Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2555
Thai Budgetary Reform to Counter Corruption
2555
/
... /
...
...
...
361
11000
- -
. .
.. ...
..
.. ..
...
- -
(
) (Red Flags
Warning Signs)
(Corruption Risk Index: CRI)
CRI
()
1. ... .. 2539
2.
3. ...
4. 1,000
5. . 1,000
6.
7. (Leniency Program)
...
...
8. ...
9. (Corruption Risk Index: CRI)
- -
Abstract
Rampant corruption in Thai budgetary process harms public administration. This is
mainly due to a myriad of flaws in the budgetary process. Then, this research paper examines
strengths and weaknesses of the budgetary process, as well as analyze all loopholes, which are
categorized according to each stage of budgetary process (i.e., budget preparation, budget adoption,
and budget execution and control). Following these findings, the paper constructs indicator (red flags
or warning signs) to signify the possible irregularities in the budgetary process, so that one can
pinpoint the corruption-prone projects. The indicator is called Corruption Risk Index (CRI), which
is tested its accuracy against Klong Dan Wastewater Treatment Project. The project is selected
because its abundant information.
The paper then recommends that one should increase cost of corruption by disclosure
of all stages of the budgetary process, as well as strictly employing law to improve budgetary process
and management by reducing monopoly power and discretion. Moreover, accountability and
transparency must be put in place. The guidelines are as follows.
1. Strictly enforcing law on liability for the wrongful acts of government officials
2. Disclosing all projects which did not get approval, and explain the reasons
3. Broadcasting the meeting of House of Representatives budget scrutiny committee
4. Disclosing information related to projects worth more than 1billion baht
5. Improving Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) of Office of the Auditor General, by
adding a KPI to inspect all projects worth more than 1billion baht
6. Creating database of those who sign contracts with the government and disclose the
information
7. Employing leniency program which is exemption or reduction of punishment
conferred to those who reveal corruption information, and Office of the National Anti-corruption
Commission should expedite its investigation process in order to protect witnesses
8. Educating the general public through all media by Office of the National Anticorruption Commission
9. Applying CRI to signify the possible irregularities in the budgetary process and
pinpoint the corruption-prone projects
- -
(Red Flags)
(Economics of Corruption) (Political Economy)
(New Institutional Economics: NIE)
Isaksen (2005)
(Documentary Research)
(
) (In-depth Interview)
1.
1.1
1.2
1.3
.. 2549
- -
1.4
2.
2.1
... ...
()
2.2 ..
2.3
2.4 (Informal Rule)
(Lump Sum)
3.
3.1
3.2
3.2.1
/
3.2.2
3.2.3 / /
3.2.4
E-auction
3.2.5
- -
3.2.6
3.2.7
(Red Flags Warning
Signs)
(Corruption Risk Index: CRI)
Klitgaard (1998)1
Klitgaard
(Monopoly) (Discretion) (Accountability)
(Transparency)
1.
... .. 2539
( ... .)
2.
2.1) (Corruption Risk
Index: CRI)
.
2.2) (Key Performance Indicators: KPIs) .
1,000
1
- -
3.
3.1)
3.2) 1,000
3.3)
3.4)
...
4. ...
4.1) (Leniency
Program)
4.2) ...
(
)
- -
Executive Summary
The rampant corruption in Thai budgetary process harms public administration. This
is mainly due to a myriad of flaws in the budgetary process. Then, this research paper examines
strengths and weaknesses of the budgetary process, as well as analyse all loopholes in order to
create red flags or warning signs to detect irregularity of Thai government spending projects. The
findings will lead to the proposal to revolutionise Thai budgetary process to prevent corruption.
There is a variety of conceptual framework employed by this paper. They include
Economics of Corruption, Political Economy, and New Institutional Economics, together with
following guidelines made by Isaksen (2005) which categorises risk contained in each stage of
budgetary process. The method used in the paper is mainly documentary research studied
extensively from both domestic and international literature, law pertinent to fiscal and budgetary
affairs. To make the paper more rigorous, conducting in-depth interviews is added.
The main findings indicate forms of corruption in each stage of budgetary process as
follows.
1. Corruption Risk in Budget Preparation
1.1 There is collusion among politicians, businessmen, and government officials
(particularly in budget preparation agency).
1.2 During budget preparation process, people participation is low.
1.3 Some government agencies, e.g. Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces,
typically exercise high bargaining power throughout all budgetary process. After 2006 coup, budget
of Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces have increased substantially, and most of the budget has
been allocated to buying weapon contained in Thailands defence plan.
1.4 Conflict of interest is rampant. There is an abuse of power to reap private
benefit or favor some groups of people having close ally with officials at budget preparation agency,
politicians, and businessmen.
2. Corruption Risk in Budget Adoption
2.1 Corruption in budget adoption is risky during budget scrutiny conducted by an
ad hoc committee of the house of representatives.
- -
2.2 Corruption risks during this process is mainly in the form of collusion between
politicians and government officials. That is, politicians typically call for more budget to be allocated
to their constituencies, and government officials co-operate in the hope to be promoted in the future.
2.3 The consideration by the ad hoc committee of the house of representatives is an
arena where bargaining is likely occurred in order to mischievously allocate the budget.
2.4 Although the ad hoc committee has no power to increase the budget. In practice,
it may indirectly ask government agencies to propose projects through cabinet resolution. Then, the
committee can pick those projects. It is noticed that these projects typically are lump sump with no
specific details, plans, and geographic areas, so that these projects are easily moved as a result of
political bargain.
3. Corruption Risk in Budget Execution and Control
3.1 In budget execution and control, procurement is the most vulnerable to
corruption.
3.2 Typical type of corruption in budget execution and control are the following:
3.2.1 Specification of materials and suppliers or contractors is chosen in
advance.
3.2.2 Standard price of materials or projects is overpriced.
3.2.3 Using extra procurement process to favor some suppliers or contractors.
3.2.4 Government officials conceal information related to projects.
3.2.5 Government officials do not choose suppliers or contractors that offer the
cheapest price.
3.2.6 Government officials allow changing of contract and TOR.
3.2.7 Government officials wrongly approve projects.
Then, the paper constructs indicator (red flags or warning signs) to signify the possible
irregularities in the budgetary process, so that one can pinpoint the corruption-prone projects. The
indicator is called Corruption Risk Index (CRI), which is tested its accuracy against Klong Dan
Wastewater Treatment Project. The project is selected because its abundant information.
The paper recommends that one should increase cost of corruption by reversing
Klitgaards equation, that is, by disclosing of all stages of the budgetary process, as well as strictly
employing law to improve budgetary process and management by reducing monopoly power and
discretion. Moreover, accountability and transparency must be put in place. The guidelines are as
follows.
- -
1. Law-related Measures
Strictly enforcing law on liability for the wrongful acts of government officials
2. Auditing Effciency-related Measures
2.1) Applying CRI to signify the possible irregularities in the budgetary process and
pinpoint the corruption-prone projects
2.2) Improving Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) of Office of the Auditor General,
by adding a KPI to inspect all projects worth more than 1billion baht
3. Transparency-enhancing Measures
3.1) Disclosing all projects which did not get approval by Bureau of the Budget, and
explain the reasons
3.2) Disclosing information related to projects worth more than 1billion baht
3.3) Creating database of those who sign contracts with the government and disclose
the information
3.4) Broadcasting the meeting of House of Representatives budget scrutiny
committee
4. Measures Related to Office of the National Anti-corruption Commission
4.1) Employing leniency program which is exemption or reduction of punishment
conferred to those who reveal corruption information, and Office of the National Anti-corruption
Commission should expedite its investigation process in order to protect witnesses
4.2) Educating the general public through all media by Office of the National Anticorruption Commission
These measures will provide incentives to economic agents to change their behaviour to
avoid involving in corruption. Although it is impossible to eradicate corruption, cost of corruption
should be raised so that those who already involved in corruption refrain from this behaviour, and that
those who are interested in getting involve are reluctant. This will stop corruption vicious cycle, and
budgetary process will be more efficient and appropriate, and, ultimately, Thai citizen will truly
benefit from government expenditure.
- -
...................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................
..............................................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................................
..............................................................................................
1 .......................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 ............................................................................................... 1
1.2 ......................................................................................................... 5
1.3 ..................................................................................................................... 5
1.4 .......................................................................................................... 5
1.5 ............................................................................................................... 7
1.6 .............................................................................................................................. 9
1.7 ............................................................................................... 9
1.8 .......................................................................................... 10
2 ................................................................................................. 11
2.1 ................................................................................................... 11
2.2 ........................................................................................................ 11
2.2.1 ........................................................................................... 12
2.2.2 ............................................................................................... 18
2.2.3 .............................................................................................. 18
2.2.4 ............................................................... 19
2.3 ......................................................................................................... 20
2.3.1
...................................................................... 20
- -
2.3.2 ..................................................... 27
2.3.3
................................................................................................. 29
3 ....................................................... 34
3.1 ....... 36
3.2 : ............. 41
3.3 ................................................. 46
3.4 : .......... 48
3.5 : ? ............................................. 51
3.6 :
....................................................................................................................... 57
3.7 ... .. 2551 ................................... 58
3.8 ........................................................................................................................................ 62
4 ............................................................ 63
4.1 ... ................................................ 64
4.1.1 ... 1 ..................... 64
4.1.2 ...
..................................................................................................................... 64
4.1.3 ... 2 3 ..... 77
4.2 ... ................................................................ 78
5 ....................................... 81
5.1 :
.................................................................................................................... 83
5.2 : .......................................... 93
5.3 ...................................................... 95
5.4 .................................................................................... 96
5.4.1 ............................................................................... 99
5.4.2
.......................................................................................... 112
5.4.3 ............................... 120
5.4.4 / ............................................ 126
5.5 ...................................................................................................................................... 129
- -
6 .................................... 130
6.1 ................................................................... 130
6.1.1 ................. 132
6.1.2 ....................... 135
6.2 :
() ..................................... 145
6.2.1 ... 145
6.2.2 ... 150
6.3 .......................... 154
7 ........................................................................... 157
7.1 157
7.1.1 ......................................................................................... 157
7.1.2 ............................................................................................. 158
7.1.3 .................................................................... 159
7.2 ............................................................................................ 163
7.2.1 .................................................................. 163
7.2.2 .......................................................... 164
7.2.3 ................................................................................. 165
7.2.4 ... ................................................................................. 166
....................................................................................................................................... 168
1:
........................................................................................................................
2:
.......................................................................................................................
- -
.. .. ...................... 44
3-4: IBP................................... 49
3-5:
.. 2541 2554 ............................................. 54
3-6: ............ 55
3-7: .. 2549 ................... 61
4-1: .. 2548 - 2552 ................... 68
4-2: .. 2552
...................................................... 77
5-1: E-AUCTION .. 2549 2552 ................................................................................................................................. 84
5-2: 1 . ...... 85
5-3: 1 . .. 2553 (1
.. 2552 - 30 .. 2553) ................................................................................. 86
5-4: 100 - 1,000 1,000
........................................................................................................................ 89
5-5: .. 2546 ........ 92
5-6: ............................ 94
5-7: ....................................................................... 96
5-8:
................................................................................................ 99
- -
2-1: .......................................................................................... 13
2-2: ................................................ 31
3-1: CONFLICT OF INTEREST PORK BARREL
..................................................................................... 45
3-2: ............................................................................ 57
5-1: ....................... 122
6-1: ..................................................................................................... 130
6-2:
CRI ................................................................................................ 132
6-3: CRI ........................ 156
7-1: ................................................. 157
- -
- -
...
...
...
.. 2535
... ...
.
BOQ
Bill of Quantities
TOR
Term of Reference
- -
- 1-
11 2553
( 16 2553 5)
( ) .. (ASTV 22 2553 34)
1.1
25 - 30%
.. 2553
169,100 - 202,920 1.6 2% GDP ( 30 2553)
Governance Matters 2007: Worldwide
Governance Indicators 1996 2006
6
- 2-
1-1 (Rank of
Control of Corruption)
(Percentile Rank among all Countries) 0 100
0
- 3-
100
.. 2553
0.9 98.06
.. 2541 ( .. 2540) 60.00 ..
2551 39.32
(Kaufmann, Kraay, Massimo 2007)
(
)
.. 2546
...
(2543)
(Budget
Reform)
Ma Ni (2008)
.. 1999
- 4-
(Budget Process) 4
( Budget Preparation) (Budget Adoption)
(Budget Execution) (Budget Control)
Isaksen (2005)
3 (High) (Medium) (Low)
Isaksen (2005)
1.
2.
3.
(Red Flags)
- 5-
1.2
1)
2)
3)
4)
1.3
1)
2)
3)
4)
1.4
(Structure of Incentives)
(Economics of Corruption) (Political
Economy) (New Institutional Economics: NIE)
Becker (1968) (Individual Motivation)
- 6-
Krueger
(1974) (Rent Seeking)
(Iron Triangle)
2
(Principal-Agent Model) Principal
Agent
Agent Principal
NIE
(Rationality
Postulate) (Transaction Cost)3
(Harriss, Hunter, Lewis 1995: 3) NIE
North (1994)
1. (Formal Rules)
( , , )
- 7-
2. (Informal Rules)
( , , , )
3. (Enforcement)
2
NIE
(Rent Seeking)
( ) Rose-Ackerman (1997: 31)
( )
Lambsdorff (2007)
The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform: Theory, Evidence and Policy
Government intervention is a fact of life. (Bad Regulation)
(Red Tape)
(Rule of Law)
1.5
(Documentary Research)
(
) (In-Depth Interview)
- 8-
(Focus Group)
(Face to face)
( )
(Key Informants)
(Theoretical Sampling)
(Sensitive) (
) (Snowball Sampling)
3
(Descriptive Analysis)
- 9-
(2542)
( )
1.6
(Primary data)
(Secondary data)
1 2
. 2 .
3
2
1.7
1)
2)
3)
- 10 -
4)
1.8
7
2
3 5
3
4 5
6 (Corruption Risk
Index: CRI) 7
- 11 -
2
3
2.1
/
( 2544)
1.
2.
3. 1 ( )
1
4.
/
2.2
(Budget Procedure)
- 12 -
...
2-1
2.2.1
(Budget Preparation)
...
3
1) (Budget Revision)
- 13 -
2-1:
- 14 -
2) (Budget Planning)
4
GDP
4
- 15 -
3) (Budget Formulation)
(Budget Calendar)
(
.. 2554 2-1)
...
2
( 15 ... .. 2502)
...
12
(Budget Document)
- 16 -
2-1: .. 2554
//
20 .. 52
2
.. 52
.. 53
.. - .. 52
.. - .. 52
.. - .. 52
15 .. 52
.. 52 .. 53
26 .. 53
.. 2554
-
-
(PART) .. 2553
-
.. 2553
-
-
.. 2553 4
/
.. 2554
.. 2554
- 17 -
//
16 - 18 .. 52
16 .. 52 - 1 .. 53
19 ..- 7 .. 54
10
30 .. 53
11
31 .. - 9 .. 53
12
12 - 26 .. 53
13
27 .. 53
14
12 .. - 7 .. 53
15
11 .. 53
16
26 - 27 .. 53
17
18 - 19 .. 53
18
6 .. 53
19
10 .. 53
.. 2554
.. 2554
4
.. 2554
.. 2554
...
...
.. 2554
...
1
...
.. 2554 2 - 3
... ..
2554
...
.. 2554
- 18 -
2.2.2
(Budget Adoption) ...
...
3
...
...
3
1
2
3
...
...
...
...
...
20
...
...
...
...
2.2.3
(Budget Execution)
- 19 -
...
/
...
2.2.4
2
(Budget Control)
(Pre-audit)
- 20 -
2
1) -
2)
2.3
3
2.3.1
2.3.2
2.3.3
2.3.1
3
1. .. 2525
(Line-item Budgeting System) (Planning
Programming Budget System: PPBS)
(2530)
- 21 -
(Bottomup Process)
(Topdown Process)
(2544)
(1) (
)
(2)
(System Analysis)
(3)
(Benefitcost Analysis)
(Costeffectiveness Analysis) /
(4)
(Work Measurement) (Indicators)
2. .. 2541
Performance-Based Budgeting System
(PBBS)
(Input)
(Centralization)
(Accountability)
- 22 -
PPBS
PBBS
3
(Medium-term
(Incremental Budgeting)
Expenditure Framework: MTEF)
MTEF
MTEF
(Line (Block Grant)
Item) 4
- 23
PPBS
7
3 4
(Cash Basis)
(Pre Audit)
PBBS
4 3
(Accrual Basis)
(Post Audit)
3. .. 2545
(Strategic Performance-Based Budgeting System: SPBBS) SPBBS
26 2544 ...
PBBS
SPBBS
.. 2546
- 24 -
3
1)
2)
3)
(Devolution) (Accountability)
3
2
(Input)
(Outputs) (Outcomes)
(Accountability)
(Transparency) (Reporting)
- 25 -
3
.. 2550
5 8
(Public Expenditure Review: PER)
PER 5
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
- 26 -
...
...
: (2551: 24)
2550
. 76
. 76 (2)
. 167
. 167
. 167
. 168
. 169
. 169
. 170
PER
2
3
4
(2543)
(Trade-off)
- 27 -
2.3.2
1.
(Veto)
(Office of Management and
Budget: OMB)
... (
) (Sector) 10-15 /
(Social Security) (Homeland Security)
(2548)
(PPBS) (PBBS) /
1 30
1 5 ...
(Medium-term Expenditure Framework: MTEF)
4
10
2.
( 2548)
1)
(House of Common) (Spring Budget)
3 (1)
- 28 -
(2) (3)
2) 3 (
) 2
(Finance Committee)
..
3) (Tax Continuations)
10
2
(1) (Permanent Taxes) (2)
(Annual Taxes)
4) (Finance Bill)
..
5)
3.
(Result-based Budgeting) (Outputs)
(Outcomes) (Public
Finance Act, 1989)
( 2547;
2552)
1) ( )
3
(Outcomes)
- 29 -
(Fiscal Responsibility Act, 1994)
(Half-year Economic and Fiscal Update)
(Budget Policy Statement)
2) ( )
3) Budget
Initiatives ( )
4) (
) (Baselines)
2
5) ( )
6)
...
7) (Finance and
Expenditure Committee)
2
...
2.3.3
(2547)
6
- 30 -
100
44.3%
(Petty Corruption)
(Grand Corruption)
(Corruption in Budget Process)
Corruption is the abuse of public power for private benefit.
(Corruption in Government Expenditure) (Corruption in Public
Procurement) (Conflict of Interest: CoI)
(Budget Preparation)
(Budget Execution)
- 31 -
2-2:
(Corruption in Budget Process)
Corruption in Government
Expenditure
Corruption in Public Procurement
(Conflict of Interest)
Mauro (1998)
more
lucrative opportunities Mauro
(
)
Mauro
(Mauro
1998: 264)
Tanzi Davoodi (1997)
(City Rail Links) 52%
57% 59%
- 32 -
Tanzi Davoodi
(Tanzi Davoodi 1997: 284-285)
Isaksen (2005)
Isaksen
(High) (Medium) (Low)
(Budget Adoption) (Budget
Execution) (Control, Audits and Oversight)
(Budget Preparation) Isaksen
(Feasibility Study) (EIA)
(2543)
(
) ( )
()
(2546)
(
)
(Budget Preparation)
Kenny (2007)
- 33 -
Kenny
Isaksen
(2005) Isaksen
3 (Informal Rules)
Isaksen
Ma Ni (2008)
Modern Public Budgeting
(Clean Government)
..
1999 Ma Ni
(Treasury
Management Reform) (Government Procurement Reform)
Jan Isaksen
(2005) Ma Ni (2008)
- 34 -
... 4 .
3-1 3-2
(Investigation Audit) .
.
(.)
- 35 -
3-1: ...
2545
12
1
5
2546
14
2
7
2547
16
3
2549
1
2550
1
2551
4
: ... .. 2545 - 2551
: .. 2548 .. 2549 ...
...
3-2: .
2545
43
22
3
12
2546
28
22
6
4
2547
101
35
6
38
2548
52
13
2
11
2549
37
22
3
15
2550
100
37
11
55
2551
65
46
11
47
2552
43
27
7
13
: . .. 2545 - 2552
- 36 -
- 37
..
- 38
...
4
. 100,000
50,000
40,000
... ...
.
.
. . .
.
. . .
- 39 -
1.
2.
(Reciprocal Benefit)
(Detect)
(Conflict of Interest)
(2546)
- 40 -
7
1. (Acceptance of Benefit)
2. (Self Dealing)
3. (Post
Employment)
- 41 3-1: ...
1. .
( .)
2. . ...
.
. 4
3. . .
.
4.
.
5. .
.
6. .
: ... (www.nacc.go.th)
3.2 :
(Pork-barrel Politics)
(...) Pork Barrel
5 Pork Barrel
Pork-barrel Projects
(Pork) (Barrel)
- 42 -
Brown & Root
Central Arizona Project Brown & Root
Pork-barrel Politics
Pork-barrel Politics 60 LDP (Liberal
Democratic Party)
(2546)
..
..
Pork-barrel Politics
.. (2550)
Pork-barrel Politics
.. ..
(Pork Barrel)
- 43 -
Pork-barrel Politics - ..
300,000 .. 2513 1,000,000
.. 2514 ..
(...)
..
..
(2552)
.. ..
Pork-barrel Politics .. 2550
265 266 ..
3-3
- 44 -
3-3:
.. ..
2074
2073
219 (
1)
219 (
2)
4013
2166
(.)
7.325
11.381
5.400
()
33,000,000 .
48,472,000 .
18,480,000 .
4.000
19,882,000 .
.. ()
.. ()
..
()
.. ()
4.901
24,938,000 .
.. ()
0.325
5.640
1,462,000 .
18,480,000 .
.. ()
.. ()
5.921
28,430,000 .
..
()
..
()
..
()
.. ()
226
6.229
19,280,000 .
( 1)
226
8.430
26,435,000 .
( 2)
24
3.300
15,958,000 .
( 1)
24
3.580
16,897,000 .
.. ()
( 2)
24
5.010
18,480,000 .
.. ()
24
3.800
17,608,000 .
.. ()
218
5.000
18,480,000 . ..
()
: www.dustfreeroad.info
:
- 45 -
3-2:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
: (2543)
. .
. .
(2553: 231 - 232)
- 46 -
(2546)
TDRI
3.3
(2554)
3-3
3-3:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
...
... ...
... ...
: (2554)
- 47 ...
...
15 1
...
- 48 Hidden Agenda
Hidden Agenda
Maximum Hidden Agenda
3.4 :
.. 2546
- 49 -
3-4: IBP
(Extensive)
(Significant)
(Some)
(%)
80%
61 % 80 %
41 % - 60 %
(Minimal)
21 % - 40 %
(Scant
or No)
20 %
: http://internationalbudget.org/
(Minimal)
IBP
IBP
(2553: 156 - 157)
- 50 -
6
Line
Item (PPBS)
40
Sector
3
1
Carlitz (2009)
IBP
6
www.internationalbudget.org
(Transparency Budget in Philippines)
- 51 -
- 52 -
-
Isaksen (2005)
(Macro Basis
for the Budget)
(Strategic PerformanceBased Budgeting System: SPBBS) .. 2546
(2547)
(Strategic Performance-Based
Budgeting System: SPBBS)
- 53
35% 17%
( 3-5)
3
1)
2)
3)
(2553: 167) ...
(2544 - 2549) 200%
1)
2)
...
...
60,000 SML
(
) (
)
1%
- 54 -
...
547
400 300 1,000
S Class
3-5:
.. 2541 2554
2541
( )
76,590
(%)
9.2
2542
78,311
9.5
2543
76,936
8.9
2544
86,912
9.6
2545
183,941
18.0
2546
148,134
14.8
2547
265,826
22.8
2548
250,190
20.0
2549
243,185
17.9
2550
197,651
12.6
2551
242,775
14.6
2552
254,583
13.0
2553
215,007
12.6
2554
265,763
12.2
: .. 2541 - 2554,
- 55 -
9,400
19,100
(SML)
: .. 2545 - 2552,
2550
2551
2552
15,000
3,000
15,000
6,900
2,652
- 56 3-4: :
1.
2.
3.
.
4. 1 3
15
5.
: (...) (2553)
...
..
... .. 2553
2549
10
..
( , 28 2552)
..
... .. 2554
2 1).
2). ..
..
( , 7 2553)
- 57 -
3.6 :
.. 2549 8.1 .. 2549
1.68 .. 2554 2 3-2
3-2:
:
200,000
100,000
0
81,241 85,936
2548
2549
115,024
2550
143,519
2551
2552
2553
2554
: .. 2548 - 2554
.. 2554 .. ..
10%
- 58 -
1.7 ..
.. ..
1.9
7,200 1,800
..
16
9
.
..
.
16
- 59 -
...
1.
2. ... .. 2551
3.
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) (Government to
Government: G2G)
... .. 2551
43
30
26
43 ... .. 2551
26 2
- 60 -
2544
19 2549 .
...
.. 2551
1/2554 26 2554
.. 2554 - 2563 Modernization Plan:
Vision 2020
2563
2% GDP
GDP
GDP
.. 2554 - 2563
332 1,307,731
301 770,392
- 61 -
157 497,358 62 440,074
48 325,523
.. 2549
GT200
Enstrom 480B
16 3-7
3-7: .. 2549
4 1.2
GT200
.. 2548
Sky Dragon
BTR 3E1
BTR 3E1
96
96
Enstrom 480B
16
: CNN GT200 , http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/node/706 ( 30
2555)
200 1.2 ! ,
http://www.prachachat.net/news_detail.php?newsid=1258352285&grpid=00&catid=no (
30 2555)
. 8 , www.isranews.org/southnews/scoop/38.../1650-qq-8.html ( 30 2555)
, http://www.thairath.co.th/content/pol/98437 ( 30
2555)
- 62
- . ,
http://www.manager.co.th/Home/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9530000115505 ( 30 2555)
,
http://www.manager.co.th/Home/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9530000115505 ( 30 2555)
- . , http://www.manager.co.th/Home/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9530000090054
( 30 2555)
. ., http://www.thaiday.com/Home/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9530000077296 (
30 2555)
4 ?,
http://www.matichon.co.th/news_detail.php?newsid=1279160046&grpid=&catid=02 ( 30
2555)
. . ,
http://www.matichon.co.th/news_detail.php?newsid=1279631595&grpid=00&catid ( 30 2555)
3.8
1.
... .
2.
3.
4.
.. 2549
5.
- 63 -
4
...
.. ... ( ... ) 2
... 3
( 105 ... )
1 ...
... 2
... ( )
..
... ..
3 ...
...
20 ...
...
...
(2544) 2
..
- 64 -
4.1 ...
...
4.1.1 ... 1
... 1
1. ...
2. ..
3.
1
( 2533: 38)
4.1.2 ...
... 1
2
... () ...
- 65 -
..
( 1 4
)8 (2541)
...
(
)
.. 2545 63
.. 2550 2551 35 43
.. 7
...
...
...
-
10-11
250-280 ( 2552)
- 66 -
-
... .. 2554
8 9 ( 26 )
3 ()
9
8
1. ...
2. ...
3.
4. 1 ()
5. 2 ()
6. 3 ()
7. 4
()
8. 5 ()
- 67 -
.. 2554 7
10
1.
2.
3.
4.
5. 5
6.
7.
1
.. 255010
.. ( ..
)
3 - 4 ( 2552: 120)
... 1
10
.. 2550 168
168
- 68 -
.. ..
..
-
..
..
..
..
2
.. ( 2540)
4-1: .. 2548 - 2552
:
1,200,000,000,000
2548
1,360,000,000,000
2549
1,566,200,000,000
2550
1,660,000,000,000
2551
1,835,000,000,000
2552
1,700,000,000,000
2553
2,070,000,000,000
2554
:
17,704,733,300 17,704,733,300
1.48
20,351,308,200 20,351,308,200
1.50
5,596,849,500
5,596,849,500
0.36
9,736,089,200
9,736,089,200
0.59
45,009,585,700 45,009,585,700
2.45
22,505,238,100 22,505,238,100
1.32
33,449,343,100 33,449,343,100
1.62
1
( )
- 69 -
.. 2550 2551
11
4.1.2.1
..
...
( )
...
( 2548, )
..
..
3
..
2549
[]
( 2550: 67)
11
2552
- 70 -
... 1
..
..
...
( 2544;
2546)
( 2545)
..
..
2550
... Hidden
Agenda
.. .. 3
1) .. 10 17
2552 ..
- 71
2
..
20,000
( 2552: 203, 208, )
2) .. 25 2552 ..
..
..
10,000
10,000 ..
10,000 20,000
( 2552: 209, 210, )
3) .. 27 2552 ..
- 72
30,000 10,000
..
..
( 2552: 232, )
...
..
..
..
..
..
- 73
..
(Interest
Groups)
( 2544: 45)
..
...
..
.. ()
.. 26
2552 (2552: 205)
..
(Line Item)
- 74 -
/
( 2550)
(2552: 203, 208)
4 2552
...
(Item)
80% Item
( )
(2551) ... .. 2552
300
... .. 2548 2552
( )
( )
(Lump Sum)
...
/
- 75 -
(
2546)
(Lump Sum) .. 2552
1) 15,026
2
(
.) 8,946
5,569
/
15,000
. 12,000
.
. 3,000
Lump
Sum
(.)
.
- 76
.
2) .. 2550
12 .. 2552
3,221
( )
3,500
Lump Sum 13
3)
3,577
1,280 6,000
700 Lump Sum
12
.. 2550 78
... .. 2550 7
13
3
1.
2.
3.
- 77 -
( ) ...
...
(2539: 28)
( 2540)
(2552)
..
2552 2 4-2
4-2: .. 2552
169,092
69,670
10
45
31
15
:
88
1,153
1,150
603
4.1.3 ... 2 3
- 78 -
2 ...
..
... 2
2 2 - 3
2
.. 2
..
3
...
...
3 ... 14
...
4.2 ...
...
20 ...
...
... (
14
.. 2550 168
105
...
- 79 -
) ...
... .. 2553 27
2-3
...
...
..
3
...
... ...
...
... 105
20
.. ...
...
- 80 -
... ..
(2552: 196)
.. 25 2552 ..
( )
...
- 81 -
5
...
(Budget Execution and Control)
(2543)
5
1. 15
2.
3.
4.
5.
(Public Procurement)
.
16
15
16
... .. 2542
46
- 82 -
.
.
2
1.
2.
(
5-1)
...
5
- 83 5-1:
.
1.
2.
3.
() 10 20
4. /
5.
6. 1
7.
8. 5
5.1 :
(Electronic Government Procurement: E-GP)
2 - 4 .. 2548 ( 1 .. -30 .. 2548)
6,449 96,618 89,798
E-auction 9,820
10.16% ( )
- 84 -
5-1
5-1: E-auction .. 2549 - 2552
( )
E-auction
()
( )
2549
20,698
223,031
210,690
12,341
5.53
2550
20,219
213,732
196,274
17,458
8.17
2551
20,834
329,007
307,998
21,009
6.39
2552
26,423
308,301
288,749
19,552
6.34
22,044
268,517
250,928
17,590
6.60
:
: E-auction 2
www.gprocurement.go.th
5-1
E-auction 17,590 6.6%
E-auction
E-auction
( 2553)
. 1
. .
.
1
.
http://procurement-oag.in.th/login .
.
- 85 -
.. 2543
5-2
5-2: 1 .
1
. ()
()
2543
28,529
242,414,392,152
2544
31,822
210,985,513,981
2545
37,355
301,244,747,269
2546
36,994
274,824,225,831
2547
39,509
484,716,928,822
2548
51,149
447,891,814,059
2549
57,811
783,011,643,752
2550
55,072
448,711,432,385
2551
54,394
395,512,612,316
2552
63,546
545,353,073,210
2553
70,344
553,081,035,878
: http://procurement-oag.in.th/cont/search/detail_cont.php
.
.
.
.
.. 2553 1 . 70,344
553,081,035,878
5-3
- 86 -
5-3: 1 .
.. 2553 (1 .. 2552 - 30 .. 2553)
1
. ()
( )
396
4,322,088,533
6,535
42,348,757,492
1,444
16,533,188,955
33
251,144,051
367
3,088,533,143
766
6,484,217,259
5,209
55,817,609,651
7,689
105,220,086,996
4,572
14,908,546,626
791
12,970,602,310
1,462
30,742,760,257
224
1,107,177,330
29,247
151,148,590,467
464
3,638,152,442
206
1,656,030,818
202
1,203,839,154
195
801,721,132
4,781
60,373,698,009
4,465
24,336,552,107
348
1,651,842,263
706
10,864,182,841
210
3,243,711,051
32
368,002,993
70,344
553,081,035,878
: http://procurement-oag.in.th/cont/search/detail_cont.php
.
5-3 .. 2553
1 . 29,247
1.5 .
- 87 -
100 1,000
(
)
2
1. (Cost of Being Audited and Caught)
(Initiated Cost)
(.) (...)
(DSI)
(...)
- 88 -
.. 2544- 2552
...
.. 2544 - 2546
.. 2550 - 2555
- 89 -
()
()
2543
263
54,090,225,408
11
36,490,952,028
2544
170
41,058,354,874
16
23,434,402,351
2545
241
52,957,290,915
17
83,998,192,813
2546
210
53,388,733,167
18
66,126,364,763
2547
386
101,821,720,963
47
198,167,961,329
2548
433
107,733,062,833
32
107,967,931,582
2549
584
169,053,379,419
57
359,874,477,168
2550
401
104,022,725,804
30
98,889,089,966
2551
324
83,237,354,409
21
66,689,794,546
2552
427
103,753,286,080
24
138,781,873,709
2553
489
126,669,684,113
23
90,150,770,457
357
90,707,801,635
27
115,506,528,247
: http://procurement-oag.in.th/cont/search/detail_cont.php
.
5-4 100
1,000 357 9
1,000 27
1.15
100
(
)
- 90 -
. ...
100
. . .
1,000
1,000
1,000
(.)
(www.ect.go.th)
5,000
5-5
(2551)
75
75
75
() 36 13 () 6
- 91 -
5 3
13 2540
.. ..
2
( 2551)
2540
- 92 -
5-5: .. 2546
()
. ()
()
. ()
() ()
.. (1964)
. .
()
.
.
. .
()
()
. ()
. (1970)
- ()
: (www.tcijthai.com)
.. 2546 .. 2554 (www.ect.go.th)
:
( .)
- 93 -
5.2 :
(Public Procurement Audit)
.
.
. 3
1.
18
.. 2546
2.
(E-auction)
3.
18
... .. 2542
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5) (1) (2) (3) (4)
(6) .
- 94 -
.
5-6
5-6:
( )
( )
( )
()
( )
2545
72,998
2,893
705
na
na
2546
73,118
4,625
1,772
3,846
18,307.48
2547
71,285
2,945
1,146
1,398
18,139.08
2548
71,414
2,770
1,160
2,537
11,241.12
2549
71,562
4,198
738
1,717
6,566.86
2550
71,734
1,985
528
1,318
14,555.71
2551
71,787
2,551
952
1,108
26,417.69
2552
71,866
2,171
945
3,545
14,108.68
: . .. 2545 - 2552
(Ellicott)
- 95 -
.
5.3
.
. 44 - 46 ...
.. 2542
3
1.
...
...
.. 2542
2. 2
2.1
.. 2544 4
19
2.2
20
3.
19
(.) ..
2544 4
1 1 2 2 - 4 3 5 - 8
4 9 - 12 . 37 - 49
20
www.cgd.go.th
- 96 -
5.4
7 5-7
5-7:
1.
27
29 34
2.
3. : 100,000
: 100,000
2,000,000
:
2,000,000
: 100,000
:
(1)
(2)
:
2,000,000
19, 39
20, 40 - 43
21, 44 - 56
23 - 24, 57 - 58
26, 59
- 97
4. / /
/
: 100,000
- 50 /
- 50 100 /
- 100 /
- 25 /
- 25 50 /
- 50 /
:
5.
.
6.
-
-
-
- /
-
:
65 - 67
132 - 135
71
72 - 73
136
139
137 - 138
5-7
- 98 -
.
.
(Investigative Audit)
.
.
2
1.
2.
- 99 -
5-8:
:
2545
14
18
32
2546
12
15
27
2547
25
27
52
2548
45
7
52
2549
14
23
37
2550
84
16
100
2551
52
13
65
2552
40
3
43
: .. 2545 - 2552,
.
...
5.4.1
(
)
5.4.1.1
5.4.1.2
5.4.1.3
- 100 -
5.4.1.1
2
(1)
Post Tension
Table Form
.. 2543 ( . 2543: 50)
40,000
(2)
5-2
- 101 5-2:
() 7 2 2
()
.
2
(.)
.
: (2552: 119-120)
5-2
( )
5-2
(Bid Suppression)
- 102 5-3:
(.)
153,000 6
/
3
.
112,842,557
: (2554: 33)
5-3
(2549)
10%
- 103 -
15
30%
5.4.1.2
(TOR)
.
.
.
.
2537 ... 1 37 .
8
(
)
15% .
.
9 50
Factor F
- 104 -
.
8
(...)
5-9
5-9:
...
1.
2.
3.
4. 15%
.
5. VAT
6. VAT
7.
8.
9. 30%
10.
- ...
0.30
-
11.
12.
-
-
- Factor F
-
- 105
13.
-
/
-
-
14.
- (BOQ)
- (BOQ)
15.
- / /
16. Factor F
- Factor F
Factor F
- Factor F
Factor F
- Factor F /
Factor F
- Factor F Factor F
- Factor F Factor F
(Built in)
...
- 106
-
Factor F
: 8 (...)
...
- 107 5-4:
3
1
2 3
.
440,044,454.48
1.
... .. 2502
80,717,796.20 ..
2535
Detail Design (Shop Drawing)
69,864,108.48
2.
3 Factor F
160,277,166
3. - 3
Factor F
-
Factor F
2 206,807,180
4.
3 77
- 9
72 3,096,000
: (2554: 30-31)
: ...
( 51430603)
- 108 5-5:
(.)
.
(BOQ) BOQ
( )
.
2
. . .
: (2554: 32)
.
5-4 .
5-5
(2547)
.. 2521
.. 2543 (BOQ)
40,000 0.1%
.. 2541
- 109 -
21
22
...
.. 255423
103/7 103/8 ...
.. 2542
1.
2.
500,000
5.4.1.3 /
(E-auction)
.
21
0202/ 12 30 2541
1305/ 9628 20 2542
23
1 .. 2555
.
22
- 110
( )
.
2546 . (
)
(.)
24
27
57 (6)
24
- 111 5-6:
2542 ()
4 75 1 28.8
(
3 )
.. 2535 50 (6)
50,000,000
4 49,900,000
50 (6)
20 2
2 1
38,191,162.63
: (2553)
/
. .
- 112 . 1
132 1
.
5
.
/
(Conflict of Interest)
5.4.2
29
34
- 113
..
abuse
..
30% 20% 10% ..
.. 2535
20
100 5-10
- 114 -
5-10: .. 2535
(1)
(2) ( 29)
( 31)
(3)
( 32 34)
(4) ( 37) ( 38)
( 15)
(5) ( 39
)
(6) (
43 50)
(7) ( 51)
( 52)
( 23(7) 24(5))
( 47)
(8)
50 ( 65 91) 25 ( 66)
(9)
(10) ( 68)
(11) 5% ( 142)
(12) ( 132 133)
(13) ( 134)
(14)
( 71 72)
(15)
( 136)
(16) ( 137 138)
( 140)
(17)
( 139)
(18) 1 . 30
( 135)
(19) (.)
(20) ( 15 15 145)
100,000,000
50,000,000
: .. 2535
- 115 -
.. 2535
5-11:
... ...
2545 1. 1.
.. 2539
5 2.
2.
28
10%
1
.. 2544 182
3.
4.
- 116
...
IAI
.6
(UH-1H)
...
3.
4.
5.
6.
2550
()
7.
2551 5.
Ground
Improvement for Airside Pavements
.
: ... .. 2545 - 2551
2546
- 117 -
5-11 ...
.. 2545
( )
...
3 ...
157 ...
... .. 2542
.. 2549
(.)
...
16 9 25 . 24
... 8
5-12
25
...
- 118 -
5-12:
.
() (.)
(TAGS)
(TOR)
(.)
(.)
VKP Joint
Venture
() 6CI4500016 22 2550 ..
13,696,000
.
() ...
..
2542 (Limousine) -
5 8
2,651,481,500
.
4 ()
4 ( 2)
4 ()
(
2)
( 9)
- 119
.
()
...
.. 2542
SPS Consortium
...
...
(CTX)
...
..2542
5-12 .. 2549
.
...
- 120 -
...
5.4.3
.. 2535
5-13
- 121 -
5-13:
/
1.
2.
3.
4. E-auction
1.
2.
1.
2.
3.
1.
2.
1.
2. ()
1.
2.
1. /
2.
- 122 -
5-13
. ...
1.
.. 2535
26
...
.
.
2,000,000
5-1:
5-1
26
.
0205/ 193 13 2554
- 123 -
(E-auction)
E-auction
. .
E-auction
E-auction 40
Username Password
G procurement (www.gprocurement.go.th)
IT
.
. TOT IP Address
Username Password
... ... Username Password
E-auction
2
Fax
User name Password Username Password
G procurement
- 124
E-auction
Username Password
2.
(Bid Rigging)
(Market Allocation)
(Bidding Ring)
(Sub-contract Bidding)
(Bid Suppression)
(Complementary Bidding Phony Bidding)
(Bid Rotation)
- 125 -
...
.
3.
()
.. 2535
.. 2549
(TOR)
5-7:
()
(BOQ)
386,000,000
: (2554: 23-24)
- 126 -
5.4.4 /
/ .. 2535
2 1)
2)
27
1.
2. 1 .
3.
4.
5.
.
27
- 127 -
Strength Test 28
(
)
.. 2535
(Accountability)
- 129 -
5.5
1.
2.
2.1 /
2.2
2.3 /
2.4 Eauction
Username
Password E-auction
2.5
2.6
2.7
- 130 -
6
(Red Flags)
(Corruption
Risk Index: CRI)
Kalnins (2005) Kenny Musatova (2010) Transparency International
(2006) Ware (2007) World Bank (2007)
4
6-1:
(CRI)
6.1
(Corruption Risk Index: CRI)
22 2551
/
2
2
3
) (Key Risk Area)
) (Political Risk)
) (Negotiation Risk)
- 131 -
8
) (Public Accountability)
) (Public Participation)
) (Responsiveness)
) (Rule of Law)
) (Virtue)
) (Transparency)
) (Equity)
) (Value for Money)
3 8
( 6-2)
(CRI) 2
(1) (Project Risk: )
(Corruption Measurement)
- 132 -
(RF3) (RF4)
(RF5)
CRI = RFS
RFS = RF1 + RF2 + RF3 + RF4 + RF5
(1)
(2)
(1) 2
()
(RFS) (2)
6-2:
CRI
6.1.1
(Project Risk:
) (2543)
- 133 -
(
) (
)
8
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
5 1 5
( )
( 6-1)
- 134 -
6-1:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
2.1
2.2 5
Joint Venture Consortium
2.3 5
Joint Venture Consortium
3.1 10
3.2 10 100
3.3 100 500
3.4 500 1,000
3.5 1,000
4.1 3
4.2 3 5
4.3 5
5.1
5.2 10
5.3 11 - 30
5.4 31 - 50
5.5 50
(Feasibility Study)
6.1
6.2
1
2
3
4
5
1
3
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
3
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
3
- 135
6.3
5
7.
7.1
1
7.2
3
7.3
5
8.
8.1 . ...
1
8.2 . ...
3
8.3
5
(Project Risk: )
8
6.1.2
6.1.2
(Red Flag
Scores in Budget Process)
( Checklists)
(Best Practice)
3
(1)
(2)
- 136 -
(3)
4
1
0
( 6-2)
6-2:
(Red Flags)
1. (Budget Preparation)
1.1
1.2
(/) (
/)
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9 /
1.10
2. (Budget Adoption)
2.1
()
2.2
..
2.3
3. (Budget Execution)
3.1 (TOR)
3.1.1
3.1.2
3.1.3
( 2 )
E-auction
Turn-key
3.1.4
3.2.3
3.2.4
3.3
3.3.1
3.3.2
3.3.3
3.3.4
3.3.5
3.3.6 (Time Lag)
3.3.7
3.3.8
3.4 /E-auction /
3.4.1 /
3.4.2
3.4.3
/
3.4.4 /
/ (Bid Suppression)
3.4.5
1% 3% 10%
( )
3.4.6
(Sub-contract Bidding)
3.4.7 (Bidding
Ring)
(Bid Rotation)
3.4.8 /
3.4.9
3.4.10
3.4.11
3.4.12
3.4.13 /
3.4.14 /
( )
3.4.15 / /
(Phantom Bidding)
3.4.16 /E-auction
3.5
3.5.1
3.5.3 .
3.5.4
3.5.5
3.5.6
( )
3.5.7
/
3.5.8
3.5.9 K
4.5
4.6 (
)
4.7
5.
5.1
5.2
/
/
: 1
0
29
- 142 -
6-3:
1.
2.
3.
4.
0.25
0.10
0.55
0.05
5
0.25
0.10
0.60
0.05
5.
0.05
1.00
1.00
: 5
( ) 5 (
0.05) 3
RFS (2)
RFS (3) (4)
(3)
(4)
(
)
(Corruption Likelihood) 6-4
- 143 -
6-4:
CRI
0.00 1.99
2.00 3.99
1
4.00 5.00
Green Flag
Yellow Flag
... .
Red Flag
... .
6-4 CRI 3
1. CRI 0 - 1.99
2. CRI 2.00 -3.99
1
3. CRI 4.00 - 5.00
CRI
CRI 0 - 1.99
... . (Green Flag)
CRI
(Yellow Flag)
- 144 -
(Red Flag)
CRI (Warning Signs Red Flags)
30
(Sik 2002: 91)
(Likelihood
Probability) (Kalnins 2005)
(Not a Sure Sign of Corruption) (Guidelines)
( )
2
(Kenny Musatova 2010)
1. False Positives
2. False Negatives
(Second Look)
(CRI)
(Red Flag)
30
(Hotlines)
(Whistleblowers)
- 145 -
6.2 :
( )
()
23,000
1,785,000 /
.. 2542 ...
5 ( .. 2542 - 2547) 36 4
2
6.2.1
4
... 8 2554
(
2554)
.. 2546 ( 1 2546)
( 2554)
- 146 -
1. (Budget Preparation)
1)
( ) (Asian Development Bank: ADB)
2
1,550
350
13,611.9 17 2538
6 2539
( )
(TOR)
1,550 1,900 (1,550 + 350 )
1,600
2) 2
2
.. 2538 ...
.. 2535
- 147 -
2. (Budget Adoption)
( )
1) 12 2539
( .. 2540 - 2545) 12,704.40
10,144 2,722 12,866
18,462 4,493 22,955
2) 13 2540
2/2540 17 2540
3) 11 2540
25 2540
2/2540 17 2540 ()
3. (Budget Execution)
1)
(Turn-key)
- 148 -
Turn-key
(Outline)
2)
NVPSKG31
3) 9, 11, 12
( 22)
NVPSKG
4) 51
(Asian Development Bank:
ADB)
Commitment Charge 0.75
ADB
5)
(TOR)
NVPSKG ( )
31
N ( ),
V , P , S (1979) , K
, G
- 149 -
6)
7)
5 2540 ()
8)
9)
NVPSKG
10)
NVPSKG
(OPCO) OPCO 300,000 1
( 100 )
OPCO
4. (Control, Audits and Oversight)
- 150 -
/ 3
2
20 2541 1,956.6
1,044.6
( )
...
...
K
K
6.2.2
(CRI)
(Project Risk: ) (Red Flags Scores:
RFS)
6.2.2.1
8 (
1)
() 6-5
- 151 -
6-5:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6. (Feasibility Study)
7.
8.
()
2
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
4.62
6.2.2.2
(4) (
2)
(RFS) 6-6
- 152 -
6-6:
1.
0.80
2.
0.67
3.
0.65
3.1
0.750
(TOR)
3.2
1.000
3.3
0.125
3.4 /E-auction /
0.500
3.5
0.890
4.
0.86
:
6-6
(4)
RFS
RFS
=
=
()
(RFi)
- 153 -
(CRI)
6-7
6-7: CRI
1.
2.
3.
3.1
(TOR)
3.2
3.3
3.4 /
E-auction /
3.5
4.
(RFi)
()
0.80
0.67
0.65
CRI
3.70
3.10
3.00
0.750
1.000
0.125
0.86
3.47
4.62
0.58
4.62
0.500
2.31
0.890
4.11
3.97
6-7 CRI
CRI ( 3.97)
. .
()
- 154
.. 2543
(
1 2546)
6.3
(Corruption Risk Index:
CRI)
.
46 ... .. 2542
.
.
32 .
.
.
32
(Conflict of Interest)
Office of the Auditor General of Canada
(Performance Audit) (Managing Conflict of Interest) 5
(
http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/parl_oag_201010_04_e.pdf)
- 155 -
12
2 33
(Preventive Audit) (Proactive
Audit)
.. 2542
39 (2) () .
.
1,000
.
.
CRI
.
( 6-3)
33
2552 282
- 156 -
6-3: CRI
. CRI
CRI
- 157 -
7
7.1
7.1.1
7.1.1.1
2
1)
2)
7-1:
- 158 -
7.1.1.2
7.1.1.3 (Pork-barrel
Politics)
Isaksen
(2005)
... .
7.1.2
7.1.2.1
... ()
7.1.2.2 ...
( ) (Line Item)
7.1.2.3
..
7.1.2.4
(Informal Rule)
- 159 -
Lump Sum
1.2.5
1.2.6
1.2.7 /
..
7.1.3
7.1.3.1
1)
2)
7.1.3.2 /
1)
E-auction
2)
3) /
4)
5)
7.1.3.3 /
4
- 160 -
1)
(Subcontract)
2)
3)
4)
7.1.3.4
1)
2) /
7.1.3.5
1)
2)
3
3
- 161 -
7-2:
7-2
1.
(Strategic Performance-Based Budgeting)
(
)
(Line-item Budgeting System)
2.
... ..
2539 4
... .. 2542
.. 2535 .. 2549
... .. 2542 ...
.. 2542
- 162 -
.. 2544 7-3
7-3:
3.
2
1) (Law Enforcement)
2) ... .. 2551
2,226 ( 8,273 ) 27%
6,047 ... 56 ( 8,273 )
0.687% ...
3
2
- 163 -
7.2
... .
Klitgaard (1998)34
+ -
7-4: Klitgaard
Klitgaard
7.2.1
... .. 2539
( ... .)
34
- 164 -
... .. 2539
( )
( )
... .
...
7.2.2
1) (Corruption Risk Index:
CRI) CRI
.
- 165 -
. 1,000
CRI (
.. 2542 39 (2) () .
) .
CRI
.
.
2) (Key Performance Indicators: KPIs) .
1,000
1,000 ( 27
.. 2543 - 2553)
7.2.3
1)
(Value for Money)
- 166 -
2) 1,000
3)
(eGovernment Procurement: e-GP) (Government Fiscal Management
Information System: GFMIS)
4)
...
7.2.4 ...
1) (Leniency
Program)
...
35
...
2) ...
35
.. 2542 ( 2)
.. 2554 103/6
...
...
- 167 -
7-5
7-5:
(
)
- 168 -
Adams, G. 1981. The Iron Triangle: The Politics of Defense Contracting, Council on Economic Priorities.
New York: Council on Economic Priorities.
Becker, G. S. 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy 76
(2): 169 - 217.
Carlitz, R., P. de Renzio, W. Krafchik, V. Ramkumar. 2009. Budget Transparency around the World:
Results from the 2008 Open Budget Survey. OECD Journal on Budgeting 2009/2: 1 - 17.
Harriss, J., J. Hunter, C. M. Lewis. 1995. Introduction: Development and Significance of NIE, J.
Harris, J. Hunter C. M. Lewis ( ), The New Institutional Economics and Third
World Development. London: Routledge.
Isaksen, J. 2005. The Budget Process and Corruption. Bergen, Norway: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource
Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute.
Kalnins, V. 2005. Assessing Trends in Corruption and Impact of Anti-corruption Measures, The Anticorruption Network for Transition Economies: 6th General Meeting. Istanbul, Turkey.
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, M. Massimo. 2007. Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and Individual
Governance Indicators for 1996-2006. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper No. 4280.
Kenny, C. J. 2007. Construction, Corruption, and Developing Countries, Policy Research Working Paper
Series 4271. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.
Kenny, C., M. Musatova. 2010. 'Red Flags of Corruption' in World Bank Projects: An Analysis of
Infrastructure Contracts: The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5243.
Klitgaard, R. 1998. International Cooperation against Corruption. Finance & Development 35 (1): 3-6.
Krueger, A. O. 1974. The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society. American Economic Review 64
(3):291 - 303.
Lambsdorff, J. G. 2007. The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform: Theory, Evidence and
Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ma, J., X. Ni. 2008. Toward a Clean Government in China: Does the Budget Reform Provide a
Hope? Crime Law and Social Change 49:119 138.
Mauro, P. 1998. Corruption and the Composition of Government Expenditure. Journal of Public
Economics 69: 263-279.
- 169 -
North, D. C. 1994. Economic Performance through Time. The American Economic Review 84 (June): 359
- 368.
. 1997. Prologue, J. N. Drobak J. V.C. Nye ( ), The Frontier of the New
Institutional Economics. San Diego: Academic Press.
Rose-Ackerman, S. 1997. The Political Economy of Corruption, K. A. Elliott ( ),
Corruption and the Global Economy. Washington: Institute for International Economics.
Sik, E. 2002. The Bad, the Worse and the Worst: Guesstimating the Level of Corruption, S. Kotkin
A. Sajo ( ), Political Corruption in Transition: A Sceptic's Handbook. Budapest:
Central European University Press.
Tanzi, V., H. Davoodi. 1997. Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth, IMF Working Paper No.
97/139.
Transparency International. 2006. Handbook for Curbing Corruption in Public Procurement. Berlin,
Germany: Transparency International.
Ware, G. T., S. Moss, J. E. Campos, G. P. Noone. 2007. Corruption in Public Procurement: A
Perennial Challenge, J. E. Campos S. Pradhan ( ), The Many Faces of
Corruption: Tracking Vulnerabilities at the Sector Level. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
World Bank. 2007. Corruption Warning Signs: Is Your Project at Risk? Good Practices in Latin America
and the Caribbean 1 (1).
. 2546.
: .. 2542 - 2544.
( ) .
. 2533. .
: .
(...). 2553.
() 2552.
. 2547.
2549 .. 2546,
.
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.
- 170 -
. 2552.
,
. : .
. ... 5 , .
www.livingriversiam.org 19 2554.
. 2544. ,
. : .
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2555. http://www.supremecourt.or.th/file/criminal/new%203.pdf.
. 2543. ( ),
3. : .
. 2547. : :
30 6.
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40-48.
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.
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.
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.
.
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. 2546.
(Conflict of Interest),
4 .. 2546 .
. 2551.
2550. 5 (17).
- 172 -
1. 2546.
. :
.
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2550.
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(1).
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, . 2549.
. 8 (1): 183 228.
. 2547.
:
.
. 2541. . 18 (1): 15 - 20.
. 2548. . : .
- 173 -
. 2542. . :
.
- -
1:
1.
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.3
1.3
2.
2.1
2.2
5
(Joint Venture)
(Consortium)
2.3
5
(Joint Venture)
(Consortium)
3.
3.1 10
3.2 10 100
3.3 100 500
3.4 500 1,000
3.5 1,000
4.
4.1 3
23,000
2540-2545
2
3
1
3
2537
4
23,000
1
2
3
4
5
1
4.2 3 5
4.3 5
5.
6.
5.1
5.2 10
5.3 11 - 30
5.4 31 - 50
5.5 51
(Feasibility Study)
6.1
6.2
6.3
5
2541
2547
13
.
3
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
3
(Feasibility
Study) 3 ,
,
13
2
(
)
2538 ...
.. 2535
7.1
7.2
7.3
8
8.1 .
...
8.2 .
...
8.3
7.
1
3
- -
2:
(Red Flags)
1. (Budget Preparation)
1.1
1.2
(/
) (/)
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
...
2
0
1
1
...
2/2540 17 2540
()
-
(Red Flags)
1.9
/
1.10
2. (Budget Adoption)
2.1
(
)
2.2
..
2.3
8/10
(Turnkey)
2540 - 2544
2540 - 2545
5 2540
()
... 11 2543
0.80
-
(Red Flags)
3. (Budget Execution)
3.1
(TOR)
3.1.1
3.1.3
3.1.3
( 2 )
Eauction
( Turn-key )
3.1.4
3.1.5
(Technical Specifications)
2/3
0.67
0
1
(Turn-key)
5 2542
...
11 2543
...
0302/5110 5113 30 2539
(TOR)
18 19
7 2539
(First-stage Tender)
2
NVPSKG
9
350
-
(Red Flags)
3.1.6
( /
)
3.1.7 /
(
9, 11,
12
NVPSKG
6 2539
TOR
1,550
1,900 (1,550 + 350 )
1,600
20 2540
NVPSKG 1 2540
NVPSKG
.. 2535 51
TOR
NVPSKG
-
(Red Flags)
)
3.1.8
TOR
3.1
3.2 (
)
3.2.1
3.2.2
6/8
0.75
3
2
2546
550,000
950
12 2539
.. 2540 12,704.40
( 2540 - 2545)
10,144
2,722
12,866 18,462
4,493
22,955
3.2.4
4/4
TOR
3.2.3
3.2
1.00
-
(Red Flags)
3.3
3.3.1
(
)
3.3.2
3.3.3
3.3.4
3.3.5
3.4.3
/
3.4.4 /
/ (Bid
Suppression)
0
0
0
0
0
1/8
0
0.125
NVPSKG
-
(Red Flags)
3.4.5
1% 3%
10%
( )
3.4.6
(Sub-contract Bidding)
3.4.7
(Bidding Ring)
(Bid Rotation)
3.4.8 /
3.4.9
3.4.10
3.4.11
3.4.12
NVPSKG
1
0
TOR
NVPSKG
NVPSKG (
)
-
(Red Flags)
3.4.13 /
3.4.14 /
(
)
3.4.15 / /
(Phantom
Bidding)
3.4.16
/E-auction
3.4
3.5
35.1
NVPSKG
(.
) (. )
(. )
(. )
(
(2551))
(
)
0
8/16
0.5
3.5.2
3.5.3 .
3.5.4
3.5.5
(OPCO)
20 2540
0
( )
-
(Red Flags)
3.5.6
( )
3.5.7
/
3.5.8
3.5.9 K
()
(
1 (2546))
AMS
(
1 (2546))
(
1 (2546))
K
(
1 (2546))
3.5
4. (Control,
Audits and Oversight )
4.1
8/9
4.2
4.3
(Whistleblowers)
4.4
4.5
0.89
2544
4
(
1 2546)
-
(Red Flags)
4.6
( )
4.7
4
5.
5.1
(
)
5.2
/
/
6/7
0.86
(ADB)
- -