling power in each state?

    Certainly.

    And the different forms of government make laws democratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and these laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the justice which they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses them they punish as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what I mean when I say that in all states there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest of the government; and as the government must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion is, that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger.

    Now I understand you, I said; and whether you are right or not I will try to discover. But let me remark, that in defining justice you have yourself used the word ‘interest’ which you forbade me to use. It is true, however, that in your definition the words ‘of the stronger’ are added.

    A small addition, you must allow, he said.

    Great or small, never mind about that: we must first enquire whether what you are saying is the truth. Now we are both agreed that justice is interest of some sort, but you go on to say ‘of the stronger’; about this addition I am not so sure, and must therefore consider further.

    Proceed.

    I will; and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just for subjects to obey their rulers?

    I do.

    But are the rulers of states absolutely infallible, or are they sometimes liable to err?

    To be sure, he replied, they are liable to err.

    Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and sometimes not?

    True.

    When they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest; when they are mistaken, contrary to their interest; you admit that?

    Yes.

    And the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects,—and that is what you call justice?

    Doubtless.

    Then justice, according to your argument, is not only obedience to the interest of the stronger but the reverse?

    What is that you are saying? he asked.

    I am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us consider: Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about their own interest in what they command, and also that to obey them is justice? Has not that been admitted?

    Yes.

    Then you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for the interest of the stronger, when the rulers unintentionally command things to be done which are to their own injury. For if, as you say, justice is the obedience which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, O wisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to do, not what is for the interest, but what is for the injury of the stronger?

    Nothing can be clearer, Socrates, said Polemarchus.

    Yes, said Cleitophon, interposing, if you are allowed to be his witness.

    But there is no need of any witness, said Polemarchus, for Thrasymachus himself acknowledges that rulers may sometimes command what is not for their own interest, and that for subjects to obey them is justice.

    Yes, Polemarchus,—Thrasymachus said that for subjects to do what was commanded by their rulers is just.

    Yes, Cleitophon, but he also said that justice is the interest of the stronger, and, while admitting both these propositions, he further acknowledged that the stronger may command the weaker who are his subjects to do what is not for his own interest; whence follows that justice is the injury quite as much as the interest of the stronger.

    But, said Cleitophon, he meant by the interest of the stronger what the stronger thought to be his interest,—this was what the weaker had to do; and this was affirmed by him to be justice.

    Those were not his words, rejoined Polemarchus.

    Never mind, I replied, if he now says that they are, let us accept his statement. Tell me, Thrasymachus, I said, did you mean by justice what the stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not?

    Certainly not, he said. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken the stronger at the time when he is mistaken?

    Yes, I said, my impression was that you did so, when you admitted that the ruler was not infallible but might be sometimes mistaken.

    You argue like an informer, Socrates. Do you mean, for example, that he who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken? or that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian at the time when he is making the mistake, in respect of the mistake? True, we say that the physician or arithmetician or grammarian has made a mistake, but this is only a way of speaking; for the fact is that neither the grammarian nor any other person of skill ever makes a mistake in so far as he is what his name implies; they none of them err unless their skill fails them, and then they cease to be skilled artists. No artist or sage or ruler errs at

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