Nahlik 1 Philip Nahlik Ethics Essay 2- Professor Matt Klinsky Higher Happiness How to live a fulfilled and happy

life has been an important topic of philosophers for millennia. Contemporary philosophers like Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, and Friedrich Nietzsche have grappled with the definition and place of happiness in our lives, often times referring to and refining each other's views. While recognizing the power of happiness as a desirable feeling, each of these philosophers depicts a different goal for happiness and for all human actions. Kant portrays happiness as a possible and common goal of human life, but he points to natural psychology for proof of a higher motive which he calls a good will. He defines happiness as contentment with one's condition (Ethics p184). He includes this contentment with similar goals of power, riches, honor, and even health all of which must be corrected by a good will. Although each of these principles affect human actions, Kant believes that good will should be the ultimate goal of all actions and that a good will further seems to constitute the indispensable condition even of worthiness to be happy (Ethics p184). He expands on this idea that happiness is not the goal of human life by pointing out that if happiness were the real end of nature in a being having reason and will, then nature would have hit upon a very poor arrangement in appointing the reason of the creature to be the executor of this purpose since reason does not always support the happiness of a person (Ethics p185). He even claims that the more a person applies reason to happiness, the more the man falls short of true contentment (Ethics 185). Therefore reason, which naturally controls the mind, has some other end apart from happiness. However, Kant recognizes the value of happiness as a strong inclination which can promote true moral worth because of each man's duty to promote their own happiness (Ethics 188). He

Nahlik 2 revisits the conflict of reason with happiness by saying that reason issues inexorable commands without promising anything as to the inclinations which he sums up under the name of happiness (Ethics 191). He displays happiness as a force of passion in the individual which is separate but not always opposed to reason. He calls happiness a purpose which we can presuppose that [rational beings] all do have by necessity of nature and therefore must have a universal goal (Ethics 193). However, Kant recognizes that happiness is such an indefinite concept that people cannot, therefore, act according to definite principles so as to be happy (Ethics 195). For this reason, he dismisses happiness as the rightful driving force of the human soul, favoring instead his categorical imperative as the more practical principle. Mill concurs with Kant about the role of happiness as a universal motivation, but Mill places more value on happiness as a worthy goal of human life. He introduces happiness as intended pleasure, and the absence of pain which are the only things desirable as ends and therefore direct all other actions (Ethics 220). He refines this definition by noting that a beast's pleasures do not satisfy a human being's conceptions of happiness initiating a hierarchy of pleasure (Ethics 220). He then develops this hierarchy further by claiming that beings with higher faculties, although less satisfied than beings with lower faculties, are ultimately better off: It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied (Ethics 222). Therefore, each individual should strive for the highest pleasure of which they are capable. With this characterization of individual happiness complete, Mill transitions to consider his Greatest Happiness Principle for the sake of which all other things are desirable (Ethics 223). He describes this principle as an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality (Ethics 223). This description builds upon his definition of happiness by making it a testable quality. He then addresses some of his

Nahlik 3 contemporaries' objections against happiness as the ultimate purpose of human life. He first concedes that a continuity of highly pleasurable excitement...is impossible (Ethics 224), but he reaffirms that his notion of happiness is a life with the most pleasure and the least pain which he believes humans can obtain. He then concedes to his objectors that it is possible to do without happiness mostly for the sake of the happiness of others (Ethics 226). This sacrifice of personal happiness for the greater happiness of others expands his idea of the Greatest Happiness Principle beyond the individual. He also notes that in this imperfect world the conscious ability to do without happiness gives the best prospect of realizing such happiness as is attainable (Ethics 226). Mill then moves on from individual happiness to consider the relationship of the individual to humanity. He first clarifies that a utilitarian views happiness as the interest of the whole not of an individual (Ethics 227). He also portrays the object of virtue as the multiplication of happiness among a small group of individuals as long as doing so does not violate the rights of anyone else (Ethics 228). He compares the search for happiness to a traveler's road which has landmarks and signs to direct the traveler just as morality can advise people to take one direction rather than another (Ethics 232). He views the past as an eternal test of pain against pleasure which can direct our future actions by encouraging us to choose the option that will make us happiest and, therefore, most moral. Unlike Mill and Kant, Nietzsche views happiness as a force which does not encourage higher virtue but still produces drastic effects on human actions by prompting them to act out of their isolation. He begins his book by having Zarathustra question a star saying: what would your happiness be had you not those for whom you shine? (Thus Spoke Zarathustra p9). He implies the idea that personal happiness or fulfillment is somehow based on a duty to and appreciation of others, for which Zarathustra leaves his solitude to seek. He initially preaches to the people about their greatest hour when they will call happiness poverty filth and wretched contentment as

Nahlik 4 though they should hate to be content (Zarathustra p13). This contentment seems to be embodied in the last men who say 'we have invented happiness' while eradicating all forms of pain which would spur them on to greater things (Zarathustra p17). He seems to value happiness as an initial motivation to action which becomes unnecessary later in life, like a drug which is initially beneficial but becomes detrimental if the patient becomes dependent upon it. Nietzsche also stresses the value of earthly experiences rather than a search for some hypothetical principle such as true happiness. Zarathustra mocks the men who seek heavenly ways to sneak into another state of being and happiness, claiming that their heavenly experiences are based on the earth (Zarathustra p32). He points to earthly things like butterflies and soap bubbles as sources and authorities on happiness (Zarathustra p41). He also mocks the monkeys who all want to get to the throne...as if happiness sat on the throne, when really they are worshipping mud (Zarathustra p50). Nietzsche seems to refer here to any philosopher, like Plato, who claims that true happiness exists above and outside of human experience when they are really praising experiences based on earth or mud. Zarathustra in fact preaches that your spirit and your virtue [should] serve the sense of the earth to gain knowledge and to experiment so that in this elevated state the soul becomes gay (Zarathustra p77). Similar to Mill's hierarchy of pleasure, Zarathustra praises the higher pleasure of a soul which is free from the happiness of slaves, redeemed from gods and adorations (Zarathustra p103). Nietzsche seems to believe that if people give up the idea of happiness as a distant idea, they will recognize the true value and purpose in their earthly life. Nietzsche also includes a sense of obligation to others which happiness encourages. Zarathustra revisits the idea of happiness involving a duty to others by bemoaning that his happiness in giving died in giving as though happiness were merely a motivating force behind his duty to give to others (Zarathustra p106). This happiness becomes unnecessary and maybe even

Nahlik 5 detrimental once Zarathustra accepts his duty for which he evade[s his] happiness and offer[s him]self to all unhappiness, for [his] final testing and knowledge (Zarathustra p162). He cannot avoid his happiness though which runs after him like a woman for happiness is a woman (Zarathustra p163). Zarathustra later talks about his unhappiness or loneliness as a type of winter which spurs him to be a better person and to appreciate the happiness of which he preaches when asking, how could [the simple people] endure my happiness (Zarathustra p175). In accordance with Mill's view of higher satisfaction, Nietzsche seems to portray Zarathustra as one of the higher beings who is dissatisfied and, therefore, better off than the simple man who is satisfied. He portrays the pain of dissatisfaction and loneliness as a necessary force along with happiness to motivate human actions. In the final book, Zarathustra talks of giving up his happiness in favor of his work: I have long ceased to be concerned with happiness; I am concerned with my work (Zarathustra p237). Responding directly to Utilitarianism and Mill, he later encourages the higher men, his disciples, to overcome the 'happiness of the greatest number' favoring their own lives over others' (Zarathustra p287-8). Finally Zarathustra rebukes himself for being concerned with pity and happiness, affirming: I am concerned with my work (Zarathustra p327). In this final rejection of happiness, Nietzsche appears to praise the individual search for fulfillment as the most important force of goodness in the world. I am most inclined to agree with Mill's portrayal of happiness as a life full of pleasure and without pain because it is straightforward and fairly easy to test in specific circumstances. This explanation seems to logically follow the animal instincts of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain while allowing the possibility of deeper meaning with human reason to think ahead and wager present pain against future pleasure. This evolution of pleasure to a life principle creates morality in humans by allowing them to think outside their own happiness for the sake of others as Mill

Nahlik 6 discussed. I appreciated the way he used the Greatest Happiness Principle to explain how someone can sacrifice their own happiness for others'. I think this action is necessary for humans as social animals to promote our general good. The main disagreement I have with Mill involves his lack of appreciation for pain. I agree with Nietzsche that oftentimes pain or evil is a necessary step toward happiness or fulfillment. If we never had pain, how could we even know what happiness feels like? Yes, this pain should be minimized, but experiencing pain is the best way for people to grow and change their lives for the better. Mill even seems to recognize this fact when he mentions that those who can choose to do without happiness have the best prospect of achieving true happiness. I again agree with Nietzsche that happiness cannot be the goal of life because it encourages people to be sedentary in their contentment. As for Kant, I simply do not think he gives enough credit to happiness as a valuable goal and motivator. I think that Mill characterized happiness the most accurately, but I agree more with Nietzsche's views on the goal of happiness and of human life.