157

(A Study of the Suitability of Legal Reform Relating to

Malfeasance in Office as Provided in Section 157 of the Penal Code)

.
.
.

...
2553
2555


...
...
.. .

.
.
.

...
361 .- . . . 11000

157

...


...

(Documentary Research)


(In-depth Interview)

(Focus Group Discussion)





. .

.
...




.
2555

(1)


...

157



157

..127

157
(corruption)
...

...

157

157
2
157
(Administrative act)
(Justice act) (Act of government)


157
157

(2)

 ...

157
123/1
..2542
( 2) ..2554
11 ..2502

(3)


Abstract
OfficeoftheNACC

Section 157 of the Criminal Code is Thailands past and present control
systemoftheexerciseofstatepower.Itdefinestheoffenseofpublicofficialsin
broad terms, covering those improper actions or inactions in performing their
official duty with the intent to cause damage to other persons or corruptly
perform or refrain from performing their duty. The special purpose of Section
157 is to prevent and suppress those undesired conducts in official circles in
general, and has been continuously used since the enforcement of the criminal
law of the Rattanakosin era of 127 without discriminating which improper
conductsshouldbesubjecttothecontrolofcriminalmeasure.

Inpractice,Section157hasbeenusedtocontroltheimproperconducts
ofpublicofficialsbeyondthoseofcorruptioncases.Thepracticecontributesto
the expansion of the National AntiCorruption Commission (NACC) scope of
inspection beyond that of corruption matter, which is not in accordance to the
constitutional will. The practice not only directly affects the working system of
the NACC itself, but it also extends its enforcement broadly to include the
improperly use of decisions of the state officials. This enlargement has caused
theapplicationofSection157indefiniteandunclear,inspiteofthepresentlegal
systemhasinstitutedfunctionallyspecializedmechanismstodealwitheachkind
ofoffences,namely,politicaldecisionsoftheexecutive,theroutinedecisionsof
theadministration,orthepracticesofjudicialprocessbythecourts.

TomaketheenforcementofSection157clearanddefiniteasstipulatesin
theconstitution,oneofthetwoalternativesisrecommendedasanapproachfor
thelegalreformmeasure.ThefirstmethodistoamendSection157tolimitthe
criminalliabilitytoonlythoseofadministrativebranchwhoperformorrefrain
from performing administrative acts. Those belong to justice acts and acts of
government are not included. In addition, it must deal with only corrupt
practices of performing or not performing their official duty, or to harbor a
harmfulintentiontocausedamagetootherpersons.Thesecondapproachisto
removeSection157,andtomakeanewlawthatspecificallydefinestheoffences
ofpublicofficialsonperformingtheirduty.Thatistosaynoneedforageneral
provisionsuchasSection157anymoreasithasbeenpracticesinFrance,Japan
andtheUS.ThereformwillhelplessentheNACCburden,anditcanconcentrate
andspenditstimeandintelligenttodealwiththeinspectionofcorruptioncases,
whileleavingtheinspectionofotherimproperperformanceofpublicduties,not
corruptioncases,tothepersonnelcommissionsoftheadministrativebranchor
administrativecourts.

Coupled with the idea of amending Section 157, it is also about time to
amend other related laws which impose criminal offences on persons who are
notpublicofficials,namelySection123/1ofthe1999OrganicLawonCorruption
PreventionandSuppression,AmendmentNo.2of2011,aswellasSection11of
the1959ActonLiabilityofOfficialsofStateOrganizationsandAgencies.

(4)

(1)
(2)
(10)

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

1
7
7
8
10

2
1.
1.1
1.2
2.
2.1
2.2
2.2.1

2.2.2
2.2.3
3. 157
3.1 157
3.1.1 157
3.1.2 157
3.2 157
3.2.1

3.2.2
3.3 157

(5)

12
12
12
17
19
19
21
22
23
25
30
30
30
40
43
43
51
53

 3 ...

1.
...
1.1 ...
1.1.1
1.1.2
1.2 ...
1.2.1
1.2.2
2.
2.1
2.1.1
2.1.2
2.1.3
2.1.4
2.1.5
2.2 ...
2.2.1
2.2.2
2.2.3
3. ...
3.1
3.2

1.
1.1
1.1.1
1.1.2
1.2
1.2.1
1.2.2
(6)

58
59
60
62
63
64
65
67
73
73
73
73
74
74
75
75
75
75
80
81
81
84

85
85
86
86
90
91
91
101

1.3
1.3.1
1.3.2

1.3.3
1.3.4
1.3.5

1.3.6
2.
2.1
2.1.1
2.1.2
2.2
2.2.1
2.2.2
2.2.3
2.2.4
2.2.5
2.3
2.3.1
2.3.2
2.3.3
3.
3.1
3.2
157
3.2.1

3.2.2

3.2.3

3.2.4

(7)

112
114
116
121
122
123
124
126
127
127
132
133
134
137
138
138
138
138
139
140
141
144
144
150
150
152
153
153

 5 157
1. 157
1.1 157
1.1.1
1.1.2
1.1.3
1.1.4
1.1.5
1.1.6
1.1.7 157
1.2 157

1.2.1
1.2.2
1.2.3
1.2.4
1.2.5 157
1.3 157

1.3.1 157
1.3.2
1.3.3
2. 157
2.1 157
2.1.1
2.1.2
2.1.3
2.2 157
2.2.1 157
2.2.2
2.2.3

(8)

155
155
155
156
158
160
164
165
167
168
169
169
171
172
173
173
175
175
175
175
178
178
178
179
179
180
180
180
180

3. 157
3.1 157
3.2 157
3.2.1
3.2.2
3.2.3
3.3

181
181
182
182
183
187
188

189

1.
189
1.1 157
189
1.2 157 ... 192
1.2.1 ...
192
1.2.2 ...
193
2.
197
2.1
197
2.1.1
...
197
198
2.1.2
2.2 157
199
2.2.1 157
200
2.2.2
157
203

204

(9)

..2540



1 157

"

"
157
2

157
157 3
157

..127 145




1

, 2540, ( :
, 2546), .19-23.

, 2 3, 10, ( : , 2544) .66

, 2 1, ( : , 2543) .281- 287

(10)


4
...

157

157

1.

157




157

157



157

5
157

, , ( : , 2477), .588

, 9, ( : , 2551)
.245-246

(11)

1.1 157
157 ..127 145

6
..127





157 7

, ..127, ( : ,
2546) .49

, 157
, , 2553, .28-34

( 82/2537) 58 1, 2539, .32.

(12)

(civil
law)

(act of
government act of state) (administrative act)
(justice act) 10
1.2 157



9

,
3, ( : , 2551) .11-63.

10

(),
: , ( : ,
)

(13)

 (statutory offense)
(precedent)11 (common law offenses)

12

(nullum crimen, nulla poena, sine lege)

..2550 39

157

11

, , ( : , 2542) .2-6 ; ,
, ( : , 2545) .47-48

12

, , 24 3 2537, .568582

(14)

2. ...
157 ...

2.1 ...
...
..2540
..2542

.. 2518

( ...)



...
...

...

...

...13
2.2
13

Medhi Krongkaew, Clash of Reason : Methodological Conflicts Between Law and Economics in Anti-Corruption
Perspections and Practices in Thailand, NACC JOURNAL, Vol.3, No.2, July 2010, p.2

(15)

 ...


...
157
...


157

157




...

...
...

3.

157
3.1

...
...

(1) ...

(16)


...




(2)
...

...
...

...






...
...

...


3.2 157

(17)

 (Civil Law)

157

(nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) 39
2 157

157
..127 145

157

157


157





157 157

(1) 157
157


157 2 157
157
1) 157
157

(18)

 157 157
2
) (administrative
act) 157
(justice act) (act of government) 157

157
) 157
145

157

157


157


157 157

2) 157
(nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege)
157

(19)

 157
157

...

(2)
157

123/1
..2542
( 2) ..2554 11
..2502

(20)

ExecutiveSummary
..

Background

Overthepastseveralyears,Thailandhasundergonealargescalereformationofits
legal system, especially the promulgation of peoples constitution of 1997. With such
reforms, numerous organic and special laws have been enacted. Consequently, new
independent control mechanisms of state power in various specialized fields have been
instituted,includingtheconstitutioncourt,theadministrativecourts,theombudsmen,the
human rights commission, the auditor commission, the election commission, etc.1 Under
the newlegalcondition andenvironment, thereis aseriousquestionto be asked,i.e., Is
Section157ofthePenalCodestillrelevantandpractical?Sincethearticlestipulatesthat:

Whoever,beinganofficial,wrongfullyexercisesordoesnotexerciseanyofhis
functions to the injury of any person, or dishonestly exercises or omits to
exerciseanyofhisfunctions,shallbepunishedwithimprisonmentofonetoten
yearsorfinedoftwothousandtotwentythousandBaht,orboth.

From the provision, we see that Section 157 of the Penal Code of the Kingdom of
Thailandhasdefinedthemalfeasanceinofficeinaverybroadway.Itcanalsobeviewedas
a generalprovisionprescribing punishmentforpublic officialsforall kindsof offenses, a
socalledsweepingsection.2Namely,thecommissionofanoffensebypublicofficials,even
ifthecrimeisnotconsideredguiltyaccordingtoanyspecificoffense;canstillbedecidedas
guiltythroughSection157.Ontheotherhand,ifanoffencewasconsideredguiltyunderthe
definitionofaspecificcrime,itcanalsobejudgedthattheoffenseisguiltyunderSection
157. But it is the discretion of the court of justice to give a verdict on a specific kind of
offense without giving an additional verdict on the general scope of Section 157.3 As a
matteroffact,themakingofSection157isalawmakingtechniquetofillanyloopholethat
allowspublicofficialstobehaveordoanykindofoffenses.

Inthepast,asimilarprovisionwasmadeinSection145ofthecriminallawofthe
Rattanakosineraof127.Theintroductionofsuchaprovisioninthelawmakesthecontents
oftheoffenseswhichthelawwantstodealhaveabroadrange.Itdoesnotdefinewhatthe
offenses are, and makes it difficult to define the scope of the offenses. Whether an act is
considered guilty or not, therefore depends on the people of the organization who
1SeeBovornsakUwanno,TheOverviewofConstitutionandtheConstitutionofThailand2540B.E.,(Bangkok:KPI,
2003),pp.1923.

2YudSanguthai,CriminalLaw,Book23,10thedition,(Bangkok:ThammasatUniversityPress,2001),p.66.
3JittiTingsabadh,CriminalLaw,Book2Title1,8thedition,(Bangkok:ThaiBarAssociation,2005),pp.281287.

(21)

implementthelaw,especiallythecourtsofjusticetointerpretandapplytheprovisionto
casesastheyseefit.Itisthecourtsofjusticewhodecidewhatactsarewrongandwhatacts
arenot.Inotherwords,itisnotthelawthatsayswhichactsarewrongandwhichactsare
not.Undersuchacondition,itisequivalenttothelegislativebranchgivingitslawmaking
powertothejudiciary.Thiscanbeconsideredaviolationoftheconstitutionalprincipleof
separation of powers,4 and affects the function of the National AntiCorruption
Commission(NACC)asaspecializedinspectionbody.

UponstudyingSection157ofthePenalCode,itispossibletoidentifytheproblems
in terms of principles and practices. In addition, a comparative study of the article with
thoseofforeigncountriesleadsustofindoutthedifferencesandtheappropriatemethods
tosolvetheproblem.

1.Problemsintermsofprinciples

The obscurity of Section 157 in terms of enforcement is obvious since individual

persons can arbitrarily bring up Section 157 as a justification to make ways for an
extensive inspection of all kinds of governmental works. It does not matter whether the
issue to the usual business of the administrative bureaucracy, the policy issued under
politiciansresponsibility,orthejudicialworkofjudges.Itisneitherlimitedtoactionnor
inaction with corrupt intention, or of being induced by corrupt reasoning of the
practitioner, or of involving problems that fall within the scope of discretion of public
officials.Itseemsthatthearticlecaninclusivelyapplytoalltypesofoffensescommittedby
anystateofficials.

In addition, according to a number of the Supreme Court verdicts, it can be

ascertainedthatthecourtshavebeeninvariablyveryflexible,adjustingtheapplicationof
the article to the facts of each particular case involved. Superficially, it is a good idea to
havesuchalawthatallowsjudgestodecideindependentlywhatactionconstitutesacrime
or not. It looks as if the Section is an application of law for the purpose of justice and
protectionofpersonalrightsandthepublicinterest.Onthecontrary,thepracticereflects
theproblemthattheuseofSection157asatoolforcontrollingpublicofficialsisnotclear
cutandgoesagainsttheprincipleoftheconstitutioninguaranteeingpersonalrightsand
liberty,5includingthatofgovernmentofficials.Ifconsideredacademically,thelimitations
ofSection157canbeconstruedfromitsconception,itsconceptionasatoolforcontrolling
publicofficials,aswellasitsenforcement.

1.1ThelimitationofSection157intermsofcontrollingconception

Originally Section 157 came from Section 145 of the criminal law of the
Rattanakosin era of 127. The draft was an effort to improve and modernize Thai law to
enableittodealwiththenewlyreformedbureaucracy.Thiswasdonebybringingsimilar
4H.Eygout,CriminalLaw,(Bangkok:ThammasatUniversityPress,1934),p.588.
5KanitnaNakorn,PenalCode:PrincipleandBasicConcept,9thedition,(Bangkok:Winyuchon,2008),pp.245246.

(22)

foreignwrittenlawsthatexistedintothusconsiderationtodeterminethecriminaloffences
thatcouldbecommittedbypublicofficials.Thementionedforeignwrittenlawscamefrom
European and some Asian countries. The aim was fill loopholes in the law and to make
publicofficialswhoperformedtheirdutyillegallyguiltyofsuchactions.Thiswasdoneby
adoptingtheItalianPenalCodewhichprescribedallillegitimateactsofpublicofficialsas
anoffensewhichthegovernmentcouldputtotrialandinflictpunishmentonthem.6

InthebeginningthecriminallawoftheRattanakosineraof127broadlyprescribed
the offensive actions and inactions of the public officials that were considered as wrong
doing.Theaimwastoallowthecourtofjusticetodecidewhatactionswereconstitutedas
offensiveandshouldbeblamedandpunishedfordamagetothepeople,duetothemisuse
of authority. This was the prototype for making general provisions for offensive acts. An
amendmentwaslateraddedtoincludetheactionsandinactionsofpublicofficialsonduty
with the intention of corruption. This was extended to Section 157 of the present Penal
Code.7

Thesystemofcontrollingpublicofficialsatthetimeitwasintroducedtherewasno
separation of official functions. Namely there were provisions prescribing the wrong
doings of state officials with no discrimination of what jurisdiction, were under the
executive, legislative or judicial branches. All came under one roof, with no process for
using different measures for different branches or type of government organization or
officials. The measures covered constitutional, executive, administrative, professional, or
criminal matters, which may at the same time, improve the efficiency of state
administration,andnotcreatetoomuchdisturbancetostatemechanisms.8

Uponthestudyoftheprincipleofjusticemanagement,consideringtheaimoflaw
enforcement is to make it both fair and efficient, it is necessary to be careful of the
differencesinalawsobjectives,mechanismsofcontrolandresponsibility.9Forinstance,
the objective of the criminal control measure is to control the behavior of the people
involved,includingpublic officials. Its purposeisto protectsocietyfrom disturbances, to
guaranteepeaceandorder,aswellastomakethecorrectionprocessesworkandtoenable
wrongdoerstoreturntosociety.Thedisciplinarymeasuresemphasizetheresponsibility
ofthemembersofanorganizationtomakethemworkefficientlyaccordingtothedirection
setbytheorganizationsobjectives.Thecivilresponsibilityaimstosolveandremedythe
6 Surasak Likasitwatanakul, Report of Monsieur Georges Padoux Concerning the Bill of Criminal Law of
RattanakosinEra127,(Bangkok:Winyuchon,2003),p.49.
7 See Tula Chotpakdee, Action or Inaction of Duty in Unlawful Performance as provided in Section 157: the
Principle of Clearcutting and Definite in the Making of Criminal Law, LL.M. Thesis, Dhurakij Pandit University,
2010,pp.2834.

8SeetheOpinionoftheOfficeoftheGeneralAttorney(Consultationno.82/2537)inAyakarnNithet,Volume58,
No.1,1996,p.32.

9 In case of the concept of administrative control, see Banjerd Singkaneti, Legal Principle of the Administrative
Control,3rdedition(Bangkok:Winyuchon,2008)pp.1163.

(23)

damagescreated bythe action ofthe offenderon the damaged party. The administrative
responsibilityaimstocorrecttheunlawfulactionsoftheadministrativeagencies,eitherby
cancelling the action that is against the law, by forcing the administrative agency to act
lawfully,orbygivingcompensationtothedamagedpartysothattheycanrecovertotheir
formerstatus.Butforpoliticalresponsibility,whichconcernsthelevelofpolicymaking,the
constitutionseesthatitshouldbelefttotheresponsibilityoftheindependentspecialized
inspectionbodies.Itisobviouslydifferentfromnormalinspectionsystems.

The states control and inspection measures for officials has its own rules and
regulations which specify the procedures and organizations responsible for carrying out
theinvestigationoffactsandarebasedondifferentsetsoflaws.Especiallycountriesthat
resort to a written or civil law system, there is a separation of the use of civil law and
criminal law as private laws. This separation is installed within the law system and law
enforcingorganizationsrelatedto thecourts ofjustice.Thecontrolandinspection ofthe
useofdiscretionsbytheadministrationandpoliticsareunderthepubliclawsystem.They
canbedividedintotheactofgovernmentortheactofstate,theadministrativeact,orthe
justiceact.Theseactsareunderthecontrolandinspectionofdifferentmeasuresprovided
bythelaws.10

1.2ThelimitationofSection157intermsofconstitutionality

Broadlyprescribingcriminaloffensesandallowingthecourtsofjusticetousetheir
discretion to decide which category of actions constitute a criminal offense is equal to
making laws in the fashion of the common law system. In such a system not only is the
legislative branch vested with power to make written laws of statutory offenses, but the
courts of justice also possess the capacity to make such laws through offering court
verdictswhichsetprecedentsforfuturecases.11Thisincludescommonlawoffenses.Inthe
commonlawcountries,therightofboththelegislatureandthecourtsofjusticetoperform
the lawmaking function is not prohibited. In England and some other common law
countries,theyevenrecognizethatthecourtshavethesamelegitimatesasthelegislature
tomakelaws.Thisistohelpmaintainjusticeinsociety.

Inthecivillawsystem,thepowertodeterminewhichkindofactionsconstitutean
offence and the punishment imposed with is must be made in the form of a written law
approvedbytheHouseofRepresentatives.Theparliamentisthesoleholderofpowerto
makecriminallaws,bearinglimitationsonimportantrightsandlibertyofthepeople.This
powerisinalienable,anditiscongruentwiththeprincipleofseparationofpowers,i.e.,the
checksandbalancesofpowersamongvariousbranchesofgovernmentwiththepurposeof
protecting the legitimate rights and liberty of the ruled. The courts, therefore, have no

10 For legal opinions of public lawyers, see Eakaboon Wongsawatgul (editor), Governmental Act or Act of
Government:AcademicDiscussioninThaiPublicLawSystem,Bangkok:FacultyofLawThammasatUniversity,no
date.

11 Ackaratorn Chularat, Interpretation of Law, (Bangkok: Kodmai Thai, 1999) pp.26; Prasit Piwawatanapanit,
IntroductionofLaw,(Bangkok:ThammasatUniversityPress,2002)pp.4748.

(24)

legitimacytoexercisethepoweroflawmaking,12ortosetrulesbythemselvestellingwhat
actions constitute a criminal offense. This practice is consistent with the constitutional
principleofprotectingpeoplesrightsandliberty,noguilt,nopunishment,withoutlaws.
(nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege.). By such a measure, the provisions that impose a
criminaloffensemustbeclearcutanddefiniteasmuchaspossibletoprovideaguarantee
thattherestrictionsonanyrightsandlibertytotheactionorinactionofthepeoplemustbe
somethingpeopleknowinadvance.ThisisconsistentwithSection39oftheconstitution:

Nopersonshallbesubjecttoacriminalpenaltyunlesshehascommittedanact
whichthelawinforceatthetimeofcommissionprovidestobeanoffenseand
provides a punishment therefore, and the punishment to be imposed on such
personshallnotbeofgreaterseveritythanthatprovidedbylawinforceatthe
timeofcommissionoftheoffense.

IntheopinionofsomelawyerswhoseeThailandaschoosingtofollowthecivillaw
system, Section 157, especially the phrase that prescribes the action or inaction of the
government official on duty who unlawfully intended to create damage to anyone else,
provestobeactofcontradictiontotheprincipleofclearcutanddefinitedefinitionsinthe
criminal law. The article not only threatens the rights and liberty of the people, but also
contradictstheprincipleofnoguilt,nopunishment,withoutlaws.

2.ImpactonthefunctioningoftheNACC

InenforcingSection157,TheNACChastwomajorpointstoconsider:oneiswhat
theconstitutionalintends,andtheotherishowtomaketheinspectiontasksefficient.

2.1TheconstitutionalroleoftheNACC

The establishment of the NACC was a product of the 1997 Constitution of the
Kingdom of Thailand and the subsequent 1999 Organic Law on the Prevention and
SuppressionofCorruption.ThelawsshowedThailandseffortstostrengthenitscapability
todeal with corruption in the political and bureaucratic circles. In the past, the task was
vested to the 1975 Act of Prevention and Suppression of Corruption and Misconducts in
GovernmentalCircles.ItsetuptheCounterCorruptionCommission(CCC)vestedwiththe
power to investigate charges and complaints on state officials both within the scope of
criminal offenses as stipulate in the penal code and other criminal laws, related to their
official duty and disciplinary misconduct. That is to say, its authority covered corruption
cases, as wellas disciplinary misconduct ofstate personnel.Though thecommission was
nothingtodowithcorruptioncharges,thecommissionstillhadpowertoindictonprima
facie cases of misconducts. The authority to investigate disciplinary issues was later
removedfromthenewNACCinanattempttoincreaseitsefficiencyindealingwithmore
seriouscorruptioncases.However,theNACCisstilldeeplyinvolvedintheformerscopeof
the CCCs functions, namely the investigation of cases of criminal, corruption and
12 Worapot Visrutpich,, Administrative Court and the Principle of Separation of Powers, Law Journal, Vol. 24
No.3,September1994,pp.568582.

(25)

disciplinarymisconductinoffice.Consequently,theNACCisstillheavilyoverwhelmedwith
allkindsofcases.13

2.2Efficiencyasinspectiontarget

Accordingtothenewlaw,theNACCslegitimateassignmentistocurbcorruptionin
officeofstateofficials,especiallypoliticiansandhighrankingstateofficialswiththestatus
ofdivisiondirectororequivalent.Themissionstatementindicatestheresponsibilityofthe
NACC is to exclusively investigate corruption offenses, more than to extend its hand into
othercriminalormisconductinofficecases.SincethemissionoftheNACCanditsworkis
confinedtocorruptioncasesinoffice,Section157isnotconsistentwiththenewroleofthe
NACC.ThisisbecauseSection157coversawiderrangeofoffensesthancorruptionofstate
officials. Harmful intention to other people is not necessary always involve corruption
offenses. Moreover, it can be enlarged to cover other wrongdoings by the organization
concerned.Therefore,oneeffectivewaytodealwithcorruptioncasesistoabolishSection
157 and makes new laws that indicate clearly what specific kinds of behavior are
consideredcorruptioninoffice.

Infact,misconductinofficecanbedealtwithbymanyregulatorymeasures.There
are political, administrative, criminal, disciplinary measures, which have both laws and
organizationstoproperlytakecareof.Itis,therefore,notappropriatetouseSection157,
whichisageneralprovisioncoveringvarietyofoffenses,includingmisconductinoffice.It
makes the division of work go astray. It is also an encroachment into other regulatory
organizationsresponsibility.Itisespeciallyaninterferenceintothepoliticaldiscretionof
the government, as well as the courts. This is clearly a contradiction to the principle of
separation of powers and consequently, a threat to the peoples rights and liberty. The
NACC, which is an independent organ of the constitution, should be an organization
focusedoncorruptioninspectionofpoliticiansandhighrankingstateofficials.Besides,it
should be aware of its constitutional role of enforcing the law effectively and in the line
with the constitution, curbing corruption in government circles with efficiency and
economy.

3.Recommendation

Aspreviouslymentioned,theNACCsmissionhasnotbeenhighlysuccessful.There
aremeasuresthatneedtobetakentomakeitmoreeffectiveandefficiency.

3.1Improvingthecorruptioninvestigationprocess
SeparatenoncorruptioncasesfromtheresponsibilityoftheNACC.Itshouldbein
chargeofcorruptioncasesonly.

13 Medhi Krongkaew, Clash of Reason : Methodological Conflicts BetweenLaw andEconomics in AntiCorruption

PerspectionsandPracticesinThailand,NACCJournal,Vol.3,No.2,July2010,p.2

(26)


(1) Separating cases not involving corruption from the consideration of the
NACC

In investigating complaints, it should decide whether the complaints involve

corruptionofstateofficials.Iftheydonotinvolvecorruptionoffenses,theNACCshouldnot
receivethecasesintoitsinvestigationprocess.TheNACCshouldtheninformthecompliant
party about its decision, or refer the matter to a relevant organization. The initial
examinationofcomplaintsshouldseewhethertherearereasonablegroundstoprosecute
andcontinuetheinvestigation.Ifthefirstexaminationfindsthatthecasedoesnotcontain
enoughevidence,itshouldberejected.

(2)Consideringanddecidingprimafaciecorruptionevidences

The factfinding responsibility of the NACC should concentrate on actions or

behaviorthatinvolvedcorruptionasstipulatedinthepenalcodeorothercriminallaws.At
investigating level, the responsibility of the subcommission, with the assistance of the
NACC,istoinvestigatefactsandcollectevidencesimilartoacriminalinvestigationofficer
in the Code of Criminal Procedure. By doing this, they have to inform the accused party
abouttheaccusationbroughtagainstthem.Theyhavetogivetheaccusedanopportunity
toacquiretherighttodefense,andtobringlawyersortrustedpersonstotakepartinthe
investigation process. In case there is not enough evidence, the subcommission should
submitthecasetotheNACCforacquitral.Iftheyfindthatitisonlyacaseofmisconductin
office,theyshouldreferthecasetotheaccusedssupervisor.TheNACCshouldnotmake
the decision in place of the accuseds supervisor. If they find the case has grounds for a
corruptioncase,theyshouldreferthecasetoGeneralProsecutortoprosecutethecasein
courts.

3.2ProposalonamendingSection157andrelatedlaws

The Thai law system is that of the civil law system. It adheres to written laws
especially the infliction of criminal punishment should be strictly subjected to the
provisionsoftheconstitution.Section39ofthe2007Constitution,inthesameprovisionas
Section2ofthePenalCode,guaranteestheprincipleofclearcutanddefinitelaw,whichis
consistent with the important principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. This
principle contradicts Section 157 which is a general inclusive provision of offenses, and
breachesthepeoplesrightsandliberty.

Intermsofhistory,Section157haditsoriginfromSection145ofthecriminallawof
theRattanakosineraof127.Thelatercamefromthecommonlawsystem,whichaimsto
setuplimitationsonpublicofficialsexerciseoftheirpowerbyusingabroadwording.This
wording later was changed with the aim of causing damage to other people in Section
157.Thebroadnessoftheprovisionwasemployedasatooltocontrolpublicofficials,in
matters as broad as political discretion, administrative judgments, or the practice of the
courts.Thepracticeproducesadverseeffectstotheadministrationofgovernment,andthe
controlsystemingeneral.

(1)ProposalonamendingSection157

ToresolvetheproblemoftheambiguityofSection157duetotheindefinitescopeof
criminaloffensesthelawcovers,is,therefore,necessarytoamendthearticletomakeits

(27)

provisionclearcutintermsofthepersonsandactionsinwhichthelawwantstoimposea
sanctionon.Onthismatter,theresearcherwouldliketoofferatwostepapproach:thefirst
stepisamethodtoamendthearticle;thesecondstepisamethodtoremovethearticle.

1) The method toamend Section 157.Since a largenumber of peoplestill see the

needforhavingageneralprovisiontopunishofficialswhoperformtheirdutyunlawfully,
abruptlyabolishthearticlewillalsocreateproblem,researcherproposesthat,inthefirst
step, some amendment to the article should be done to make it clearer. Two points that
shouldbedealtwithare:

(A) Prescribe the actions or inactions in the administrative act that constitutes an
offenseunderSection157.Theotheractssuchasthoseofjusticeacts,actsofgovernment,
should not be contained in the article. This can be done by adding administrative into
Section157rightafterthewordduty.

(B)AddmorecomponentsintoSection157tomakeitmoreclearcutanddefinite.
This can be done by adopted the concept of Section 145 of the criminal law of the
Rattanakosin era of 127 which separate personal matters from those of the public. The
amendmentcanbemadebyaddingthephrasebadfaiththatcauseddamagetoanyone.
ThiswillhelpclarifythatpublicofficialswhowillbeguiltyunderSection157willinvolve
only those persons who bring personal matters into their duty. In this case, the two
personalmattersarecorruptionandbadfaiththatcausedamagetoanyone.Therefore,
misconduct in office that does not involve the two categories should not constitute an
offenseofSection157.

2) The Method to remove Section 157. According to the principle of clearcut and
definite law and the principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, this provision is
defectiveinthesensethatitprovidesabroadscopeofoffenses,butdoesnotprovidethe
appropriate safeguard for public officials who execute their duty honesty. By removing
Section157,thelegislationmaycreateasystemsimilartothatofFrance,JapanandUSA,
wherespecifiableoffensesareconsideredacorruptmisdeed.Thebenefitofthissolutionis
that it frees the NACC to deal with corruption only and relegates the investigation of
misconductinofficetotheStateServiceCommissionortheAdministrativeCourt.

(2)Proposalonamendingrelatedlaws

Coupled with the idea of amending Section 157 of the Penal Code, it is also about
timetoamendotherrelatedlawswhichimposecriminaloffensesonstatepersonnelwho
are not public officials according to the Penal Code, namely Section 123/1 of the 1999
OrganicLawonCorruptionPreventionandSuppressionamendedbyAmendmentNo.2of
2011,aswellasSection11ofthe1959ActonLiabilityofOfficialsofStateOrganizationsor
Agencies.

(28)

1.

40 14
..2516

1571
...

...

157

2



...
3

157 "

"
2
. 2-3, 10, (: , 2544) 66.
. 157

3
, , 53 ( :
, 2553), .3-8. ...
, : ...
? http://www.nacc.go.th/ewt_dl_link.php?nid=1502 , ...
: , , . 75-97

157

157
5

157
...
..2550 ..2540
...

, 157 , 2 ( :
, 2549), .13-17

. , 10, (: , 2553) .787. .

...

6

...





...

...

...

7
...

..2551

... ..2550 250

..2542
..2550 2 ..2554 19
7
...
... ..2540 ,
(...) , (: , 2547), .51

... 1
... 2

1
...
2550-2555

2550
2551
2552
2553
2554
2555

11,578 2,829 14,407 2,509 1,118

533
4,527
68
5,652 3,029 8,681 489 194
112
2,231
63
5,592 2,779 8,371 646 195
99
949
75
6,407 3,049 9,456 1,057 276
92
40
95
7,896 3,092 10,988 1,270 222
66
93
171
9,166
299
9,465
61
17
12
23
10

... 17 2554

8,755
3,089
1,964
1,560
1,822
123

5,652
5,592
6,407
7,896
9,166
9,342

2
3
..
.. 2535
.. 2536
.. 2537
.. 2538
.. 2539
.. 2540
.. 2541
.. 2542
.. 2543
.. 2544
.. 2545
.. 2546
.. 2547
.. 2548
.. 2549
.. 2550
.. 2551
.. 2552
.. 2553

347
382
391
318
335
310
276
369
411
392
487
461
597
565
667
957
1302
1600
1494

138
95
119
106
92
94
107
117
119
134
180
330
409
265
252
290
324
379
472

41
28
45
38
36
28
32
30
26
40
30
107
33
55
97
60
92
57
120

...



157
157
... ...

2.

1. 157
...

2.

...
3.

3.

1.
..2500-2553
2

2. 157

...
157

3.

4.

157

(Common Law
Offenses)

157
..127

157

...




157

...

10

...

157
...
... 157
157

...

... ...
...

5.
1


2
(corruption)


157

11

3 ...

...

4




157
5 157

157
6

157

 2

157





(1) (2)
(3)
157

1.

(corruption) 2 (1)
(2)
1.1

(corruption)

13

1





(model of fact situations)



(Huntington)

(Corruption is behavior of public officials which deviates from accepted norms in order to serve
private ends.)2

See Controlling Corruption: A Parliamentarians Handbook. Prepared by The Parliamentary Centre, Canada in
Partnership with the Economic Development Institute of the World Bank with support from the Canadian
International Development Agency, Laurentian Seminar, 1998, pp.7-16.
2
Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p.
59.

14

Transparency International
(abuse of entrusted power for private gain)5
World Bank
(misuse of public office for private gain)6

Joseph S. Nye, Corruption and Development : A Cost-Benefit Analysis in Arnold Heidenheimer (ed.)
Political Corruption (New Brunswick, N.J. : Transaction Books, 1978) pp.566-567.
4



5
Transparency International, Frequently asked questions about corruption, retrieved from www.transparency.org,
November 3, 2010.
6
World Bank, Introduction to Corruption, Youth for Good Governance: Distance learning program Module III,
p.3., retrieved from www.worldbnk.org, November 3, 2010. UNDP USAID
Obert Chinhamo and Garbriel Shumba, Institutional Working Definition of Corruption, working paper
made for the Anti-Corruption Trust of Southern Africa (2007), p.4.

15

OECD (The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)

7
ADB (The Asian Development Bank)


(Corruption involves
behaviour on the part of officials in the public and private sectors, in which they improperly and
unlawfully enrich themselves and/or those close to them, or induce others to do so, by misusing the
position in which they are placed.)8
SADC (The Southern African Development Community)


( behavior in relation to persons entrusted
with responsibilities in the public and private sectors which violates their duties as public officials,
private employees, independent agents or other relationships of that kind and aimed at obtaining
undue advantage of any kind for themselves or others)9

SIDA (The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency)

Abubakar H. Kargbo, Corruption: A Glossary of International Criminal Standards, (OECD: 2007) p. 19.
retrieved from www.oecd.org, November 3, 2010.

OECD

8
Ibid.
9
Obert Chinhamo and Garbriel Shumba, supra note 6, p.3.

16

( corruption occurs when organizations or individuals profit

improperly through their position in an activity, and thereby cause damage or loss)10

11
1)

2) (private gain or benefit)

(democratic processes)

3)

4)
(entrusted power or authority)


5)

( SIDA)

10
11

Ibid., p.4.
Ibid., pp.4-6.

17

1.2


.


. 3
(white corruption)


(grey corruption)

(black corruption)

12

- (public corruption) (private corruption)
13
- (bureaucratic corruption) petty corruption,
(political corruption) grand corruption (corruption which affects the

12

Arnold Heidenheimer, supra note 3, p.18. : ,

11 1-3 .. - .., .68 101.
13
World Bank, supra note 6, p.3.

18

entire state apparatus) state corruption

14
- (personal corruption)
(political corruption)
15
- (individual corruption)
(organizational or institutional corruption)
16

14

Ibid., p.4.
Abubakar H. Kargbo, supra note 6, p.3.
16
Ibid.
15

19

2.

17
2.1



18

19

17

, 157, (
, 2539), .6-13
18
,
, ( , 2530), .26.
19
, , 10 , ( : , 2553), .767.

20

20
21


(common law) (The King can do no wrong)

22

23

(merit system)

20

, , ( : , 2477), .538.
21
, 16 , .21.
22
, , 14,
2536, . 40.
23
, . ( :
, 2512), .101-102.

21

24

25

2.2

(separation of powers)

3 (legislative function) (executive function)
(judicial function)

24

, :
(..2471-2518) ( : , 2523) .65.
25
, , .10-13.

22

(checks and balances)
26

3 (1) (2) (3)

2.2.1

26

. , 24 3
2537, 568 582.

23

2.2.2.

27

1)
2)

3)
4)

2




28

(United Nations Basic Principles on the

27
28

. 7 ( : , 2554) 227 231.

, 7, ( : , 2549), .86-90.

24

Independence of the Judiciary)29

1)
2)

3)

4)
5)

2

1)

29

8 , , .792-795.

25

2)

30
...



31

2.2.3

32
2 (1)
(act of state acte de gouvernement) (2)
(administrative act acte administratif)

30

..2550 270
31
..2550 272
32
. 984/2551
, (),
:
, ( : ,
), .184-237

26

33

(1)

(2)
2 1)
2) 34

33

1 ..
2551, ( ), :
, , .154-162

27

1)

() ()
()
)

) (1)
(2)

)

2)

34

, 3, ( : , 2551)
.23

28

)



)



35
)

35

,
2540, : , 2546, .19-23

29

36

37




38

36

..2542 9
..2539 8 10
38
, , 3 (: , 2551), .
32-33
37

30

3. 157
157

3.1 157
157
..127

3.1.1 157

31

39

157
(1) .. 127
..127


..
1860 40

..127 ..1810 ..1870


28 ..1878 14
..1879 3 ..1881
30 ..1880
14 ..1904
(Georges Padoux) ..127



45 ..1860
39

, 2 1, 8 ( : , 2548) .59
. ..127. ( :
, 2546) .49.

40

32

..1903 ..1907
..127 41

..127 145 (Georges Padoux)
175
16642 145


43
145 3
145
157

..127 145

41

, , 86.
175 166
[voir Code pen. italien ( ast. 175) et pen. des indes ( ast. 166)]
43
145 ..127 (Georges
Padoux), Code pnal du royaume de Siam promulgu le 1 juin 1908: Act 145 Tout fonctionnaire qui
exerce indment ou sabstient indment dexercer ses fonctions dans le dessein de nuire autrui, le dit acte
ne tombant pas autrement sous le coup de la loi, est puni de lemprisonnement de deux ans au plus et de
lamende jusqu mille ticaux.

42

33

157
..127 145

145
(civil law)
(common law)

44
45





46
..127 145


47

44

, , 23, .100.
, 20, .539.
46
, .539-540.
47
177/2463 . ..127, :
, 2548, .284.
45

34

747/247148 .
.
. .
. 145
228/247249



145
145




50
(2) .. 2477

31
..2476



48

. , 284.
, . ( : , 2478), .428
50
, 20, .588
49

35

30 ..2476 .
51


52
129 146

( 30 .. 1927
)
()



420
( 425 426)
51

95/209
30 ..2476
52
138
145
.

36

(
)

1.

( 43 )53

53

43

(1)
(2)

(3)

37

2.
sabotage

(
)

()

2 (
)
...

.


247
1
247
2
3 146

38

4 2 2 2 (
)
... 145 ... ...
9 ..2477
( 2) 2477
129 139 142 146
54
(3) ..2484


2484 25 ..2484 131
138


2




55

141 .

54

. (: ,
2497) .()
55
, 157
, ,
2553, .28-34

39

136

(abuse of office or power)
2


(abuse of office)
(injury)56



141 .



57
(4) ..2500
1 .. 2500

56

abuse of office injury abuse of

office arbitrary act
abuse
186/152/2484 20 ..2484
57
186/152/2484 20
..2484

40

157


157 .. 2502
.. 2502 13 157
157



3.1.2 157




58






59
60

58

, 39, .65
, , 66
60
253/2503
59

41

61 2


62


63








(principle of legality)

(
147 166)
157

61

1787/2524
, 39, .72.
63
82-86/2506
62

42

147 156
158 166 157 64

157
65

157
157

147 147
157
147 157 66
157
..127 145 157

.
157 .
.127 145 157
67

, 1, ( : , 2536), . 283
, 2-3, 10, , 2544, . 66
66
, 64, . 281-287
67
, 65, . 66
64
65

43

3.2 157
157
2 (1)
(2)

3.2.1
-
(1)



68
2
1)

69

68
69

700/2490 () 1 .848
1787/2524 () 7 .1323

44

2)

70

70

358-359/2500

() 1 .195
82-86/2506
() 1 .56
1173/2539

2 2 2
() 2 .363

45

71
.

72

(2)

71
72

, 65, . 43.
, 19, . 90-91.

46

73


74


157 75

73

1403/2512 () 3 .1681, 117/2516 () 1 .184,

1033/2533 () 2 .206
74
737/2504

157 () .598
364/2531


157 () 3 .92
75
1399/2508 () 4 .2084

47

76

(separation of powers)
3 77
1.

157
157
2. 2
1)
(act of state act of government)



157
2)

(administrative act)

76

77

7663/2543 () 8 .213
2.2, .20-28

48

78
3.


157
79 80
157


157

, ,
13 2 ( 2537)
79
612/2526 () 2 .289
80
248/2524 () 2 .247
78

49

157

-
1)
59

157
1221/2515

1
81
2)

81

2 .986

50

82

145 ..127
157
157 157
83 157 .

84


.. 127 145
85 86

82

, 64, . 235.
29, 85/2548 26
..2482.
84
, 65, .55.
85
, 64, .273-274.
86
409-410/2509 157
83

157 ()
4 .2065
3215/2538

51

3.2.2
-
1)
2)

1

-
1)

157 () 6 .198
3478/2546

157 () 12 .31

2444/2521

157 () 8 .1161
12-13/2523


() 1 .4
2577/2534
2-3

4-5

157 () 7 .146

52

2)
1 (1)
87

88

87

1161/2538

.
. .
157 () 6 .1006

88

.1/2548
..2542 5 107
... ...

...

...
157

53

3.3 157


(common law)
(statutory offenses)
(precedent)89 (common law offenses)

(civil law)

90

(nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege)

89

, , ( : , 2545) .
47-48
90
, , 24 3
2537, .568-582

54

91
(Rechtsstaat)92 (rule of
law)93 Albert Venn Dicey, Lon L. Fuller
Joseph Raz


(clarity)
(certainty)


94

95


(analogy)

..2550 39

92
, ,
() : ,
2553, .265267. , (das Rechtstaatsprinzip) , .240
93
, , , ()
, . 335 - 336
94
, (Rule of Law) , ()
, .86-107.
95
, , 9 : ,
2551, .245 246.
91

55

96

34

97



98

99
2

Rmy Cabrillac, Marie-Anne Frison-Roche et Thierry Revet (Sous la direction) Droits et liberts
fondamentaux. 4e d., Dalloz, 1997, pp.411-412.

96

No 80-127 DC des 19 et 20 janvier 1981; no 84-176 DC du 25 juillet 1984; no 86210 DC du 29 juillet 1986; no 86-213 DC du 3 septembre 1986.
98
No 84-181 DC des 10 et 11 octobre 1984.
99
No 84-183 DC du 18 janvier 1985.
97

56

The
King can do no wrong

.. 127

57

2
157

157

157

157
157 157

157 145
.. 127 145
.. 127
145 .. 127
157

145 157

157

 3
...

..2550 ...
..2540

...
...

...
1

...

...
...

2
1

... ..2550
250 ..2542
..2550 2 ..2554 19
2
...
... ..2540 ,
, ( : , 2547). .
51

 3 ... | 59

...

..2551

...3
...

157


...


...
... 157

1. ...

...

... 1 2 1 .5-6

 3 ... | 60

1.1 ...
...

..2502

4

5


(accusatorial
system)



6
4

,
... 26 2546
5
,
, ( : , 2547). .2223.
6
30 2496

 3 ... | 61

(...) 7 (...)8
(...)


..2518 ( ...)

.. 2518



9

"

()
..2503

7

..2503
17
2514

8
324 13
2515
14 2516
9
..2518 3

 3 ... | 62

1.1.1

 3 ... | 63

1.1.2

10

11


10

, , , ( : , 2514) .
169-170.
11
, , 1,
( : , 2520), .23, , ,
17 3 2520 .448449, , ,
10 2516, .44 45.

 3 ... | 64

12

..2540

..2542 ( 2) ..2554 103/1

...

13

1.2 ...
.. 2542

... 4
...
...

...

12

, , 3.
, 2, : ,
2554, .58-68

13

 3 ... | 65

...


1.2.1



147 166

157
(1)
(2)




...

..2542




157

 3 ... | 66

..2542 123
157

..2542
19

2 2
3 2
..
2542 123 123/1
..2502 11
..2542
157

...

157
250

 3 ... | 67

..2550



157
...

1.2.2

..2542
(1)




14

14

.1/2547
.1/2548

 3 ... | 68

15


289 (2) 136
147
158 162
16

157


2

149
15

,
(: ,)
16
. 9 ( : , 2554), .34

 3 ... | 69

...

3 2
2 2

17


157







18
19
157

17

157
157
3509/2549
157 200

18
3509/2549
19
(judicial immunity) , :
... ? http://www.nacc.go.th/ewt_dl_link.php?nid=1502
, ... : ,
, . 75-97

 3 ... | 70

..2542 ...


157
...

(2)
..2542

4
..2542 ( 2) ..2554

8
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

 3 ... | 71

(7)
(8)

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5) (1) (2)

(6)
(7)
...
(8) ...

123/1
..2542
( 2) ..2554

 3 ... | 72

157 123/1

...


...
..2550 250 (2) (3)
..2551 17 (4)
40 (
...)

... 17 (5) 45


...
...
(1) ...
...
..2518

...

(2) ...
3
..2551

 3 ... | 73

2.

...
2.1


2.1.1
2
... 84

2.1.2
...


66

... 30
... 84
...

 3 ... | 74

2.1.3
... 44

(1) ...

(2)

2.1.4
... 4

(1) ...

...

(2) 47

(3) 48

 3 ... | 75

2.1.5

50

.
.
.
.
.
.

30
2.2 ...

30 ... 3

2.2.1
...

...

2.2.2
...

 3 ... | 76

(1)
1)

...

...

2)

()

()

()

...

3)
...
...

 3 ... | 77

(2)

1)
... 30

... 15
2)

... 15

(3)

30

1)


2)

...
2


2/2546

 3 ... | 78

3)
.. ..
... ..

...
20
...

...

...

...

...

96
93

124 ( )

126 ()
..

20

2/2546
226

 3 ... | 79

...




... (.)

...

...

...

.. 2542

 3 ... | 80

9621
..2542
...

42 22
..2542

4) 96
30
..2542

96
30 96
2.2.3
...

(1)
...


21

96 93

22
42

 3 ... | 81

...
97
(2)
...
...
...
...


...
97
(3)
...
...
...
... 74

3.
...
..2542



2
...
3.1
... ..
2550 250 (2) (3)

 3 ... | 82

...


...
..2518 13 (3)
... ...
...
23
24
...
...

..2542 91
92 ...

23

..2518 4

24
..2518 4

 3 ... | 83

25


...
3.2

... ..
2542


...
26
27

...

...

25

..2542 91
...
...
(1) 92
(2) 97
26
, 1, .
27
Medhi Krongkaew, Clash of Reasons : Methodological Conflicts Between Law and Economics in Anti-Corruption
Perspections and Practices in Thailand, NACC JOURNAL, Vol.3, No.2, July 2010, p.2

 3 ... | 84

28

28

. 157.
, 2539 . 4752.

(civil law)

(common law)
2

1.
(civil law)

(legality)

 4 86

1.1
(corruption)1

(crimes of corruption)
193 198 (Japan
Financial Intelligence Center)2 (Japan Fair
Trade Commission)3 (National Public Service Ethics Board)4
(Board of Audit of Japan)5
1.1.1

Herbert Smith, Guide to anti-corruption regulation in Asia 2010/2011, (Hong Kong: Herbert Smith, 2010) pp.25-30.;
Kenichi Sadaka & others, Getting the Deal Through: Anti-Corruption Regulation in 40 jurisdiction worldwide 2009,
Homer E. Moyer Jr. Ed., (London: Law Business Research Ltd., 2009) pp. 95-100.
2

 4 87

6


3
( 193
194) ( 195 196)
( 197 198)
(1)
7

8
(2)



9
6

Article 7 (1) The term "public officer" as used in this Code shall mean a national or local government official, a member
of an assembly or committee, or other employees engaged in the performance of public duties in accordance with laws
and regulations.
7
(Abuse of Authority by public officers)
Article 193 When a public officer abuses his or her authority and causes another to perform an act which the person has
no obligation to perform, or hinders another from exercising such person's right, imprisonment with work or
imprisonment without work for not more than 2 years shall be imposed.
8
(Abuse of Authority by Special public officers)
Article 194 When a person performing or assisting in judicial, prosecutorial or police duties, abuses his or her authority
and unlawfully captures or confines another, imprisonment with or without work for not less than 6 months but not more
than 10 years shall be imposed.
9
(Assault and Cruelty by Special public officers)

 4 88

(3)
-


10

11
-
12
Article 195 (1) When a person performing or assisting in judicial, prosecutorial or police duties commits, in the
performance of his or her duties, an act of assault or physical or mental cruelty upon the accused, suspect or any other
person, imprisonment with or without work for not more than 7 years shall be imposed.
(2) The same shall apply when a person who is guarding or escorting another person detained or confined in
accordance with laws and regulations commits an act of assault or physical or mental cruelty upon the person.
(Abuse of Authority Causing Death or Injury by Special public officers)
Article 196 A person who commits a crime prescribed under the preceding two Articles and thereby causes the death or
injury of another shall be dealt with by the punishment prescribed for the crimes of injury or the preceding two Articles
whichever is greater.
10
(Acceptance of Bribes; Acceptance upon Request; Acceptance in Advance of Assumption of Office)
Article 197 (1) A public officer or arbitrator who accepts, solicits or promises to accept a bribe in connection with his/her
duties shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than 5 years; and when the official agrees to perform an
act in response to a request, imprisonment with work for not more than 7 years shall be imposed.
(2) When a person to be appointed a public officer accepts, solicits or promises to accept a bribe in
connection with a duty to be assumed with agreement to perform an act in response to a request, the person shall be
punished by imprisonment with work for not more than 5 years in the event of appointment.
11
Article 197-3 (1) When a public officer commits a crime prescribed under the preceding two Articles and consequently
acts illegally or refrains from acting in the exercise of his or her duty, imprisonment with work for a definite term of not
less than 1 year shall be imposed.
12
(Passing of Bribes to a Third Party)
Article 197-2 When a public officer, agreeing to perform an act in response to a request, causes a bribe in
connection with the official's duty to be given to a third party or solicits or promises such bribe to be given to
a third party, imprisonment with work for not more than 5 years shall be imposed.

 4 89

13
-
14
-
15
-
16





17
13

Article 197-3 (2) The same shall apply when a public officer accepts, solicits or promises to accept a bribe, or
causes a bribe to be given to a third party or solicits or promises a bribe to be given to a third party, in
connection with having acted illegally or having refrained from acting in the exercise of the official's duty.
14
Article 197-3 (3) When a person who resigned from the position of a public officer accepts, solicits or
promises to accept a bribe in connection with having acted illegally or having refrained from acting in the
exercise of his or her duty with agreement thereof in response to a request, the person shall be punished by
imprisonment with work for not more than 5 years
15
(Acceptance for Exertion of Influence)
Article 197-4 A public officer who accepts, solicits or promises to accept a bribe as consideration for the influence which
the official exerted or is to exert, in response to a request, upon another public officer so as to cause the other to act
illegally or refrain from acting in the exercise of official duty shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more
than 5 years.
16
(Giving of Bribes)
Article 198 A person who gives, offers or promises to give a bribe provided for in Articles 197 through 197-4 shall be
punished by imprisonment with work for not more than 3 years or a fine of not more than 2,500,000 yen.
17

5,000 ( 1,800 )

 4 90

18



(National Public Service Ethics Board)



1.1.2
(1)

(National Public Service

Ethics Board)

18

(Confiscation and Collection of a Sum of Equivalent Value)

Article 197-5 A bribe accepted by an offender or by a third party with knowledge shall be confiscated. When the whole
or a part of the bribe cannot be confiscated, an equivalent sum of money shall be collected.

 4 91

(2)

1.2

..127 ..2477 ..2500

(la personne dpositaire de lautorit publique ou charge dune mission de
service public)
157

19

1.2.1

432-1 432-17 3
- (abus dautorit dirigs contre
ladministration)
- (abus dautorit commis contre les particuliers)
19

, 1, 10, , 2551,. 22

 4 92

- (manquements au devoir de probit)

(1) (abus dautorit dirigs
contre ladministration)
432-1 432-2
20 432-3
21
432-122
5 75,000
165
432-223 432-1
10 150,000
432-324
2 20,000
145
(2) (abus dautorit commis contre les
particuliers)

4 432-4 43220

165


21
145

22

Le fait, par une personne dpositaire de l'autorit publique, agissant dans l'exercice de ses fonctions, de prendre des
mesures destines faire chec l'excution de la loi est puni de cinq ans d'emprisonnement et de 75000 euros d'amende.
23
L'infraction prvue l'article 432-1 est punie de dix ans d'emprisonnement et de 150000 euros d'amende si elle a t suivie
d'effet.
24
Le fait, par une personne dpositaire de l'autorit publique ou charge d'une mission de service public ou par une personne
investie d'un mandat lectif public, ayant t officiellement informe de la dcision ou de la circonstance mettant fin ses
fonctions, de continuer les exercer, est puni de deux ans d'emprisonnement et de 30000 euros d'amende.

 4 93

6
432-7 432-8
432-9
25
1)
432-426
7 100,000

432-527

3 45,000

25

163

(1)
(2)

(3)
(4)

26

Le fait, par une personne dpositaire de l'autorit publique ou charge d'une mission de service public, agissant dans
l'exercice ou l'occasion de l'exercice de ses fonctions ou de sa mission, d'ordonner ou d'accomplir arbitrairement un acte
attentatoire la libert individuelle est puni de sept ans d'emprisonnement et de 100000 euros d'amende.
Lorsque l'acte attentatoire consiste en une dtention ou une rtention d'une dure de plus de sept jours, la peine est porte
trente ans de rclusion criminelle et 450000 euros d'amende.

27

Le fait, par une personne dpositaire de l'autorit publique ou charge d'une mission de service public ayant eu
connaissance, dans l'exercice ou l'occasion de l'exercice de ses fonctions ou de sa mission, d'une privation de libert illgale,
de s'abstenir volontairement soit d'y mettre fin si elle en a le pouvoir, soit, dans le cas contraire, de provoquer l'intervention
d'une autorit comptente, est puni de trois ans d'emprisonnement et de 45000 euros d'amende.
Le fait, par une personne vise l'alina prcdent ayant eu connaissance, dans l'exercice ou l'occasion de l'exercice de
ses fonctions ou de sa mission, d'une privation de libert dont l'illgalit est allgue, de s'abstenir volontairement soit de
procder aux vrifications ncessaires si elle en a le pouvoir, soit, dans le cas contraire, de transmettre la rclamation une
autorit comptente, est puni d'un an d'emprisonnement et de 15000 euros d'amende lorsque la privation de libert, reconnue
illgale, s'est poursuivie.

 4 94

432-628

2 30,000

309 310
157
2)
432-729
5 75,000 1.
2.


3)

432-830

2 30,000

28

Le fait, par un agent de l'administration pnitentiaire, de recevoir ou retenir une personne sans mandat, jugement ou ordre
d'crou tabli conformment la loi, ou de prolonger indment la dure d'une dtention, est puni de deux ans
d'emprisonnement et 30000 euros d'amende.

29

La discrimination dfinie l'article 225-1, commise l'gard d'une personne physique ou morale par une personne
dpositaire de l'autorit publique ou charge d'une mission de service public, dans l'exercice ou l'occasion de l'exercice de
ses fonctions ou de sa mission, est punie de cinq ans d'emprisonnement et de 75000 euros d'amende lorsqu'elle consiste :
1 A refuser le bnfice d'un droit accord par la loi ;
2 A entraver l'exercice normal d'une activit conomique quelconque.
30
Le fait, par une personne dpositaire de l'autorit publique ou charge d'une mission de service public, agissant dans
l'exercice ou l'occasion de l'exercice de ses fonctions ou de sa mission, de s'introduire ou de tenter de s'introduire dans le
domicile d'autrui contre le gr de celui-ci hors les cas prvus par la loi est puni de deux ans d'emprisonnement et de 30000
euros d'amende.

 4 95

4)
432-931
3
45,000

163

.. 2550
(3) (manquements au devoir de
probit) 3
5
- 432-10 32
- 432-11
33
31

Le fait, par une personne dpositaire de l'autorit publique ou charge d'une mission de service public, agissant dans
l'exercice ou l'occasion de l'exercice de ses fonctions ou de sa mission, d'ordonner, de commettre ou de faciliter, hors les cas
prvus par la loi, le dtournement, la suppression ou l'ouverture de correspondances ou la rvlation du contenu de ces
correspondances, est puni de trois ans d'emprisonnement et de 45000 euros d'amende.
Est puni des mmes peines le fait, par une personne vise l'alina prcdent ou un agent d'un exploitant de rseaux
ouverts au public de communications lectroniques ou d'un fournisseur de services de tlcommunications, agissant dans
l'exercice de ses fonctions, d'ordonner, de commettre ou de faciliter, hors les cas prvus par la loi, l'interception ou le
dtournement des correspondances mises, transmises ou reues par la voie des tlcommunications, l'utilisation ou la
divulgation de leur contenu.
32
154



155

 4 96

- 432-12 432-13
34
- 432-14
- 432-15 432-16
1) (concussion)
432-1035
5
75,000
154
2) (corruption passive et trafic
dinfluence)
2 (corruption)
(trafic dinfluence) 432-11

33

149



143



34
152

35

Le fait, par une personne dpositaire de l'autorit publique ou charge d'une mission de service public, de recevoir, exiger
ou ordonner de percevoir titre de droits ou contributions, impts ou taxes publics, une somme qu'elle sait ne pas tre due, ou
excder ce qui est d, est puni de cinq ans d'emprisonnement et de 75000 euros d'amende.
Est puni des mmes peines le fait, par les mmes personnes, d'accorder sous une forme quelconque et pour quelque motif
que ce soit une exonration ou franchise des droits, contributions, impts ou taxes publics en violation des textes lgaux ou
rglementaires.
La tentative des dlits prvus au prsent article est punie des mmes peines.

 4 97

(corruption) 432-1136

10
150,000 1....
corruption passive corruption active corruption passive


corruption active

corruption passive
corruption active37
149
(trafic dinfluence)
432-11
10
150,000 ... 2.

143

36

Est puni de dix ans d'emprisonnement et de 150 000 euros d'amende le fait, par une personne dpositaire de l'autorit
publique, charge d'une mission de service public, ou investie d'un mandat lectif public, de solliciter ou d'agrer, sans droit,
tout moment, directement ou indirectement, des offres, des promesses, des dons, des prsents ou des avantages quelconques
pour elle-mme ou pour autrui :
1 Soit pour accomplir ou avoir accompli, pour s'abstenir ou s'tre abstenue d'accomplir un acte de sa fonction, de sa
mission ou de son mandat ou facilit par sa fonction, sa mission ou son mandat ;
2 Soit pour abuser ou avoir abus de son influence relle ou suppose en vue de faire obtenir d'une autorit ou
d'une administration publique des distinctions, des emplois, des marchs ou toute autre dcision favorable.
37
Jean LARGUIER, Anne- Marie LARGUIER, Droit pnal spcial, 11e dition, Dalloz, pp. 333-335.

 4 98

3) (prise illegal dintrts)

432-1238
5 75,000
152
432-1339
3
2 30,000

100 101
..2542
4) (atteintes la libert daccs et
lgalit des candidats dans les marchs publics et les dlgations de service public)
432-1440

2 30,000
38

Le fait, par une personne dpositaire de l'autorit publique ou charge d'une mission de service public ou par une personne
investie d'un mandat lectif public, de prendre, recevoir ou conserver, directement ou indirectement, un intrt quelconque dans
une entreprise ou dans une opration dont elle a, au moment de l'acte, en tout ou partie, la charge d'assurer la surveillance,
l'administration, la liquidation ou le paiement, est puni de cinq ans d'emprisonnement et de 75 000 euros d'amende.
39

Est puni de deux ans d'emprisonnement et de 30 000 euros d'amende le fait, par une personne ayant t charge, en tant
que fonctionnaire ou agent d'une administration publique, dans le cadre des fonctions qu'elle a effectivement exerces, soit
d'assurer la surveillance ou le contrle d'une entreprise prive, soit de conclure des contrats de toute nature avec une
entreprise prive ou de formuler un avis sur de tels contrats, soit de proposer directement l'autorit comptente des dcisions
relatives des oprations ralises par une entreprise prive ou de formuler un avis sur de telles dcisions, de prendre ou de
recevoir une participation par travail, conseil ou capitaux dans l'une de ces entreprises avant l'expiration d'un dlai de trois ans
suivant la cessation de ces fonctions.
40

Est puni de deux ans d'emprisonnement et de 30 000 euros d'amende le fait par une personne dpositaire de l'autorit
publique ou charge d'une mission de service public ou investie d'un mandat lectif public ou exerant les fonctions de
reprsentant, administrateur ou agent de l'Etat, des collectivits territoriales, des tablissements publics, des socits
d'conomie mixte d'intrt national charges d'une mission de service public et des socits d'conomie mixte locales ou par
toute personne agissant pour le compte de l'une de celles susmentionnes de procurer ou de tenter de procurer autrui un
avantage injustifi par un acte contraire aux dispositions lgislatives ou rglementaires ayant pour objet de garantir la libert
d'accs et l'galit des candidats dans les marchs publics et les dlgations de service public.

 4 99

..2542
5) (soustraction et dtournement de biens)
432-1541
10 150,000

432-1642

1 15,000
147

1 .. 1996 30 .. 1999 ( 3 6 )
460
(soustraction et dtournement de biens) 124
(faux) 120 (corruption) 56
(concussion) 28

41

Le fait, par une personne dpositaire de l'autorit publique ou charge d'une mission de service public, un comptable public,
un dpositaire public ou l'un de ses subordonns, de dtruire, dtourner ou soustraire un acte ou un titre, ou des fonds publics
ou privs, ou effets, pices ou titres en tenant lieu, ou tout autre objet qui lui a t remis en raison de ses fonctions ou de sa
mission, est puni de dix ans d'emprisonnement et de 150000 euros d'amende.
La tentative du dlit prvu l'alina qui prcde est punie des mmes peines.
42

Lorsque la destruction, le dtournement ou la soustraction par un tiers des biens viss l'article 432-15 rsulte de la
ngligence d'une personne dpositaire de l'autorit publique ou charge d'une mission de service public, d'un comptable public
ou d'un dpositaire public, celle-ci est punie d'un an d'emprisonnement et de 15000 euros d'amende.

 4 100

(abus dautorit) (atteinte la libert

individuelle) 43
(
) 1,270
1 .. 1996 30 .. 1999 41%44


(protection juridique)

(corruption)

157


43

Roger MARTINEZ Myriam BERNARD La responsabilit pnale des agents de l'tat, Ministre de la fonction publique et de
la rforme de lEtat, 2000 p. 2-3 at www.fonction-publique.gouv.fr, 27 2553.

44

Ibid.

 4 101

1.2.2

3

2

(1) (Conseil dEtat)

(2) (Cour des comptes)45

47-2 7





(arrt de dcharge
lgard du comptable publique)

45

http://www.vie-publique.fr/decouverte-institutions/finances-publiques/ressources-depenses-etat/controle-finances-etat/quelssont-pouvoirs-controle-cour-comptes.html 9 2554

 4 102

1.

2.

3.

(3) (Cour de discipline budgtaire et financire)46

25 ..1948

(journal official)

46

http://www.vie-publique.fr/decouverte-institutions/finances-publiques/ressources-depenses-etat/controle-finances-etat/qu-estce-que-cour-discipline-budgetaire-financiere.html 9 2554

 4 103

(4) (jurisdiction rpressive de droit commun)

432-10 432-14

(5) (Cour de justice de la Rpublique)

..2540 .. 2550

-
- (Haute Cour de justice)
(Cour de justice de la Rpublique)
-
- (ministre publique)
-
-
-

1)
..1789
..1791
(sret nationale)

 4 104

47 167 ( .. 1791 .. 1958)

4
5 ..1958
48
5 ..1958

(Haute Cour de justice) 2
(haute trahison)
49

(juge dinstruction)



(lettre morte)
..1958 ..1993

47
48

.. 1791, Titre III, Chap. II, Sect. IV, art. 5

Pierre-Olivier Caille, COUR DE JUSTICE DE LA RPUBLIQUE, Fasc.40, JurisClasseur Administratif, LexisNexis SA, 2011.
N 1.
49
4 ..1958, , art. 67 et 68.

 4 105

50

2) (Haute Cour de justice)

(Cour de justice de la Rpublique)
5

..1980 (sang contamin)

(Cour de justice de la Rpublique)

(Haute Cour de la
justice) 51

HIV HIV

50

B. Mathieu, Th.-S. Renoux, A. Roux, La Cour de justice de la Rpublique : PUF, coll. "Que sais-je ?", 1995, p. 46-53 in
Pierre-Olivier Caille, COUR DE JUSTICE DE LA RPUBLIQUE, Fasc.40, JurisClasseur Administratif, LexisNexis SA, 2011. N
5.
51

O. Beaud, Le sang contamin : PUF, 1999 in Pierre-Olivier Caille, COUR DE JUSTICE DE LA RPUBLIQUE, Fasc.40,
JurisClasseur Administratif, LexisNexis SA, 2011. N 6.

 4 106

(juge dinstruction)

52 (Commission
dinstruction)
(dlits de dfaut d'assistance personnes en danger)
53

Vedel
15 ..1993
3 54

52

(Commission dinstruction) (Haute Cour de la justice)

(Juge dinstruction)

53

Haute Cour de la justice, comm. instr., 5 fvr. 1993, X : D. 1993, jurispr. p. 261, note J. Pradel ; Dr. pn. 1993, comm. 75,
note A. Maron ; Dr. pn. 1993, chron. 8, concl. contraires P. Truche
54

15 ..1993 (Comit consultatif pour la

rvision de la Constitution) : 16 ..1993.

 4 107

Vedel
..1993 (Cour de justice de la
Rpublique)

..1993
31 ..2010 1,066
12 14
4 6
55
3)
(Cour de justice de la Rpublique) 3

- (Commission des requtes)
- (Commission d'instruction)
- (Cour de justice de la Rpublique)

) (Commission des requtes)

7
- 3

- 2
- 2

55

Pierre-Olivier Caille, COUR DE JUSTICE DE LA RPUBLIQUE, Fasc.40, JurisClasseur Administratif, LexisNexis SA, 2011.
N63.

 4 108

56
5

) (Commission dinstruction)

3
3 3
3

) (Cour de justice de la Rpublique)

15
- 3
3
- 6

- 6

56

Pierre-Olivier Caille, COUR DE JUSTICE DE LA RPUBLIQUE, Fasc.40, JurisClasseur Administratif, LexisNexis SA, 2011.
N 10.

 4 109

4) (ministre publique)

(Procureur gnral prs la Cour de Cassation) 3

5)


3
-

(Ministres d'tat) (Ministres dlgus) (Secrtaires d'tat)


57


58
-
68-1
(actes accomplis dans l'exercice
de leurs fonctions)
(qualifis crimes ou dlits au moment o ils ont t commis)59

57

Pierre-Olivier Caille, COUR DE JUSTICE DE LA RPUBLIQUE, Fasc.40, JurisClasseur Administratif, LexisNexis SA, 2011.
N 26.

58
59

23

Crime 10 Dlit 10

 4 110

(loi du 29
juillet 1881)
60



-

61
6)
3

)

60

Cass. ass. pln., 23 dc. 1999, n 99-86.298, Royal : JurisData n 1999-004737 ; Bull. inf.
C. cass., n 509, 1er mars 2000, p. 2, concl. Ph. Chemithe, rapp. et note Ch. Chanet ; Bull. crim. 1999, n 312 ; Gaz. Pal. 1617 fvr. 2000, p. 15, note J.-F. Burgelin

61

Cass. crim., 26 juin 1995, n 95-82.333, Carignon : JurisData n 1995-002036 ; Bull. crim. 1995, n 235 ;
Rev. sc. crim. 1995, p. 837, obs. J.-P. Dintilhac

 4 111

.. 1993

(Commission de requte)

(Commission dintruction)

(constitution de
partie civile)

62




)
(Commission dinstruction)

62

68-2

 4 112

(Assembl
plnire)
)
15




(majorit absolue) 8 15

7)

(Assemble plnire de la Cour de Cassation)

63

1.3.
19

(corruption)64

Cass. ass. pln., 23 juill. 2010, n 10-85.505, Pasqua et proc. gn. prs C.
cass. : Bull. civ. ass. pln. 2010, n 2, p. 7 ; Bull. inf. C. cass., n 729, 15 oct. 2010, p. 7, rapp. D. Gurin,
avis Ch. Rayssquier
64
Anthony Didrick Castberg. Campaign financing and Corruption in the US.2000, p.412.
63

 4 113

New Yorks Tammany

Hall65 Watergate66 Abscam67 Wedtech68
(The Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971) (The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977) (The Ethics in Government Act of
1978)


()
()

65

66
Richard Nixon

(Democratic Party) (Watergate) Nixon
(impeachment) Nixon

67
FBI (arab sheik)

6 1

68
.. 1986 - 1989 2

 4 114

157





69

70


(public corruption)71
1.3.1

(federal officials) (state officials)
(local officials)33
(federal Codes) (abuse of power)
(embezzlement)
69

Kala Finn and Anne Skove. Anticorruption Laws: Knowledge & information Services Office, The national Center of
State Courts, 2004
70
(18 U.S.C)
(RICO) (Sunshine Laws)
(FOIA)


71
1

33
18 U.S.C. section 201-211 18 U.S.C. Chapter 31

 4 115

(Codes of ethical conduct) (administrative regulations)

(presidential orders)
(sanctions)






(The King can do no wrong)

1940

2

(1) (absolute immunity)

(2) (Qualified Immunity)

 4 116

(Good Faith)

1.3.2

157



(1) (Bribery)34 (Illegal Gratuity)
..1962

(Bribery) (United States Code) 18 201 209
72

201
(Public official) 201 (a)
(Public official) 73 (witness)74
34

(Functional term)
(Heidenheimer, 1970: p.57)
72
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S 398, 409-10 (1999)
73
18 U.S.C. section 201 (a) (1), 201 (a) (2) U.S.S.G Manual section 2C 1.1, cmt. n.1
(A)-(B) 2J 1.2 (Obstruction of justice) U.S.S.G
Manual

 4 117

201 (b)75
(1) (2)
(3) (4)
76

201(c) (1) (2)
(3)
77



78 (official act)

2

2


(The commission
of a fraud against the U.S.)
74

18 U.S.C. section 201(b) (3), (c) (2) 2J 1.3 U.S.S.G Manual

18 U.S.C. section 201(b) (3) (4)
75
U.S.S.G Manual section 2C 1.1 (a) (1) 2C 1.1, cmt. n.1 (A)-(B)
76
18 U.S.C. section 201(c) (1) (A)-(B)
77
18 U.S.C. section 201(c) (1) (A)-(B) (2006), United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S 398, 409-10
(1999) 2C 1.2 U.S.S.G Manual ( 2C 1.3 U.S.S.G. Manual (United States Sentencing
Guideline Manual, 2009)
78
18 U.S.C. section 201(a)(3)

 4 118

(2)
18 203

(unauthorized compensation)
201 203
21679 203

80 81
82

203

83 203

205

84 203
205
85 203 205 86

79

216 203-206
18 U.S.C. section 203 (a) (1) (A)-(B)
81
18 U.S.C. section 202 (a) (2006)
82
United States v. Lecco, 495 F. Supp. 2d 581, 588-589 (S.D.W.Va 2007)
83
18 U.S.C. section 203 (a) (1) (B)
84
18 U.S.C. section 205 (a) (2006)
85
18 U.S.C. section 203 (a) (1)-(2)
86
18 U.S.C. section 205 (d) (1) (A) 207 (j) (1) (A)-(B),
80

 4 119

..1996 205 (d) (1)

(B)
87
(3)
18 207
(lobbying) ..
1989 (The Ethics Reform Act, 1989)
..2007 (The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act, 2007)
88

207 216 2C1.3 U.S.S.G. Manual89
207 (1) (2)
2
(3)
(4)
(particular matter)90 1 (5)
91 92
(4)
87

Federal Employee Representation Improvement Act of 1996

, see United States ex rel.Siewick v. Jamieson Science and
Engg, Inc., 214 F3d 1372,1374-77 (D.C. Cir.2000)
89
United States Sentencing Guideline Manual, 2009
90
particular matter
, See United States v.C.A.C.I., Inc.-Federal. 719
F2d 1567 (Fed. Cir.1983)
91
18 U.S.C. section 207 (c)
92
United States v .Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
88

 4 120

18 208




216 2C1.3
U.S.S.G. Manual93
(1)
(2)
(3)
94
(5)
18 209

216
95
(1) (2) (3)
(4)
209


96

93
94

United States Sentencing Guideline Manual, 2009

18 U.S.C. section 208 (a)

18 U.S.C. section 209 (a)
96
United States v .Project on Govt Oversight, 454 F.3d 306,309 (D.C. Cir.2006)
95

 4 121

(6) (Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization-RICO)97
(corruption)

RICO (Civil RICO)
(police misconduct)
(brutality)


(sexual misconduct) /
(use of drugs)

1.3.3


(Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI))
FBI


98
99
97

Stevent P.Ragland, Using the Masters Tools: Fighting Persistent Police Misconduct with Civil RICO, 51 Am. U. L.
Rev. 139 (2001)
98
, FBI 2537,.4.
99

(undercover operations) sting operations

 4 122

FBI
(Government Accounting Office (GAO))
FBI
GAO (accountability)
(integrity) (reliability)100
1.3.4
(corruption)

(federal crimes)

1971


(prison related activities)

Frank Anachiarico and James B. Jacobs.Visions of Corruption Control and the Evolution of American Public
Administration,1993.p,21.
100
David M. Walke, Fighting Corruption ,Enhancing Performance and Assuring Accountability, XI OLACEFS
Assembly,2000.p.3.

 4 123

1.3.5


The United States Office of Government Ethics (OGE)
1978

OGE

101
OGE

The Ethics in Government Act of 1978




FBI GAO OGE

(The Offices of The United States Attorneys) 102

101

,
, 2536, .4.
102
,.5.

 4 124

1.3.6

(1)




(Executive Office the President)

(National Security Council)
(Council of Economic
Advisors)

(Office of Management and Budget)

(2)

(power of the purse)

 4 125

(Congressional Budget Office)

(3)

 4 126

(The Administrative Procedure Act)

1960

(Freedom of Information Act)

10

2.

(common law)

 4 127

2.1
2 (common law)
(statutes)
2.1.1
(bribery)

(common law offense of misfeasance)103
104
(misconduct in public office)


105
R v Bembridge
(1783) The Office of the Receiver and Paymaster General of
103

Llewellyn-Jones [1968] 1 QB 429.

Pomfriet v Brownsal (1600) Cro Eliz 736; 78 ER 968.
105
Collin Nicholls QC et al., Corruption and Misuse of Public Office, (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2006), p.65.
104

 4 128

the Forces
Lord Mansfield QC







106
Bembridge
Makalley (1611)

Crouther (1600)
107
(1)
Halsburys Laws of England

-
1)

106

Lucinda Maer, Misconduct in public office,

<http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/research/briefings/snpc-04909.pdf>', retrieved by April 2011.
107
Collin Nicholls QC et al., op.cit., p.66.

 4 129

2)

108
2.1) (fraud in office)
2.2) (nonfeasance)
2.3) (misfeasance)
2.4)
(malfeasance)
2.5)
(oppression)
3)
109
3.1)
3.2)
3.3)
3.4)
3.5) (
)

Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)

4)
108

P. Finn, Official Misconduct, (1978) 2 Criminal Law Journal, pp.307-310.

David Lusty, Misconduct in Public Office, Criminal Law and Justice Weekly,
<http//www.criminallawandjustice.co.uk/index.php?/analysis/misconduct-in-public-office.html>, retrieved by
April 2011.
109

 4 130

- (mens rea)

1) (intention)
(corrupt motive)110
2) (recklessness)
111
112

R v Dytham (1979) QB 722

113


110

Justice2008, Misconduct in Public Office, <http://www.justice2008.co.uk/misconductinpublicoffice.aspx> retrieved

by April 2011.
111
The Attorney General, Attorney-Generals Reference, (No.3 of 2003) [2005] 1 QB 73 [28].,
<http://www.uniset.ca/other/css/20051QB73.html> retrieved by April 2011.
112
The Legal Line, Misconduct in Public Office, <http://www.thelegalline.co.uk/pfm/misconduct-in-public-office.pdf>
retrieved by April 2011.
113
The element of culpability must be of such a degree that the misconduct impugned is calculated to injure the public
interest so as to call for condemnation and punishment. The motive of the public officer is irrelevant and the
consequences of the breach must be more than trivial. In R v Dytham [1979] QB 722, 727-728; the Attorney-Generals
reference (No 3 of 2003) [2004] EWCA Crim 868.

 4 131

..2007 Thomas Lund-Lack

Sunday Time
..1989 (Official Secret Act 1989)
8 114
(2) Crown Prosecution Service
Crown
Prosecution Service
(misconduct in public office)

(perverting the course of justice)

115

1)
2)

3) (perverting the course
of justice)
4)

..1998

5)
7

114

Lucinda Maer, op.cit., p.7.

115
Collin Nicholls QC et al., op.cit., pp.65-66.

 4 132

common law

..1997 The
Committee on Standards in Public Life Lord Nolan
116

2.1.2 (statues)
(corruption bill)



117
..2010 ..2010 (Bribery Act
2010)118

(common law),
Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act, 1889 Prevention of Corruption Act,
1906 Prevention of Corruption Act, 1916
2
1 (
116

The Committee on Standards in Public Life, Misuse of Public Office: A Consultation 1997,
http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/parlment/nolan3/misuse-1.htm, retrieved by April 2011.
117
,
..2003,
..., 2551, 140-148.
118
See Bribery Act 2010 <http://www.legislation.gou.uk./ukpga/2010/23/contents>, retrieved by April 2011

 4 133

) 2
()
2

10

2.2

(The Prevention of Corruption Act: PCA)
(The Corrupt
Practices Investigation Bureau: CPIB) 119



(The

119

Herbert Smith, Guide to anti-corruption regulation in Asia 2010/2011, (Hong Kong : Herbert Smith, 2010) pp.55-60.

 4 134

Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes Confiscation of Benefits Act)

2.2.1

-

-

-

-

(ordinary and objective standard)
(guilty knowledge)


120

120

Art. 161. Public servant taking a gratification, other than legal remuneration, in respect of an official act
Whoever, being or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain, from
any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or
reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act, or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official
functions, favour or disfavour to any person, or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any

 4 135

121
122
123 124 125
126

person, with the Government, or with any Member of Parliament or the Cabinet, or with any public servant, as such, shall
be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 years, or with fine, or with both.
Explanations.Expecting to be a public servant. If a person not expecting to be in office obtains a gratification by
deceiving others into a belief that he is about to be in office, and that he will then serve them, he may be guilty of
cheating, but he is not guilty of the offence defined in this section.
Gratification The word gratification is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications, or to gratifications estimable in
money.
Legal remuneration The words legal remuneration are not restricted to remuneration which a public servant can
lawfully demand, but include all remuneration which he is permitted by law to accept.
"A motive or reward for doing". A person who receives a gratification as a motive for doing what he does not intend to
do, or as a reward for doing what he has not done, comes within these words.
121
Art. 162. Taking a gratification in order, by corrupt or illegal means, to influence a public servant.
Whoever accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain, from any person, for himself or for any other
person, any gratification whatever, as a motive or reward for inducing, by corrupt or illegal means, any public servant to
do or to forbear to do any official act, or in the exercise of the official functions of such public servant to show favour or
disfavour to any person, or to render or attempt to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Government, or
with any Member of Parliament or the Cabinet, or with any public servant, as such, shall be punished with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to 3 years, or with fine, or with both.
122
Art. 163. Taking a gratification, for the exercise of personal influence with a public servant.
Whoever accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain, from any person, for himself or for any other
person, any gratification whatever, as a motive or reward for inducing, by the exercise of personal influence, any public
servant to do or to forbear to do any official act, or in the exercise of the official functions of such public servant to show
favour or disfavour to any person, or to render or attempt to render any service or disservice to any person with the
Government, or with any Member of Parliament or the Cabinet, or with any public servant, as such, shall be punished
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.
123
Art. 166 Public servant disobeying a direction of the law, with intent to cause injury to any person.
Whoever, being a public servant, knowingly disobeys any direction of the law as to the way in which he is to conduct
himself as such public servant, intending to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will, by such disobedience, cause

 4 136

166
157
..1860

166


(public servant)

127

injury to any person, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with
both.
124
Art. 167 Public servant framing an incorrect document or electronic record with intent to cause injury
Whoever, being a public servant, and being, as such public servant, charged with the preparation or translation of any
document or electronic record, frames or translates that document or electronic record in a manner which he knows or
believes to be incorrect, intending thereby to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he may thereby cause, injury to any
person, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 years, or with fine, or with both.
125
Art. 168 Public servant unlawfully engaging in trade
Whoever, being a public servant, and being legally bound as such public servant not to engage in trade, engages in
trade, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.
126
Art. 169 Public servant unlawfully buying or bidding for property
Whoever, being a public servant, and being legally bound as such public servant not to purchase or bid for certain
property, purchases or bids for that property, either in his own name or in the name of another, or jointly or in shares with
others, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 2 years, or with fine, or with both; and the
property, if purchased, shall be confiscated.
127
Art. 21 Public servant
The words public servant denote a person falling under any of the following descriptions:
(a) every officer in the Singapore Armed Forces;
(b) every judge;

 4 137

2.2.2
CPIB
CPA




CPIB



CPIB
PCA
(c) every officer of a court of justice whose duty it is, as such officer, to investigate or report on any matter of law or fact,
or to make, authenticate, or keep any document, or to take charge or dispose of any property, or to execute any judicial
process, or to administer any oath, or to interpret, or to preserve order in the court, and every person specially authorised
by a court of justice to perform any of such duties;
(d) every assessor assisting a court of justice or public servant;
(e) every arbitrator or other person to whom any cause or matter has been referred for decision or report by any court of
justice, or by any other competent public authority;
(f) every person who holds any office by virtue of which he is empowered to place or keep any person in confinement;
(g) every officer of Government whose duty it is, as such officer, to prevent offences, to give information of offences, to
bring offenders to justice, or to protect the public health, safety or convenience;
(h) every officer whose duty it is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep or expend any property, on behalf of Government,
or to make any survey, assessment, or contract on behalf of Government, or to execute any revenue process, or to
investigate, or to report on any matter affecting the pecuniary interests of Government, or to make, authenticate or keep
any document relating to the pecuniary interests of Government, or to prevent the infraction of any law for the protection
of the pecuniary interests of Government, and every officer in the service or pay of Government, or remunerated by fees
or commission for the performance of any public duty;
(i) a member of the Public Service Commission or the Legal Service Commission constituted under Part IX of the
Constitution.

 4 138

48

CPIB

CPIB

2.2.3
CPIB
(plea bargaining)

CPIB
2.2.4
PCA
100,000 5
7
2.2.5

2.3

 4 139

The Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC)

3 128
- The Independent Commission against Corruption Ordinance
ICAC
- The Prevention of Bribery Ordinance

- The Election (Corrupt and Illegal Conduct) Ordinance

common law

2.3.1
The Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance
129
-
-
-


(bribery for procuring withdrawal of tenders)
-
(bribery in relation to auctions)
-

128

See <http://www.icac.org.hk>, retrieved between March 14 April 4, 2011.

129
Chapter 201, Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Part II Offences section 3 section 10.

 4 140

-
-
(possession of unexplained property)
2.3.2
ICAC

-
-
-

-
-
-
-

-
-
-
- (private surveillance)
(Department of Justice)
ICAC

10 500,000

 4 141

2.3.3 (malfeasance)
(malfeasance)

-

-

-

-

common law
(misconduct in public office) 18

R v. Dytham ..1979

.. 2000

 4 142

ICAC 13 9

(malfeasance)

-

-

(injurious conduct)

-

-

ICAC

(misuse in public office for personal gain)

 4 143

-

-
-

- (Secretary for
Justice)
common law misconduct in
office
130
1.
2.
- (malfeasance)
- (misfeasance)
- (nonfeasance)
3.
(corrupt intent)
(voluntary and intentional)
130

Corrupt behavior by an officer in the exercise of the duties of his office or while acting under color of his office In
People v Coutu, 459 Mich 348, 354; 589 NW2d 458 (1999)

 4 144

4.

misconduct in office
131

3.
3.1

131

Opinion of the Michigan Supreme Court, 18 june 2003

 4 145

132

157



132

... ( :
, 2553), .111-114

 4 146

(common
law)

Model Penal Code

(
) FBI

 4 147

common law
common law offences of misfeasance misconduct in public
office

common law




.. 2010




common law

157

 4 148

..1997

misfeasance
common law

 4 149

133

133

/ civil law

/ civil law

common
law
common
law
common
law
common
law

, civil law

Tony Kwok Man-wai (Ex-Deputy Commissioner & Head of Operations) ICAC,

http://www.icac.0rg.hk/en/services_and_resources/sa/m/index.html?print=l

 4 150

3.2 157

3.2.1

157
134
135

136

157 137
166 138

134

Konrad Zweigert and Hein Ktz, Introduction to Comparative Law, transl. by Tony Weir, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1998). P.219-220.
135
157 2 28-38
136
Konrad Zweigert and Hein Ktz, supra note 134, pp.226-227.
137
The Indian Penal Code 1860
Art.166 Public servant disobeying law, with intent to cause injury to any person.
Whoever, being a public servant, knowingly disobeys any direction of the law as to the way in which he is to conduct himself as
such public servant, intending to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will, by such disobedience, cause injury to any person,
shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both. (from The

Indian Penal Code, (ACT XLV. OF 1860,) with Notes by W.Morgan and A.G.Macpherson, Esqrs. Barristers at
Law (Calcutta, C.B.Lewis, Baptist Mission Press, 1861)
138
The Singapore Penal Code
Art. 166 Public servant disobeying a direction of the law, with intent to cause injury to any person.

 4 151

139

140

141
Whoever, being a public servant, knowingly disobeys any direction of the law as to the way in which he is to
conduct himself as such public servant, intending to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will, by such
disobedience, cause injury to any person, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
one year, or with fine, or with both.
139
, : , ( :
, 2551) .16-17.
140
Konrad Zweigert and Hein Ktz, supra note 134, pp.69-70.
141
, , (
: , 2477), .588.

 4 152

157

3.2.2

142

142

129-133 Tony Kwok Man-wai

133

 4 153

3.2.3

3.2.4

143

143

, ,
13 2 ( 2537)

 4 154

157


5
157

157
3 (1)
(2) 157 (3)
157

1. 157
1.1 157
157


1

227
157
157

, 1, 10, , 2551, .190

 5 157 156

1.1.1
4243/2542







2


157

157


2-3

() 8 .173

5 157 157

1573


4
7663/2543
27 (..) ..

.. .. 21
..

2577/2534
23
1
4-5




.. 157 () 7 .146
4
1399/2508

157 391() 4 .2084

 5 157 158

157

..

157 91

1.1.2
3509/2549
. . . .
.

5 157 159

. .
.. 157 200


5


157




6




157


34

() 4 .788

, , 7, , 2549, .442-445

 5 157 160

2105/2544
.

.. 2535 126


7
15
1577

7

157
8
1.1.3
999/2527

() 4 .684

..2536 ..2537

5 157 161

157





157

786/2532 1

() 3 .543

 5 157 162

.
1
1

15710

157
4
11 12 13
137

151

157
1022/2505

10

() 3 .641
288 334
12
157
13
137
11

5 157 163

157 14 1022/2505
999/2527 1022/2505

999/2527

7836 - 7837/2544

15715
7836 - 7837/2544

117/2547
.
.
.
.

16
117/2547
157

14
15
16

() 1 .1008
() 8 .155
() 5 .1

 5 157 164

1.1.4
2754/2536
. . .
. .

17

157
157

157

18

157

17

() 10 .189

18

, 1, .190

 5 157 165

1.1.5
7630/2549

... 37 (2)
.
. 2 (7)



.. 15719
10
2538 3 .


12 2538
. 10 2538

14 2538
157
. .
157
.
157
157

19

() 10 .2086

 5 157 166

59
157
.

.

.
.
.
.
.

157

 5 157 167

1.1.6

4436/2531
.


157
200
157 20


200 157

3215/2538

20

() 10 .2882

 5 157 168

15721

1.1.7 157
1797/2536 1

1
1


1 161 1




1 15722

161
157
23

21

22
23

() 6 .198
() 8 .192
, 2 1, , 2543, .281-285

 5 157 169

1.2 157
157
1.2.1
1005/2549 157

2
2

2 2
24

1 .

2
2

. 157
5053/2530

24

() 1 .111

 5 157 170

15725

157
3135/2535 .. 157

2
2 3
1 2 1
.. 15726

157

1074/2532

148, 157 162

27
1033/2533
157

25

() 11 .3024
() 9 .187
27
() 10 .2789
26

 5 157 171

28
1.2.2
364/2531



157
29529
2255/2520



15730
737/2504 157



31

()

28

() 1 .226
29
() 1 .186
30
() 11.1701
31
() .598

 5 157 172

157
157

1.2.3
3295/2543
157
32
(.. 3 .)
..3 . .


.
157

157 157

157

6564/2542
157 1 2

32

() 4 .901

 5 157 173

15733
1.2.4
294/2525 157





34


157

1.2.5 157
147 166
2
147 156 11
35

33
34

() 9 .228
() 2 .213

35

11 1) 2) 3)

4)
5) 6)
7) 8)

 5 157 174

158
166 13 36
24
157

157

( 147 156)
( 158 166) (lex generalis)

(lex specialis)
37
157

90

157 38

9) 10)
11)
36
13 1) 2)
3)
4) 5)
6) 7)
8) 9)
10) 11)
13)
37
1561/2525 () 6 .1216
38
, 10, .284-285.
. 1 / 2545

 5 157 175

1.3 157
1.3.1 157
157
157 39
1.3.2
157

40
1.3.3

...

39
40

. 1/2544 .1/2545
1/2544

 5 157 176

( ...)

...
...
...
...

157 41
.10/2552
31
42

31 42
3 2 31

157 42
..2502 1142

41
.1/2547

.1/2548 ...

1 9
42

.1/2551 .10/2552 ()

5 157 177

10



3 2






10

157
33 35 37 41 ()
3 2
1 ()



33
35 37 41 31 4243

43

.1/2551 . 10/2552 ()

 5 157 178

3 2 1 10
3 2
1




157 44

2. 157
157 45

2.1 157
2.1.1

46


2

44

, .
45
1.2.7, .160-162
46

. 157 ,
8, 3 (..-..2551) 10-23.

 5 157 179

39 ..2550
47
2.1.2

(act of state act of government)
(justice act) (administrative act)
48



49

2.1.3
28



... 157

47

(
82/2537) 58 1, 2539, .32
48
. ... ,
23 2552 .7
49
. : vs. , 7
21 2548, .22-42

 5 157 180

2.2 157
2.2.1 157
157



50
2.2.2

51

2.2.3

157

50

. , 18 213 2538,
.7578.

51

(Focus group)

157 11 2554 ()

 5 157 181

52
157

...
162 (1)
53

3. 157
157
157
157
3.1 157
157

(nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege)

(act of government)

52

. 2 3, 10, , 2544, .66.

157 . .
30 2554, ()

53

 5 157 182

157

157

3.2 157
157
157



3.2.1
157



(rule of law)
(The supremacy of the parliament)

(malfeasance) (misfeasance)
(nonfeasance)

 5 157 183

157
157
3.2.2

(1)
157
157

157
(administrative act) (justice act) 54
(act of state act of government) 157







157

54

3509/2549 () 4 .788

 5 157 184

55

157


157
(act of government) (justice act)
157



157
157
157 147 166
157
200 205
(justice act)

55

999/2527 () 3 .543

5 157 185

157


157

157

157
(administrative act)
(2)

157
157




157
145
157 56

157
145
145
57 157

56

157 2 3.1, .28-42

57
2, .42

 5 157 186

157

157

157 58

157
...
..
... ..

58

3509/2549 () 4 .788 2105/2544 ()

4 .684 2754/2536 () 10 .189
157

 5 157 187

15759
157

157



157

157
157
157 157

157
145

3.2.3
157




157
157

59

3509/2549

 5 157 188

10
157


2

50


1 20,000
40,000

200,000
3.3

157
2 11
..2502 123/1
..2542 ( 2)
..2554 157

1.

157

...

1.1 157

157

...


157

...

190

157

157






157
..127 (..2451) ..2499

(common law
offenses) (statutory offenses)



157


157

(nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege)

157

191

157 ..127 145

157

157
145 ..127
157
157

157


157

157

192

1.2. 157 ...

157
...
...

1.2.1 ...
...
. . 2540
..2542


.. 2518
(
...)

...

... ..2540
..2550 ...

157

193

..2542 92

...


157

...

...

...
1.2.2 ...
...


..
2550 250 (3) ...

...

...

194

157



157

157

157

195

157
...

... ...

157

157

157

157
157

157

157 157

157

196

157
(administrative act) (justice act)
157

(act of state act of government)
157
157
157
157



157
157 157
157

157 ..127 145

157

157 157

197

157

2.

2 ...

157

2.1
...

...
...

2.1.1 ...







...

198

2.1.2

...

...

...

...
...
... ...

199

2.2 157
(civil law)

157

(nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege)
..2550 39 2 157


157
..127 145

157

157


157





157

200

2.2.1 157
157


157 2
157 157
(1) 157
157
157
157 4
)
(administrative act) 157
(justice act) (act of state act of government)
157
157
) 157
145

157

157


157

201

) 157 157

157

1 10 157

5 20 147
149

1
2 2 145
157

10 161

202

5 165
1 2

157 .. 2502 2,000
20,000
50
.. 2502

1
20,000
1 10
20,000 200,000
1 2
20,000 40,000
157
157



157

203

(2) 157
(nullum crimen,
nulla poena sine lege) 157

157
157

2.2.2
157

123/1
..2542
( 2) ..2554 11
..2502

. 1. 10. : ,
2551.
. 1
. : , 2548.
. . 7. : , 2549.
. . 10. : , 2553.
. . : , 2547.
. . : , 2540
. . 9. :
, 2551

. , , 2554.
. 2 1. 8. : , 2548.

 205

. 2 107 275. : , 2544.

. . :
, 2551

. . 3. :
, 2551.
.
2540. : , 2546.
. . :
, 2552.
. . :
, 2551.
. . : , 2525.
. . : ,
2545.
. . :
, 2497.
. .
: , 2547.

 206

, . . :
, 2512.
. 157
: , 2549.

. 2.

. . : ,
2523.
(). 3 . : , 2548.
. 3. : ,
2530.
... :
. : ,
2553.
. (...)
. : , 2547.
. ..
127. : , 2546.
. . : , 2547.
. 2-3. 10. , 2544.

 207

. ..127. : , 2548.
. . 2. : ,
2515.
. . : , 2542.
( ). :
. :

. .
. . : , 2477.
. . 2. :
, 2554.

.
. . 42, 3. 2529, 61.
. . . 5, 2525.
25-29.

. . . 19,
2530. 22-23.

 208

. . . 42.
2529, 26-45.
. :
. . 234, 10. 2534. 349365.
. (Rule of Law) , ()
:
, 2553. 86-107.
. 157. . (4-6 2536) 29.
. (das Rechtstaatsprinzip) ,
() :
, 2553. 233-248.
. . . 14
( 2536) 40
. ,
() :
, 2553. 249-275.
. 157
. . 8, 3 (..-..2551) 10-23.

 209

. :
. . 2548, 17. 130-145.
. ....
. 23 2552 7.
. , , ()
:
, 2553.318-342

. : vs. .
. 7 21 2548, 22 42.
. . .157. . 3. 50.
. . 53. :
, 3-8.
.
. . ..-.. 2484, 2536.
. ... :
. . 75-97.
. .
. 13 2 ( 2537).

 210

. :
.
, 2525.
. . .
, 2523.
.
. , 2541.
. 157.
, 2539.
. 157
.
, 2553.
. .
, 2521.
. .
, 2529.
.
. , 2544.

 211

.
..2003.
..., : , 2551.
. .
, 2524.
. .
, 2544.
.
. ,
2531.
. .
, 2534.

42 . 17
.. 122
47 . 9 ..122
23
.. 2465 (.. 140)
...
30 ..2542

 212

29, 85/2548
26 .. 2482

..2542
..2550 2 ..2554

..
2542 ..2550
..2551
..2542
..2502

Emmanuel Aubin. Lessentiel du droit de la function publique. 5eed., Gualino, 2010.

Rmy Cabrillac. Marie-Anne Frison-Roche et Thierry Revet (Sous la direction) Droits et liberts
fondamentaux. 4e d., Dalloz, 1997.
Jean-Christoph Crocq. Le guide des infractions. 12e ed., Dalloz, 2011.
Frdric Desportes et Francis Le Gunehec. Droit pnal gnral. Economica, 2003.

 213

Kala Finn and Anne Skove. Anticorruption Laws: Knowledge & information Services Office. The
national Center of State Courts, 2004
Roger Martinez Myriam Bernard, La. responsabilit pnale des agents de l'tat, Ministre de la
fonction publique et de la rforme de lEtat, 2000 at www.fonction-publique.gouv.fr, 27
september 2010.
Walter Morgan and A.G. Macpherson. Indian Penal Code. Calcutta: G.C. Hay & Co., 1861.
Collin Nicholls QC et al., Corruption and Misuse of Public Office. Oxford : Oxford University Press,
2006.
Kenichi Sadaka & others. Getting the Deal Through : Anti-Corruption Regulation in 40 jurisdictions
worldwide 2009. Homer E. Moyer Jr. Edt., (London : Law Business Research Ltd., 2009), pp.
95-100.
Herbert Smith. Guide to anti-corruption regulation in Asia 2010/2011. Hong Kong: Herbert Smith,
2010.
Konrad Zweigert and Hein Ktz. Introduction to Comparative Law. transl. by Tony Weir, 3rd ed.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.
Article
P. Finn. Official Misconduct. (1978) 2 Criminal Law Journal. pp.307-310.

 214

Medhi Krongkaew. Clash of Reason: Methodological Conflicts between Law and Economics in AntiCorruption Perceptions and Practices in Thailand. NACC Journal (special issue). Vol.3
No.2, July 2010, pp.1-5.
Giuliano Vassalli. The Reform of the Italian Penal Code. HeinOnline. 20 Wayne L. Rev. 1031 19731974, pp.1031-1069.

, : ... ?
http://www.nacc.go.th/ewt_dl_link.php?nid=1502
The Attorney General, Attorney-Generals Reference, (No.3 of 2003) [2005] 1 QB 73 [28].,
http://www.uniset.ca/other/css/20051QB73.html
Bribery Act 2010 http://www.legislation.gou.uk./ukpga/2010/23/contents
The Committee on Standards in Public Life, Misuse of Public Office: A Consultation 1997,
http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/parliament/nolan3/misuse-1.htm
Abubakar H. Kargbo, Corruption : A Glossary of International Criminal Standards, (OECD: 2007) p.19.
retrieved from www.oecd.org

ICAC<http://www.icac.org.hk>

 215

Justice2008, Misconduct in Public Office,

<http://www.justice2008.co.uk/misconductinpublicoffice.aspx>
Tony Kwok Man-wai, Malfeasance,
http://www.icac.org.hk/en/services_and_resources/sa/m/index.html?print=l
The Legal Line, Misconduct in Public Office, http://www.thelegalline.co.uk/pfm/misconduct-in-publicoffice.pdf
Lucinda Maer, Misconduct in public office,
<http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/research/briefings/snpc-04909.pdf>',
World Bank, Introduction to Corruption, Youth for Good Governance: Distance learning program Module III,
retrieved from www.worldbnk.org


(1) . ()

- ..
- .. ()
- (D.S.U.ParisII)
- (D.E.A.etDoctorat - NancyII)

...
-

-

-

(2) . ()

-..
-.. ()
- (S.J.D.KeioUniversity)

-
-
-
-
(3) . ()

-.. (, )
-...
-.. ()
- (AixMarseilleIII)

-
-

(4) ()

-..
-.. ()
-
-
- Conflict Analysis and Resolution: Basic
Concepts & Skills in Dispute Resolution

- Professional Short Course Program on
Ombudsman

-
-
-
(5) ()

-..
-
-.. ()
- Professional Short Course Program on
Ombudsman
-

(6) ()

..