A Military Government in Exile: The Polish Government in Exile 1939-1945, A Study of Discontent

Evan McGilvray was born in August 1961 in Winchester, Hampshire.

He is a graduate of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London (UCL). Following this he undertook post-graduate studies at the University of Bradford and the University of Leeds, where he researched the politics of the Polish Army from 1918 to date. He also taught at the two universities.

Evan is quite happy to challenge the myths that Poles have created around the Polish Army and has noted the changes made from its modern origins to its present role as a partner in the NATO Alliance; as part of his research he was fortunate enough to be granted an interview with General Jaruzelski.

Evan's interest in Poland goes back to the original Solidarity-era of the early 1980s, and from a first visit that he made to Poland during that decade. He also met Ela, who is now his wife, whilst travelling in Łódź: they were married in Poland during July 1988. During the summer of 1989 he witnessed the fall of communism in Poland, living in Poland between 1991 and 1994, where he taught English as a foreign language.

In addition to writing Polish military history he has also written articles on East-Central Europe, regarding the politics and economics behind the various attempts of the region in attempting to join the euro-zone.

He also has an interest in other militaries and their role in society – quite simply civilmilitary relations – Poland being one of the most interesting European examples.

At present Evan is writing a biography of General Stanislaw Maczek and researching the military politics regarding the involvement of General Sir Ian Hamilton at the Dardanelles during 1915.

To relax Evan likes to read comic novels, especially P.G. Wodehouse, attend the theatre (leg-room permitting) and argue! Evan notes, Despite what Polish reviewers write, I am not a Scot, only in name!

In Memory of Gienia Łaszczewska

1914-2004

‘What is more immoral than war?’

Marquis de Sade (1740-1814)

‘All War is Deception’

Sun Tzu (c.544 BC-c. 496 BC)

Helion Studies in Military History

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Published by Helion & Company 2010

eBook edition 2012

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Cover designed by Farr out Publications, Wokingham, Berkshire

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Text © Evan McGilvray 2010

Photographs © Imperial War Museum

ISBN 978 1 906033 58 3

eBook ISBN 9781907677946

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Contents

List of photographs

Introduction

1     Poland and the Polish Army

2     The Establishment of the Polish Government-in-Exile

3     The First Ally: Poland and Britain, June 1940 – June 1941

4     The Polish-Soviet Agreement, June-July 1941 – An Interim Period

5     Reactions and Conflicts in the Polish Army: Sikorski versus Anders, 1941-1943

Photographs

6     Sikorski Exposed – Katyń and the Collapse of Polish-Soviet Relations: The Consequences for the Polish Government-in-Exile, January – July 1943

7     The Endgame: The Destruction of the Polish Underground State, July 1943–October 1944

8     The Polish Government-in-Exile: a government of no relevance. Dealing with Anders and Mikołajczyk October 1944 – July 1945

Bibliography

eBooks Published by Helion & Company

List of Photographs

All photographs © Imperial War Museum.

The ‘Big Three’, Winston Churchill, President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin, sit for a group photograph outside the Livadia Palace during the Yalta Conference, February 1945. (IWM NAM234)

Lieutenant-General Sir Alan Brooke (Commander in Chief Home Forces), General Sikorski and Lieutenant-General Carrington (Commander in Chief Scottish Command) at the saluting base as Polish troops march past, during a visit to Polish forces at Dundee, 11 December 1940. (IWM H6094)

Winston Churchill inspecting Polish troops with General Sikorski at Tentsmuir in Scotland, 23 October 1940. (IWM H4961)

Home Front: Churchill with General Władysław Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish Government-in-Exile and Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces and General Charles de Gaulle, General Officer Commanding French Forces, following a tank demonstration, 14 February 1941. (IWM H7233)

King George VI and General Władysław Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish Government-in-Exile, inspecting a guard of honour of Polish troops at Glamis in Scotland, 8 March 1941. (IWM H7755)

Home Front: Churchill at the Foreign Office for the signing of the Anglo-Soviet Alliance, 26 May 1941. From left to right: Mr Sabolev, Undersecretary of the Soviet Foreign Office; M. Maisky, Soviet Ambassador; Mr M.V. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs; Mr Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary; Prime Minister Winston Churchill. (IWM CH5699)

A colour party bearing the PAF standard marches past ranks of saluting airmen after the presentation ceremony at Swinderby, Lincolnshire, 16 July 1941. The standard was made by women and their families in Wilno, Poland, and was smuggled to Sweden by Japanese diplomats, from where it eventually reached the United Kingdom in March 1941. (IWM CH2997)

The Churchill Coalition Government 11 May 1940-23 May 1945: Captain Oliver Lyttelton (right), the Minister of State resident in the Middle East from June 1941 to February 1942 at the British Embassy in Cairo with Sir Miles Lampson, Ambassador in Egypt, 8 July 1941. (IWM JAR565)

Russian Ambassador Ivan Maisky addresses workers at a tank factory in Smethwick, during ‘Tanks for Russia’ week. A Valentine tank which has been produced at the factory can be seen behind him, September 1941. (IWM P234)

Lieutenant-General Sir Alan Brooke talking to a Polish officer during a visit to Polish forces at Dundee, 11 December 1940. General Sikorski is in the centre. (IWM H6095)

A line-up of Polish-manned Churchill Mark II tanks in Scotland, 11 December 1941. (IWM H16100)

Clement Attlee, Deputy Prime Minister, visiting Polish paratroopers stationed in Scotland, 20 April 1942. (IWM H18882)

The Churchill Coalition Government 11 May 1940-23 May 1945: R.G. Casey Minister of State resident in the Middle East from March 1942 to December 1943 (right) with Lord Moyne in Cairo. (IWM E17691)

Winston Churchill with Field Marshal Smuts and behind, Sir Arthur Tedder (left) and Sir Alan Brooke, at the British Embassy in Cairo, 5 August 1942. (IWM E15223)

Lieutenant-General Adrian Carton de Wiart VC, a friend of Poland. (IWM IB3449C)

Sir Stafford Cripps, not a friend of Poland, on a special mission to India, conversing with Mr Ghandi on the steps of Birla House, Delhi, April 1942. (IWM IND740)

General Sir Bernard Paget (Commander-In-Chief, Home Forces) visiting Polish Paratroops, Scotland, May 1942. Stanislaw Sosabowski is in the centre. (IWM H20062)

Molotov, still in flying kit, is greeted on alighting at an airfield in northern Britain by Mr Geoffrey Wilson of the Foreign Office, 1942; a Russian interpreter is in the centre. (IWM CH5704)

Mr Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, USSR, in his special train reading English morning newspapers during a journey from the airfield where he arrived in the UK to London, 1942. (IWM CH5694)

Molotov, Eden and Maisky at the signing of a treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Foreign Office, London, 26 May 1942. (IWM CH5696)

The Prime Minister, Mr Winston Churchill with military leaders during his visit to Tripoli, 7 February 1943. The group includes: General Sir Oliver Leese, General Sir Harold Alexander, General Sir Alan Brooke and General Sir Bernard Montgomery. (IWM E22271)

Mr Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labour, and Count E. Raczynski, Polish Ambassador in Great Britain, with General Sikorski. (IWM D1943)

General Sikorski with his wife and daughter at breakfast in his London flat. (IWM D2433)

Polish Cabinet Meeting. From left to right: Mr A. Zaleski, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Mr H Strasburger, Minister of Finance; Professor J. Kot, Minister for International Affairs; General S. Sosnkowski, Deputy Prime Minister; Professor S. Stronski, Minister of Information; M. Seyda, Minister of Justice; General Haller, Minister of Education; General Sikorski. Standing: Count A. Romer, Secretary-General to the Cabinet. (IWM D1944)

General Sikorski with his wife and daughter at breakfast in his London flat. (IWM D1945)

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, newly-appointed commander-in-chief Middle East forces, talking to General Anders on his departure from Baghdad to take up his new appointment, 1943. (IWM E22775)

General Anders and the American Minister, Mr Wilson, at the airfield in Baghdad to see General Wilson leave, 1943. (IWM E22778)

The Commander of the Polish 2nd Corps, Lieutenant General Władysław Anders and the Commander of the Allied Armies in Italy, General the Hon Sir Harold Alexander salute, after General Alexander had invested General Anders with the Order of the Bath in recognition of Polish services at Cassino, 24 May 1944. (IWM NA15352)

Members of the Polish Home Army in conversation during the Warsaw Uprising in August 1944. (IWM HU31075)

Members of the Polish Lublin government in 1944. (IWM HU31076)

The crew of a Consolidated Liberator B Mark VI of No 178 Squadron RAF which took part in the operations to resupply the Polish Home Army by air during the Warsaw Uprising. In attempting to drop their loads at under 500 feet over drop-zones in the middle of the heavily-defended city during August 1944, the Squadron suffered heavy losses, nine aircraft being shot down in less than two weeks. (IWM CL3557)

Introduction

Poland entered the Second World War as a state weakened by internal political conflict brought about by the primacy of the Polish Army in the Polish political system. This situation contributed to the destruction of the Polish Second Republic as it was overwhelmed by the Soviet Union and Germany, who had co-operated in the invasions and partitions of Poland in 1939. However the dichotomy in inter-war Polish politics, which was a simple Left-Right struggle with the Polish Army ruling the country, meant that remnants of the army that survived 1939 became a major political force in exile, but were also politically divided. These divisions were based along the political lines of post-1926 Poland but the position of power had changed: instead of Right-wing military officers, closely identified with the inter-war Polish military regime, Sanacja , holding office, it was the inter-war Polish political opposition who took office, partly owing to the perception that Sanacja officers and officials had failed in their duty to rigorously prepare Poland for war in the face of increasing aggression, principally from Nazi Germany. This meant that inter-war opposition military and political figures such as General Władysław Sikorski and Stanisław Mikołajczyk, who both followed a policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union, were mistrusted by other Polish political and military actors such as President Raczkiewicz, who was associated with the Sanacja , and General Władysław Anders. During the inter-war period the latter had been attracted to Right-wing politics, and after his release from Soviet captivity during 1941 was strongly opposed, with the support from his army, to any policy linked to an amelioration in relations between the Polish Government-in-Exile and the Soviet Government if this meant that Poland would have to accept the annexation of its eastern territories by the Soviet Union. These were the principal divisions of exiled Polish politics and in which the Polish military, especially those forces under the command of Anders, felt free to interfere in politics whenever they considered Polish interests or their own might be endangered. This situation was part of the legacy of the primacy of the Polish Army in Polish politics after 1926.

The traditional attitude of many Poles that the military had been the saviour of Poland and would be once more was a barrier to any true measure of party politics within the émigré Polish community in London. It was all too easy for the Polish Army to dominate the politics of the exiled Polish community. The primary reason for this was that between 1939, when the Polish Government-in-Exile and the Polish Army reformed, and 1943, Sikorski as Prime Minister and C-in-C, Polish Armed Forces, was able to co-ordinate both civil and military policies. Furthermore, as a serving military officer he was more likely to enjoy the corporate support of the Polish Army and as the senior Polish officer he could demand obedience from his men. However despite working with civilian politicians Sikorski remained very much a Polish general.¹ Between 1939 and 1941 four factors influenced developments concerning Sikorski's tenure: first, the civilian politicians with whom Sikorski worked were mainly second- rate, as most senior Polish figures remained in Poland; secondly, these politicians had very little in common but like Sikorski had opposed the inter-war military regime in Poland; thirdly, Sikorski as a ‘political general’ in the ‘traditional role’ seeking Polish independence, could afford to take risks even to the point of defying legal restraints and commonly-held beliefs; fourthly, he did so by signing the Polish-Soviet Treaty in July 1941, thus ignoring the presidential prerogative defining who should sign treaties while the treaty itself was a peace treaty with a traditional enemy of Poland.

Sikorski dominated the military until 1941 when General Anders was released from Soviet captivity. Sikorski's most basic weapon was internment, as he pursued those from the inter-war regime whom he considered had failed in their duty during the September Campaign.² With the removal of those officers who were most likely to oppose him, while his main military rival until 1941, General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, was kept busy with the organisation of the Polish Underground Army, Sikorski was able to impose his will on the military, which was demoralised after the Fall of France, the second Polish defeat in a year. Sikorski, as the ‘saviour’ of the Polish Army began to rebuild it; he needed to do so as it was the only real political expression of strength that the Polish Governmentin-Exile had.³ Furthermore Polish soldiers considered Sikorski to be a symbol rather than a human being.⁴ This allowed him to organise the Polish Army with little reference to others, a situation that continued until 1942 when Anders challenged Sikorski's position.

Anders was another messianic figure but with a different army which had had a different collective experience – captivity in the Soviet Union. After Sikorski's death in 1943 Anders began to manipulate the Polish Government-in-Exile when he demanded that President Raczkiewicz take full control civil and military matters. He claimed that the army would support the president.⁵ Later events prove that Anders was basically trying to subvert the presidency for his own ends.⁶ He was prevented from doing so in 1943 as Mikołajczyk proved to be a doughty opponent. However after Sikorski's death when the offices of prime minister and C-in-C were split this had the effect of severing links between the prime minister and his most senior officer simply because Sosnkowski and Mikołajczyk did not like each other and rarely met. This gave the army a great deal of independence and according to one source, Sosnkowski, who was against any pro-Soviet policies, went to Italy, where Anders’ 2nd Corps was fighting, with plans for a mutiny if Mikołajczyk made too many concessions to the Soviet Government.⁷

After the failure of the Warsaw Uprising in 1944, Mikołajczyk resigned his post. Sosnkowski was dismissed towards the end of the uprising. Anders was able to take advantage of the resulting weak government and dominate the Polish military while the official Polish Government-in-Exile was ignored by the Western allies.⁸

From this evidence it can be seen that there were five prominent political actors in the Polish Government-in-Exile of whom three were generals. The question then arises, what were the other generals doing during this time given that the Polish Army was the leading force in exiled Polish politics? The answer is quite simple: very little! Some generals were perhaps motivated by fear, as Sikorski had already interned officers who had opposed him, while others such as Kopański, whose brigade was involved in heavy fighting in North Africa and Maczek, who was preoccupied with the establishment and training of the 1st Polish Armoured Division and after August 1944 was fighting in North-West Europe, were heavily engaged with operational concerns. General Marian Kukiel, the long serving Polish Defence Minister, was a Sikorski appointee and managed to survive in office after Sikorski's death, later serving in Arciszewski's government, by rarely uttering an opinion.

The fact that these men, who did have influence with the Polish Army or in the case of Kukiel, had, with Sikorski met and worked with senior British politicians and officers, was known to the British Government, said very little about the Polish political situation, especially that relating to the Soviet Union, and should be seen as a failing on their part. While military interference in politics is considered to be unorthodox in democratic states, Poland was not a democracy but a political system dominated by its military. Therefore apolitical or politically moderate officers could have played a role in wartime Polish politics. Maczek and Kopański commanded great respect from their men and if they had offered criticism of the policies being pursued by Anders he might have been forced to moderate his views as there would have been evidence of an alternative vision of post-war Poland. However, these officers, perhaps acting from motives of caution or, as in the cases of Kopański and Maczek, more likely prompted by professional considerations, appear not to have found any reason to oppose Sikorski and failed to criticise Sosnkowski or Anders. This tacit acceptance of the situation allowed elements from the military to dominate the Polish Government-in-Exile by 1945.

Sikorski was not only mistrusted by most of the Polish Army but owing to his rescue and raising from relative obscurity by the French Government during September 1939, he was considered by some Polish and British politicians and officials to be a ‘creature’ of the French Government.⁹ By overemphasising the importance of the French Government and the supposed strength of the French Army, Sikorski lost credibility with many Poles in the West, especially those loyal to the inter-war Polish regime after the Fall of France.

Those Polish officers associated with 1st Corps were largely loyal to Sikorski but the conditions of Polish military politics altered with the German invasion of the Soviet Union. In keeping with British foreign and military politics connected with the prosecution of the war against Germany, Sikorski sought and negotiated an agreement with the Soviet Government. This caused a schism within internal Polish émigré politics as many Poles, especially those from the Right of Polish politics, could not agree with the necessity of an alliance with the Soviet Union as part of a wider policy that should have led to the restoration of Polish independence.

The group of Polish soldiers who finally emerged out of Soviet captivity were understandably extremely bitter with their experiences of Soviet prison camps and brutality whilst there. At first they supported Sikorski's Soviet policy but swiftly under the leadership of Anders became his most severe critics and enemies. The breakdown between Anders and Sikorski was extremely damaging. This relationship was crucial as it was evidence of a power struggle within the exiled Polish community based on military might as both men were in command of armies. Even though the official designations were 1st Corps and 2nd Corps it is more realistic to consider the two corps as being ‘Sikorski's Army’ and ‘Anders' Army’. Indeed 2nd Corps is frequently referred to in both British and Polish historiography as ‘Anders’ Army'. By virtue of having a larger army than Sikorski and being geographically distant from him, Anders was able to defy Sikorski and did so. Once Sikorski was dead there appeared to have been nobody in the Polish military willing to challenge Anders and eventually he was able to usurp political power from the Polish Government-in-Exile and manipulate it.

The rise of General Anders coincided with acts of sabotage on aircraft that Sikorski was travelling in or about to travel in. There were rumours of disaffected Polish officers who were willing to take drastic action to prevent Sikorski's Soviet policies being realised. The flight from Gibraltar in which Sikorski died has been subject to rumour, accusation and counteraccusation since July 1943. It is true that not all of the facts relating to the case are available owing to the lack of Soviet documents of that period but it is equally true that while much of the evidence relating to Polish activities is available, it tends to be ignored by Polish historians, while few Western academics are interested in the matter. The fact that the conspiracies were centred around the ‘Anders’ camp', notably the notorious Klimkowszczyna, should not be ignored. This should cause the historian to reconsider Anders and his relationship with Sikorski: were he and his followers loyal to Sikorski or were they traitors to him? However if the Polish Government-in-Exile had had Anders court-martialled this would have provided evidence to the Soviet and German governments that there was a split in Western military-political circles.¹⁰ In 1960 a court action brought by General Anders against a small-circulation Polish magazine, Narodowice, published in London, which had made several criticisms of Anders’ career and character, was only partially successful because even though the jury found for Anders on several accounts, it did rule that Anders had been an enemy of Sikorski and his government.¹¹ Anders was an example of how a popular Polish leader was able to overshadow the leader of the recognised Polish Government and pursue different policies that were frequently at odds the with accepted government agenda. This was basically a re-enactment of Polish inter-war politics in miniature.

The result was that after the resignation of Mikołajczyk in November 1944, the British Government, despite recognising the succeeding Polish Government-in-Exile and continuing to do so even after the recognition by the Soviet Government of the Lublin Committee as the provisional government of Poland, did not have an active relationship with the Polish Government-in-Exile: the two governments never met after November 1944. Instead the British Government recognised that Mikołajczyk was the only senior Polish politician acceptable to the Soviet Government, but more importantly it was recognised that as difficult as Anders was, he was the only Polish general with enough charisma to keep the Polish army in the line in Italy.¹² However after Yalta, conversations between Anders and the British Government had little to do with operations and were instead concerned with the future of the Polish armed forces in the West. The ever-romantic Churchill even considered that there might be some form of Polish Foreign Legion. He was advised that this would have been difficult both politically and practically while military experts considered that Poles would not make ‘good mercenaries.’¹³ A later idea put forward by Anders was that the huge pool of Polish manpower available in the West could be used as a labour force engaged in civil work in Britain. Churchill considered this to be a good idea as in his opinion there was no politics involved, observing that the Soviet Government never consulted the British Government while deporting ‘…few hundred thousand (Poles) to Siberia.’¹⁴ Anders also considered that Polish troops could be used for occupation duties. The British Chiefs of Staff considered this to be ‘perfectly acceptable’ as it would relieve British troops.¹⁵ At this stage of the war it was still considered that the war with Japan might continue for several more years and so it was not unrealistic to suggest that British forces would be sent to that theatre. By June 1945 some decisions had been arrived at regarding the short term of the Polish armed forces in the West. Polish forces in 21 Army Group were to be used in the occupation of Germany, located ‘somewhere in the British zone’ while the Polish Army was not going to be used in the war against Japan.¹⁶ Poland had declared war on Japan in 1941. However it was noticed during June 1945 that the morale of Polish troops in Italy was poor. Polish servicemen were bitter about American and British policies relating to Poland, which they considered to be weak. There was also widespread concern at the circumstances of 16 AK (Polish Underground fighters) leaders who had been arrested by Soviet security forces and taken to Moscow for trial.¹⁷

This unsatisfactory situation continued throughout the final months of the war with the result being that Polish concerns were largely ignored as the allies raced towards Germany and its capital Berlin.¹⁸ This posture continued until August 1945 when the British Government withdrew its recognition of the President of the Polish Republic as the supreme authority for the Polish armed forces and this was accompanied by the withdrawal of recognition of the appointment of the Polish Commander-in-Chief.¹⁹ Churchill, despite his difficulties with Anders, still stood by him and referred to him as ‘this gallant man’ in reference to Anders’ war service and recommended that he should honoured by making Anders a Knight Commander of the Bath (K.C.B.) in recognition of his service during the war against Germany.²⁰

If Polish politics had matured between 1918 and 1945, even though it would not have prevented the overrunning of Poland by its enemies, wartime diplomacy between Poland, the Western allies and the Soviet Union might have been different. In the period of 1941 and 1945 it might have been easier for the British and American Governments to defend a truly democratic Poland rather than a Poland of a Right-wing military junta. Indeed it was observed that the Soviet Government was bewildered as to why the Western allies in 1945 ‘went all out for Finland’ and not for Poland.²¹ Despite being on the Axis side after 1941, Finland had been attacked by the Soviet Union in 1939 and was forced to cede territory to the Soviet Union after its capitulation in March 1940. Finland rejoined the war against the Soviet Union in 1941 in an attempt to win back its lost territories and by 1945 had again lost a war against the Soviet Union. However, despite this, the allies were more inclined to support Finland rather than Poland against Soviet encroachment as during the inter-war period Finland had been a democracy and had only found itself on the losing side at the end of the war as the result of unprovoked Soviet aggression in 1939. Poland, as already observed, had not been a democracy and furthermore was responsible for aggression against Czechoslovakia and the annexation of Czech territory in 1938: Churchill never seemed to forgive the Poles for this and it worked against them. Indeed Churchill took the view, in a telegram to the Finnish leader, Marshal Mannerheim, that the British Government was being pressurised by the Soviet Government into declaring war against Finland.²² The British pro-Finland stance was also strong at the time of the Soviet invasion of Finland as the British War Department declined to issue licenses for the export of munitions ordered by the Soviet Union. Eventually after the Finnish-Soviet War trade between the Soviet Union and Britain resumed. Earlier, however, the Soviet Government had been abusive towards the Vatican, as well as the Italian and British Governments owing to their sympathies towards Finland during the Finnish-Soviet War.²³

The Polish Government-in-Exile was divided, principally along the lines of the Second Republic, which was a conflict between the military and civilians. After the death of Sikorski, this situation worsened because as a soldier occupying the top political and military offices he had been able to straddle this gap; Mikołajczyk as a civilian politician could not gain the support of the military. Therefore it must be seen that Poland in exile was doomed as much by the continuation of the legacy of pre-war politics and the operation of military ‘politics in exile’ as it was by the policies of its allies, especially those of the Soviet Government, who as Churchill had long observed, took little if any notice of world opinion.

After the death of Sikorski and the resignation of Mikołajczyk, the Western allies distanced themselves from the Polish cause as it became increasingly obvious that democracy would not be restored in Poland by the Polish Government-in-Exile. At the same time the Red Army overran Poland while Polish Communists claiming to represent the Polish people were established there. Quite simply the pre-war political baggage of the Polish Second Republic, which had bedevilled the Polish Government-in-Exile during the war, finally caught out the exiled Poles as its Right-wing political agendas were no longer trusted by many people while Soviet propaganda was hugely successful in convincing the British general public that its vision for a new Europe was of value.²⁴ The loss of office by Churchill and Eden following the 1945 General Election