Approaching the World’s Religions, Volume 1: Philosophically Thinking about World Religions

Approaching the World’s Religions

Volume 1

Philosophically Thinking about World Religions

Robert Boyd

APPROACHING THE WORLD’S RELIGIONS

Volume 1: Philosophically Thinking about World Religions

Copyright © 2017 Robert Boyd. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in critical publications or reviews, no part of this book may be reproduced in any manner without prior written permission from the publisher. Write: Permissions, Wipf and Stock Publishers, 199 W. 8th Ave., Suite 3, Eugene, OR 97401.

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paperback isbn: 978-1-4982-9592-5

hardcover isbn: 978-1-4982-9594-9

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Cataloguing-in-Publication data:

Names: Boyd, Robert, author.

Title: Approaching the world’s religions : vol. 1, philosophically thinking about world religions / Robert Boyd.

Description: Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2017 | Includes bibliographical references.

Identifiers: isbn 978-1-4982-9592-5 (paperback) | isbn 978-1-4982-9594-9 (hardcover) | isbn 978-1-4982-9593-2 (ebook).

Subjects: LCSH: Religions | Religion—Methodology.

Classification: bl41 b68 2017 (print) | bl41 (ebook).

Manufactured in the U.S.A. 02/02/17

All quotes from the Christian Scriptures will be from the Revised Standard Version (RSV), unless otherwise indicated or the scriptures are being quoted by a secondary source. Revised Standard Version of the Bible, copyright 1952 [2nd edition, 1971] by the Division of Christian Education of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America. Used by permission. All rights reserved.

Conze, Edward et al., eds. Buddhist Texts Through the Ages. Rockport, MA: Oneworld Publications, 1997. Reprinted with the permission of Oneworld Publications.

Excerpts from The Idea of Revelation, The Prophetic Understatement, and The Mystery of Revelation from God in Search of Man by Abraham Joshua Heschel. Copyright © 1955 by Abraham Joshua Heschel. Copyright renewed 1983 by Sylvia Heschel. Used by permission of Farrar, Straus & Giroux, LLC.

Gillman, Neil. Sacred Fragments: Recovering Theology for the Modern Jew. Reprinted by permission of the University of Nebraska Press. Copyright 1990 by Neil Gillman. Published by the Jewish Publication Society, Philadelphia.

Jahner, Elaine, ed. Lakota Myth by James R. Walker. Reprinted by permission of the University of Nebraska Press. Copyright 1983 by the University of Nebraska Press.

Khadduri, Majid. Islamic Conception of Justice. pp. 41–50. © 1984 The Johns Hopkins University Press. Reprinted with permission of Johns Hopkins University Press.

Tanakh: The Holy Scriptures. Reprinted by permission of the University of Nebraska Press. Copyright 1985 by the Jewish Publication Society, Philadelphia.

The Holy Bible, English Standard Version® (ESV®) Copyright © 2001 by Crossway, a publishing ministry of Good News Publishers. Used by permission. All rights reserved.

Robert Ernest Hume, Thirteen Principal Upanishads, 2nd ed. Brihad-Aranyaka (4.10 and 4.4.3–6), Kaushitaki (1.2), and Mundakya (1–12). © 1971 Oxford University Press. Reprinted with permission of Oxford University Press.

Winter, Tim, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Theology. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press.

Table of Contents

Title Page

Preface

Acknowledgments

Introduction to Volume 1

Part 1: Preliminary

Chapter 1: Philosophically Thinking about World Religions

Chapter 2: Common Second-Order Issues

Chapter 3: Nature of Religious Truth

Part 2: Exploration

Chapter 4: Sacred Texts

Chapter 5: The Notion of God in Hindu and Christian Understandings

Chapter 6: The Cosmos from the Perspectives of Buddhism and Judaism

Chapter 7: The Notion of Persons in Daoism and Sikhism

Chapter 8: The Theoretical Problem of Evil

Chapter 9: The Existential Problem of Evil

Chapter 10: Survival of Death or Life after Death

Chapter 11: Symbolic Forms and Ultimate Existence

Part 3: Application

Chapter 12: Divine Action/Human Replication

Appendix A: Basic Definitions and Study Questions

Appendix B: Selected Readings of Sacred Texts

Bibliography

Preface

There are many different reasons for an author to write a book. Sometimes they may want to report a body of information to their audience. Others may believe they have answers that their audience should think about. Still others write in hopes that their audience may seriously respond to the written materials not by embracing what is said, but by raising their own questions and seeking answers. This project is not written because I believe I have the right answers or the best answers; I know better. Rather, it is hoped that this project challenges a group of individuals to ask questions and seek better answers than I have offered. Within the Christian religion, we find a fascinating story of Paul and Silas visiting Beroea. We are told, these Jews were more noble than those in Thessalonica, for they received the word [from Paul and Silas] with all eagerness, examining the scriptures daily to see if these things were so (Acts 17 : 11 ). The Beroeans’ immediate response was not to reject the message because it was something new to them, nor did they simply embrace the message. Rather the Beroeans were open to the message and then examined the scriptures—testing the message of Paul and Silas. Because of their response to the new message, the Beroeans are called noble. I do not ask my readers to accept my interpretations of the various world religions, or my evaluations of the various philosophical positions discussed in the following pages, or my proposals for the development of an evangelical theology of religions. Rather I hope my readers will respond by asking their own questions, making their own critical study in a way such that they too will be called noble. This involves philosophically thinking about the world religions and the theology of religions.

While some philosophers may see their written work as an attempt to advocate a particular approach, this writer sees philosophy as a tentative work. The job is never complete; there is always more to do; and any one individual will not do it. Philosophical inquiries should stimulate discussion and dialogue. This writer does write from a particular philosophical/theological stance. Philosophically I am influenced by analytical philosophy, especially the work of Peter Strawson, who emphasized looking for connections. The pragmatic philosophy of Charles Peirce drives me to make sure I am not engaged in discussions regarding the number of angels that can dance on the head of a pin. Religiously, I am committed to the Christian tradition, theologically, to a form of evangelical thought. Do these positions influence my work—of course! But hopefully not to the point that I am intellectually unfair with positions contrary to these positions. This project is offered not with the idea of having the final answers, but rather with the hope that it will stimulate discussion and dialogue, both among those who share common interests with me and with those who have different positions than I. The study of world religions is an exciting enterprise, especially if we understand it as an ongoing engagement with the world and those that make up the world.

Finally, this project is seen as foundational for a study and development of a theology of religions. The theology of religions, roughly, is concerned with how members of one religious tradition view members of another tradition. Today we live in a secular global society. Only after we have seriously considered the world religions can we hope to make progress with one of the most exciting new fields of theology. In the second volume of this project, we explore how evangelical Christians can affirm the particularities of their theological perspective and develop a positive approach that promotes dialogue and interaction with members of other faith traditions. For those readers who do not share my religious beliefs, this volume should provide an example for you to work on a theology of religions for your tradition. However, it should be noted that many readers might prefer to start with the second volume and then work through the first. This project is not presented as a linear work, but one looking for connections and desires to promote dialogue.

Acknowledgments

Any project like this comes to fruition because of the work of many individuals and opportunities. It is impossible to name all; however, some individuals or groups of individuals must be acknowledged. For the past twenty years I have had the wonderful opportunity to teach philosophy and world religions at Fresno City College. The demographics of Fresno, California, reflect the diversity of religious traditions found in our secular global society today. My students, who reflect this diversity, provided the challenge required to undertake this project. I must thank my colleagues, who over the years endured reading many drafts as I explored how to best approach the subject matter. I especially want to thank both Wendell Stephenson and Kerry Ybarra; they are wonderful colleagues in philosophy. For many years I had the opportunity to work with members of various religious traditions, as I was involved in the Fresno Multifaith Exchange. They taught me much. Several of these essays were initiated by an invitation from the National Research University of Moscow, specifically Dr. Boris Kashnikov, to present a series of lectures regarding philosophy and world religions. I wish to also thank Dr. K. C. Hanson, my editor at Cascade Books, an imprint of Wipf and Stock Publishers, and his staff for their support and direction. Finally, I must thank my wife, Kathy, for her patience and support as I have worked on this project. Not only has she read every essay and commented, but also she was a great travelling partner as we visited religious sites in the UK, India, Russia, and China. She continues to be a great travelling partner through life. Thank you! In spite of all the great advice I have received over the years, I am solely responsible for the content of this project, since I have not always heeded that advice.

Introduction to Volume 1

Today there are a number of viable and enlightening ways of approaching the study of world religions. Whether we approach the subject by considering the history of religions or through an anthropological study of the world religions or a via sociological approach, or maybe a praxis approach, valuable insights are to be gained. We frequently approach the study of world religions focusing on the facts, whether the data is historical or phenomenological, as if these religions are merely a set of stagnant artifacts. We think that if we can master the data, then we have captured the essence of the world religions. However, these approaches are flawed in at least two ways from a philosophical perspective, and these approaches are seldom satisfactory to a philosopher, for philosophy tends to focus on questions not addressed by those other approaches, and, by themselves, they tend to narrow the study rather than broaden it.

First, Chuang Tzu, the Daoist thinker, in section 2 of the book bearing his name raises the epistemological problem of claiming to focus on the facts. Knowledge of the world around us, and the language we use to describe it, are perspectival. Was Chuang Tzu a philosopher dreaming he was a butterfly, or was he a butterfly dreaming he was a philosopher? Second, the world religions are not a set of stagnant artifacts; they are dynamic, living, growing, and influential entities: not only are impacted by their culture and history, but they influence their culture and history. To approach the world religions, we need to come with an imagination that seeks to understand and appreciate the similarities and dissimilarities of the major religious traditions. We need to do so understanding the perspective of our own study. I openly acknowledge that my perspective is that of an evangelical Christian approaching the world religions as a generalist and, at the same time, I understand that not all will agree with my particular perspectives. Obviously, those with different perspectives will bring to the table of dialogue different assessments, and, as a result, we will gain a richer perspective of the world religions. As philosophers looking at the major world religions, we recognize our own assumptions and the need to engage with others who have different assumptions, and we value the dialogue among these assumptions as we look at examples of this thing we call religion.

Furthermore, philosophers look at their subject matter, in this case world religions, differently than others might. We are interested in issues such as the nature of religious truth, the notion of God, problems of evil, survival of death, and so forth. Philosophy involves thinking hard about such topics as these. It is not that the other disciplines such as history or anthropology or sociology are doing something wrong as they approach the world religions; rather, philosophers do different things. Furthermore, unlike some other disciplines that place an emphasis on descriptive practices, philosophy tends to be more focused as a normative study. For us, it is not enough to simply describe the world around us, though that is important; we must critique it. (There are times as philosophers when we need to sit back and describe and marvel at the world around us.) Philosophy should promote a sense of awe, but it also must stimulate the asking of questions. We want to know what the best possible world would be like. Instead of assuming that all religions are saying the same thing, we must embrace the empirical evidence of religious plurality, and then strive to understand the importance of carefully laying out a philosophical position by letting the position speak before we embrace or critique it. We need to critically examine positions taken or advocated and ask whether those positions are even consistent or viable. We want to consider whether there are better approaches to a given question or better questions to ask. Philosophers tend to ask different types of questions from scholars in other disciplines, and philosophers are seldom satisfied with answers that simply describe a situation—they wish to critically examine it. While this project presents a basic introduction to the world religions, its goal is to stimulate that imaginative pursuit of questions each religion addresses for its adherents. The basic data, historical or phenomenological, is readily available to anyone with access to the Internet, so this text does not rehearse that data. Rather, it presents a series of essays intended to stimulate the philosophical pursuit.

This project intentionally is different from other works in the discipline today. It intentionally deviates from the typical approaches used today for the study of world religions. Its goal is to engage readers in thinking hard about world religions, not about the data surrounding those traditions. Furthermore, it should be recognized that even though we are dealing with the same philosophical question (e.g., What is the cosmos like in this tradition?), the specific form of the question could differ. Some may want to know what the tradition says about the origins of the cosmos, others may focus on current status or environmental issues, and still others want to know about the future state of the cosmos, for example, within a tradition. By focusing on specific philosophical questions through the lens of philosophical essays, each reader should be challenged to do their own investigations that may reveal the heart of these traditions. By learning to ask questions like these, we learn to ask even more fundamental questions such as, how do we account for the empirical evidence that we as agents and social beings seem to be religious by nature? Even when dealing with religion, we must ask serious questions and seek meaningful answers. Another stance that this project takes, which distinguishes it from other texts in the discipline, is that it advocates an inclusivist perspective regarding the world religions. Pluralism, which is the predominant assumption today, ends in either contradiction or the development of a metatheory that dismisses crucial distinctions between the various traditions or eliminates some ancient religions because they do not fit the metatheory. Within an open inclusivist approach, all religious traditions may engage at the table of dialogue. The final essay in this section is about justice and social affairs. While that discussion is couched within the context of a particular tradition, as is the third essay, it is a discussion that each religious tradition must have. But the discussion must be more than an intrareligious dialogue; it must become an interreligious dialogue—a dialogue that may lead to bonds of confidence and trust—a trust that changes attitudes.

Part 1

Preliminary

1

Philosophically Thinking about World Religions

As Socrates taught us, philosophy begins with asking questions. So we may begin our study with the question, why philosophy and not some other discipline as an approach to the study of world religions? Another question we want to ask is, what does it mean to think philosophically about the world religions?

The purpose of our study is to gain a better understanding of some of the major world religions by approaching the topic philosophically in order that we might better appreciate the rich diversity provided by these traditions within our secular global society. This essay focuses on foundational issues related to the study of philosophy and the use of philosophy as an approach to world religions. It will be argued in the first section that a philosophical approach to the study of world religions is an excellent approach and provides a rich contribution to the study. Frequently when we think of approaching religion philosophically, we think of either the proofs for the existence of God or the philosophical arguments against religion. Much has been written regarding the proofs, so our focus in the second section of this essay will be on some of the philosophical arguments against religion. We will contend that while the arguments do provide challenges to those who wish to take religion seriously, they do not close the door on religion. The third section will deal with relevant issues related to basic religion and theology. In the closing comments we will be reminded of an important point made by Gotthold Lessing in 1779.

Approaching World Religions Philosophically

Religion is a set of symbolic forms and acts that relates persons to their ultimate existence. It has to do with that ultimate concern that individuals use to make sense of their own existence and the world in which they exist. Religion is not solipsistic, for most frequently this ultimate concern is expressed in some social context and cannot be understood apart from this context.

When we think about the world religions, we could approach the study by focusing on the history of each religious tradition. We could do a comparative study of religions that is sociologically or psychologically oriented. In fact, there are many different and valuable approaches to the study of religion. In a pluralistic global society, philosophy provides an avenue for understanding religions by focusing on philosophical issues and questions that are common to many of the major traditions. Furthermore, it allows us to apply philosophical methods, which often strive to be fair-minded, to the inquiry. Philosophy is concerned with the basic beliefs that people use to make sense of their lives and by which they order their existence. Philosophy is concerned with pursuing reality, truth, and attempts to make sense of the human experience. Philosophy begins with wonderment, which results in questions that involve asking and examining those enduring questions about God, persons, and the world around us. Because of the importance of philosophical questions, we cannot simply take a neutral stance. Furthermore, philosophy tends to be normative or prescriptive. As a result, a philosophical approach is not content to merely describe the society of a given religious tradition but wishes to evaluate that tradition. The philosophical method involves two distinct but related tasks. First, there is the critical task that involves carefully examining and questioning beliefs, both basic and derived. Second, there is the constructive task in which we attempt to reconstruct a worldview that makes sense in light of the critical task. It must be acknowledged that one of the most frustrating issues of doing philosophy is the tentativeness of any philosophical position. For the philosopher, any adopted worldview is based upon current information, and the philosophical process of critical examination begins anew. As a result, the philosophical enterprise is never finished; there is always the need for reexamination.

Paul Tillich, a twentieth-century American theologian, tells the story of the minister who asked, Why do we need philosophy when we possess all the truth through revelation?¹ That is, why use philosophy to approach religion? Tillich pointed out, the moment religion begins to talk of truth, it is connecting with philosophical thought. In fact, we cannot avoid philosophy, because the ways we take to avoid it are carved out and paved by philosophy.²

This does suggest a very crucial issue for our studies. The issue is the objective search for truth. What does it mean to objectively search for truth? Do we mean by scholarly objectivity that the scholar has no presuppositions that influence her selection of data, let alone her interpretation of the data? This is the naïve picture we frequently have of an objective approach to any subject. It is often believed that the objective search for truth is inconsistent with having any presuppositions or personal beliefs. However, Thomas Kuhn and others have pointed out the importance of presuppositions.³ Presuppositions and assumptions are valuable starting points—as long as we recognize them. Philosophers tend to be aware of their own assumptions. Scholars, whether dealing with science or political ideologies or religion, do have presuppositions and make assumptions without losing objectivity. Presuppositions provide a necessary reference point from which we ask questions. We may not share common reference points, but as philosophers we can strive to be fair-minded when dealing with traditions other than our own, especially as we evaluate and compare the various religious traditions.

The history of philosophy presents ample examples of philosophical debate regarding how the evaluation of conceptual positions takes place.⁴ While different schools of philosophy may embrace particular criteria, four basic criteria are identifiable: internal consistency, viability, harmony between empirical knowledge and implications or presuppositions of position, and relationship to other alternative positions.⁵

Internal consistency. A position has internal consistency when it is possible to maintain that all of its constituent components are true at the same time. A philosophical position that is self-contradictory should be avoided because from inconsistent premises anything can be proved. As a result, preference is given to philosophical positions that are internally consistent.

Viability. Is the position even plausible? Viability may encompass more than whether the position is plausible. It may encompass ramifications or implications of the position. A preferred philosophical position will be plausible, as will its implications. The criterion of viability raises two crucial questions. First, is the position useful? Does it do any work? Second, does the position fit in with other accepted beliefs?

Harmony between empirical knowledge and implications or presuppositions of the position. While we may recognize potential flaws in our empirical knowledge of the world, such knowledge does seem crucial when developing a conceptual position. A preferred philosophical/theological position will be in harmony with what we know about the empirical world; it should provide an explanation of empirical events, and it should predict events that will occur in the empirical realm.

Relationship a given position has with other alternative positions. The preferred position will be at least as likely or viable as any alternative position, it should harmonize as well as any alternative position, and it should have at least as much predictive power as any alternative position.

Philosophy is an excellent discipline for the study of world religions.

The second question, which is also metaphilosophical, i.e., dealing with methodology, is, how does philosophy approach the study of religion? There are two basic ways for approaching the study of religion using philosophy: philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. The demarcation between these two approaches is not clearly defined, and frequently they overlap. Both begin by asking questions that are philosophical in nature. Both explicitly use human reason in seeking answers to these questions. Both are necessary for the study of world religions. However, there are recognizable differences. Philosophy of religion is a second-order study, whereas philosophical theology might wrestle with theological issues using philosophy and appropriate sources for a given theological tradition as a first-order study. Philosophy of religion might be used to refer to a series of issues that relate to religion in general, and philosophical theology addresses philosophical problems from within a particular religious tradition and allows for a meaningful comparative study between traditions only after working within the traditions to be considered. Philosophy of religion may refer to a religiously neutral inquiry of religious issues, whereas philosophical theology points to a religiously committed inquiry. While scholars do not universally accept this outlined demarcation, it will be the position taken in this project.⁶ More will be said about second-order studies in next chapter.

One final distinction can be made for our study. For many years now, the predominate approach to the study of religion has been that of the history of religions. This approach emphasizes the phenomenon of religion, such as the history or anthropology of religious practice. It assumes that religions develop from simple to more complex notions. In many cases it has stressed religious pluralism. The approach for this project wants to place an emphasis on texts of religion. Some of these texts may be sacred texts, such as the Qur’ân, but there are times that the texts we want to consider are scholarly works, such as those produced by philosophers or theologians working in a given tradition. This approach will emphasize the meaning of the text and frequently stresses the philosophy or theology of the text. Whereas the history-of-religions approach may stress religious pluralism, the textual approach will stress normativity. This is possible because it assumes that while religious ideas do evolve, the origin of most of the world religions is based upon some type of revelation.

Philosophical Arguments against Religion

Frequently when a student hears that I am seriously interested in the study of religion he/she responds in the following way, Well religion is purely subjective, and hasn’t the door really been closed? I mean, haven’t philosophers shown that religion is an empty subject? Philosophical arguments against religion are as old as philosophy itself. While there are many such philosophical arguments, we will consider six of the more important arguments. Our task here is not to prove the arguments wrong, but simply to show why the problems raised do not necessarily close the door on religion. They may present serious obstacles for the religious believer to grapple with, but they do not totally undercut the possibility of a rational religion or a rational study of religions.

Four of the arguments to be considered are associated with individual philosophers who either developed the argument or laid the foundation for what others use to argue against religion. Not all of these individuals were personally opposed to religion. The fifth philosophical argument against religion introduced here is the problem of suffering and evil. The final argument to be introduced concerns the relativistic theories of truth. This problem will only be introduced at this time, but the epistemological issue will be addressed in the third essay. Now to our four arguments associated with a particular philosopher.

David Hume

For David Hume (1711–1776), religion was a concern that held his interest his entire life. While dealing with the issue of immortality of the soul in Treatise of Human Nature, published in 1738, Hume claims the arguments for and against religion were equal. In fact, if my philosophy . . . makes no addition to the arguments for religion, I have at least the satisfaction to think it takes nothing from them, but that everything remains precisely as before.⁷ This claim appears modified by the time he publishes Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in 1748, for Hume presents one of philosophy’s strongest arguments against religion in this work. In section 10 we find his essay On Miracles. While this discussion is dealing with the Christian religion, his claim extends to all the major religious traditions since miracles are part of all major world religions. On Miracles becomes an argument against religion in general.

A theme found in his earlier work, and one that most rational individuals would endorse, is reiterated early in section 10: a wise man . . . proportions his belief to the evidence.⁸ He continues by claiming that evidence is generally acquired via one of two sources: our sense perception or testimony of others. The former when founded on infallible experience provides "full proof of the future existence of that event;⁹ the latter provides a degree of probability. Furthermore, a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger"¹⁰ evidence. Our sense perception is generally considered stronger evidence than the testimony of others. Hume’s empiricism seems unobjectionable for those of us doing philosophy within a form of the analytical tradition. We believe that one ought to align one’s belief with the best available evidence, and, generally speaking, personal sense perception is better than someone else’s testimony, if for no other reason than the person’s testimony is ultimately based on their sense perception.

Now consider miracles. Whether we are considering the miraculous birth of Jesus¹¹ or Siddhārtha¹² or miraculous events in history such as the parting of the Sea of Reeds¹³ or Allah sending birds against the Elephant Army,¹⁴ miracles are found in the major world religions. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature.¹⁵ Hume explains that if something happens in the common course of nature, then it is not a miracle. "A miracle may be accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent.¹⁶ Furthermore, the laws of nature have been discovered via our sense perception and are established as laws because of the principle of uniformity. Hence, a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle."¹⁷ To finish his argument, Hume alludes to a principle established in Treatise of Human Nature. When any opinion leads us into absurdities, ‘tis certainly false; but ‘tis not certain an opinion is false, because ‘tis of dangerous consequences.¹⁸ Good reasoning leads us to reject miracles, for they are contrary to reason.

This argument is one of the most powerful arguments against religion in general. While there are miraculous events embraced by a given tradition such that if that event in fact were only legend and something not based in space-time (sense perception), the tradition would not be drastically altered. For example, what if the story of Moses receiving the commandments is not totally factual? Rather the story of God giving Moses the commandments on stone tablets grew as a legend that was later canonized. Is Judaism fundamentally altered? Possibly not. But surely God’s self-revelatory communication with individuals would qualify as a miracle given Hume’s definition. If such a miracle is contrary to reason, then we ought to reject the miracle even though revelatory events are foundational to at least three of the Western religious traditions, as well as several of the Eastern. If we must reject God’s self-revelation, then we must reject those religious traditions. The Eastern traditions do not fare any better given Hume’s position. The cycle of life that involves numerous rebirths lies outside our sense perception, thus violating the laws of nature.¹⁹ Hume’s brief essay On Miracles does seem to close the door to any further discussion of religion. Of course, we might wish to reject Hume’s empiricism because of its dangerous consequences for religion. But Hume has already pointed out that rejecting a position because of its consequences is not good reasoning.²⁰

If Hume’s position is flawed, it has two possible weak points: his definition of miracles and classical empiricism’s model of nature. Many contemporary theologians have pointed out that, at least within the Judeo-Christian traditions, a miracle is best understood as a sign of wonderment. It reveals the awe of God, but does not entail a violation of the laws of nature. Contemporary theologians have taken this position based on a better understanding of ancient cultures and a clearer picture of science. Furthermore, if the classical empirical model of nature is potentially flawed, then Hume’s view of miracles is potentially flawed.

To understand the classical model, we must ask what is meant by the laws of nature. These laws are established because of uniform experience or what became known as the principle of uniformity—like events will produce like results. Hence, Hume maintained that these experiences constitute proof, i.e., using deduction, which guarantees the end result if the reasoning is proper. However, such a view of nature finds little support from the sciences today. It is true that in some areas, such as chemistry, the principle of uniformity appears to hold. But the principle of uncertainty appears more persuasive today. Instead of nature being a closed system that becomes static, as we better understand it, we view nature as dynamic and as an open system. Given this dynamic view of nature, we cannot conclusively say that a given event violates a set of static laws. Rather the event does not conform to what is typically observed; as a result it is a sign of wonderment. This very weak position is adequate to support the claim that Hume’s position, while raising difficulties for the religious practitioner, does not undermine the possibility of religion.²¹ Religion is not necessarily contrary to good reasoning.

Immanuel Kant

The second philosopher we must consider is Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who does not directly attack religion. In fact, he saw himself liberating religion from the hypocrisy and arrogance of the religious thinkers of his time. Why discuss Kant in the context of philosophical antireligion arguments? First, one cannot read the Critique of Pure Reason, which was published in 1781, without realizing that it is an attack upon the theological/philosophical system of Christian Wolff (1679–1754).²² Wolff represented everything that Kant saw as wrong with the religious pietism of his day.²³ The second reason to look at Kant in the context of antireligion arguments is how he argued against Wolff. Wolff’s theology, predominately metaphysical in character, looks not to the historical basis or to the empirical manifestations of religion, but to its transcendent metaphysical object.²⁴ While the Critique of Pure Reason was written to expose the arrogance of Wolff’s position, the Critique was doomed as far as Kant was concerned.²⁵

Unlike his earlier project on the subject, Kant is very careful to lay out his project in the introduction to Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics.

My purpose is to persuade all those who think metaphysics worth studying that it is absolutely necessary to pause a moment and, regarding all that has been done as though undone, to propose first the preliminary question, Whether such a thing as metaphysics be even possible at all?²⁶

He also predicts that readers who are independent thinkers of the Prolegomena, will not only question their previous view of metaphysics, but will become convinced that metaphysics cannot be done unless certain conditions are satisfied. Kant does not close the door on metaphysics, as he claims metaphysics is necessary; he simply wishes to make sure it is done with integrity.

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant added the following note in the second edition: "Metaphysics has as the proper object of its enquiries three ideas only: God, freedom, and immortality."²⁷ This clarity is significant to the issue at hand as Kant divides all objects into two camps: the phenomena and the noumena. The former contains objects of the empirical realm; things that we can properly know. In the latter are objects that are beyond our ability to know. The Supreme Being, the God concept, he places in the noumena. The implications for religion may appear devastating, but they are not. Kant’s purpose and motivation were consistent. His purpose was to question the possibility of metaphysics. His motivation was to attack the dogmatism of Wolff. Kant did not see his position as antireligion; rather he was opposed to a certain approach to religion.²⁸ While the metaphysics of Immanuel Kant may seem to lead to an antireligion position, Kant did not seem to think so. His issue was with a particular approach to religion, not religion itself. While Kant’s position does warn us about the limits of human reason in talking about religion, his position does not close the door on religion.

Ludwig Feuerbach

Before I discuss our third philosopher, Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1892), a brief historical setting must be established. Unlike the theology of Thomas Aquinas, who believed that the chief way to consider the divine essence is the way of negation,²⁹ Protestant theology took a positive approach. For example, the Westminster Shorter Catechism (1647) boldly claimed, God is a spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in His Being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth.³⁰ For those who paid attention to individuals like David Hume and Immanuel Kant, such claims are problematic.³¹ In fact, following Kant, any objective claim about the essence of God lies outside the realm of our knowledge. Religion must be limited to the phenomena, and, reflecting the optimism of the time, capable of being probed by objective thinkers. The nineteenth century was thus able . . . to view religion in general and Christianity in particular as a subject for historical investigation and critical reflexion.³²

Although Ludwig Feuerbach considered himself an atheist, religion, specifically Christianity, was very important to him. In his major work, The Essence of Christianity, he sets forth what he believes to be the correct interpretation of Christianity and the true essence of religion.³³ In the preface to the second edition, Feuerbach, with complete confidence, tells his readers that he has faithfully and accurately translated Christianity from the ancient texts into plain speech.³⁴ He has done this by laying aside all a priori notions and by focusing only on the empirical evidence—the objective facts. From these facts he would show that religion . . . worships man, and religion itself . . . says: God is man, man is God.³⁵ Thus, the proper subject matter for theology is anthropology.

Religion has its basis in the essential difference between man and the brute—the brutes have no religion.³⁶ With these words, Feuerbach opens his book with a study of the essential nature of man (generic man). For Feuerbach humans have a twofold life: