Indian Government and Politics 4

CONTENTS
Preface 1. Impact of Centre-state Relations on Indian Politics 1 32 84 124 178 218 244 304 328 351 355
INDIAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
2. Problems in Centre-state Relations 3. Nature of Party System in India 4. State, Regional, Cast Based Political Parties 5. Election Commission and Electoral Reforms in India 6. Politics of Communalism and Secularism in India 7. Regionalism 8. Democratic Decentralisation-Structure, Pattern and Trends 9. Indian Experience with Democracy and Development Bibliography Index
Vol. IV
Impact of Centre-state Relations on Indian Politics
1
IMPACT OF CENTRE-STATE RELATIONS ON INDIAN POLITICS
INTRODUCTION As we all are well aware of the federal structure of the Indian political system. To take this discussion further, you will see the impact of center-state relations on Indian politics. Despite comprehensive provisions, the relations between center and states have not been smooth. The Indian states have addressed the task of coping with the tensions arising in different regions of the country by resorting to a variety of means, depending upon the particular facet-economic, political, constitutional or linguistic-involved in each specific conflict. Shifts have occurred in the major thrust of centre-state in conflicts and contradictions since Independence which by virtue of their magnitude and in view of the political actors involved can be best analysed by appropriate periodization. The interest of these conflicts for the student of politics stems from the following main considerations: (1) Major political tensions within the ruling party at the centre-the ruling Congress party in its different transmogrifications, undivided Congress, Congress (R), and Congress-I, except during the brief post-emergency interregnum of 1977-9/1980-as well as tensions between it and a wide variety of opposition parties, which offer more or less plausible alternative centres of power in different regions (and also at the centre, albeit in coalition)2 are clearly reflected in the unfolding of centre-state tensions in any given period.
Indian Government and Politics
(2) Major economic tensions have tended to follow parallel lines. On the one hand, the contradiction between the rising urban and rural working classes (consisting of unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled industrial workers, and their multiplex trade unions rooted in the major political formations in the country-Congress, the Communist Party of India (CPI), the Socialist Party (SP), the Janata party (JP), and the Communist Party of India-Marxist CPI(M); and unevenly and sporadically organized agricultural workers and poor peasants) and the ruling classes has, at least since me early 1970s, been successfully deflected by the state. Not only have working class organizations become fragmented and emasculated, but also the ideological underpinnings which imparted class 'militancy' to them have been undermined as a consequence of the emergence of a number of trade union satrapies of which Bombay textile mill workers under Datta Samat constitute out the most recent and dominant example. At the same time, the logic of economic development under Indian conditions of dependence and unevenness4 has rendered the working class as a whole unstable in composition. The instability of the working class, during recent decades, has been endemic due to the rationalization of industry and sudden shifts from labour intensive to capital-intensive production, and the large-scale transformation of subsistence agriculture into cash crop agriculture. As a result, widespread displacement of labour has occurred, leading to the expansion of marginalized, unorganized and seasonal migrant labour forces which are, politically and economically even than the unionized workforce. On the other hand, as I have argued elsewhere, there has an intensification of the horizontal contradiction within the dominant class during recent decades. The conflict, at least in the short run, between the industrial bourgeoisie (which has been, on the whole, the greatest beneficiary of central planning and public sector expansion policies of the central government) and the rising rich and middle
peasant classes (which have effectively displaced the 'feudal' landed classes of the colonial period) has not been easy To contain. By adopting the green revolution strategy, the Indian state created conditions under which the development of agriculture took place along lines that ensured not only a sharp differentiation of rural classes and contradiction between them in me countryside (i.e. between the rich and middle peasants on the one hand, and the poor peasants and landless labourers on the other, but also a divergence of interests between the industrial bourgeoisie and the rural rich. This horizontal conflict has been activated since 1972 when for the first time, India attained self-sufficiency in food. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the tension between the industrial capitalist forces and the rural rich has been aggravated, with centre-state relations providing the political arena in which it is manifested. Except during the brief period (1978-9) when Chaudhuri Charan Singh was successively Finance Minister and caretaker Prime Minister, the central government has been seen invariably as the custodian, by and large, of the interests of India's national industrial bourgeoisie in this conflict. Over the last two decades, the state governments (especially in regions where the green revolution has been successful-for example Punjab, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh) have emerged as the natural champions of the interests of the rich and middle peasant classes. This aspect of power sharing between the centre and the states has undergone some modification since the assumption of power by the Rajiv Gandhi government. (3) Cultural and linguistic differences, which have no doubt contributed to the political idiom specific to centre-state relations right from Independence, are generally given too much or too little importance in the two major strands of the literature functionalist and Marxist. Whilst political and economic conflicts develop centre-state conflict dimensions of their own, conflicts involving linguistic and cultural (and even communal) dimensions have tended to assume significance under certain circumstances.
First, language and culture are emphasized (especially in the regions lying outside the Hindi-speaking heartland of India, embracing Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan) as features unique to the different 'nationalities' comprising India.9 Demands for an equitable distribution of political power and privileged access for weaker regions to economic resources are often couched in the language of demands for greater autonomy for the different states as well as for a more generous investment of central plan resources in remoter regions far away from the 'heartland'. Second, poorer states which do not have an active 'producing' class capable of accumulating surplus through agricultural or small industrial economic activities have shown themselves to be specially skilled in raising the banner of rebellion against the centre. Thus the Assam agitation must be distinguished from movements such as Udayachal, Jharkhand and Gorkhaland movements in which the sheer despair of oppression by a majority community is believed to justify rebellion. The difficulties in the relations between the centre on the one hand, and on the other, small but strategically significant states on India's periphery can be legitimately viewed in terms of pressures generated by the ruling elements of the various 'nationalities' involved. Thus, for example, the ruling elements in the societies of Jammu and Kashmir and the 'seven sisters' of the north-east (with the exception of Tripura), which may be more or less adequately characterized as 'nonproductive' petit bourgeois forces, have been involved during recent decades in constant agitation to secure increased flow of resources from the centre and the state governments' right to exercise control over them. In the existing literature on the cultural and linguistic dimensions of centre-state relations, one strand lays far too great an emphasis on aspects relating to such questions as 'Hindi imperialism', 'unitarization of the federal polity,12 by manipulating the Indian Constitution, and 'foreign influences'.13 Another strand tends (mistakenly) to dismiss these as unimportant in preference to locating centre-state conflicts in the tensions and contradictions between classes qua classes, without providing a detailed empirical characterization of the class configuration developing in India
and of the role played by the Indian state in the process of its unfolding. Only very tiny segments of the literature show evidence of an appreciation of the complex character of the inter-weaving between linguistic/cultural and political/economic factors underlying centre-state conflicts in independent India. During the first four decades of Independence, three major shifts have occurred in the pattern assumed by centre-state conflicts. The original impetus for these was provided by the cultural and linguistic divisions between heartland or hinterland states in which Hindi is spoken and the states/regions on the periphery in which non-Hindi languages predominate. Whilst the importance of the centre-state conflicts of the 1950s for the unity of India was magnified and exaggerated out of proportion outside India, they were viewed within India as no more than teething troubles of the new federation in which power was shared between likeminded politicians and mutually compatible economic groups in the states and at the all-India level. Even so, it is worth remembering that intra-Congress rivalries between state-level leaders and the centre did take place in the political atmosphere surrounding a not-as-yet sufficiently fortified Indian state. As political opposition to the Congress party grew in the states on the periphery, apparently cultural and linguistic divergences acquired economic overtones and developed into competition between different segments of the ruling elements in a number of states for control over the executive power in governments. With electoral success, state-based 'nationality' movements in regions such as Tamil Nadu, along with much weaker national opposition parties have been able to mount a steadily accelerating challenge to the centre's power. The relationship between the Congress party and the opposition parties in general and provincially based opposition in particular was modulated in a rapidly changing political atmosphere in which the Indian state was being steadily strengthened and its coercive power was becoming capable of ever more rapid deployment throughout the country. Even so, within a period of less than two decades ending with the Emergency, centre-state relations had come full circle with the
dawning of the realization that the era of massive centralization of power in the state as in the central ruling party did not automatically result in the victory of the centre over the states. However, since the end of the Emergency, and to an even clearer extent since the induction of the Rajiv Gandhi government to power, an entirely new chapter of co-existence between rival segments of power holders at the centre and in the states seems to have been begun in the history of independent India. The periodization suggested in this article is as follows: (1) the era of linguistic and cultural differentiation within a framework of unchallenged unity and integrity of the Indian state (1947-67); (2) the era of centralization following the challenge from the states (1967-77); (3) a brief interregnum of attempts to redress the balance of influence in favour of the centre (1977-84); and (4) the era of coalition and co-existence between the centre and the states (from 1985). The political emphasis of the Indian Constitution rapidly shifted from a confederal to a federal to a unitary conception of the Indian union during the brief life time of the Constituent Assembly.18 The overwhelming popularity of the Congress party throughout the country at the time of Independence, ensuring a homogeneous government at the centre as well as in all the states, enabled the Indian government to successfully create the impression that the Constitution was federal in character and power would be shared between the two levels of government rather than imposed by the centre on the states. The pressure in favour of linguistic states intensified during the initial stages in the provincial Congress organizations in the non-Hindi regions, except in Tamil Nadu where a wide spread popular opposition to Hindi led by non-Congress elements went hand in hand with demands for a Tamil state defined by the, regional language which emanated from the Tamil Nadu Pradesh Congress. Very early on, the Indian state established a double, standard in the measures that it adopted to deal with mass agitations (for example the linguistic agitation of Telugu-speaking Andhra people led by the Congress) and class agitations (for example the Telengana agitation, also in Andhra) led by the Communist Party of India (CPI). Even though national leader (for
example Nehru) were not nearly as keen after Independence as they had been before on the idea of linguistic states, the Congress party organization (which continued to bear the imprint of Sardar Patel's style of functioning even after his demise) was not averse to the idea of strengthening the state governments a means of maintaining its mass following. During the period 1947-57, there was no other party in any (the Indian states which posed a sustained electoral challenge to the Congress.20 With the CPI tamed after Telengana into a parliamentary opposition force (after being forced to all but give u its insurrectionary or revolutionary role) and the Congress at the helm both at the centre and in the states, the centre appear to yield to linguistic pressures in line with the ruling party commitment, during the nationalist struggle, to redivide India into politically homogeneous states reflecting the country's national unity in cultural/linguistic diversity. As a result of the recommendations of the high powered States Re-organization Commission (SRC), large new states we] brought into existence: Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat and Karnataka. Nevertheless, the general understanding of the non contradictory (in fact, even mutually complementary) character, the power-holders at the centre and in the states underlying the first great spurt of recarving the internal boundaries of multilingual India did not extend to three specific areas. In the case of Uttar Pradesh, a powerful argument was advanced by K.M. Panikkar (one of the three members of the SRC) to the effect that the opportunity provided by linguistic events to redraw state boundaries should also be taken advantage of to divide the administratively unwieldy and economically unevenly developed state of Uttar Pradesh into two more viable states. This recommendation, in the form of a lengthy dissenting minute, was greeted with such hostility by the ruling party that it was widely believed to be animated by a touch of 'Hindi imperialism' and ' hegemonism of the north'. The linguistic demands of the Punjabi-speaking population, largely but not exclusively Sikh in composition, 22 were ignored by a provincial leadership dominated by Hindus which engaged in political manipulation of the linguistic census in such a manner
as to create a false impression to the effect that the Punjab was a largely Hindi-speaking region. Nehru believed that the Punjab should be regarded as a special category of state (bordering as it does on Pakistan) to which the restrictions of 'unitarism' rather than the flexible adjustments characteristic of 'federalism' ought to apply. In the case of Assam, compounded by the rising tensions of the north-east as a whole, the linguistic conflict which took on a new dimension (by virtue of the fact that the economic, educational and administrative life of the state was dominated by an immigrant upwardly mobile Bengali community, and the economic future of the mass of the people belonging to the Assamese linguistic/ cultural nationality was being imperiled by the regular exodus of Bengali people-mainly poor Muslim peasants and h labourersfrom East Pakistan into Assam) was not given the attention that it deserved until it exploded into a big violent for the first time in 1962. In the north-east as in the north-west arguments of national integrity, unity and security were invoked to suppress political demands in Assam that were met as a of course in other parts of the country. By and large, however, 'federal' India, during the period 67, was characterized by political homogeneity. The power state, as indeed power in the states, was wielded by the political force represented by the Congress. No great conflict had yet surfaced between the captains of industry who envisaged a dominant role for the state in the modernization of the economy on the one hand, and on the other, the newly 'rural rich' whose interests in the states were largely represented by the Pradesh Congress leaders in control of executive power. During this period, significant economic changes were introduced mainly through the instrument of central planning expansion of industry throughout the country under the a the state, the widening of the market accompanied by its penetration of wider and wider sections of the population, the increased scope for the expansion of private industry in general and small and medium industries in particular, and the up of the whole of the country to entrepreneurs from any it wishing to invest, produce and sell, contributed to a pro economic unification of India and
of giving its rising industrial bourgeoisie a 'national' (as differentiated from a sectional, re or partial) identity. The Indian national bourgeoisie, for it welcomed these changes and the opportunities that they pre for industrial expansion and diversification. The agrarian economy of India, also in the throes of farreaching transformation, however, presented a somewhat different picture. Indian agriculture was even more unevenly developed than Indian industry. The social and political changes required to place Indian agriculture on a modem footing were enormous in comparison to the modest beginnings which most Congress governments were prepared to contemplate during the first three five-year plans Even though the days of the pre-capitalist landlord class of the colonial period were numbered, feudal relations of production continued to exercise sway in many parts of India.28 The rise of a new class of more or less 'capitalistically' orientated rich and middle peasantry (drawn largely from the ranks of the 'tenantry' of the colonial era) on the one hand, and on the other, the emergence of a 'wage' conscious landless labour class and poor peasantry (in place of bonded serfs in a state of perpetual indebtedness) with a potential claim to the land tilled by them, was a slow process, the full dynamic of which had not yet begun to unfold itself. The drama of subsequent decades, located in a plot dividing the agrarian and industrial segments of the Indian capitalist class into mutually antagonistic elements-combining together to constitute an increasingly fractured ruling class impinging upon a rapidly fragmenting political system-was scarcely discernible, except as a distant portent, so long as Congress successfully appeared to perform the tasks of a ruling umbrella party capable of serving the interests not only of antagonistic classes but also of mutually antagonistic segments within the same class. On the eve of the fourth general election (1967), India presented a picture, the main components of which were a considerably more powerful state (than at Independence), capable of exercising coercive power on the mass of the population more or less at will, an economy dominated at the national level by the state acting mainly in the interests of the national bourgeoisie and a rising class of as yet
10
11
not strongly differentiated rich and middle peasantry, and a polity in which the intra-party differences of the Congress revolve round the question of the relative autonomy of the states within federal framework of the Indian constitution were rapidly yield place to conflicts of a substantial nature between the Congress party on the one hand, and on the other, the national and regional position parties belonging to the entire political spectrum from left to the right. The failure of successive Congress administrations at the centred in the states to alleviate the harsh economic conditions of the of the Indian people led to widespread alienation and disaffection throughout the country which were reflected in the disastrous performance of the ruling party in the 1967 general election in a number of states and in its much reduced majority in the Lok Sabha. Of the several opposition governments which took power in the sates during the interregnum between the indecisive fourth general election and the much more decisive fifth general election 971), the government of Tamil Nadu led by the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) party was the first to take on board the, question of centre-state relations on a political level in a systematic manner. In the other states where the Congress party had lost control, executive power was wielded for brief uncertain periods (interspersed with intervals of President's rule under the Governor) far-flung coalitions. They were inherently unstable by virtue of their eclectic political colouration, and their sole purpose seemed.. be to keep themselves afloat in the face of the machinations of Congress party which manifested a decisive proclivity to encouraging defections from almost all non-cadre parties (especially the Hindi-heartland states) with the aid of monetary and other incentives. On the left of the political spectrum, the 1964 split of the undivided CPI had the effect of hamstringing the much more popular CPI(M) in West Bengal, Tripura, and Kerala. For the CPI(M) was, on the one hand, not well placed (especially in West Bengal) to cope with opposition from Naxalites or Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (CPI-M-L) elements without unleashing violence and resorting to desperate measures, whilst
on the other, it was unable to prevent the CPI from slipping into the role of the Trojan horse of the left by edging closer and closer to the new brand of shibboleth socialism that the ruling party was propagating during the run up to the 1971 general election. Although the CPI(M) did raise the issue of centre-state relations during the 1967-9 United Front experiments in Kerala, West Bengal and Tripura (in which it shared executive power with other parties), its substantive contribution to the debate had been minimal The Rajamannar Report, commissioned by the Tamil Nadu government, was the first detailed official document published by a state government to deal with various aspects of the political, financial and economic relations between the centre and states. The ruling party at the centre was much more concerned during this period with refurbishing its image in the eyes of the mass of the Indian electorate, whilst the Indian state embarked upon a strong programme of containing popular unrest, of destabilizing popularly elected but opposition-controlled state governments, and of attempting to emasculate and crush left parties in general and the CPI(M) in particular. The already impressive and far reaching coercive power wielded by the Indian state apparatus was further augmented in the performance of these repressive tasks by repeatedly invoking the need to safeguard India's unity, integrity, and security from internal and external threats. The strategy adopted by the leadership of the Congress party to improve its public standing consisted of provoking an internal split aimed at cleansing the organization of the baleful influence of the so-called 'Syndicate' and entrenching the sway of a catchy brand of pseudo-radical populism championed by those in positions of influence who favoured a greater centralization of power. It was, in fact, during this period that the practice was begun of the central organization of the party imposing its own nominees for the Chief Ministership of Congress-ruled states and of changing their incumbents at will. At the same time, the practice of democratic election of office-bearers at various levels within the party was brought to an indefinite standstill. Thus even though the immediate reason behind the 1969 crisis within the party was provided by intra-party differences over who should be the
12
13
Congress nominee in the presidential election (1969), the organizational changes initiated during the 1969-70 period were to have far reaching effects on the internal working of the Congress party, on the role of the Indian state in dealing with legitimate opposition, and on the role of the Indian Constitution and the machinery of government established under its provisions. During the period 1969-75, attempts were made by the centre to clamp down on opposition which manifested itself mainly in the form of trade union agitation by organized sections of labour, a brief but unconvincing return on the CPI(M)'s part to revolutionary activigr38 after its retreat from the parliamentary path compelled by the ruthless application of state power against the organization and its cadres, and the mass movement (especially but not only in Bihar and Gujarat) against corruption under Jaya Prakash Narayan's leadership. Compared to these large-scale manifestations of discontent, the challenge-already watered down in content and portent due to years of less than incorruptible exercise of power, to say the least-posed by a regional opposition party in control of executive power in a single state (DMK of Tamil Nadu) was negligible. The centre under the Congress party and the Tamil Nadu state under DMK had become habituated to a regimen of co-existence without wires being crossed between the two sides about the extent of leeway a state could expect from the centre. All this notwithstanding the political wisdom enshrined in the celebrated Rajamannar Report. The impetus for the Indian Emergency (1975-7) was thus derived not from any contradiction between the different instruments of federal power representing the centre and the states, but predominantly from political challenges that sprang from outside the confines of government and which were interpreted by the Indian state as a threat to its integrity and security rather than as demands for a new democratic mandate for the control of its power. The full impact of the Emergency can only be understood against a background of three related considerations. First, with the success of the green revolution, powerful political forces rose to the surface in a number of regions which represented the interests of the 'rural rich', more specifically
the rich peasantry and the middle peasantry. Whilst the Congress party was in a position to put itself forward as the champion of the interests of the rich and middle peasant classes through the ranks of its regional elites, its influence among these classes was being eroded for two major reasons: (1) The centre came under increasing pressure from industrial capital to release some of the surplus derived from agriculture for furthering the industrialization and modernization of the Indian economy. With the achievement of self-sufficiency in food, it was argued, the balance between industrial capital and agricultural capital should be reconstituted by government policy at the state level aimed at reducing grants, keeping down procurement prices and introducing a measure of agricultural taxation. (2) The rural poor (and in particular, landless labourers and poor peasants), largely consisting of low caste people and Muslims, who looked up to the Congress party which they supported in elections, bore the brunt of local oppression by landowning castes whose interests were served by the ruling party as well as several regionally based opposition parties. Over a period of time, the rural poor became disenchanted with the Congress as well as with other nonleft regional parties. Except in Kerala, West Bengal and Tripura where the CPI and CPI(M) had shown themselves capable of introducing limited but enlightened land reform, and in Karnataka where the relative lack of entrenched rich peasant power enabled the Congress Chief Minister Devraj Urs to implement (during the 1970s) a liberal land and agricultural policy, the plight of the poor peasantry and landless labourers rapidly worsened throughout India in an economic atmosphere of downward differentiation leading to an expansion of the ranks of agricultural (and especially landless) labourers. The Emergency simply added a new dimension of state oppression and tyranny to the economic and social oppression that they suffered in their daily lives. All the more ironic, in view of the government's claim in its 20-point (and Sanjay Gandhi's five-point) justification of the Emergency that it was solely
14
15
inspired by concern for the welfare of the poor and oppressed. Moreover, the 1969 split, far from healing the rift within the Congress, simply had the effect of opening the floodgates of factionalism, groupism and dissidence even wider. In order to deal with the process of internal disintegration and the momentum rapidly gained by the growing contradiction within the party between those in control of state power (for example the central leadership personified in the Prime Minister) on the one hand, and on the other, the Pradesh-level leaders, power was concentrated in the hands of a coterie which enjoyed the confidence of the Prime Minister and her family. The Pradesh Congress organizations were pitted against opposition parties (for example, the Bharatiya Kranti Dal [BKD] and its various subsequent fragmentations and transmogrifications) which put themselves forward as champions of the rich and middle peasant classes in their struggle against a centre eager to seize the political opportunity to compel them to agree to a policy of transferring surplus from agriculture to industry by reversing the terms of trade between the two sectors of the economy. They were also confronting the central Congress leadership which took advantage of endemic dissidence within the ruling party to impose its own nominees as Chief Ministers of Congress-ruled state governments and leaders of the various Pradesh Congress organizations. The Pradesh Congress organizations were thus undermined and their leaders (with individual exceptions) lost touch with the mass of the people. At the same time, money power became a substitute for mass contact. A huge parallel economy fuelled by black market money became the engine through which such a basic transformation of the Congress organization was achieved in such a brief period of time. Several leaders who had a talent for making the right contacts with black market barons emerged within the organization resulting in support for the government being purchased rather than won by argument and persuasion. The Indian state did little to curb the black economy which, from the early 1970s onwards, had become the demi-goddess presiding over the fortunes of the ruling party of the government.
Further, the literature on political developments in India rightly lays stress on the enormous increase in the coercive power of the state during the last quarter of a century and the consequent undermining of democratic processes, values and elementary liberties guaranteed under the Indian Constitution. At the same time, popular democratic resistance to the government's arbitrary political behaviour has also markedly increased during the last two decades, though it is not invariably manifested in a concerted manner except when electoral opportunities become available Established political parties including cadre-based organizations had failed to provide adequate leadership in channeling popular discontent in a democratic and constructive manner. However, during the Emergency, they did take part in a joint organized democratic resistance4 to the central government's arbitrary rule which spread far beyond the confll1es of party-based action to mass-based opposition. The success of such a general strategy of opposing the emergency was reflected in the resounding defeat suffered by the ruling party at the center and in a majority of the states in the general and state legislative assembly elections h in 1977. Centre-state relations, during the 1969-77 period, were practically reduced to a state of near non-existence as a problems of federal politics in India. Unitarism triumphed under the aegis of a strong state whose power was controlled by a ruling party which had lost its democratic mainspring. Centre-state relations were, at Independence, orchestrated in accordance with an equilibrium model in which politically homogeneous states on one hand and the centre on the other acted as countervailed forces in the evolution of a powerful post-colonial state. At end of the Emergency and on the eve of the 1977 general elections however, they had undergone a paradigm shift characterized a puissant centre presiding over a federation of thoroughly feeble states. The Indian state itself was no longer controlled by a popular mass party functioning through a complex and reticulated organization but by a clique of powerful elements which could relied upon to strike terror among potential opponents of new brand of politics. The 1977 elections exposed the shallowness of the achievements of the Congress as the ruling party a helped
16
17
reverse the process of paradigmatic shift described in a section by strengthening democratic opposition to the regime and once again bringing out the question of centre-state relation into the open as one of fundamental importance, for the future of the Indian state. The 1977 general election provided the first occasion for the transfer of the control of state power from the Congress party the loose-knit Janata coalition representing a variety of ruling class interests50 without putting on an artificial gloss of homogeneity. to cover their disparateness and contradictions. Even though the new ruling coalition, unlike the Congress party, was both organizationally and ideologically weak, it did preside over a state, which had become immensely strengthened during the previous three decades. Despite its impressive majority in the Lok Sabha, Janata's grasp of state power was, however, severely compromised by its lack of political clout and by the chronic inability of its ageing leaders to unite together on a positive programme. The abrupt change from an autocratic unitarist to an entropic polyglot pattern of wielding state power was accompanied by centrifugal tendencies plaguing the very heart of the political system in its day-to-day functioning. Yet the new leaders (who were uncompromisingly 'constitutionalist' in their determination to restore the primacy of parliamentary institutions and their practices-in spirit as in letter) shared the political orientation of their predecessors on the question of centre-state relations. They were not basically sympathetic to demands for increased autonomy from the states except in certain well-defined spheres, and certainly not when they were couched in combative political terms. Their grounds for believing that a strong centre and weak states did not represent an unhealthy combination were similar to the arguments advanced by the Congress party when it was in power. The sudden removal of the Congress party from the centre, followed by the election of a number of state governments led by parties other than the Congress 54 breathed new life into the question of centre-state relations which had been put under constitutional sedation following the systematic destabilization by the centre and the Congress party of the non-Congress state
governments during the period 1967-70. The resurgence of interest in this question in post-Emergency India was manifested in three different forms. (1) States in which there was a strong tradition of Congress rule, where its popularity had not suffered during the Emergency, found themselves on the defensive for the first time since Independence. Their governments attempted to raise the question of the autonomy of states by protesting against imagined encroachments by the centre which was under the control of the traditional opposition forces. The very act of restoring the Constitution to its pre-1975 condition by the new government at the centre was criticized by the Congress Chief Ministers of the soud1ern states of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, and by the Pradesh Congress organizations as a deliberate attempt to curtail state autonomy. In the event, not much political mileage could be derived from such protests. (2) Following Janata's landslide victory in the 1977 general election, a number of non-Congress governments won majorities in the state assembly elections that followed in its wake in many states. Janata, CPI(M)-led United Left Front (ULF) and other governments took control of executive power based on substantial majorities in the assemblies. In putting the centre-state relations issue back on the political agenda, the leaders of these new ruling parties/coalitions were seeking not to confront the centre but rather to raise a number of crucial questions affecting economic development. 58 In other words, the question of centre-state relations was raised by a number of state governments as a means of readjusting the relations between the two sides and of achieving a modus vivendi that would take account of genuine economic and political grievances. Despite the new Prime Minister's personal reluctance to depart from his predecessor's general line on the subject, the Janata government-itself new to the art of wielding political power and accustomed much more to an oppositional than to a governmental role was, by and large, prepared to accommodate these pressures mainly
18
19
by a return to the Constitution and by reactivating such instruments as the National Development Council (NDC). The Janata government also reviewed the process of planning, specifically with the aim of bringing about a mutually acceptable readjustment of fiscal allocations by the centre to the states, and of initiating agricultural procurement policies from a much more differentiated perspective than that to which the centre had been accustomed in the past under successive Congress Prime Ministers. (3) From the perspective of centralists/unitarists, agitation for greater political autonomy for the states assumed its most dangerous form whenever it was advanced in the name of more or less direct mass democratic political participation of aggrieved segments of the people. Thus in the Punjab, in Jammu and Kashmir, in Assam, and in several of the north-eastern states, pressure for a radical reordering of centre-state relations did not arise during this period (1977-84) from political parties/coalitions in control of state governments as such. Rather, it arose from powerful political movements enjoying a degree of mass popularity which they were in a position to augment by carrying the banner of political protest and by raising demands of a basic nature which would have been stifled in the past by a powerful centre on the grounds that states on India's periphery were specially sensitive and vulnerable to foreign penetration and infiltration. During the Janata interregnum, these popularly based forces seriously reared their heads for the first time with the covert encouragement of Congress-whose main aim was to expose the political weakness of the Janata, to undermine it by exploiting its inner contradictions, and to bring its rule to an end by whatever means available. In the Punjab, the Congress-I strategy took the form of supporting Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale as a fundamentalist Trojan horse within the political sphere of the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) and the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC). As a result, the SAD-led government (1977-80) was successfully
destabilized more or less simultaneously with the bringing down of the Janata itself. It is important to note that the Janata party in particular and the Janata government as a whole were deeply opposed to the fundamentalist Sikh political forces which gave an entirely new twist not only to the spirit of the Ananadpur Sahib resolution, but also to the question of state autonomy itself. They were equally disapproving of the Assam students' movement and of populist movements such as the Mizoram National Front (MNF). But unlike the Indira Gandhi (Mark I) government (in its 1969-7 phase) which deployed all the political and governmental power at its command to thwart such movements, the Janata coalition found itself too much at odds internally to be able to give attention to these new tensions and contradictions entering the picture (centrestate relations in the aftermath of the ruling Congress party's defeat. When Congress-I was returned to power in 1980 under Indira Gandhi (Mark II), the crises which it had helped keep stoked u when it was out of power had already become firmly embedded in the political life of the country. My aim here is to outline the strategy adopted by the new Congress-I government to deal wit centre-state tensions during its four years in power. The Janata was a weak and badly organized political coalition which accidentally gained control over an extremely powerful state. The weakness of the ruling coalition during the 1977 interregnum was reflected in the reduced effectiveness of the state in dealing with political tensions and conflicts. By the same token when the Congress-I took power, its hold over the state was qualitatively different from what it had been under the Indira Gandhi (Mark I) government. Democratic opposition in different forms, once given a powerful voice not only by parties other than the Congress-I enjoyed executive power in certain states, but also by mass-based opposition movements challenging the centre's right to limit the democratic rights of the people, could 110 longer be stifled. Congress was returned to power by an electorate which found Janata wanting, but which had by no means forgotten the Emergency forgiven its perpetrators. There was no doubt in 1980
20
21
that if Congress-I government was elected as a lesser evil and not as popular alternative to the Janata. The reinheritance of state power by the Congress-I in 1980 was marked by two other major shifts in Indian politics. First, the agricultural bourgeoisie had emerged as a formidable nation-I force capable of claiming a share of central state power. It was no longer to be confirmed to the narrower limits of state politic Chowdhury Charan Singh, as caretaker Prime Minister Qu1 1979January 1980) became the political symbol of the insisted demands in favour of a shift in the terms of trade between industrial and agriculture which had gathered momentum during the mid 1970s. Even though it was not yet in a position to sustain itself in control of the commanding heights of state power, the agriculture and bourgeois class had so successfully entrenched itself in the state structures that no ruling party (including Congress-I) could afford to underestimate its importance. The increased political restive ness of a number of state governments-not limited only to those governed by opposition parties but also extending to such important Congress-I-ruled states as Maharashtra-should be viewed as a reminder that India's agricultural bourgeoisie has come to stay as a dominant class force with considerable potential for national cohesion in the foreseeable future. Second, during its brief tenure, the Janata government, release from the stranglehold of its predecessor's socialist shibboleths and slogans, embarked upon the second stage of the Indian state's task of strengthening capitalist development in India. It took the initiative to open up the Indian manufacturing industry to powerful thrusts of foreign and multinational capital under the guidance of George Fernandes, the 'socialist' Minister for Industries. The task of financing the engines of capitalist development of the gigantic, but nevertheless chronically dependent, Indian economy would, the Janata government believed, require substantial participation of foreign capital. Whilst eager to continue the Janata policy of encouraging foreign capital in Indian industry, the Indira Gandhi (Mark II) government was unable to reverse the democratic political trends set in the country as a consequence of the re-emergence of selfconfidence among different (and especially the relatively deprived)
segments of the ruling class and its supporters among the petitbourgeoisie and the intelligentsia (as well as organized labor during the 1977-80 interval. Notwithstanding attempts made by the Indira Gandhi (Mark II) administration to reintroduce the Emergency by the backdoor, indecision and drift were the characteristic features of its policy towards the various regionally based opposition parties and popular movements in different parts of India. The Prime Minister continued to espouse the view that opposition to the centre was ipso facto against the interest and integrity of the nation. But the ruling party which controlled state power was far too riven by internal dissension (the main feature being the revolt of the agricultural middle classes) and by conflicts appearing in the seemingly menacing guise of protests by different nationalities, to prevent the creeping paralysis of the system of conflict management that a democratic polity backed by a powerful state ought to be in a position to wheel into action. Paradoxically, the centralizing and autocratic approach adopted by the Indian government to centre-state relations and to such regionally based opposition to the centre as the Assam students' movement, as exemplified in a repeated resort to President's rule in the offending states, had the effect of exposing the limitations of deploying the main force in the form of an unbridled use of the coercive power of the state apparatus in order to stifle democratic dissent. At the same time, not only was the Congress-I severely defeated in a series of state legislative assembly elections during the period 1982-4, but also essentially democratically organized opposition to the centre in such states as the Punjab, Assam, and Jammu and Kashmir quickly acquired an overlay of communalism and 'extremist' violence. Operation Bluestar and the eventual assassination of the Prime Minister thus appeared as the obverse and reverse of the same coin. Indira Gandhi's efforts to restore the balance of influence in centre-state conflicts in favour of the centre failed because she was not willing to change her political methods of the early 1970s in the changed socio-economic circumstances of the 1980s. The Janata coalition had an adequate understanding of the tensions brewing in the relations between the national industrial bourgeoisie and
22
23
the agricultural bourgeoisie which could only be resolved by loosening the political grip of the centre over the states and by establishing a broad consensus between the different opposing segments of the ruling class dominating different spheres of the economy and in acute competition with each other for resources for development. Its failure lay in its inability to build a ruling political party capable of reflecting such a consensus as an alternative to the Congress party. The failure of the Indira Gandhi (Mark II) government lay in the fact that the Prime Minister refused to acknowledge the need for a coalition between the agricultural and industrial (as well as other) segments of the dominant class, preferring instead an immobilized state to a centre in which different interests would be reflected as they manifested themselves at the level of the state and in society at large. In an epoch demanding power-sharing between competing segments of the ruling class, the anomalous political behaviour of the Indira Gandhi (Mark II) government resulted in a petrifaction of the centre's resources for compromise and consensus. Rajiv Gandhi's government (from 1985) has not departed from the style of functioning of the Indira Gandhi (Mark IT) government; however, its instinctive understanding of the social and economic forces at odds with one another in the Indian polity is somewhat more pragmatic and less rigid than that of its predecessor. The development of centre-state relations during the present period must be viewed within a larger framework of the major tensions and contradictions of contemporary Indian society. Under the Rajiv Gandhi government, the rhetoric of forging ahead into the twenty-first century is being used to justify inegalitarian policies as well as an economic strategy directed towards an expansion of industrial capacity and towards increasing the resilience of industrial capital. Whilst the economic trend set in 1977 of injecting significant amounts of international and multinational capital has been given an additional fillip by the present government, the Janata government's policy of evenhanded treatment of the industrial and agricultural bourgeoisie no longer fits in with its general economic orientation. The needs of the agricultural bourgeoisie-a crucial class rooted in the states-
which are committed to a general policy of modernization, expansion of its productive base, and a more rapid reproduction of capital in its sphere (all with the continued aid of the state) can no longer be given the same importance as those of the industrial bourgeoisie. It is a characteristic feature of the Indian political economy that agricultural and industrial capital cannot, in the long run, expand simultaneously within an indigenous framework. Each segment of the bourgeoisie would inevitably regard the preponderant development of the other as taking place at its expense. In recent years this trend has been increasingly discernible. Dependent capitalist development under acutely uneven conditions of development of production relations cannot take place without giving rise, in the long run, to conflicts between different segments of capital or without transforming existing intra-ruling class conflicts from a basically non-antagonistic to an increasingly antagonistic state. But in adopting Rajiv Gandhi as its most favourite candidate to date for piloting the ship of state into the future, the industrial bourgeoisie of India may have been prematurely confident of the potential for growth inherent in Indian capital and of its own capacity to withstand, even with the aid of state power, the vigorous onslaught of the rural rich that is bound to follow sooner than might be anticipated. It is against this general background that centre-state relations during the final phase of this discussion must be viewed. Since its accession to power under Rajiv Gandhi's leadership, Congress-I has had to face sixteen state legislative assembly elections. Of these, ten states went to the polls within six months of the eighth general election (1985). State legislative assembly elections in the Punjab (1985), Assam (1986) and Mizoram (1987) were called on the basis of accords signed between the government at the centre and leaders of popular movements based in the states. Of the three most recent state legislative assembly elections (March 1987), those in West Bengal and Kerala were regular quinquennial ones required under the Constitution. The election in Jammu and Kashmir took place after a brief interruption of President's rule during which a deal had been hammered out between the National Conference (NC) (led by Farooq Abdullahf
24
25
and the Congress-I. These developments throw into bold relief three trends of importance for the future of centre state relations in India. In the heartland states and in the states in peninsular India, the Congress-I's strategy of frightening the electorate by means of warnings that state governments controlled by parties otl1er than Congress-I could be starved of development resources was counter-productive to varying degrees. The sense of disgruntlement of local elites (predominantly rural in character, with some links with the wider economy through small industrial enterprises, especially in the south) laced with popular support for 'democratic' values (in the given context) led to opposition parties being returned to power with comfortable majorities. In Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, the Dalit Mazdoor Kisan Party (DMKP) emerged as a substantial force on the opposition benches of the legislative 'assembly with the Congress-I in a majority. In Maharashtra, the People's Democratic Front (PDF), a coalition representing powerful agrarian interests, established itself as substantial presence in the assembly, though not in a majority, after a successful campaign demanding crop protection insurance by the state and better procurement prices for jowar and cotton. the Congress-I's two-pronged strategy of dealing with a potential crisis in Maharashtra consisted of replacing the locally chosen compromise candidate for Chief Minister's post by a more powerful figure from the central cabinet and of wooing Congress-S, the most influential segment of PDF, back into the Congress-I fold. The case of Maharashtra also illustrates a fundamental weakness f the political organization of the Congress-I. We have already voted that the erosion of internal democracy was an important 'actor in the debilitation of the ruling party in a number of states. central dictation as to who should be Chief Minister as well as the arbitrary removal and replacement of elected and incumbent chief Ministers of the Congress-I-ruled states with lightning rapidity and without proper consultation have sharpened the contrast between them and the states in which executive power is held by opposition parties which invariably function according to well recognized democratic principles, practices and procedures.
The second broad trend relates to tensions arising in state: closely linked to the heartland where a political backlash ha: affected the relations between the different segments of the regional elite. In Gujarat, for example, where the numerical proportion between 'forward' and 'backward' classes/castes80 is man balanced than that prevailing in states such as Tamil Nadu, say the policy of showing positive discrimination towards 'backward' castes, pursued by successive Congress governments of the state, was believed by 'forward' castes to have resulted in unfair disadvantage to them over the years in the spheres of education, employment, social welfare, etc. The movement led by the late Jayaprakash Narayan during the mid-1970s against government corruption caught on in a big way in Gujarat. After the Emergency, however, fresh agitation for social and economic justice was mounted by the socially 'forward' but by then deeply aggrieved castes. Their leaders claimed that 'forward' castes had indeed been rendered economically 'backward' as a result of three decades of Congress governments' policy affecting their interests. The central government, led successively by Janata, Indira Gandhi's Congress-I, and Rajiv Gandhi's Congress-I has been unable to deal with this intra-elite strife in Gujarat in an effective manner because of the fear that (1) a reversal of the policy of 'reservation' under pressure would be a cure worse than the disease because well-entrenched political and socio-economic forces representing the interests of 'backward' castes/classes would be up in arms81 and (2) Gujarat is not alone in facing the problem of the imbalances where decades of working a policy of 'reservation' has come home to roost in the form of new pressures which cannot be satisfactorily dealt with by a mechanical reversal of existing policy. The case of Gujarat is of particular significance in view of the fact that its relations with the centre have always been close, even as its influence on the national economy has been considerable. But the ruling Congress-I, which was returned to power in the state legislative assembly election with a sizeable majority, id so completely miscalculated the mood of the middle class elements belonging to the 'forward' castes, that its administration IS brought
26
27
to a halt by strikes and social clashes within weeks assuming power. The centre's response to the crisis in Gujarat s to change the Chief Minister rather than to give political leadership by tackling the question of 'reservation' in a sensitive manner. Thus even though Gujarat poses no great threat to the existing scheme of federal relationships in India, it illustrates the practically intractable nature of the socio-economic tensions and contradictions that can emerge under the specific conditions of adjusting political power relationships between unequally developed segments of ruling elites exemplified in the context of this discussion. To the third tier of development of centre-state relations in contemporary India belongs the far more complicated questions led by those states in which the economic logic of protest is over laid by a clearly augmented consciousness of cultural, communal, linguistic, jurisprudentially and other forms of neglect on e part of the Indian state. At the present moment, Punjab and, Assam clearly belong to this category, but the states on India's periphery (for example Jammu and Kashmir and the north-eastern states such as Mizoram) are equally susceptible to such pressures. Such social and cultural aspects of their role accrue to these peoples as minorities or separate nationalities (not to be confused with 'nations')86 and they can only be brought into the mainstream by taking cognizance of their susceptibilities which have been suppressed by a stepping up of coercion on the part of the state apparatus. The Rajiv Gandhi government's initiatives in respect of the Punjab question have, to date, wavered between extending the / live branch of conciliation to the aggrieved Sikh community in the hope of isolating Sikh 'extremists' on the one hand, and on the other, lapsing into a continuation of the repressive policy orientation of the Indira Gandhi (Mark II) government. The Longowal-Rajiv Gandhi accord (1985) seemed to open a fresh chapter of healing the rupture between the centre and the state of Punjab based on a serious attempt on the former's part to remove the political, social and economic grievances embodied in the Anandpur Sahib resolution of the SAD. But the Akali Dal
government which took power in September 1985 received no real support from the centre which was content to blame the popularly elected state government for the persistence of terrorism and of tension and conflict between the Sikh and Hindu communities. Not a single undertaking by the centre outlined in the Longowal-Rajiv Gandhi accord was carried out. Apart from the centre's belief that the administration of Punjab could not be left entirely in the hands of the government duly elected for the purpose, 8 it was subject to enormous pressure from elements within Congress-I, particularly in neighboring Haryana89 (and, to a lesser degree, Rajasthan) which successfully frustrated even the tentative moves which the Indian government appeared to be ready to initiate in relation to the demands of Punjab. The Punjab situation deteriorated despite Chief Minister Barnala's determination to sustain the credibility and viability of the SAD government until, finally, the centre dismissed it (May 1987) on the ground that it was no longer capable of restoring law and order. In fact, however, the immediate motivation for dismissing the popularly elected government of Punjab and imposing President's rule lay in the fact that the state legislative assembly election in Haryana was fast approaching in which the Congress I would have to acquit itself well if the massive erosion of the popularity of the Rajiv Gandhi government as signified in the results of the March 1987 state legislative assemblies' elections in different parts of India was to be staunched. The Punjab and Assam crises point out different dimensions of the question of centre-state relations. In Punjab, the main difficulty arose from the Sikh view of the link between politics and religion on the one hand, and on the other, the reluctance of the Hindus to identify themselves primarily as Punjabis rather than as a part of the Hindu mainstream of India. The crisis engulfing Assam arose out of the indigenous Assamese population feeling outnumbered and marginalized in its own home ground. To some degree the problem faced by the Assamese in relation to the Bengalis and Bangladeshis has also been experienced by the different 'tribal' peoples of the north-east in relation to non-tribal settlers in their midst.
28
29
By 1973, the proportion of indigenous Assamese to the total population of the state had dropped by over 20 per cent to well below 50 per cent, spreading alarm among a population which, only in 1967, had achieved a new stability with the formation of Meghalaya. The formation of Bangladesh, far from allaying the fears of the indigenous population, aroused anxiety afresh with each successive wave of Bangladeshi immigration into Assam. The ruling party at the centre and in Assam was unconcerned about the impact of this massive influx of Bengali Muslims for the understandable reason that they, in contrast to the Assamese inhabitants of the Brahmaputra valley (in the upper reaches of Assam), could be relied upon to give electoral support to the Congress. But the resulting social disruption posed a threat to the communally organized agrarian economy of the state because the new immigrants who were accustomed to radically different methods of cultivation sought to establish themselves on the land that they cultivated as individual owners. The defeat of the Congress party in the state legislative assembly election in 1978 was followed by the emergence of a mass movement, led by the students, highlighting Assamese grievances. It focused attention on one main demand arising out of a grievance going back to the 1960s. Declaring that the East Pakistan/Bangladeshi immigrants were 'foreign' nationals, the student movement demanded that they should be repatriated to their 'homeland' or sent to any other part of India. The Janata government of the state (1978-80) was paralyzed by strikes, blockades, and demonstrations, which evoked massive support from the population. When the Indira Gandhi (Mark II) administration took power, the Janata administration in Assam was summarily dismissed. Its place was taken by a much less popular Congress-I administration which was defeated in the legislature within a short time. The state could not be governed by the centrally appointed bureaucrats who stepped into the political vacuum resulting from the collapse of elected government. The student-led movements continued to demand that the Assamese people and not the centre had the right
to disenfranchise 'foreign nationals' in the state as a prelude to expulsion. A constitutional imbroglio of unparalleled intensity was thus injected into the very heart of the dispute between the centre and the state of Assam. Even though the central government maintained a pretence of keeping negotiations alive with the student leaders, the Prime Minister was unwilling to resolve the dispute in a spirit of accommodation. The state legislative assembly election, called in February 1983, ended in widespread mayhem and murder. A government of questionable legitimacy was installed in power in a political atmosphere which reeked of divisions between Assamese and 'tribals', Assamese and Bengalis, Hindus and Muslims, and Hindus and Christians. The Rajiv Gandhi government's approach to the Assam question appeared to be at least as positive in character as its Punjab initiative. The new Prime Minister seemed to appreciate that in order to maintain the status quo in broad terms in the country as a whole, the national 'ruling classes' ought to share state power with political forces dominant in the various regions. The Assam accord was signed in an improved atmosphere as a prelude to a fresh state legislative assembly election.99 It is worth noting that the original demands of the student leaders which had been rejected by the Indira Gandhi (Mark II) government on the grounds that they were constitutionally impertinent and injurious to India's integrity were accepted by the Rajiv Gandhi government on purely pragmatic considerations. By thus distancing itself from the lame duck Congress-I government, on the eve of the 1985 state assembly election, the centre weakened its already enfeebled position even further. In October 1985, the student movement gave birth to the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), the first regional party in Assam's history which came to power on a platform emphasizing its simultaneously national and regional character. The communal polarization of the state had reached such serious proportions that the new government was obliged to begin its career cautiously under the careful scrutiny of the All Assam
30
31
Students' Union (AASU) which has kept its identity entirely separate from that of AGP. During the last seventeen months of its existence, the AGP government has not been signally successful in gaining the cooperation of the centre in the implementation of the Assam Accord, especially with reference to the 'foreigners issue'. With the centre far too slow to respond to these pressures and the AASU radicalizing rapidly on the issues underlying the tensions engulfing Assam since the mid-1970s, the AGP government has lost a good deal of its initial momentum As in the Punjab, so too in Assam the centre has been caught in a contradiction between an awareness of the need to enlist the cooperation of regional elites and an unwillingness to modify the centralist orientation of the Indian state to which the Indian government has long become habituated. During the last four decades, independent India has undergone a transformation from a homogeneous polity in which power was shared between the centre and the states under the control of the ruling Congress party into one in which control is shared between a centre which has continued to be governed by the Congress party and the states in which a variety of different parties (of which the Congress-I is one) have won executive power in the legislative assemblies. A vigorous and determined effort on the part of the Indira Gandhi (Mark I) government to prevent this change from setting in by destabilizing non-Congress state governments and imposing the central leadership's writ on Congress-controlled state governments in an arbitrary manner failed. But the Indian state has continued to grow in power and has been able to increase its coercive capacity steadily throughout the post-Independence phase. Since the end of the Emergency, attempts have been underway to accommodate the horizontal conflicts between the two main I segments of the ruling class (namely, the national industrial bourgeoisie and the regional bourgeoisie, mainly but not exclusively rural in character). These have resulted in the emergence of fairly stable regional parties well entrenched in a
number of states, in a strengthening of national parties such as the CPI(M) and Janata in certain states, and in enhancing the influence of the rural element in the agriculturally important states where Congress control of the state legislative assembly is becoming predicated more and more on its capacity to collaborate and to share power with its competitors. India may well be on the verge of a new era of power having in which, despite new uncertainties over the correct constitutional relationship between the elected representatives in control of state power on the one hand and the indirectly elected President on the other, powerful states can benefit from a strong Indian state controlled at the centre by a coalition of parties representing diverse ruling class interests.
32
Problems in Centre-state Relations
33
2
PROBLEMS IN CENTRE-STATE RELATIONS
INTRODUCTION In the last chapter, you have seen the impact of center state relations on Indian politics, now you will see the problems in center-state relations. This discussion centers on problems mainly created by the distortion of constitutional laws and politically motivated. In the realm of modern constitutional governments federations were formed by and among sovereign independent states when those states realised that they had some common interest, objectives and purposes which could be promoted and safeguarded better if they all joined hands. When and where such a realization occurred, the states concerned entered into a covenant and created, by the terms of that covenant a new state they called the 'federal' state. The powers, functions and responsibilities of governance were divided between the federating units and the federation. While making this division the federating units were influenced by the economic and political conditions prevailing at the time the federation was created and by the circumstances under which it was created. In the modem period, 'a federation was set up for the first time by the thirteen Colonies, situated on the Atlantic coast of North America, which fought their War of independence against Great Britain, and which, after becoming independent in 1783, decided to transform themselves into a federation. When those Colonies met in a convention in 1787 at Philadelphia to frame a Constitution for the new federal State
(called the United States of America) they gave it that is to the federation-only such powers and functions as were considered by them absolutely necessary to make the federation work and to promote the interest of the people most effectively and promptly. There was, therefore, a good deal of negotiations, bargaining adjustment and compromise before the Constitution was finally agreed upon and implemented. Only limited powers were given to the federation and the residue of powers was vested in the federating states, that is, the powers that were not given to the federal Government and were not explicitly denied to the federating states resided with them, that is, with the states. India a Union of States and not a Federation-Why In India, the situation in which the federal polity was created was different from what it prevailed hi America. Here, there were no independent sovereign political entities feeling any compulsion is necessity to get together and create a new federal authority. It was an outside authority-the British Parliament-that decided to set up, by indirect elections, a Constituent Assembly to frame a Constitution 1m India, and it was this Assembly that drafted and adopted the Constitution on 19 November 1949. I The framers of the Constitution were influenced, in their task, by a variety of factors. The first was, of course, the status of Ire Provinces into which the country stood divided on the eve Constitution-making. These Provinces were not independent sovereign entities. They were, rather, administered on a unitary basis Government of India headed by a British Governor-General. Although autonomy was introduced in the Governors' Provinces under the Government of India Act, 1935, the' powers of the Council m Ministers and Provincial Legislatures were considerably circumscribed by the "special responsibilities" of the Governors who were, in the discharge of those "responsibilities," responsible to the Governor General and not to the Provincial Assemblies. The Chief Commission' Provinces were under the direct administrative control of the Government General. Thus, whatever powers were being enjoyed by the Provinces had been delegated to them by some superior and central authority. In such a situation, they could not have any decisive voice in the distribution of financial,
34
35
legislative and administrative powers, 'Ii: Princely states were, of course, given under the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the right to accede to the Indian Dominion on a "negotiated basis," but their geographical, political and financial situation mal" it well-nigh impossible for them to enter into much negotiations, As such, the framers of the Constitution were free to grant them the powers and authority which they considered necessary and proper. More important than the status of the Provinces and the princely states was the question of the integrity arid stability of the CI the years to come. India was a vast and populous country with deep diversities of races, religions, languages, traditions, cultures and regions, and all of them were contending for recognition and languages, traditions, cultures and regions, and all of them were contending for recognition and growth. The centrifugal forces had always been strong in the country's history, and these did not die down with the attainment of Independence. The Constitution-makers, many of whom were distinguished historians, jurists and farsighted statesmen, perceived the vital need of a strong Central government which would keep in check those disintegrating forces. and safeguard the solidarity, sovereignty and integrity of the country. The problems created by some of the big Princely states and the terms and conditions presented by the Chamber of Princes to negotiate their accession to the Dominion of India firmed up the thinking of the Constitutionmakers that India should have a strong and powerful government at the Centre. The third factor uppermost in the mind of Constitution-makers was that the function and responsibilities of modern welfare State were so vast and complex and the plans of economic reconstruction and development were so much inter-dependent that only a Central Government equipped with sufficient resources and authority could discharge them with speed and success. The founding-fathers of the Constitution were also conscious of the vast responsibilities and obligations which a free India would have to undertake in the international arena. The establishment of the United Nations and numerous Specialized Agencies, the commencement of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States, the possibility of the emergence of
a large number of independent states in Asia and Africa in the near future and the question of their economic reconstruction and development were issues that presented big challenges and called for concerted efforts. These could not be met if India were weak, divided or involved in something like a civil strife. In order to avoid all these, it was considered vital that the Central Government should be strong and powerful. Because of these considerations the framers of the Constitution did not, anywhere in the Constitution, use the word "federation"; they preferred to describe India a Union of states. Federation was something in the nature of a contract implying equal or almost equal status for all the parties, but the framers of the Constitution had no such status for the states in their mind. They did divide governmental power between the Centre and the states and made the states autonomous in their own sphere, but the states were to exercise that autonomy within the framework of the over-all superiority and predominance of the Centre. If and when there was a conflict between the two, the States were obliged to submit. Presenting the draft Constitution before the Constituent Assembly Dr B.R. Ambedkar said: "It establishes a dual polity with the Union at the Centre and the states at the periphery, each endowed with sovereign power to be exercised in the field assigned to, them built Constitution. The Union is not a league of states, united in a loose relationship, nor are the states the agencies of the Union deriving powers from it Both the Union and the states are created by the Constitution; both derive their respective authority from the Constitution. The one is not subordinate to the other in its own field: the authority of the one is coordinate with that of the other." He; in fact concluded that the Indian Constitution would be "both unitary as well as federal according to the requirements of the time and circumstances." N.V. Gadgil, a member of the Constituent Assembly, said: "I doubt whether there is a single individual either here or outside, Oil, party here or outside which has stood or stands: for a completely Unitary State." K.M. Munshi, a distinguished statesman and member of the Constituent Assembly, held the.view that the Constituent made.India "a quasi-federal Union invested with several important features of a unitary government." In the State
36
37
of West Bengal &', Union of India, the majority judgement of the Supreme Court, while commenting upon the nature of the Constitution observed that it was, "not true to any traditional pattern of federation." The minority judgement stated that India's Constitution was "a federal structure with a strong bias towards the Centre." Dr P.B. Gajendragadkar, a former Chief Justice of India, opined that though the Constitution "partakes of some of the characteristics of federal structure, it can be said to be federal in the true sense of the term. Many foreign scholars also looked at the Constitution the same way. Sir Ivor Jennings, for example, wrote: "India has a federation, with a strong centralizing tendency." K.C. Wheare observed that India has a "quasi-federal" Constitution. W.H. MorrisJones held the view that Indian federalism was a kind of "cooperative federalism where bargaining took place between the Centre and the stales but ultimately a solution came out arid both agreed to cooperate, Benjamen N Schoenfeld held the view that there was a tendency of centralism in the Indian federation, but that was not because of its structural framework but because of its socialistic goals and centrally-devised plan development. Because of these views on the nature of the Indian O1nstitution Professor Alexandrowicz had been led to remark that 'India is a case sui generis" (Latin for "altogether unique"). The Indian Constitution was, in fact, not a federation but a new contrivance designed to meet the special requirements of the country. LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRE AND STATES The executive authority of a government was co-extensive with its legislative competence and, therefore, the framers of the Constitution took utmost care in distributing law-making powers between the Union and the states. In Article 245, they laid down that Parliament might make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India, and the Legislature of the state might make laws for the whole or any part of the state. While there were territorial limits to the laws of state Legislatures, clause (2) of Article 245 provided that there would be no such limitations on the laws of Parliament. It could enact laws, which had extra-territorial
applicability. This provision appeared to be superfluous, because Parliament should not, and would not enact a law which it could not get enforced, and obviously the laws passed by Parliament could not be enforced outside the territory of the Indian Union. Its laws, however, could cover offences committed by Indian citizens outside India, and the person involved in the breach of a law could be punished when he (or she) entered the Indian territory. All the possible subjects of administration the Constitution makers could think of, were classified into three legislative liststhe Union Legislative List, the state Legislative List, and the Concurrent Legislative List. There were 97 subjects in the Union List, 66 subjects in the state List, and 47 in the Concurrent List. Article 246 provided that Parliament had exclusive power to legislate with respect to matters included in the Union List, that state Legislatures had exclusive power to make laws with respect to subjects in the state List and that Parliament and state Legislatures were entitled concurrently make laws with respect to matters in the Concurrent List. Predominance of Parliament In spite of a clear demarcation in the law-making power of Parliament and state Legislatures, Parliament was assigned predominant position in the general legislative field. If a matter happened to be included both in the Union List and these if there was ever a conflict between them the Union List prevailed. Similarly, if there was an overlapping between the Concurrent Lists, the Union List was paramount. And tht1 List had priority over the state List. Power of Parliament to Legislate with Respect to any matter in the State List in National Interest The predominance of parliament in the sphere of law-making was established-by several of the Constitution. Article 249, for instance, provided Rajya Sabha declared by a resolution supported by not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting that it was necessary expedient, in the national interest that Parliament should with respect to any matter enumerated in the state List specified resolution, it became lawful for Parliament to make laws for whole or any part of the territory of India with
38
39
respect to that matter during the period the resolution remained in force. Such a resolution remained in force for such period, not exceeding one year; be specified therein. The Rajya Sabha, however, could extend period of such a resolution for a further period of one year from the date on which it would otherwise have ceased to operate. A law made by Parliament, which Parliament would not but for the pass resolution by-the Rajya Sabha have been competent to rnake, ceased to have any effect on the expiration of a period of six months'!, resolution had ceased to be in, force, except in respect of things done or omitted to be done before the expiration of that period. This provision enabled the Rajya Sabha, which represented the states, to put in the Concurrent List any matter that was of local concern but had assumed national 'importance. The Rajya Sabha could do so any time, emergency or no emergency. Power of Parliament to Legislate with Respect to any in the State List if a Proclamation of Emergency was in Operation If the security of India was threatened either by war or aggression or internal disturbance, and the President issued a Proclamation of Emergency, under Article 352, the constitution became, for all practical purposes, unitary. Article 250 clause (1) entitled Parliament to make laws for the whole of India or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the state List. No such provision was made in the Constitutions of the United States, Australia and Canada and the powers of the Federal Governments to deal with emergent situations were enhanced by the interpretations of the courts. The framers of the Indian Constitution did not like to leave things to the determination of the Courts and made a constitutional provision to enable the Union Government to become sufficiently strong to deal with an emergency situation. A law made by Parliament under Article 250 clause (1) ceased to have effect on the expiration of a period of six months after the Proclamation had ceased to operate. Articles 249 and 250 did not restrict the power of the state.Legislatures to make any law which under the Constitution they had the power to make, but if any provision of law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by
the Legislature of the state, prevailed and the law made by the Legislature of the state was to the extent of repugnancy but so long only as the law made by" Parliament continued t6 have effect, inoperative. Power of Parliament to Legislate for Two or more States by Consent Parliament also became entitled to legislate for two or more states by their consent. Article 252(1) provided that if it appeared to the Legislatures of two or more states to be desirable that any of the matters with respect to which Parliament had no power to make laws for the states except as "provided in Articles 249 and 250 should be regulated in such states by Parliament by law and if resolutions to that effect were passed by all the Houses of the Legislatures of those states it became lawful for Parliament to pass an Act for regulating that matter accordingly, and any Act so passed applied to such states. Such a law could also apply to any other state if it was adopted afterwards by the Legislature thereof. Any Act so passed by Parliament could be amended or repealed only by an Act of Parliament. Article 252 became applicable only when at least two states joined. Once any subject of the state List was placed under the competence of Parliament, the state Legislatures stood excluded from that field. Legislation for giving Effect to International Agreements In the field of international relations, only the Union Government acted and the state Governments had no competence. Sometimes, the Union Government entered into such obligations with foreign powers as were of general application all over the country. In order that such obligations were implemented, it was deemed essential that the Union Government should have sufficient power to do so. It was, therefore, provided in Article 253 that Parliament had power to make any law for the whole or any part of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention with any other country or countries or any decision made at any international conference, association or other body. This provision entitled Parliament to legislate even in respect of those subjects that were included in the state List.
40
41
Inconsistency between Union and State Laws Both Parliament and the Legislatures of states were competent to enact a law concerning any subject of the Concurrent List Sometimes, the provisions of a Union law might conflict with provisions of a state law on the same subject. Article 254 made provision for such a contingency. II provided that the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of a state, shall prevail, and the law made by the Legislature of the state shall, to the extent of repugnancy, be void. But if the state law on a subject of the Concurrent List had been reserved for the consideration of the President and had received his assent, it shall prevail in that state. But Parliament was entitled to enact at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the state. Power of Parliament to Legislate for States in Case of Failure of Constitutional Machinery The predominance of Parliament was further established by Articles 356 and 357 of the Constitution. Article 356 stipulated that if the President was satisfied that a situation had arisen in which the government of a state could not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, he might declare that the powers of the Legislature of that state would be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament. Parliament might, Article 357 provided, delegate the law-making power to the President. The effect of Article 356 would be that the Legislature of the state in question would stand dissolved or suspended and the law making power would vest in Parliament during the period the Proclamation of Emergency remained in force. Union Government's Control over State Legislation Not only Parliament enjoyed predominance over law-making in the states; the Union Executive also exercised some control. Clause (3) of Article 31 (dealing with Right to Property) provided that if the Legislature of a state adopted a Bill providing for compulsory acquisition of movable or immovable property for public purposes, such a Bill would not be effective unless it had
been reserved for the consideration of the President and had received his assent. This provision was made to enable the President to ensure that provision for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired was made in the Bill. A proviso to Article 200 slated that the Governor should not assent to, but should reserve for the consideration of the President, any Bill which in the opinion of the Governor would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger the position which that Court was by the Constitution designed to fill. Sometimes, a controversy might arise between the state Legislature and the High Court of that state (as it did in early 1964 between the U.P. Legislative Assembly and Allahabad High Court) and Legislature might adopt a Bill adversely affecting the jurisdiction and authority of the High Court The above provision in Article 200 was made to enable the President to safeguard the authority and independence of the judiciary. Articles 200 and 201 provided for Presidential assent (0 Bills of the state Legislatures, but prescribed neither a-time limit within which to give or refuse to give, assent nor the principles or criteria according to which the assent was to be given or withheld. Under Article 200, the Governor could reserve a Bill of the state Legislature for the consideration and assent of the President. Whether he would do so in his discretion or on the directive of the Union authorities had not been stated in the Constitution. The general implication, however, was that the Governor would reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President only if some important political issues were involved. Under Article 304 (b), the Legislature of state might by law impose such reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or within that state as might be required in the public interest, but no Bill or amendment for this purpose should be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a state without the previous sanction of the President.. If the President issued a Proclamation of Emergency under Article 360 arising out of financial difficulties, he might direct any state to reserve a money Bills or financial Bills for his consideration after these were passed by the Legislature of the state.
42
43
Administrative Relations between Centre and States The law-making powers of Parliament and state Legislatures were clearly defined in the Constitution, but the territory in which the Union laws operated was divided into states. If these laws were to be enforced in different states it was essential that the Union Government were given enough administrative or executive power to do so,. The Constitution-makers provided, in Article 256, that the executive power of each state shall be so exercised as to ensure compliance with the laws made by Parliament and with any existing laws which applied in that state. The same Article stipulated that the executive power of the Union would extend to the giving of such directions to a state as would appear to the Government of India to be necessary for that purpose. Control of Union Over States in Certain Matters In order to enable the Union Government to exercise effective control over the entire country, the states have, Article 257 stipulated, to so exercise their executive power as not to impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive power of the Union, and the Government of India might give to a state such directions as might appear to it necessary for that purpose. It might direct a state to construct and maintain means of communication which it might declare to be of national or military importance, though usually the Union Itself would construct and maintain means of communications as part of its functions with respect to Naval, Military and Air Force works. Parliament might declare highways or waterways to be national highways and national waterways, and the Union might direct a state to take steps necessary for the protection of the railways within the state. Power of Union to Confer Powers etc. on States in Certain Matters The President was empowered to entrust, either conditionally or unconditionally, to the Government of a state with its consent functions in relation to any matter to which the executive power of the Union extended. Further, Parliament might confer powers and impose duties upon the state or officers and authorities thereof in respect of a Jaw which applied in that state, and about the
subject matter of which the Legislature of the state had no power to make laws. These provisions empowered the Centre to make use of the state administrative machinery for the purpose of enforcing the laws of Parliament. Any extra costs of administration incurred by the state in connection with the exercise of those power and duties were paid by the Centre. When a Proclamation of Emergency had been issued by the President under Article 35T, the Union Executive could give directions to any state as to the manner in which the executive power thereof was to be exercised. Similarly, when the President issued a Proclamation of Financial Emergency under Article 360;.the executive authority of the Union extended,"to the giving of directions to any state to observe such canons of financial propriety" as might "be deemed necessary' and adequate for the purpose." If and when any state failed to comply with, or to give effect to, any direction given by the Union under provisions of the Constitution, the President could, under Article 356, conclude that a situation had arisen in which the, government of the state could not be carried on in accordance with the provisions' of the Constitution. Such a conclusion might lead to the invoking of Article 356 and to the promulgation of President's rule in that state: Financial Relations between' Centre and States: Money is the life-blood of all governments without which they could not function and undertake obligations to improve the lot of the people. The sources from which finances were raised were several, but taxes upon the people and levies on various items of use were the most important source. Since in a federal polity two sets of government operated, it was necessary that each of them had funds. The framers of the Constitution, therefore, distinctly demarcated the sources from which the Union and the states derived revenues. Taxes and Duties Levied Exclusively by Centre: The following taxes enumerated in the Union List and any other tax not enumerated instate and Concurrent Lists and which might be termed as "residuary lax" could be levied only by the Union Government: taxes on income other than agricultural income;
44
45
duties of customs including export duties; duties of excise. on tobacco and other goods manufactured or produced in India except (a) alcoholic liquors for human consumption; opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs and narcotics, but including medicinal and toilet preparations, containing alcohol or any substance included in sub-paragraph (c f this entry; corporation lax; taxes on the capital value-of the assets; estate duty in respect of \property other than agricultural land; duties in respect of succession, to property other than agricul~1 land; terminal taxes on goods or passengers carried by ran, sea" taxes. on railway fares and freights; taxes other than stamp duties on transactions in stock exchanges and future markets, rates of stamp duty in respect of bills of exchange, cheques, promissory notes, bills of lading, letters of credit, policies of insurance, transfer of shares, debentures, proxies and receipts; taxes; on the sale or purchase of newspapers and on advertisements published therein; and fees in respect of any of the matters in the Union List. Taxes and Duties Levied Exclusively by States: There were taxes which only the state governments could levy, collect and utilize. These were: land revenue including its assessment and collection; taxes on agricultural income, duties in respect of succession to agricultural land; estate duty in respect of agricultural land, taxes on lands and buildings; taxes on mineral rights; excise duties on alcoholic liquor for-human consumption and opium etc; taxes on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein, taxes on the consumption or sale of electricity; taxes on advertisement other 'than advertisements published in the newspapers; taxes on goods and passengers carried by road or on inland waterways; taxes on vehicles; taxes on animals and boats; taxes on professions, trades, callings and employment; capitation taxes; taxes on luxuries, including taxes on entertainments, amusements, betting and gambling; and stamp duty in respect of documents other than those specified in the provisions on the Union List. Distribution of Revenue between Union and States: While the taxes levied by the states were exclusively utilized by them, the taxes levied by the Union were not so used by it. The Constitutionmakers realized that the financial resources of the states would
not be sufficient to meet their requirements of economic and industrial development and, therefore, they made provision for the sharing of Union revenues by the states. Article 268 enumerated duties which were levied by the Union but were collected and appropriated by the states. These were stamp duties and duties of excise on medicinal and toilet preparations which were mentioned in the Union List. The proceeds of any such duties leviable within any state in any financial year did not form part of the Consolidated Fund of India, but were assigned to that state. Taxes Levied and Collected by Union but Assigned to States: There were: duties in respect of succession to property other than agricultural land; estate duty in respect of property other than agricultural land; terminal taxes on goods or passengers carried by railway, sea or air; taxes on railway fares and freights;-taxes other than stamp duties on transactions in stock exchanges and future. markets; and taxes on the sale or purchase of newspapers and on advertisements published therein. The net proceeds from these taxes and duties were assigned to the states in accordance to the principles formulated by Parliament by law (Article 269). Recognizing that the states would not be viable without Central subvention, the Constitution-makers provided, in Article 270, for the compulsory sharing to the net proceeds of tax on income other than agricultural income. This tax was levied and collected by the Union, but net proceeds were distributed between the Union and the states. Article 272 provided that the Government of India shall levy and collect duties of excise other than such duties of excise on medicinal and toilet preparations-as were mentioned in the Union List, and the sums collected might be distributed between theUnion and the states. This was only a permissive provision, and the sharing of sums depended upon the Centre's convenience. The Union Government levied and collected export duty on jute, produced in the states of. Assam, Bihar, Orissa and West Bengal. These four states got from the Union, for a period of ten years from \he commencement of the Constitution, grants-in-aid in lieu of that share. Article 275 made provision for grants from the Union to certain Slates. Such grants were made to those states
46
47
which undertook schemes of development, with the approval of the Government of India, for the purpose of promoting the welfare of the Scheduled Tribes and raising, the level of administration of Scheduled Areas. The state of Assam was entitled to special grants for promoting the welfare of the tribal areas. The amount of such grants in each case was determined by Parliament. The state Legislatures were entitled, under Article 276, to levy taxes for the benefit of the state or of a municipality, district board, local board, or other local authorities in respect of professions, trades or employment's. Any law imposing such a tax would not be invalid on the ground that it related to a tax on income. The tax levied by the states under Article 276 on one person in one, ear could not exceed two hundred and fifty rupees. Borrowing Powers of Union and States: The framers of Constitution, realizing that the Union and state governments would not be able to raise sufficient funds through taxation, made provisions to enable them to borrow on the security of their Consolidated Funds. Article 292, which authorized the Union Government to do so, placed no territorial limitations, though it did provide for limitations as to the amount which was to be fixed by Parliament from time to time. While the states could also borrow upon the security of their Consolidated Fund, Article 293 provided that they could do so only within the territory of India. The Government of India might, subject to conditions laid down by Parliament, make loans to any state or give guarantees in respect of loans raised by any state. A, state might not without the consent of the Government of India, raise any loan if there was still outstanding 'any part of a loan which had been made to the state by the Government of India or by its predecessor Government, or in respect of which a guarantee had been given by the Government of India or by its predecessor Government. Exemption of Union Property from State Taxation: Article 285 exempted the-property of the Union from all taxes imposed by a state or by any authority within a state unless Parliament by law provided otherwise. The states were also prohibited from imposing any tax on electricity consumed by the government of India or consumed in the construction, maintenance or operation of any railway by the Government of India. Similarly, no law of a state
in force immediately before the commencement of the Constitution could impose a tax (unless the President by order provided otherwise) in respect of any water or electricity stores, generated, consumed, distributed or sold by any authority established by Parliament for regulating or developing any inter-state river or river valleys. This provision was made to promote the establishment of inter-state multipurpose river-valley projects. On the basis of the principle of reciprocal immunity, Article 289 exempted property and income of a state from Union taxation. But this did not prevent the Union from imposing any tax in respect of a trade or business of any kind carried on by or on behalf of the government of a state. The scheme of the distribution of legislative, administrative and financial powers between the Union and the states discussed above clearly and beyond any doubt established the predominance of the former over the latter. In addition to exercising control over the states through the above-mentioned powers the Union Government regulated and controlled the functioning of state governments through a number of constitutional and extra-constitutional agencies" and instruments. More important of these were the wide and extensive powers of the Planning Commission, the allotment of funds and subsidies for schemes of socio-economic development, the deployment of the Central Reserve Police and after the passage of the Forty-second Constitution Amendment Act, the deployment of any of the three wings of the Armed force for the purpose of dealing with any grave situation of law and order-in any state, the use of the office of the Governor and the promulgation of President's rule under Article 356, and finally the dominance of the High Command of the political party ruling at the Centre over the party apparatus at the state capitals. Strains in Centre-State Relations The constitutional framework of Union-state relationship worked reasonably well during the 17-year period from 1950 to 1966. There were occasions during this period when strains were witnessed, particularly when the Union Government set aside the constitutional machinery in a state and imposed President's rule
48
49
under Article 356. This was done in East Punjab on 20 June 1951; in Patiala and East Punjab States Union on 5 March 1953; in Andhra on 15 November 1954: and in Travancore-Cochin on 23 March 1956. In all these cases, the Opposition parties criticized the Congress Government at the Centre for not giving them the opportunity of forming an alternative government. They alleged that the Congress Party was not willing to tolerate a non-Congress government in any state. Allegations during this period were also made that the governors were not impartial in the discharge of their duties, particularly when non-Congress parties happened to be in power in some states, and that they had, become instruments in the hands of the Congress Party leadership to serve its political ends. There was, however, no open confrontation between the Union and the aggrieved state, and the complainants quieted down after the event passed off. This phenomenon was due mainly to two factors: the charismatic leadership of Prime Minister Nehru and the rule of the congress Party at the Centre and in most the states. Nehru was almost in unquestioned control of the government and party machine, and most of the Government and party leaders took dictation from him. In fact depended upon him for a political career in the country. The grievances and complaints of state government leaders, if at all, were sorted out at the party-level, and either these were removed or brushed aside irremovable. A recalcitrant state leader was either subdued or was ousted from the government or the party organization as the case might be. End of Congress Party Predominance-Era of Union-state cooperation ended partially after the death of Nehru on 27 May 1964 and largely after the fourth General Election held in February 1967. After Nehru, none within the ranks of the Congress Party could command that much of respect and awe, and the affairs of the party and the governments at the Centre and in the states Passed into the hands of a group of leaders that in later years became known as the 'Syndicate'. After the fourth General Election the Party's dominant at the centre and in some states declined considerably. Its majority in the Lok Sabha was reduced from 361 in 1962 to 282 seats, and in six states out, of seventeen nonCongress parties formed united front or coalition governments.
The stale bosses of these parties were hardly entrenched into power that they began to speak the language of conflict, threats, warnings and complaints. GRIEVANCES OF STATES AGAINST CENTRE Specific Grievances The grievances and complaints of the states rule by the non Congress parties against the Central Government were both specific and general-that is, specific grievances of individual states general of all those states. Among the specific grievances of Kerala for example, one was that the Centre was not supplying it adequate food grains. The then Chief Minister, E.M.S. Namboodripad (CPl Marxist), hinted, on 18 May 1967, that if the Centre failed to fulfill its commitment to his state he would be compelled to make arrangement from China. He demanded a share of Kerala's foreign exchange earnings. During March-April 1969, relations between the Union Government and the United Front Ministry of West Bengal led by Ajoy Mukherjee became strained on the issue of Governor Dharam Vira's address to the Legislature. While addressing the two Houses jointly on 6 March, Vira omitted two paragraphs of the speech prepared by Ajoy's Cabinet which described the dismissal of his United Front Ministry in November 1967 by him as "peremptory" and "unconstitutional." The parties constituting the United Front expressed great resentment; and the CPM, one of its constituent units, demanded his immediate:.recall, because "no normal relations"-could be established between him and the Ministry. Chief Minister Mukherjee asserted that in the appointment of the next Governor his Government should be consulted. But the Central Government rejected both the demands, and this made the relations between the Centre and the West Bengal Government very tense. The Chief Minister of Punjab, Gurnam Singh, accused the Centre, on 28 June 1969, of "political dishonesty" in respect of the demarcation of Punjabi Suba and the determination of the future of Chandigarh. The Kamataka Chief Minister, Veerendra Patil, complained, in November 1970, that the Chief Ministers not belonging to the Congress Party were "humiliated" by the,Centre,
50
51
and that they were not taken into confidence in respect of "Central policies and latest international developments." He even alleged that Union Ministers visiting his state capital lured MLAs to defect to their party and topple his Government. He further said that while the Union Ministers were accorded all hospitality by the state Governments, the state Ministers not even got interviews with the Union Ministers in New Delhi with ease and grace. Mahamaya Prasad Sinha, Chief Minister of Bihar, got disgusted with the Centre and appealed to the Soviet Union to come to his state's aid to meet the famine situation there. C.B. Gupta and Mrs. Sucheta Kripalani complained while Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, that the Centre had neglected their needs, and that the hunger and poverty of four crores of people in 28 eastern districts of the state had not evoked much response from the Centre, though its purse strings opened tip for some of other states which requires "political nursing." R.N. Singh Deo, Chief Minister of Orissa, demanded the location of a second steel plant in his state, and threatened mass agitation if that were not done. He alleged that the attitude of the Centre-towards Orissa was "intransigent, indifferent and discriminatory." The Rajasthan leaders described the attitude of the Union Government towards their state as "most apathetic." The Chief Executive Councillor of the Union Territory of Delhi, V.K. Malhotra, heading a Jan Sangh Government, alleged that the Centre was assuming an "anti-Delhi" posture, and. that its policies were "stifling" Delhi's welfare plans, There were only a few of the many specific grievances of the states against the Union. In fact, the number was much larger, and each of the states ruled by the non-Congress parties felt aggrieved on many more grounds. Situations of confrontation continued to occur very often, and views were expressed that the integrity of the Indian Union was likely to shatter and disintegrate. General Grievances Apart from the specific grievances and complaints of the states against the Centre there were five complaints of a general nature, One of those was in relation to the use of paramilitary forces, such as the Central Reserve Police (CRP) and the Border
Security Force. Several Central enterprises and undertakings, such as the steel mills, ammunition factories, the post and telegraph offices and railways etc., were spread over all the states, and in times of strikes, lock-outs and violent demonstrations these became the object of violence and arson, The CRP units were deployed in almost every state and Union Territory, and these were a versatile force trained and equipped to deal with armed hostiles as well as anti-social elements. These units were pressed into service, according to the contention of Union Home Ministry, whenever there was danger to Central Government undertakings or property and the state government's ability to afford adequate protection appeared to be in doubt. The maintenance of law and Order was, under the Constitution, a state subject, and the state governments asserted that the CRP and BSF units should be deployed within their territories by the Centre only when asked for by them. In 1968, serious trouble developed between the Centre and Kerala overthis issue. On 19 September of that year, the Central Government employees all over the country went on strike, and the situation in certain-places took a violent turn. Without consulting, or even informing, the Kerala Government in advance Home Minister Y.B. Chavan dispatched a battalion of CRP into that state to guard Central Government offices there. He also asked the state government to take action against such persons as were inciting or intimidating Central Government's loyal employees. Chief Minister Namboodripad protested against Chavan's action, and his Cabinet decided to withdraw, with the permission of the courts, all cases connected with the strike other than those involving violent attacks on persons and property. The Union Government took a serious view of this decision, and told the state government that its action was "illegal" and "unconstitutional." On 8 April 1969, the Defense Security Corps personnel at the Gun and Shell Factory Cossipore (West Bengal) resorted to firing to disperse a violent mob of workers, and this resulted in the death of five persons. The United Front and its trade union wing, the Rashtriya Sangram Samiti, called a 24-hour "Bangia Bandh" (stoppage of work), and the strike was a total success. Chavan announced the setting up of a single-member commission of
52
53
inquiry to enquire into the facts and circumstances relating to the firing. The Deputy Chief Minister, Jyoti Basu (CPI-Marxist), resented the appointment of the commission without consulting the state government. He told newsmen in Calcutta: "It seems the centre is in no mood to cooperate" with the inquiry commission. He even accused the Centre of "insulting" the people of Bengal "dislodging"' the first United Front Ministry in 1967. The Chief Minister of Punjab, Gumam Singh, also resented the deployment of CRP units in his state, and asserted that those units could not act without authority from the state government. The Union Government maintained in all these cases of protests that it had the unfettered right of stationing CRP and BSF units anywhere it liked to protect the country from internal subversion or external threats. Through the Forty-second Constitution Amendment Act, Mrs. Gandhi's Government made it amply clear that the Central Government had the unquestioned right to deploy not only, the CRP and BSF units but also the units of the armed forces in any state "in aid of the civil power." The second general grievances of the states against the Centre (and on this matter there was not much difference between Congress and non-Congress-ruled states except that the Congressruled states did not say it as vociferously) was that the Centre had monopolised the control of industries, trade, the commerce and Production and distribution of goods. They argued that these were subjects of the state Legislative List-industries in entry 24; trade and commerce in entry 26; and production, supply and distribution of goods in entry 27-but that taking advantage of the constitutional provisions (that Parliament could regulate them in national interest) the Center had brought them virtually under its own control. Parliament had passed in 1951 the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, specifying those industries which had to be controlled by the centre in national interest The Act as originally passed was fair and reasonable and rightly gave to the Centre control over vital and strategic industries. But in course of time, more and more industries were brought within the purview of the said Act, and the result was that the constitutional scheme was considerably subverted. The subjects of entries 24,26
and 27 ceased to be state subjects and became for all practical purposes Union subjects. Even items like razor blades, paper, gums, shoes, match sticks, house-hold electrical appliances, cosmetics, soaps and other toilet requisites passed under the Central domain. Over-centralization, it was pointed out by state leaders, had resulted in poor rate of economic growth and the consequent poverty of the people Supply and distribution of essential items of daily use, such as sugar, wheat, kerosene, rice and vanaspati ghee, were also brought under Central control, and complaints were often made by the state leaders that the supply and distribution of these commodities were handled-by the Union Ministers with political motives. These commodities became, it was alleged, instruments of winning elections in the states. The third grievance of the states against the Union Government was that it was encroaching upon their autonomy even in respect of those subjects that had been included in the state Legislative List, and that the Indian Union of states had in actual practice become a unitary state. In order to check the increasing trends towards centralization, the state leaders began to demand that they should be given more powers. Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, M. Karunanidhi, urged amendment of the Constitution for this purpose. Namboodripad felt more excited on this issue and said, on 19 April 1971, that unless the states were given maximum autonomy there was "every likelihood of Bangladesh being repeated in India." The fourth general complaint of the states against the Centre was that the Centre had not shared taxes with them in the spirit of the Constitution, that they had to perform the ever-widening functions in development and social services, but matching finances were not being transferred to them from the Centre, and that under the existing system of allocation of funds the rich states got more and poor slates less, resulting in an ever-widening gap. Apprehending lest the Central assistance to the states should be made selectively and on political considerations, the framers of the Constitution had provided for an independent agency,; a Finance Commission, under Article 280. The duty of the Commission was to make recommendation to the President as to (a) the distribution between the Union and the states of the net
54
55
proceeds of taxes which were to be, or might be, divided between them; and (b) the principles which should govern the grants-inaid of the revenues of the states out of the Consolidated Fund of India. But the mechanism did not work well, because the Finance Commissions that were set up from time to time handled and controlled only the statutory grants-in-aid, and the quantum of money at their disposal was very limited. The bulk of the funds assigned by the Union to the states fell within the category of discretionary grants, and these were made on the recommendations of the Planning Commission. Whereas the Finance Commission was the creation of the Constitution, and its recommendations were by law and convention binding on the Centre, the Planning Commission was the offspring of the Union Government. The powers and scope of activity of the Planning Commission were so wide and extensive that they covered almost the entire field of government activity. All plans of economic development of the country were prepared by the Commission; all broad targets were fixed by it and the ordering of priorities was done by it...Funds for the various schemes of development and projects were allocated by the same body. The state governments, of course, prepared their own plans, but the final shape was determined only after their representatives had held discussions with the Planning Commission. The targets and priorities fixed by the Planning Commission had to be born in mind by the planners in the states, and if it were not so, the state plans were either substantially modified or scuttled. Thus, the, Planning Commission, controlled the developmental activities of call the states. Even the legislative activities of the state governments relating to such subjects of the state List as agriculture, education, health and cooperation passed.into the hands of the Planning Commission. Very often, the Planning Commission made such grants as were tied up with particular projects, and the state governments were obliged to use them for that purpose only. There was, in fact, hardly any developmental activity of the state governments where the Planning Commission was not involved, and the composition of the Commission was such that amounted to the domination 01 the Union Government. Voices were, therefore, raised that the Planning Commission had
become another "super-government," and that through financial control, it had made the states subservient to the Centre. Demands were put forth that the Planning Commission should be made an independent autonomous body and should not merely be a wing of the Central Government. Discretionary grants from the Central Government to the states flowed directly, and these were outside the discipline of both the Finance Commission and the Planning Commission. After the Gadgil formula, transfers were affected by the Planning Commission according to a certain criteria, but the direct transfers were purely discretionary. And their volume grew up tremendously over the years. The last, and the fifth in number, general complaint of the states against the Centre, which very often embittered their relations, was the promulgation of Presidential rule in the states. With the exception of a few cases in which the imposition ofCentral rule was welcomed even by the state governments and the leaders of Opposition parties, on most such occasions the step was resented by the parties and the politicians adversely affected by the Central move. After the fourth General Election united front governments could not last for their full term of five years. The Ministry was dismissed; the Assembly was dissolved and the state was placed under Central rule. Almost in all cases when this happened, the Centre was accused of maneuvering their downfall and the Governors were accused of acting at the behest of the Centre. The gubernatorial office, it was often alleged, had become an instrument in the hands of the Central Government to topple non-Congress party governments in the states. Proposals and Suggestions for Smooth Union States Relationship In the wake of the fourth General Election the issue of relationship between the Centre and the states became a subject of serious public concern in the country. Distinguished jurists, constitutional experts journalists and statesmen suggested ways and means to establish that relationship on the basis of cordiality and cooperativeness. A seminar organised by the Bar Council of India in April 1967 maintained that the powers and duties of the President and Governors in regard to the suspension of a state
56
57
government in case of the breakdown of constitutional machinery needed fuller investigation, that the Planning Commission should be made an independent autonomous body, and that the Finance Commission should be-made a permanent body and its scope should be widened so that it could deal not only with statutory but also with discretionary grants. K. Subba Rao observed at that seminar that since different parties held power in different states the emphasis hereafter should be "more on cooperation than on control, more on patriotism than on authoritarianism, more on healthy competiti6n in common interests than on regimentation, more on service than on power, more on well conceived conventions than on expediencies, more on objective appraisals of the state's problems than on a partisan approach." Supreme Court Judge M. Hidayatullah, who later on became the Chief Justice of India and for some time acted as President of India, stated that the "Constitution will be put to severe strain unless the states are given a freer rein in legislative, administrative and financial matters." A former Attorney-General 9f India, M.C. Setalvad, (now dead) who presided over the seminar, regretted that during the last several years the Centre had developed a tendency to dictate policies to states in numerous fields. This, he said, had killed initiative in the states. He expressed happiness that the fourth General Election had ended "this stranglehold of Delhi." A few other speakers at the seminar expressed the view that no Centre-state conflict would occur if the constitutional provisions were followed in "letter and spirit," if the interests of the nation as a whole remained the guiding factor of their policies, and if the Central Government raised itself above narrow party considerations and conducted itself as the national government rather than a party government. A few weeks after this seminar, the regional correspondents of The Hindustan Times in New Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras interviewed constitutional experts, eminent politicians and Ministers on the issue of Centre-state relations, and all those who were interviewed underlined that the relationship should be regularized on a more rational basis in view of the changed political situation. K.M. Munshi said that if the view held during the Nehru regime that the Congress Prime Minister under cover of
the President could control the policy and action of the states were applied to present conditions, and if the view that the President was bound in all circumstances by the "aid and advice" of the party in power at the Centre was pursued, a conflict between the Centre and states was inevitable. He spoke in terms of the supraministerial powers of the President, and argued that the reserve powers of the President should be utilised to protect the structure of the Constitution. Dr A. Appadorai and B. Shiva Rao argued in favour of the setting up of an inter-state Council in order to avoid Centre-state conflicts. Such a Council, they said, should comprise the Chief Justice of India, the former Chief Justices of India, former Presidents and Vice Presidents, former Prime Ministers and Deputy Prime Ministers and the Attorney-General. To such a Council, they said, could be referred important matters such as the promulgation of President's rule in a state the appointment of Governors, interstate boundary disputes or presidents assent to a Bill passed by a state legislature and reserved by the Governor his assent. The advice of the Council, Appadorai maintained, should be binding upon the President even if that conflicted with-the one tendered by the Council of Ministers. Others who were interviewed Nath Pai, C.N. Annadorai, Jyoti Basu, A.B. Vajpayee, and Bhupesh Gupta-suggested that the best way to avoid center state conflict was that the Centre should show imagination, understanding and a spirit of accommodation, and that it should grant the states adequate finances without discrimination between Congress and non-Congress governments. In 1970, Tamil Nadu Government set up a three-member committee headed by P.V. Rajamannar to inquire into and examine the question of Union-state relations, and make recommendationsto strengthen the fabric of Indian polity. Its main recommendations were six. First an inter-state Council comprising Chief Ministers of all the states or their nominees with the Prime Minister as its chairman should be set up. No decision should be taken by the Centre, with the exception of issues relating to Defence and Foreign Affairs, without consulting the inter-state Council if that decision was likely to affect the interest of states. Second, the Planning Commission, as constituted presently, should be disbanded, and
58
59
its place must be taken by a statutory body, consisting of scientific, technical, agricultural and economic experts, to advise the states which should have their own planning boards. Third, the Finance Commission should be set up on a permanent basis and there should be a larger devolution of taxes in favour of the states so that their dependence upon the Centre minimised. Fourth, 'the Rajamannar Committee recommended the transfer of several subjects from the Union and Concurrent Legislative Lists to the state Legislative List. Fifth, the Governor should be appointed by the President in consultation with the state Cabinet or some other high power body that might be set up for the purpose, and once a person held held this office he should not be appointed to any other office under the government. And sixth, the High Courts of states should be the highest courts for all matters falling within the jurisdiction of states. Cases involving the interpretation of the Constitution could, however, continue to be brought before the Supreme Court. UNION GOVERNMENT TURNS DOWN SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORMS In view of the threats and warnings from state Chief Ministers and another Opposition party leaders, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi called for a careful study of the issue of union state relations. The proposals and suggestions for reform made from different quarters were analysed and examined by the home Minister, and the government reached the conclusion that the Constitution-of the country sufficiently sound, that no amendmentof the Constitution to redefine Union-state relations was necessary and that if was not the Constitution, but the politics of the country that was faulty and confused. Referring to the problems of law and order, Home Minister Chavan maintained that those were not purely a police matter, but were "expressions of social, political and economic tensions" and took various forms communal riots, youth unrest, extremist political philosophies and industrial and labour disputes-and the Centre intervened only when the situation was considered beyond the control of state governments. Replying to the critics of Governors the Home Minister maintained that their powers had
come into play due to the game of defections that was started by MLAs to seek offices, and that the Governors had, by and large, exercised their discretionary powers in the matter of selection of Chief Ministers, dismissal of Ministries and summoning and proroguing of Legislatures in accordance with the set principles. The position of the Union Government on the complaint of states-that funds to them were allocated on political considerationswas that the distribution of funds was by and large just and the evidence of this was that while in.the early years of the India Republic there had been a certain degree of Central discretion, that discretion had later on been replaced by a convention that the National Development Council determined the quantum of grants and aid.to the states. The states' share of revenues, it was pointed out, had been stepped up. While the first Finance Commission handled about Rs 52 crores, the fifth Commission disbursed Rs 800 crores. Congress Governments in States again-End of Centre-State Tensions In the thinking of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the best, and probably the only guarantee of harmony and cooperation between the Centre and the states was the rule of her own party everywhereat the centre and in the states. And this was what she sought to do throughout her stewardship of the country's government and politics. In each of those states where the non-Congress parties had formed location governments, Mrs. Gandhi maneuvered either the rule of the Centre under Article 356 or a Congress Party government or a government that was favourable to her rule at the Centre. The details of her. moves and counter-moves have been discussed in the chapter on coalition politics, but here a brief account might be desirable. After a General Election in Kerala on 17 September 1970, Achuta Menon, leader of the CPI-led United Front, formed a Ministry with the support of 56 Congress MLAs. Later on, some Congress MLAs joined his Government as Ministers. After the fourth General Election West Bengal remained under President's rule for most of the time. Uttar Pradesh passed into the Congress fold, and Kamlapati Tripathi formed Ministry there on 4 April 1971. Bihar had Ministries either with Congress support
60
61
or was ruled by the Centre after a lot of political turmoil. The same was the fate of Punjab. The Congress leader, Nandini Satpathi, formed Ministry in Orissa in the summer of 1971. When in July 1970, Himachal Pradesh became a full-fledged state, it had a Congress Ministry. With the exception of Tamil Nadu and Nagaland, other states had Congress Ministries. Among the Union Territories, the Congress was in power in Manipur, Tripura and Pondicherry. With the exception of Delhi, Where Jan 5angh was in power, other Union Territories were ruled directly by the Centre. Fifth General Election for sixteen state Assemblies and the Legislatures of two Union Territories was due to be held in February March 1972. The country had just then, in December 1971, fought a war with Pakistan over the Bangladesh issue, and leaders of several Opposition parties expressed the view that elections for the Assemblies should be postponed for some time in order to save the country from the huge expenditure involved in that exercise. But professing to be ~ a great constitutionalist and a democrat Mrs. Gandhi took the view that the election should be held according to schedule. The real reason why she took this stand appeared to be that due to victory over Pakistan her image in the country had gone high and she wanted to Cash on it. The election was, therefore, held, and her party got majority of seats in Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Bihar, Haryana, Punjab, Madhya pnidesh, Rajasthan, Assam, West Bengal, Jammu and Kashmir and Tripura. In all these states the Congress Party was installed into power on its own strength. In the Meghalaya Assembly the Congress could secure only 9 out of 60 seats and therefore could not form the government. In Manipur; which had become a full-fledged state in January 1972, the Congress obtained 17 out of 60 seats. It was, however, able to form the Ministry with the support of other MLAs. In the metropolitan Council of Delhi, the Congress got 44 out of 56 seats, and its leader Radha Raman formed the Government in Goa, the Congress could secure only 1 out of 30 seats and the leader of the Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party, Dayanand Bandodkar, formed the Government.
There were no elections in the remaining five states-Nagaland, Kerala, Orissa, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh in March 1972, as mid term elections had taken place there, and the Assemblies had not yet completed their full term of five years. In Nagaland, the leader of the Naga Nationalist Party, Hokishe Sema, had formed a government on 22 February 1969. Later on, his Ministry went out of office due to defections, and Central rule was promulgated there. When election was held there in February 1974, the Naga Nationalist Party lost the. majority support, and the United Democratic Front leadert Vizol, formed, on 27 February, a Government His Ministry also fell from power on 9 March 1975, because of defections, and two weeks later President's rule was promulgated there. Due to the strategic importance of Nagaland the Central Government kept a vigilant eye upon all political developments there. Elections were held in Uttar Pradesh and Orissa in February 1974, and in both the states Congress Party came into power. Tamil Nadu continued to be ruled by the DMK and its Chief Minister, Karunanidhi continued to confront the Centre with a defiant posture. In order to keep the Congress Party leaders in power in state capitals Mrs. Gandhi endeavoured not only to ensure their victory at the polls, but also to ensure that her proteges remained undisturbed and unchallenged by their rivals within the party. Whenever the Chief Ministers were accused of corruption, maladministration and self-aggrandizement not only by the leaders of Opposition parties but also by the MPs and MLAs of the Congress Party Mrs. Gandhi protected and supported the Chief Ministers. For instance, there were serious allegations against Haryana Chief Minister, Bansi Lal, and Himachal Pradesh Chief Minister, Y.S. Parmar, and demands were made that inquiry committees shouid be set up by the Centre to look into their conduct. But Mrs. Gandhi turned down their demands and asserted that there were no prima facie cases for such an action. Similarly, the dissenters in UP Congress, which included in their ranks MIAs and-MPs, asked for the removal of Chief Minister Kamlapati Tripathi, but their agitation was cowed down. In Madhya Prade6h, five Congress Ministers in the Ministry of P.C. Sethi resigned from
62
63
their posts and demanded the ouster of the Chief Minister, but the Congress High Command persuaded them to withdraw their resignations and left Sethi untouched. The dissidents held by D.P. Mishra were told that they and no genuine case for a change in leadership. The third step Mrs. Gandhi took in the same direction was to intervene in the politics of thuse states where there was rivalry between two or more Congressmen for Chief Ministership. For instance, Hardeo Joshi and Ram Niwas Mirdha were contending for the Chief Ministership of Rajasthan in October 1973. The Primer Minister drafted Swaran Singh, then External Affairs Minister, to manoeuvre a unanimous choice. And on his appeal, Mirdha withdrew from the contest and Joshi was elected. In Bihar, 25 of the 40 Ministers asked Chief Minister Kedar Pandey to resign, and when the latter refused to oblige them, the Centre intervened, installed Abdul Ghafoor in his place and, thus, saved the Congress Ministry from disintegration. The Gujarat Chief Minister, Ghanshyam Oza, was threatened by dissident Congressmen with a no-confidence motion in mid-June 1973. Mrs. Gandhi intervened, asked him to resign and Chimanbhai Patel was sworn in on 18 July as the new Chief Minister. In the Union Territory of Delhi, a group of dissident Congressmen submitted to Mrs. Gandhi a memorandum demanding the removal of Radha Raman as the Chief Executive Councilor, but they were snubbed and told that they would be black-listed if they continued their agitation against Raman. The strategy of the Prime Minister worked well and served her political interests fully. When in June 1975, she chose to impose Internal Emergency in the country the state governments lent her full support and cooperation. They implemented her decrees ungrudgingly and without demurring Janata Government Seeks Dissolution of Congress-ruled StatesSituation of Confrontation In the third week of January 1977, Mrs. Gandhi took the decision to end the Emergency era and hold election for the Lok Sabha. That election was held in March and resulted in the formation of Janata Party Government at the Centre. Next month,
it sought the dissolution of nine states Governments of the Congress Party. On 18 April, Home Minister Charan Singh addressed a letter to the Chief Ministers of Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh.. Bihar.. West Bengal, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan-suggesting to them that they should advise their Governors to dissolve the Assemblies and facilitate the holding of fresh elections' as soon as possible thereafter. The reasons given by the Home Minister for the proposed step were several First, the total or almost total rout of the Congress Party in the Lok Sabha election was, to a considerable extent, the consequence of the excesses and atrocities perpetrated during the period of Emergency. And since all the nine states mentioned above carried out the directions of the Central Government 1n suppressing all human rights and freedoms and also committed atrocities on their own, they had no right to remain in office as they apparently had lost the confidence of the electorate. The basic democratic imperative underlying the Constitution was, it was contended, that a government should remain in office only so long as it enjoyed the confidence of the people and not only that it merely enjoyed the confidence of the state Assembly. The second reason for seeking the dissolution of the state Assemblies was that a climate of uncertainty and widespread sense of diffidence at all levels of administration had come to prevail in those states. The uncertainty was visible, it was said, in the want on haste with which decisions of considerable importance had been taken in total disregard of financial and administrative proprieties and consequences. It was also manifest in the handling of day-to-day problems of law and order and also in the disrespect shown to the political authorities by the civil authorities. The Home Minister claimed to be receiving reports suggesting that there was near-paralysis of normal functioning of governments in the nine states. The third argument in favour of Charan Singh's advice to the Chief Minister was that the state Assemblies, with the exception of Uttar Pradesh and Orissa, had already completed their legal term of five years and they were functioning on "borrowed time", as their term was extended through the Forty-second Constitution Amendment Act which was pushed through Parliament by a
64
65
"repressive dictatorial" regime of Mrs Gandhi during the period of Emergency without any mandate from the electorate to do so. It was also contended that the five year term of the Lok Sabha had really expired, and it did not have the continued mandate to such an important Act as the Forty-second Amendment. The last, and probably the most important, reason for seeking the holding of fresh elections in those nine states (and this was not mentioned in the Home Minister's letter) was that election for the Presidency of the Indian Republic was due to be held (Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed had expired on 11 February 1977) around the 11th of August of that year and the Janata Government leaders wanted their own candidate to win it. Whatever the impotency of the Presidential office politically, it was very important constitutionally and the new leaders wanted to ensure that the occupant of the Rashtrapati Bhawan should be a person who would assist, and not hinder, them in undoing the wrongs of the Emergency era and in fulfilling the promises they had made to the people of India on the eve of the Lok Sabha poll. Congress-ruled States seek Supreme Court Protection-Petitions are Rejected All the nine states to whose Chief Ministers Charan Singh had sent the above letter rejected the Home Minister's advice. Finding that the authorities at the Centre were determined to bring about a dissolution of the Assemblies six state governments filed suits before the Supreme Court and prayed for injunctions restraining the Union Government from doing so. The states that did so were Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Bihar and Orissa. Three MLAs of Punjab filed writ petitions under Article 32, which dealt with the right to move the Supreme Court to enforce Fundamental Rights. Their complaint was that if the Legislative Assembly of the state of Punjab was dissolved by the Acting President they would be deprived of their right to receive salary as members of the Assembly and the salary being property there would be unconstitutional infraction of their right to property under Article 19(1)(1). During the hearing, counsel for the state governments argued that the grounds mentioned ir, the Home Minister's letter of 18
April were "extraneous" to Article 356. A seven-member Constitution bench headed by Chief Justice M.H. Beg gave on 29 April, 1977 a unanimous verdict which read: "We are unanimously of the opinion, for reasons to be mentioned later, that the suits and writ petitions should be dismissed. We accordingly dismiss the same and as a consequence reject the prayers for injunctions or interim orders..." The full judgement was delivered by the Court on 6 May of the same year, and each Judge, delivering his individual judgement, gave different reasons for the same conclusion. They upheld unanimously the doctrine of judicial review, and stated that the promulgation of Presidential rule in a state could be reviewed by the Supreme Court in spite of the fact that Article 356 had been amended by the Forty second Constitution Amendment Act to the effect that the President's satisfaction-that the government of the state cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution "shall be final and conclusive and shall not be questioned in any court on any ground." Chief Justice Beg observed: "Whenever the exercise of power to issue a proclamation under Article 356(l) of the Constitution has been challenged in a High Court it has been held that sufficiency of grounds on which the order is based could not be questioned. "As it happened in the case, the reasons for the contemplated action were set out in the Union Home Minister, Mr. Charan Singh's letter to the Chief Ministers, dated 18 April, and the Union Minister for Law, Justice and-Company Affairs, Mr. Shanti Bhushan's talk on All India Radio four days later. They were considered by the Court which unanimously pronounced them to be germane to the President's exercise of his power under Article 356." Chief Justice Beg stressed that the court was only concerned with legal rights to dissolve or legal obstacles to dissolution. The view of the Law Minister that there was an overwhelmingly large electoral verdict in the states against the ruling party there and this situation justified action under Article 356 was "largely a political and moral issue," and it, was "impossible to substitute our judgement for that of the Union Government on such a matter."
66
67
On the same issue, Justice Bhagwati and Justice Gupta remarked: "This is not a case where just an ordinary defeat has been suffered by the ruling party in a state in the elections to the Lok Sabha. There has been a total rout of candidates belonging to the ruling party. In some of the plaintiff states, the ruling party has not been able to secure a single seat. Never in the; history of this country has such a clear and unequivocal verdict been given by the people, never a more massive vote of no-confidence in the ruling party. When there is such crushing defeat suffered by the ruling party, and the people have expressed themselves categorically against its policies, it is symptomatic of complete alienation between the Government and the people. It is axiomatic that no government can function efficiently and effectively in accordance with the Constitution in a democratic set-up, unless it enjoys the goodwill and support of the people." Dealing with the question of directive by Charan Singh to the Chief Minister concerned in the suits, their Lordships said that each state had sought a declaration that the directive of the Home Minister was "unconstitutional, illegal and ultra vires of the Constitution and an injunction restraining the Union of India from giving effect to this directive was essential." They observed: "We fail to see how such declaration or injunction. can be granted by the Court. The directive of Mr. Charan Singh is nothing but an advice or suggestions to the Chief Minister of each plaintiff state to recommend to the Governor for dissolution of the Legislative Assembly of the concerned state. It has been wrongly described as directive. It has no constitutional authority behind it. It is always open to the Home Minister of the Central Government to give advice of suggestions to the Chief Minister of a state and the Chief Minister may accept or reject such advice or suggestion as he thinks fit." Dealing with the writ petition of three Punjab MLAs under Article 32, the Supreme Court held that "no one had a Fundamental Right to continue as a member of a Legislative Assembly." They observed: "It is true that if petitioners cease to be members of the Legislative Assemblies, they would lose their right to receive a salary, but that would be the result of their ceasing to be members of the Legislative Assembly and not the direct consequence-of the
dissolution of the Legislative Assembly." They held that "the contention of the petitioners-was clearly unsustainable, and noted that there could be no doubt that if there was a threatened violation of Fundamental Right the person concerned was entitled to approach the Supreme Court under Article 32 and claim relief by way of 'Injunction. "But they said, "difficulty here in the way of the petitioners is that it is not possible to say that by the threatened dissolution of the Legislative assembly any Fundamental Right of the petitioners would be infringed. It is only where there is direct.invasion of Fundamental Right or imminent danger of such invasion that a petitioner can seek relief under Article 32. The impact on the Fundamental Right must be direct and not indirect or remote." Union Government Dissolves Assemblies Within a couple of hours after the Supreme Court's verdict on 29 April the Union Cabinet met to discuss the situation, and it did not take long for it to decide to go ahead with its plan. The draft of the nine Proclamations under Article.106 reached the office of Acting President B.D. Jatti at about 8 P.M. but Jatti signed the order after about 24 hours. An official Press release said that the Ministries in the nine states-Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Bihar, ' West Bengal, Orissa, Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan had "vacated" office and that those states had been placed under President rule till the completion of fresh elections likely to be held in the middle of June. On 22 April, Jatti issued an executive order saying that the Metropolitan Council of Delhi had ceased to exist and that elections to a new Council would be held "at the earliest." He also issued an order directing that the Chief Executive Councillor and other Executive Councillors in Delhi "shall cease to hold office." Congress Leaders Denounce Centre's Move While the leaders of the Janata, Party, of the Congress for Democracy, of the Akali Dal and CPM, non-party leaders like Acharya J.B. Kripalani, Jayaprakash Narayan and Vijayalakshmi Pandit, newspaper men, pro-Janata party intellectuals and the
68
69
masses in general. welcomed the dissolution of state Assemblies, the top leaders of the Congress Party such as its President, Brahmanand Reddy and Y.B. Chavan, described it as a "dictatorial act" and "a blow to the federal democratic structure" of the country. The Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, N.D. Tiwari, described the step as "sad and unfortunate" in the constitutional and parliamentary history of India. The Punjab Congress leaders including Cabinet Ministers described it as "wholly immoral, unconstitutional and complete negation of its own election promises." The Rajasthan Chief Minister, Harideo Joshi, called the action as "absolutely undemocratic." The Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh, S.C. Shukla, described it as a "dictatorial act." Haryana Chief Minister B.D. Gupta said that the Janata Party had taken shelter of the Forty-second Constitution Amendment Act which it intended to scrap. The legal luminaries of the Janata Party quoted several world renowned jurists and experts of constitutional law in support of the step taken by them. For instance, Sir William Anson was quoted as having opined that the Crown could force dissolution of Parliament whenever there was "reason to suppose that a House of Commons and the majority of'1he electorate are at variance." A.C. Dicey was quoted as having written in his well-known book on British constitutional law that "there are certainly combinations of circumstances under which the Crown has a. right to dismiss a Ministry command a Parliamentary majority, and to dissolve the Parliament by which the Ministry is supported." The reason why a House could, in accordance with the Constitution, be deprived of power and of existence was that an occasion had arisen in which there was fair reason to suppose that the opinion of the House was not the opinion of the electors. A dissolution was in its essence an appeal from the legal to the political sovereign. Sir A.B. Keith held the view that the Crown might force dissolution if necessary by dismissing the government, if it thought if necessary for giving the will of the people its just course." Dr Eugene A. Forsey, a Canadian authority on constitutional law and writer of a book titled, The Royal Power of Dissolution of Parliament in the British Commonwealth, also expressed the view held by Anson, Keith and Dicey.
Centre-State Relations during Janata Party Regime The writ petitions of the six states and. three Punjab MLAs having been rejected by the supreme Court elections were held for the Assemblies of "nine states" on June 10, 12 and 14, 1977. Elections were also held in the state of Tamil Nadu and the Union Territory of Pondicherry, because both of them were then under Central rule. The Union Territory of Delhi, whose Metropolitan Council was also dissolved along with the "nine states", also went to the poll. In seven of ten states and in one of the two Union Territories (Delhi), toe Janata Party obtained the majority of seats, and its leaders formed governments there. Those states were: Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Haryana. Later on, a Janata Party government headed by Golap Borbora was formed in Assam also. This party had been the ally of the.Akali Dal, and its leaders joined the Ministry of that party in Punjab with Prakash Singh Badal as the Chief Minister. All other states and Union Territories had non-Janata Ministries. In Jammu and Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah was the head of the National Conference Government. West Bengal Government was headed by the CPM leader, Jyoti Basu. M.G. Ramachandran was the head of AIADMK Ministry in Tamil Nadu. Tripura had a Janata CPM coalition Ministry headed by Radhika Ranjan Gupta. Mrs. Sashikala Kakodkar formed a government of the Maharashtrawad Gomantak party in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu. On 2 July 1977, AIADMK leader, S. Ramaswamy, had formed a Ministry in Pondicherry, but it went out of office after sixteen months due to political instability and the Union Territory was placed under President's rule on 12 November 1978. Karnataka had a Congress Ministry headed by Devraj Urs though it went out of office on 31st December 1978 when the state was brought under President's rule. Kerala had a democratic front Ministry. Andhra Pradesh was being ruled by Congress (I) leader Chenna Reddy. Maharashtra had a Congress (I) Congress coalition Ministry headed by Vansantrao Patil. Shortly after coming into power Prime Minister Desai declared that the Centre's attitude towards the non-Janata governments in
70
71
the states and Union Territories would be the same,as towards the Ministries of his own party, and that the Government would fully protect and promote the interests of the states. In later months, the Akali Dal in Punjab, the DMK in Tamil Nadu, the Nagas, the Mizos and the CPM governments in West Bengal, Kerala and Tripura almost consistently demanded more autonomy for the states. On a number of occasions and from a number of forums they criticised the Centre for ignoring their demand for more and more autonomy which, they thought, would bring about the development of the states. DMK, which at one stage talked even of secession from the Indian Union, clamoured that the states should be given the maximum of powers and authority to manage their affairs themselves. On 21 August 1978, the Chief Ministers, attending the meeting of the National Development Council, called for measures to ensure a higher proportion of total transfer of resources from the Centre to the states. On 24 January 1979, the Chief Minister of Orissa expressed dissatisfaction over the progressive erosion of financial autonomy of states. CPM Chief Minister of West Bengal, Jyoti Basu, urged the Centre on 15 April 1979 that the Centre should immediately initiate discussion with state governments on decentralisation of powers. He complained that the Centre was encroaching into the domain which did not belong to it. On 28 April of the same year, Namboodripad and Bhupesh Gupta accused, while speaking at the all-India conference on regional disparities, the Centre of not giving the states sufficient autonomy and power for their development. All the speakers at the conference almost unanimously expressed the view that regional disparities were increasing and they all held the Centre responsible for that phenomenon. The state governments became all the more assertive and defiant when they found the Desai Government breaking up. A serious crisis had rocked three Janata-ruled states in April 1979. Thirteen Ministers and three Parliamentary Secretaries belonging to erstwhile Jan Sangh, resigned from Karpoori Thakur's Ministry
in Bihar and thereby undermined the position of the Chief Minister belonging t6 the BLD group of Charan Singh. In retaliation to this, three Ministers opposed to the Jan Sangh Chief Minister of Himachal Pradesh, Shanta Kumar, tendered their resignations and thereby plunge his government into a serious crisis. Devi Lal, Chief Minister of Haryana, removed-from his Ministry four Ministers-three of them belonging to the erstwhile Jan Sangh and the fourth actively supported by them-and he was reported to have decided to ban RSS "shakhas" and its other activities. Devi Lal belonged to the BLD. The Janata-ruled states were, thus, grouping up behind Charan Singh-Raj Narain on the one side and Morarji Desai and his Jan Sangh colleagues on the other. In early June 1978, Ram Naresh Yadav, Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh and belonging to the BLD, had succeeded in winning confidence vote when challenged by the Jan Sangh dissidents led by S.P. Malviya, but he was subsequently ousted from his office and his place was taken by Banarsi Das who too belonged to Charan Singh group within the Janata Party and formed Janata Party (Secular). Following the footsteps of Charan Singh who became the Prime Minister after the resignation of Desai Ministry the Chief Ministers of Bihar, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh converted themselves into Janata Party (Secular) and obeyed the directives of the Centre with great pleasure. And the Chief Ministers of Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, who did not do so, struggled for their survival. Due to the internecine quarrels within the Janata Party the states, particularly the non-Janata-ruled ones, became bolder and vocal in their demand for greater autonomy. Jyoti Basu launched almost a campaign for more powers for the states, and the Chief Ministers of Jammu and Kashmir, Tamil Nadu and Punjab actively supported. Basu's argument was that a strong and unified India could only be one in which the democratic aspirations and the distinctiveness of the people of different states were respected and not treated with disdain. When Charan Singh was reduced to the
72
73
status of a caretaker Prime Minister only, the states adopted a more defiant attitude and began to ignore Central directives openly. For instance, on 5 October 1979, the President promulgated the Prevention of Black marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Ordinance. Under this Ordinance, the state governments were required to constitute advisory boards. These were to be set up in accordance with the recommendations of the Chief Justice of the appropriate High Court and were to be presided by a sitting Judge of the High Court and were to be assisted by not less than two other retired or serving High Court Judges. The state governments were required to place before the advisory board within three weeks from the date of detention the grounds on which an alleged black marketeer was detained. With the exception of Nagaland, no other state government even initiated the process of constituting the advisory boards. In several other matters also, the state governments, particularly belonging to other political parties, ignored the Central directives, and due to its internal weaknesses the Centre found itself helpless to chastise them. Mrs. Gandhi's Government Dissovles "Nine" State Assemblies In January 1980, Mrs. Gandhi again came into power at the Centre. Having tried her tactic so successfully in the past and having learnt from the fate of the Janata Party Mrs. Gandhi sought to establish the hegemony of the Centre over the states. She had learnt from history that the best way of suppressing and controlling fissiparous forces in the country was to make the Central authority strong and effective and to keep the state governments submissive and subservient. And she had also learnt that the best way to do it was political, and neither constitutional nor legal. So, the first major step she took in, that direction was to seek the dissolution of the Legislative Assemblies in nine states and hold fresh poll. The Home Minister in her Ministry, Zail Singh, began to say that he would be 'advising' the Chief Ministers of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Punjab, Orissa, Gujarat,
Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu that they submit the resignations of their respective Ministries to the Government, and that the Governors should dissolve their Assemblies. On 29 January, the Chief Ministers of the above-mentioned states' warned the Prime Minister to keep her hands off the states and stop her toppling exercise. The Lok Dal organised a huge demonstration in Lucknow on 4 February for,launching the "dissolve Lok Sabha agitation" as a move to counter the dissolution of state Assemblies, The protestors, who were led by Raj Narain and Madhu Dandawate etc. were raising slogans like" Agar Vidhan Sabha Bhang Hogi to Lok Sabha Bhee Bhang Hogi," "Sun Lo Dilli Ki Rani, Nahi Chalegj Ab Manmani", Maa Bete Ki Goondagardi Nahi Chalegi" and "Banarsi Das Mat Ghabrana, Saath Tumahre Naya Zamana". On the same day (February 4), the Orissa Chief Minister, Nilomani Routray, said the ruling Lok Dal government. would not surrender to "intimidation" and would "resist with full force" any attempt by the Centre to topple it About a week later, Punjab Chief Minister, Prakash Singh Badal warned the Centre that it would be responsible for all consequences if it attempted to dissolve non-Congress(l) state Assemblies on one pretext or the other. Jiwan Singh Umrangal said a morcha would be launched if state assemblies were dissolved. On 12 February, the Janata Party leader, Jagjivan Ram, said there was no justification for the dissolution of the state Assemblies. Acharya Kripalani and M.C. Chagla, in a joint statement, condemned the Centre's purported move to dissolve the Assemblies and called it a violation of the Constitution and a mockery of the federal polity for purely party gains. All these warnings, threats and exhortations had no effect, and on 17 February Mrs. Gandhi dissolved the Assemblies of the nine states, dismissed their governments and took over their administration in her own hands. While the proclamations issued by Rashtrapati Bhawan gave no reasons for the dissolution of the Assemblies the Law Minister, Shiv Shanker, said in a four-page statement that there were three main reasons for that step. The first reason, he-pointed out, was
74
75
that the states run by the non-Congress (I) parties had delayed the ratification of the Forty-fifth Constitution Amendment Bill which provided for the reservation of seats for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Government, he said, feared that those states might block other progressive legislation in the future also. The second ground for dissolution was that the massive victory of the Congress (I) in the Lok Sabha poll showed that the non Congress (I) parties had lost the confidence of the people, and that, therefore, they had no moral and legal right to stay on in office. The third reason given was that the Opposition parties had adopted a "negative attitude" even though the Prime Minister had sought their cooperation in the administration of the country. She said that the attitude of the Opposition parties which moved an amendment to the motion of thanks to the Presidential address in the Rajya Sabha "was symptomatic of their noncooperation," and that trend was likely to lead to complications and problems "which would arise in the smooth working of the Government. Apart from these, there was still a fourth, and probably more weighty, reason. One-third members of the Rajya Sabha were due to retire on 2 April 1980. Mrs. Gandhi's party was already in minority in that House, and the danger was that if the elections were held on the basis of the Assemblies ruled by the Janata Party, the Lok Dal and other non-Congress (I) parties it would not be able t<;> increase its strength there. The elections were held on 28th and 31st May (1980), and the results were as under: The Congress (I) secured two-third majority in Gujarat (getting 140 out of 182 seats), Rajasthan (obtaining 131 seats out of 2(0), Madhya Pradesh (obtaining 246 out of 320 seats), Orissa (securing 115 out of 147 seats) and Uttar Pradesh getting 305 out of 425 seats). In Maharashtra, it secured 185 out of 288 seats, thus getting absolute majority. In Punjab also, the Congress (I) got absolute majority, securing 63 out of 117 seats. In Bihar, Mrs Gandhi's party obtained 150 seats out of 288. Only in Tamil Nadu, the COngress (I) suffered a serious debacle where
it could get only 30 seats in a House of 234-128 of these having gone to All India ADMK. While the Assemblies of nine states mentioned above were dissolved, those of Haryana and Himachal Pradesh were spared. In Haryana Chief Minister Bhajan Lal had defected to Congress (D alongwith his whole group of MLAs shortly after the Lok Sabha poll, and in Himachal Pradesh Ram L.al had formed a Congress (I) Ministry on 14 February 1980 after the resignation of Janata Party Chier minister Shanta Kumar due to defection of some of his supporters. Andhra Pradesh and Kamataka were already being ruled by the Congress (I) and Mrs Gandhi admirers were safely saddled into power there. In Manipur, a Congress (I) led coalition Ministry had been formed on 14 January 1980 under the Chief Ministership of R.K. Dorendra Singh. In April 1980, a Congress (I) backed Ministry led by S.C. Jamir had been formed in Nagaland. This party however, suffered a setback in early June, and a regional party-the Naga National Democratic Party-came into power there. The state of Sikkim had a Congress (I) backed Ministry. The Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh had a Congress (I) Ministry headed by Gagong Apang since 18 January, 1980. AI ADMK Congress (I) coalition Ministry headed by D. Ramachandran had come into power in Pondicherry on 16 January 1980. The position in other states and Union Territories when Mrs. Gandhi came into power at the Centre was like this: West Bengal had a CPM led Ministry headed by Chief Minister Jyoti Basu. In January 1980, the Congress (I) led United Democratic Front Government of Kerala gave way to the CPM and its allies who won 93 seats out of a total of 140 seats, and the CPM which had been out of power for nearly a decade staged a spectacular come back to govern the state along with its allies, all of whom were not described as leftists. The state of Tripura had a CPM Government headed by Nripen Chakraborty; Tamil Nadu passed under the rule of the All-India ADMK; Assam was under President's rule ever since the commencement of agitation on the "foreigners" issue there, and
76
77
the Union Territory of Delhi, was under the direct rule of the Centre. All other Union Territories were similarly under Central rule. Thus, the hegemony of the Congress (I) at the Centre and in most of the states and Union Territories was re-established, and the ground was prepared for Union-state harmony and cooperation. Non-Congress (I) Parties Assail Mrs. Gandhi's Move The steps Mrs. Gandhi took to instal into power in the states and Union Territories governments of her own party evoked sharp and prompt reaction from non-Congress (I) leaders. The Janata Party General Secretary, Surendra Mohan, said that the decision of the Central Government was a "blatant misuse of authority." Madhu Dandawate called it the "most undemocratic step and an infringement on the democratic rights of the people who elected their Assemblies." The CPM Chief Minister of Kerala's left democratic front, E.K. Nayanar, said that the Central decision had proved beyond doubt that the hopes, that the mistakes of the Emergency would not be repeated, were misplaced. Punjab Chief Minister Badal said that the dissolution of the Assemblies was "unconstitutional, undemocratic and totally dictatorial action." Rajasthan Chief Minister Bhairon Singh Shekhawat noted' that the "dissolution of the state Assemblies is only a formal announcement of the dictatorship in the country." Maharashtra Chief Minister Sharad Pawar said the Centre's step amounted to the destruction of democracy and the Constitution framed by Ambedkar. Madhya Pradesh Chief Minister Sunder Lal said the Congress (I) had not learnt any lesson from the last two elections and was reverting to its old ways of working. CPM secretary-general Namboodripad said the Prime Minister was so busy in destabilizing the non-Congress (I) state governments that she had no time even to form her full-fledged Cabinet. The Politbureau of this party commented that the dissolution of the nine-Assemblies was the
"biggest onslaught" on democratic Opposition. The General Secretary Of the CPI, C. RajeSWara described it as the Centre's "arbitrary action" in its drive for absolute power. West Bengal Chief Minister Jyoti Basu felt perturbed, and said the Centre's move had imperiled democracy in the country. Drawing attention to Union Minister, A.B. Ghani Khan Choudhry's statement that his party would not rest content until the CPM Government of West Bengal was thrown into the Bay of Bengal and Mrs. Gandhi"s statement after her visit to Narainpur in UP that state Governments not cooperating with the Centre in the implementation of Congress (I) policies would have t? go. Namboodribpad called for a mass upsurge at the all-India level against the "Indira-Sanjay authoritarianism" at the Centre. ' The Akali Dal termed it as a second Emergency. Dr Mangal Sein, leader of the Haryana Janata Legislature Party, said: "Mrs. Gandhi has come in her true colours. The step has proved that she cannot tolerate the Opposition. The caucus is again back around her." The President of the Shiromdni Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, G.S. Tohra, assailed the dissolution move and said the reasons given for that step were "filrnsy and untenable." Acharya Kripalani called the Assembly dissolution as the erosion of India's federal polity. This, in effect, aihounted to saying: "I will condemn an action as evil when I am not in power, but as soon as I come to power, I shall do the same thing and consider it right." Bhupesh Gupta called the step as "illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional." Whatever the merits and demerits of dissolution and whatever the arguments for and against, Mrs. Gandhi's Government took this step mainly because the Janata Government had taken it earlier. It was nothing short of vindictiveness. Even the number of the state Assemblies was somehow managed to be the samenine-no more, no less. Changes in Centre-State Ties Sought The Congress (I) leadership at the Centre had installed its own governments in the states and Union Territories in the hope that such governments would submissively carry out the behests
78
79
of the Central authorities without questioning, and to that extent the scheme was quite successful. But the states ruined by noncongress (I) parties refused to behave the same way. They felt aggrieved for a variety of reasons and began to give expression to their grievances from time to time. The AIADMK Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, M.G. Ramachandran, had hardly been entrenched into office that he began to speak the language of confrontation with the Centre. On 10 June 1980, he said that his Government would not tolerate the Centre's tendency to treat' the states as a panchayat or a municipality: The whole of the North East regian comprising five states and two. Unian Territaries-Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, Nagaland, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram-was in the midst of terrible violence and anarchy. The government and peaple af that regian were apenly defying the authority of the Centre. The Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir Sheikh Abdulla, accused the Centre, on 8 May 1980, of creating law and order problems in the states with the about of toppling non Congress(I) governments there. In view of the increasing strains between the Centre and the non Congress (I)-ruled states, the President of India, Sanjiva Reddy, said that it had became "almost impassible" for the Centre to deal with the multifarious problems of the states promptly,and efficiently. He urged greater autonomy for the states. In the wake of Reddy's statement non-Congress states and leaders of Opposition parties became mare vehement in their demand for greater autonomy far the states. Andhra Chief Minister, N.T. Rama Rao rapped on 4 December 1982, the Central government for continuing its "absolute strangle held aver the planning and execution of programmes of states, making progress impassible." On 26 December, BJP President Vajpayee said the states had been reduced to third class municipalities under the Congress (I) rule, and Centre-state ties must be reviewed in the light of experience gained in the functioning of the country's Constitution far the past three decades. Kamataka Chief Minister Ramakrishna Hegde said on 13 January 1983 that while his Government wauld seek very friendly
ties with the Centre, any attempt to discriminate against his state just because it was ruled by non-Congress government would be strictly resisted. Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Farooq Abdulla warned, on the following day, that "dangerous consequences" could follow if the Centre did not ensure adequate aid to his state. In early February, Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, M.G. Ramachandran, resorted to a fast to protest against the Centre's neglect of his state in the allotment of rice. In the third week of March, the issue of Centre-state relations entered into a new phase. The four non-Congress (I) Chief Ministers of Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry formed a Council to review the fiscal relations between the Centre and states and to discuss other matters of common interest. The conclave of these Chief Ministers demanded changes in the Constitution "to accommodate and give pull play to the flew definitions of Centre state relationship." The 'Council, it was hoped, would expand to include more-Chief Ministers. Central Government Sets Up Sarkaria Commission to Review Centre-State Relations Realising the importance of Centre-state interdependence in the Indian political system and finding that the non-Congress(I) state governments and Opposition leaders were assuming a confrontations posture Mrs Gandhi announced, on 24 March (1983), the setting up of a Commission to go into the question of Centre state arrangements. The Commission was set up under the chairmanship of R.S. Sarkaria, a retired Judge of the Supreme Court, and was asked to recommend such changes in the existing Centre-state arrangements as might be appropriate within the present constitutional framework." The non-Congress (I) Chief Ministers' hailed the Prime Minister's announcement and described it as a "good move." They expressed the hope that issues like the appointment and transfer of Governors and tile misuse of Article 356 by the Centre would be re-examined and causes of heart-burning would be removed. They, however, whipped up their invectives against the Centre,
80
81
and they probably did so to wrest more favourable report and recommendations from the Sarkaria Commission. Supporting the "just complaints" of the states against the "flagrant, and repeated abuse of Article 356 by the Centre, arbitrary appointment and. transfer of High Court judges, unilateral constitution of the Planning Commission and, misuse of radio and television, the national executive of the BJP urged.the President to invoke Article 263 of the Constitution to constitute an interstate council to take care of these and' other inter-state and Centrestate issues. On 5 May, N.T. Rama Rao said that the states were "neither adversaries nor supplicants to the Centre, but partners in the democratic' endeavour for creating an egalitarian society in which people of different states would have equal opportunities for development." He decried the drift towards more and more concentration of power in the Centre's hands. A few days later, West Bengal Chief minister Basu accused the Centre of discriminating against his state in manners of industrial development on political considerations. On 5 August, the Karnataka Chief Minister called for the decentralization of political and administrative power to avert the balkanization of the country. A superpower attitude by the Centre, he said, had generated a feeling of injustice among the states, and that institution like the Planning Commission and the Reserve Bank had become mere departments of the Executive. A three-day seminar sponsored by the Karnataka State Economic and Planning Council in early August called for the setting up of an inter-state council to review the whole issue of Centre-state relations. In later months, the Chief Ministers of all non-Congress (I)-ruled states and leaders of all Opposition parties joined hands in asking for more powers for the states and a reexamination of Centre-state ties. A two-day all-India seminar on Centre-state relations in Hyderabad city regretted that the states had wholly become dependent upon the Centre for all their 'financial needs, and that the sources of revenue of the states had been abridged by certain actions of the Central Government. Most of the speakers the
seminar sought more financial powers for the states. The Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir alleged that the Centre was adopting a step-motherly attitude towards his state. He alleged that the Congress (I) leaders in all those states where the nonCongress (I) parties were in power were, in collusion with the congress (I) High Command, manoeuvring to topple those governments, and that they were using the Governors for that purpose. The leaders of Opposition parties alleged time and again that behind the plea of a strong Centre, the Prime Minister and her colleagues in the Government and her party organisation were weakening the states by concentrating all powers and financial resources in their own hands, that the Raj Bhawans had become the refuge of "unwanted politicians or discarded bureaucrats", and that the Centre would be strong only when the states were also strong. They expressed displeasure over the slow progress of the Sarkaria Commission's work, and demanded that the entire framework-of centre-state relationship needed, to be re-examined and re-adjusted. The party ruling at the Centre and in most of the states and Union Territories made counter-attacks. On 15 July 1983, the Prime Minister assailed, the non-Congress'(I) Governments for having developed an attitude of constant confrontation" with the Centre, and asserted that they were interest only in weakening' the centre and ousting her from Premiership. She decried the formation of the council by the four southern Chief ministers and said that that was "ail uncalled for agitational approach", and the beginning of a "parallel sort of arrangement." She refuted all the above allegations and asserted that the charge that the charge that was not giving them adequate funds was just not true, that funds allocated for specific projects remained unspent, and that they were working against the Centre which breeded "indiscipline and retarded progress." Thus, the allegations of the states against the Centre and counter allegations of the Centre against the states continued and the federal structure of the Indian polity operated under great strains," The Congress (I) leadership learnt the lesson that the'
82
83
Centre-state relations would be smooth and harmonious only when a single party ruled at both the centres of power, and it was towards that end that it always worked. Some leaders of this party, such as C.M. Stephen, at one time its general secretary, asserted that they had a right to lure MLA's to their party from the ruling group. They not only fomented defections but also organized agitation's, demonstrations and violence to topple nonCongress governments. While the Centre-state controversy was going on, the Sarkaria Commission complained that it was, not receiving full cooperation from the Central and state governments. Addressing the Press in Bhubaneswar in early July 1985, Justice Sarkaria lamented that as many as 13 state Governments had not," even responded to the questionnaire that had been issued of the Commission. He often complained of neglect, and its term of office was being extended again and again. Union-State Disputes or Disputes between States-Provision of an Inter-State Council 'Envisaging that disputes between the Union and the states or between states were quite likely to arise in a federal system of Government the Founding-fathers of the Indian Republic made provision in Article 143 for an inter-state Council. That Article stipulated that if at any time it appeared to the President that 'the public interests would be served by the establishment of a Council charged with the duty of (a) inquiring into and advising upon disputes that-may have arisen between states; (b) investigating and discussing subjects in which some or all of the states or the Union and one or more of the states, have a common interest or (c) making recommendation upon any such subjects and in particular, recommendations for better coordination of policy and action with respect to that subject, it shall be lawful for the President by' order to establish such a Council and to define the nature of the duties to be performed by it and its organization and procedure. This provision merely gave the Centre discretion as to the timing of setting up such a Council, and did not permit him to ignore the setting up of the Council. This subject came up for
discussion on several forums and-levels, but the Council was not set up. As late as 5 April 1989, the then Home Minister Buta Singh told the Lok Sabha that the Government had not accepted the Sarkaria Commission recommendation for the establishment of the inter-state Council. The Governments of the states also had their own reservations and apprehensions about the setting up such a Council. The National Front Government also did not clearly define its position, though it approved the proposal to set up an inter-state council as recommended by the Sarkaria Commission, which went into the entire gamut of Union-state relations.
84
Nature of Party System in India
85
every country. They exist not only in the democratic countries but also in totalitarian states, though they differ in their purposes and functions. DEFINITION
3
NATURE OF PARTY SYSTEM IN INDIA
Political parties are indispensable for the successful functioning of democracy. Modern democracies are representative or indirect democracies. The citizens of a state elect the representatives periodically at election. Political parties put up the candidates and present their programmes and appeal to' the electors to vote for their candidates. The party, which secures the majority at election, forms the government and implements the programmes, which they had put before the electorate and are approved by them. The political parties have come to occupy the most influential and dominating position in the process of democratic government. Yet they are an extra-legal growth. No democratic constitution mentions the existence of a political party. There were no political parties during the initial stages of some of the major democracies of today. Unlike other political institutions, it is not created by or not even referred to in any constitution. But later it has become as indispensable as the constitution itself. In Britain where the party system 6riginated, it is still outside the legal framework of the state. . But without political parties the British constitution, which is mainly based on conventions is unworkable. Similarly the makers of the constitutions of USA abhorred political parties, because they thought, it would encourage division, strife, and manipulation. But within a few years the party system became the mainstay of American democratic system. Presently Political parties influence, control and dominate almost the entire game of politics in almost
There are various definitions offered by different writers on political party. Gettle defines 'political party as a group of citizens, more or less organised, who act as a political unit and who by the use of their voting power aim to control the government and carry out their general policy.' Ranny and Kendall define a political party 'as an autonomous organised group that makes nominations and contest election in the hope of eventually gaining and exercising control of the personnel and policies of government.' Prof. R.N.Gilchrist defines a political party 'as an organised group of citizens who profess to share the same political views and who by acting as a political unit, try to control the government. Politics is a contest among different interests and groups organised or unorganized for influence over the politics of the government. Four elements are necessary to constitute a group of persons into a political party 1) People must be organised. Without organisation it is difficult to carry out INTRODUCTION Classification of political party systems-single party system, bi-party system, multi party system Functions of party systems Objectives The plan of the lesson is to teach you the different types of party systems in the world and their functions. common programmes. 2) What binds the people together is a common belief in certain principles. There may be differences in detail, but all of them must agree in fundamentals 3) A political party seeks to carryout its policies by constitutional means and by capturing the government. It is the ballot box, which gives them power 4) political party, exists to promote the national interests as distinguished from the sectarian or Communal interests. Sir Edmund Bruke defines a political party "as a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interests
86
87
upon some particular principles in which they are all agreed." The political parties in the present form came to existence only a couple of centuries ago. Before that as Maciver says, there were only 'trends of opinion, popular clubs, philosophical societies and parliamentary groups, but no real political parties.' Political parties have become indispensable only after the introduction of universal suffrage. When the voting right has passed on to the masses, it became necessary to organize, educate, and canalize the voters to gain control of the government and this led to the formation of political parties. CLASSIFICATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES Party system is a term used by political scientists to identify certain general characteristics of political parties in a country. The most common criterion used is the number of parties. It does not account all the parties in existence but only those which have been strong enough and able to secure a substantial amount of votes and form the government or to form a recognized opposition in the near future. On this basis we may classify the party into 'single party', 'bi-party' and 'multi-party' systems. SINGLE PARTY SYSTEM Single party system is referred to a party system where only 'one party' dominates in the politics of that country. There may be other parties, but they are not popular, influential and strong enough to secure substantial amount of votes to form government or an effective opposition. However now a days the term single party system is referred to denote the single party dominance in totalitarian states. The Nazi party of Germany during the dictatorship of Hitler, the Fascist party of Italy during the dictatorship of Mussolini and the Communist party of China are examples of single party system. In a single party system the authority of the party is totalitarian. They are organised like well disciplined armies, they have an ideology and the faith in it is unflinching and dogmatic like a religious order. Single party system aims to canalize the political life of the country in a single way. The life of the nation is regimented to the pattern of that party and opposing parties are
liquidated either as a consequence of the positive law or by force. The Single party thus, becomes the engine of the whole life of the nation. Party instead of remaining a means to democracy becomes the end. A single party system is, therefore, totalitarian. All the authority of the state is concentrated in a, single integrated political party. It even absorbs the state instead of merely acting on its behalf. Any single authority by its nature is total. It has no other authority at its side with which it must divide the exercise of power. Its authority, accordingly, embraces all aspects of human life and every form and phase of community's life. It was national unity for the Nazis and fascist and it is social unity with in communists MERITS OF SINGLE PARTY SYSTEM Single party system can provide a stable government, since it has monopoly over the government and politics and there is no opposition to dislodge it from Power 2) It is suited for undeveloped states which cannot afford the wasteful luxury of frequent elections and expensive election campaigns 3) It can provide an efficient government and can bring rapid prosperity to the country 4) There will be no conflict between the party and the government, since members of one are also members of the other. This provides for smooth functioning of the government 5) A single party system is able to achieve national and social unity 6) It helps to avoid classes and cleavages and clashes of interests in society. DEMERITS 1) The main defect of one party system is that, since the party has a monopoly over the government and politics of the nation, it would tend to become tyrannical and irresponsible. It ruthlessly suppresses and eliminates all oppositions 2) There is no alternate government that can be formed and no genuine option for the people at the election 3) One party system leads to totalitarian rule where the political and social get identified with each other 4) It leads to the rule of the elite and the supreme leader becomes unrestrained 5) It is prone to commit mistakes and repeat them since there is no opposition to criticize them.
88
89
BI-PARTY SYSTEM A BI-party system is that in which only two parties regularly secure substantial portion of the votes and public offices and in which the two major parties alternate in the exercise of power. Such system might also contain many other minor parties, which will nominate the candidates for election, but rarely win more than a fraction of the votes or elect any candidate. In a two party system the political opinion is polarized into two major parties. In the election, the party, which secures a majority in the legislature, forms the government and the other forms the opposition. In the presidential form, the candidate of one of the parties is elected as the president and the same party or the other will have majority in legislature m-party system is prevalent in countries such as USA, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. In a BI-party system, the parties are moderate and are normally of broker type rather than of missionary type. Their views are usually identical. Merits of Bi-party System (1) A two party system ensures stability. A majority in the legislature in such a context will be a decisive majority and-'not a relative majority. A cabinet supported by such a majority can be strong and masterful. It can effectively implement its programmes and can give forceful leadership in the legislature. (2) In a BI-Party system the election is simple. It presents just two alternatives to the electorates, making it easy for them to choose. Besides a two party system provides an alternate government, an alternate policy and an alternate leadership. (3) There is less chances of corruption in this system because the ruling party is not obliged to satisfy any other party by allowing or ignoring or defending some political corruption for their support to retain the ministry. (4) In a two party system the responsibilities are easily identified. One party rules and the other forms the opposition. The leaders of both the parties and the people know the responsibilities of each.
Demerits (1) A two party system can lead to a very strong executive. Supported by a majority in the legislature, the cabinet can establish its dictatorship. (2) In this system the choice of the voters is limited to only two alternative policies and programmes. It helps to create polarization of vested interests and party prejudices. It may ignore minority interests. (3) In a bi-party system the ruling party might ignore the opposition or even public opinion because it is secure by virtue of its majority. It can be removed from power only through a general election. Similarly if the opposition is too strong the work of the government is hampered by too much of criticism. (4) A two party system implies that both the parties must be well disciplined and the rigidity of the party discipline nullifies the freedom of the party members to make their own decisions. Multi Party System A multi party system is that in which at least three or more parties regularly secure a substantial number of votes and public offices and usually a single party is not able to secure an absolute majority to form the government. The result of such a situation is coalition government. In a multi-party system, there are number of major parties, each well organised on an ideology of its own and has considerable influence over the national politics. In a general election., It is very rare for one single party to win a majority of votes or seats in the legislature to form the government. Multiparty system prevails in many countries of Europe. Presently India also can be included in this category. Most of the parties differ in name in different countries but closely resemble in their ideology, organisation, policies and programmes. Merits (1) It is more democratic than any other system. Since various parties represent various ideologies, interests and shades
90
91
of opinion, a combination of these parties in a coalition government naturally reflect various shades of public opinion, hence more democratic. (2) In a multi-party system the government is more sensitive and responsive to public opinion. It cannot ignore any section of interest or opinion as it would sometimes lead to the downfall of the ministry. (3) In a multiparty system people have enough choice. People can vote for a party, which they think, represent and would work for their interests. De-merits (1) The main drawback of multi-party system is the instability of the government. Since it is almost always a coalition of heterogeneous political parties, it is very likely to collapse on simple reasons. (2) Tthe legislature becomes a hot-bed of intrigues and 'horse trading'. Alliances and counter-alliances are formed among the parties adversely affecting the efficiency and stability of the government. (3) There is no continuity of policy or programmes for the government. Each party puts forward its own ideology, policy and plans to the electorate. They might even be mutually opposing. After the election, a coalition is formed on a common minimum programme. But each party is enthusiastic to give more consideration to its own policies and plans. (4) The government is compelled to make any political compromise and grant concessions to the constituent parties in order to remain in power. This leads to political corruption. (5) Multi-party system confuses the voters. In this system the choice becomes very wide and hence confusing. Out of the welter of manifestoes and programmes the elector has to choose only one. The general masses of electors are bewildered by the complexity of choice. (6) Finally in this system the community is divided into mutually opposing political groups.
Functions of Political Parties Democracy and Political parties go hand in hand. Parties can exist under other conditions too, but can flourish most in a democratic state, as the representative government is the best medium for the expression of public opinion. Political parties, accordingly, perform certain indispensable functions. (1) Political parties organize and fight elections on a determined program, which is put before the electorate. They choose the most capable and popular persons who have a chance of winning the election, as their candidate. (2) Political parties assist in the formulation and expression of the general will by organizing and winning the election. They bring order out of chaos of multitude of voters by putting the programmes of the party before them and secure their approval or disapproval. (3) Political parties educate the people and mould public opinion. They use all available media like press, platform and various other vehicles of propaganda. Political parties act as 'brokers of ideas. (4) Political parties put into practice the public opinion which they have been instrumental in molding. Control over the governmental machinery gives the party adequate opportunity to fulfil its promises. While the majority party forms the government, the minority parties subject the party in power to a searching criticism. (5) Political parties secure harmony of action among the various departments of government. 'It is the work of the parties to find these disconnected organs into a unity and secure the harmonious co-operation of the entire government' It is a unifying agency which makes democracy workable. (6) Political parties also co-ordinate the members of the legislature. It keeps them under some sort of discipline. The legislative chambers cannot function smoothly without party whip. In its absence the legislature would be a babel of tongue.
92
93
(7) Political parties 'Canalize politics and keep the nation politically alive, They are links which keep the individual in touch with the government.' Apart from these main functions enumerated above, the political parties perform many other functions. It co-ordinate the functions of the executive and legislative branches of government especially in a presidential form of government. It helps to maintain discipline in legislature. Some parties establish youth organisation to mobilize young electorates, conduct study classes establish libraries and run charitable institutions. National Parties National parties are political parties which participate in different elections held all over India. Some of the national parties have their origin even before India's independence. The oldest national party in India is the Indian National Congress (INC). In was established in 1885 as a pro-British Indian organization. Later on it became the main voice of India's freedom struggle. After India's independence, the British passed the administration of India to the leaders of the Indian National Congress. Until 1966 the Congress was a stable party. In 1966 Indira Gandhi became the leader of the Congress and Prime Minister of India. From this period the Congress lost its stability. Some of the veteran members of the Congress did not accept her leadership and they tried to dispose her. In 1969 the Congress split and her opponents established a new Congress part. But still INC was the largest and ruling party of India. Indira Gandhi's Congress lost the 1977 elections to the Janata Party. A few months after the defeat, another split happened in the Congress party. The party of Indira Gandhi was called Congress (I), the initial denoting of her name. During this period many more splits and coalitions occurred within the different Congress parties. Some of these new party members including its founders returned later on to the Congress (I) party and the party was renamed Indian National Congress. But there are others who left the INC at different periods and established parties outside the
fold of Congress and have a name Congress in their party name. Before the 1999 elections some senior members of the INC were forced to resign because they questioned the leadership of Sonia Gandhi. These people have created the National Congress Party to participate in 1999 elections. The INC is in the Indian political arena prior to India's independence. There were other parties, which were established after independence, and, for some period, were challenging the continuous rule of the Congress, some of them were almost vanished from the political arena. The first political party which, was seen as challenging the Congress continuous rule was Swatantra Party. It was established in 1959 and was supported by some big businessmen. It opposed the socialism policy of the Congress It had members in the Lok Sabha until 1977. Another party, which challenged the Congress party but later on almost vanished from the political arena, was Janata Party. Janata Party was the first political party in India to establish a non-Congress government when it won the 1977 elections. Janata Party was established before the 1977 elections. The person responsible for the formation of Janata Party was Jayaprakash Narayan, called in short JP. JP was a freedom fighter and a social activist. Many in India respected him and saw in him a moral figure. In the early 1970s the reign of Indira Gandhi began to show signs of corruption and dictatorship and there was a general feeling that liberal democracy is coming to an end. JP openly attacked Indira Gandhi's policy and asked other leaders to express their views about the dangers. Between 1975-77 emergency rule was declared. During this period many of Gandhi's political rivals were arrested and put behind the bars. Censorship was enforced on Indian press. The justice system was restricted and turned into 'puppet show' of the government. The people also suffered a lot from this emergency rule. Under the birth control policy many people were forced to have sterilization. Even so Indira Gandhi was sure that the Indian people would support her because her general intention was to make India a better place and so she declared elections in 1977.
94
95
To prevent her victory different political parties organized as one party. This party was called Janata Party. The main factions of this party were, Congress (O), Lok Dal, Jan Sangh, and other parties. This party won the 1977 elections and Morarji Desai became the Prime Minister of India. But this party as it was formed did not survive for a long time. This party which was actually a group of factions with one desire to defeat Indira Gandhi, did not find any thing common among its members after they defeated Gandhi. As long as JP was alive, the different factions still stayed together. But after his death in 1978 a clear split occurred in the Janata Party between Morarji Desai's supporters and Charan Singh's supporters. In 1979 Morarji Desai resigned as Prime Minister and other members tried to replace Prime Minister. During this period Jagjivan Ram, an untouchable according to strict Hindu society, was very near to become a Prime Minister. But finally Charan Singh of the Lok Dal faction was proclaimed the new Prime Minister. A few weeks after Charan Singh became the Prime Minister, because of the instability in the coalition, the president declared on new elections. In 1980 new national elections took place in which Indira Gandhi's Congress again won the elections. Later on after these elections, different factions of the Janata Party broke up from the Janata Party and established their own parties. Among these parties were Jan Sangh which later on was renamed Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) and is today the largest party in India. Janata Party continues to survive, but is very small. In the 1996 elections it did not win any seat in the national elections and in the 1998 elections it won only one seat. Another political party which, was actually a political bloc of different factions and managed to form a government was Janata Dal. This party was established because of the claim that there was corruption in the Congress government. In 1984 Rajiv Gandhi formed the Congress government. The finance minister of his government was VP Singh. VP Singh found out that a Swedish company, Bofors, was bribing some senior members of the Congress. Singh tried to investigate this affair. Gandhi moved him from the office and made him Defence Minister, but Singh resigned from the government and started a new party called
Janata Dal. This party was made up of former Janata Party, Lok Dal and some INC members. In the 1989 elections this party came second after INC but it managed to establish a coalition government with other parties. This coalition was called National Front. This front also broke up after two years. The largest party today is the Bhartiya Janata Party. The BJP began its political career after India's independence with only three members in the first elections held in 1952. The BJP is a Hindu nationalist party, which draws its inspiration from Hinduism. This party sees in India a Hindu state and it emphasizes Hindu pride and Hindu past of India. This party was established after India's independence, but its origin is also pre-independence. In the 19th century a Hindu nationalist organization, Arya Samaj, was established. The ideas of this organization influenced another Hindu organization established later in British India, the Hindu Mahasabha. Hindu Mahasabha opposed the secular Congress philosophy and wanted to establish a Hindu state in British India. Another Hindu organization in British India was Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), meaning national volunteers organization. One person who belonged in different stages of his life to these two organizations assassinated Mahatma Gandhi in 1948. After his assassination these two organizations were outlawed for sometime. The leader of the Hindu Mahasabha, Shyam Mookherji resigned from the party and established with the members of RSS a new Hindu nationalist party, which was named Jana Sangh. This party had moderate ideas than the its former components. In its first two decades the party's major holds were in north India's Hindi speaking regions, because this party supported turning Hindi into the national language of India (see Official Language of India). In 1977 this party was an important faction of the Janata Party. In the 1980s it broke from the Janata Party and changed its name to Bhartiya Jana Sangh. Later on it renamed itself as Bhartiya Janata Party. There are also other national parties, which were established in India. The Bahujan Samajwadi Party was established in the 1980s. But even though this party is a national party, its represents only the oppressed classes of India. Samajwadi Party was
96
97
established in 1992. Two communist parties, Communist Party of India (CPI) and Communist party of India-Marxist (CPM) are also national parties. There are some parties who have national agendas but participate only in certain regions of India and not all over India. For example Forward Bloc (see also Subhas Chandra Bose) which participates in elections only in West Bengal and neighboring Bihar. Regional Parties Regional parties are parties whose main holds are in one certain state and mostly they participate in the elections only within that state. Most of these regional parties have agenda fitting certain culture dominant within that state. Some of these regional parties also participate in neighboring states, which have constituencies with culture similar to the first state. Different state parties were established at different periods because of different reasons. Some even have origins prior to India's independence. In Tamil Nadu in south India, two main state parties are All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (AIADMK) and Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK). Of these two parties the DMK is the veteran party. The origins of these parties are prior to India's independence. The main ideology of this party is Tamil national pride. Before India's independence there were two Dravidian parties. One was Independent Party, which demand an independent Dravidstan in south India. Other was Justice Party, which had a Dravidian pride ideology. After India's independence, the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) was established from the merger of these two parties in the former state of Madras, in south India. This party first demanded an independent Dravidstan for all of south India. Later on the demand was changed to independent Tamil state. Finally this party compromised on a Tamil Nadu state within the Indian Union. In the beginning this party was anti-north Indian. They opposed to any entrance of any kind of cultures of north India. They specially attacked the attempt to introduce Hindi language in Tamil Nadu (see also Official languages of India). This party members also saw in the Tamili Brahmans agents of north India who immigrated to south India to enforce to north Indian Aryan
culture on the south Indians (see Aryans and Dravidians). The party demanded to reserve the government jobs for Dravidians and not to 'immigrant' Brahmans. In 1972 this party split and a new party was founded by MC Ramachandaran and it was named All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (AIADMK). In 1987 Ramachandaran died and Jayalalita inherited him. In the last few years these Tamilian pride parties have moderated their ideologies and before the 1998 elections the AIADMK even cooperated with BJP, which is considered as a north Indian party. In Andra Pradesh, also in south India, Telegu Desam was founded in 1982 by Telegu film actor, NT Rao. The ideology of the party is similar to the ideology of the AIADMK, which is local cultural pride. In the Telugu Desam case, the local cultural pride is of Telugu culture. Another one state party is Akali Dal and its main hold is in Punjab, north India. This party is considered a state party, but actually it is a religion oriented party whose followers are the Sikhs. This party also has its origin prior to India's independence. Before independence this party demanded from the British a separate entity for the Sikhs in Punjab. During the independence period these demands were delayed for a while. After independence this party began demanding special status for the Sikh culture and the Punjabi language. They struggled for a Punjabi state with a Sikh majority within the Indian Union and recognition of Punjabi as a distinct language. They succeeded in forming the establishment of Punjab in 1966, but it had a very small majority of the Sikhs (see Internal map of India). But they also succeeded in obtaining the recognition of Punjabi as a distinct language and not as a dialect of Hindi (see Official languages of India). Later on the Akali Dal broke up into some factions. Some of the militant factions of the Akali Dal demanded an independent Sikh state to be called Khalistan. But the dominant Akali Dal faction in Punjab wants Punjab to be a part of Indian Union. In Assam in east India and in Maharashtra in west India there are political parties which came into existence because of the discriminatory feelings of the local 'sons of soil' population. In British India, Assam was a British province. For some period the British attached Assam to the neighboring Bengal
98
99
province. During this period the Bengalis held many senior government posts. Later on Assam again became a separate province, but the government posts were still hold by the Bengalis. In the 1960s and the 1970s many Bengali oriented people immigrated to Assam. In the 1980s the Asom Gana Parishad was founded with an agenda to give back Assam to the Assamese people. In Maharashtra, in west India, the local population is known as Maharashtrians. Their language is known as Marathi. Sometimes the Maharashtrians are also known as Marathi. The capital of Maharashtra is Mumbai, formerly Bombay. During the British rule, the city of Bombay was the capital of Bombay State. The Bombay State included in it regions of present day Maharashtra and present day Gujarat. The main language of Gujarat is Gujarati. The Gujaratis are the business communities of India. The city of Bombay was the business center of India. Many business communities from Gujarat settled in Bombay and were the important business community of Bombay. But the majority of the population of Bombay was Marathi and they were the working classes of the city. Many Indians from all around India also immigrated to Bombay to find a better future. This made Bombay the largest Indian cosmopolitan. In 1960 Bombay State was divided into Maharashtra and Gujarat. Bombay the cultural capital of the Marathis and the Gujaratis was made capital of Maharashtra. After Maharashtra was established, a general feeling among many Marathis, was that Bombay is ruled and governed by 'foreigners'. Their main targets were not the Gujarati business communities, but immigrants who arrived from all over India and settled in Bombay. So these people established the Shiv Sena party. This party which began as a protest movement of the Marathis in Bombay, slowly became popular all around Maharashtra. This party ideology was spiced with Hindu-Marathi nationalist pride. Its rivals consider this party as a fanatic and anti-Muslim party. According to the party policy, many places in Maharashtra were renamed with Marathi oriented names. For example Bombay was renamed back to its original name Mumbai.
There are other state parties in India. To name a few there are, National Conference in Kashmir, Haryana Vikas Party in Haryana, Manipur People's Party in Manipur, Maharashtrawadi Gomantak in Goa, Sikkim Democratic Front in Sikkim and many other parties. People who broke away from larger national parties, like the Congress founded some state parties. For example the West Bengal Trinamul Congress, Tamil Manila Congress, Kerala Congress. There are also communist state parties. Congress Parties The oldest national party in India is the Indian National Congress (INC). In was established in 1885 as a pro-British Indian organization. The real purpose of the British in establishing this organization was to continue to rule India with the help of liberal and pro-British Indians. Later on this organization became the main voice of India's freedom struggle. Among its founders were Surendranath Benarjee, Dadabhai Naoroji and Justice M. G. Ranade. Before founding of the Congress, Justice M. G. Ranade had established an organization based on the ideas of the 'Brahmo Samaj' with the aim of social and religious reforms in India. One of Ranade's disciple, G. K. Gokhale, became the leader of Indian National Congress till 1915. Gokhale was considered by Mahatma Gandhi as his political guru. Mahatma Gandhi, more than any other Indian, is identified with modern India's creation. After India's independence, the British passed the administration of India to the leaders of the Indian National Congress. Mahatma Gandhi who was the father figure of the Congress party, suggested to transform the Indian National Congress into a charity organization, because the main cause of the Congress party was achieved. But the other leaders of the Congress did not accept his proposal and the Indian National Congress became a political party with a secular, socialist and democratic tendency. During its independence, two Congress leaders Jawarharlal Nehru and Vallabbhai Patel wanted to be the first Prime Minister of India. Nehru, who was younger, was secular and socialist oriented, while Patel was more Hindu nationalist oriented.
100
101
Mahatma Gandhi wanted the young Jawarharlal Nehru to be India's first Prime Minister and therefore Patel withdrew his candidacy. Before independence the Congress was a roof organization and it included many factions. After independence the Congress leaders changed the structure of the party and established a new political agenda. The different factions in the Congress could either join the new agenda or leave the Congress. Some left the Congress and established other political parties outside the Congress. And so some new political parties were established among them the Socialist Party of India and Forward Bloc Until 1950 the Congress was under the influence of these two leaders. After Patel's death in 1950, Congress came under full influence of Jawarharlal Nehru. Nehru died in 1964, without appointing an heir. The party chose Lal Bahadur Shastri as the new leader. In 1966 Shastri arrived in Tashkent, in former Soviet Union to sign a cease-fire agreement with Pakistan. Shastri died in his sleep in Tashkent. After Shastri's death, some Congress leaders competed for the leadership of the party. Surprisingly the inter party election was won by the less favourite candidate, Indira Gandhi. Indira Gandhi was Jawarharlal Nehru's daughter (and had no family relations with Mahatma Gandhi). Some of the veteran members of the Congress did not accept her leadership and they tried to dispose her of. In 1969 the Congress split up into two parties. The veteran members of the Congress established the Congress (O) party, while Indian National Congress was recognised as Congress (R). Of these two parties the INC was the larger and dominant party. The Congress (O) was no threat to Indira Gandhi's Congress. Indira Gandhi was a very centralist leader. She pulled all the strings in the party and was seen as the dictator of her party. She planned to inherit her party to her younger son, Sanjay Gandhi. Between the years 1975-77 Indira Gandhi proclaimed emergency rule. During this period many of Gandhi's political rivals were arrested and put behind the bars. Censorship was enforced on Indian press. The justice system was restricted and turned into
'puppet show' of the government. The people also suffered a lot from this emergency rule. Under the birth control policy many people were forced to have sterilisation. Even so Indira Gandhi was sure that the Indian people supported her because her general intention of making India a better place and so she declared elections in 1977. Her party lost the 1977 elections to the Janata Party. A few months after the Congress defeat in the elections, another split occurred in the Congress party. The party of Indira Gandhi was called Congress (I), because of the initial of her name. During this period many more splits and coalitions occurred within the different Congress parties. Former Congress member Sharad Pawar established one such party of the Congress during this period. He even established a government in the state of Maharashtra with this party which later on was known as Congress (S). Another party was established in Uttar Pradesh. Some of these new party members including it establishers like Sharad Pawar returned later on to the Congress (I) party and the party was renamed Indian National Congress. But there are others who left the INC at different periods and established parties outside the Congress and have a name Congress in their party name. For example Mumta Benarjee established West Bengal Trinamool Congress in West Bengal before the 1998 elections. Moopanar established Tamil Maanila Congress in Tamil Nadu. And there are more other such parties. There were some Congress members who resigned from the Congress and established parties without having the name Congress in their party name. For example Lok Dal that was established in the 1960s by Charan Singh and Janata Dal, which was established by VP Singh after resigning from the INC in the late 1980s. Before the 1999 elections some senior members of the INC were forced to resign because they questioned the leadership of Sonia Gandhi. These people have created the National Congress Party to participate in 1999 elections. Sonia Gandhi who lead the INC in the 1999 elections is the widow of Rajiv Gandhi, the elder son of Indira Gandhi. She was
102
103
born in Italy to a European Christian family. She met Rajiv Gandhi in England and married him. Indira Gandhi intended to inherit her party to her younger son Sanjay. But Sanjay died in a plane crash in 1980. So Indira Gandhi forced her elder son, who had no interest in politics, to resign from his job as a pilot and join politics. In 1984, her Sikh bodyguards assassinated Indira Gandhi. Rajiv Gandhi was proclaimed her heir. He was Prime Minister of India until 1989. In the 1991 election campaign a suicide bomber assassinated him. The Congress appointed Narsimha Rao as its new leader. After losing the 1996 elections Rao resigned. For sometime Sitaram Kesari was the leader, but many Congress members saw in Sonia Gandhi as the new leader and gave her lot of respect. They thought that the Congress needs a 'Gandhi' as its leader to attract votes. COMMUNIST PARTIES IN INDIA In the early 19th century a new philosophy in political world emerged and it was Marxism. Many people in India were impressed by Marxist ideas and many communists from around the world arrived in India to teach and preach the communist philosophy. After the communist revolution, which occurred in Russia in 1917, many in India wished to cause same kind of revolution in India against the British. Under inspiration from Moscow the Communist Party of India (CPI) was established. Like other communist parties in the world, this party's members also had strong relations with Moscow and Moscow dictated its actions. This party did not support the freedom struggle, which was organized by the Indian National Congress and saw it as a struggle organized by rich businessmen. After India's independence, many Indian leaders blamed the Communist party as a Russian agent and as a party acting according to orders from Moscow. In 1957 this party won the state elections held in Keralla, in south India, and so gave the world a precedent in which people democratically elected a communist regime. In 1964 the Communist Party of India split into two parties. The new party added the word Marxist to the party name and is called in short, CPM. The CPI, between these two parties was
considered as a Russian agent in India until the emergence of Prestroika in Russia. Of these two parties the CPM is the stronger party. Their main strength was in West Bengal in east India and in Keralla, south India. Along with these two national level communist parties, there are also communist parties who act only within one state. Such parties exist in West Bengal, Tripura and Keralla. There are also some communist oriented violent local organisations that tried to fulfil the communist ideology with violent methods. These groups attacked big landlords, government representatives and government property. These groups are sometimes called Maoist groups or Naxalite groups, because of the place named Naxalbari where first such violent attempt took place BHARATIYA JANATA PARTY The BJP is unique among India's political parties in that neither it nor its political predecessors were ever associated with the Congress. Instead, it grew out of an alternative nationalist organization--the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS--National Volunteer Organisation). The BJP still is affiliated with the network of organizations popularly referred to as the RSS family. The RSS was founded in 1925 by Keshav Baliram Hedgewar. Until 1928 a member of the Congress with radical nationalist political leanings, Hedgewar had grown increasingly disenchanted with the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi. Hedgewar was particularly critical of Gandhi's emphasis on nonviolence and civil disobedience, which he felt discouraged the forceful political action necessary to gain independence. He established the RSS as an organization that would provide training in martial arts and spiritual matters to rejuvenate the spiritual life of the Hindu community and build its unity. Hedgewar and his successor, M.S. Golwalkar, scrupulously endeavored to define the RSS's identity as a cultural organization that was not directly involved in politics. However, its rapidly growing membership and the paramilitary-like uniforms and discipline of its activists made the political potential of the RSS apparent to everyone on the political scene. There was considerable sentiment within the Congress that RSS members should be
104
105
permitted to join, and, in fact, on October 7, 1947, the Congress Working Committee voted to allow in RSS members. But in November 1947, the Congress passed a rule requiring RSS members to give up their affiliation before joining. The RSS was banned in 1948 after Nathuram Godse, a former RSS member, assassinated Mahatma Gandhi. The ban was lifted in 1949 only after the RSS drafted an organizational constitution that was acceptable to the government. Intensely loyal RSS members refused to give up their affiliation to join the Congress and, instead, channeled their political energies to the Jana Sangh (People's Union) after its founding in 1951. The Jana Sangh grew slowly during the 1950s and 1960s, despite the efforts of RSS members, who quickly took control of the party's organization. Although the Jana Sangh succeeded in displacing the Hindu Mahasabha (a communal party established in 1914 as a counter to Muslim separatists) as the preeminent party of Hindu activists in the Indian political system, it failed to develop into a major rival to the Congress. According to political scientist Bruce Graham, this failure occurred because of the Jana Sangh's inability "to transcend the limitations of its origins," in particular, its identification with the Hindi-speaking, northern heartland and its Brahmanical interpretation of Hinduism rather than the more inclusive and synergetic values of popular Hinduism. However, the experience of the Jana Sangh during the 1970s, especially its increasing resort to populism and agitational tactics, provided essential ingredients for the success of the BJP in the 1980s. In 1977 the Jana Sangh joined the Janata Party, which defeated Indira Gandhi and the Congress (I) in parliamentary elections and formed a government through the end of 1979. The rapid expansion of the RSS under Janata rule soon brought calls for all members of the RSS family to merge with Janata Party affiliates. Ultimately, intra party tensions impelled those affiliated with the Jana Sangh to leave the Janata Party and establish a new party--the BJP. The BJP was formed in April 1980, under the leadership of Atal Behari Vajpayee. Although the party welcomed members of the RSS, the BJP's effort to draw from the legacies of the Janata Party as well as that of the Jana Sangh were suggested by its new
name, its choice of a green and saffron flag similar to that of the Janata Party rather than the solid saffron flag of the old Jana Sangh, its adoption of a decentralized organizational structure along the lines of the Janata Party rather than the more centralized model of the Jana Sangh, and its inclusion in its working committee of several non-Jana Sangh individuals, including Sikandar Bakht-a Muslim. The invocation of Gandhian socialism as one of the guiding principles of the BJP rather than the doctrine of "integral humanism" associated with the Jana Sangh was another indication of the impact of the party members' experience in the Janata Party and "J.P. movement." The new synthesis, however, failed to achieve political success. In 1984 the BJP won only two seats in the parliamentary elections. In the wake of the 1984 elections, the BJP shifted course. Advani replaced Vajpayee as party president. Under Advani's leadership, the BJP appealed to Hindu activists by criticizing measures it construed as pandering to minorities and advocating the repeal of the special status given to the Muslim majority state of Jammu and Kashmir. Simultaneously, it cooperated more closely with other RSS affiliates, particularly the VHP. During the 1980s, the BJP-VHP combine developed into a dynamic political force through its brilliant use of religious symbolism to rouse the passions of the public. The BJP and VHP attained national prominence through their campaign to convert back to Hinduism members of the Scheduled Castes who had converted to Islam. The VHP also agitated to reclaim the Babri Masjid site and encouraged villagers throughout the country to hold religious ceremonies to consecrate bricks made out of their own clay and send them to be used in the construction of the Ramjanmabhumi Temple in Ayodhya. In the general elections of 1991, the BJP expanded its support more than did any other party. Its number of seats in the Lok Sabha increased from eighty-five to 119, and its vote share grew from 11.4 percent to 21.0 percent. The party was particularly successful in Uttar Pradesh, where it increased its share of the vote from 7.6 percent (eight seats) in 1989 to 35.3 percent (fifty seats) in 1991, and in Gujarat, where its votes and seats climbed from 30 percent (twelve seats) to 52 percent (twenty seats). In addition, BJP support appeared to be spreading into new areas. In Karnataka,
106
107
its vote rose from 2.6 percent to 28.1 percent, and in West Bengal the BJP's share of the vote expanded from 1.6 to 12.0 percent. However, the elections also revealed some of the limitations of the BJP juggernaut. Exit polls showed that while the BJP received more upper-caste support than all other parties and made inroads into the constituency of Backward Classes, it did poorly among Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, constituencies that it had long attempted to cultivate. In Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan, three state governments run by the BJP since 1990, the BJP lost parliamentary seats although its share of the vote increased. In Uttar Pradesh, where the BJP also won control of the state government in 1991, veteran political analyst Paul R. Brass cogently argued that the BJP had reached the limits of its social base of support. The limits of the BJP's Hindu nationalist strategy were further revealed by its losses in the November 1993 state elections. The party lost control over the state-level governments of Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh while winning power in Gujarat and the National Capital Territory of Delhi. In the aftermath of the Hindu activists' dismantling of the Babri Masjid in December 1992, the evocative symbolism of the Ramjanmabhumi controversy had apparently lost its capacity to mobilize popular support. Nevertheless, the BJP, by giving more emphasis to anticorruption and social issues, achieved unprecedented success in South India, where it won 28 percent of the vote and came in second in elections in Karnataka in November 1994. In the spring of 1995, the BJP won state elections in Gujarat and became the junior partner of a coalition with Shiv Sena (Army of Shivaji--Shivaji Bhonsle was a seventeenth-century Maratha guerrilla leader who kept Mughal armies at bay) in Maharashtra. In view of the potential demise of the Congress (I), the BJP stands poised to emerge as India's largest party in the 1990s. The aim of the party is to establish a democratic state guaranteeing equality of opportunity and liberty of faith and expression. It commits itself to 'Sarva Dharma Sambhav' and value based politics. The Party stands for decentralization of economic and political power. The Party pledges to build up India
as a strong and prosperous nation with a progressive and enlightened in outlook. The main agendas are: o Making India a Developed Nation and a Great Power by 2020 o Broadening and deepening of economic reforms, based on a self-reliant approach o To fulfill the basic needs in education, healthcare, housing, cultural development. o Commitment to women's all-round empowerment Intensifying dialogue with Pakistan to find a lasting solution to all bilateral issues INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS The Congress has, by any standards, remarkable political accomplishments to its credit. As the Indian National Congress, its guidance fashioned a nation out of an extraordinarily heterogeneous ensemble of peoples. The party has played an important role in establishing the foundations of perhaps the most durable democratic political system in the developing world. As scholars Francis Robinson and Paul R. Brass point out, the Congress constituted one of the few political organizations in the annals of decolonialization to "make the transition from being sole representative of the nationalist cause to being just one element of a competitive party system." The Congress dominated Indian politics from independence until 1967. Prior to 1967, the Congress had never won less than 73 percent of the seats in Parliament. The party won every state government election except two--most often exclusively, but also through coalitions--and until 1967 it never won less than 60 percent of all elections for seats in the state legislative assemblies. There were four factors that accounted for this dominance. First, the party acquired a tremendous amount of good will and political capital from its leadership of the nationalist struggle. Party chiefs gained substantial popular respect for the years in jail and other deprivations that they personally endured. The shared experience of the independence struggle fostered a sense of
108
109
cohesion, which was important in maintaining unity in the face of the party's internal pluralism. The second factor was that the Congress was the only party with an organization extending across the nation and down to the village level. The party's federal structure was based on a system of internal democracy that functioned to resolve disputes among its members and maintain party cohesion. Internal party elections also served to legitimate the party leadership, train party workers in the skills of political competition, and create channels of upward mobility that rewarded its most capable members. A third factor was that the Congress achieved its position of political dominance by creating an organization that adjusted to local circumstances rather than transformed them, often reaching the village through local "big men" (bare admi) who controlled village "vote banks." These local elites, who owed their position to their traditional social status and their control over land, formed factions that competed for power within the Congress. The internal party democracy and the Congress's subsequent electoral success ultimately reinforced the local power of these traditional elites and enabled the party to adjust to changes in local balances of power. The non-ideological pragmatism of local party leadership made it possible to co-opt issues that contributed to opposition party success and even incorporate successful opposition leaders into the party. Intra-party competition served to channel information about local circumstances up the party hierarchy. Fourth, patronage was the oil that lubricated the party machine. As the state expanded its development role, it accumulated more resources that could be distributed to party members. The growing pool of opportunities and resources facilitated the party's ability to accommodate conflict among its members. The Congress enjoyed the benefits of a "virtuous cycle," in which its electoral success gave it access to economic and political resources that enabled the party to attract new supporters. The halcyon days of what Indian political scientist Rajni Kothari has called "the Congress system" ended with the general elections in 1967. The party lost seventy-eight seats in the Lok Sabha, retaining a majority of only twenty-three seats. Even more indicative of the Congress setback was its loss of control over six
of the sixteen state legislatures that held elections. The proximate causes of the reversal included the failure of the monsoons in 1965 and 1966 and the subsequent hardship throughout northern and eastern India, and the unpopular currency devaluation in 1966. However, profound changes in India's polity also contributed to the decline of the Congress. The rapid growth of the electorate, which increased by 45 percent from 1952 to 1967, brought an influx of new voters less appreciative of the Congress's role in the independence movement. Moreover, the simultaneous spread of democratic values produced a political awakening that mobilized new groups and created a more pluralistic constellation of political interests. The development of new and more-differentiated identities and patterns of political cleavage made it virtually impossible for the Congress to contain the competition of its members within its organization. Dissidence and ultimately defection greatly weakened the Congress's electoral performance. It was in this context that Indira Gandhi asserted her independence from the leaders of the party organization by attempting to take the party in a more populist direction. She ordered the nationalization of India's fourteen largest banks in 1969, and then she supported former labor leader and Acting President Varahagiri Venkata Giri's candidacy for president despite the fact that the party organization had already nominated the more conservative Neelam Sanjiva Reddy. After Giri's election, the party organization expelled Indira Gandhi from the Congress and ordered the parliamentary party to choose a new prime minister. Instead, 226 of the 291 Congress members of Parliament continued to support Indira Gandhi. The Congress split into two in 1969, the new factions being the Congress (O)--for Organisation-and Mrs. Gandhi's Congress (R)--for Requisition. The Congress (R) continued in power with the support of non-Congress groups, principally the Communist Party of India (CPI) and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK--Dravidian Progressive Federation). With the Congress (O) controlling most of the party organization, Indira Gandhi adopted a new strategy to mobilize popular support. For the first time ever, she ordered parliamentary elections to be held separately from elections for the state government. This delinking was designed to reduce the power of
110
111
the Congress (O)'s state-level political machines in national elections. Mrs. Gandhi traveled throughout the country, energetically campaigning on the slogan "garibi hatao " (eliminate poverty), thereby bypassing the traditional Congress networks of political support. The strategy proved successful, and the Congress (R) won a dramatic victory. In the 1971 elections for the Lok Sabha, the Congress (R) garnered 44 percent of the vote, earning it 352 seats. The Congress (O) won only sixteen seats and 10 percent of the vote. The next year, after leading India to victory over Pakistan in the war for Bangladesh's independence, Indira Gandhi and the Congress (R) further consolidated their control over the country by winning fourteen of sixteen state assembly elections and victories in 70 percent of all seats contested. The public expected Indira Gandhi to deliver on her mandate to remove poverty. However, the country experienced a severe drought in 1971 and 1972, leading to food shortages, and the price of food rose 20 percent in the spring of 1973. The decision by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to quadruple oil prices in 1973-74 also led to inflation and increased unemployment. Jayaprakash (J.P) Narayan, a socialist leader in the preindependence Indian National Congress who, after 1947, left to conduct social work in the Sarvodaya movement (sarvodaya means uplift of all), came out of retirement to lead what eventually became widely known as the "J.P. movement." Under Narayan's leadership, the movement toppled the government of Gujarat and almost brought down the government in Bihar; Narayan advocated a radical regeneration of public morality that he labelled "total revolution." After the Allahabad High Court ruled that Mrs. Gandhi had committed electoral law violations and Narayan addressed a massive demonstration in New Delhi, at Indira Gandhi's behest, the president proclaimed an Emergency on June 25, 1975. That night, Indira Gandhi ordered the arrest of almost all the leaders of the opposition, including dissidents within the Congress. In all, more than 110,000 persons were detained without trial during the Emergency. Indira Gandhi's rule during the Emergency alienated her popular support. After postponing elections for a year following
the expiration of the five-year term of the Lok Sabha, she called for new elections in March 1977. The major opposition party leaders, many of whom had developed a rapport while they were imprisoned together under the Emergency regime, united under the banner of the Janata Party. By framing the key issue of the election as "democracy versus dictatorship," the Janata Party--the largest opposition party--appealed to the public's democratic values to rout the Congress (R). The vote share of the Congress (R) dropped to 34.5 percent, and the number of its seats in Parliament plunged from 352 to 154. Indira Gandhi lost her seat. The inability of Janata Party factions to agree proved the party's undoing. Indira Gandhi returned to win the January 1980 elections after forming a new party, the Congress (I--for Indira), in 1978. The Congress (I) largely succeeded in reconstructing the traditional Congress electoral support base of Brahmans (see Glossary), Muslims, Scheduled Castes, and Scheduled Tribes that had kept Congress in power in New Delhi during the three decades prior to 1977. The Congress (I)'s share of the vote increased by 8.2 percent to 42.7 percent of the total vote, and its number of seats in the Lok Sabha grew to 353, a majority of about two-thirds. This success approximated the levels of support of the Congress dominance from 1947 to 1967. Yet, as political scientist Myron Weiner observed, "The Congress party that won in 1980 was not the Congress party that had governed India in the 1950s and 1960s, or even the early 1970s. The party was organizationally weak and the electoral victory was primarily Mrs. Gandhi's rather than the party's." As a consequence, the Congress's appeal to its supporters was much more tenuous than it had been in previous decades. Indira Gandhi's dependence on her flamboyant son Sanjay and, after his accidental death in 1980, on her more reserved son Rajiv gives testimony to the personalization and centralization of power within the Congress (I). Having developed a means to mobilize support without a party organization, she paid little attention to maintaining that support. Rather than allowing intraparty elections to resolve conflicts and select party leaders, Indira Gandhi preferred to fill party posts herself with those loyal
112
113
to her. As a result, party leaders at the state level lost their legitimacy among the rank and file because their positions depended on the whims of Indira Gandhi rather than on the extent of their popular support. In addition, centralization and the demise of democracy within the party disrupted the flow of information about local circumstances to party leaders and curtailed the ability of the Congress (I) to adjust to social change and incorporate new leaders. When Rajiv Gandhi took control after his mother's assassination in November 1984, he attempted to breathe new life into the Congress (I) organization. However, the massive electoral victory that the Congress (I) scored under Rajiv's leadership just two months after his mother's assassination gave him neither the skill nor the authority to succeed in this endeavor. Rajiv did, however, attempt to remove the more unsavory elements within the party organization. He denied nominations to one-third of the incumbent members of Parliament during the 1984 Lok Sabha campaign, and he refused to nominate two of every five incumbents in the state legislative assembly elections held in March 1985. Another of Rajiv's early successes was the passage of the AntiDefection Bill in January 1985 in an effort to end the bribery that lured legislators to cross partisan lines. Speaking at the Indian National Congress centenary celebrations in Bombay (officially called Mumbai as of 1995), Rajiv launched a vitriolic attack on the "culture of corruption" that had become so pervasive in the Congress (I). However, the old guard showed little enthusiasm for reform. As time passed, Rajiv's position was weakened by the losses that the party suffered in a series of state assembly elections and by his government's involvement in corruption scandals. Ultimately, Rajiv was unable to overcome the resistance within the party to internal elections and reforms. Ironically, as Rajiv's position within the party weakened, he turned for advice to many of the wheelers and dealers of his mother's regime whom he had previously banished. The frustration of Rajiv Gandhi's promising early initiatives meant that the Congress (I) had no issues on which to campaign as the end of his five-year term approached. On May 15, 1989, just months before its term was to expire, the Congress (I) introduced amendments that proposed to decentralize government authority
to panchayat and municipal government institutions. Opposition parties, many of whom were on record as favoring decentralization of government power, vehemently resisted the Congress (I) initiative. They charged that the initiative did not truly decentralize power but instead enabled the central government to circumvent state governments (many of which were controlled by the opposition) by transferring authority from state to local government and strengthening the links between central and local governments. After the Congress (I) failed to win the two-thirds vote required to pass the legislation in the Rajya Sabha on October 13, 1989, it called for new parliamentary elections and made "jana shakti" (power to the people) its main campaign slogan. The Congress (I) retained formidable campaign advantages over the opposition. The October 17, 1989, announcement of elections took the opposition parties by surprise and gave them little time to form electoral alliances. The Congress (I) also blatantly used the government-controlled television and radio to promote Rajiv Gandhi. In addition, the Congress (I) campaign once again enjoyed vastly superior financing. It distributed some 100,000 posters and 15,000 banners to each of its 510 candidates. It provided every candidate with six or seven vehicles, and it commissioned advertising agencies to make a total of ten video films to promote its campaign. The results of the 1989 elections were more of a rebuff to the Congress (I) than a mandate for the opposition. Although the Congress (I) remained the largest party in Parliament with 197 seats, it was unable to form a government. Instead, the Janata Dal, which had 143 seats, united with its National Front allies to form a minority government precariously dependent on the support of the BJP (eighty-five seats) and the communist parties (forty-five seats). Although the Congress (I) lost more than 50 percent of its seats in Parliament, its share of the vote dropped only from 48.1 percent to 39.5 percent of the vote. The Congress (I) share of the vote was still more than double that of the next largest party, the Janata Dal, which received support from 17.8 percent of the electorate. More grave for the long-term future of the Congress (I) was the erosion of vital elements of the traditional coalition of support for the Congress (I) in North India. Alienated by the
114
115
Congress (I)'s cultivation of Hindu activists, Muslims defected to the Janata Dal in large numbers. The Congress (I) simultaneously lost a substantial share of Scheduled Caste voters to the BSP in Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh and to the Indian People's Front in Bihar. To offset these losses, the Congress (I) attempted to play a "Hindu card." On August 14, 1989, the Supreme Court ruled that no parties or groups could disturb the status quo of the Babri Masjid, a sixteenth-century mosque in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh. The mosque was controversial because Hindu nationalists claim it was on the site of the birthplace of the Hindu god Ram and that, as such, the use by Muslims was sacrilegious (see Vishnu, ch. 3). Despite the court ruling, in September the Congress (I) entered into an agreement with the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP--World Hindu Council), a conservative religious organization with close ties to Hindu nationalists, to allow the VHP to proceed with a ceremony to lay the foundation for the Ramjanmabhumi (birthplace of Ram) Temple. (The VHP had been working toward this goal since 1984.) In return, the Congress (I) secured the VHP's agreement to perform the ceremony on property adjacent to the Babri Masjid that was not in dispute. By reaching this agreement, the Congress (I) attempted to appeal to Hindu activists while retaining Muslim support. Rajiv Gandhi's decision to kick off his campaign less than six kilometers from the Babri Masjid and his appeal to voters that they vote for the Congress (I) if they wished to bring about "Ram Rajya" (the rule of Ram) were other elements of the Congress (I)'s strategy to attract the Hindu vote (see Political Issues, this ch.) The 1991 elections returned the Congress (I) to power but did not reverse important trends in the party's decline. The Congress (I) won 227 seats, up from 197 in 1989, but its share of the vote dropped from 39.5 percent in 1989 to 37.6 percent. Greater division within the opposition rather than growing popularity of the Congress (I) was the key element in the party's securing an increased number of seats. Also troubling was the further decline of the Congress (I) in heavily populated Bihar and Uttar Pradesh,
which together account for more than 25 percent of all seats in Parliament. In Uttar Pradesh, the number of seats that the Congress (I) was able to win went down from fifteen to two, and its share of the vote dropped from 32 percent to 20 percent. In Bihar the seats won by the Congress (I) fell from four to one, and the Congress (I) share of the vote was reduced from 28 percent to 22 percent. The Congress (I) problems in these states, which until 1989 had been bastions of its strength, were reinforced by the party's poor showing in the November 1993 state elections. These elections were characterized by the further disintegration of the traditional Congress coalition, with Brahmans and other upper castes defecting to the BJP and Scheduled Castes and Muslims defecting to the Janata Dal, the Samajwadi Party (Socialist Party), and the BSP. Strong evidence indicates that the Congress (I) would have fared significantly worse had it not been for the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in the middle of the elections. A wave of sympathy similar to that which helped elect Rajiv after the assassination of his mother increased the Congress (I) support. In the round of voting that took place before Rajiv's death, the Congress (I) won only 26 percent of the seats and 33 percent of the vote. In the votes that occurred after Rajiv's death, the Congress (I) won 58 percent of the seats and 40 percent of the popular vote. It may also be that Rajiv's demise ended the "anti-Congressism" that had pervaded the political system as a result of his family's dynastic domination of Indian politics through its control over the Congress. Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by a Tamil suicide bomber affiliated with the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) during a political campaign in May 1991. Only after his assassination did hope for reforming the Congress (I) reappear. The end of three generations of Nehru-Gandhi family leadership left Rajiv's coterie of political manipulators in search of a new kingpin. The bankruptcy of the Congress (I) leadership was highlighted by the fact that they initially turned to Sonia Gandhi, Rajiv's
116
117
Italian-born wife, to lead the party. Sonia's primary qualification was that she was Rajiv's widow. She had never held elected office and, during her early years in India, she had expressed great disdain for political life. However, although she did not assume a leadership role, she continued to be seen as a "kingmaker" in the Congress (I). Her advice was sought after, and she was called on to lead the party in the mid-1990s. An unusual public speech by Sonia Gandhi criticizing the government of P.V. Narasimha Rao in August 1995 further fueled speculation that she was a candidate for political leadership. Sonia Gandhi's refusal in 1991 to become president of the Congress (I) led the mantle of party leadership to fall on Rao. Rao was a septuagenarian former professor who had retired from politics before the 1991 elections after undergoing heart-bypass surgery. Rao had a conciliatory demeanor and was acceptable to the party's contending factions. Paradoxically, the precariously positioned Rao was able to take more substantial steps in the direction of party reform than his predecessors. First, Rao had to demonstrate that he could mobilize popular support for himself and the party, a vital currency of power for any Congress (I) leader. He did so in the November 15, 1991, by-elections by winning his own seat in Andhra Pradesh unopposed and leading the party to victory in a total of eight of the fifteen parliamentary byelections. By the end of 1991, Rao had succeeded in initiating the first intraparty elections in the Congress in almost twenty years. Although there was widespread manipulation by local party bosses, the elections enhanced the legitimacy of party leaders and held forth the prospect of a rejuvenated party organization. The process culminated in April 1992 at the All-India Congress (I) Committee at Tirupati, Andhra Pradesh, where elections were held for the ten vacant seats in the Congress Working Committee. In the wake of the Tirupati session, Rao became less interested in promoting party democracy and more concerned with consolidating his own position. The change was especially apparent in the 1993 All-India Congress (I) Committee session at Surajkund
(in Haryana), where Rao's supporters lavishly praised the prime minister and coercively silenced his opponents. However, Rao's image was damaged in July 1993 after Harshad Mehta, a stockbroker under indictment for allegedly playing a leading role in a US$2 billion stock scam in 1992, accused Rao of personally accepting a bribe that he had delivered on November 4, 1991. The extent of the press coverage of the charges and their apparent credibility among the public was evidence of the pervasive public cynicism toward politicians. Rao's stock in the party and Congress (I)'s position within Parliament were greatly weakened. On July 28, 1993, his government barely survived a noconfidence motion in the Lok Sabha. Rao's position was temporarily strengthened at the end of 1993 when he was able to cobble together a parliamentary majority. However, support for Rao and the Congress (I) declined again in 1994. The party was rocked by a scandal relating to the procurement of sugar stocks that cost the government an estimated Rs6.5 billion (US$210 million; for value of the rupee--see Glossary) and by losses in legislative assembly elections in Andhra Pradesh--Rao's home state, where he personally took control over the campaign--and Karnataka. The Congress (I) again lost in three of four major states in elections held in the spring of 1995. The political fallout in New Delhi was an increase in dissident activity within the Congress (I) led by former cabinet members Narain Dutt Tiwari and Arjun Singh and other Rao rivals who sought to split the Congress and form a new party. The Party boasts of the leadership of what can be said the first political family of the country. The dynasty goes back to the time of Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister. His daughter, Indira Gandhi, active during the years of the freedom struggle was the natural heir to the throne. The suspension of democratic institutions during emergency earned her many critics and also led to the birth of many antiCongress factions. Indira Gandhi was assassinated in 1984. Rajiv Gandhi, then a political novice, swept the polls through the apparent sympathy wave. His tragic assassination again brought
118
119
the Congress to power in 1991, with PV Narasimha Rao as the Prime Minister. The Congress popularity nose-dived mainly due to the involvement of its leaders, including Narasimha Rao, in the vote buying case during a confidence vote and other corruption charges. In 1999 Mrs. Sonia Gandhi entered politics and took the reins of the party. This was the time when the party most needed the support of the Nehru-Gandhi Family. Now she has matured in the game and is again leading the party in General Elections 2004. The party in her leadership plans the comeback to power. The main agendas are: o Generation of more jobs o Eradication of poverty o Step up public investment in agriculture o One-third reservation for women o Commission for the problems of North Eastern States BAHUJAN SAMAJ PARTY The BSP was formed in 1984 by Kanshi Ram who has remained party leader ever since. The party emerged from Kanshi Ram's earlier activity promoting the interests of Scheduled Caste government employees. Kanshi Ram was able to promote the organisation in the states of Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana and Madhya Pradesh. Although the BSP is recognised by the Election Commission as a national party it effectively functions on certain North Indian states only. Its ideology is based on the argument that the majority are oppressed by the select upper class. It aims to change this using the government power. Mayawati and Kanshi Ram are the two key figures of the party. The BSP first entered the election fray in 1984 but didnot do well. It started to rise in the post alliances era. While in power in 1995, the BSP was clouded in several controversies. It still has risen with it's limited following based on the cast credentials. Its single point program is the upliftment of dalits.
SAMTA PARTY Samata Party was formed in 1994 when a faction lead by George Fernandes and Nitish Kumar broke away from Janta Dal. The reason was that the party ideology had shifted to casteism. George Fernades rose to fame during 1977-79 for his opposition to multinational companies. He was the key figure behind packing off Coca cola from India then. He campaigned against BJP calling it a communal party. In 1996 Samata Party came into alliance with BJP and won on eight seats, six in Bihar and one each in Uttar Pradesh and Orissa. Before this it was largely based in Bihar only. In 1998 elections again in alliance with BJP it won twelve seats, ten from Bihar and two from Uttar Pradesh. Since then the two leaders George Fernandes and Nitish Kumar were Union Ministers in the NDA government; George Fernandes the Defence Minister and Nitish Kumar the Railway Minister. More recently with yet another split in Janta Dal, SP has been able to rope in Janta Dal Led by Sharad Yadav, Lok Shakti led by Ramakrishna Hegde and Samata Party on a single platform for the NDA. In October 2003, it announced that it will be merging with the Janata Dal (United) Party. It is part of the ruling coalition the National Democratic Alliance. The main agendas are: o Oppose and end communalism o Eradicate corruption at all levels o Increased security of the nation COMMUNIST PARTIES The Communist Party of India (CPI) was founded on December 26, 1925, at an all-India conference held at Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh, in late December 1925 and early January 1926. Communists participated in the independence struggle and, as members of the Congress Socialist Party, became a formidable presence on the socialist wing of the Indian National Congress. They were expelled from the Congress Socialist Party in March 1940, after allegations that the communists had disrupted party activities and were intent on co-opting party organizations. Indeed, by the time the communists were expelled, they had gained control over the entire
120
121
Congress Socialist Party units in what were to become the southern states of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh. Communists remained members of the Indian National Congress although their support of the British war effort after the German invasion of the Soviet Union and their nationalist policy supporting the right of religious minorities to secede from India were diametrically opposed to Congress policies. As a result, the communists became isolated within the Congress. After independence, communists organized a peasant uprising in the Telangana region in the northern part of what was to become Andhra Pradesh. The uprising was suppressed only after the central government sent in the army. Starting in 1951, the CPI shifted to a more moderate strategy of seeking to bring communism to India within the constraints of Indian democracy. In 1957 the CPI was elected to rule the state government of Kerala only to have the government dismissed and President's Rule declared in 1959. In 1964, in conjunction with the widening rift between China and the Soviet Union, a large leftist faction of the CPI leadership, based predominantly in Kerala and West Bengal, split from the party to form the Communist Party of India (Marxist), or CPI (M). The CPI (M)-led coalition victory in the 1967 West Bengal state elections spurred dissension within the party because a Maoist faction headed a peasant rebellion in the Naxalbari area of the state, just south of Darjiling (Darjeeling). The suppression of the Naxalbari uprising under the direction of the CPI (M)-controlled Home Ministry of the state government led to denunciations by Maoist revolutionary factions across the country. These groups--commonly referred to as Naxalites-sparked new uprisings in the Srikakulam region of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, and other parts of West Bengal. In 1969 several Naxalite factions joined together to form a new party--the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)--CPI (ML). However, pursuit of insurrectionary tactics in the face of harsh repression by the government along with an array of ideological disputes kept Naxalite factions isolated in their local bases.
In the 1990s, the CPI (M) enjoys the most political strength of any communist group. Nationally, its share of the vote has gradually increased from 4.2 percent in 1967 to 6.7 percent in 1991, but it has largely remained confined to Kerala, Tripura, and West Bengal. In Kerala the CPI (M) in coalition with other parties wrested control from the Congress and its allies (frequently including the CPI) in 1967, in 1980, and in 1987. Support for the CPI (M) in Kerala in general elections has ranged from 19 percent to 26 percent, but the party has never won more than nine of Kerala's twenty seats in Parliament. From 1977 to 1989, the CPI (M) dominated Tripura's state government. It won two parliamentary seats in 1971, 1980, and 1984, but it lost all of its seats in 1977, 1989, and 1991. In West Bengal, the CPI (M) has ruled the state government with a coalition of other leftist parties since 1977, and, since that time, the party has also dominated West Bengal's parliamentary delegation. Support for the CPI is more evenly spread nationwide, but it is weak and in decline. The CPI share of the parliamentary vote has more than halved from 5.2 percent in 1967 to 2.5 percent in 1991. In 1982 a CPI (M-L) faction entered the parliamentary arena by forming the Indian People's Front. In the 1989 general elections, the front won a parliamentary seat in western Bihar, and in 1990 it won seven seats in the Bihar legislative assembly. However, the Indian People's Front lost its parliamentary seat in the 1991 parliamentary elections when its vote in Bihar declined by some 20 percent. Leded by Somnath Chatterjee, the CPI-M took 5,5% of vote in last legislative election (May 2004) and it has 53 MPs. It formed with the Communist Party of India (CPI), and two other left-wing groups, the Left Front, that has 59 MPs and 7,6%. They support new India National Congress' government, but without taking part in it. JANTA DAL Janata Dal is an Indian political party which broke off from the the Janata Party. It first came to power in 1989, after allegations of corruption, known as the Bofors affair, caused Rajiv Gandhi's Congress (I) to lose the elections. The National Front coalition that was formed consisted of the Janata Dal and a few smaller parties
122
123
in the government, and had outside support from the BJP and the Communists. V. P. Singh was the Prime Minister. In November 1990, this coalition collapsed, and a new government headed by Chandra Shekhar which had the support of the Congress (I) and a faction of the Janata Dal came to power. This coalition fell shortly causing new elections in June 1991 which brought the Congress back to power. Its second spell of power started in 1996, when the Janata Dalled United Front coalition came to power, with outside support from the Congress, choosing H. D. Deve Gowda as their Prime Minister. Congress (I) withdrew their support in less than a year, hoping to gain power with the support of various United Front constituent groups, and Inder Kumar Gujral became the next Janata Dal Prime Minister. His government fell in a few months, and in February 1998, the Janata Dal-led coalition lost power to the BJP. This party has had several splits. Amongst the larger splinter groups include the Rashtriya Janata Dal, which rules the state of Bihar, and the Janata Dal United Party, whose leader George Fernandes is India's Defense Minister. Several smaller splinter groups also exist. NATIONALIST CONGRESS PARTY The Nationalist Congress Party was formed on May 25, 1999, by Sharad Pawar, P.A. Sangma, and Tariq Anwar after they were expelled from the Congress (I) Party for questioning why Sonia Gandhi should be leader, when she was born an Italian citizen. In January 2004, Sangma quit the NCP to join with NEPF as Sharad Pawar was getting closer to NCP's enemy Sonia Gandhi. The NCP considers itself a progressive, secular party that stands for "democracy, Gandhian secularism, equity, social justice, and federalism." It positions itself as a moderate, left-leaning alternative to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Congress. The party's election symbol is an analog clock that reads 10:00. NCP Policies: o Establishment of a national agricultural policy o Establishment of a national policy to empower women o Review and revision to the national health policy to add a separate sub-component on women's health
o Integrated implementation of a national nutrition policy to merge and coordinate various services provided by different government departments and agencies o Citizenship law reform to stipulate that high offices in government be confined to natural-born Indian citizens o Reserving for women one-third of the seats in parliament and in state legislatures o Enactment of a competition law to protect against corrupt practices o Enactment of a bio-diversity law to protect bio-diversity and intellectual property o Enactment of a law establishing an independent telecasting authority
124
State, Regional, Cast Based Political Parties
125
4
STATE, REGIONAL, CAST BASED POLITICAL PARTIES
INTRODUCTION Given India's social, cultural, and historical diversity, it is only natural that regional parties play an important role in the country's political life. Because of India's federal system, state assembly votes are held in an electoral arena that often enables regional parties to obtain power by espousing issues of regional concern. Simultaneously, the single-member district, first-pastthe-post electoral system has given the advantage to national parties, such as the Congress, which possess a realistic chance of gaining or retaining power at the national level and the opportunity to use central government resources to reward their supporters. Although regional parties have exercised authority at the state level, collectively they receive only from 5 to 10 percent of the national vote in parliamentary elections. Only during the governments of the Janata Party (1977-79) and the National Front (1989-90) have they participated in forming the central government. However, as India's party system becomes more fragmented with the decline of the Congress (I), the regional parties are likely to play an important role at the national level. Regional political parties have been strongest in Tamil Nadu, where they have dominated state politics since 1967. Regional parties in the state trace their roots to the establishment of the Justice Party by non-Brahman social elites in 1916 and the development of the non-Bhraman Self-Respect Movement, founded in 1925 by E.V. Ramaswamy Naicker. As leader of the
Justice Party, in 1944 Ramaswamy renamed the party the Dravida Kazhagam (DK--Dravidian Federation) and demanded the establishment of an independent state called Dravidasthan. In 1949, charismatic film script writer C.N. Annadurai, who was chafing under Ramaswamy's authoritarian leadership, split from the DK to found the DMK in an attempt to achieve the goals of Tamil nationalism through the electoral process. The DMK dropped its demand for Dravidasthan in 1963 but played a prominent role in the agitations that successfully defeated attempts to impose the northern Indian language of Hindi as the official national language in the mid-1960s. The DMK routed the Congress in the 1967 elections in Tamil Nadu and took control of the state government. With the deterioration of Annadurai's health, another screen writer, M. Karunanidhi, became chief minster in 1968 and took control of the party after Annadurai's death in 1969. Karunanidhi's control over the party was soon challenged by M.G. Ramachandran (best known by his initials, M.G.R.), one of South India's most popular film stars. In 1972 M.G.R. split from the DMK to form the All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK). Under his leadership, the AIADMK dominated Tamil politics at the state level from 1977 through 1989. The importance of personal charisma in Tamil politics was dramatized by the struggle for control over the AIADMK after M.G.R's death in 1988. His widow, Janaki, herself a former film star, vied for control with Jayalalitha, an actress who had played M.G.R.'s leading lady in several films. The rivalry allowed the DMK to gain control over the state government in 1989. The AIADMK, securely under the control of Jayalalitha, who was cast as a "revolutionary leader," recaptured the state government in 1991. However, since 1980, the Congress (I), usually in alliance with the AIADMK, has won a majority of Tamil Nadu's seats in Parliament. After three decades of Congress rule, the politics of Andhra Pradesh during the 1980s also became dominated by a charismatic film star who stressed regional issues. In 1982 N.T. Rama Rao (popularly known as N.T.R.), an actor who frequently played Hindu deities in Telugu-language films, formed the Telugu Desam. The party ruled the state from 1983 to 1989. It also won thirty of Andhra Pradesh's forty-two parliamentary seats in 1984. With the
126
127
objective of enhancing Andhra Pradesh's regional autonomy, N.T.R. played a key role in the formation of the National Front coalition government in 1989. However, in the 1989 elections, the Telugu Desam won only two parliamentary seats and lost control over the state government to the Congress (I). It was able to improve its showing to thirteen seats in Parliament in the 1991 elections. The Telugu Desam returned to power in Andhra Pradesh after winning the state legislative assembly elections in November 1994. The Akali Dal (Eternal Party) claims to represent India's Sikhs, who are concentrated primarily in Punjab. It was first formed in the early 1920s to return control of gurdwaras (Sikh places of worship) to the orthodox Sikh religious community. During the 1960s, the Akali Dal played an important role in the struggle for the creation of Punjab as a separate state with a Sikh majority. Even with the majority Sikh population, the Akali Dal's political success has been limited by the Congress's ability to win votes from the Sikh community. The Akali Dal won nine of Punjab's thirteen parliamentary seats in the general elections of 1977 and seven in 1984 but only one in the 1971 and 1980 elections. Similarly, the Akali Dal headed coalition state governments in 1967 and 1977 and formed the state government in 1985, but it lost state government elections to the Congress (R) in 1972, and to Congress (I) in 1980 and in 1992. As the 1980s progressed, the Akali Dal became increasingly factionalized. In 1989 three Akali Dal factions ran in the elections, winning a total of seven seats. The Akali Dal factions boycotted parliamentary and state legislative elections that were held in February 1992. As a result, voter turnout dropped to 21.6 percent, and the Congress (I) won twelve of Punjab's thirteen seats in Parliament and a majority of seats in the legislative assembly. The National Conference, based in Jammu and Kashmir, is a regional party, which, despite its overwhelmingly Muslim following, refused to support the All-India Muslim League (Muslim League--see Glossary) during the independence movement; instead it allied itself with the Indian National Congress. The National Conference was closely identified with its leader, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, a personal friend of Nehru, and, after
Abdullah's death in 1982, with his son, Farooq Abdullah. Friendship, however, did not prevent Nehru from imprisoning Sheikh Abdullah when he became concerned that the "Lion of Kashmir" was disposed to demand independence for his state. Ultimately, Sheikh Abdullah struck a deal with Indira Gandhi, and in 1975 he became chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir. The National Conference remained Jammu and Kashmir's dominant party through the 1980s and maintained control over the state government for most of the period. In parliamentary elections, it won one of Kashmir's six parliamentary seats in 1967, none in 1971, two in 1977, and three in 1980, 1984, and 1989. However, popular support for the National Conference was badly eroded by allegations of electoral fraud in the 1987 state elections-which were won by the National Conference in alliance with the Congress (I)--and the widespread corruption of the subsequent state government under the leadership of Farooq Abdullah. There was little popular sympathy for Farooq Abdullah and the National Conference even after the government was dissolved and President's Rule declared in 1990. Jammu and Kashmir remained under President's Rule through 1995, and the absence of elections makes it difficult to ascertain the extent of the National Conference's popular support. Nevertheless, it appears that Farooq and the National Conference remain discredited. During the late 1980s, the AGP rose to power in Assam on the crest of Assamese nationalism. Immigration to Assam-primarily by Muslim Bengalis from neighboring Bangladesh--had aroused concern that the Assamese would become a minority in their own state. By 1979 attention was focused on the controversial issue of determining how many immigrants would be allowed on the state's list of eligible voters. The Congress (I), which gained a substantial share of the immigrants' votes, took a more expansive view of who should be included while the Assamese nationalist organizations demanded a more restrictive position. An attempt to hold state elections in February 1983, and in effect to force the Assamese nationalists to accept the status quo, resulted in a breakdown of law and order and the deaths of more than 3,000 people. The subsequent formation of a Congress (I) government
128
129
led by Hiteshwar Saikia was widely viewed in Assam as illegitimate, and it was dissolved as part of the terms of the Assam Accord that was signed between Rajiv Gandhi and Assamese nationalists on August 15, 1985. The Assam Accord also included a compromise on the voter eligibility issue, settled the issue of the citizenship status of immigrants, and stipulated that new elections were to be held in December. The AGP was formed by Assamese student leaders after the signing of the accord, and the new party won the December 1985 elections with 35 percent of the vote and sixty-four of 108 seats in the state legislature. The victory of the AGP did not end the controversy over Assamese nationalism. The AGP was unable to implement the accord's provisions for disenfranchising and expelling illegal aliens, in part because Parliament passed legislation making it more difficult to prove illegal alien status. The AGP's failure to implement the accord along with the general ineffectiveness with which it operated the state government undercut its popular support, and in November 1990 it was dismissed and President's Rule declared. As the AGP floundered, other nationalist groups of agitators flourished. The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) became the primary torchbearer of militant Assamese nationalism while the All Bodo Students' Union (ABSU) and Bodo People's Action Committee (BPAC) led an agitation for a separate homeland for the central plain tribal people of Assam (often called Bodos). By 1990 ULFA militants ran virtually a parallel government in the state, extorting huge sums from businesses in Assam, especially the Assamese tea industry. The ULFA was ultimately subdued through a shrewd combination of ruthless military repression and generous terms of surrender for many of its leaders. The ABSU/BPAC-led mass agitation lasted from March 1987 until February 1993 when the ABSU signed an accord with the state government that had been under the Congress (I) control since 1991. The accord provided for the creation of a Bodoland Autonomous Council with jurisdiction over an area of 5,186 square kilometers and 2.1 million people within Assam. Nevertheless, Bodo agitation continued in the mid-1990s as a result of the demands of many Bodo leaders, who insisted that more territory be included under the Bodoland Autonomous Council.
Caste-Based Parties One irony of Indian politics is that its modern secular democracy has enhanced rather than reduced the political salience of traditional forms of social identity such as caste. Part of the explanation for this development is that India's political parties have found the caste-based selection of candidates and appeals to the caste-based interests of the Indian electorate to be an effective way to win popular support. More fundamental has been the economic development and social mobility of those groups officially designated as Backward Classes and Scheduled Castes. Accounting for 52 and 15 percent of the population, respectively, the Backward Classes and Scheduled Castes, or Dalits as they prefer to be called, constitute a diverse range of middle, lower, and outcaste groups who have come to wield substantial power in most states. Indeed, one of the dramas of modern Indian politics has been the Backward Classes and Dalits' jettisoning of their political subordination to upper castes and their assertion of their own interests. The Backward Classes are such a substantial constituency that almost all parties vie for their support. For instance, the Congress (I) in Maharashtra has long relied on Backward Classes' backing for its political success. The 1990s have seen a growing number of cases where parties, relying primarily on Backward Classes' support, often in alliance with Dalits and Muslims, catapult to power in India's states. Janata Dal governments in Bihar and Karnataka are excellent examples of this strategy. An especially important development is the success of the Samajwadi Party, which under the leadership of Mulayam Singh Yadav won the 1993 assembly elections in India's most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, relying almost exclusively on Backward Classes and Muslim support in a coalition with the Dalit-supported BSP. The growing support of the BSP also reflects the importance of caste-based politics and the assertiveness of the Dalits in particular. The BSP was founded by Kanshi Ram on April 13, 1984, the birthday of B.R. Ambedkar. Born as a Dalit in Punjab, Kanshi Ram resigned from his position as a government employee in 1964 and, after working in various political positions, founded the All-India Backward, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Other
130
131
Backward Classes, and Minority Communities Employees Federation (BAMCEF) in 1978. Although both the BAMCEF and BSP pursue strategies of building support among Backward Classes, Scheduled Tribes, and Muslims as well as Dalits, Kanshi Ram has been most successful in building support among the Dalit Chamar (Leatherworker) caste in North India. In the November 1993 Uttar Pradesh state elections, Ram's BSP achieved the best showing of any Dalit-based party by winning sixty-seven seats. At the same time, the BSP increased its representation in the Madhya Pradesh state legislature from two to twelve seats. On June 1, 1995, the BSP withdrew from the state government of Uttar Pradesh and, with the support of the BJP, formed a new government, making its leader, Mayawati, the first Dalit ever to become a chief minister of Uttar Pradesh. Observers as doomed because of political differences, however, saw the alliance. State parties: o All India Forward Bloc o All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam o Akali Dal o Asom Gana Parishad o Bihar Peoples Party o Biju Janata Dal o Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam o Himachal Vikas Congress o Indian National League o Indian National Lok Dal o Janata Dal (Secular) o Janata Dal United Party o Jharkhand Mukthi Morcha o Kerala Congress (Mani faction) o Muslim League o National Conference o People's Democratic Party o Revolutionary Socialist Party
o Rashtriya Janata Dal o Rashtriya Lok Dal o Samajwadi Party o Telugu Desam Party o Telangana Rashtra Samiti o Trinamool Congress o Shiv Sena ROLE OF PRESSURE GROUPS AND INTEREST GROUPS Interest Group According to Bentely society is nothing more than the complex of groups that compose it. 'Social system is a sort of mosaic of groups. It is, therefore, through it that the various groups seek to realise or maximise their interests. A groups may be defined as 'a certain portion of the men of a society, taken, however, not as a physical mass cut from other masses of men, but as a mass of activity, which does not preclude the men who participate in it from participating like wise in many other group activities.' A group represented a pattern of processes rather than a static from. A group, as such emerges only when the interaction among its individual members are both relatively by one group upon certain other groups, in a social system. Group, thus is mass of activity directed by interest, and the social system, which consists of a large number of groups, makes the arena for the interaction of group activity. Therefore we may say that it is the interest, which leads to the organization of groups. Political parties, as we know, are the organizations for all kinds of political activities. Besides political parties, people who hold similar views and interests may form an organisation to translate their views or interests into reality. These groups or organizations may be religious, social, political, occupational or commercial. Some groups are organised at the national level while some are at the state or local level. But each one is organised to protect and further some particular interest of its members. Some of the interest groups are well organised while some are not. Today in every country, particularly in democracy, we see a
132
133
bewildering number of such groups. There are consumer societies to solve the problems of consumers, the bus passengers association to solve the problems of bus passengers of a region, the parents and teachers association to solve the problems of students and schools etc. These are called interest groups. They are formed to protect some particular interest. A person can be a member of different associations simultaneously. These interest groups mayor may not indulge in political activities. Their mission is to protect their particular interest for which it was formed. Interest groups, therefore, are associations formed by a group of like-minded people to protect and further some specific interest or interests. Pressure Groups Pressure groups are those interest groups, which directly or indirectly exert pressure on the political and administrative machinery of the nation in order to win a decision in their favour. Pressure groups are not political organisations. They do not nominate their members for election nor do they intend to capture governmental powers. They only influence public policy by pressure tactics to safeguard their specific interests. They pressurise the party leaders, members of the legislature or some influential bureaucrats or whoever can tilt the policy and decisions of the government in their favour. Although, the type of groups and the method they employ vary from one political system to another. Groups are involved significantly in the decision-making process in all countries. Some of the pressure groups are well organised and wield lot of power and influence. The national association of manufacturers in the United States is an example. It is an organisation of the big business groups and spend. millions of dollars to influence the governmental decisions. In Kerala we have many such pressure groups organised and unorganised, strong and weak. The Merchants association, Private Bus owners association, various trade unions, students union, MES, NSS, SNDP, etc are examples of pressure groups. Each pressure group has its own interest to protect and to achieve that; a change in the policy or decision of government may be necessary.
This is achieved by exerting pressure on the individuals and parties who can bring about the desired results. Therefore, any interest group using pressure tactics as a means to achieve their ends may be called a pressure group. The pressure groups are very active in all democratic countries. There are informal and formal interest groups. Since almost invariably, formal groups are better organized, financially and numerically stronger, and more likely to have developed contacts with public officials than informal groups, they would seem to provide most effective channel for influencing the government. Some of the pressure groups are formed to achieve a specific purpose. They are called 'single issue' or 'ad-hoc pressure groups. Some others are organized on permanent basis. In modern society, pressure groups can be found among the numerous voluntary associations, such as labor unions, trades associations, and reform groups, that have some intercst at stake in politics. However, essentially the same phenomenon as the modern pressure-group existed in other times when society was not so mobile and associations not so voluntary. "Almost every interest in medieval society," writes Helen Gam "almost every element in its make-up, has left its trace on the legislation of council and parliament." She listed the principal sources of legislative activity as: "The directive or planning urge in the ruler, the need for clarifying and defining experience by the judicature, and the demand from the ruled for redress of grievances. " This last source, "public" demand, meant, especially by the end of the fifteenth century, about what it means today, although the interests have changed somewhat. The medieval pressure-groups were the legal profession, the clergy, the nobility, the landowners, the sheriffs and bailiffs, the merchants, and the leaders of localities. Also, developing continuously as an influence on lawmaking through the late medieval and early modern periods was the notion of the commonweal, often a mere pretense or rationalization and yet often truly advanced. Modern pressure-groups have grown in close relation to the various party systems. When there are many parties, a number of such interest groups can be absorbed into the party system. Then the problem of pressure groups becomes almost inextricable
134
135
from the general study of the political parties. In England, where one kind of two-party system exists, pressure groups play a role different from the role they play in America, where another kind of two-party system exists. In England, until recently, a small group drawn from the same social class had been able to represent dominant landed, religious and commercial interests. Many members of Parliament incarnated the values that might have otherwise prompted strong and numerous pressure groups. But in America, society has been for a long time relatively classless. The politician has been an individualist, footloose by comparison with his British counterpart, free to bargain and willing to deal with a variety of opposing groups. Furthermore, the American economy is tremendously diversified, the population exceedingly heterogeneous, and the political structure greatly decentralized and unintegrated. The formal structure of the government cannot reflect faithfully any large part of the interests, which must seek informal ways of influencing the government. TYPES OF INTEREST/PRESSURE GROUP Categories Defined by Purpose Within the broad definition of interest groups, two polar types are recognizable: first, interest groups proper, such as trade unions, farmers' unions, and employers' associations, which have as their primary purpose the enhancement of the advantage of their members; and, second, promotional groups, such as the societies for the prevention of cruelty to children or various voluntary relief agencies, which exist primarily or entirely to enhance the advantage not of their own members but of the population, even perhaps to the discomfort or disadvantage of their own members. Some of these, such as churches or various evangelizing groups, exist to promulgate a distinctive set of values to be applied to society as a whole. The distinction between interest groups proper and promotional groups is not sharp for two reasons. In the first place, most interest groups proper sincerely believe that in furthering their own material advantage they are also serving that of society as a whole--by promoting "free enterprise" or a healthy and wealthy body of farmers or a well-paid and enthusiastic corps of
schoolteachers. But the propagation of such beliefs is certainly not the primary purpose of such organizations, thus distinguishing them from promotional groups. The second reason is that some groups--for instance, organized churches--fall between the two types; they can simultaneously pursue advantages for their own sect and seek to inculcate a distinctive set of values in a whole society. Categories Defined by Structure In primitive or developing societies, the most prominent type of interest group is the natural (i.e., primordial or communal) one-that is, one based on kinship, lineage, neighbourhood, or religious confession. In Western, industrialized societies, though such groups do sometimes retain influence (as do the nationalities in Latvia and Belgium), the most prominent interest group is the associational (i.e., secondary or factitious) type, like the trade union or Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, which is deliberately created to serve defined purposes. Often, associational (or factitious) groups are created for the sake of the specialized purposes of the first type; the Indian Workers Union, for instance, was created from the community of Indian persons in Britain. Within the class of associational groups, further qualifications must be made: 1. Not all associational groups possess formal structure. "Wall Street" in the United States, or the "City" in London, though consisting of a loose network of persons or functions, may nevertheless exert powerful collective pressures. 2. Some associational groups are collectivities; but others are single, discrete organizations. Thus General Motors Corporation exerts its own strong influence vis--vis the U.S. government irrespective of the influence of the more general employers' organization to which it possibly belongs, like the National Association of Manufacturers. 3. Some associational groups are temporary or ad hoc. Such are the so-called anomic groups, such as enraged French farmers who come together briefly to put logs across roads in order to draw governmental attention to their grievances. 4. Some associational groups are "latent." There may be a common interest among certain members of the public
136
137
even though these individuals may not have combined into a formal or informal organization. The individuals may be unaware that they have a common interest or, if aware, see no reason to defend or promote it. Or, even if the members consciously wish to defend or promote an interest, the laws may restrict or control their ability to associate for such a purpose. Categories Defined by Political Activity If or when any interest group tries to influence the government in the pursuit of its aims, it becomes a "pressure group." Not all interest groups proper try to exert influence on governments; many (such as businesses and trade unions) do so only as a part of their more general activities of promoting their own interests. Promotional groups, on the other hand, spend much or all their time precisely in trying to influence the government to favour their aims. Groups such as an anglers' association may, therefore, turn into pressure groups for a time--the time when they seek to influence the government for one of their purposes--and then revert to simple interest-group status. A pressure group is therefore definable as "any interest group that is not a part of the government and does not itself seek to govern the country in its own name, but does seek to influence that government for its own purposes." Difficulties of definition arise, however. Some groups are neither a governmental agency nor entirely a private group. In autocratic states, Communist or otherwise, for instance, trade unions are often controlled by the government or the governing party. In the Western liberal democracies, again, agencies like the Tennessee Valley Authority (in the U.S.) or the British Broadcasting Corporation, though subject to the overriding control of the government, enjoy substantial autonomy in certain broad areas. Also, as noted at the beginning of this article, some pressure groups eventually turn into political parties, or vice versa. KINDS OF INTEREST/PRESSURE GROUPS Business:-Most of the modern democracies with a capitalistic economic set up have business pressure groups. Generally they are of two types. One to protect the interest of the business
community as a whole by influencing the governmental policy on taxation, licensing, import and export, tariff etc. The National Association of Manufacturers of the United States, The British Chamber of Commerce, All India Manufacturers Association, and The Indian Chamber of Commerce are some of the examples. The other business pressure groups are organized to protect the interest of one particular industry, e.g., The textiles manufacturers association, private bus owners association, etc. Agriculture:-Like business-men the agriculturists also have two types of pressure groups, One to protect the interests of the agriculturists as a whole such as National farmers union and the other to speak for a particular agriculture sector, such as the National Co-operative milk producers Association, Coffee Growers Association, Rubber Planters Association, etc. Labour:-In every democracy with a capitalistic economic system, there is bound to be some conflict between the employers and the employees. The employers and the employees have organised pressure groups. The employee's organisation is also called trade unions like CITU, AITUC, INTUC, etc. Professionals:-The professionals like the doctors, lawyers, teachers have their own pressure groups to protect and promote their economic and' other interests. The Indian Medical Association (lMA), The Bar Association, All Kerala Private college Teachers Association (AKPCTA) etc are example. Religious and community:In all modern democracies there are many religious and community pressure groups to promote their interests, such as the practice and propagation of their religion, running of educational institutions, publishing literature, etc. The Hindu Maha Sabha, The Jama-ate-Islami, The Muslim Educational Society, The Nair Service Society are some of the examples. Apart from these major categories many other pressure groups are seen effectively functioning in many countries. Students, minority communities, ethnic groups, etc form these pressure groups. CHARACTERISTICS OF PRESSURE GROUPS Power Elements Even in the most pluralistic of the Western liberal democratic states, it is wrong to picture public policy as simply the result of
138
139
a parallelogram of group forces. The groups are themselves restrained by institutions, procedures, and public beliefs. Among the institutions, the most important are the public bureaucracy, the political parties, and the independent branches of the government (the executive, legislature, and judiciary--or some combination of these, depending on the structure of government). To the extent that each or all of these institutions have strong traditions, no interest group supplants them but instead has to deal with them. The governmental procedures in force also affect groups' performance. To the extent that public issues are traditionally subject to publicity and wide discussion, groups are limited in the kind of activities that they can pursue. They are constrained by public beliefs as to what is in "the public interest," by what is a proper or improper procedure, or by what causes are respectable and what are not. If any of these three entities--institutions, procedures, or public beliefs--become feeble, interest groups can intrude into them. By allying with or gaining power over the parties, the legislature, or the bureaucracy, for instance, groups can tend to substitute themselves for such organs in the decision-making process. Inside every country the power that pressure groups wield against the government and that each group wields relative to its rivals depends on a combination of the following variables, some of which are mutually dependent: 1. Density is the ratio of actual membership to potential membership. The higher the density, the more "representative" is the group of all the people whose interests it purports to represent and the greater will be the inclination for governments to recognize and consult it. On the other hand, too wide a membership brings with it internal cleavages, so that on certain issues the organization may not be able to tender clear-cut advice or, indeed, may have to refrain from offering advice altogether. 2. Wealth not only helps a group to develop a skilled management and bureaucracy but also enables it to propagandize and to finance political parties.
3. Prestige lends a group the ability to get a favourable initial hearing from government and public, even though its numbers may be small and its wealth meagre. 4. Organization consists notably of the ability to brief legislators and administrators well and quickly, to mobilize members and the public rapidly, and to receive advance intelligence of likely trends in policy. 5. Socioeconomic leverage is strong among some groups (such as trade unions) that can disrupt social life and low among others (such as consumers associations). 6. Militancy consists of making an effective nuisance of oneself, so that, hopefully, governments will be willing to "buy" time or peace. 7. Specialized information and skills add the weight of authority. 8. Electoral strength refers to the power of some groups that, though poorly organized or having a low density, nevertheless command wide support in the electorate and so find themselves courted by rival political parties. TACTICS OF PRESSURE GROUPS Organization: Any group with an objective must be properly organized. Organization brings strength. An organized group can better mobilize their resources and put their whole weight behind their move to achieve their objectives. The unorganised or informal groups cannot achieve anything substantially. On the other hand, well-organised pressure groups like the trade unions are forces to be reckoned with. They can influence the governmental policy to a great extent. Lobbying: Lobbying is a term used to refer to process of the pressure groups persuading the public officials to act according to their wishes. The terms originated from the word 'lobbies' attached to legislative chambers were the members of the legislature and their guests can meet and talk. But it does not mean that only the members of the legislatures are subjected to lobbying. All the public servants are targets of lobbying by pressure groups.
140
141
Public Opinion: In advanced democracies, the public opinion is a vital means to influence the policy of the government. The pressure groups, therefore, organize public opinion in favour of their objectives to influence the government. Political Allegiance: Some pressure groups actively associate with political parties. They identify with one or the other party and use it to achieve their objectives. They can exert considerable pressure on the party leadership to get the nomination of their candidates in the election or in the ministry. The British trade unions have a great voice in labour party. Electioneering: Some pressure groups, on the other hand, wish to keep away from being openly identified with one or the other party. They do not maintain any allegiance to any political party. They pick up the candidate who can be relied upon to work. Then during the election they work for the success of such candidates. They do everything required in an election to ensure the victory of such candidates. Strike: Resorting to general stoppage of work to achieve some of their objectives is a common tactic used by many pressure groups. Almost all the pressure groups use this weapon one-way or the other. The pressure groups of the employees resort to stoppage of work, the employers' resort to closure of factories and the merchants close the shops, all ultimately leading to the same end. Some of the pressure groups use violence too to achieve their objectives. Bandh and Gherao: Literally bandh means 'closure' that, may be likened with total strike of all, including offices, shops, markets, transport and the like. The instances of bandh illustrates that it is a mischievous and mob manipulation. Gherao implies encirclement or confinement of the employers by the employees for coercing them to meet their demands as per their own satisfaction. Relationship Between Interest/Pressure Groups and Governments: Interest/Pressure Group Systems The nature of interest groups existence is to influence policymakers which results in some type of relationship between
the Government and Interest Groups. This systematic connection between governments and interest groups is characterized by five patterns: 1. PLURALIST INTEREST GROUP SYSTEM: This system is characterized by many kinds of autonomous associational groups and multiple groups representing the same sector of society. This is typified by multiple groups that are further fragmented which results in conflicting and fragmented articulation. All groups press their demands simultaneously on policymakers and the implementing bureaucracies. The US is a good example. 2. DEMOCRATIC CORPORATIST INTEREST GROUP SYSTEM: This system is characterized by centralized interest groups who impact on policy. This system appears to have a closer coordination between organizations making demands for groups in a particular sector of society. The lack of autonomy for these group systems is detrimental or has serious consequences in a political system. If interest groups in this system are denied expression may result in an outbreak of violence. The subordination of interest groups by political parties may limit the adaptability of the political process. 3. CONTROLLED INTEREST GROUP SYSTEM: This system is composed of organized groups which are penetrated and dominated by other institutions such as parties and bureaucracies. A specific example would be the Communist system. 4. NEOCORPORATISTS GROUP SYSTEM: These systems are organized, specialized associations which seek to advance or defend interests by influencing and contesting collective choices. The large focus of is on government accountability and binding decisions on society. This group tends also tends to focus on government responsiveness. 5. PATRON-CLIENT NETWORK GROUP SYSTEM: Of all the systems this is the most primitive structure of all politics. This system reflects the human interaction out of which larger and more complicated political systems are composed. It is a system where personal dependency and
142
143
loyalty are central. It is the driving idea behind feudalism and political machines. This network tends to rely on a static pattern of overall policy formation. As collective interests become broader, personal networks tend to become regulated, limited, and incorporated into broader organizations. Today, this pattern is often reflective of lesser developed countries. SIGNIFICANCE AND ROLE OF PRESSURE GROUPS The study of the pressure groups occupies a very important place in modern political system. There was a time when these groups were viewed as alarms and moral indignation. It was held that they lead to the distortion of the democratic process. However, pressure came up to be gradually recognized by society as an indensible pasrt of it. Today they are not regarded as a necessary evil but as a healthy factor in poltical dynamics. Today, pressure groups are organisations of people with a common interest which want to influence but not become the government; they tend to have a narrow range of issues they are concerned with, or just one issue. They have certainly become a more significant political force in recent years, because of a number of factors: The trend towards a more plural society. Society and voters has become less class based and more pluralistic, in that it consists of a greater variety of groups and interests; these are less suited to be represented by mass membership parties. We can note the decline in party membership and rise in pressure group membership. The more diffuse nature of policy making. Policy making is less concentrated in the party hierarchy and now includes a wider variety of participants such as think tanks, advisers, government agencies, and interest groups. This is described by Phillip Norton as 'policy sectorisation'. Since there are more points of access it is reasonable to suggest that the opportunities for influence by pressure groups are greater. The decline in political ideology and the new politics of consensus. Parties are less dogmatic about their beliefs; this in part is due to the new consensus that is broadly centrist, and based around the free market economy. Politics is therefore more about
emphasis and delivery of policies, rather than the policies themselves. The greater importance of the media in politics, and developments in media technology. Groups now have more powerful weapons at their disposal to organise themselves and campaign; a good example of this at the international level was the 1999 Seattle pre-ministerial meeting that was effectively sabotaged by groups organised through the internet. On a more day to day basis, the growth in news coverage, and the decline in deference towards government by TV journalists, gives groups more exposure and potential impact on public opinion. Criticisms put Forth against Pressure Groups o They are selfish o Too powerful and not in the public interest o They sometimes adopt undesirable tactics o The wealthy sections of society have a district advantage in that they are better organised. o A threat or necessity An Analysis-whether Pressure Groups are Good or Bad Unfortunately, no formula can say which of these various individual pressures that have been described are good and which bad. Pressure in itself, obviously, is neither good nor bad. One can influence the government to his own financial profit; but one can also influence the government to relieve famine in India. This is as true of individuals we are now discussing as of the social groups we shall discuss below. The student must determine in his own mind the extent to which the pressure of an individual or group is for an unjustified personal benefit or for a justified larger cause. If one has no settled standards for making such evaluations, he ought to turn to some of the moral philosophers for help. Aristotle's Ethics, Plato's Republic, Marcus Aurelius' Meditations, Augustine's Confessions, Dante's Divine Comedy, and Spinoza's Ethics are only a few of the older works that can help one to formulate his ethical position on general questions of politics. The
144
145
problem is not an easy one, and we shall touch on it again in the next to last chapter. Nowhere is it more apparent than in the debate over pressure politics that most people consider their own ideas legitimate and true and those of their opponents illegitimate and false. The mere fact that a person advocates reforms on behalf of others does not argue in itself for his goodness. Napoleon almost ruined France by policies that sought glory for that country. For some, pressure groups are a fundamental part of democracy. To others, pressure groups undermine the whole principle of democracy. Democracy is a system of government where decisions are arrived at by majoritarian principles with representatives elected at periodic elections where political equality and political freedom allow the voter an effective choice between competing candidates in a secret ballot. How do pressure groups fit in with this concept? In the pluralist model of democracy, pressure groups play an essential role. Political parties cannot provide adequate representation for the full range of diverse interests and opinions in a modern democracy because their key function is to aggregate interests into a coherent political entity capable of governing the country. Pressure groups enable particular interests and causes to be heard and to exert influence in public decision and decisionmaking. Yet it is precisely the representation of specialist interests and of single issues which may give cause for concern, both in terms of the methods used to achieve objectives and of the undue power and influence which particular lobbies can exert. Pluralists believe that pressure groups overcome the democratic deficit that builds up as most people's political participation is to cast a vote every five years, this leading to people having little or no influence over decisions made between elections, and minority views not being represented. Pressure groups increase participation and access to the political system, thereby enhancing the quality of democracy. They complement and supplement electoral democracy in two main ways: first, by providing an important mechanism by which citizens can influence government between elections; and second by enabling opinions to be weighed as well as counted.
Pressure groups improve the quality of government. Consultation with affected groups is the rational way to make decisions in a free society. It makes government more efficient by enhancing the quality of the decision making process-the information and advice provided by groups helps to improve the quality of government policy and legislation. Pressure groups are a product of freedom of association, which is a fundamental principle of liberal democracy. Freely operating pressure groups are essential to the effective functioning of liberal democracy in three main ways: they serve as vital intermediary institutions between government and society; they assist in the dispersal of political power; and they provide important counterweights to balance the concentration of power. Pressure groups enable new concerns and issues to reach the political agenda, thereby facilitating social progress and preventing social stagnation. For example, the women's and environmentalist movements. Pressure groups increase social cohesion and political stability by providing a 'safety-valve' outlet for individual and collective grievances and demands. Pressure groups assist the surveillance of the government by exposing information it would rather keep secret, thereby reinforcing and complementing work of opposition through political parties. Pressure groups thereby improve the accountability of decision makers to electorates. Although few people would deny that pressure groups play an important role in British politics, critics have argued that this role may not be the one suggested by the pluralist model. Pressure groups improve participation, but in an unequal way, benefiting the well organised but disadvantaging the weakly organised. In this sense, they work against-not in favour of-the public interest. Pressure groups themselves may not be representative of their members. Their officers are not usually elected. Few groups have procedures for consulting their members. As a result, the views expressed by group officials may not be shared by the group's members.
146
147
Although the views of pressure groups may sometimes be considered, they are likely to be ignored if they do not confirm with the ideology or agenda of the decision makers. Pressure group activity gives people hope that they can make a difference. This hope is a distraction. The ruling class would rather that people put their energies into pressure group activities, which do not question the fundamentals of the system than into political activity, which seriously challenges the right of the elite to govern. Group opposition can slow down or block desirable changes, thereby contributing to social immobilisation. The in-egalitarian way that some groups operate increases social discontent and political instability by intensifying the sense of social frustration and injustice felt by disadvantaged and excluded sections of the population. ELECTION AND PROCESS OF POLITICISATION India is known as one of the largest democracy of the world whereby people of India choose their representatives directly to formulate the government and make the laws of the country. The students should learn about the how the electoral system works in India and what are the different types of ways to be represented in the electoral system. Process of Election Universal suffrage:-In all progressive countries universal adult suffrage has been introduced. All men and women who have attained the age of majority are given the right to vote. The only limitation is that of the age. The persons who are specifically excluded are the minors, lunatics, hardened criminals, paupers and aliens. Excluded classes:-Although the right of voting is to be given to all, there are certain persons living in a state who cannot be given that right. The right to vote is a political right, which can be extended only to citizens. Hence aliens have no right to vote. Voters should also possess some moral qualifications. The right of voting should not be given to those who are mentally unfit.
Women suffrage:-For long time men alone were considered to be fit to enjoy the right to vote. In nineteenth century J.S.Mill advocated the cause of women and insisted that they also should be given the right to vote. However only in the twentieth century women were enfranchised. Even in Switzerland till recently women were deprived of this right. This system is known as "universal manhood suffrage." Joint Electorate and Communal Electorate: Under, the system of joint electorate, all the voters belonging 'to a constituency vote together for a particular candidate. A person who is elected from a constituency represents all the voters irrespective of their caste, and religious differences. Whereas under communal electorate separate representations can be given to religious or linguistic minorities. The British Government introduced the communal representation in India. British government gave separate representation to Muslims and later on to Sikhs. Under the Government of India Act 1935, provision was made for separate representation to Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians, And Europeans. The scheduled castes also were put in separate category. Under the constitution of India joint electorate have been provided for. Open Ballot and Secret Ballot System: Under the open ballot system the voters vote publicly. Before the introduction of secret ballot, a voter was required to go to the polling station and mark publicly or write on the ballot paper the name of the candidate for whom he wishes to vote. The ballot boxes were also kept in public. This system was quite popular in nineteenth century. In modern times it is not used.. Under the secret ballot system the voter castes his vote secretly. The voter cans caste his vote to any candidate he likes without anyone knowing about it. The voter is 'given a ballot paper, in which he can mark by a seal on the name or symbol of the candidate for whom he wishes to vote. In secret ballot system, the elections can be conducted peacefully without any disturbances. Single and Multiple Member Constituency: Under singlemember method the whole country is divided into as many constituencies as there are seats to be filled up and one member is returned from each constituency. Each constituency should
148
149
have a minimum number or voters as are sufficient to elect a representative. In India, the whole country is divided into 542 parliamentary constituencies and the Lok Sabha has a strength of five hundred and forty two. Garner, holds that the single member constituency system "increases the responsibility of the voter in choosing his representative and at the same time, perhaps, intensifies the interest of the representative and increases his responsibility to his constituency." In multiple member constituency system, constituencies are larger in size. From each constituency two or more representatives are sent to the legislature. In this method each voter has as many votes as there are' seats to be filled. Such a system gives greater freedom in selection and persons with superior qualities can be returned to the legislature. In this system the local interests do not dominate and the members can think in terms of the nation as a whole. This method is adopted for the purpose of 'proportional, representation of different interests in the country. By-election: At the time of general election all the seats in the legislature may be filled up. However there are possibility that certain seats lay fall vacant before the next general election. Insuch cases, by elections are, conducted to fill the vacancies Types of Representative: There are two views regarding the essential nature of an elected representative. According to one, he is simply an agent or delegate, who has to vote in the legislature according to the instructions of his constituent. The other holds that a representative is a senator, who is chosen for his superior wisdom and integrity, and who is, therefore, free to use his best judgement upon the issues he is called upon to decide. The former may be called the theory of 'instructed representation' and the latter of 'unrestricted representation.' THEORIES OF REPRESENTATION We live in an age which is no parallel to the small states of antiquity. Modern states are large states with enormous area and population. Its structure and problems are complex and varied. It is, therefore, physically impossible for the people to meet together and deliberate on diverse economic, social and political problems. The will of the state is, accordingly formulated and expressed not
directly by the people themselves but by their representatives. In a representative democracy people elect their representatives to exercise the power of the state. The people are the ultimate repository and the source of sovereign power. They-delegate it to their representatives for a limited period. They are-given a mandate by the people to carry out their will. In a representative government all the organs of it, like the legislature, executive and judiciary are to be elected by the people. But in actual practice judiciary, in most of the democracies are not elected. The executive is elected directly, or indirectly appointed. Therefore, when we discuss about modern representative government, at least the representatives, directly chosen by the people constitute the legislature. J.S. Mill defines representative democracy, as one in which "the whole people or some numerous portion of them exercise the governing power through deputies periodically elected by themselves." For the functioning of representative democracy political parties are indispensable. Elections are contested through political parties and representatives elected are the nominees of the party. Each political party submits its programme before the people and the party, which secures majority in election, becomes entitled to form the government. The party in power endeavors to implement the programmes, which the people have approved. Thus representative democracy attribute the ultimate source of authority to the people. Representative government as distinguished from direct democracy is based on the principle that popular sovereignty can exist without popular government. The primary means by which the people exercise their sovereignty is the vote. Those who are qualified by the law of the state to elect members of the legislature form the electorate. The right to elect the representative is known as franchise. Minors, lunatics, aliens etc. are deprived of this right. A person who enjoys the right to vote is known as a voter or an elector. Thus the electorate consists of the whole population of the state minus those who cannot vote. The electorate forms the popular sovereign in a democracy. The nature and structure, the rules and practices regarding the voting systems vary from state to state. Different theories exist about the franchise. Thus, there are different systems of franchise.
150
151
The primary problem that naturally arises in the system of elections is the question who, should be entitled to vote? It is a question of dispute both in theory and practice. It was widely held by theorists in the nineteenth century that every individual has 'the inalienable and sacred right' to participate in the governance of the country and that no one could be deprived of this 'upon any pretext'. The declaration of the Rights of Man asserted 'the law is an expression of the will of the community, all citizens have the right to concur, either personally or by their representatives, in its formation." But writers like Bluntschli, J.S. Mill and Henry Maine argue that all the people of a state should not be given franchise. Franchise, according to them; is a sacred right, which requires judicious exercise of judgement. The illiterate and ignorant people cannot be given this right, because they are incompetent to exercise it properly. Hence certain restrictions are laid on the basis of sex, race, property or education. Thus, the universal adult and the restricted adult systems of franchise are the two main patterns in existence. UNIVERSAL ADULT FRANCHISE By Universal Adult Franchise we mean that every person, both male and female, above the age of maturity, irrespective of caste, color, creed, property, education or profession, is entitled to enjoy the right to vote in the elections. The idea underlying this principle is that the ultimate sovereignty lies with the people as a whole and not with a particular section of the society. At present nearly all the civilized countries like England, USA, France, India, etc. have adopted this principle of 'Adult Suffrage' and accordingly all adults enjoy the right to vote. The age of attaining maturity is fixed by the state. In England and India it is 18 years and in Switzerland 20 years. Arguments in Favor of universal Adult Franchise: The principle of Universal Adult Franchise possesses some fundamental merit. The merits are as follows. 1. It is In accordance with democratic principal Democracy is a government of the people, by the people and for the people. If the principle of Universal Adult Franchise is not introduced, it will be the negation of the principles of democracy.
2. Leads to National Unity:-The system of Universal Adult Franchise is quite essential for the maintenance of national unity. If only a section of the people are given the right to vote, then the entire people of the state would not consider the government as their own. The people would be divided into two groups and the people who do not enjoy the right to vote may not extend willing co-operation to the government. If the system of Universal Adult Franchise is introduced, then all the citizens would consider the state as their own. 3. Laws are universal in application:-Laws of the state affect all alike. They are not meant for a particular community or a section of the people. It is only when right to vote is extended to all the people, the entire population would feel that the laws are framed in accordance with their wishes. 4. Maintenance of peace and order:-The application of Universal Adult Franchise will help maintain peace and order in the state. All people would obey' the laws if they are framed in accordance with their wishes. People would also extend their willing co-operation to the government and the laws would never be violated. All this will help in the maintenance of peace and order in the state. 5. Political Education:-An important merit of Universal Adult Franchise is that, it gives political education to the people. When all the people participate in election, they are bound to think about the problems of the country and try to find solutions for the problems. Political parties also explain their viewpoints to the people regarding national issues. It will lead to the articulation of public opinion. In the absence of political education democracy will be a farce. 6. It creates spirit of self-respect:-When every body gets a chance to participate in election, people will develop a proud feeling that they have a share in the government. They think themselves a very important part of the machinery of the state. This feeling of importance would create spirit of self-respect and make them law abiding citizens.
152
153
7. Chances of Revolution Is less:-Where there is universal Adult Suffrage, the government represent the entire mass of public. Since the government represents alilhe people, no section of the society will oppose its actions. They can change the government if it does not function in accordance with the wishes of the people. Hence there exist hardly any chance of agitation, violence and revolution. ARGUMENT AGAINST ADULT FRANCHISE Writers like Bluntschli, J.S. Mill and Henry Maine argue that all the people of a state should not be given franchise. Franchise, according to them; is a sacred right, which requires judicious exercise of judgement in the election of representatives. The critics of Universal Adult Franchise advance the following arguments in support of their viewpoints. 1. Illiterate and ignorant people should not be given the right to vote:-The right to vote is not a natural right. In fact it is a sort of special privilege which is conferred only on those persons who have the necessary qualification to exercise it judiciously. J.S. Mill argued that "I regard it as wholly inadmissible that any person should participate in suffrage without being able to read, write and perform the common operations of Arithmetic. Universal teaching must precede Universal enfranchisement. The exclusion of a class is justified when that class is likely to make a dangerously bad use of the vote." Therefore it is argued that only educated persons must be given the right to vote. 2. Ownership of property a base of franchise: According to the exponent of this theory, those persons who own property in the state.and pay taxes should only be given the right to vote. In such case the representatives could frame the laws in accordance with the wishes of the taxpayers. Macaulay is of the opinion that if the people who do not possess property are given the right to elect and to get elected, then the administration will come under the control of the poor and they will waste the national wealth. But we cannot subscribe to this argument in modern time, as
all people pay taxes either directly or indirectly and the laws are applicable to all the people equally. 3. Universal manhood suffrage:-Some people are of the opinion that the women should not be given the right to vote. The women, according to them; are physically weak and are not capable enough to take an active part in politics. Their proper place is home and not the political field. Their participation in politics will disturb the peace at home. We cannot agree with this argument also in modern age as women are taking a very active and intelligent part in politics. 4. Inequality of citizens:-According to some critics of Universal Adult Franchise, all the people are not equal. They argue that nature has not created everybody equal and as such all the people cannot be given similar kind of work. Therefore, right to franchise should remain an exclusive privilege of those who are capable of exercising it properly. 5. Franchise Is not a right but a responsibility:-Many scholars consider that the right to vote is not a right but a responsibility. Hence the responsibility of electing the representatives should become the prerogative of those who are capable of using it properly. If it is extended to undeserving people, there are every chances of misusing it. Therefore, they argue that the right to vote should be extended only to the capable and educated people. There is no doubt that the system of Adult Franchise has been criticized on various grounds and various arguments have been advanced against it, but the fact remains that the merit of Adult Franchise outweigh its demerits. In the absence of Universal Adult Franchise democracy is incomplete and it cannot be a success. Therefore, in modern time almost all the countries have adopted the system of universal 'Adult Franchise.' TERRITORIAL REPRESENTATION Territorial or geographic composition of constituencies has become the prevalent form of representation in most of the
154
155
democracies of the world. In this system the whole electorate of the country is divided into territorial constituencies which elect one representative, if it is a single member constituency or more than one, from a multi-member constituency. The representative represents the constituency from where he is elected. All citizens living in that constituency elect him and he represents the opinion of all the people of his constituency. In a territorial constituency system the whole population of a state is divided into; constituencies with more-or-less equal number of voters. The' election commission de-limits the constituencies to accommodate the increase of voters in each constituency after every census. Merits of Territorial Representation (a) Territorial representation makes election procedure simple, practical and convenient. It ensures the principle of equality, namely "One person, one vote." (b) It develops a close and intimate relationship between the voters and the representatives due to the limit of the area of the constituency and the size of the population. (c) Territorial system entails lesser election expenditure due to the limit of the area of the constituency. (d) It avoids the complex problems associated with functional representation and provides a stable majority in the legislature. De-merits (a) Territorial representation will tend to promote spirit of localism and parochialism, among the representatives. The representatives will lose the national perspective and tend to become parochial. (b) The representatives will try to magnify the local issues concerning their constituencies to the neglect of national interests (c) Due to the restriction of choice of candidates from the same constituency often persons who are mediocre, get ticket to contest election. (d) In this system, often the number of seats a party obtains will be dis-proportionate to the percentage of votes it gets:
In other words there is no direct relation between the popular votes a party gets and the number of seats it gains in the legislature. (e) In a multi cornered contest a candidate who secures only a minority of total votes may be declared elected as the system requires only relative majority to win a seat. Functional Representation Many political scientists like G.D.H. Cole, Duguit, Webbs and Graham Wallace are of the opinion that territorial representation is inadequate as it does not give representation to different interests and professions. The interest of a doctor is different from that of a lawyer, and the interest of a laborer is quite different from that of a mill owner. The representative interest of both the doctor and the lawyer and also the laborer and the Mill owner. If the same representative tries to represent the interest of the different categories of professions, he cannot do justice to any of them. Hence these writers are of the opinion that the Territorial representation should be replaced by the system of functional representation. In this system, the citizens are divided into constituencies on the basis of their economic functions or occupational interests. There will be separate constituencies for farmers, industrial workers, manufacturers, teachers, journalists, doctors, lawyers, government employees and housewives etc. Accordingly seats for each profession should be fixed in the legislature. The voters of each profession should elect their representatives to the legislature. The supporters of Functional representation argue that democracy can be successful only if all the professions get adequate representation in the legislature. Merits of Functional Representation 1. All Aspects of National Life Get Representation:-. On the basis of Functional representation all the great forces of national life get representation. Industry, Commerce, Manufacturing, processing and even religion would find representation in the legislature. 2. Democracy becomes Real under the System of Functional Representation:-According to G.D.H. Cole "real democracy
156
157
is to be found not in a single omnipotent Assembly but in a system of coordinated functional representative bodies." Here each profession gets representation in the legislature. Hence the legislature always functions in the interest of all the professions. 3. One Representative cannot Represent all the Functions and Interests:-In the system of territorial constituency, one person represents all the people and all the professions of the constituency. One representative cannot do justice to different interests and points of view of his constituency. The advocates of Functional representation have been the Guild socialists, the syndicalists, and the Italian Fascists. Pluralists have also supported the system of Functional representation. Their main argument is that, it is a better way of obtaining representation for a cross section of interests in the legislature. Graham Wallace is of the opinion that second chamber in the legislature should essentially be organised on the basis of Functional representation. He argued that the lower chamber should be organised on the basis of Territorial representation and this chamber should protect the general interest of the people. But the second chamber should be organised on the basis of Functional representation to safeguard the interests of different professions. Demerits There are several weakness in the system of Functional representation. It is pointed out that in this system Function becomes so important that it obscures the individual. 1. Functional Representation Destroys the unity of Legislature: This system divides the legislature into various groups. The members representing each profession will try to safeguard the interests of their own profession. The legislature will become faction ridden and no member will do anything to promote national interest. 2. Classification of Function is Difficult: It is quite difficult to classify the various professions and to determine the number of seats to be allotted to each profession. It makes the whole election procedure very complex.
3. Functional Representatives do not always Safeguard Functional Interests : It has been pointed out that functional representative do not enter into active politics and care very little about the interest of their profession. 4. Functional Representatives do not Represent National Interest: Each member of the legislature should be considered as the representative of the whole nation. If a person is elected on the basis of functional representation he cannot represent the nation. 5. Man is' not only a Functional Entity: It is true that profession always has great impact on the life of an individual. But there are many other aspects, like, moral, social and political besides profession, which need be taken care of. The person elected on the basis of Functional representation cannot represent all other aspects of individual life. Hence Functional representation is considered harmful to the interest of the society and the nation. Proportional Representation Citizen's participation in the process of government is a very important aspect of modern political thought. As democracy is a government of the people, by the people and for the people, we should ensure maximum participation of the people in the process of the government. Democracy vests the ultimate sovereignty in the people and they exercise it through their representatives elected periodically. Democracy may be broadly classified into two, direct and indirect democracy. In the former, citizens directly take part in the deliberations while in the latter the general public chooses their representative to sit in deliberations. Due to the enormous growth of population and extension of territory of the modern states, direct democracy is unworkable and thus is replaced by indirect or representative democracy. Therefore choosing the right type of representative is of vital importance for the success of democracy. In the earlier periods of history, the right to choose the representatives was limited to the property owners, taxpayers and males. But universal suffrage has become the accepted rule in almost all the modern states. There are two methods of electing the representatives. When voters themselves cast their votes and
158
159
elect the representative, the method of election is direct. If the voters elect only intermediaries, who constitute the electoral college, and the latter finally elect the representatives, it is indirect election. Before we proceed further, we may examine the meaning of certain commonly used words in the parlance of election. Vote is a means to express one's choice or option. Any person who enjoys the right to vote is a voter. Election is the process of choosing a representative from two or more contestants by voting. Any person who has the right to participate in the election is an elector and the whole body of electors is called the electorate. The right to vote is called suffrage and right to suffrage is called franchise. Minority Representation It is very often maintained that the existing system of representation does not give representation to the whole people. A candidate who secures majority of votes is declared elected whatever be the margin of votes by which he wins. A successful candidate represents the views of' his electors whereas others who had supported an unsuccessful candidate remain underrepresented, no matter with what insignificant margin of votes their candidate might have lost. Sometimes the situation becomes still worse as only a minority is represented and the majority is left out without representation. Suppose there are four candidates contesting an election; we may name the candidates ABC and D and total electorate is ten thousand. In the election A gets 2600 votes, B gets 2580 votes, C gets 2520 votes and D gets 2300 votes and the candidate A is declared elected. In this case 'A' represents 26% of the total electorate and the remaining 74% are not represented. This way if a party secures majority of seats in the parliament from all over the country and forms the government, it will be in reality a minority government; because they represent only a small minority of the total population. Hence they do not reflect the will of all and do not carry a mandate of the majority, which is against the principles of democracy. A true democracy should represent the will of all. It is therefore, maintained that minorities should be adequately represented. If they cannot secure due representation, then it is not real democracy. In certain other
cases, a minority party or group is always defeated in the election and therefore, the followers of such party or group cannot get adequate representation. As our society is divided into many political, racial, linguistic, religious and communal groups, and each group put up their candidate in the election, invariably the major political parties bag the seats. All other candidates put up by various minority groups are defeated and thus not represented. These groups may be present in all the constituencies but have no adequate strength to win the election in any constituency. In a real democracy all the sections should be adequately or proportionately represented. In order to avoid such anomalies and to ensure representation to all 'se'iHh9ns of the population and to make democracy more realistic, 'some,' other electoral systems are invented. The scheme of proportional representation aims at giving adequate representation to minorities. In envisages different plans, but all plans are not varieties of proportional representation. The varieties of proportional representation are 'Hare system' or scheme of 'single transferable vote' and the 'list system'. The rest are schemes of minority representation. Minority representation aims at giving representation of some kind to the minorities, but not in proportion to the number of their votes. Whereas proportional representation gives representation to minorities, in proportion to their voting strength. According to this system, the percentage of seats allotted to a party or group in the legislature' is in proportion to the percentage of the total popular votes it has secured in the election. For instance if party 'X' has secured 5% of the total votes in the election it will get 5% of the total seats in the legislature. The aim of this system is to ensure representation of all sections of the population proportionate to their numerical strength. There are two types of proportional representation. Both these systems require a multi-members constituency and the candidate is declared elected not on securing majority votes but a minimum quota of votes required to win. Hare System Thomas Hare formulated this system in 1851. The plan advocated by Hare an English man in his book, "The election of representatives" was introduced in Denmark by Andrae, a minister, in 1855. Since then it was popularized in both the countries. Hence
160
161
it has been called Hare or Andrae system. It is also called preferential system because of the preference, which a voter is required to give to the candidate. This system can work only in a multi-member constituency of at least three seats. There is no upper limit, although Lord Courteny suggested a fifteen-member constituency as a reasonable limit. According to this system total number of candidates to be elected is determined at first. Total number of voters also should be known. From these two facts a minimum 'quota' is calculated. To secure election every candidate is required to obtain a certain quota of votes. The quota represents the number of votes necessary for the election of a candidate. Different methods are followed to determine the quota. The simplest is to divide the number of votes cast by the number of seats to be filled up, and the quotient is taken as the quota or the number of votes necessary to elect candidate. But Droofs in 1881 found that in constituencies of 3 to 8 members, sometimesinaccurate results are achieved in the practical operation of this system. Hence he suggested his own method of finding out the quota. It is found by dividing the total number of vote's cast by one more than the number of seats to be filled in and adding one to the result-: Quota = Total Number of votes +1 Number of set +1 Thus if the total votes cast were 7000 and there are 7 seats to be filled, in, the quota required to get a candidate elected will be. 7000 +1 7 + 1 875 + 1 = 876 votes split his votes and cast them to any party he likes or cast some votes to one party and some to other parties. In other words if a voter has five votes he can vote for three candidates from one list and two candidates from another list. But he cannot give more than one vote to anyone candidate. A voter has, as many votes as there are number of seats. All votes cast in favor of different candidates on the list are counted as votes for the list itself. The number of votes required to secure a candidate's elections is determined by dividing the total number of votes cast by the
number of seats to be filled. Then, the quota divides the total number of votes polled by each party list and the result is the number of representatives to which each party is entitled. If all the seats are not filled up, the party, which has the largest fractional surplus, get the remaining seats. In this system the party enjoys absolute discretion in appointing the representatives. If anyone dies, the party appoints a substitute and there is no by-election. According to this system, each party is allotted certain number of seats proportionate to the votes secured by it in the election. This is a simple system and followed by the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland and Belgium.. OTHER SYSTEM OF MINORITY REPRESENTATION The ideal behind both Hare and List system of proportional representation are to ensure representation for all the minority parties or groups in proportion to their numerical strength. But minority representation is different from proportional representation. All systems of minority representation only ensure some kind of representation to the minorities not necessarily proportional to their strength. Some of the systems of minority representations are discussed below. The Limited Vote Plan This system works in multi-member constituencies of at least three seats. Each voter is entitled for a fewer number of votes than total number of candidates to be elected and he cannot give more than one vote to one candidate. These votes must be distributed to as many candidates as there are votes to cast. For example, in a five-member constituency the voters are allowed to vote only for four candidates or even less. The result is that the minorities can get one or two seats. This system was used in England, Italy, Portugal and Japan at various times, but no longer in use anywhere. The Cumulative Vote System This system also works in a multi-member constituency. Each voter has as many votes as the number of candidates to be elected and is allowed to give all the votes to one candidate or one vote each to each candidate or distribute them in any manner he likes. For example, if there are five members to be elected from a
162
163
constituency, it is the option of the voter to either give all his five votes to one single candidate, or give one vote to each, or distribute them in any other way. This system is also known as plumbing system. In this method even a small minority can get representation by plumbing all their votes to one candidate. The cumulative vote system prevails in the legislature of the' state of Illinois in the United States. THE SECOND BALLOT SYSTEM This system can work only in a single member constituency, where according to the relative majority principle, the highest polled candidate is declared elected. When there are only two candidates contesting election for a single seat, one who secures simple majority is declared elected. But when there are more than two candidates, it may happen that the candidate elected secures only a relative majority and not an absolute majority. For example, if in a constituency, three candidates are contesting; candidate 'A' may secure 5000 votes candidate 'B' 4000 and candidate 'C' 3000 votes. 'A' has secured a majority over 'B' and 'C' but candidate Band C have more votes between them than the votes secured by 'A'. Candidate Band C together have secured 2000 more votes than candidate A. The representative elected under such an electoral system represents only a minority of voters. To avoid such an unjust nature of representation the system of second Ballot is adopted to choose between the two highest polled candidates after eliminating all others in the first election. Who ever gets a majority of the votes in the second election will be declared elected as the representative.of that constituency. This system, in fact, does not ensure minority representation,' but ensures that the elected candidate represents the majority opinion of the electorate. Communal Representation A novel device of representation of minorities found its origin in India during the British rule. Communal representation was introduced with a view to giving representation to different religious minorities. Every religious community secured a separate representation. This was done in two ways. Firstly by separate
electorates, where voters of each community voted separately for candidates of their own community. The second method was the reservation of seats under a system of joint electorates as in the case of Scheduled Castes. The system of communal representation has been abolished from the Indian Republic as the division of people on the basis of religion is harmful to the interest of the nation. Merits of Proportional Representation According to J.S. Mill "Proportional Representation is among the greatest improvements yet made in the theory and practice of government." Its merit is that, it secures representation even to the smallest minority. It gives every voter a real representative in whose choice, he has a hand. It brings about justice in the matter of representation of all sections of political opinion. When every interest is duly represented, election does not degenerate into a gamble. It offers an easy solution of the baffling problems of minority representation and the legislature becomes truly a mirror of public opinion and, as such, is a representative Assembly of the nation. It is only under such conditions that democracy really works as a government of the people. Then proportional representation stands for the security of minority and goes against the tyranny of the majority. Finally it is based upon political opinion rather than on territorial area. Demerit There are certain serious defects found in the scheme of proportional representation. It is the experience of many countries, which have experimented with it that this scheme leads to the growth of a large number of parties. The Mushroom growth of parties each wedded to its separate and sectional interests without any regard to the interests of the nation as whole, is against the interest of the nation. Such a system will encourage disintegration, questioning the national solidarity. Further this system will lead to the formation of coalition government. Thus proportional representation renders cabinets unstable, destroys their homogeneity and makes parliamentary democracy unworkable. It multiplies the number of groups in the legislature thereby destroying the national character of the legislature and
164
165
makes it an area of sectional and particular interest. In the words of Sidwick the group representation will inevitably tend to increase pernicious class legislation. The system of proportional representation is sufficiently complicated. The Hare system puzzles the voters and places them under the mercy of the counting authorities. In the list system there is, the danger of corruption. Candidates are tempted to employ unfair and corrupt means for their inclusion in the party list. It encourages party maneuvering and enables the group managers to arrange the list in such a way as to secure majority for their own nominees. It also increases the influence of the party bosses. On these grounds it is now generally believed that the introduction of proportional Representation is not desirable. Electoral System in India India is a constitutional democracy with a parliamentary system of government, and at the heart of the system is a commitment to hold regular, free and fair elections. These elections determine the composition of the government, the membership of the two houses of parliament, the state and union territory legislative assemblies, and the Presidency and vice-presidency. Indian Elections-Scale of Operation Elections in India are events involving political mobilisation and organisational complexity on an amazing scale. In the 1996 election to Lok Sabha there were 1,269 candidates from 38 officially recognised national and state parties seeking election, 1,048 candidates from registered parties, not recognised and 10,635 independent candidates. A total number of 59,25,72,288 people voted. The Election Commission employed almost 40,00,000 people to run the election. A vast number of civilian police and security forces were deployed to ensure that the elections were carried out peacefully. The direct cost of organising the election amounted to approximately Rs. 5,180 million. Constituencies and Reservation of Seats The country has been divided into 543 Parliamentary Constituencies, each of which returns one MP to the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Parliament. The size and shape of the
parliamentary constituencies are determined by an independent Delimitation Commission, which aims to create constituencies which have roughly the same population, subject to geographical considerations and the boundaries of the states and administrative areas. How Constituency Boundaries are drawn up Delimitation is the redrawing of the boundaries of parliamentary or assembly constituencies to make sure that there are, as near as practicable, the same number of people in each constituency. In India boundaries are meant to be examined after the tenyearly census to reflect changes in population, for which Parliament by law establishes an independent Delimitation Commission, made up of the Chief Election Commissioner and two judges or exjudges from the Supreme Court or High Court. However, under a constitutional amendment of 1976, delimitation was suspended until after the census of 2001, ostensibly so that states' familyplanning programmes would not affect their political representation in the Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabhas. This has led to wide discrepancies in the size of constituencies, with the largest having over 25,00,000 electors, and the smallest less than 50,000. Reservation of Seats: The Constitution puts a limit on the size of the Lok Sabha of 550 elected members, apart from two members who can be nominated by the President to represent the Anglo-Indian community. There are also provisions to ensure the representation of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, with reserved constituencies where only candidates from these communities can stand for election. There was an attempt to pass legislation to reserve one third of the seats for female candidates but the dissolution of Lok Sabha for the 1998 election occurred before the bill had completed its passage through parliament. System of Election Elections to the Lok Sabha are carried out using a first-past-the-post electoral system. The country is split up into separate geographical areas, known as constituencies, and the electors can cast one vote each for a candidate (although most candidates stand as independents, most successful candidates stand as members of political parties), the winner being the candidate who gets the maximum votes. Parliament: The Parliament of the Union consists of the President, the Lok Sabha (House of the People) and the Rajya
166
167
Sabha (Council of States). The President is the head of state, and he appoints the Prime Minister, who runs the government, according to the political composition of the Lok Sabha. Although the government is headed by a Prime Minister, the Cabinet is the central decision making body of the government. Members of more than one party can make up a government, and although the governing parties may be a minority in the Lok Sabha, they can only govern as long as they have the confidence of a majority of MPs, the members of the Lok Sabha. As well as being the body, which determines whom, makes up the government, the Lok Sabha is the main legislative body, along with the Rajya Sabha. Rajya Sabha-The Council of States: The members of the Rajya Sabha are elected indirectly, rather than by the citizens at large. Rajya Sabha members are elected by each state Vidhan Sabha using the single transferable vote system. Unlike most federal systems, the number of members returned by each state is roughly in proportion to their population. At present there are 233 members of the Rajya Sabha elected by the Vidhan Sabhas, and there are also twelve members nominated by the President as representatives of literature, science, art and social services. Rajya Sabha members can serve for six years, and elections are staggered, with one third of the assembly being elected every 2 years. Nominated members The president can nominate 2 members of the Lok Sabha if it is felt that the representation of the AngloIndian community is inadequate, and 12 members of the Rajya Sabha, to represent literature, science, art and the social services. State Assemblies India is a federal country, and the Constitution gives the states and union territories significant control over their own government. The Vidhan Sabhas (legislative assemblies) are directly elected bodies set up to carrying out the administration of the government in the 25 States of India. In some states there is a bicameral organisation of legislatures, with both an upper and Lower House. Two of the seven Union Territories viz., the National Capital Territory of Delhi and Pondicherry, have also legislative assemblies. Elections to the Vidhan Sabhas are carried out in the same manner as for the Lok Sabha election, with the states and union territories divided into single-member constituencies, and the first-past-the-post electoral system used. The assemblies range in size, according to population. The largest Vidhan Sabha is for
Uttar Pradesh, with 425 members; the smallest Pondicherry, with 30 members. President and Vice-President The President is elected by the elected members of the Vidhan Sabhas, Lok Sabha, and Rajya Sabha, and serves for a period of 5 years (although they can stand for re-election). A formula is used to allocate votes so there is a balance between the population of each state and the number of votes assembly members from a state can cast, and to give an equal balance between state and national assembly Parliament members. If no candidate receives a majority of votes there is a system by which losing candidates are eliminated from the contest and votes for them transferred to other candidates, until one gain a majority. The Vice President is elected by a direct vote of all members elected and nominated, of the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha. The Single Transferable Vote System Election for the members of the Rajya Sabha and the President are carried out using the single transferable vote system. The single transferable vote system is designed to ensure more diverse representation, by reducing the opportunity for blocks of voters to dominate minorities. The ballot paper lists all candidates standing for election and the voters' list them in order of preference. A threshold number of votes, known as the 'quota' is set, which candidates have to achieve to be elected. For presidential elections the quota is set at one more than half the number of votes, ensuring that the winner is the candidate who gets a clear majority. For the Rajya Sabha the quota is set at the number of votes that can be attained by just enough MPs to fill all the seats but no more. Votes that are deemed surplus, those given to candidates who have already got a full quota of votes, or votes given to candidates who are deemed to be losing candidates, are transferred according to the voter's listed preferences, until the right number of candidates have been elected. Independent Election Commission An independent Election Commission has been established under the Constitution in order to carry out and regulate the holding of elections in India. The Election Commission was established in accordance with the Constitution on 25th January 1950. Originally a Chief Election Commissioner ran the commission, but first in 1989 and later again in 1993 two additional Election Commissioners
168
169
were appointed. The Election Commission is responsible for the conduct of elections to parliament and state legislatures and to the offices of the President and Vice-President. The Election Commission prepares, maintains and periodically updates the Electoral Roll, which shows who is entitled to vote, supervises the nomination of candidates, registers political parties, monitors the election campaign, including candidates' funding. It also facilitates the coverage of the election process by the media, organises the polling booths where voting takes place, and looks after the counting of votes and the declaration of results. All this is done to ensure that elections can take place in an orderly and fair manner. At present, there are two Election Commissioners appointed by the President. Chief Election Commissioner can be removed from office only by parliamentary impeachment. The Commission decides most matters by consensus but in case of any dissension, the majority view prevails. Election Commission: Present composition Mr. J.M. LyngdohChief Election Commissioner Mr. T.S. Krishna Murthy-Election Commissioner Mr. B.B. Tandon-Election Commissioner Chief Election Commissioners Sukumar Sen: 21 March 1950 to 19 December 1958 KVK Sundaram: 20 December 1958 to 30 September 1967 SP Sen Verma: 1 October 1967 to 30 September 1972 Dr Nagendra Singh: 1 October 1972 to 6 February 1973 T Swaminathan: 7 February 1973 to 17 June 1977 SL Shakdhar: 18 June 1977 to 17 June 1982 RK Trivedi: 18 June 1982 to 31 December 1985 RVS Peri Sastri: 1 January 1986 to 25 November 1990 Smt VS Ramadevi: 26 November 1990 to 11 December 1990 TN Seshan: 12 December 1990 to 11 December 1996 Dr. MS Gill: 12 December 1996 to 13 June 2001 J.M. Lyngdoh: 13 June 2001 (afternoon) to present The Commission has its headquarters in New Delhi, with a Secretariat of some 300 staff members. At the state level a Chief Electoral Officer with a core staff of varying numbers, is available on a full time basis. At the district and constituency level, officers and staff of the civil administration double up as Election officials. During actual conduct of elections, a vast number of additional staff are temporarily drafted for about two weeks. They function mainly
as polling and counting officials. Who can vote? The democratic system in India is based on the principle of universal adult suffrage; that any citizen over the age of 18 can vote in an election (before 1989 the age limit was 21). The right to vote is irrespective of caste, creed, religion or gender. Those who are deemed unsound of mind, and people convicted of certain criminal offences are not allowed to vote. There has been a general increase in the number of people voting in Indian elections. In 1952 61.16 per cent of the electorate voted. By 1996 the turnout for the general election was 57.94 per cent. There have been even more rapid increases in the turnout of women and members of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, who had tended to be far less likely to participate in elections, and voting for these groups has moved closer to the national average. The Electoral Roll The electoral roll is a list of all people in the constituency who are registered to vote in Indian Elections. Only those people with their names on the electoral roll are allowed to vote. The electoral roll is normally revised every year to add the names of those who are to turn 18 on the 1st January of that year or have moved into a constituency and to remove the names of those who have died or moved out of a constituency. If you are eligible to vote and are not on the electoral roll, you can apply to the Electoral Registration Officer of the constituency, who will update the register. The updating of the Electoral Roll only stops during an election campaign, after the nominations for candidates have closed. Computerisation of Rolls The Election Commission is currently undertaking the computerisation of the electoral rolls throughout India, which should lead to improvements in the accuracy and speed with which the electoral roll can be updated. This has already been completed in the northern states of Haryana, Punjab and Himachal Pradesh and the Eastern state of Tripura and Rolls in the new computerised format put to use for the general Election in 1998. Electors' Photo Identity Cards In an attempt to improve the accuracy of the electoral roll and prevent electoral fraud, the Election Commission has pressed for the
170
171
introduction of photo identity cards for voters. This is a massive task, and at present over 338 million have been provided. The Commission is providing ways and methods to deal with the problems with the issue of cards, and difficulties in keeping track of voters, especially the mobile urban electorate. When do elections take place? Elections for the Lok Sabha and every State Legislative Assembly have to take place every five years, unless called earlier. The President can dissolve Lok Sabha and call a general election before five years is up, if the government can no longer command the confidence of the Lok Sabha, and if there is no alternative government available to take over. Governments have found it increasingly difficult to stay in power for the full term of a Lok Sabha in recent times, and so elections have often been held before the five-year limit has been reached. A constitutional amendment passed in 1975, as part of the government declared emergency, postponed the election due to be held in 1976. This amendment was later rescinded, and regular elections resumed in 1977. Other measures have been taken to adjust the timetable of elections when civil unrest has made the holding of elections problematic. Disturbances in Jammu and Kashmir, the Punjab, and Assam have led to the postponement of elections. Holding of regular elections can only be stopped by means of a constitutional amendment and in consultation with the Election Commission, and it is recognised that interruptions of regular elections are acceptable only in extraordinary circumstances. Scheduling the Elections When the five-year limit is up, or the legislature has been dissolved and new elections have been called, the Election Commission puts into effect the machinery for holding an election. The constitution states that there can be no longer than 6 months between the last session of the dissolved Lok Sabha and the recalling of the new House, so elections have to be concluded before then. In a country as huge and diverse as India, finding a period when elections can be held throughout the country is not simple.
The Election Commission, which decides the schedule for elections, has to take account of the weather-during winter constituencies may be snow-bound, and during the monsoon access to remote areas restricted-, the agricultural cycle-so that the planting or harvesting of crops is not disrupted, exam schedulesas schools are used as polling stations and teachers employed as election officials, and religious festivals and public holidays. On top of this there are the logistical difficulties that go with holding an election-sending out ballot boxes, setting up polling booths, recruiting officials to oversee the elections. Who can stand for Election? Any Indian citizen who is registered as a voter and is over 25 years of age is allowed to contest elections to the Lok Sabha or State Legislative Assemblies. For the Rajya Sabha the age limit is 30 years. Candidates for the Rajya Sabha and Vidhan Sabha should be a resident of the same state as the constituency from which they wish to contest. Every candidate has to make a deposit of Rs. 10,000/-for Lok Sabha election and 5,000/-for Rajya Sabha or Vidhan Sabha elections, except for candidates from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes who pay half of these amounts. The deposit is returned if the candidate receives more than one-sixth of the total number of valid votes polled in the constituency. Nominations must be supported at least by one registered elector of the constituency, in the case of a candidate sponsored by a registered Party and by ten registered electors from the constituency in the case of other candidates. Returning Officers, appointed by the Election Commission, are put in charge to receive nominations of candidates in each constituency, and oversee the formalities of the election. In a number of seats in the Lok Sabha and the Vidhan Sabha, the candidates can only be from either one of the scheduled castes or scheduled tribes. The number of these reserved seats is meant to be approximately in proportion to the number of people from scheduled castes or scheduled tribes in each state. There are currently 79 seats reserved for the scheduled castes and 41 reserved for the scheduled tribes in the Lok Sabha. Number of Candidates The number of candidates contesting each election
172
173
has steadily increased. In the general election of 1952 the average number of candidates in each constituency was 3.8; by 1991 it had risen to 16.3, and in 1996 stood at 25.6. Some commentators have criticised the openness of the nomination process, arguing that it is far too easy for 'frivolous' candidates to stand for election, and that this confuses the electoral process. Certain remedial measures have been taken in August 1996, which included increasing the size of the deposit and making the number of people who have to nominate a candidate larger. The impact of such measures was quite considerable at the elections which were subsequently held in Uttar Pradesh in October, 1996, where the number of contestants Come down quite significantly. In 1998 the number of nominations for the Lok Sabha has come down to, an average of per constituency and % lower than the figures for 1996. Campaign The campaign is the period when the political parties put forward their candidates and arguments with which they hope to persuade people to vote for their candidates and parties. Candidates are given a week to put forward their nominations. These are scrutinised by the Returning Officers and if not found to be in order can be rejected after a summary hearing. Validly nominated candidates can withdraw within two days after nominations have been scrutinised. The official campaign lasts at least two weeks from the drawing up of the list of nominated candidates, and officially ends 48 hours before polling closes. During the election campaign the political parties and contesting candidates are expected to abide by a Model Code of Conduct evolved by the Election Commission on the basis of a consensus among political parties. The model Code lays down broad guidelines as to how the political parties and candidates should conduct themselves during the election campaign. It is intended to maintain the election campaign on healthy lines, avoid clashes and conflicts between political parties or their supporters and to ensure peace and order during the campaign period and thereafter, until the results are declared. The model code also prescribes guidelines for the ruling
party either at the Centre or in the State to ensure that a level field in maintained and that no cause is given for any complaint that the ruling party has used its official position for the purposes of its election campaign. Once an election has been called, parties issue manifestos detailing the programmes they wish to implement if elected to government, the strengths of their leaders, and the failures of opposing parties and their leaders. Slogans are used to popularise and identify parties and issues, and pamphlets and posters distributed to the electorate. Rallies and meetings where the candidates try to persuade, cajole and enthuse supporters, and denigrate opponents, are held throughout the constituencies. Personal appeals and promises of reform are made, with candidates travelling the length and breadth of the constituency to try to influence as many potential supporters as possible. Party symbols abound, printed on posters and placards. Polling Days Polling is normally held on a number of different days in different constituencies, to enable the security forces and those monitoring the election to keep law and order and ensure that voting during the election is fair. Ballot Papers and Symbols After nomination of candidates is complete, a list of competing candidates is prepared by the Returning Officer, and ballot papers are printed. Ballot papers are printed with the names of the candidates (in languages set by the Election Commission) and the symbols allotted to each of the candidates. Candidates of recognised Parties are allotted their Party symbols. Some electors, including members of the armed forces or government of India How the voting takes place Voting is by secret ballot. Polling stations are usually set up in public institutions, such as schools and community halls. To enable as many electors as possible to vote, the officials of the Election Commission try to ensure that there is a polling station within 2km of every voter, and that no polling stations should have to deal with more than 1200 voters. Each polling station is open for at least 8 hours on the day of the election. On entering the polling station, the elector is
174
175
checked against the Electoral Roll, and allocated a ballot paper. The elector votes by marking the ballot paper with a rubber stamp on or near the symbol of the candidate of his choice, inside a screened compartment in the polling station. The voter then folds the ballot paper and inserts it in a common ballot box which is kept in full view of the Presiding Officer and polling agents of the candidates. This marking system eliminates the possibility of ballot papers being surreptitiously taken out of the polling station or not being put in the ballot box. Political Parties and Elections Political parties are an established part of modern mass democracy, and the conduct of elections in India is largely dependent on the behaviour of political parties. Although many candidates for Indian elections are independent, the winning candidates for Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha elections usually stand as members of political parties, and opinion polls suggest that people tend to vote for a party rather than a particular candidate. Parties offer candidates organisational support, and by offering a broader election campaign, looking at the record of government and putting forward alternative proposals for government, help voters make a choice about how the government is run. Registration with Election Commission Political parties have to be registered with the Election Commission. The Commission determines whether the party is structured and committed to principles of democracy, secularism and socialism in accordance with the Indian Constitution and would uphold the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India. Parties are expected to hold organisational elections and have a written constitution. The Anti-defection law, passed in 1985, prevents MPs or MLAs elected as candidates from one party forming or joining a new party, unless they comprise more than one-third of the original party in the legislature. Recognition and Reservation of Symbols According to certain criteria, set by the Election Commission regarding the length of political activity and success in elections, parties are categorised by the Commission as National or State parties, or simply declared
registered-unrecognised parties. How a party is classified determines a party's right to certain privileges, such as access to electoral rolls and provision of time for political broadcasts on the state-owned television and radio stations-All India Radio and Doordarshan-and also the important question of the allocation of the party symbol. Party symbols enable illiterate voters to identify the candidate of the party they wish to vote for. National parties are given a symbol that is for their use only, throughout the country. State parties have the sole use of a symbol in the state in which they are recognised as such Registered-unrecognised parties can choose a symbol from a selection of 'free' symbols. Limit on Poll Expenses There are tight legal limits on the amount of money a candidate can spend during the election campaign. In most Lok Sabha constituencies the limit as recently amended in December, 1997 is Rs 15,00,000/-, although in some States the limit is Rs 6,00,000/-(for Vidhan Sabha elections the highest limit is Rs 6,00,000/-, the lowest Rs 3,00,000/-). Although supporters of a candidate can spend as much as they like to help out with a campaign, they have to get written permission of the candidate, and whilst parties are allowed to spend as much money on campaigns as they want, recent Supreme Court judgements have said that, unless a political party can specifically account for money spent during the campaign, it will consider any activities as being funded by the candidates and counting towards their election expenses. The accountability imposed on the candidates and parties has curtailed some of the more extravagant campaigning that was previously a part of Indian elections. Free Campaign time on state owned electronic media By a recent order of the Election Commission, all recognised National and State parties have been allowed free access to the state owned electronic media-AIR and Doordarshan-on an extensive scale for their campaigns during elections. The total free time allocated extends over 122 hours on the state owned Television and Radio channels. This is allocated
176
177
equitably by combining a base limit and additional time linked to poll performance of the party in recent election. Splits and mergers and anti-defection law Splits, mergers and alliances have frequently disrupted the compositions of political parties. This has led to a number of disputes over which section of a divided party gets to keep the party symbol, and how to classify the resulting parties in terms of national and state parties. The Election Commission has to resolve these disputes, although its decisions can be challenged in the courts. As of 1998 there are 7 National Parties, and 35 State Parties, with 620 registeredunrecognised parties. Election Petitions Any elector or candidate can file an election petition if he or she thinks there has been malpractice during the election. An election petition is not an ordinary civil suit, but treated as a contest in which the whole constituency is involved. Election petitions are tried by the High Court of the State involved, and if upheld can even lead to the restaging of the election in that constituency. In the 1996 general election xx election petitions were upheld, and in x constituencies the result was countermanded and bye-elections held. Supervising Elections, Election Observers The Election Commission appoints a large number of Observers to ensure that the campaign is conducted fairly, and that people are free to vote as they choose. Election expenditure Observers keeps a check on the amount that each candidate and party spends on the election. Counting of Votes After the polling has finished, the votes are counted under the supervision of Returning Officers and Observers appointed by the Election Commission. After the counting of votes is over, the Returning Officer declares the name of the candidate to whom the largest number of votes have been given as the winner, and as having been returned by the constituency to the concerned house. Media Coverage In order to bring as much transparency as possible to the electoral process, the media are encouraged and provided with facilities to cover the election, although subject to maintaining the
secrecy of the vote. Media persons are given special passes to enter polling stations to cover the poll process and the counting halls during the actual counting of votes. Media are also free to conduct Opinion Polls and Exit Polls. By a recent set of Guideline issued, the Election Commission has stipulated that the results of opinion polls can not be published between two days before the start of polling and after the close of poll in any of the constituencies. Results of exit polls can only be published or made otherwise known only after half an hour of the end of polling hours on the last day of poll 28th of February in the present election of 1998.
178
Election Commission and Electoral Reforms in India
179
in the conduct of elections, the Election Commission has the residuary powers under the Constitution to act in an appropriate manner. A CONSTITUTIONAL BODY
5
ELECTION COMMISSION AND ELECTORAL REFORMS IN INDIA
The chapter flashes light on how election process is conducted in India and how it is handled under the ages of Election Commission, an extra-constitutional body. And what are reforms introduced by election commission with the change of time. India is a Socialist, Secular, Democratic Republic and the largest democracy in the World. The modern Indian nation state came into existence on 15th of August 1947. Since then free and fair elections have been held at regular intervals as per the principles enshrined in the Constitution, Electoral Laws and System. The Constitution of India has vested in the Election Commission of India the superintendence, direction and control of the entire process for conduct of elections to Parliament and Legislature of every State and to the offices of President and VicePresident of India. ELECTORAL LAWS AND SYSTEM Elections are conducted according to the constitutional provisions, supplemented by laws made by Parliament. The major laws are Representation of the People Act, 1950, which mainly deals with the preparation and revision of electoral rolls, the Representation of the People Act, 1951 which deals, in detail, with all aspects of conduct of elections and post election disputes. The Supreme Court of India has held that where the enacted laws are silent or make insufficient provision to deal with a given situation
Election Commission of India is a permanent Constitutional Body. The Election Commission was established in accordance with the Constitution on 25th January 1950. The Commission celebrated its Golden Jubilee in 2001. Originally the commission had only a Chief Election Commissioner. It currently consists of Chief Election Commissioner and two Election Commissioners, for a long time, though, it had only the Chief Election Commissioner. For the first time two additional Commissioners were appointed on 16th October 1989 but they had a very short tenure till 1st January 1990. Later on 1st October 1993 two additional Election Commissioners were appointed. The concept of multimember Commission has been in operation since then, with decision making power by majority vote. APPOINTMENT AND TENURE OF COMMISSIONERS The President appoints Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners. They have tenure of six years, or up to the age of 65 years, whichever is earlier. They enjoy the same status and receive salary and perks as available to Judges of the Supreme Court of India. The Chief Election Commissioner can be removed from office only through impeachment by Parliament. TRANSACTION OF BUSINESS The Commission transacts its business by holding regular meetings and also by circulation of papers. All Election Commissioners have equal say in the decision making of the Commission. The Commission, from time to time, delegates some of its executive functions to its officers in its Secretariat. ELECTION MACHINERY The Commission has a separate Secretariat at New Delhi, consisting of about 300 officials, in a hierarchical set up.
180
181
Two Deputy Election Commissioners who are the senior most officers in the Secretariat assist the Commission. They are generally appointed from the national civil service of the country and are selected and appointed by the Commission with tenure. Directors, Principal Secretaries, and Secretaries, Under Secretaries and Deputy Directors support the Deputy Election Commissioners in turn. There is functional and territorial distribution of work in the Commission. The work is organised in Divisions, Branches and sections; each of the last mentioned units is in charge of a Section Officer. The main functional divisions are Planning, Judicial, Administration, Information Systems, Media and Secretariat Coordination. The territorial work is distributed among separate units responsible for different Zones into which the 35 constituent States and Union Territories of the country are grouped for convenience of management. At the state level, the election work is supervised, subject to overall superintendence, direction and control of the Commission, by the Chief Electoral Officer of the State, who is appointed by the Commission from amongst senior civil servants proposed by the concerned state government. He is, in most of the States, a full time officer and has a team of supporting staff. At the district and constituency levels, the District Election Officers, Electoral Registration Officers and Returning Officers, who are assisted by a large number of junior functionaries, perform election work. They all perform their functions relating to elections in addition to their other responsibilities. During election time, however, they are available to the Commission, more or less, on a full time basis. The gigantic task force for conducting a countrywide general election consists of nearly five million polling personnel and civil police forces. This huge election machinery is deemed to be on deputation to the Election Commission and is subject to its control, superintendence and discipline during the election period, extending over a period of one and half to two months. BUDGET AND EXPENDITURE The Secretariat of the Commission has an independent budget, which is finalised directly in consultation between the Commission
and the Finance Ministry of the Union Government. The latter generally accepts the recommendations of the Commission for its budgets. The major expenditure on actual conduct of elections is, however, reflected in the budgets of the concerned constituent unit of the Union-State and Union Territory. If elections are being held only for the Parliament, the expenditure is borne entirely by the Union Government while for the elections being held only for the State Legislature, the expenditure is borne entirely by the concerned State. In case of simultaneous elections to the Parliament and State Legislature, the expenditure is shared equally between the Union and the State Governments. For Capital Equipment, expenditure related to preparation for electoral rolls and the scheme for Electors' Identity EXECUTIVE INTERFERENCE BARRED In the performance of its functions, Election Commission is insulated from executive interference. It is the Commission which decides the election schedules for the conduct of elections, whether general elections or bye-elections. Again, it is the Commission, which decides on the location polling stations, assignment of voters to the polling stations, location of counting centres, arrangements to be made in and around polling stations and counting centres and all allied matters. ELECTION SCHEDULE The Commission normally announces the schedule of elections in a major Press Conference a few weeks before the formal process is set in motion. The Model Code of Conduct for guidance of candidates and Political Parties immediately comes into effect after such announcement. The formal process for the elections starts with the Notification or Notifications calling upon the electorate to elect Members of a House. As soon as Notifications are issued, Candidates can start filing their nominations in the constituencies from where they wish to contest. These are scrutinised by the Returning Officer of the constituency concerned after the last date for the same is over after about a week. The validly nominated candidates can withdraw from the contest within two days from the date of scrutiny.
182
183
Contesting candidates get at least two weeks for political campaign before the actual date of poll. On account of the vast magnitude of operations and the massive size of the electorate, polling is held at least on three days for the national elections. A separate date for counting is fixed and the results declared for each constituency by the concerned Returning Officer. The Commission compiles the complete list of Members elected and issues an appropriate Notification for the due Constitution of the House. With this, the process of elections is complete and the President, in case of the Lok Sabha, and the Governors of the concerned States, in case of Vidhan Sabhas, can then convene their respective Houses to hold their sessions. The entire process takes between 5 to 8 weeks for the national elections, 4 to 5 weeks for separate elections only for Legislative Assemblies. Indian Elections, the Largest Event in the World Conduct of General Elections in India for electing a new Lower House of Parliament (Lok Sabha) involves management of the largest event in the world. The electorate exceeds 668 million voting in 800,000 polling stations spread across widely varying geographic and climatic zones. Polling stations are located in the snow-clad mountains in the Himalayas, the deserts of the Rajasthan and in sparsely populated islands in the Indian Ocean. POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE COMMISSION Political parties are registered with the Election Commission under the law. The Commission ensures inner party democracy in their functioning by insisting upon them to hold their organizational elections at periodic intervals. Political Parties so registered with it are granted recognition at the State and National levels by the Election Commission on the basis of their poll performance at general elections according to criteria prescribed by it. The Commission, as a part of its quasi-judicial jurisdiction, also settles disputes between the splinter groups of such recognised parties. Election Commission ensures a level playing field for the political parties in election fray, through strict observance by them of a Model Code of Conduct evolved with the consensus of political
parties. The Commission holds periodical consultations with the political parties on matters connected with the conduct of elections; compliance of Model Code of Conduct and new measures proposed to be introduced by the Commission on election related matters. Advisory Jurisdiction and Quasi-Judicial Functions Under the Constitution, the Commission also has advisory jurisdiction in the matter of post election disqualification of sitting members of Parliament and State Legislatures. Further, the cases of persons found guilty of corrupt practices at elections which come before the Supreme Court and High Courts are also referred to the Commission for its opinion on the question as to whether such person shall be disqualified and, if so, for what period. The opinion of the Commission in all such matters is binding on the President or, as the case may be, the Governor to whom such opinion is tendered. The Commission has the power to disqualify a candidate who has failed to lodge an account of his election expenses within the time and in the manner prescribed by law. The Commission has also the power for removing or reducing the period of such disqualification as also other disqualification under the law. Judicial Review The decisions of the Commission can be challenged in the High Court and the Supreme Court of the India by appropriate petitions. By long standing convention and several judicial pronouncements, once the actual process of elections has started, the judiciary does not intervene in the actual conduct of the polls. Once the polls are completed and result declared, the Commission cannot review any result on its own. This can only be reviewed through the process of an election petition, which can be filed before the High Court, in respect of elections to the Parliament and State Legislatures. In respect of elections for the offices of the President and Vice President, such petitions can only be filed before the Supreme Court.
184
185
MEDIA POLICY The Commission has a comprehensive policy for the media. It holds regular briefings for the mass media-print and electronic, on a regular basis, at close intervals during the election period and on specific occasions as necessary on other occasions. The representatives of the media are also provided facilities to report on actual conduct of poll and counting. They are allowed entry into polling stations and counting centres on the basis of authority letters issued by the Commission. They include members of both international and national media. The Commission also publishes statistical reports and other documents which are available in the public domain. The library of the Commission is available for research and study to members of the academic fraternity; media representatives and anybody else interested. The Commission has, in co-operation with the state owned media-Doordarshan and All India Radio, taken up a major campaign for awareness of voters. The Prasar Bharti Corporation which manages the national Radio and Television networks, has brought out several innovative and effective short clips for this purpose. International Co-operation India is a founding member of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Stockholm, Sweden. In the recent past, the Commission has expanded international contacts by way of sharing of experience and expertise in the areas of Electoral Management and Administration, Electoral Laws and Reforms. Delegates of the Commission have visited Sweden, U.K, Russia, Bangladesh, and the Philippines in recent years. Election Officials from the national electoral bodies and other delegates from the several countries-Russia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Indonesia, South Africa, Bangladesh, Thailand, Nigeria, Australia, the United States and Afganistan have visited the Commission for a better understanding of the Indian Electoral Process. The Commission has also provided experts and observers for elections to other countries in co-operation with the United Nations and the Commonwealth Secretariat.
New Initiatives The Commission has taken several new initiatives in the recent past. Notable among these are, a scheme for use of State owned Electronic Media for broadcast/telecast by Political parties, checking criminalisation of politics, computerisation of electoral rolls, providing electors with Identity Cards, simplifying the procedure for maintenance of accounts and filling of the same by candidates and a variety of measures for strict compliance of Model Code of Conduct, for providing a level playing field to contestants during the elections. New Initiatives The Commission has taken several new initiatives in the recent past. Notable among these are, a scheme for use of State owned Electronic Media for broadcast/telecast by Political parties, checking criminalisation of politics, computerisation of electoral rolls, providing electors with Identity Cards, simplifying the procedure for maintenance of accounts and filling of the same by candidates and a variety of measures for strict compliance of Model Code of Conduct, for providing a level playing field to contestants during the elections. NEED FOR ELECTORAL REFORMS The health of a democracy depends on the choice of representatives and leaders, which in turn is directly linked to the way political parties function and elections are conducted. While we have outstanding men and women in public life, flawed electoral process is increasingly alienating public-spirited citizens from the political and electoral arena. The persons best equipped to represent the people find it impossible to be elected by adhering to law and propriety. If elected, decent citizens cannot survive for long in elective public office without resorting to, or conniving in, dishonest methods. Even if they survive in office, their ability to promote public good is severely restricted. Indian people have often been changing governments and elected representatives. However, this change of players has little real impact on the nature of governance. Even if all those elected lose, and all losers are elected, the outcome is not substantially
186
187
altered. This sad situation calls for a change in the rules of the game, and citizens cannot be content with mere change of players. Perceptions Macro level vs. Micro level The elections are largely plebiscitary and the people vote for a platform or a leader or a promise or, as is seen more often, vote to reject the incumbent government or party in power. The individual candidate's ability is rarely an issue in our electoral politics. At the same time party workers and local oligarchies do not regard election as an opportunity to vindicate their policies or ideologies. In most cases, election of their chosen candidate is merely an opportunity to have control of state power and resources, to extend patronage selectively to people of their choice, to get pliant local bureaucrats appointed in plum postings, to humiliate and harass the inconvenient employees who would not do their bidding, and increasingly to interfere in crime investigation and prosecution by doctoring evidence, influencing investigation and letting criminals loyal to them go scot-free and implicating people opposed to them in criminal cases. In the midst of this, governance is an irrelevant and often inconvenient ritual without any meaning to those in power and without any positive impact on the people. At the macro level when we examine a whole state or the country, the electoral verdict does broadly reflect public opinion. More often than not this verdict is a reflection of the people's anger and frustration and is manifested in the rejection vote, or their support to a leader, promise or platform. However, at the local level, caste or subcaste, crime, money and muscle power have become the determinants of political power. All parties are compelled to put up candidates who can muster these resources in abundance in order to have a realistic chance of success. While political waves are perceived around the time of election or afterwards, at the time of nomination of candidates all parties are uncertain about their success and would naturally try to maximize their chances of success at the polls by choosing those candidates who can somehow manipulate or coerce the voters. As a net result, irrespective of which party wins, the nature of political leadership and quality remain largely the same, and
the people end up being losers. This is then followed by another rejection vote in the next election and the vicious cycle keeps repeating. Where the candidate cannot muster money or muscle power, he stands little chance of getting elected irrespective of his party's electoral fortunes. Increasingly in several pockets of the country, people are spared even the bother of having to go to the polling station. Organized booth capturing and rigging is ensuring victory without people's involvement. There is much that is wrong with our elections. Flawed electoral rolls have become a menace. About 40% errors are noticed in electoral rolls in many urban areas, and bogus voting in towns exceeds 20%, making our elections a mockery. Purchase of votes through money and liquor, preventing poorer sections from voting, large scale impersonation and bogus voting, purchase of agents of opponents, threatening and forcing agents and polling personnel to allow false voting, booth-capturing and large scale rigging, bribing polling staff and police personnel to get favors and to harass opponents, use of violence and criminal gangs, stealing ballot boxes or tampering with the ballot papers, inducing or forcing voters to reveal their voting preferences through various techniques including 'cycling' etc, illegally entering the polling stations and controlling polling process all these are an integral part of our electoral landscape. No wonder the Election Commission estimate that more than 700 of the 4072 legislators in States have some criminal record against them! Many scholars wonder how despite massive irregularities the electoral verdicts still seem to largely reflect public opinion, and how parties in power often lose elections. The answers are simple. Happily for us, though parties in power are prone to abusing authority for electoral gains, there has never been any serious state-sponsored rigging in most of India. The irregularities are largely limited to the polling process alone, and most of the prepolling activities including printing and distribution of ballot papers, and post-polling activities including transport and storage of ballot boxes and counting of ballots are free from any political interference or organized manipulation. That is why parties in power have no decisive advantage in manipulating the polls, and
188
189
electoral verdicts broadly reflect shifts in public opinion. However, the massive irregularities in polling process make sure that candidates who deploy abnormal money and muscle power have a distinct advantage. Sensing this, most major parties have come to nominate 'winnable' candidates without reference to their ability and integrity. Thus, the use of money power and muscle power is sanctioned by almost all the parties, and often they tend to neutralize each other. The net result is that candidates who do not indulge in any irregularity have very little chance of being elected. Election expenditure-mostly for illegitimate vote buying, hiring of hoodlums and bribing officials-is often ten or twenty times the ceiling permitted by law. Criminals have a decisive or dominant influence on the outcome in many parts of India, and have often become party candidates and won on a large scale. New Entrants into Politics If we examine the new entrants into politics over the past three or four decades in the country, very few with intellect, integrity, commitment to public service and passion for improvement of the situation could enter the political arena and survive. Almost every new entrant has chosen politics exactly for the wrong reasons. A careful analysis shows that heredity and family connections are the commonest cause for entry into politics. Those who have large inherited or acquired wealth and have decided that investment in politics is good business closely follow this. In recent years, many local muscle men, whose services were earlier sought for extortion or vote-gathering, are now directly entering the fray and gaining political legitimacy. A few persons have entered politics out of personal loyalty to, and close contacts with those in high public office. People with very high visibility on account of great success in mass entertainment like sports or films have also been increasingly drawn into the vortex of politics. Occasionally, accidents of fate are pitch-forking certain individuals into elective public office. If we exclude these methods of heredity, money power, muscle power, personal contacts, high visibility, and accidents of fate, there will not be even a handful of persons in this vast country
of ours, who have entered politics with deep understanding of public affairs and passion for public good and survived with honesty for any length of time over the past four decades. There is no activity more vital and nobler than governance. In the true sense, politics is about promotion of happiness and public good. But if the best men and women that society can boast of are either prevented or repelled or rendered incapable of surviving in the political arena, then that governance is bound to be in shambles. Democracy is the only system which demands constant selection, nurturing and development of capable leadership. If the best men and women society can offer are repelled by the political process and politics acquires a pejorative connotation, the result is collapse of ethics in public life, and with it public confidence in governance. With the most competent and qualified persons eschewing politics, paralysis of governance is the inevitable consequence. With all decisions geared towards somehow winning elections and retaining power or to amass individual wealth at the cost of the public, the people are swindled. This legal plunder ensures that public goods and services are of appalling quality and wholly insufficient to meet the requirements of a civilized society or growing economy. Public exchequer will soon be depleted and fiscal collapse will be imminent. Sadly, all these ugly features of a dysfunctional democracy are evident in contemporary India. ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES In India, traditionally parties have been seen as pocket boroughs of those at the helm. Often there are entry barriers to members. Communist parties have always had a somewhat strict membership admission procedure, which is generally uniform in its application. The mainstream parties which are mass-based and have no rigid membership norms, however, have been erecting barriers of entry to all persons who are potential threats to the current leadership. While ordinary, faceless members are admitted as cannon-fodder with ease, the potentially influential members are not always welcomed with open arms. Similarly, even the faintest criticism of party bosses on any issue is taken as an act of indiscipline, often leading to suspension or expulsion. Again,
190
191
when leadership changes in the party, the same member who was earlier punished for rebellion is welcomed back with alacrity. There are countless instances of such disgraceful autocracy in all major political parties in India. The political parties, which exhibit such authoritarian tendencies in protecting the privileges of those in power and nipping in the bud any potential threat to individual dominance have not shown the slightest sense of shame or remorse in assiduously cultivating and recruiting known criminals, corrupt persons and charlatans and rogues. Such shady elements are courted and welcomed, while decent and dignified citizens are shunned and often rejected. No major mainstream party has any published membership rolls. Spurious membership and disputes arising out of it are only too well known to all of us in respect of major political parties. As a net result, parties have often become a collection of greedy, corrupt and unscrupulous persons, who are willing to use any method, however ugly, immoral, violent or brutal, to perpetuate their hold on state power. By virtue of entry barriers and expulsion powers in the hands of party bosses, no real rejuvenation of parties with injection of fresh blood is possible. All idealistic, talented youngsters are often repelled by the parties, and undesirable elements find a haven in them. As a perceptive political observer commented some years ago, in Indian political parties, 'the man who wears the crown is the king'. Leadership is often acquired through undemocratic means and retained by the power of patronage, nomination and expulsion, rather than the support of members. This paved way for oligarchies and unaccountable and un-elected coteries dominating and manipulating the political process. Party leadership, however illegitimate the ascent to it may be, gives total control of the party apparatus and resources. Through total monopoly over candidates' choice, the leadership's access to, and control over, levers of state power is complete and unchallenged. Given the fact that most parties are dominated by only one leader, and not even a small group, 'monarchy' is the correct description of party leadership. Once in office, the power of leadership is absolute, and control of resources is awesome. Any potential dissidence or principled
opposition is instantly snuffed out. Suspension, expulsion, instant removal from office, denial of party tickets, all these and more weapons are fully available to leadership if there is any whiff of opposition. If the party is in power, state machinery is used for party ends, and more often to perpetuate absolute control over the party and state, with cynical disregard to propriety and public good. All positions in the regional and local units are nominated by the party leader. Every party functionary owes his or her position to the grace and good will of the 'High Command'. Myths and images are assiduously propagated to perpetuate personal power. No other party functionary or leader is allowed to share the limelight. The moment a local or rival national leader is gaining in popularity, he is immediately cut to size, removed from office, and if necessary expelled from the party to deny him a political base, and force him into political wilderness. Membership rolls are not available, and when prepared are often spurious. Elections are not held, and if held are rigged. Musclemen often take over party meeting and conferences at various levels, and fisticuffs and violence are quite common. All parties, without exception, nominate candidates for public office through the dictates of the leadership or high command. All funds are collected clandestinely and spent at will to further augment personal power. State level 'leaders' are nominated by the 'high command'. When a party is elected to office in any State, the legislature party leader, who will be Chief Minister, is nominated by the central leadership, and formally anointed in a farcical 'election'. Often sealed covers are sent indicating the name of the person chosen as Chief Minister by the party leadership. There are instances in which persons who did not command the support of even a handful of legislators became Chief Ministers. Even candidates for public office in local government elections and cooperatives are decided by the party's central leadership. When the party obtains a majority in a local election, again the zilla parishad chairman or other functionaries are decided by the party bosses far removed from the scene. In short, political party functioning has become totally autocratic, oligarchic, unaccountable and undemocratic. The whole political process and all democratic institutions are systematically subverted. Party
192
193
leaders have become medieval potentates, with the sole intent of survival in power, and bequeathing their office to their family members or chosen successors. Public Scrutiny and Regulation It does not require any great analysis or insight to understand that undemocratic political parties cannot nurture, sustain or strengthen a democratic society. The most critical need is to reform parties and make them open, democratic and accountable. Basic democratic principles of member control, elected representatives from lower tier electing leadership at higher levels, open membership rolls, fair and free elections, no power to central party over regional and local units, easy and effective challenge to incumbents, no recourse to expulsion or removal of potential rivals, and no nominated office holders at any level, should be integral to the functioning of any political party. The question then is, can the political parties be left to manage their own affairs democratically? Past experience shows that it is futile to expect parties to become democratic on their own. Through long years of neglect, democratic processes have become fragile. The coteries, individuals and families controlling parties are so firmly entrenched that there is no realistic hope of members being allowed to organize themselves and challenge the leadership and procedures. It will be somewhat nave to except the party leaders themselves to initiate the process of party reform, which will undermine their own unaccountable and often illegitimate personal power. Nor is there hope that democratic elections for public offices will automatically force reform on parties. As the choices offered to the public are between Tweedledom and Tweedledee, no matter which party wins, the picture remains unchanged and immutable. We as a people have an abiding and legitimate interest in the affairs of parties. As we have seen, parties are by no means private clubs looking after their personal interest. They are the engines of democracy and instruments of governance in society. They seek and acquire power over us, and in reality have effective, and unbreakable monopoly over power. The power of the party cartels cannot be checked by forming new parties. Experience everywhere
shows that the hope of new parties emerging and spawning a new culture rejuvenating the political process is a pipe dream. The emergence of a successful new political party itself is a rare phenomenon in modern world. The emergence Telugu Desam Party in Andhra Pradesh was one such rare example. A combination of unusual circumstances-a strong-willed, extremely popular leader who became an idol to millions as a successful film star, absence of a viable political alternative to the dominant ruling party, people's disgust with mis-governance and corruption, and a strong anti-establishment sentiment have brought about a major political change in 1983 in Andhra Pradesh. However, as events have shown, the same new party has become a replica of Congress, and has conformed to the iron law of Indian politics-'all mainstream, centrist parties imitate Congress and become its clones'. This fate is seen in varying degrees in many parties. The Janata of 1977, which took birth from the anger of people, and its various progeny; BJP, which claimed indigenous cultural roots and promised a brave new world, and yet lost is sheen in office within a few months; the regional parties like the two Dravidian parties, whose origin was based on cultural regionalism; the Shiv Sena, which rose out of urban middle class frustration; the many other religious, tribal, caste, and regional ethnic parties with bases all over India all these have proved to be no different from Congress in organizational ethos and internal functioning. Of the three truly ideology-driven parties, Swatantra party and Socialists disappeared, and Communists continue their policy of splendid isolation and democratic centralism, unmindful of the tectonic shifts in global and Indian politics. From this bird's eye view of Indian political parties, it is clear that we, as a people, have stakes in their functioning and future. The moment they seek power over us, and control over state apparatus, they forfeit their claim to immunity from public scrutiny and state regulation based on reasonable restraints. This is particularly true in a climate in which they have proved to be utterly irresponsible, unaccountable and autocratic, perpetuating individual control over levers of power and political organization, entirely for personal aggrandizement, pelf and privilege.
194
195
Therefore, in a deep sense, the crisis in political parties is a national crisis, and has to be resolved by a national effort. This leads us to the inescapable conclusion that there should be internal democracy in parties, regulated by law, and monitored and supervised by statutory authorities. Every party, by law, should be obligated to practice internal democracy in all respects. The details of functioning can be left to the party's own constitution, but it should conform to the broad principles of democracy stated clearly in law. The actual practice of internal democracy should be verifiable by an external agency, say the Election Commission. Mandatory publication of membership rolls of political parties at local level, election of leadership at every level by secret ballot supervised by the Election Commission, a comprehensive prohibition on nominations of office bearers or expulsion of rivals, a well-established system to challenge the leadership of incumbents at every level, and justifiability of these internal democratic processes through special tribunals-all these measures could form the basis of any meaningful reform and regulation of political parties. Extreme care and caution should, however, be exercised to ensure that a party's democratic choices of leadership or its espousal of policies are not in any way directly or indirectly influenced by law or external monitoring agencies. The party leaders and its policies should be judged only by the public, in the market place of ideas and in elections. Election Expenditure-Root Cause of Corruption Excessive, illegal and illegitimate expenditure in elections is the root cause of corruption. Often the expenditure is 10 to 15 times the legal ceiling prescribed. Among elected representatives, almost everyone violates expenditure ceiling laws. Most election expenditure is illegitimate and is incurred in buying votes, hiring hoodlums or bribing officials. Abnormal election expenditure has to be recouped in multiples to sustain the system. The high risk involved in election expenditure (winner-take-all process), the long gestation period required for most politicians who aspire for legislative office, the higher cost of future elections, the need to involve the vast bureaucracy in the web of corruption (with 90% shared by the large number of employees)-all these mean that for
every rupee of expenditure, hundred rupees has to be recovered to sustain the system. One rupee election expenditure normally entails at least a five-fold return to the politician. To share five rupees with the political class, the rent-seeking bureaucracy has to recover about Rs.50. In order to extort Rs.50 from the public, there should be delay, inefficiency, harassment, humiliation and indignity worth Rs.500 heaped on the innocent citizens! To take the example of a major State, it is estimated that about Rs.600 crores (6 billion) has been spent by the major political parties in the general elections for Parliament and Legislative Assembly in 1999. This expenditure can be sustained only when the returns are of the order of at least Rs.3000 crores (30 billion), which in turn is translated as extortion of Rs.30000 crores (300 billion) from the public by the vast bureaucracy. The inconvenience, humiliation, the lost opportunities and the distortion of market forces are often worth ten times the actual corruption. Unaccounted and illegitimate election expenditure is thus translated into huge corruption siphoning off money at every level. In addition, this ubiquitous corruption alters the nature of political and administrative power, and undermines market forces, efficiency and trust on a much larger scale, retarding economic growth and distorting democracy. Cleansing elections is the most important route through which corruption and mis-administration can be curbed. The Curse of Defections People also have come to realize that their vote has no sanctity after the election. Even if a candidate gets elected on a platform, there is no guarantee that their representative will not defect to a party with an entirely different agenda and ideology and betray the people's verdict purely for personal gain. Public office is seen as private property and in handling it the trust reposed by voters is of little consequence. Personal honor and commitment to a cause are at a premium in a system which rewards defections and does little to penalize political malfeasance. Let us now briefly examine the Tenth Schedule of the constitution, incorporated by 52nd Amendment popularly known as the Anti-defection Act. These provisions have a major bearing
196
197
on parties, public discourse and legislative and parliamentary voting. The Anti-defection Act was obviously well-intentioned, and was meant to ensure that the people's mandate is respected, and elected legislators do not violate the trust reposed in them by the public. Candidates are generally elected on the basis of the platform and a party, and their defection, often in return for money or favors, is a gross insult to democracy. However, the Anti-defection Act completely failed to prevent defections. There are countless instances of defections in Parliament and State legislatures since 1985, after the law came into effect. The only novel feature now is that individual defections invite disqualification for legislative office, and therefore there is no incentive for such defection. However, collective defection is now legitimate and amply rewarded. The provision that if 1/3 legislators defect, it is a split in the party and is permissible is a classic case of missing the wood for the trees. It is tantamount to saying that if an individual commits a murder, it is a crime; but if a group does it, it is perfectly legitimate! As a result splits are engineered, and constitutional coups are planned with meticulous precision, and careful conspiracy. Politics is reduced to the ugly numbers game in the legislature, without any sense of fairness, principle or obligation to the electorate. At the same time, as the Uttar Pradesh case of defections by Bahujan Samaj Party legislators showed, partisan Speakers can actually create new arithmetic, hither to unknown to man! In effect, the anti-defection provisions have completely failed in achieving the intended result. There is, however, one major unintended result of the Antidefection Act. Once the law provided that violation of party whip on any vote attracts disqualification, party legislators who may honestly differ on a piece of legislation are now forced to submit to the will of the leadership. The ill-conceived legislation on muslim women's maintenance after the Supreme Court verdict in Shah Bano case is one sad example of such a case. An even more shameful episode is the whip issued by Congress Party to its MPs in the impeachment case of Justice Ramaswamy. Parliament sits as a court while deciding on impeachment matters, and only evidence of wrong doing and the judgment of individual MPs
should matter. Party whips have no place on such issues, and are manifestly illegitimate, and are probably unconstitutional. However, once the law gives the same enforceability to all whips, the legislators have no choice but to obey, or risk disqualification. We cannot allow such a conspiracy of a group of individuals in the name of a party to distort all public debate and legislation. By throttling legislators and preventing them from giving concrete expression to their legitimate views, Anti-defection Act made them captives to irresponsible party leaderships in an already authoritarian and unaccountable party hierarchy. Thus all dissent is stifled and smothered, whereas collective plunder of the state goes on merrily unchecked. At the same time defections continue in a systematic and organized manner, thwarting people's will. SYSTEMIC INERTIA As a net result of these distortions, elections have lost their real meaning as far as the people are concerned. It is often tempting to blame the illiterate and poor citizens for this plight of our democracy. But in reality it is the democratic vigor and enthusiastic participation of the countless poor and illiterate voters, which has sustained our democracy so far. However, most people have realized with experience that the outcome of elections is of little consequence to their lives in the long run. If, by a miracle, all winners in an election lose, and all their immediate rivals are elected instead, there will still be no real improvement in the quality of governance. This remarkable inertia and the seeming intractability of the governance process have convinced citizens that there is no real long-term stake involved in electoral politics. Therefore many poor citizens are forced to take a rational decision to maximize their short-term gains. As a result the vote has become a purchasable commodity for money or liquor. More often it is a sign of assertion of primordial loyalties of caste, religion, group, ethnicity, region or language. Very often without even any material inducement or emotional outburst based on prejudices, the sheer anger against the dysfunctional governance process makes most voters reject the status quo.
198
199
Often this rejection of the government of the day is indiscriminate and there is no rational evaluation of the alternatives offered. In short, even the illiterate, ordinary voter is making a rational assumption that the vote has no serious long-term consequences and the choice is between Tweedledom and Tweedledee. Therefore he is attempting to maximize his shortterm material or emotional gain! Obviously, this situation calls for urgent and practical electoral reforms along with fundamental governance reforms to enhance people's empowerment and participation. These electoral reforms should address the following concerns: 1. Criminalization of politics. 2. Abuse of unaccounted money power. 3. Electoral irregularities of flawed electoral rolls, personation, false-voting, rigging and booth capturing. 4. Autocratic, unaccountable political parties. 5. The curse of defections for personal gain DECRIMINALIZATION OF POLITICS Present Status: 1. Sections 8, 8A and 9 of RP Act, 1951 provide for disqualification of persons convicted of specified offences. The list is comprehensive and reasonable. 2. The provisions obviously failed to achieve the desired result. The Election Commission pointed out that more than 700 of the 4092 legislators at state level have criminal record against them. 3. Lok Satta released a list of 45 candidates, most of them nominated by major parties in Andhra Pradesh in the general election for Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha in 1999. The names of about 20 more persons with suspected criminal record could not be revealed for want of verifiable evidence. With the backing of major political parties, several of them were elected. Several citizens' initiatives made similar efforts elsewhere.
4. Section 8(4) of RP Act, 1951 gives a grace period of three months to incumbent legislators before disqualification comes into effect in case they are convicted of an offence, or if an appeal is filed within three months, until the appeal is disposed of by the court. Unfortunately this provision was misinterpreted by election officials consistently until 1997, and any candidate, who had been convicted but filed an appeal, was exempted from disqualification until the appeal was disposed of. The Election Commission gave guidelines in 1997 effectively closing this loophole. Problems: 1. Many known criminals are still in the electoral fray and often get elected. The problem is getting worse with successive elections. 2. The conviction rate in criminal cases is a pitiful 5-6% 3. Disposal of criminal cases is excruciatingly slow, and most cases take years to dispose of. Technically, the murderers of Rajiv Gandhi were perfectly free to contest elections in India for 7 years after the dastardly crime until 1998 when they were convicted, provided they are Indian citizens and are otherwise eligible. This obviously is an unacceptable situation. 4. If the persons facing criminal prosecution are disqualified indiscriminately, there is a real danger of trumped up charges against political opponents. This is particularly likely in a system in which police function directly under the control of the government, and the government has specific powers to withdraw prosecution, order investigation and grant parole and pardon. 5. Mafia dons and organized gangs often escape even prosecution for want of tangible evidence. 6. There are rowdy sheets and history sheets opened by the police against certain individuals with criminal record. 7. The period of disqualification under RP Act 1951 for conviction varies with the offence, and this variation does not always seem to have a rational basis. Annexure 2 gives
200
201
a table indicating the offence and the period of disqualification. 8. While the list of offences under Sections 8,8A and 9 of RP Act 1951 is fairly large and comprehensive, certain offences seem to have been left out. Annexure 3 gives an illustrative list of offences conviction for which should incur disqualification as recommended by the Law Commission. Possible Proposals for Electoral Reform 1. The anomalies in respect of period of disqualification may be corrected broadly in line with the recommendations of the Law Commission. 2. The punishments for certain offences should be altered, and certain new offences should be included, so that there are more rational criteria for disqualification of candidates as proposed by the Law Commission. The list should include conviction for corrupt electoral practices under section 99 of RP Act, 1951 3. Any person against whom criminal charges are framed by a magistrate for any offence listed under section 8 of RP Act 1951 or any warrant case should be disqualified to contest in elections as long as charges are pending against him/her. 4. Any person in respect of whom a History sheet or a Rowdy sheet or a similar record by whatever name it is called, has been opened and is kept open in any police station within the Indian union in accordance with the provisions of the appropriate laws or police standing orders, should be disqualified as long as such History sheet or Rowdy sheet is kept open. 5. In order to ensure that there is no misuse of this provision to harass political opponents, a safeguard should be provided in the form of judicial scrutiny. Any person who is aggrieved by the opening of History sheet or Rowdy sheet and who wishes to contest the election may appeal to the Sessions Judge at least two months before the date of election notification, and thereupon the Sessions Judge shall hold a summary enquiry and decide within a month
whether or not the opening of such History sheet or Rowdy sheet is valid. The order of the Sessions Judge shall be binding on the police authorities. 6. Every candidate for an elective office shall file at the time of nomination before the returning officer an affidavit on the lines given in Annexure 4 and the nomination of those persons who do not file such an affidavit shall be rejected. 7. If any misleading or incorrect information is furnished in the affidavit, or if any facts are concealed, such a person shall be disqualified for a period of, say twelve years. In case such a person has been already elected, his election stands nullified and he shall be disqualified for twelve years. In such cases a complaint shall be filed before the Election Commission, whereupon the Commission shall issue notices to the compliant and the candidate and after summary enquiry give its decision within 90 days from the date of complaint. The decision of the Election Commission shall be final and binding. 8. Similar disqualification provisions should be incorporated in respect of elections to local governments. Note: A few critics have expressed the concern that decriminalization efforts might inadvertently hurt the interests of the dalits and backward classes. Given the power-centered nature of our society and the iniquitous nature of our polity, there is always the danger of influential sections manipulating the system in their favor and marginalizing disadvantaged sections. Also often the so called upper castes may remain in the back ground and use the dalits and OBCs as canon fodder to execute crimes, thus escaping disqualification. However, empirical evidence shows that criminalization of politics is not the monopoly of any caste group. In fact, there are more organized criminal gangs with political connections among the so called upper castes. When criminal record of candidates is carefully compiled, there are more upper caste candidates with such a record. Also once disqualification is applicable to all crime violent as well as white-collared, there is greater probability of the provisions being applicable to all sections equitably. For instance
202
203
if willful defaulters of bank loans are disqualified, there is greater chance of influential sections being made accountable. There are other concerns expressed about the fairness of disqualification of candidates facing criminal charges or those listed as rowdy sheeters etc. Firstly only charges framed by a magistrate in warrant cases after prima facie enquiry are included. Once there is judicial application of mind, it acts as a reasonable safeguard to protect individual interest. Secondly, there have to be certain reasonable standards with uniform and objective application, and there can never be absolute certainty about a person's guilt. There are cases of conviction which are set aside on appeal. There are known cases of innocent persons having been found guilty of capital offences and executed. If we wish to apply exacting standards, we should wait until the final appeal is heard, which obviously defeats the objective of decriminalization of politics. Thirdly, there are fears that police records about rowdy sheeters etc could be highly subjective and arbitrary. In fact, the criteria for opening such records are well laid down and are objective. To eliminate the risk of political manipulation, a provision is made for judicial determination of the fairness of the police records at the level of the Sessions Judge. Fourthly, when there is a clash between the society's right to have fair and proper representation in legislatures and the individual's right to represent the people, clearly society's rights take precedence over individual right. The right to contest elections is not a fundamental right. The harm done by denying an occasional innocent person a chance to contest is much less than allowing a criminal to be elected. In fact the balance today has swung against decent citizens in elections, and this distortion ought to be corrected. Fifthly, these proposals are meant to reduce the role of criminals in politics, and cannot in themselves be adequate to eliminate the flaws and distortions in the criminal justice system. That requires a different, and far-reaching reform effort. However, the failure to reform, the criminal justice system cannot militate against reform of the electoral system. Electoral reform is central to the fairness of representation and health of a democracy.
Finally, when there is overwhelming distortion in electoral politics and money power and criminal involvement have come to dominate elections, effective and far-reaching reforms are required to safeguard public interest. Tentative and half-hearted reforms will fail to cleanse our political and electoral system. PROPOSALS FOR CAMPAIGN FUNDING REFORM Pre-Conditions for Public Funding 1. Political Party regulation to ensure internal democracy 2. Party candidates to be democratically selected by secret ballot by members or their elected delegates 3. Democratic selection of candidates 4. Decriminalization of politics 5. Rectification of defects in electoral rolls 6. Elimination of voting fraud through introduction of voter identity cards and electronic voting. 7. Strict disclosure and penalty norms Essential Elements of Public Funding 1. Transparent 2. Verifiable 3. Non-Discretionary 4. Incentive for performance 5. Encourage private resource mobilization 6. Prevent fragmentation 7. Fair to new parties and independents 8. Finite cost to exchequer 9. Equal treatment of all candidates Measures to Encourage Political Funding-Tax Incentives and Ceilings 1. All individual contributions to candidates or parties for political and election activity shall be 100 % exempt from income tax subject to a ceiling of, say Rs.10,000. Total ceiling on contributions from an individual to all candidates
204
205
and parties put together shouldn't exceed Rs.50,000 in a calendar year. 2. 100% tax exemption for all corporate contributions with a ceiling of 5% of the net profit not exceeding Rs. 50 lakhs for national parties and Rs. 10 lakhs for state parties. 3. Corporate contributions shall be subject to the following norms: - As mentioned above no contribution shall exceed 5% of the net profit. - A company which receives state subsidy or has a decision or contract or license pending with government shall not contribute. - Contributions by Public Sector enterprises are prohibited - Prohibited to individual candidates. Measures to prevent abuse of office: 1. Government shall not issue any advertisements containing the name of a person or party or photograph of any leader 2. No government advertisement shall be issued listing any achievements of a particular government. 3. Government transport or infrastructure shall not be used for political campaigning 4. No contribution shall be received from any person or corporate body in respect of whom any decision or license or contract or claim of subsidy or concession of any nature is pending with the government. Measures to Enforce Disclosure and Accountability-Penalties 1. Every individual contribution totaling Rs.1000/-or more and every corporate contribution to candidates or political parties for any political activity shall be disclosed with full particulars of identity, address and other details of donors. All contributions exceeding Rs. 500 /-shall be by cheque only. Both the donor and recipient shall be obliged to make full disclosure to the Election Commission and the Income Tax authorities. Penalty for non-disclosure or false
disclosure shall be: a. Donors: fine equal to ten times the contributions and imprisonment for six months. b. Candidates: disqualification for six years, fine equivalent to ten times the amount not disclosed, and imprisonment for at least one year. c. Parties: de-recognition and deregistration for five years, fine equivalent to ten times the amount not disclosed, and imprisonment of office bearers for three years. 2. The parties shall file returns every year, and after every election. The candidates shall file an audited statement after the election. The penalty for not furnishing audited accounts shall be: a. Candidates: disqualification for a period of six years or until accounts are furnished, whichever is later. b. Parties: de-recognition of the political party until accounts are furnished. c. Every political party and candidate shall submit the audited statement of accounts to the Election Commission as well as the Income Tax authorities in the prescribed proforma. Every political party and candidate shall make available to the public the audited accounts for the financial year by September 30, through print and electronic means. Copies shall be made available to any member of the public by the Election Commission on payment of a nominal fee, as well as publishing them electronically. 4. Every candidate shall disclose his/ her income and assets along with those of his family members at the time of the nomination. There shall be annual disclosure of income and assets of elected legislators and their family members. False or incomplete disclosure will invite confiscation of undisclosed properties and assets, disqualification for six years and imprisonment for three years. Non-declaration will invite automatic disqualification. 5. The Election Commission shall be the final authority to receive statements of income, and assets as well as political contributions and expenditure, their verification and
206
207
auditing, and determination of false disclosure or nondisclosure. The Commission's determination of noncompliance on an application or suo motu shall automatically invite penalty ten times the amount and disqualification for six years, and in case of parties, derecognition and deregistration for five years. Ordinary criminal courts or special courts appointed for the purpose will have jurisdiction to try related offences and sentence the guilty to imprisonment. Measures to Limit Campaign Expenditure 1. There shall be a reasonable ceiling on expenditure in elections as decided by Election Commission from time to time. All expenditure including that incurred by a political party or any individual or group to further the electoral prospects of a candidate shall be included in the election expenditure. 2. Penalty for violation of ceiling shall be a fine equal to five times the excess expenditure. Penalty for willful non-disclosure of any expenditure shall be disqualification of the candidate for six years, fine equal to ten times the non-disclosed amount and imprisonment for six months. 3. There shall be reasonable ceilings fixed on television/ radio/newspaper advertisements. 4. During election time, rallies held under covered roofs alone shall be permitted, and outdoor public rallies shall be prohibited. However, there shall be no restrictions on all other campaign related individual or group activities. Measures for Indirect Public Funding-Media 1. Free television and radio time shall be given in state media to registered parties as prescribed by the Election Commission. 2. Private electronic media shall earmark time for recognized parties as prescribed by the Election Commission for election-related campaign. The licensing conditions should be suitably amended by law.
3. There shall be election debates telecast and broadcast live by all electronic media as per the directions of the Election Commission. Gist of Proposals for Public Funding 1. Rs. 10 per vote polled. 2. Independent and party candidates to be treated on par as long as they pass the threshold of 10 % of valid votes polled in the constituency to become eligible for public funding. 3. Party gets 1/3 of the eligible funding, and candidate receives 2/3 of the funding. 4. Parties to receive 50 % of advance @ Rs.5 per vote based on their performance in earlier elections. 5. Independents to be reimbursed after the poll. 6. Stringent enforcement and strict penalties for noncompliance of disclosure norms. Cost of Public Funding - Population 101 crore - Estimated no. of eligible voters 60 crore - Actual votes polled (at 60%) 36 crore Exclude 40% from funding on account of eligibility criteria and limits imposed 10% voting threshold, ceiling limits, matching funds, funds raised by parties and candidates. - Balance required for funding: 22 crore. Funding cost at Rs.10 per vote is Rs.220 crores for the Lok Sabha elections, to be borne by the Union government. Funding cost for State Assemblies may be Rs. 250 crore on account of likely higher percentage of voting. This will be borne by the States. A Public Fund for Political and Campaign Funding 1. The Union and States shall start such Public Funds. 2. All contributions from individuals and corporate bodies will receive the benefit of 150 % tax exemption without subject to any ceiling.
208
209
3. The Public Fund shall be operated by the Election Commission, and candidates and parties will be funded from that fund as per the norms. Miscellaneous 1. The Election Commission shall be the final authority to determine compliance or otherwise of these norms, and to impose penalties. 2. Public funding to party candidates shall be contingent upon the party candidates being selected democratically by secret ballot by members of the party or an assembly of elected representatives of the party members in the constituency. 3. Any expenditure to give inducements to voters, distribute gifts, bribe public officials involved in conduct of election, or hire any workers or gangs for any unlawful activity shall be unlawful. Penalties for such unlawful expenditure shall be disqualification of the candidate for six years, a fine equivalent to ten times the expenditure incurred and imprisonment for three years. 4. Every candidate shall make a declaration of his/her income and property at the time of nomination, along with income and properties of the members of his family. False or incomplete declaration shall be invite disqualification for six years and imprisonment for one year. Non-declaration will invite automatic disqualification. The Election Commission shall determine the compliance of this provision and make public these declarations. The EC shall be the final authority to decide on complaints of false declaration. MEASURE FOR CURBING POLLING IRREGULARITIES Present Status 1. In the actual conduct of elections, the pre-polling activities including printing of ballot papers etc are fool-proof and largely free from any irregularities. 2. Similarly the post-poll activities including transport and storage of ballot boxes and counting are fool proof and there are effective safeguards against mischief.
3. The irregularities are largely limited to the polling process itself. In fact most electoral politics is now reduced to manipulating the polling process including influencing appointment of election and polling officials in certain states. 4. Electoral registration law is near-perfect. However, the procedural flaws allow for serious distortions. 5. Prior identification of the voter by verifiable means is not insisted upon as a precondition for voting. Therefore false voting by impersonation is unchecked. 6. The only check is the opportunity for the polling agent of a candidate to object (challenged vote). However, often polling agents do not know all the voters. In urban areas it is impossible to have knowledge of even a fraction of the voters. Sometimes the polling agents are in conclusion with opponents. There are areas where the dominance of one caste or group is so pronounced that polling agents may not even be available for certain candidates, or when available, are intimidated. 7. Tendered ballots are given to those voters in whose name a vote was cast earlier by impersonation, and who can establish their identity. However, the provision is not widely known. Even if a tendered vote is cast, under the present law it has no validity. In fact the false vote already cast and inserted in the ballot box is counted, and the legitimate vote cast as tendered vote is kept in a sealed cover separately, and is not counted. This sealed cover is opened only in the event of a court order on an election petition. In effect, impersonation is rewarded in elections. 8. A tendered vote is indisputable proof of rigging. No matter what form rigging takes, its one inevitable manifestation is a false vote being cast in the name of another person. Tendered vote is thus the surest means of proving personation and rigging, provided there is great publicity and voters attach value to tendered vote. 9. Use of ballot papers involves several logistical difficulties including printing of ballots, large scale personnel
210
211
deployment, tampering with ballot papers, forcible entry into a polling station and at times massive rigging by rapid unauthorized stamping of ballots and insertion in ballot box. 10. Voter identity cards are introduced, and the law and rules have been amended. However, though Rs.1000 crores have been spent, identity cards have not been made mandatory for polling. 11. Electronic voting machines (EVM) can now be used, and the law has been amended. EVM technology is available, and they have been used successfully on pilot basis in select constituencies. They can be manufactured on large scale and their introduction actually reduces election expenditure in the medium and long-term. EVMs also reduce the scope for rigging, and make polling simpler and counting faster. Proposals for Reform 1. The local post office shall be made the nodal agency for electoral registration a. Electoral rolls for the polling stations covered by the post office shall be made available to citizens across the counter for a price. They can be purchased like any postal stamps or stationery. b. Copies of electoral rolls shall be displayed and made available for scrutiny when asked. c. The forms of registration, deletion of names and correction (in English and local language) shall be made available to citizens free of cost or for a nominal price of say, 10 paise. d. All such forms shall be received by the post office and acknowledgement given to the applicant. They shall then be forwarded to the electoral registration officials. e. The post office shall maintain a register showing details of applications, and shall receive action taken reports from electoral registration officials. This register shall be open to public for scrutiny.
2. Voter identity cards shall be mandatory in any election. The exercise of distribution of these voter identity cards shall be completed within one year. All other suitable means of identity ration card, driving license, pattadar pass book, bank pass book, passport, credit card, employer's certificate, tax receipt etc shall be permitted in lieu of voter identity card. 3. Electronic voting machines shall be introduced in every polling station. 4. Ballot papers shall be limited to those on official election duty or members of the armed forces. Measures should be evolved to facilitate voting of such persons in time. Proxy voting for soldiers on duty by their relations with prior authorization is one such method. 5. If the tendered votes in a polling station exceed 1% of the valid votes polled, there shall be automatic re-polling in that polling station. 6. If the tendered ballot papers are below 1% in a polling station, they shall be counted as normal ballot papers. (The vote polled by a legitimate voter is thus counted. Tendered ballots may not be relevant if voter identity cards are universally implemented and identification is made mandatory. Rules need to be framed regarding tendered votes in case of Electronic Voting Machines). INTERNAL DEMOCRACY IN POLITICAL PARTIES Present Status 1. Art 19 of the constitution accords citizens the right to form associations, thus implicitly recognizing the right to form political parties. 2. Election symbols (Reservation and Allotment) order, 1968, issued by the Election Commission under Art 324 of the constitution, read with the provisions of RP Act, 1951 and conduct of Election Rules 1961 provides for recognition of political parties. 3. A party will be recognized by the Election Commission as a State-level party and allotted a common symbol for its
212
213
candidates if it has been engaged in political activity continuously for five years, and had obtained at least one out of 25 members of Lok Sabha or one out of thirty members of State Legislative Assembly or 4% of the total valid votes caste at the election in the State. 4. A party satisfying these conditions in four or more states is recognized as a national party. 5. The symbols allotment order, 1968 has been recognized by the Supreme Court as a self-contained code and can be treated as one of the important land marks in the evolution ofregulation of political parties. (RP Bhalla). The Court upheld the order in the Sadique Ali Vs Election Commission of India, case. 6. Section 77 of RP Act, 1951, amended in 1974 mentions a political party for the first time in a statute. This amendment excludes expenditure incurred by a party from the statement of accounts lodged by a contesting candidate. 7. Tenth Schedule was added to the constitution in 1985 through 52nd amendment. This is the only reference to political parties in the constitution. Tenth Schedule provides for disqualification of members for voluntarily giving up membership of a political party or violating party whip. 8. Section 29A was inserted in the RP Act 1951 making provision for registration of political parties with the Election Commission. Problems 1. Parties have become arbitrary, autocratic and unaccountable. 2. As parties are integral to democratic politics, their undemocratic functioning has weakened Indian democracy and politics. 3. The choice of candidates for the voters is essentially limited to parties. Non-party candidates have very little say in elections. 4. As a party represents decades of effort, dreams, aspirations, history, nostalgia and emotions, new parties cannot be
easily formed. The only effective way of improving the quality of a democracy is by improving the functioning of political parties. 5. Entry into a party is often tightly and arbitrarily controlled by the leadership. Strict, but objective and uniform norms as applicable to communist parties are welcome. But in most mainstream parties the leadership denies membership to those with the potential to challenge their position. Similarly persons utterly opposed to party's stated ideology are admitted as members when it suits the leadership. 6. Disciplinary powers are invoked and expulsions are resorted to habitually only to safeguard the position of leadership of a party. No healthy debate and democratic dissent are tolerated. 7. Leadership choices at various levels are rarely made by democratic voting. In most parties, internal elections are rarely held, or when held, are perfunctory. Even membership rolls are not available. 8. Party leadership is utterly unaccountable to its members as well as the public regarding contributions made and expenditure incurred. 9. Choice of candidates is left to the discretion of the party bosses. There are no democratic procedures of member choice and secret ballot for candidate selection. 10. Party policies are rarely debated or decided in party fora. Members have no role in shaping party's policies. Manifestoes are written in a cavalier manner, and if the party is elected to office, promises are disregarded with impurity. Proposals 1. Membership of a party should be open to all citizens of India, subject to their subscribing to the party philosophy, and uniform membership norms and barriers of entry. 2. Rules governing membership of the party and registers of current members should be available and open to inspection by any member of the party or the representatives of Election Commission.
214
215
3. There shall be internal mechanisms for adjudicating disputes within the party, including those concerning the interpretation of the party constitution. 4. Disciplinary action shall not be initiated on the grounds that a member has opposed the leadership or espoused a view contrary to the leadership's view. 5. The party constitution should contain provisions on: a. The name, register office and activities of the party, b. The admission and resignation of members, c. The rights and duties of members d. Admissible disciplinary measures against members and their exclusion from the party, e. The general organization of the party, f. Composition and powers of the executive committees and other organizations g. The preconditions, form and time limits for convening meetings of members and representatives and the official recording of resolutions. h. Matters which may only be decided upon by a meeting of members and representatives. i. An overall vote by members and the procedures to be adopted when the party convention has passed a resolution to dissolve a party or merge with another party. The result of the overall vote determines whether the resolution is confirmed, amended or rescinded. j. The form and content of a financial structure which satisfies the rules of financial accountability 6. A member may only be expelled from the party if he or she deliberately infringes the statutes or acts in a manner contrary to the principles or discipline of the party and thus seriously impairs its standing. 7. The Election Commission decides upon appeals on expulsion from the party. The rights to appeal to a higher court is guaranteed. Decisions must be justified in writing.
8. There shall be democratic election by members through secret ballot for filling all vacancies of office bearers and the highest executive body. The executive committees at various levels shall be elected at least every second calendar year. 9. All decision making in party organs shall be by majority vote, and the ballots shall be secret at the executive committee, delegates' and representatives' assemblies. Voting at other levels shall be secret if the members ask for it. 10. Party's assets, receipts, income and expenditure shall be audited and the audited statements shall be furnished to the Election Commission by September 30 next. Public shall have access to there records and may obtain copies from EC on payment of a nominal fee. 11. All contributions more than Rs. 1000 shall be disclosed to the public and the Election Commission. The commission shall make available copies to the public on payment of a nominal fee. Any violation of disclosure norms shall invite de-recognition and imprisonment of members of executive committee for three years. 12. Candidates for election to any public office must be chosen by secret ballot. The nomination procedure shall be governed by the party statutes. A person may only be named as party candidate in a constituency if he or she has been selected in an assembly of party members in the constituency or in a special general assembly of representatives elected for this purpose. The candidates and the representatives for the assemblies of representatives shall be selected by secret ballot. Selection of candidates for other public offices shall be by secret ballot at the appropriate level. 13. A provision similar to Article 21 of the German Basic Law should be incorporated in the constitution to facilitate effective regulation of parties. "21(1) political parties shall participate in the formation of the political will of the people. They may be freely established. Their internal
216
217
organization must conform to democratic principles. They must publicly account for their assets and for the sources and use of their funds. 21 (3) Details shall be regulated by federal laws." Anti Defection-Changes in the Tenth Schedule Problem The present provisions of Tenth Schedule under Article 102 (2) and 191 (2) of the constitution gave rise to several anomalies 1. These provisions incorporated in 1985 failed to prevent defections. Countless defections took place subsequently without incurring disqualification. 2. Individual defections invite disqualification, whereas collective defections are amply rewarded. 3. Speakers have tended to act in a partisan manner often. Even when defecting members did not constitute onethird of the party members in the legislature, Speakers sometimes did not disqualify members. The case of defection of members of BSP in UP Assembly is a classic example. 4. Since Tenth Schedule applies to any vote in the legislature, legislators who may honesty differ on a piece of legislation are forced to submit to the will of the leadership. Muslim Women's Bill brought in to nullify Supreme Court's verdict in Shah Bano case, the whip issued by congress party in Justice Rama Swamy's impeachment case are two telling examples. 5. 'Splits' are engineered in legislature parties without any real split in the party. 6. As whip applies to Rajya Sabha, the party with people's mandate in Lok Sabha has no pportunity to persuade Rajya Sabha to approve any legislation on merits. Only backroom deals with party leaders can facilitate Union legislation. Proposals: 1. Any voting on a finance bill or confidence motion or noconfidence motion against party whip shall invite
automatic disqualification irrespective of the number of members defying party whip. 2. A 'split' in a party shall be recognized only after due process in the actual party fora with one month's notice to the Election Commission. A split in a legislature party shall be recognized only in the event of a split in the party after following due procedure. 3. In case of such a legitimate and recognized split, the persons who form the splinter group shall not be disqualified for violation of the whip issued by the original party. 4. In the event of such a legitimate split, the persons who form the splinter group shall not be eligible for ministerial office for at least one year. 5. Whip shall not be issued to members of Rajya Sabha or legislative council. 6. Whip does not apply to ordinary Bills or on impeachment motion to remove constitutional functionaries. 7. Violation of party whip on matters other than finance bill and confidence or no confidence motion shall not invite disqualification, through it may entail disciplinary action by the party. 8. The Election Commission shall be the competent body to determine whether or not a member is disqualified and to recognize a split.
218
Politics of Communalism and Secularism in India
219
6
POLITICS OF COMMUNALISM AND SECULARISM IN INDIA
INTRODUCTION Before we discuss' the growth of communalism in modem India, it is perhaps useful to define the term and point to certain basic fallacies regarding it. Communalism is basically an ideology with which we have lived so long that it appears to be a simple, easily understood notion. But this is, perhaps, not so. Adherence to a religious system is not communalism. Attachment to a religious community or religiosity is not communalism. On the other hand using a religion or a religious community against other religions or communities and against the nation and its development is communalism. Communist ideology consists of three basic elements or stages. First, it is the belief that people who follow the same religion have common secular interests. This is the first bedrock of communal ideology. These different communities are alleged to have their own leaders. Those who talk of being national, regional, or class leaders are merely masquerading; beneath the mask they are only leaders of their own communities. The best they can do is to unite as communal leaders and then serve the wider category of the nation or country.. The second element of communal ideology rests on the notion that in a multi-religious society like India, the secular interests, that is the social, cultural, economic and political interests, of the followers of one religion are dissimilar and divergent from the
interests of the followers of another religion The third stage of communalism is reached when the interests of the followers of different religions or of different 'communities' are seen to be mutually incompatible, antagonistic and hostile. Thus, the communalist asserts this stage that Hindus and Muslims cannot have common secular interests, that their secular interests are bound to be opposed to each other. HISTORY OF COMMUNALISM IN INDIA Communalism emerged as a consequence of the emergence of modem politics, which marked a sharp break with the politics of the ancient or medieval or pre-1857 periods. Communalism; as also other modem views such as nationalism and socialism could emerge as politics and as ideology only after politics based on the people, politics of participation and mobilization, politics based on the creation and mobilization of public opinion had come into existence. In pre-modem politics, people were either ignored in upper class based politics or were compelled to rebel outside the political system and, in case of success, their leaders incorporated into the old ruling classes. Many perceptive Indians recognized this. Jawaharlal Nehru, for example, noted in 1936: 'One must never forget that communalism in India is a latter-day phenomenon, which has grown up before our eyes.' Nor was there anything unique about communalism in the Indian context. It was not an inevitable or inherent product of India's peculiar historical and social development. It was the result of conditions which have in other societies produced similar phenomena and ideologies such as Fascism, anti-Semitism, racism, Catholic-Protestant conflict in Northern Ireland, or Christian Muslim conflict in Lebanon. The communal consciousness arose as a result of the transformation of Indian society under the impact of colonialism and the need to struggle against it. The growing economic, political and administrative unification of regions and the country, the process of making India into a nation, the developing contradiction between colonialism and the Indian people and the formation of modem social classes and strata called for new ways of seeing one's common interests. They made it necessary to have wider
220
221
links and loyalties among the people and to form new identities. This also followed from the birth of new politics during the last half of the 19th century. The new politics was based on the politicization and mobilization of an ever-increasing number of the Indian people. The process of grasping the new, emerging political reality and social relations and the adoption of new uniting principles, new social and political identities with the aid of new ideas and concepts was bound to be a difficult and gradual process. The process required the spread of modem ideas of nationalism, cultural-linguistic development and class struggle. But wherever their growth was slow and partial, people inevitably used the old, familiar pre-modem categories of self-identity such as caste, locality, region, race, religion, sect "and occupation to grasp the new reality, to make wider connections and to evolve new identities and ideologies. Similar developments have occurred all over the world in similar circumstances. But often such old, inadequate and false ideas and identities gradually give way to the new, historically necessary ideas and identities of nation, nationality and class. This also occurred on a large scale in India, but not uniformly among all the Indian people. In particular, religious consciousness was transformed into communal consciousness in some parts of the country and among some sections of the people. This was because there were some factors in the Indian situation which favored its growth; it served the needs of certain sections of society an~ certain social and political force. The question is why did communalism succeed in growing during the 20th century? What aspects of the Indian situation favored this process? Which social classes and political forces did it serve? Why did it become such a pervasive part of Indian reality? Though it was not inherent or inevitable in the situation, it was not a mere conspiracy of power-hungry politicians and crafty administrators either. It had socio-economic and political roots. There was a social situation which was funneling it and without which it could not have survived for long. Above all, communalism was one of the by-products of the colonial character of Indian economy, of colonial underdevelopment, of the incapacity of colonialism to develop
the Indian economy. The resulting economic stagnation and its impact on the lives of the Indian people, especially the middle classes, produced conditions which were conducive to division and antagonism within Indian society as also to its radical transformation. Throughout the 20th century, in the absence of modem industrial development and the development of education, health and other social and cultural services, unemployment was an acute problem in India, especially for the educated middle and lower middle classes who could not fall back on land and whose socio-economic conditions suffered constant deterioration. These economic opportunities declined further during the Great Depression after 1928 when large-scale unemployment prevailed. In this social situation, the nationalist and other popular movements worked for the long-term solution to the people's problems by fighting for the overthrow of colonialism and radical social transformation. In fact, the middle classes formed the backbone both of the militant national movement from 190.5 to 1947 and the left-wing parties and groups since the 1920s. Unfortunately there were some who lacked a wider social vision and political understanding and looked to their narrow immediate interests and short-term solutions to their personal or sectional problems such as communal, caste, or provincial reservation in jobs or in municipal committees, legislatures, and so on. Because of economic stagnation, there was intense competition among individuals for government jobs, in professions like law and medicine, and in business for customers and markets. In an attempt to get a larger share of existing economic opportunities, middle class individuals freely used all the means at their disposaleducational qualifications, personal merit as also nepotism, bribery, and S.J on. At the same time, to give their struggle a wider base, they also used other group identities such as caste, province and religion to enhance their capacity to compete. Thus, some individuals from the middle classes could, and did, benefit, in the short run, from communalism, especially in the field of government employment. This gave a certain aura of validity to communal politics. The communalist could impose his interpretation of reality on middle class individuals because it did have a basis, however
222
223
partial, perverted and short-term, in the social existence and social experience of the middle classes. Gradually, the spread of education to well-off peasants and small landlords extended the boundaries of the job-seeking middle class to the rural areas. The newly educated rural youth could not be sustained by land whether as landlords or peasants, especially as agriculture were totally stagnant because of the colonial impact. They flocked on the towns and cities for opening in government jobs and professions and tried to save themselves by fighting for jobs through the system of communal reservations and nominations. This development gradually widened the social base of communalism to cover the rural upper strata of peasants and landlords. Thus, the crisis of the colonial economy constantly generated two opposing sets of ideologies and political tendencies among the middle classes. When anti-imperialist revolution and social change appeared on the agenda, the middle classes enthusiastically joined the national and other popular movements. They then readily advocated the cause and demands of the entire society from the capitalists to the peasants and workers. Individual ambitions were then sunk in the wider social vision. But when prospects of revolutionary change receded, when the anti-imperialist struggle entered a more passive phase, many belonging to the middle classes shifted to short-term solutions of their personal problems, to politics based on communalism and other similar ideologies. Thus with the same social causation, large sections of the middle classes in several parts of the country constantly oscillated between anti-imperialism and communalism or communal-type politics. But there was a crucial different in the two cases. In the first case, their own social interests merged with the interests of general social development and their politics formed a part of the broader anti-imperialist struggle. In the second case, they functioned as a narrow and selfish interest group, accepted the socio-political status quo and objectively served colonialism. To sum up this aspect: communalism was deeply rooted in and was an expression of the interests and aspirations of the middle classes in a social situation in which opportunities for them were grossly inadequate. The communal question was,
therefore a middle class question par excellence. The main appeal of communalism and its main social base also lay among the middle classes. It is, however, important to remember that a large number of middle class individuals remained, on the whole, free of communalism even in the 1930s and 1940s. This was, in particular, true of most of the intellectuals, whether Hindu, Muslim or Sikh. In fact, the typical Indian intellectual of the 193 Os tended to be both secular and broadly left wing. There was another aspect of the colonial economy that favored communal politics. In the absence of openings in industry, commerce, education and other social services, and the cultural and entertainment fields, the Government service was the main avenue of employment for the middle classes. Much of the employment for teachers, doctors and engineers was also under government control. As late as 1951, while 1.2 million persons were covered by the Factory Acts, 3.3 millions got employment in government service. And communal politics could be used to put pressure on the Government to reserve and allocate its jobs as also seats in professional colleges on communal and caste lines. Consequently, communal politics till 1937 was organized around government jobs, educational concessions, and the like as also political positions-seats in legislative councils, municipal bodies, etc.-which enabled control over these and other economic opportunities. It may also be noted that though the communalists spoke in the name of their 'communities,' the reservations, guarantees and other 'rights' they demanded were virtually confined to these two aspects. They did not take up any issues, which were of interest to the masses. Above all, communalism developed as a weapon of economically and politically reactionary social classes and political forces-and semi feudal landlords and ex-bureaucrats (whom Dr. K.M. Ashraf has called thejagirdari cIasses) merchants and moneylenders and the colonial state. Communal leaders and parties were, in general, allied with these classes and forces. The social, economic and political vested interests deliberately encouraged or unconsciously adopted communalism because of its capacity to distort and divert popular struggles, to prevent the masses from was a specific feature of Indian social development-in several
224
225
parts of the country. The religious distinction coincided with social, and class distinctions. Here most often the exploiting sections-landlords, merchants and moneylenders,-were upper caste Hindus while the poor and exploited were Muslims or lower caste Hindus. Consequently, propaganda by the Muslim communalists that Hindus were exploiting Muslims or by the Hindu communalists that Muslims were threatening Hindu property or economic interests could succeed even while wholly incorrect. Thus, for example, the struggle between tenant and landlord in East Bengal and Malabar and the peasant-debtor and the merchant-moneylender in Punjab could be portrayed by the communalists as a struggle between Muslims and Hindus. Similarly, the landlord-moneylender oppression was represented as the oppression of Muslims by Hindus, and the attack by the rural poor on the rural rich as an attack by Muslims on Hindus. For example, one aspect of the growth of communalism in Punjab was the effort of the big Muslim landlords to protect their economic and social position by using communalism to turn the anger of their Muslim tenants against Hindu traders and moneylenders, and the use of communalism by the latter to protect their threatened class interests by raising the cry of Hindu interests in danger. In reality, the struggle of the peasants for their emancipation was inevitable. The question was what type of ideological political content it would acquire. Both the communalists and the colonial administrators stressed the communal as against the class aspects of agrarian exploitation and oppression. Thus, they held that the Muslim peasants and debtors were being exploited not as peasants and debtors but because they were Muslims. In many cases, a communal form is given to the social conflict not by the participants but by the observer, the official, the journalist, the politician, and, finally, the historian, all of whom provide a post-facto communal explanation for the conflict because of their own conscious or unconscious outlook. It is also important to note that agrarian conflicts did not assume a communal color until the 20th century and the rise of communalism and that too not in most cases. In the Pabna agrarian riots of 1873, both Hindu
and Muslim tenants fought zamindars together. Similarly, as brought out in earlier chapters, most of the agrarian struggles after 1919 stayed clear of communal channels. The peasants and workers and the radical intelligentsia succeeded in creating powerful secular peasants' and workers' movements and organizations, which became important constituents of the antiimperialist struggle. It is important to note in this context that Hindu zamindars in Bengal had acquired control over land not because they were Hindus but as a result of the historical process of the spread of Islamic religion in Bengal among the lower castes and classes. Hindu zamindars and businessmen acquired economic dominance over landed capital in Bengal at the beginning of the 18th century during the rule of Murshid Quli Khan, religiously the most devout of Aurangzeb's officials and followers. Under his rule, more than seventy-five per cent of the zamindars and most of the taluqdars were Hindus. The Permanent Settlement of 1793 further strengthened the trend by eliminating on a large scale both the old Hindu and Muslim zamindar families and replacing them with new men of commerce who were Hindus. Similarly, the predominance of Hindus among bankers, traders and moneylenders in northern India dated to the medieval period. The dominance these strata acquired over rural society under British rule was the result not of their being Hindu but of the important economic role they acquired in the colonial system of exploitation. In other words, colonial history guaranteed the growth and economic domination of merchant-moneylenders; medieval history had guaranteed that they would be mostly Hindus. Communalism represented, at another level, a struggle between two upper classes or strata for power, privileges and economic gains. Belonging to different religions (or castes) these classes or strata used communalism to mobilize the popular support of their co-religionists in their mutual struggles. This was, for example, the case in Western Punjab where the Muslim landlords opposed the Hindu moneylenders 'and in East Bengal where the Muslimjotedars (small landlords) opposed the Hindu zamindars.
226
227
COMMUNALISM IN BRITISH INDIA British rule and its policy of Divide and Rule bore special responsibility for the growth of communalism in modem India, though it is also true that it could succeed only because of internal social and political conditions. The fact was that the state, with its immense power, could promote either national integration or all kinds of divisive forces. The colonial state chose the latter course. It used communalism to counter and weaken the growing national movement and the welding of the Indian people into a nation. Communalism was presented by the colonial rulers as the problem of the defense of minorities. Hindu-Muslim disunity-and the need to protect the minorities from domination and suppression by the majority-was increasingly offered as the main justification for the maintenance of British rule, especially as theories of civilizing mission, white man's burden, welfare of the ruled, etc., got increasingly discredited. Communalism was, of course, not the only constituent of the policy of Divide and Rule. Every existing division of Indian society was encouraged to prevent the emerging unity of the Indian people. An effort was made to set region against region, province against province, caste against caste, language against language, reformers against the orthodox, the moderate against the militant, leftist against rightist and even class against class. It was, of course, the communal division, which survived to the end and proved the most serviceable. In fact, near the end, it was to become the main prop of colonialism, and colonial authorities were to stake their all on it. On the other hand, communalism could not have developed to such an extent as to divide the country, if it did not have the powerful support of the colonial state. In this sense, communalism may be described as the channel through which the politics of the middle classes were placed at the service of colonialism and the jagirdari classes. "In fact, communalism was the route through which colonialism was able to extend its narrow social base to sections of workers, peasants, the middle classes and the bourgeoisie whose interests were otherwise in contradiction with colonialism.
What were the different ways and policies, or acts of omission and commission, through which the British encouraged and nurtured communalism? First, by consistently treating Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs as separate communities and socio-political entities, which had little ji1 common. India, it was said, was neither a nation or a nation-in-the making, nor did it consist of nationalities or local societies, but consisted of structured, mutually exclusive and antagonistic religion-based communities. Second, official favor and patronage were extended to the communalists. Third, the communal Press and persons and agitations were shown extraordinary tolerance. Fourth, communal demands were readily accepted, thus politically strengthening communal organizations and their hold over the people. For example, while the Congress could get none of its demands accepted from 1885-1905, the Muslim communal demands were accepted in 1906 as soon as they were presented to the Viceroy. Similarly, in 1932, the Communal Award accepted all the major communal demands of the time. During World War II, the Muslim communalists were given, a complete veto on any political advance. Fifth, the British readily accepted communal organizations and leaders as the real spokesperson for their 'communities,' while the nationalist leaders were treated as representing a microscopic minority-the elite. Sixth, separate electorates served as an important instrument for the development of communal politics. Lastly, the colonial government encouraged communalism through a policy of nonaction against it. Certain positive measures which the state alone could undertake were needed to check the growth of communalism. The failure to undertake them served as an indirect encouragement to communalism. The Government refused to take action against the propagation of virulent communal ideas and communal hatred through the Press, pamphlets, leaflets, literature, public platforms and rum ours. This was in sharp contrast with the frequent suppression of the nationalist Press, literature, civil servants, propaganda, and so on. On the contrary, the Government freely rewarded communal leaders, intellectuals and government servants with titles, positions of profit, high salaries, and so on. The British administrators also followed a policy of relative inactivity and irresponsibility in
228
229
dealing with communal riots. When they occurred, they were not crushed energetically. The understanding the socio-economic and political forces responsible for their social condition, to prevent unity on national and class lines, and to turn them away from their real national and socio-economic interests and issues and mass movements around them. Communalism also enabled the upper classes and the colonial rulers to unite with sections of the middle classes and to utilize the latter's politics to serve their own ends oppressed as the Hindu masses, and there were Hindu zamindars, nobles and rulers along with Muslim ones, these writers declared that all Muslims were rulers in medieval India and all Hindus were the ruled. Thus, the basic character of a polity in India was identified with the religion of the ruler. Later the culture and society of various periods were also declared to be either Hindu or Muslim in character. The Hindu communalist readily adopted the imperialist view that medieval rulers in India were anti-Hindu, tyrannized Hindus and converted them forcibly. All communalist, as also imperialist, historians saw medieval history as one long story of Hindu-Muslim conflict and believed that throughout the medieval period there existed distinct and separate Hindu and Muslim cultures. The Hindu communalists described the rule of medieval Muslim rulers as foreign rule because of their religion. The talk of 'a thousand years of slavery' and 'foreign rule' was common rhetoric, sometimes even used by nationalists. Above all, the Hindu communal view of history relied on the myth that Indian society and culture had reached great, ideal heights in the ancient period from which they fell into permanent and continuous decay during the medieval period because of 'Muslim' rule and domination. The basic contribution of the medieval period to the development of the Indian economy and technology, religion and philosophy, arts and literature, and culture and society was denied. In turn the Muslim communalists harked back to the 'Golden Age of Islamic achievement' in West Asia and appealed to its heroes, myths and cultural traditions. They propagated the notion that all Muslims were the rulers in medieval India or at least the
beneficiaries of the so-called Muslim rule. They tended to defend and glorify all Muslim rulers, including religious bigots like Aurangzeb. They also evolved their own version of the 'fall' theory. While Hindus were allegedly in the ascendant during the 19th century, Muslims, it was said, 'fell' or declined as a 'community' throughout the 19th century after 'they' lost political power communalism, whose removal was basic to tackling or solving the communal problem. Here we must distinguish between religion as a belief system, which people follow as part of their personal belief, and the ideology of a religion-based socio-political identity, that is, communalism. In other words, religion is not the 'cause' of communalism, even though communal cleavage is based by the communalist on differences in religion-this difference is then used to mask or disguise the social needs, aspirations, conflicts, arising in nonreligious fields. Religion comes into communalism to the extent that it serves politics arising in spheres other than religion. K.M. Ashraf put this aspect in an appropriate phrase when he described communalism as 'Mazhab ki siyasi dukandari' (political trade in religion Communalism was not inspired by religion, nor was religion the object of communal politics-it was only its vehicle. Religion was, however, used as a mobilizing factor by the communalists. Communalism could become a popular movement after 1939, and in particular during 1945-47, only when it adopted the inflammable cry of religion in danger. Moreover, differing religious practices were the immediate cause of situations of communal tension and riots. We may also note that while religion was not responsible for communalism, religiosity was a major contributory factor. (Religiosity may be defined as intense emotional commitment to matters of religion and the tendency to let religion and religious emotions intrude into non religious or non-spiritual areas of life and beyond the individual's private and moral world.) Religiosity was not communalism but it opened a person to the appeal of communalism in the name of religion. Secularization did not, therefore, mean removing religion but it did mean reducing religiosity or increasingly narrowing down the sphere of religion to the private life of the individual.
230
231
The Reasons of Growth of Hindu-Muslim Communalism in India It would be pertinent to examine as to why Hindu-Muslim communalism continued to persist in post-1ndependence era. Before doing so, it would be appropriate to understand what was meant by communalism. In common parlance, communalism was understood to mean a sentiment of enmity towards other religious communities with prejudice against and possible aggressiveness towards the individuals belonging to them. Positively speaking, it was interpreted to mean attachment to one's own community and to its preservation and concern for the upliftment of its members. But actually speaking communalism was much more complex phenomenon and was generated by a variety of factors. During the period' of British rule Hindu Muslim communalism was due to deep diversities in respect of places of worship, holy books, method of worships, religious festivals, social customs and ways of daily life, language and standard of living. And of course, the British policy of "divide and rule" played a very important part. After the end of British rule, while these differences remained, a few new elements of discord were added. These were: separatism and isolationism among the Muslims their religious orthodoxy and obscurantism, and their economic backwardness, role of Pakistan, Hindu chauvinism and government inertia. Let us discuss each one of them in detail. Separatism and Isolationism among Muslims The first foremost reason for Hindu-Muslim discord was the tendency of the Muslim masses to keep themselves aloof from the majority community and isolate themselves from the secularnationalistic politics of India. On the eve of and immediately after Independence, some Muslim leaders, such as Mohammad Ismail and Nawab Ismail Khan, realized that the support of the demand for Pakistan by the Muslims of non-Muslim majority provinces was a great mistake. They sought to retrieve the situation after Independence and advocated among their co-religionists that they should support and strengthen the hands of those political parties and individua1s who stood for secularism and economic justice,
and they should join the national mainstream that their future lay in unison with, and not in separation from, the rest. of the Indian people, and that they should wipe out the stigma that they were responsible for the division of the country. But these ideas did not go very far, and many Muslim organizations and individuals preached that the Muslim community should organize itself separately to protect its interests, culture, language, and religion. The Jamaat-e-lslami advised the Muslims not to take part in the first General Election under the Constitution of Independent India, on the ground that the election would not establish an Islamic state. A section of the Jamaat-ulUlemai Hind, an organization of Muslim divines and. intellectuals, also talked the same way. The remnant of the Muslim League demanded, in 1948, separate electorates for the Muslims. It went into eclipse during the 1950s, but reappeared on the eve of the third General Election. On 29 October 1961, a split occurred within its ranks when Mohammad Raza Khan broke away from the parent body and formed a new All-India Muslim League. He advised the Muslims to support the Congress candidates as, he thought, the Congress Party was the best protector of Muslim interest. But the General Secretary of the original League, Ibrahim Suleiman Sait, continued to claim during the 1960s that his organization was "the sole representative body of the Muslims," and that it "alone speaks for the Muslims of India." In order to emphasize Muslim interests and lend support only to such political parties as promised promotion of those interests, the Muslims from all parts of India held in New Delhi, on the eve of midterm poll for the Lok Sabha in March 1971, an All-India Political Convention. The Convention adopted half a dozen resolutions, emphasizing the interests of the Muslims. These resolutions related to the security of life and property of the minority communities, protection of Urdu, reservation of posts in services, preservation of the status' of the Aligarh Muslim University, and elections on the basis of proportional representation. The Convention set up an all India Political Consultative Committee for the purpose of coordinating the activities of the organizations affiliated to it. While declaring that the Committee would not put up its own candidates, it said that
232
233
it would act as "a sort of clearing house" giving guidelines to those Muslim organizations which chose to do so. Ansar Harvani, a former member of Parliament, disclosed that the mastermind behind the Muslim Convention was one Ali Khan, who was closely associated with the Jamaat-e-Islami. The Jamaat, he said, had close links with the Akhwane Musalmeen which was allegedly responsible for the overthrow of President Sukamo of Indonesia, and with Anjuman Subhan-ul Musalmeen which had made successive attempts to assassinate the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic. Apparently out of disappointment with the performance of the Congress party governments at the Centre and in states in ameliorating the lot of the Muslim masses the Muslim League became, in early 19705, more active, and set up branches in important towns and cities of those states where the Muslims were in a sizeable number. A unit of the Muslim League was formed in Uttar Pradesh on 5 August 19,73 and many Muslims left other political parties and joined it. Another organization of the Muslims' of Uttar Pradesh came into existence by the name Muslim Majlis and began to preach the cult of separation of Muslims from the Hindus. On the occasion of election to the UP Assembly in 1974, it made a deal with the SSP and the BKD to contest a fixed number of seats with the support of those parties. A few Muslim leaders decried the activities of these organizations and urged the Muslim masses to join hands with Secular-nationalist forces in the country. Sheikh Mohammed Abdulla lambasted at the League, held it responsible for the partition of the country and regretted that the Muslims had not adjusted themselves to changed circumstances of the country. Some liberal and enlightened Muslim scholars expressed the view that the Muslim League was not the answer. to the problems of the Muslim community, and that its future lay in unison with, and not in separation from, the' Hindus. It was worth noting that despite all the communal propaganda of the Muslim sectional and communal organizations the candidates of the Muslim League and Muslim Majlis did not get much success in state Assembly election in February 1974 (Muslim League got only one seat while it contested 51), and the communalism of either the Hindus or the
Muslims did not make much appeal to the electorate. The Muslim leadership by and large continued to keep their brethren aloof from the national mainstream. In view of the mid-term poll of the Lok Sabha that was scheduled to be held in January 1980, several Muslim organizations made efforts to unite all Muslims in order to obtain for the minority community greater protection against communal riots and against political and economic stagnation. On 27 September 1979, the working committee of the Jamaat-ul-Ulema-eHind decided to launch a satyagraha from 2 October of the same year to boast the efforts then being made for a united stand by all Muslims in the elections. The All-India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat, which allied itself a non-political body, convened a conference for the same purpose. That conference was attended by the representatives of the Muslim League, the Muslim Majlis, the Jamaat-e-Islam the Jamaat. e-Ulema, the Ittehadul Musulmeen, the National League, the Tameer e-Millat, the Awami Action Committee and several Muslim youth organizations. It set up a committee for the purpose of coordinating and implementing its decisions. It set up a committee for the purpose of coordinating and implementing its decisions. A few days later, four Muslim parties-the Muslim League, the Muslim Majlis, the Ittehadul Musulmeen and the National Leagueformed a "National Muslim Front" to negotiate with national parties on seat adjustments for the mid-term poll. That Front demanded reservation of seats in the Lot Sabha for Muslims and reservation of jobs for them in armed forced and other security forces. The Shahi Imam of Jama Masjid of Delhi, Abdulla Bukhari who wielded considerable influence among Muslim voters in north India, demanded 20 per cent reservati.on f.or Muslims in the law-enforcing machinery, in the administration, in the Union Cabinet and in the Lot Sabha. He made a deal with Mrs. Gandhi, because she offered to fulfill his demand if elected in the election, and urged his followers to vote for Congress (I) candidates. Most of the Muslim leaders asserted from time to time that their brethren had been the worst sufferers since Independence, and that their interests had always been neglected by national leadership. Such
234
235
utterances continued to widen the gulf between the two communities of the country. Religious Orthodoxy and Obscurantism among Muslims Another factor which bred communalism in the postIndependence period was religious orthodoxy and obscurantism among the Muslims. The Jamaat-e-Islam~ Majlis-e-Mashawarat, Muslim League and Muslim Majlis fostered anti-modem ideas, the 'obscure and medieval glories Of Islam, the supremacy and significance of religion in individual life and the basic and fundamental differences between the Hindu and Muslim cultures, personal laws, and ways of living and thinking. Even the future of Aligarh Muslim University, ta which the Union Government wanted to transform into a national institution from a minority one was emphasized time and again as an issue involving the cultural identity of the minority community. The All-India Political-Convention, held in early 1971, warned the Government of India not to interfere in the "Personal Law" of the Muslims. This was being done at a time when even the people of Pakistan and other Muslim countries were modifying the "Personal Law", based on the Shariyat in several respects. Towards the end of December 1972, a conference of Muslim scholars, divines and political leaders was held in Bombay. This was presided over by Maulana Qari Mohammed Tayyeb of the Dar-ul-Aloom, Deoband in Saharanpur district of Uttar Pradesh, and was inaugurated by the Rector of the Arabic Academy Dr Yusuf Najmuddin. Among those who attended the conference were representatives of the Muslim League, Muslim Majlis, Shia conference Jamaat-e-'Pabligh~Jaamat. uJ.Ullema-i-Hindi, Jamaate-lslam~ lttehad-ul-Muslmeen, Delhi, ilie Islamic Research Institute, Lucknow,Sulemani Bohra Community and the Sunni Jamaat. Besides, some people from Aligarh Muslim University also attended. This conference adopted a resolution which said: "We have lost everything-the government, our honor, property and the Urdu language-and if attempts are made to take from us our religion and the Personal Law given by God himself, we will be left with nothing to fall upon." The resolution warned the Union
Government that if it made any attempt to amend the Muslim Personal Law the Muslims all over the country would consider it an attack on Islam and they would not hesitate from offering' any sacrifice "to prevent this greatest catastrophe." This conference as well as Muslim league leader, Ebrahim Sulaiman Sait, declared a few months later, that Article 44 of the Constitution calling for a Uniform Civil Code could not be applied to the Muslim Personal Law and that the Muslims refused to accept any move to change it by Parliament. In view of this accumulating pressure the government authorities declared that the Muslim personal Law would not be modified. Similarly, several Muslim organizations including the Muslim League and the Muslim Majlis held, on 10 March 1973, a two-day All-India Aligarh Muslim University Convention in New Delhi and demanded "radical changes" in the 1972 Muslim University (Amendment) Act and the restoration of the management of the University to the Muslim community. Three weeks later, the Working Committee of the Jamaat-ul-Ullema-i-Hind demanded an amendment of that Act to restore the "original" character of the Aligarh Muslim University. On 22 April 1973, the Muslim League declared that it would contest the elections in Uttar Pradesh on the issue of AIigarh Muslim University. Act. When the election was held, in February 1974, it made that issue as one of its main planks. Quite a large section of the Muslim community continued to feel strongly about the preservation of the minority character of the Aligarh Muslim University. In order to placate them almost all political parties promised in their manifestoes issued on the eve of January 1980 mid-term poll for the Lok Sabha that they would take steps in that direction. When Mrs. Gandhi's Congress formed government at the Centre the requisite legislation was passed. A militant section of the Muslim community formed in April 1970 in Delhi a "sena" (army) to protect the rights of Muslims. It selected a flag with a green ground and a white moon and a red star on it. Within hours of the formation of the "sena" a municipal councilor from the Jama Masjid area, Dr Z.A Abbas Mullick, held out a threat that if the Nizamuddin mosque and graveyard were not repaired "within 24 hours" the Muslims would resort to "direct
236
237
action." All these indicated that while the rest of the countrymen were struggling to transform themselves from medievalism to modernization and were taking to new ways of living and ideas of thinking many of the Muslims were thinking only of Personal Law, graveyards, mosques and things of that sort. Economic Backwardness of Muslims An inevitable consequence of religious orthodoxy and obscurantism in fast-changing world was the economic backwardness of the Muslim masses. The anti-Muslim policy followed by the British for about a century after the disintegration of Mughal Empire reduced them to poverty and brought most of them to the level of starvation. The Industrial Revolution which the British brought to India from Europe deprived the Muslim artisans and craftsmen of their means of livelihood. Their position did not improve even 'when the British reversed their policy during and after the last quarter of the nineteenth century, because once thrown into oblivion they became inward-looking, took shelter behind religion and obscure traditions, and discarded modernity including western scientific, technological and literary education. The situation did not change even after Independence. ill-equipped with educational talent, they could not secure an adequate quota of public services or an adequate share of trade and industry. The inevitable consequence of this was frustration and demoralization and this, on occasions, burst forth in the form of violent and lawless activities against those who appeared to be better placed in services, trade, and industry. Role of Pakistan The existence of Pakistan on the two sides of India during 1947 and 1971 was another factor which encouraged, in fact goaded, communalism in this country. Whenever there was a HinduMuslim flare-up, the Pakistan leaders, radio and the Press, without caring to know which community was responsible for it, blurted out stories of genocide of Muslims by the Hindus, and accused the Government of India of 'connivance' in the 'crime'. For instance, when there was a riot at Aligarh Muslim
University in 1961, President Ayub Khan said the riots could not have occurred without the connivance of the Indian administration. The then High Commissioner of that country in New Delhi, Agha Hilaly, described it as 'organized killing' of Muslims by 'militant Hindu communalists,' and called it an 'act of barbarism'. Similarly, when there were riots in Kashmir, in the wake of the theft of the holy relic, the then Pakistani Foreign Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, alleged on January 1, 1964 that the theft had been 'permitted' by the Indian occupation authorities and their puppets as part of India's plan to reduce the Muslim majority in Jammu and Kashmir to a minority, by bringing home to its Muslim population the feeling that lives, honor and religion of Muslims were not safe and that, therefore, they must leave the state. Mass protest demonstrations, at which the speakers incited the crowds to prepare for a 'holy war' (Jehad), were held in several cities of Pakistan. The Pakistani political leadership, the Mullahs and the Maulvis and the Press reacted the same way whenever there was some communal trouble in India. During the riots commencing from 13 August 1980 in Moradabad exaggerated reports were published in the Pakistani newspapers. By August 19, the number of the Muslims alleged to have been killed went up to 600. The Government-owned Pakistani Times wrote editorially: "If there had been no Pakistan we who live here enjoying the fruits of freedom and holding our heads high, would have met the same fate as the unfortunate Indian Muslims" The editorial said further that "the Muslim situation in India would not improve, and that the Islamic countries should take up the issue. This idea was echoed by some others, including Maulamf Mufti Mahmud and Mian Tufail Mohammed, leaders of the' now defunct Pakistan National Alliance which had supported General Zia-ul-haq's Government since the fall of Z.A. Bhutto's Government in July 1977. The Zia Government sought to capitalize on these riots to divert the attention of its own people who had 'started agitation for free elections and the.formation of a democratic government. Moreover, Pakistan did all this partly to wean the Indian Muslims away from secular-nationalistic forces in India and partly to either put more restraints upon the Hindus living with his
238
239
territory or to create fear in their minds so that they ran away to India. But the illiterate Indian Muslims carried the impression that Pakistan was their benefactor, advocate and well-wisher, and that she would save them, if need be "against the onslaughts of Hindu fanaticism." With such a frame of mind, they did not hesitate to indulge in acts of violence and rioting whenever there was an opportunity. This was largely true about the orthodox and militant section of the Muslim community. Hindu Chauvinism The Muslim religious orthodoxy obscurantism, and separatism had its reaction on the Hindu community and it became chauvinistic. Hindu chauvinism existed in the pre. Independence period; it was then fomented by the Hindu Mahasabha, the Arya Samaj and the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS). These organization emphasized Hindu culture in a "predominately Hindu land" stressed Hindutva, Hindu rashtra and Hindu bhasha (Hindi), and glorified Aryavarta-the land of a magnificent culture and ancient civilization. The culture of not only the British but of the Muslims as well was depicted as "alien". The chauvinism of these organizations became stronger after the partition of the country, and not only were Hindu beliefs, values and institutions emphasized with greater vigor and fanaticism, well planned movements were started to enforce and propagate them. In early October 1950, the Hindu Mahasabha opened its doors to non. Hindu minorities, but emphasized that only those who had "stakes" in the country and were willing to safeguard them under the system of "Hindu rashtra" would be admitted to the organization. Thereafter, it went into oblivion and engaged itself in non-political activities, by and large. Essentially a socio-cultural organization, the Arya Samaj, organized, in June 1956, a civil disobedience campaign in Punjab in support of its demand for securing a "rightful" place for Hindi in the educational and administrative fields. The real leadership of Hinduism passed into the hands of the Jan Sangh, the political wing of the RSS. On the eve of the second General Election held in 1957 the Jan Sangh called for the annulment of partition and the restoration of "Akhand Bharat,"
demanded territory from Pakistan for the rehabilitation of Hindu refugees in India, and urged the "liberation" of Pakistan occupied areas of Kashmir. In its third General Election manifesto (1962) it emphasized, inter alia, Bhartiya Sanskriti and maryada (culture and civilization) and called upon the Congress government to abandon the policy of "appeasement" of Pakistan and the Indian Muslims. It stressed promotion of Hindi and Sanskrit Languages. In the summer of 1966, the Jan Sangh spearheaded a movement to protect the cow and advocated a ban on cow slaughter. On November 7 of that year, an estimated crowd of 100,000 people demonstrated in support of their demand in front of Parliament. A Hindu religious leader and high priest of Puri temple, Shankaracharya Niranjan Nath, undertook an indefinite fast to press the demand, and another similar leader, Probhudatt Brahmachari, threatened to do the same, but he was arrested before he could do that. Because of political considerations, the Jan Sangh made only an oblique reference to its anti-Muslim slant in its fourth General Election manifesto by stating that the Congress Government 'appeased separatist, disruptionist and anti-national forces." After improving its fortune considerably in that Election it became more vehement in its anti-Muslim harangue. The All-India delegates" session of the Jan Sangh at Patna demanded in December 1969, the "Indianisation" of all fissiparous elements, especially those overtly or covertly believing in the "two-nation" theory. An extremist leader of the Jan Sangh, Balraj Madhok, said on 12 February 1970: "Islam will have to be lndianised if Indian Muslims are to become nationalists." "The present face of Islam" he said, "it's most dangerous." He observed that so long as "the biggest den of communal and anti-national activities" was allowed to function, the Indianisation of the Muslims was not possible. The RSS also continued the anti-Muslim harangue. Its c!1ie leader, M. S. Golwarkar, in his book A Bunch of Thoughts, wrote that Indian nationality was founded on Hinduism. He called the Muslims, Christians and Communist as "internal threats" who could "qualify" for Indian nationality only if they broke away from their "extra territorial moorings" and learnt to respect Hindu traditions. On November 22, 1970, he advised Hindus to take
240
241
heed of the danger to India from those who had "invaded 1,000 years ago" and were now "taking advantage of our endurance." He stated that India meant "Hindu rashtra, "and that Indian culture was basically Hindu culture. Addressing a rally in Jaipur a little later, the RSS chief asserted that Pakistan was born "due to Muslim enmity against India." When in December 1970, the AIl-India Muslim Political Convention demanded separate electorate for the Muslims, the Hindu Mahasabha broke its long silence, and said the move was fraught with grave consequence. In a resolution, it stated that those Muslims who still sought separate privileges on the basis of 'two-nation theory' should be sent to Pakistan "on government level". In early January 1971, efforts were made to form a "Hindu Sena" to counter the "Muslim Sena". The convener of the All-India Hindu Sena, Ranjan Baba Satyarathi, said the Sena would be "closer" to Jan Sangh which was a "nationalist party." The Shiv Sena in Maharashtra originally directed against Communists and trade unionists, adopted in mid-1970, a violently anti-Muslim stance. Its chief leader, Bal Thackeray, denounced the "green menace of Islam". In the Shiv Sena journal he wrote: "Hindus should not only remain Hindus, but the fanatic Hindus and dedicated crusaders of their religion. I am not ashamed to say that I am a fanatic Hindu." A good number of Musalmans looked at the Hindus through the eyes of such organizations and they developed a belief that the Hindu community could not safeguard their interest and well-being. Hence, they became communalminded and developed a dislike for the majority community. Government's Inertia Hindu-Muslim communalism persisted in the country due to the failure of union and state governments also to tackle the problem squarely and firmly. No serious attempt was made to examine the problem rationally arid in all its aspects, and whenever there was a flare-up the non-Congress parties were made the scapegoat and were blamed for it. The tendency of the rulers was to treat the Hindu-Muslim riots as a law and order problem whole the malady had its roots in economic disparity, social backwardness and religious and cultural diversities of the two communities.
Besides these, another facto appeared to be that the consolidation of Hindu forces and increasing Sanskritisationinvolving the eclipse of Urdu language from schools and colleges and the unwillingness of government authorities to take effective measures to promote its teaching, the move of die Union Government to change the ethos and character of the Aligarh Muslim University, the All-India Radio's broadcasts of purely Hindu religious songs and prayers, particularly on occasions of even national festivals, the expounding of Hindu beliefs and religious practices in schools where Muslim children also studied, and the unwillingness of governments to ban purely Hindu organizations such as the RSS and the Jan Sangh, created a feeling in the Muslim mind that while talking of secularism the rulers were bent upon making India a land of Hinduism. During war with Pakistan in September 1965, while Muslim soldiers and generals also gave their lives for the defence of India, the Muslim masses were not assigned civil defence duties such as control of traffic and routine police duties which were entrusted to RSS volunteers. Steps like these created complexes and apprehensions in the Muslim mind. Moreover, the administrative machinery of the Union and state governments proved unworthy of the task. On occasions, allegations were made, usually by the Muslim community, that the police, including its intelligence wing, did not take timely action either to avert a flare-up or to stop it when started, that the government officials, mostly Hindus, connived when the majority community was on the offensive, that the government did not provide adequate relief and assistance when they (the Muslims) were the victims of onslaughts, and that even after those who indulged in communal violence had been caught were not punished. The Central Government did not ban the communal parties, reportedly, on the ground that that would be unconstitutional. Even if that were true the amendment of the constitution in that regard were not feasible the Government could have used the Preventive Detention Act or the Defence of India Rules or the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act or the Maintenance of Internal Security Act for suppressing the activities of the Plebiscite Front in Kashmir or of the Mizo National Front
242
243
of the Naga hostiles in Assam or the Naxalites in West-Bengal and other parts of the country. During the 19-month-period of Emergency in the country, the Muslims suffered as much as the Hindus. The members of the RSS and the Jamaat-e-lslami lived together, dined together and exchanged views together in jails, and shed prejudice against each other. When the Emergency ended and elections for the Lok Sabha and ten state Assemblies and two Union Territories were held in March and June 1977 respectively the members of the two communities voted together without any preference for their own community. The leaders of the Muslims, such as Abdulla Bukhari, the Shahi Imam of the Jama Masjid of Delhi, campaigned shoulder to shoulder with the leaders of Janata Party from the same platform and in the same language, and for a time it appeared as if communalism had disappeared from the country. But that phenomenon did not last long, and Hindu-Muslim riots began to reoccur. In order to win elections to get into law making bodies the political leadership worked up the communal sentiments of the electorate and exploited those sentiments to serve their nefarious ends. Whereas the Hindu-Muslim communal diversities served the interests of foreign masters upto 1947, these continued to be fully exploited by the indigenous leadership in the postIndependence period. AN ANALYSIS The experience of past four decades in India suggests that it is wrong to think that just with the modrenisation of the medieval society, with economic development and the secular pretensions of the government process of ascriptive identity building or the majority and minority problems can be liquidated. On the contrary it suggests that the realities of social and economic antagonisms arising out of generation and articulation of demands in a backward plural society undergoing development through westernized capitalist, path can be marked by a religious vocabulary. Hence the alleged problem of communalism or parochialism, which is a normal human phenomenon having its root deep in the historical events and human psychology cannot be solved by stigmatizing this or that group.
The basic issue is, can we find a solution to communal or such problems in a non-mobilized and a conciliatory political system, like one in India? Perhaps some thing can be done by having more discipline among party leaders and workers on sectarian issues and other similar measures but the real cure must penetrate the social structure itself. Already a point of contradiction has been reached today between the available administrative structure and the level of socio-economic development of people, between the legitimate expectations for growth and the inadequacy of the political arrangement that impedes such a growth. The experience so far has proved that the adopted approach based on capitalistic postulates has failed to deliver goods to the common man belonging to the so-called minority or majority. Given the present model and the relationship between production and distribution in the world, given the western style of industrialization we Are pursuing, we may produce nothing but consumerism, corruption, revolts, disorder and ultimate the collapse of the democratic order. The only alternative, therefore, is that the transformation of the social system and economic development have to go together. A political system based on the concept of freedom will survive in the measure in which values are generally expressed in everyday life and in opportunities of common people in human and social relationship at the level of the community. There can be no success in the system unless it envisages justice to all and ensures equality in practice. Economic equality and justice are the basis of integrated society. It presents a vital and unifying goal, and is a necessity for harnessing the energies and initiative of the people in all fields of activity. The solutions have to be economic and political and not legal or administrative. The problems should be tackled at that level. Without this, high-sounding exhortation and platitudes like "unity in diversity" or "composite culture" will be of little help in achieving the goals of national integration.
244
Regionalism
245
Tamil ("We Tamil") organized a joint campaign throughout Madras state for the secession of Madras from India and for making it an independent sovereign state of Tamilnad. They burnt publicly the maps of India minus "Tamilnad".
7
REGIONALISM
INTRODUCTION Till now you are well aware of the divisive issues in Indian politics. Now you will see the regionalism in Indian politics, which is another major issue trying to destabilize the country. Regionalism was the first and foremost manifestation of the diversity of India. Whereas communalism meant the love of the community preference to the nation, regionalism meant the love of particular region in preference to the country and in certain cases, preference to the state of which the region was a part. Whereas communalism was limited largely to two communities, namely, Hindus and Muslims, regionalism was a country-wide phenomenon, and often took the form of well-conceived and wellorganized agitations and campaigns. It assumed in the political field, mainly, four forms: demand of people of certain states for secession from the Indian Union, demand of people for separate statehood, demand for full fledged statehood, and inter-state dispose. Each of these was important in itself and needed a fuller discussion. SECESSION FROM INDIA Dravida Munnetra Kzhagam in Tamil Nadu The first and most challenging form regionalism took was the demand of the people of certain states to secede from the Indian Union and become an independent sovereign state. The first such example was the Tamil community of the state of Madras. On 5 June 1960, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the Nam
On 30 January 1961, another organization, by the name of Tamil Arasu kahagam, launched an. agitation for the renaming of Madras state as "Tamil Nadu". A little later, the DMK proposed that the states of Madras, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and Mysore should secede from the Indian Union and form an independent "Republic of Dravida Nad." But this proposal did not enlist much support outside Madras. On 9 April 1961, several leading members of the DMK left the party and formed a new party called the Tamil National Party under the leadership of E.V.K. Sampath, a member of Parliament. It decried the DMK proposal and, instead, advocated a radical amendment of the Constitution so that India would become a highly decentralized federation of autonomous linguistic states, each of which would "have the right to secede." The Central Government, this party proposed, should be formed with the consent of all states and it should control only such subjects of national importance as defence and foreign-affairs. Several DMK members of the state Assembly and of Madras Corporation, including the Mayor of Madras, V. Munuswami, joined this party. The DMK, however, continued to carry on its campaign for an independent Dravidian state. Its programme found wide acceptability. It contested the third General Election to the state Assembly on the issue, and it won 50 seats, while it had got only 15 seats in the second General Election. Its strength in the Lok Sabha rose from 2 in 1975 to 7. During a debate in the Rajya Sabha on 1 May 1962, its leader, C.N. Annadurai, maintained that the people of southern India were of a stock different from that of the north. He alleged that the South had been "ignored" and "neglected" by the Union Government in the successive five year plans for India's socio-economic development. Prime Minister Nehru denounced what he called the "Balkanization" (dismemberment) of India, and said that the DMK's demand for secession from the Indian Union was "manifestly outrageous".
246
Regionalism
247
In view of the disintegrating trends in the country, Parliament adopted, in early October 1963, the Sixteenth Constitution (Amendment) Bill which: (1) enabled Parliament to make laws providing penalties for any person questioning the sovereignty and integrity of Indian Union, and (2) laid down that a candidate for election to Parliament or state Legislature would have to undertake, by oath or affirmation, to bear true faith and allegiance to the Indian Constitution and to uphold the country's sovereignty and integrity. In consequence of this amendment, the DMK, on 3 November of the same year, dropped from its programme the demand for a sovereign independent Dravidian federation (Dravidanad) and its secession from the Indian Union. Instead, a new Article to the party's constitution was added, and the party's objective, therefore, was declared to be the formation of a "Dravida Union" of Madras, Mysore, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala with as large powers as possible within the framework of the sovereignty and integrity of India and of the Constitution. The agitation went on unabated. In mid-September 1970, the DMK convened in Madras city a "state Autonomy Conference," and its leader, V.B. Raju, MP criticized "Delhi's attitude" in trying to administer state's subjects, holding the states as its "debtors" and using its "financial strings" to control them. In the last week of April 1971, Chief Minister Karunanidhi. threatened that separation of Tamil Nadu from the Indian Union "would become unavoidable" if the demand for state autonomy continued to be neglected for long. On 19 September, he repeated the threat and said that his party (DMK) was prepared to launch an agitation to secure state autonomy. At one stage, he even demanded a separate flag for Tamil Nadu. He continued to repeat his demand for the autonomy of states time and again. On 5 March 1975, he expressed his preparedness to undergo imprisonment like Sheikh Abdullallah, if he could achieve the demand of state autonomy. A week later, he accused the Central Government of "insulting and humiliating"
the DMK Government and expressed the hope that it would not force the DMK to deviate from its constitutional and peaceful fight for state autonomy. His complaint was that under the existing constitutional arrangements, the states were pitifully dependent upon the Centre, and that the. Central Government neither respected the sentiments of the people in states nor appreciated their needs and problems. He, therefore, suggested that in order to bring about the speedy and sustained growth of the people the states should be accorded the maximum autonomy. He even held out the threat of adopting "other methods" for achieving his goal, though he did not specify what those methods would be. The emphasis, however, shifted secession to autonomy. Being regional party, the DMK always sought to pick up local issues to work up people's passions in order to stay on in power. In the last week of May 1974, Tamizhar Padukappu Peravai (Tamil Protection Organization) took out in Madras city a procession and the participants shouted anti-Malayali slogans like "drive out Malayalis" and give employment to Tamilians alone. They took oath "not to-allow any non-Tamilians like Malayalis" to head any undertaking, political party or government in Tamil Nadu. The processionists stoned two theaters screening Malayalam picture, damaged hoardings and ransacked the auditorium of one of them, and indulged in other acts of violence and lawlessness. On the day following this occurrence, Chief Minister Karunanidhi declared that his Government favored reserving 80 per cent of the jobs in the government and private sectors for local people. An appeal to this effect was immediately issued by the authorities. On 9 December 1974, the founder leader of the DMK E.V. Ramaswamy Naicker, threatened secession of Tamil Nadu if the Center failed to abolish the caste system before the Republic 26 January 1975. The two-day conference of this party said that if the Centre did not end the caste distinction which divided society into Brahmins and non-Brahmins "we will proclaim that we are not citizens of this country." In its manifesto released on 11 February 1977, on the eve of elections to the Lok Sabha in March, the DMK reiterated its demand for autonomy and asserted that such a demand could neither be construed as "anti-national" nor as "secession-oriented." In later years also, the DMK led by
248
Regionalism
249
Karunanidhi and the All India Anna-DMK led by M.G. Ramachandran the two Kazhagarns which dominated Tamil Nadu politics continued to clamour for more and more autonomy for the states. THE AKALI DAL IN PUNJAB The Sikh community, following the lead of Master Tara Singh, had demanded, during the freedom struggle, an independent state, to be called Khalistan, for itself. Immediately after Independence, Tara Singh demanded a Sikh state consisting of the Gurgaon district of Punjab and Patiala and the East Punjab States' Union (PEPSU). On 2 November 1949, he demanded a "Sikh Province" of east Punjab, declaring that the Hindus of East Punjab had become "narrow minded communalists and that the Sikhs could not "hope' to get a fair deal at their hands." During the 1950's and early 1960's, the Sikhs of Punjab carried an agitation; often times violent, for a Punjabi suba and eventually this demand was conceded by the Centre on 1 November 1966. This did not satisfy all the Sikhs, and those of them who followed Sant Fateh Singh revived the idea of a Sikh "homeland." They emphasized that the establishment of a "socialist democratic Sikh homeland in north India" was the true and the only goal of the Sikh politics. A general secretary of this faction, Dr. Jagjit Singh Chauhan, toured several countries to mobilise Sikh opinion in favour of Sikhistan and even planned to set up the headquarters of his "rebel-government" of Sikhistan at Nankana Sahib (birth place of Guru Nanak) in Sheikhupura district of West Pakistan. News appeared in the Press on 30 September 1971 that the Pakistan Government was considering giving Vatican status to Nanakana Sahib. Sant Fateh Singh considered him as going too far and acting against the policy and programme of his faction of the Akali Dal and expelled him. This was done because any demand for secession from the Indian Union would have been a violation of the sixteenth Constitution Amendment Act and would have attracted penal action. Having realised that secession from the Indian Union would not be possible, the Akali leadership started talking of decentralisation of political power and the granting of greater
autonomy' to the state. At a meeting held at Anandpur Sahib on October 16 and 17, 1973, the Akali Dal adopted a resolution, generally known as Anandpur Sahib Resolution, containing its demands. This resolution stated that certain areas which had been taken away from Punjab and had been intentionally kept apart should be immediately merged with Punjab under one administrative unit, and that in the new Punjab, the Central intervention should be restricted to Defence, Foreign Affairs, Posts and Telegraphs and Currency and Railways. A different version of the. Anandpur Sahib Resolution was put forth by the Akali (Talwandi Group) at a World Sikh Convention at Anandpur Sahib in April 1981. Its resolution states that an autonomous region in the north of India should be set up forthwith wherein the Sikhs' interests were constitutionally recognized as of primary and special importance, and that the Sikh Autonomous Region may be conceded and declared as entitled to frame its own constitution and may enjoy all powers except Foreign Relations, Defence and General Communications. Yet another version of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution authenticated by Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, President of the AkaIi Dal was issued in November 1982. This version asked for the merger of all Punjabi-speaking areas "to constitute a single administrative unit where the interests of the Sikhs and Sikhism are specially protected." In September 1981, the Central Government received a list of 45 demands, but the following month, these were cut down to 15. These could be grouped into three broad categories, viz, (i) those which concerned the Sikh community as a religious group; (ii) those which related to other states besides the Punjab; and (iii) those of a general nature. 'The main religious demands were as under: (1) Amritsar should be granted the "holy city" status on the pattern of Haridwar, Kashi and Kurukshetra: (2) A radio should be installed at the Golden Temple to relay kirtan; (3) Sikhs should be permitted to travel by air on domestic and international flights with kirpan on their person; and (4) An All India Gurudwara Act should be enacted.
250
Regionalism
251
Demands which related to other states besides the Punjab were mainly two: first, the distribution of the water of rivers Beas and Ravi, and second, claims about territory. The issue of river waters affected the Punjab, Rajasthan and the state of Haryana and the territorial dispute involved the Punjab and Haryana. The Akali Dal's demands of a general nature involved the Centre and all other states of the Indian Union. As per the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, the Akali Dal took the position that the progress of the states entailed the prosperity of the Centre and, for this, suitable amendments must be made in the Constitution to give more rights and autonomy to the states. Besides this, it was contended, the Sikhs should be accorded "special" rights as a Nation. Shortly after receiving the Akali Dal's demands, the Prime Minister invited representatives of the Akali Dal to a meeting on 16 October 1981. Thereafter, she met them again on two occasions, in November 1981 and April 1982. The process of consultations and discussions went on, sometimes secretly and sometimes openly, and between November 16, 1982 and May 26, 1984, nine rounds of parleys were held, sometimes in New Delhi and sometimes in Chandigrah, between the Akali Dal representatives and the authorities of the Central Government. In the course of these, the Centre accepted several of the Akali demands. For example, it was announced that Hardwar, Kashi and Kurukshetra did not enjoy any 'Holy City' status, that no such status could be conferred to Amritsar, and that the sale of meat, liquor and tobacco would be banned (and was subsequently banned) in a demarcated area around the Golden Temple as well as the Durgiana Temple in Amritsar. While the Government authorities told the Akali Dal representatives that private radio broadcasting facilities were not allowed to any group anywhere in the country as a matter of national policy they offered to arrange for direct relay of shabad kirtan from the Golden Temple through the Jullundhar station of All India Radio. About the Akali Dal demand that Sikhs traveling by air should be permitted to carry kirpans on domestic as well as international flights the Government took the position that after the hijacking incident of September 1981 certain restrictions were imposed, but that in deference to the sentiments of the Sikh
community Sikh passengers would be free to carry kirpans which did not exceed 22.8 cms in length and whose blade did not exceed 15.24 cms on domestic flights. About the Akali Dal demand for the enactment of an All India Gurdwara Act, bringing all historical gurdwaras situated in different parts of the country under the purview of one administration the Government position was that such an Act would have far-reaching implications, that it would involve the state governments, (where the gurdwaras were located) and the managements of those gurdwaras, and that such an Act could be passed only after a consensus, needed for such an Act, was reached. With regard to the distribution of surplus waters in Ravi and Beas rivers an agreement had been concluded in December 1981 between the Governments of the Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan on the one side and the Central Government on the other. The Central Government took the position that if the Akali Dal was not satisfied with that, the matter could be referred to a tribunal presided over by a Judge of the Supreme Court to determine afresh the allocation of surplus waters. The demand regarding territories proved to be the most contentious. The Shah Commission had recommended in 1966 that Chandigarh be given to Haryana, but in order to pacify the Punjab, Mrs. Gandhi had announced in 1970 that Chandigarh would go to Punjab, that a part of Fazilka Tehsil (including Abohar) of Ferozepur district of Punjab would be transferred to Haryana, and that as regards other claims and counter-claims for the readjustment of inter-state boundaries a commission would be appointed. This decision could not be implemented due to the subsequent change in the attitude of the Akali Dal which demanded that while Chandigarh should be transferred to Punjab immediately, all other claims and counter-claims, including those relating to Abohar and Fazilka, could be referred to a commission. On June 2, 1984, the Prime Minister, in a broadcast to the Nation, reiterated that Chandigarh could be given to Punjab provided Haryana got its share of some Hindi-speaking areas which were in Punjab then. Regarding the Akali Dal demand relating to Centre-state relations the authorities in New Delhi set up, in June 1983, a
252
Regionalism
253
Commission under the Chairmanship of Justice Ranjit Singh Sarkaria to examine and review the working of existing arrangements between the Union and states in regard to powers, functions and responsibilities in all spheres and recommend such changes as might be appropriate. This should have satisfied the Akalis as it did the other Opposition parties which also had raised this issue, but the Akalis were adamant that the Government should make specific mention of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution while referring the matter to Sarkaria Commission. Among their other demands, the Akali Dal representatives emphasised the following two as issues of special concern to them: (i) grant of second language status to Punjabi language in Haryana, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh and Rajasthan, and (ii) stopping the uprooting of Punjabi farmers from the Terai areas of Uttar Pradesh. The Central Government adopted a conciliatory posture, but it seemed the Akalis were not prepared for a compromise and wanted the acceptance of their demands in to. In April 1981, they had held out a threat to launch a morcha (agitation) if their demands were not conceded. The radical elements within the Akali Dal led by Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwala were not satisfied with the outcome of negotiations between the Centre and the moderate Akalis led by Harchand Singh Longowal, and they commenced violent activities involving the killing of innocent men, women and children, destruction of public and private property, and advocacy of communalism and sanction for the most heinous crimes against the state. On 24, April 1980, the spiritual head of the Nirankaris, Baba Gurcharan Singh had been assassinated because he opposed the fundamentalist Sikhs, and in September 1981, a prominent journalist of Punjab, Lala Jagat Narain, was murdered because he criticised and denounced the politics of murder and violence. Bhindranwala was arrested in connection with his murder, and a few days after this, Some Sikh extremists hijacked to Lahore an Indian Airlines plane. Akali Dal did not disapprove the merciless killings and refused to acknowledge the close Connection between its agitational programme and the violence which has developed in the entire
state of Punjab. In fact the moderate leadership of the Akali Dal lost control over the extremists who gained the upper hand over the agitation. After his release from detention, Bhindranwala and his armed followers shifted their headquarters from Chowk Mehta to Guru Nanak Niwas within the Golden Temple complex, and from there the extremists and terrorists were directed, were supplied arms and training and were given refuge after they had done the 'job' assigned to them. The tension generated by the Akali Dal agitation gave encouragement to various militant groups who joined it. One such group was the Dal Khalsa. It was originally established in India on 13 April 1978 with the avowed object of demanding the creation of an independent sovereign Sikh state. It advocated the use of violence to achieve its objectives. Jaswant Singh Thakedar, Mukh Panch of the Dal Khalsa, said, "Political power is not served to anybody on a platter; nor can it be acquired through Bhakti. Without a guerilla warfare and without an armed revolt it would be impossible to achieve our aim". "Political power", he said, "flows out of the barrel of a gun." It established branches in the UK and West Germany. It openly incited communal passions. On 26 April 1982, it claimed responsibility for serious acts of sacrilege against Hindu temples and declared its attention of repeating them. A cow slaughter campaign with grave potential for aggravating communal tension was threatened. Another militant group which joined hands with the Akali Dal agitation was the National Council of Khalistan. Dr Jagjit Singh Chauhan, the self-styled leader of the movement, proclaimed himself to be the "President of the National Council of Khalistan". He first raised the slogan of Khalistan at a Press conference in London in September 1971, Balbir Singh Sandhu became its Secretary-General. He (Chauhan) undertook tours of the Western countries to work up the Sikh sentiments and exhorted the Sikhs in India not to pay taxes and to resort to disobedience and total non-cooperation with the elected government in Punjab. He advised Longowal and Bhindranwala to form a full fledged government and parliament of their own. Along with members of the Dal Khalsa and others he established contacts with leaders of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front in the UK and with
254
Regionalism
255
Sultan Mohd. Chaudhry, the President of the Azad J & K Muslim Conference to explore whether "we can discuss the issue of the Sikhs and Kashmiris and work together." Chauhan issued a map outlining the boundaries of the Khalistan state and claimed support for his objective from many US congressmen and government leaders. The third militant group to join the Akali Dal agitation was the Babbar Khalsa and the Akhand Kirtani Jatha. The Jatha started mainly as a religious group, but it extended support to other Sikh political and extremist organisations, particularly the Babbar Khalsa, which was its political offshoot. It looked upon the Jewish struggle for the creation of Israel and the National Liberation struggle of the Kurds as models for organising its activities. It was established in India in 1978, and its branches were set up in Canada, the US, the UK, Holland and West Germany. Babbar Khalsa looked upon Pakistan, as a natural and cultural neighbour of the Sikhs ready to assist their movement. The members of this group talked about plans to organise a. Khalistan Liberation Army. On 20 May 1983, Talwinder Singh Parmar, its Jathedar overseas, claimed that the Babbar Khalsa was responsible for the murders of Lala Jagat Narain, the Nirankaris and others in Punjab. This group openly incited the Sikhs to initiate action to achieve their original target of the Sikh quam (Nation), namely the establishment of an independent entity. The fourth militant group which identified itself with the Akali Dal agitation was the All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF). It was originally founded in 1944 to inculcate love for the teachings of the great Gurus among Sikh youths, but in the 1978, it was taken over by the extremists, and its members began to kill and indulge in other acts of violence. From June 1983 onwards, an organised attempt was made to use Gurmat camp to propagate extremism and communal ideology and to impart training in arms. Pro-Pakistan and pro-Khalistan slogans were defiantly raised in several camps. The Alkali Dal and the terrorist groups entrenched themselves in the Golden Temple complex and converted it into the main base for operations against those who appeared to be the opponents of their cause. Many other gurdwaras in Punjab also became the sanctuary for criminals and the
perpetrators of the worst types of crimes. Large quantities of weapons of offensive character and communication equipment were stored within the places of worship. This clearly showed that the agitationists were planning for a full scale insurgency with the object of seceding from the Indian Union. The Government had also gathered from the intelligence reports that some foreign powers, which were not named for diplomatic reasons, were helping and assisting the terrorists with the object of weakening the Indian polity. In such circumstances, it became absolutely' essential for the Central authorities to take steps to break the well-entrenched bastions of terrorism and secessionism. On 1 May 1982, the Dal Khalsa and the National Council of Khalistan had been declared as unlawful associations. About two years later, both of these organisations were banned. In the wake of increasing terrorist activity, Punjab and Chandigarh were declared disturbed areas under the Armed Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act. The National Security Act was made more rigorous through a Presidential Ordinance. On 2 June 1984, the Central Government decided to call in the Army in aid of the civil authority to check and control the extremist, terrorist and communal violence in Punjab and the Union Territory of Chandigarh. On the following day, the entry of foreigners into Punjab was prohibited. By the early hours of June 3, Army formations moved into Punjab and Chandigarh. Within a few days, the 'Operation Blue-star', as it came to be called, was completed, and all the terrorists were either killed or arrested. Those who surrendered voluntarily were taken into custody. With this, the first phase of the Operation was over, and the second phase, namely flushing out the terrorists from their hideouts in the country-side was undertaken. On July 15, the "Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Ordinance was promulgated by the President and the Government acquired wide-ranging powers to establish special courts for trial of certain specified offences, heinous in nature and impinging upon the security and territorial integrity of the country. The Ordinance extended to the whole of India except Jammu and Kashmir.
256
Regionalism
257
As a result of the Army action, the situation in Punjab improved considerably, but many Sikhs were feeling injured in self-esteem and some of the terrorists, who had not been yet mopped up, continued to indulge in acts of sabotage and arson, both in India and abroad. Some of the Akali Dal leaders continued to talk of launching a stir to "free" the gurdwaras from the control of security forces and also to counter the situation created by the "kar seva" started by Nihang chief, Baba Santa Singh, at the Akal Takht in the Golden Temple complex. The Government, on the other hand, was determined not to allow terrorism to raise its head in Punjab again. Never before since Independence the country was confronted with such a challenge to its integrity and security from within. On 31st October 1984, Mrs. Gandhi was assassinated by her two Sikh bodyguards in her own bungalow in New Delhi, and that led to a very tense and explosive situation in the country. In order to get out of this, the Central Government authorities started a dialogue with a moderate faction of the Akali dal, and that eventually resulted in what was described by the Indian Press as an "historic accord" on 25th July 1985, between Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on the one side and the Akali dal chief, Harchand Singh Longowal, on the other. It provided for the transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab and some Hindi speaking areas to Haryana, the rehabilitation of those discharged from the Army and reference of the Anandpur Sahib resolution to the Sarkaria Commission that had been set up by the Centre to examine the whole gamut of Union-state relations and make recommendations for changes if necessary. In September 1985, general election was held for the state Assembly in Punjab, and the Akali Dal led by Surjit Singh Barnala came into power. There was some respite in the crisis ridden Punjab, and the "Punjab problem" as it became known was not resolved. The terrorists and extremists restarted their violent and subversive activities, and the Golden Temple complex again became the centre of anti-national elements. A Panthic Committee of five members issued, on 29 April 1986, a call of "Khalistan", and the situation in the Punjab became very grave. Next day at about 5 p.m. the army and para-military forces resorted to "Operation
Search' to flush out the terrorists from the Golden Temple Complex. This operation lasted only for fourteen hours, but it led to a split of the Akali Dal Legislature Party. Twenty-seven of its members left the party and formed a separate group. The Barnala Ministry having been reduced to a minority began to look for support towards other MLAs, and several Opposition parties offered to keep it in office. Two secessionist organisations-Dal Khalsa and the National Council of Khalistan-were declared illegal under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. The situation in Punjab, however, again became grave and the Central and state authorities became seriously concerned about it. In early 1990s the Tehrik-e-Huriyat (Movement for the liberation of Kashmir) was formed and its constituent units were banned. Those units were Jamayit Islami, the JK league of the people, Mahaze Azadi Islamic Institute of Students and Duktrani Milat etc. These organisations joined hands with several groups and 'factions fighting for the formation of state of a separate Khalistan. The situation became extremely serious during 1999-92. The advocates of a separate state of Khalistan took to terrorist and militant activities and got support and incitement from Pakistan. On 25 February 1992, Beant Singh became the Congress Chief Minister and terrorist activities were considerably controlled. The state seemed to be taking to Parliamentarism. North-eastern Region-Mizoram Another area of the country where secessionist movements were launched was the north-east region comprising Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura, Meghalaya, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh, jointly known as the "seven sisters." Let us first take up Mizoram. The people of the Mizo Hill district of Assam with an area of 8,200 square miles and population of about 200,000 demanded secession not only from Assam but from the Indian Union itself. They demanded the formation of an "independent Mizo state" comprising also the Mizos of the contiguous areas of East Pakistan and Burma. They formed the Mizo National Front (MNF) to press their demand. The Union Government, naturally turned down their demand, and took to repression. The Mizos
258
Regionalism
259
organized armed agitation and commenced guerrilla warfare. In the wake of the Chinese aggression line October 1962, the MNF was banned, and all its operations were declared illegal under the Defence of India Rules. But their activities continued and spread to the Cachar Hills of Assam and the then Union Territory of Tripura. Civil administration in the Mizo Hill broke down almost completely. On 2 May 1968, the Union Government alleged that the Mizos were in league with the Nagas and the Chinese who were arming and training them. It also alleged that Pakistan was assisting the rebel Mizos-an allegation described by Rawalpindi as "totally false". The Union Government detained hundreds of Mizos under the Preventive Detention Act. When on 31 December 1969, that Act expired, the Government of Assam issued an ordinance providing for preventive detention and the Mizos continued to be held. Their operations, however, continued. In January 1971, a three-member delegation of the MNF led by its President Chunga met the Prime Minister and other Union Government leaders in New Delhi, and in memorandum submitted to Indira Gandhi, they said that the Mizos were frustrated because of the injustice done to them by dividing their homeland during British rule, because of the political instability brought about by the Assam government, and because of the economic instability and hardships as a result of mismanagement by the Assam Government. Instead to talking about secession from India and forming an "independent Mizo state, they demanded in 1971 a referendum over the question of statehood for the Mizos. In order to satisfy their political aspirations, the Union Government made the Mizo Hills a Union Territory, and it was inaugurated by Indira Gandhi on 21 January 1972. It was named Mizoram. The Union Government spent crores of rupees to improve the lot of the people there so as to bring them into the mainstream of India, but the success achieved was only limited. Many extremists who would be content only with an independent state outside the Indian Union continued their violent and terrorist activities under the leadership of Laldenga. Quite a few of them sneaked to China to obtain arms and training there in guerrilla tactics of warfare so as to face the Indian Border Security Force.
During February 1973, and again in February 1974, the Government authorities held informal discussion with some of the underground leaders, but there was no result. The hard core among them took, as the then Union Home-Minister, Uma Shanker Dixit, put it, a "very unreasonable attitude." The situation deteriorated considerably. On 1 December 1974, the 'Mizo National Army' issued notice to the effect that "all Indian nationals now in Mizoram are hereby ordered to leave Mizoram before 1 January 1975. The responsibility for violation of this order shall lie upon the defaulters." The ultimatum having expired, the MNF whipped up its terrorist activities. On 13 January, two gunmen, wearing uniforms of sub-inspectors of police, walked into the conference room of the Inspector General of Police at Aizawl and shot him dead along with the Deputy Inspector General and the superintendent of Police. This ghastly crime caused serious uneasiness in New Delhi, and the authorities there launched Army operations in a big way to suppress the rebels. They also decided to hold no talks with the underground Mizo leaders, unless and until they ended their violence. It was pointed out by the Development Minister of Mizoram, R. Thagliana on 26 April 1975 that the atrocities being inflicted upon the youth of the Union Territory by the security forces were sending more and more of them into the ranks of the underground secessionists. It was, of course, a widely-known fact that Communist China was helping the Mizo hostiles with money and arms with the ultimate objective of creating lawlessness and anarchy in the north-east region of India. The Pakistani collusion with the Chinese authorities was another factor behind the activities of the Mizo rebels. In order to deal with the grave situation the Union Government authorities devised more stringent measures, one of them being a move, in early May 1975, to make the provisions of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) more rigorous. But these too had little effect. On 3 June, Chief Minister Chunga said that the rebel elements "are very active" and the situation "is not under control yet." However, about a year later, the MNF decided to give up arms and secessionist plea and acknowledged that all problems between the rebel Mizos and the Union
260
Regionalism
261
Government would be resolved within the framework of the Constitution. After long deliberations and secret discussions a peace accord was signed at New Delhi on 11 July 1976 between him and the authorities of the Central Government Laldenga acknowledged Mizoram to be an integral part of India, agreed to find a solution of all problems peaceably, undertook to abjure violence and to suspend all activities and finally to bring into camps all his followers and to deposit their weapons. The ink on the Delhi accord had hardly dried up that Laldenga himself incited his followers to scuttle its implementation. The MNF launched, in March-April 1977, a massive drive for enrolling fresh volunteers to its depleted ranks and arranging their training in guerrilla warfare in China. On 9 May 1977, the Congress Ministry of Mizoram headed by Chhunga resigned following the expiry of the 5-year term of the Assembly, and two days later the Union Territory was placed under President's rule. The 30-member Assembly was dissolved. The Union authorities took to suppression of rebels again. Hundreds of them surrendered but the secessionists were not wholly wiped out. For about one year there was neither war nor peace in Mizoram. There was no war because after 12-year-old warfare there was lull in war-like operations on the part of Mizo insurgents, and there was no peace, because thousands of them were getting training in the use of more sophisticated arms across the border in Bangladesh and Burma, On 2 July 1979, the MNF insurgents struck again and attacked with automatic weapons at the transmission centre of All India Radio, Aizawl and the Mizoram police complex. Towards the end of that month, a plot came to light that the outlawed MNF had planned to carry out blitzkrieg on Aizawl and liquidate some VIPs including the Lt. Governor, the chief Minister and senior civil and police officers. It had also planned to blow up the AIR transmitter, cut off water supply to the capital and to disrupt all communications between Mizoram and the rest of the country. Military operations were launched with full force, and the Janata Party Government took the position that unless the MNF abjured violent and.the path of confrontation, there could be no talks. Its leader, Laldenga, was told that the
Centre would grant the status of statehood to Mizoram, but the rebels would have, first, to lay down arms. On 9 November 1979, Laldenga spelt out the terms on which his followers would lay down arms and negotiate for a political solution of the Mizoram problem. He said that Mizoram should be accorded a protected constitutional status similar to Kashmir and Nagaland, that an interim government headed by an "underground" man should be constituted to enable the underground elements to be "psychologically and materially rehabilitated," and that the charge of treason-"and offence punishable by hanging"-against him must be withdrawn before the "quit Mizoram" movement (that was launched by other leaders of the MNF when he was under detention in New Delhi) could be terminated. The Union Government authorities refused to consider Laldenga's offer, and took the position that it would give no quarter to insurgency as a means of sorting out political differences, and that a policy that gave the impression that "'insurgency pays" would be strictly avoided. The underground members of the MNF took to violence again and posed a serious threat to law and order in the Union Territory. Joining hands with others in the North-Eastern region, they raised the demand that the non-Mizos should quit Mizoram. A notice to this effect was served upon them in June 1979. From then on, the outlawed MNF sought to discredit the People's Conference Ministry handed by Brigadier Saito in order to capture power. When Mrs. Gandhi again came into power at the Centre in January 1980, the Mizo leadership opened negotiations with her Government in order to bring peace to the Union territory after 14 years of insurgency. In the third week of July, Laldenga discussed with the Prime Minister a "plan of action" for finding out a permanent political solution to the Mizo insurgency, and the parleys resulted in a "cease-fire" agreement between the two leaders. This' provided that with effect from the midnight of 31 July, the Mizo insurgents would stop all rebel activities, including fresh recruitment and collection of taxes and the revocation of the "quit Mizoram" notice to non-Mizos, and the Government, on its part, would suspend all operations by its security forces against hostile activities. With
262
Regionalism
263
the enforcement of the "ceasefire", the two sides, it was agreed, would confer about how to solve the Mizo problem within the framework of the Constitution. The cease-fire accordingly came into force, and the Mizos were jubilant that peace had returned to their strife-tom home-land. But the calm that prevailed in the Union Territory proved to be deceptive. Laldenga adopted a contradictory posture. On the one side he sought to convince his erstwhile colleagues that Mizoram's future lay with India, and he told the Government of India that he was sincerely trying to find a solution to the vexed problem within the framework of the Indian Constitution. And, on the other hand, he directed the commanders of the Mizo National Army, the armed wing of the MNF, to keep their powder dry. Accordingly those commanders took full advantage of the suspension of military operations to regroup their forces, to restore their communication links, to reestablish their ideological cells in remote hamlets, to raise funds, to collect rations, to build up stocks of medicines, to establish fresh arms and ammunition dumps and to take refresher course in guerrilla warfare for their men. Thus, while there was talk of peace the MNF and the Mizo National Army prepared for war. In early March 1981, Laldenga put before Mrs. Gandhi a five point plan to solve the Mizo problem, and the Prime Minister allowed him to visit the MNF headquarters in the Arakan Hills in Burma to discuss the situation with other leaders of the MNF. On his return from there he stated on 5 April that the MNF wanted a greater Mizoram state which should include large parts of Tripura, Manipur and Assam. He also said his followers wanted "'some sort of autonomy" for Mizoram guarded by a constitutional amendment. He stressed that the Mizos were different, that they were ethnically and culturally Mongolian and Christian by religion, and that the majority of others were Indo-Aryan, governed by Hindu ethics and philosophy. The hawks within the MNF leadership, thus, sought to continue to struggle rather than agree to a solution within the Indian Union. The MNF carried on secessionist activities and the Mizo National Army continued to attack the security forces, civilian and government employees and the citizens. Laldenga demanded
the dismissal of the Mizoram Chief Minister Brig. T. Sailo and his own appointment in his place as a precondition to resume the talks. The Government of India did not accept it and on 20 January 1982, imposed a ban on the MNF under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 for carrying on secessionist activities. The outlawed MNF then demanded that the Mizoram administration be carried on by the Lt. Governor with the help of a council of advisers headed by itself. This proposal too was turned down by the Central authorities and Laldenga who had been staying on in New Delhi as the guest of the Government of India to carry on the talks was told that he was free to leave the country. Thereafter, the MNF volunteers took to guerrilla activities and served upon the non-Mizos a notice to leave the Union Territory by 21 June 1982. The Central authorities continued to send "peace feelers" to the underground headquarters to resume the negotiations, but the MNF took the position that it would not talk without Laldenga who lived in the United Kingdom and was reluctant to come to New Delhi for this purpose. For about two years the issue remained frozen, though the insurgent activities continued. In April 1984, Mrs. Gandhi said, in the course of a visit to Aizawl, that the Union Government would be prepared to hold talks with the MNF provided the rebels renounced violence and agreed to settling the dispute within the framework of the Constitution. The Mizos were losing zeal for a state continuous insurgency and had begun to yearn for peace and normal democratic politics. The successful general election in Mizoram testified to this. The Church leaders made renewed efforts to get the rebels and the Government talk again. In view of these developments, Laldenga made a conciliatory statement in London in May, and in July he wrote to the Prime Minister that as solution of the Mizo problem within the framework of the Constitution would be acceptable to the MNF, provided special protection was accorded to the Mizos in the matter of trade and commerce and also provided Mizoram was made the seat of High Court. The Union Government authorities considered these demands as unconstitutional. The talks between them and MNF chief Laldenga, however, continued, and on 30 October 1985 a
264
Regionalism
265
breakthrough was attached. Accord was reached on modalities for laying down arms by the rebels and in the wake of this a coalition government was formed by the MNF and Congress (I) with Laldenga as the Chief Minister. In the-third week of February 1987, general election for the 40-member Assembly was held, and the MNF got 25 seats, whereas Congress (I) could secure only 12. On 20 February, a 'new Ministry with Laldenga as the Chief Minister was sworn in, and on the same day Mizoram was made the 23rd state of the Indian Union. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi assured full support to the MNF Government, and Laldenga assured full cooperation to the Centre Nagaland. Another area of the North-east region where secessionist movement and an agitation for an independent sovereign state took place wasthe Nagaland. Numbering about 400,000 divided into over twenty tribes differing widely in language and customs, the Nagas lived in the Naga Hill districts and in the Tuengsang division on the Indo-Burmese frontier. There was a Naga minority in northern Manipur and about 100,000 in the adjoining areas of Burma, but neither of these two groups gave active support to the separatist movement. The Nagas of the Naga Hill district were more advanced, and they were in the forefront of the movement. Zapo Phizo was their leader, and they had formed the Naga National Council to carryon the agitation. In February 1950, Phizo held a plebiscite on the issue of Naga independence, and 99 per cent of the Nagas were proclaimed to be in favour of a sovereign independent state. In 1952, he organized a boycott of the first General Election and this was "a great success." In April of the' same year, he said that the Naga's case would besubmited to the United Nations if difficulties arose. In the spring of 1955, the Naga National Council organised serious disorders and violence, and the, Army had to be called in to suppress their onslaughts. Nearly 300 Nagas were killed, and the area in which they operated was declared a "disturbed area." Six Naga leaders repudiated Phizo's violent methods and separatist movement. In September 1956, they met Prime Minister Nehru, and put forward proposals for the unification of all Naga areas under a single administration. Nehru assured them that as soon as peace was restored the Government would consider any
change in the present set-up 'in full consultation with the Naga people "subject to the unity, integrity and security of the Indian Union." The Assam Government announced a reward of Rs. 5,000 for the arrest of Phizo and 37 of his accomplices and charged them of a number of crimes punishable with death. It convened, on 2226 August 1957, a convention of loyal Naga leaders in Kohima. This convention adopted, unanimously, a resolution demanding the integration of the Naga areas as a single administrative unit under the Indian External Affairs Ministry to be administered by the Government of Assam on behalf of the President of India. This proposal meant the abandonment of the demand for an independent Naga state and was envisaged as an "interim arrangement" pending a permanent political settlement within the Indian Union. Another resolution of the convention appealed to the Naga rebels still in arms to "give up the cult of violence" and to "cooperate for the good of our land and the free development of our people according to our traditions." The Government of India welcomed both the resolutions, and in July 1960, an agreement was reached between the Indian Union and the Naga Peoples' Convention. On 24 January 1961, President S. Radhakrishnan promulgated the Nagaland (Transitional Provisions) Regulations which made the following provisions for the adminjstration of Nagaland during the transitional period before the attainment of full statehood: (i) An Interim Body of 45 elected representatives of the Naga tribes would act for three years, as an advisory council to the Governor who, in its recommendation, would appoint not more than five of its members to serve as an Executive Council; (ii) The Interim Body would be empowered to discuss and recommend on matters of administration involving general policy and development schemes, etc; and (iii) The Executive Council would assist and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions. The Interim Body was sworn in on 18 February 1961 in the presence of General S.M. Srinagesh, Governor of Assam, who acted concurrently as Governor of Nagaland. Imakongliba Ao was elected Speaker of the Interim Body_and Dr Shilu Ao
266
Regionalism
267
as Chairman of the Executive Council. On 21 August 1962, Nehru introduced in the Lok Sabha the state of Nagaland Bill and the Thirteenth Constitution (Amendment) Bill, and after easy passage,,both the Bi1ls received the President's assent. On 4 September 1962, Nagaland became the sixteenth state of the Indian Union. It comprised the Naga Hill districts and the Tuengsang Tribal Area. The new state was inaugurated by the President on 1 December 1963. The first General Election for the Interim Body (Assembly) was held on 10-16 January 1964, and Naga Nationalist Party leader,' Dr Shilu Ao, was sworn in as Chief Minister. Although the Indian Army broke up large rebel concentrations and destroyed their hide-outs, the rebel Nagas numbering about 1,500 regrouped themselves and adopted "hit and run" tactics in small groups. The hard core of hostile lea4ership in the Naga Hills with a fairly large following and stocks of arms and ammunition remained intact Most of them operated in the Burmese fr9ntier area. After the formation of the state of Nagaland these rebels became desperate and resorted to more severe violence and acts of arson. They assassinated the Chief Minister, Shilu Ao, and formed the "Naga Revolutionary Government." Phizo fled to London to canvass support for an independent state of Nagaland from the Western countries. He and his London host, Rev. Michael Scott, went to New York to talk the Naga case in the United Nations, but they could not enlist much support there. Then, Phizo turned towards Communist China and Pakistan-the two grievous enemies of India-and obtained large quantities of arms and ammunition. These countries also provided political support and facilities for training the Nagas in the art and technique of guerrilla warfare. Equipped with these, the followers Of Phizo whipped up their drive for more terror, ambushes and assassinations. Hundreds of their political opponents were done to death. One 7 August 1972, even the Chief Minister of Nagaland, Hokishe Serna, was made the object of attack, though he escaped death. The guerrilla activities of the Naga hostiles reached an all-time high in the first half of 1973.
The Union Government adopted a stem attitude, announced that greater autonomy for Nagaland was out of question, and declared the "Naga National Council," the "Naga Revolutionary Government," and the "Naga, Revolutionary Army" as illegal bodies. The Army operations suspended eight years earlier, were resumed, and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 was rigorously, enforced. As a result, most of the hostile Nagas gave up violence and came out into the open. The "Prime Minister" of the Naga Revolutionary Government, Scato Wsu, and former "General" Zuharto surrendered, and they offered to cooperate with the rest of the country. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the state of Nagaland (1 December 1973) Mrs. Gandhi visited Kohima and exhorted the Nagas to join the task of building the state as a prosperous unit of the Indian Union. She served a warning upon Phizo and a few of his accomplices that no talks would be held with them for any settlement 'Outside the constitutional provisions. On 2 September 1974, the underground Naga National Council and its allied organisations were banned. The ban also applied to the so-called Federal Government of Nagaland, Naga Army, Kimhao (upper house), Tarar Hoho (assembly of representatives) and the Federal Supreme Court. All these measures of repression and suppression failed to wipe out the Naga insurgency. News continued to appear in the Indian newspapers in the early months of 1975 that the Nagas were sneaking into China and Burma to obtain arms and training there with the object of making yet another effort to secede from the Indian Union and form an independent sovereign state of their own. On 11 November 1975, the Governor.of Nagaland, L.P. Singh, entered, on behalf of the Government of India, into an agreement with the "known real representatives" of the underground Naga organisations at Shillong. On their part, the rebel Nagas accepted the Constitution "unconditionally," abjured violence and agreed to surrender all arms and ammunition and to give up the demand for independent Nagaland. The Union Government agreed to suspend the operation of the MISA, to release gradually the 200 Nagas in detention and to condone the acts of violence and other
268
Regionalism
269
offences committed by the underground Nagas during the period of insurgency. This agreement was welcomed by the NNO General Secretary, J.B. Jasokic, who thought, it would bring "permanent peace" in the state. But some hard liners among the rebel Nagas made frantic efforts to scuttle the "Shillong Peace Accord," as it came to be known. They recruited fresh volunteers, established contact with the rebel gangs across the border in Burma and resumed China traffic for training and arms. During his visit to London in the second week of June 1977 to attend the conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, Morarji Desai conferred with Phizo to explore the possibility of permanent ease and harmony between the Centre and the Nagas, but nothing tangible emerged out of their deliberations. Phizo showed his unwillingness to accept that Nagaland was one of the 22 states of the Indian Union. A few months later a Janata Party leader, S.M. Joshi, talked to Phizo to discuss ways of ending the secessionist insurgency in Nagaland, but the thing came out of these, talks either. Several erstwhile rebel leaders met as emissaries of Phizo to Charan Singh and Y.B. Chavan, Prime Minister and Home Minister respectively of the caretaker government, to reopen the dialogue with the Centre to arrive at a solution, but these parleys also produced no result. In the third week of May 1980, the Nagaland Peace Council, an organisation of those who wanted to resolve the Nagaland problems within the framework of the Constitution, convened in Kohima the All-Naga People's Conference, and about 500 representatives of the 14 major tribes of Nagaland participated. A consensus was reached that the "Shillong accord" was a fait accompli and had to be the basis for sorting out the remain 19 problems confronting Nagaland. 'None of the top underground lc.aders of the secessionist movement took part in the conference, and in July, two of them, T.H. Muivah and Isak Chishi Swu, called upon their followers to get ready for a protracted war for "the liberation of Nagaland". A manifesto circulated among the people said: "We rule out the illusion of saving Nagaland through peaceful means. It is arms and arms again that will save our nation and ensure freedom to tbe people". This manifesto was circulated by
the National Socialist Council of Nagaland led by Muivah and Swu, operating in close league with the Chinese. In the meantime, the United Democratic Party led by Vizol and the Naga National Party led by J.B. Jasokie sought to run the Nagaland politics through parliamentary means. Both of these parties merged into one and created tbe Nagaland National Democratic Party (NNDP). This party came into power in November 1980, with Jasokie as the leader. The Congress (I) endeavored to enter itself into Nagaland politics. It contested the election for the state Assembly in November 1982, and in a House of 60 members secured 24 seats, the same number as won-by the NNDP. The Congress (I) Central leaders descended on Kohima with capitals in hand and won-over 8 independents into their fold. S.C. Jamir, the Congress (I) leader, was sworn in as Chief Minister, and Mrs. Gandhi's party, thus, emerged the dominant political culture in the north-east The process of normalisation and constitutionalism, it appeared, began to take roots in the state, though the secessionist elements had not been wholly wiped off. State Assembly elections were held in February 1993 and Congress emerged as the largest single party.. Its government was formed on 25 February 1993. Stir in Assam against Non-Assamese A more serious manifestation of regionalism appeared in Assam, a state of the north-east region. The Assamese organised the Lachit Sena on the pattern of Shiv Sena of Maharashtra, and in the summer of 1967, that Sena launched an agitation against the immigrants from other states of the Indian Union, particularly against the Rajasthanis who owned much of the industry in the state. First, the agitation took the form of posters and leaflets asking the non-Assamese to leave the state. Then, the Lachit Sena worked up the sentiments of students and on the Republic Day, 26 January 68, they called for the boycott of the celebrations as a protest against the Centre's unwillingness to contour their demands and-they attacked the shops and industrial establishments of the non-Assamese. Justice K.C. Sen, who had been appointed by the Central Government to inquire into the situation, reported that the Assam Government was absolutely
270
Regionalism
271
"indifferent" to the agitation against the non-Assamese, and that the anti-social elements had been encouraged by that indifference. On instructions from New Delhi the Assam Government took stern action against the Lachit Sena volunteers, and the situation came under control. In the later months of 1979, an agitation against the inclusion of "foreigners" in the electoral rolls developed in Assam under the leadership of two organisations called the All-Assam Gana Sangram Parishad and the All-Assam Students Union. Between 1964 and 1971, about 1,000,000 people had entered into Assam from what then was East Pakistan prior to the creation of Bangladesh, and about 2,00,000 of them had been, allegedly, registered as voters. The Central Government declared these "refugees" as entitled to Indian citizenship. The above two organisations demanded the detection, disenfranchisement and deportation of these "aliens": The tripartite talks carried on between the AASU and the AAGSP on the one side and the Central Government and Opposition parties on the other proved abortive. In February 1983, elections were held for the Legislative Assembly of Assam, but these were opposed and boycotted by the nationalist and student groups who considered them as "illegal". Only 10 per cent voters cast their votes, and the violence that occurred during the voting resulted in the massacre of several thousand people. The Congress (I) got 90.of the 108 seats that were filled and its leader, Hiteswar Saika, was sworn in as the Chief Minister on 17 February. On the same day, President's rule was formally revoked. The AASU and the AAGSP decided to topple the "illegally" elected Ministry of Saika because the electoral rolls contained the names of "a large number of foreigners". Although, the Assam agitation was initially launched on the "foreigners" issue, the extremist groups took advantage and started intimidating the non-Assamese speaking people on the one side and accusing the Centre of neglecting Assam on the other. Towards the end of December 1979, posters exhorting the people of the north-east to unite and recreate a "golden Assam" appeared in the Sibsagar district of Upper Assam. These posters urged the people to disrupt transport links with the rest of the country, so that tea and oil were not supplied to areas outside the region. One pamphlet
said: "Bye bye India", and it alleged that the Centre was adopting a "colonial policy" towards Assam. The posters spoke of "United States of Asom". Since the Bengalis living in Assam were subjected to intimidation a counter agitation against Assam was launched in West Bengal by the Youth Congress (I) and the Chhatra Parishad, the party 'sstudents organisation, to make the Assam students realise the "folly" of their ways and to "restore good sense" to them. The agitation in Bengal also became increasingly violent, and for a moment the two states appeared to be on a war path. In the summer of 1985, Assam became involved in a border dispute with Nagaland and this led to the exchange of fire, the displacement of some 31,000 persons in Assam and the stoppage of traffic on the Assam-Nagaland border. An accord was, however, soon reached on the intervention of the Central authorities. Secessionist Stir in Manipur Manipur was another of the "seven sisters" in the north-east region where secessionist stir was launched. Manipur was formed by valleys inhabited by Meiteis and hills inhabited by tribes, mainly Nagas and Kukis. About 250 years ago, the Meiteis, who formed 60% of the population, were "forcibly converted" to Vishnava Hinduism. One of their organisations, Manipur National Front, told the Meiteis that Vaishnavism had led to their downfall by teaching them to abstain from meat, wine and war. That they had a glorious past, but that now they had to play second fiddle to the tribals and the mayangs. This organisation wanted the Meiteis to go back to their pre-Hindu religion, Sanamabi, so that their martial qualities were revived. They formed various armed groups which openly advocated the secessions of Manipur from the Indian Union. The chief among them were: People's Liberation Army, a Maoist organisation led by Biseswar Singh, the People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak, the Red Army and the Revolutionary People's Front, formerly known as the Armed Revolutionary Government of Manipur. All these organizations were banned by the Centre on 26 October 1979 under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967. By, June 19.81, the People's Revolutionary Party was believed to have
272
Regionalism
273
disintegrated but the People's Liberation Army remained, and in cooperation with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland it resorted to violent activities to pursue the secession of Manipur from the Indian Union. It served "quit Manipur" notice on nonManipuris, attacked them and killed many civil Government officials and the security force. The Meitei organisations indulged in acts of looting and intimidation of civil population and maintained contacts with foreign countries who assisted them with money, arms and training. Their rebellious activities were not new, but were rather a continuing process, but they got a new momentum in late 1970 and early 1980 because of "utter neglect" from New Delhi. Unemployment among the educated youth, widespread corruption in administration, non-implementation of development project and, above all, the "loss of Meitei identity" were the factors that led to the resurgence of secessionist stir in Manipur. That stir got support even from Chief Minister Rajkumar Dorendra Singh who described it as good and national. Unrest in Tripura Another state of the north-east where regionalism was witnessed was Tripura. During the 1970s, the tribals there agitated for their rights and privileges as original residents of the state, because they were reduced to a minority with the migration into their state of thousands of Hindu Bengalis from East Pakistan. The situation was worsened because a Bengali organisation by the name Amra Bengali" resisted the attempts of the Government to improve their lot. The CPM Government of Nripen Chakravorty, which first came into power in December 1977 and then again in January 1983 as a result of elections for the 60-member state Assembly, offered to the tribals an autonomous council, but it was not accepted to them because the powers that were proposed to be conferred upon it were much less than what they had been aspiring for. They set up the Tripura Upajati Jaba Samiti to fight for their cause. A militant organisation, known as Tripura Sena, was also organised, and in collusion with the Mizo National Front it carried on acts of terrorism and armed rebellion inside Tripura, for the
formation of an independent state by force. The tribals killed hundreds of Bengali immigrants (500 were assassinated in one day on 13 June 1980) and the Bengales assaulted the tribals and destroyed their hearths and homes as-and when possible. The anti foreignism became the main theme of the tribal movement, because the tribals felt that after the independence of the country they had become a minority in their own land, and that while "outsiders" had occupied the more fertile and developed lowlands they continued to live in dispersed villages in the forests and hills which covered the major part of the state. The "anti-foreignism" in Tripura was supported by similar movements in other parts of the north-eastern region. Unrest in Meghalaya Meghalaya was another state of the north-east region where an alarming situation developed in the later months of 1979. There, the agitation was directed not only against immigrants from Bangladesh but also against all non-tribal people, mainly the Bengalis. The hostility between the tribals and non-tribals often dubbed as "outsiders" was even sharper in Meghalaya than anywhere else in the, sensitive north-east, with the possible exception of Tripura. The non-tribal people from other states were evicted from their homes, and their names were removed from the electoral registers, on the pretext that they were not Indian citizens. The cause of unrest was a feeling of neglect by the authorities in New Delhi. The prevailing sentiment was: "The rest of India does not see us. If seen, we are not recognised. If recognised, we are not remembered. And we are not heard." An attempt was made to divert the unrest along constitutional lines. General election for the 60-member state Assembly was held on 17 February 1983. Twenty-five seats were won by Congress (I), 15, each by the Hill State People's Democratic Party and the All Party Hill Leaders Conference, 2 by the Public Demands Implementation Convention and 3 by independents. After all the principal parties had claimed the right to attempt to form a government, a coalition agreement was apparently reached between the HSPDP and the APHLC to constitute a new Meghalaya United Parliamentary Party, with B.B. Lyngdoh as leader. He was
274
Regionalism
275
sworn in as Chief Minister on 2 March 1983. A rival coalition known as Meghalaya Democratic Front was formed by Captain Sangma with Congress (I) support and from others and he replaced Lyngdoh on 2 April of the same year. The state began to move on the lines of parliamentanimism and the anti foreign stir subsided, at least for the time being North-East as a Whole in Crisis As discussed above Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram comprising the north-eastern region of India were in the midst of turmoil. The war-cry changed from place to place. In Assam, the rumpus was over the issue of "foreigners", and the wan posters there screamed: "Indians go back". In Mizoram, where the outlawed Mizo National Front had taken up arms to achieve its goal of "independent" Mizoram, hen was let loose on the "vais" or "outsiders". In distutbed Manipur, a sustained drive was made to get rid of "mayangs" of "aliens". In strife-tom Meghalaya, the ultras day in and day out chanted: "Meghalaya for Meghalayan Tribals", and the slogan was raised "kill "the Bengalis". The "chief of the Public Demands Implementation Convention, Martin Narayan, justified the killing for "self-preservation". In Nagaland, the hostile Nagas carried on insurgent movement for secession from the Indian Union at regular intervals. In Tripura, the disgruntled tribals, led by B.K.Rankhal, rallied under the "Banner of Tripura Tribal National Volunteer Force, to carry on their armed crusade against the 12 lakh Bengali settlers from erstwhile East Pakistan who had made them a minority in their own homeland. Arunachal Pradesh bordering China was the only territory to have eluded the contagion of rebellion, but it too had an unstable polity. Towards the late seventies an underground organisation of rebels called "NAMMAT" comprising the five states and two Union Territories of the north-east region was formed with headquarters in northern Burma with the objective of setting up an independent federal state in the region. The chief of this organisation was T. Muivah who had been, at one time, ousted from the leadership of the underground Naga organisation. Two other organisations called-the "Seven Units Liberation Army" and
the "United States of Assam" were formed with the object of creating an independent state in the region through armed rebellion. In addition, the" Amra Bengali" and the Anand Marg circulated pamphlets and leaflets calling for "Bengalisthan". The secessionist elements in all the five states and two Union Territories were, it was alleged, receiving military training in Burma and China. The pamphlets being circulated stressed the need for the "formation of a secret society at different levels with underground headquarters under a single leadership-with strict discipline, code and conduct". For a time, it appeared as if the whole of the north-eastern region was going to break away from the Indian Union; although that did not happen. DEMANDS FOR SEPARATE STATEHOOD Reorganization of States Another manifestation of regionalism in the postIndependence era as the demands in several parts of the country for separate statehood. The framers of the Constitution had abolished the then-existing designation of the constituent units, namely Provinces, and styled them as states. The states were classified into three categories as set forth below. In category were included the formerly-known Governor's Provinces. These were Assam, Bihar, Bombay, Madhya Pradesh (formerly Central Provinces), Madras, Orissa, Punjab (formerly East Punjab), Uttar Pradesh (formerly United Provinces of Agra and Oudh), and West Bengal. The former Princely states were included into category B states. These were Hyderabad, Jammu and.Kashmir, Madhya Bharat, Mysore, Patiala and East Punjab States' Union, Rajasthan,-Saurashtra and Travancore-Cochin. These were either big Princely state that survived the process of integration of states formed by the merger of about 275 smaller Princely states. Formerly known as Chief Commissioner's Provinces comprised the C category of states. These were Ajmer (formerly AjmerMerwara), Bhopal, Bilaspur, Coorg, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Kutch, Manipur, Tripura and Vindhya Pradesh, about 6 Princely states were merged into these states.
276
Regionalism
277
Apart from these categories of states there were territories specified in Part D of the First Schedule of the Constitution. These were Andaman and Nicobar islands. The states in A and B categories were almost identical in status except that while the former were headed by a Governor the latter were headed by a Rajprimukh. Category C states were placed under the direct control of the Union Government and were administered on a unitary basis. In regard to Andaman and Nicobar islands the Union Government exercised not only complete executive authority but also legislative power. The disparity in the status of the constituent units of the Indian Union was incongruous, but this was allowed to continue because at the time of Independence there existed three categories of administrative units, namely Governor's Provinces, Chief Commissioner's Provinces and Princely states, and the framers of the Constitution were involved in more urgent and complicated tasks, and they wanted to take up the issue of reorganisations of the constituent units at some appropriate time. The three-tier classification was not made by the British rulers on any rational or scientific basis, but was, rather, the consequence of circumstances attending the growth of. British power which took more than a hundred years. Whenever some fairly large territory was acquired or annexed a separate administrative unit was formed with some minor adjustment with other Provinces. This was largely done from political, military and economic considerations. Ideas of ethnic or linguistic homogeneity hardly influenced the decision of foreign masters in this matter. Once the Republic had been founded in 1949-50 the people began to clamour for linguistic homogeneity, and the state of Andhra was formed, more or less on linguistic basis, on 1 October 1953. This was given the status of 'A' class state. Realising that the issue of reorganization of states could not be postponed for long the Union Government set up, in 1953, a Commission, known as State Reorganisation Commission (SRC). After considering all the relevant facts the SRC recommended that the constituent units of the Indian Union should be classified only into two categories: (a) "states" forming primary constituent units having a constitutional relationship with the Centre on a federal
basis. These units should cover virtually the entire Country, and (b) "territories" which for vital strategic or other considerations could not be joined to any of the states and should, therefore, be Central1y-administered. The SRC suggested that the "Territories" might include the existing category C' states that were not to be merged and category' territories. These "Territories", it was proposed, should be represented in Parliament, but there should be no division of responsibility in 'respect of them. "Democracy in these areas," the SRC observed, "should take the form of the people being associated with the administration in an advisory rather than a directive capacity." Keeping in view' the recommendations of the SRC, Parliament passed, in April 1956, the States Reorganization Bill, and the states were reorganised, largely on the basis of language. The distinction between category A and B states was ended, and category C states were abolished. Some of them were merged into the newly-created states and others were re-designated as Union Territories. The number of states after reorganisation was reduced to fourteen. These were Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Bombay, Kerala, Madhya Pral1esh, Madras, Mysore, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Jammu and Kashmir. The Union Territories after the reorganisation of states were: Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Tripura, Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands. When after the military action Goa, Daman and Diu were taken over by India in December 1961, Parliament passed, in March 1962, the Goa, Daman and Diu (Administration) Bill, and the former Port1,lguese possessions were made a Union Territory. As a result of Agreement on 21 October 1954, between Indian and French Governments the fQur former French settlements(Pondicherry, Karaikal, Mahe and Yanam) were ceded to India in May 1956, although the de jure transfer took place a little later. These four settlements were unified into one under the name of Pondicherry, and this was added to the list of Union Territories. Afier the reorganisation of Punjab in November 1966, Chandigarh city was also made a Union Territory. Thus, the number rose to nine.
278
Regionalism
279
Demands for Further Reorganisation of States The reorganisation of states on linguistic basis did not solve the problem finally; it, rather, made it more complicated. The aspirations of people in several parts of India for a separate political entity got a new impetus, and in order to satisfy those aspirations they began to organise agitations and campaigns. The first such development took place in the state of Bombay. Bifurcation of Bombay The SRC had recommended that Bombay should remain a bilingual state, that the Gujarati-speaking states of Saurashtra and Kutch and Marathi-speaking districts of Hyderabad should be incorporated in Bombay, and that the, Marathi-speaking district of Madhya Pradesh should form a Separate state to be known as Vidarbha. These recommendations were adopted after prolonged controversy except that the Marathi-speaking districts of Madhya Pradesh were added to Bombay and not made a separate state of Vidarbha. This settlement aroused bitter opposition and violent rioting by supporters of Marathi and Gujarati states took place in Bombay city and Ahmedabad on several occasions during 195556. In Bombay city and Maharashtra both the left and right wing opposition parties united, on the eve of second General Election, in the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti to advocate a separate Maratha state with Bombay as its capital. In Gujarat, a similar alliance, Mahagujarat Janata Parishad, was formed to agitate for a separate Gujarati state. As a result of the acyvities of both of these organisations the Congress Party, which stood by the SR'C recommendations, lost many seats in the Lok Sabha and the state Assembly. Chief Minister Y.B.Chavan made efforts to bring about "emotional integration" between Maharashtrians and Gujaratis, but his efforts bore no Fruit. In August 1956, the Congress Working Committee approved a proposal to divide Bombay into two states. The dispute whether Bomber city should-be included in a Maratha or a gujarati state (which was the main factor leading to Union Government's decision in 1956 in favour of a bilingual state) was settled by a compromise solution. It was mutually agreed that Bombay would become the capital of the Maharashtra state and she would
contribute towards the cost of building a 'new capital for Gujarat. The Union Government decided to bifurcate the state. On 8 March 1960, the Bombay Reorganisation Bill providing for division of the bilingual state from 1 May 1960 into Marathi-speaking and Gujarati-speaking, states to be known as Bombay and Gujarat was placed before the Assembly pnor 'to its submission to Parliament. It was passed three days later. 'The Lok Sabha adopted it on 19 April, and Rajya Sabha on 23 April. Two days later, the Bill received President's assent. The new states came officially into being at midnight of 30 April 1960. Now, the number of state became fifteen. When on 1 December 1963, the state of Nagaland (to which reference has been made already) was created the number of states went up to sixteen. Demand for Separate Vidarbha State As stated earlier, the SRC had recommended that the Marathi speaking districts of Madhya Pradesh should be formed into a separate state of Vidarbha. But this was not accepted by the Central Government, and those districts were formed part of the state of Bombay. The people there felt aggrieved, but they were offered by the Bombay Government certain assurances that their interests would be well safeguarded. When in 1960 a proposal for the bifurcation of Bombay was under consideration the demand for the creation of separate state of Vidarbha was revived. Some Congress MLAs from the Nagpur area strongly demanded the formation of Vidarbha. They were influenced in their views by dislike of the declined political importance of Nagpur which until 1956 had been the capital of Madhya Pradesh. Many other Congressman expressed the opposition to this demand. On 4 December 1969, the Congress Working Committee adopted a resolution opposing the formation of a Vidarbha state, but recommending that adequate arrangements be made for the protection of Vidarbha's interests and the status of Nagpur. As a result, the Government of Bombay gave an assurance, on 14 March 1960, that the state Government would move to Nagpur for a definite period every year, that at least one session of the Assembly would be held there every year, that a separate development board would be set up for Vidarbha,.and that expenditure on development in the different regions would be in
280
Regionalism
281
proportion to their population. This did not satisfy all the people of the Vidarbha region. They formed Nag Vidarbha Andolan Samiti to campaign for the creation of Vidarbha state. On 30 March 1961, serious rioting and violence took place in and around Nagpur. The police had to open fire and several lives were lost. But with the lapse of time the movement for Vidarbha subsided, although casual demands continued to be made from time to time. Bifurcation of Punjab The Punjabi-speaking people of the state of Punjab, mainly Sikhs, under the leadership of the Akali Dal, demanded a separate Punjab i-speaking state and the Hindus, under the leadership of the Jan Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha and the Arya Samaj urged the union of Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Patiala and East Punjab States Union into a "greater Punjab" containing a Hindu majority. Both sides resorted to agitation, violence, strikes, demonstrations and fasts sometimes "fast unto death." The Centre did not concede their demands. Sant Fateh Singh, leader of one of the two factions of the Akali Dal, held out a threat that if by 25 September 1966 the demand for a Punjabi-speaking suba were not conceded he would burn himself to death. The situation in Punjab became very tense. Apprehending a danger to the integrity and security of the country, the Centre decided, on 1 November 1966, to divide Punjab on linguistic lines. The Punjab i-speaking districts formed the state of Punjab; seven Hindi-speaking districts formed the state of Haryana, and the Hindi-speaking hilly areas of Punjab contiguous to Himachal Pradesh were transferred to that state. The number of states now went up to seventeen Reorganisation of Assam The state of Assam, with Burma on its east and East Pakistan on its south, contained elements, apart from the Mizos and the Nagas, that clamoures for a separate political entity. First among them were non-Assamese tribal people living in the areas of Garo, Khasi Jaintia, and the Mikir and north Cachar. They formed the All-Party Hill Leaders Conference (APHLC) and demanded a separate hill state. The Union Government agreed to reorganise Assam on a federal basis. Under this arrangement, a limited
number of essential subjects of common interest were to be assigned to the regional federation, and the functioning of the rest of the subjects was to be left to the federating units. The APHLC agreed, OR f8 January 1967, to accept this proposal, but shortly after, the Assam Pradesh Congress Committee expressed its disapproval of the arrangement and took the view that the hills and plains of Assam were closely interlinked that the existence and development of the one without the other was impossible, and that their separation would jeopardize the security and defence of the area. This made the APHLC rigid, and it revived demand for a separate hill state. In December 1967, an announcement was made by the APHLC that if the Union Government failed to announce proposals for the reorganisation of Assam in the Budget session of Parliament, its members would resign from the Assam Legislature. This was not done, and on 25 May 1968, nine APHLC members of the Assembly representing the Khasi-Jaintia and Garo Hills resigned..on 9 September, complete harta/ was observed in Shillong (the capital of Assam which was situated in the Khasi Hills area) and the non-violent agitation spread to other towns. Two days later, the Union Government agreed to create the autonomous hill state in Assam, and in late April 1969, Parliament passed the Constitution (Twenty-second Amendment) Bill, authorizing the Government to do so. In December of the same year, Parliament adopted the Assam Reorganisation Bill, and on 2 April 1970, the hill state, known as Meghalaya, was inaugurated by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. This was an autonomous state within Assam, and was provided with its own Legislature and Council of Minister. But this did not satisfy the aspirations of the people, and on 30 September 1970, the Meghalaya Assembly unanimously resolved to request the Union Government to convert the autonomous state into a full-fledged state. This demand was eventually conceded in January 1972. This raised the number of states to eighteen. The reorganisation of Assam, however, was not complete. The Bengali-speaking people of the Cachar Hills of Assam complained that their rights and interests were not safe in the
282
Regionalism
283
hands of the Assam Government which, they alleged, was not providing adequate facilities for the study of Bengali in educational institutions. They, therefore, demanded a separate state, of their own. The move became quite strong, particularly among the "young blood" during early 1973. But the Union Government turned down their demand and told them that they should learn to live with the rest of Assam. Demand for Bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh The States Reorganisation Commission had recommended in its report in 1955 that the multi-lingual-state of Hyderabad should be broken up, and the Kannada-speaking areas thereof should be merged with the state of Mysore and the Marathi-speaking areas with the state of Bombay. The Commission had also recognised, that there were strong arguments in favour of the union of the Telugu-speaking-area of Hyderabad state (known as Telengana) with Andhra in a single elugu-speaking state, but it did not suggest that step immediately because of the existence of a feeling among the people of Telengana that they might be "swamped and exploited" by the more-highly educated people of Andhra. The Commission, therefore, had recommended that Telengana should be a separate state, but that a provision should be made for its union with Andhra after the third General Election "if a twothirds majority of the Legislature of Telengana expressed itself in favour." But the Union Government decided to unite Telengana with Andhra, of the ground that resultant uncertainty would retard Telegana's economic development. As a condition for union the Congress Party leaders of Andhra and Telengana concluded in 1956 the following accordingly (i) all members of the state Assembly from Telengana region would form a Regional Committee to deal with matters relating to that region; (ii) the entire revenue from Telengana would be spent on the development of that region, of course after meeting its proportionate share of the common expenditure of the state of Andhra Pradesh; (iii) the recruitment to government posts in Telengana region carrying a salary of up to Rs 500 a month would be made for five years only from among the persons who had lived in Telengana for at least fifteen years; and (iv) when the chief Minister of the state came from Andhra
the deputy Chief Mjnister would be drawn from Telengana and vice versa. On the basis of this agreement, the state of Andhra Pradesh was reformed on 1 November 1956. But the agreement did not work were, and the people of Telengana began to express their dissatisfaction and resentment. Voices were raised throughout the 19608 that they should be separated from Andhra Pradesh, and a separate state of Telengana should be created. The students of Osmania University coming from the Telengana region developed an apprehension that they would not be able to complete successfully with Andhra students, and that their future employment opportunities would be jeopardised. In January 1969, they launched an agitation demanding that the' agreement of 1956 should be implemented "fully and sincerely." At first, the agitation was generally peaceful, but later on it became violent. The then Chief Minister, Brahmanand Reddy and 44 MLAs announced that all Andhras appointed to posts reserved for the people of Telengana would be immediately transferred to Andhra region, and all the vacancies thereby occurring would be filled by qualified candidates from Telengana, and that the revenue surplus from Telengana would be utilized only for the development of that, region. Following this announcement, the agitation for a separate state of Telengana was called off. When the families of Andhra civil servants returned from Telengana the students of Andhra launched a' counter agitation. With this, the Telengana agitation also revived. The Telengana leaders formed a. Praja Samiti to press their demand for a separate state. The situation became so tense and menacing that troops had to be called in-to maintain peace and order. An announcement by the Prime Minister: on 26 March 1969, that steps would soon be taken to redress-the grievances of the Telengana people, had no effect, and the movement for the bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh became violent, leading to the destruction of government property, firing by the police on unruly mobs and the arrest of hundreds of people including the TelenganaPraja Samiti (TPS) Chairman, Madan Mohan. A number of prominent Congressmen announced their support for the separatist movement.
284
Regionalism
285
On 11 April, the Prime Minister announced an eight-point programme to assure that the pace of development and expansion of employment opportunities would be accelerated, but this had no effect, and the TPS leader, Mrs. T.N. Sadalakshmi, declared that the agitation for a separate state would continue. On 26 May, t I TPS launched a nonviolent civil disobedience campaign. The Congressmen of Telengana held a convention on 1 June, supported separation from the Andhra, seceded from the Andhra Pradesh Congress Committee, and formed an independent Telengana Pradesh Congress Committee (TPCC), with Konda Lakshman Bapuji as its President. Mr. M. Chenna Reddy assumed the chairmanship of the TPS. The Bharti.1a Kranti Dal and the separate state of Telengana and the local units Of the SSP, PSP families Republican Party took active part in the agitation The Communist Party of India and the CPM opposed the demand.,: Some university professors, retired civil' servants, a former Chief Justice of the Hyderabad High Court and some businessmen submitted 'to the Governor a memorandum protesting against "the repressive measure of the state Government to crush the Telengana movement" and emphasizing that "either separation nor a united Andhra Pradesh, should be imposed on an unwilling people. They demanded that President's rule should be promulgated in Andhra Pradesh and thereafter the peoples' wish whether they wanted separation from or unity with Andhra should be ascertained. Eight Ministers in Brahmanand Reddy's Government, who came from the Telengana region, resigned, and said that they would work among the people "in order to create a psychological climate conducive to achieving full integration of the two regions of Andhra Pradesh." The Chief Minister also placed his resignation in the hands of the Congress Parliamentary Board, so that the whole issue could be examined dispassionately and freely. In the meantime, the agitation-closure of business, demonstrations, strike, destruction of property and police firing-continued unabated. On 6 August 1969, Home Minister Chavan reiterated the Government's intention not to split Andhra Pradesh to create a separate state of Telengana. Shortly after this, Brahmanand Reddy withdrew his resignation from the Chief Ministership.
These two developments cast gloom in the TPCC circles, and it directed its thirty-five MLAs and twelve MLCs to withdraw their support from Reddy's Government. Union Defence Minister, M.R. Krishna, Parliament member Akbar Ali Khan, and a labour leader, G. Sanjiva Reddy, sought to bring about a rapprochement between the TPCC/TPS and Andhra Pradesh Government leaders, but both sides stuck to their positions. In mid-November 1970, a TPS candidate, Madan Mohan, defeated a Congress Party candidate, V.P Rejeshwar Rao, in the Siddipet by election. The candidate of the Communist Party of India that stood for a united Andhra Pradesh gave a very poor account. In the wake of this victory, TPS leader M. Chenna Reddy urged the Union and state Government leaders "to read the writing on the wall and to concede the demand for a separate state of Telengana." But the Prime Minister, rather curtly, that Andhra Pradesh would not be bifurcated. In late December 1970, President Giri dissolved the lok Sabha and ordered fresh election. Apprehending that the indignant TPS might tilt the balance in favour of the Opposition parties Indira Gandhi offered new proposals to it, and invited Brahmanand Reddy and TPS leader Mr. M. Chenna Reddy for talks on the basis of her proposals. While TPS leader insisted on a firm assurance on the future status of Telengaria and demanded that Congress should nominate all the 14 Lok Sabha candidates from Telengana. On the advice of the TPS, the Chief Minister told the Prime Minister that the "separatists" should be given no quarter, and that the Congress should fight them in the election. The talks ended in fiasco. The TPS contested the election on the basis of a separatist programme and won ten seats. Thereafter followed tortuous negotiations between Mrs. Gandhi and TPS leader Chenna Reddy, and eventually a "sixpoint" agreement was reached. The TPS agreed to merge itself with the Congress. The Prime Minister was authorised to review the situation after three years and to decide conclusively whether there should be a separate Telengana. The other provisions of the agreement provided that the Telengana Regional Committee would be accorded statutory status, that the constitutional validity of the "Mulki Rules" on employment opportunities for the Telengana
286
Regionalism
287
people would not be challenged, that separate five-year plans for the Telengana region would be drawn up, and that a person from Telengana would become the Chief Minister. According to this agreement, Brahmanand Reddy resigned from Chief Ministership and P.V. Narasimha Rao occupied this office. Many in the Telengana region apprehended in the wake of this agreement that TPS led by Chenna Reddy might sabotage their fight for a separate state of Telengana. On 10 January 1971, they formed a rival TPS with Satyanarayan Reddy of the Samyukta Socialist Party as their leader. While the former TPS came to terms with the reality of the post-election situation; the latter TPS continued its fight, though on a low key.. It was lent support by the Organisational Congress, the SSP, the Swatantra Party. On the eve of the fifth General Election to state Assemblies in March 1972 the. rival TPS passed a resolution stating that nothing short of separate statehood for Telengana would satisfy the people there. When in 1956, Telengana region of Hyderabad was united with Andhra to form Andra Pradesh the "Mulki Rules" were retained, though in a modified form, to ensure that the higher educational standards prevailing in Andhra did not place Telenganas at disadvantage in competing for employment These 'Rules' had been introduced in 1919 by the Nizam of Hyderabad, and government posts and admission to educational institutions were reserved exclusively for persons who had been born in the state or who had lived there for 15 years. Although 85 per cent population of the state of Hyderabad was Hindu all important posts were held by the Muslims. The original purpose of the "Mulki Rules" was to discourage Muslims of other areas from moving into Hyderabad state to take advantage of that situation. Violating the "six-point" agreement, some people from the Andhra region challenged the 'Constitutional validity of the "Mulki Rules", and the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the "Mulki Rules" were unconstitutional, as they violated Article 16(2) of the Constitution which stated that no citizen shall be ineligible for any public employment on grounds of, inter alia, residence. On appeal, the Supreme Court held, on 3 October 1972, that the "Mulki Rules" were covered by Article 35(b) (which laid down that any law in force immediately before the commencement of the Constitution
relating to, inter alia, any requirement as a residence within a state as a condition for employment by that state Continued in force until altered, replaced or amended by Parliament) and, therefore, demanded valid' even after the formation of Andhra Pradesh. As Hyderabad city, the capital of Andhra Pradesh, was in Telengana the Supreme Court ruling implied that all the posts in the state secretariat, including those of Judges, might be held only by people born in Telengana or who had lived there for 15 years. In November 1972, an agitation for the abolition of "Mulki Rules" commenced in Andhra, and the students took the leading part. They demanded that Andhra should be made a separate state. The situation became very grave and the army had to be called in to assist the civil authorities in maintaining order. On 27 November, Mrs. Gandhi put forward a compromise plan whereby-(a) the "Mulki Rules" would apply only to nongazetteed and junior posts; (b) in the secretariat and the office of heads of department of the state Government the Rules would apply for filling the second vacancy in every unit of three vacancies in non-gazetted posts; and (c) they (Rules) would cease to operate in Hyderabad after 1977, and in the rest of Telengana, after 1980: "Mulki Rules" Bill, incorporating these provisions received President's assent on 30 december 1982. This Act evoked strong opposition.on both'Andhra and Telengana, the people in Andhra demanding the abolition of "Mulki Rules" and those in Telanngana insisting on their enforcement. Seventy-three of the 141 Congress MLAs from Andhra demanded the separation of Andhra from Telengana, and they, as well as 11 Congress MPs from Andhra, called on the people to paralyse the government by refusing to pay taxes. They launched a violent agitation, and the state administration virtually collapsed. In view of this situation Chief Minister Narasimha Rao submitted, on 17 January 1973, the resignation of his Ministry on the advice of the Central leaders. On the following day, President's rule was promulgated in the state in a bid to prevent bifurcation of the state and 1to restore law and order. The Assembly was suspended and not dissolved. This was done in the hope that agitation and violence would end, and it would become possible to revive the popular rule. Rao's exit did not stem the agitation.
288
Regionalism
289
On 21 January, Congress leaders of Andhra decided to resign from the party, and declared that if by 5 February, a separate Andhra state was not formed "a revolution unprecedented in history" would take place. On the same day, the Congress leaders of Telengana formed the Congress Forum for Separate Telengana to work for immediate separation from Andhra. The agitation in both the regions became widespread and violent. In order to suppress these activities the Union Government deployed a battalion of Central Reserve Police, and according to the allegation of G. Larchanna, Chairman of the Praja Parishad and a member of the Central Action Council which was spearheading the separate Andhra agitation, about 300 persons were shot dead. Although violence subsided the separatist movement continued. On 1 February 1973, Larchanna warned the Centre that if a separate state of Andhra was not formed "the mass upsurge would snowball into a larger movement in Andhra seeking separation from the Indian Union." He also declared that the issue of separation was "not negotiable." Apprehending lest the situation should deteriorate beyond control the Central Government began to work for a negotiated settlement. After protracted talks spreading over a period of six months a six point formula was devised. This was as under: (1) "Mulki Rules" and Telengana Regional Committee will go. (2) Local candidates will be given preference for direct recruitment to non-gazetted posts, and the same course will be followed for the posts of tehsildars junior, engineers and civil assistant surgeons and jobs under the local bodies. (3) A high-powered tribunal will be constituted to deal with services' grievances. (4) A state-level planning board with sub-committees for different backward areas will be constituted. (5) A new Central university will be established at Hyderabad to augment existing educational facilities, and preference will be given to local candidates for admission to educational institutions. (6) The Constitution will be amended to the extent necessary for implementing the above points.
Both sides did not change their basic stand, namely the bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh, but they considered the formula as the best "under the circumstance." Leaders from both sides endorsed the formula and a climate for the restoration of popular rule was created. Since Narasimha Rao was not able to end violence and the state had to be brought under President's rule it was thought necessary to replace him by another more-widely acceptable Chief Minister. But the Congress Legislature Party was not able to agree upon the issue of leadership. On 1 December 1973, it adopted a resolution, unanimously authorising the Prime Minister to select a leader. Her choice fell upon J.Vengal Rao who had been the Home Minister in the Brahmanand Reddy's Cabinet and Industries Minister in the Government of Narasimha Rao. 'On 10 December 1973, he and a 15-member Council of Ministers were sworn in, and the ll-month old President's rule in Andhra Prapesh ended. Shortly thereafter, the Union Government introduced in Parliament the Constitution (Thirty-third) Amendment Bill to give constitutional authority to the six-point formula. It was passed by the Lok sabha on 18 December. The House also passed the Bill to provide for the repeal of the "Mulki Rules." The problem appeared to have been resolved. But the sixpoint formula did not work to the satisfaction of the separatists in Telengana. They formed the Telengana Rights Protection Committee for the purpose of restarting a campaign for the creation of a separate state of Telengana. This Committee held on 21 July 1974, a one-day convention which adopted a number of resolutions. The main resolution said that the convention believed that the' future of Telengana lay in the realisation of its demand for a separate identity. It also said that while the government and politicians might "indulge in unscrupulous political games" the public would continue to strive for a separate state. It warned the Central Government that if early steps were not taken to fulfil the aspirations of the Telengana people they would be "constrained and forced to take steps to usher in Telengana' state" and the Centre would be responsible for the consequences. Although no such steps were initiated the separatists in Andhra Pradesh continued to give vent to their feelings of unhappiness and dissatisfaction.
290
Regionalism
291
Separate Statehood Demands in Other Parts of India A new form of regionalism which came to the fore in the 1970s was the demand for separate statehood in several states of the Indian Union. The Assam Plains Tribals demanded a separate Union Territory for themselves. The told the Prime Minister, on 20 December 1973, that the Assam state Government was persistently oppressing the tribals, and that it was impossible for them to live under the Assamese. The people of the former princely state of Mysore demanded separation from the Karnataka districts. The hilly region of Kumaon and TehriGarhwal in Uttar Pradesh aspired for a state of their, own. BKD leaders Charan Singh and the Jan Singh leaders demanded, from time to time, the bifurcation of UP in three states. Such a step alone, they said, would lead to the development of the people inhabiting the largest state in' the country. On the eve of General Election for the Legislative Assembly of UP in February 1974, eight hill districts Uttar Kashi. TehriGarhwal, Chamoli, Pithoragar, Almora, Naini Tal and Dehra Dunin a communication to the chairman, Delimitation Committee, demanded more seats. It was argued that the UP hill people had suffered from chronic maladies due to inadequate representation in law-making bodies. The ascension of Janata Party into pqwer in March 1977 revived the demand of these districts for an Uttarakhand, on grounds that the development of their region had been neglected. A remark by Jayaprakash Narayan in November 1977 favouring smaller states gave a fillip to divisionists everywhere. The "westerners" wanted an "Agra" or a "Meerut" state, with claims to Dehra Dun or a "Braj" state with parts of Rajasthan; the mid-westerners clamoured for Rohilkhand; the south-westerners said they must.have a Bundelkhand with some districts' of Madhya Pradesh; the southeasterners demanded a trans-Vindhya state; and finally the easterners agitated for a "Bhojpur" state.consisting of parts of Uttar Pradesh and western Bihar, with Varanasi as its capital. During 1980 and early 1981, the Gorkha League representing some four lakh Nepalis living in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal raised the cry for "Gorkha Land", a separate state for Nepalis, but the Central Government turned down their demand as not feasible. After a seven-year lull the hill people of Darjeeling
launched an agitation in April 1993, for the formation of a separate state for them. This was done by the Gorkha National Liberation Front. Subhas Ghesing was their leader. The agitation, however, did not get much momentum. The Tribals living in about 1,400 villages of the Singhbhum district of Bihar, known as Kolhans, sought to establish an independent "Kolhanistan" in the Chaibasa region of that district. In October 1987, they formed an organisation called the Kohlan Raksha Sangh to agitate for the fulfilment of their demand. Their leaders visited London, Geneva and New York to seek recognition for the "Kohlan Government" and also to seek membership of the United Nations. In November 1983, the Kohlan Raksha Sangh submitted a memorandum to the chairman of the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in New Delhi (CHOGM). The extremists among the Kohlans took to murders and abductions and both the Central and state Government felt seriously concerned about their activities. Demands for Full-Fledged Statehood Yet another manifestation of regionalism in India was the demand of Union Territories for full-fledged statehood. On 4 September 1962, the Lok Sabha, and on 7 September, the Rajya Sabha passed the Constitution (Fourteenth Amendment) Bill enabling Parliament to create local legislatures for some of these Territories. The Territories covered by this Bill were Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Tripura, Pondicherry and Goa, Daman and Diu. The remaining Union Territories-the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindive Islansd and Delhi ~ were excluded from the scope of the Bill. Those Territories felt aggrieved, and started a campaign against the discriminatory policy of the Union Government. On 28 March 1969, Minister of State for Home Affairs, V.C. Shukla, stated on the floor of the Lok Sabha that the policy of the Government was either to merge the Union Territories with the adjoining bigger states or convert them into full-fledged states "when the conditions become proper" except in those cases where it was absolutely essential to keep them as Union Territories. These exceptions, he said, were Delhi, the Andaman and Nicobar
292
Regionalism
293
Island, the Laccadive, Minicoy am;! Amindive Islands. This announcement encouraged those who had been agitating for that status for the past several years. The members of Parliament from Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Tripura and Goa, Daman and Diu, political parties in those Territories assorted that from the point of view of population and land area they deserved full-fledged statehood. The demand of Himachal Pradesh was conceded by the Union Government on 31 July 1970, and it became the nineteenth state of the Indian Union. In January 1972, the Union Territories of Manipur and Tripura were also granted the status of full-fledged states, and, thus, the number of states rose to twenty-one. The politicians of the Union Territory of Delhi also raised a cry that in view of its large population and financial viability Delhi should be made a full-fledged state, but the Union Government turned down their demand, mainly on the ground that Delhi was the country's capital, and separate statehood for it would not be in the national interest. However, in order to satisfy the aspirations for the people for participation in lawmaking the Union Government set up a Metropolitan Council comprising 56 members. This did not satisfy the Delhi political leaders, and they continued to urge from time to time that nothing short of' complete statehood would solve the problems of the people of Delhi. But the Union Government took a firm stand, and Delhi continued to be a Union Territory. After the formation of Janata Party Government at the Centre, the state leaders of this party," such as Vijay Kumar Malhotra and Chowdhry Brahm Prakash, approached the Centre for expeditiously granting full fledged statehood to Delhi. While campaigning for Metropolitan Council elections in June 1977, they asserted that if elected to power the Janata Party would persuade the Centre to fulfill the aspirations of the people of Delhi, but the authorities of the Janata Government appeared to be reluctant to concede their demand. Mrs. Gandhi's Government, formed in January 1980, was also not in favour of ' granting the status of a full-Hedged state to the Union Territory of Delhi, and Delhi continued to be a Union Territory. However, steps were taken to satisfy their aspirations in November 1993.
Demand for Bodoland An All India Union of Students and the Bodoland People's Union demanded the creation of a separate state of Bodoland. At times the agitation became violent and aggressive, but neither the Government of India nor that of Assam was willing to concede their demand. On 2~ February 1993, the three sides signed an agreement (the Tripartite Agreement) and it provided for the creation of an autonomous council within the boundaries of Assam. This council was to comprise 2,000 villages of and 38 vital departments of the state government. INTER-STATE BOUNDARY DISPUTES Maharashtra-Mysore Boundary Dispute Yet another form of regionalism was the dispute between or among states of the Indian Union. The first such dispute took place between Mysore and Maharashtra. As stated earlier, on 8 March 1960, the Bombay Reorganisation Bill providing for division of Bombay into Marathi-speaking state to be known as; Bombay and Guiarat was placed before the Assembly prior to its submission to Parliament. This led, to an intensification of the controversy over those marathi-speaking areas, including the towns of Belgaum, Nipani and Karwar, which in 1956 had been included in Mysore (where the regional language was Kanarese) and which had recently been the scene of a civil disobedience campaign organised by the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti (the alliance of Opposition parties in the-Marathi area of Bombay) in favour of their indusio!) in Bombay. On 11 March the Bombay Legislative Assembly adapted a resolution "strongly urging the Central Government to initiate immediate steps and pursue them with a view to arriving at a just and satisfactory settlement of the border." On the other hand, the Mysore Legislature adopted, on the same day, a resolution requesting the 'Central Government to reaffirm that the boundary settled under States Reorganisation Act 1956, would not be disturbed except for minor readjustment agreed to by the states concerned. The controversy dragged on. On 5 April 1966, the Maharashtra Government demanded that the areas in dispute should be merged with Maharashtra before the fourth General Election that is before
294
Regionalism
295
February 1967. A unanimously adopted resolution of both Houses of Maharashtra 4gislature warned the Union Government that the "non-fulfilment of this demand will not only prove harmful to the interests of the state but also to the unity and integrity of the whole nation." The Union Government appointed, on 17 October 1966, a one-man commission, added by a former Chief Justice of India, Mehr Chand Mahajan, to investigate the dispute not only between Mysore and Maharashtra but also between Mysore and Kerala. The then Mysore Chief Minister, S. Nijalingappa, declared that while his Government was willing to make small boundary adjustments it would not discuss the question of the Marathispeaking areas being claimed by Maharashtra. The Shiv Sena, led by Bal Thackeray, commenced a violent agitation involving virulent propaganda and physical assaults against south Indians living in Maharashtra professedly to protect the economic interest of the "native" Maharashtrians. Nijalingappa asked Maharasttra Chief Minister V.P. Naik to curb this "goondaism." The Chief Minister of Madras, Annadurai, described the Shiv Sena activities as "atrocious and barbarous." An "antiShiv Sena movement" was commenced in Madras, and the north Indian settlers there were asked quit the state. On 7 February 1969, the Shiv Sena organised an agitation again. Bal Thackeray was arrested under the Preventive Detention Act, and this made the agitators riotous. About 50 persons were killed in police firing. In the midst of this turmoil" the Mahajan Commission submitted its report. The Sampoorna Maharashtra Samiti consisting of the Hindu Mahasabha, both wings of the Communist Party of India, the SSP and the Peasants' and Workers' Party rejected the report outright, reiterated the demand that the Marathi-speaking areas of Mysore should be merged with Maharashtra, and urged that the dispute should be solved on "just linguistic principles." The Mysore leaders, including the new Chief Minister Virendra Patil, on the other hand, insisted that the recommendations of the Mahajan Commission should be implemented in toto, and that there should be no "deviation" from them. Confronted with two irreconcilable views, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi proposed that a decision in the matter be left to
Parliament. But the Mysore Chief Minister, an Organisational Congress leader, turned down the proposal. The Organisational Congress Parliamentary Party, the Mysore MPs belonging to various political parties and the Mysore state Legislators told the Centre that they would "do all within their power" if a decision were 'imposed' upon Kamataka. In the midst of accumulating pressure, the Minister of State for Home Affairs, K.c. Pant, laid, on 18 December 1970, the Mahajan Commission report on the table of the Lok Sabha. and he declared that the Government had not been able to resolve conflict and was therefore, seeking a verdict of Parliament. There was a loud uproar, and for the first time in the life of Parliament the Opposition MPs from Mysore staged a dharna inside the House. Mysore Chief Minister Virendra Patil called Pant's step "a virtual surrender to pressures from Maharashtra and Kerala," and said that "only those who cry the loudest get justice". There was mob violence in several Towns of Mysore, and the railways and other offices and establishments became the object of attack. A special session of the Mysore Assembly called in to discuss the Centre's placing of the report before Parliament, adjourned amidst dharna and uproar. A subsequent session, however, adopted by an overwhelming majority a resolution urging the Union Government to introduce a Bill in Parliament and secure its adoption for implementation of the recommendations of the Mahajan commission. Mahdrashtra Chief minister, V.P. Naik welcomed the step of the Union Government. The Maharashtrians maintained calm when the Mysoreans attacked the Marathi-speaking people and their property in the Mysore areas bordering Maharashtra. The Government took steps to see that no retaliatory activities took place against the Kannada-speaking people living in any part of Maharashtra. The Shiv Sena also behaved with restraint, even though the Marathi newspapers published provocative headlines. Parliament did not, or could not, take a decision on the Mahajan Commission report for three long years, and the people in both Maharashtra and Karnataka (new name of the Mysore state given by Parliament in 1973) became restive. Marathi-speaking people in Belgaum, Karnataka town, were attacked and humiliated by
296
Regionalism
297
the Kannada-speaking people and lot of violence and damage took place. The trouble was sparked off by certain remarks which the Minister for Municipal. Administration, B. Basavalingappa, made against the Kannada language, against Mahatma Gandhi, and against Gita and the Gods. He also spoke of "5,000-yearold injustice to Harijans." Three persons were killed in Athani town of Belgaum district on 12 December 1973, when a Kannada-speaking mob stoned the shops and houses of Marathi-speaking people and the police resorted to firing. As a reaction to this, the Shiv Sena in Bombay and other Maharashtra towns incited violence and attacks on Kannadigans. A Shiv Sena MLA, Pramod. Navalkar, threatened, on 11 December, on the floor of Assembly that "thousands of Shiv Sainiks would march into Belgaum to ensure the safety of the Marathi-speaking people" there. In the wake of this, the violence became more widespread and the anti-Kannadigan mobs attacked Udipi hotels and shops. Much damage was done to property and severed lives in both Maharashtra and Kamataka were lost when police resorted to firing to control the situation. Hundreds of arrests were made in both the states. On 16 December, Shiv Sena chief Bal Thackeray said that he would see that the entire civic life in Greater Bombay was paralysed to protest against the atrocities committed on the Marathi-speaking people in Kamataka. The Kamataka Chief Minister, Devaraj Urs, made an appeal to the Maharashtra Chief Minister to check violence on the border dispute. In the last week of December 1973, the two Chief Ministers conferred in New Delhi with the Prime: Minister and the Home Minister. Both of them stuck to their respective positions and the parleys ended in failure. The Union Government began to toy with the idea that the status quo might continue. On 25 January 1974, the Shiva Sena again went on rampage in Bombay city and looted an estimated 250 Kannadigan-run Udipi hotels, smashed the glass fronts of banks and firms and assaulted a large number of people in crowded areas. Chief Minister Urs asked the Centre to order a probe into these incidents. Relations between the two states became tense, and the 'outsiders' in both the states continued to be subjected to harassment and violence.
The Shiv Sena volunteers directed their activities against the Keralites too, although the dispute between Maharashtra and Kerala was for different reasons. The Kerala Chief Minister, Achutha Menon, wrote to the Prime Minister seeking Central intervention to secure the protection of Malayalees (people of Kerala) living in Bombay. During 1985, the Shiv Sena even talked of stopping the influx of "outsiders" into Bombay, demanded a cut off date and suggested 1972 or 1974, and it was supported by the Congress (I) Chief Minister Vasantrao Patil. This was a terribly parochial outlook and endangered the country's unity and emotional integrity. Punjab-Haryana Dispute over Chandigarh Even after the decisions of the Union Government to bifurcate Punjab into two states of Punjab and Haryana those states continued to quarrel over their boundaries and mutual relationship. They did not like the creation of common links between them such as a common Governor, a High Court and a University. On 2 November 1966, seven followers of Sant Fateh Singh resigned from the Punjab Legislative Assembly as a protest against the exclusion of Chandigarh and other Punjab-speaking areas from Punjab. The Punjab Pradesh Congress Committee President, Zail Singh, demanded the inclusion of Chandigarh and other Punjabspeaking areas into Punjab. On 5 December 1966. Sant Fateh Singh announced that he would begin a fast in the Golden Temple and.would burn him self on 27 December if the demands were not conceded by then. Six of his followers also made similar announcement. Baghwat Dayal Sharma, the then Chief. Minister of Haryana, was not willing to "surrender even an inch of its territory to anyone." On 10 December, he said that if the issue of Chandigarh was reopened the discussion would also have to embrace the Hindi-speaking areas that had been included in Punjab. The President of the Arya Samaj, Yograj Suryadev, started an indefinite counter-fast in Chandigarh as a protest against the Sants "undemocratic" action in holding out the threat of resorting to a fast. The dispute over Chandigarh continued, and efforts at different levels to solve it failed. The situation became grave involving threats, violence, strikes and demonstrations. Ultimately,
298
Regionalism
299
the Union Government announced, on 29 January 1970, that Chandigarh would be merged with Punjab, that Haryana would be compensated for giving up its claim to the city by the transfer of 114 Hindi-speaking villages of Fazilka tehsil, including Fazilka and Abohar towns, in Punjab, that Haryana would get a Rs. 20 crore grant-cum-Ioan for building up its capital within a period of five years, and that during the intervening period Chandigarh would be a Union Territory, and both Haryana and Punjab would use it as their capital. This period was also to be utilised for: (1) setting up of commission to settle the boundary claims between Haryana, Punjab and Himachal Pradesh; and (2). suitably amending the Punjab Reorganisation Act to give effect to the decisions. It was then assumed that that Act would be amended in the Budget session of Parliament (of 1971). This decision satisfied neither Punjab nor Haryana. The then Chief Minister of Punjab, Gurnam Singh, called it "preposterous, unjust and arbitrary," and the people of Haryana, probably under incitement from their leaders, resorted to hatals, demonstrations and protests. The tempers, however, cooled down with the lapse of time. But the future of Chandigarh remained in cold storage. Neither the Central Government took any step to amend the Punjab Reorganization Act nor did it set up the boundary commission. The Haryana Government did not construct a new capital; it did not even select a site for the purpose. It took the position that it did not do so because it might select a place for the new capital in an area that would come to it in implementation of the award of the boundary commission. It felt sore that Chandigarh, that was in any case to go to Punjab, was continuing to prosper and develop with the central funds while the Fazilka-Abohar region that was to come to it, was not getting even its normal share of development because the Punjab Government was not investing anything for its growth. The Haryana Government often demanded that the region be placed under the Central administration. Although' Punjab did not have any option it was unhappy over the prospect of the rich cotton-growing areas of Fazilka tehsil going to Haryana. Even with disappointment in the circles of both Governments there
were no agitations, demonstrations and strikes. The obvious reason for this was that both the states had Congress Party Chief Ministers, and neither of them was prepared to incur the wrath of the Central leadership. On 20 February 1975, Union Home Minister K. Brahmanand Reddy announced in the Rajya Sabha that Chandigarh would continue to be a Union Territory for "some time longer". Nobody talked about this issue during the period of Internal Emergency, because all Political life in the country had come to a dead end. The Janata Party 'Government at the Centre did not take any decision on the thorny issue, because it did not want to annoy the two state Governments belonging to its own party. When Mrs. Gandhi formed a new Ministry at the Centre in January 1980, the Chief Ministers of Punjab and Haryana received their claims to the city of Chandigarh, but after the formation of Congress (I) Ministries in both of these states the Prime Minister advised both the state Governments not to reopen the issue fo' the time being. The issue was reopened during the Akali Dal agitation launched in the summer of 1981 and continued thereafter. Haryana's Thrust for "Vishal Haryana" After having had a separate state of their own, a section of the people of Haryana, led mainly by Rao Birendra Singh, began to talk of Vishal (greater) Haryana, and claimed ten districts of western Uttar Pradesh and Alwar and Bharatpur districts of Rajasthan. They argued that inadequate resources, a top heavy administration and economic backwardness would retard the progress of Haryana, and if Vishal Haryana could be created the new state would become "the granary ofIndia." A separate pplitical party, known as Vishal Haryana Party, was formed to agitate for the' formation of Vishal Haryana, but the Union Government disfavoured the move, and' the efforts of Rao Birendra Singh and his followers did not bear any fruit. Inter-State Disputes on River Waters In addition to the above inter-state disputes, there were scores of disputes among the states over the sharing of river waters. The main disputes were over the water of Narbad; Krishna and Cauvery rivers. The dispute over the water of river Narbaoa was among
300
Regionalism
301
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujarat and Maharashtra. Their different points of view led to delay in the completion of vital irrigation and power projects, including the Nawgaon dam. While the shares of Maharashtra and Rajasthan were agreed upon through mutual negotiations between the Chief Ministers of the two states the claims of Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh were referred, in October 1972, to the Prime Minister "to see how far their points of view can be reconciled and how far the gaps can be narrowed." The Prime Minister was not able to give her decision, and the issue was referred to a tribunal. This tribunal also failed to find a solution acceptable to the contending parties. In early March 1975, Union Agriculture Minister, Jagjivan Ram, convened a meeting of the Chief Ministers of Rajasthan, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh and the Advisor to the Governor of Gujarat (which then was under President's rule) and they reached an accord on the construction of eight irrigation projects utilising the Narbada waters. This accord was considered as "major step forward." Another inter-state dispute was over the distribution of the waters of Krishna River among the states of Maharashtra, Mysore (Karnataka) and Andhra Pradesh. Each of the three put divergent claims. Their dispute was referred by the Central Government to a tribunal headed by Justice R.S. Bachawat in April 1969 for adjudication. On completion of its proceedings the tribunal submitted "unanimous report" to the Union Ministry of Irrigation and Power in the last week of December 1973, and the Ministry called upon the three states to draw up viable schemes for the best utilisation of the Krishna waters. While the Maharashtra Government expressed general satisfaction over the report the two former Chief Ministers of Karnataka, Nijalingappa and Veerendra Patil, expressed the view that "irreparable damage" was caused to the interest of their state by the Krishna tribunal. The Andhra Chief Minister, J. Vengal Rao, made no immediate comment on the report, but appeared to be generally unhappy. Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Kerala quarreled over the utilization of the Cauvery river waters. However, through the mediatory role of Jagjivan Ram, the Chief Ministers of these states agreed, on 29 November 1974, to the setting up of a Cauvery
Valley Authority to work out proper and economic utilisation of the Cauvery waters and its apportionment among the three states. This authority comprised technical personnel from the three states, and a representative of the Central Government was its Chairman. It was agreed that the decision of this authority would be binding on the three states. Thus, a long-standing dispute came to an end. However, it resurfaced in the later years and the disputes between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu is still not resolved. There was controversy among the states of Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, Haryana, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh over the construction and ownership of their dam project that was supposed to generate huge power and provide irrigation facilities to the states. This dam was to submerge 700 acres of land in Punjab, 12,000 acres in Jammu and Kashmir and 1,000 acres of Himachal Pradesh. The right end of the dam and 12,000 acres of the proposed 20,000 acres lake were to fall in Jammu and Kashmir. This dam was to utilise the Ravi waters and was likely to cost one hundred crores of rupees. The project continued to hang fire for several years because Punjab claimed its sole ownership. The Central Government authorities made it clear to the Punjab Government that because of the special constitutional position of Jammu and Kashmir land there could be acquired only for the Centre and not for another state. In view of this, Punjab dropped its sole ownership claim in January 1973, and the Union Government decided to set up an inter-state board comprising representatives of the beneficiary states. Agreement on the construction of Their Dam was concluded on 3 October 1977. There were many other disputes involving the distribution of the waters of other rivers, but these were of minor importance. Some of these were resolved through mutual negotiations,' and some others remained unsettled. It was worth noting that in all these cases the state Chief Ministers behaved like spokesmen of independent nations and endeavoured to obtain the maximum for their own state. It appeared as if India was a multi-national country. In early February 1981, the Government of Mrs. Gandhi, confronted with lots of other complicated problems, announced that it would not disturb the status quo unless the states concerned came up with solutions that were acceptable to them.
302
Regionalism
303
Why Regionalism Grew It would be clear from the foregoing narration that parochialism and regionalism were a conspicuous phenomenon of India's political life. It would be pertinent now to examine as to why it grew. It grew largely due to three factors. Foremost and first among these was the problem of economic and social development of the Indian society. During the days of the struggle for freedom, the people all over the country had been told by the political leaders that all their sufferings and economic hardships were the result of British rule, and that if they wanted to extricate themselves from those hardships they should unite to end that rule. Once that goal had.been reached the people, whose expectations had been roused immensely, began to feel that the removal of poverty and the eradication of their suffering was at hand. The new Constitution of the country assured the masses that the governments at the Centre and states would take steps to organize village panchayats, provide work, old age and unemployment relief, just and humane conditions of work, a living wage for workers, free and compulsory education to children and better sanitation and hospitals and would protect their religion and places of workship. By declaring India a secular State, the Constitution also guaranteed that the governments would not be influenced by religion in the determination of public policies and executive decisions. The Union Government devised Five-Year Plans, fixed priorities of the sectors of growth and laid down/ targets of industrial and agricultural production. But all these-went awry, and the people were offered nothing but disappointment, more hardships, more exploitation and more distributive injustice. Instead of caring for the interests of the country as a whole they became narrow-minded and begun to clamor for the progress of their own state or region.. Closely connected, in fact intermingled, with this was the second factor which fomented regionalism. That was the increasing awareness of the people in the more backward parts of India that they were being neglected in the matter of education and job opportunities, in the setting up of plants and factories, in the construction of dams and bridges, and above all, in the allocation
of Central funds and grants. Had there not been one-party rule (that of Congress) at the Centre and in most of the states and the Union Territories there was every possibility that the structure of India's federal polity would have tumbled down. The third factor that gave rise to regional and parochial tendencies in the country was the personal and selfish ends of the politicians. The country had hardly become independent that a naked struggle for power among them began. Beginning from the Congress Party the contagion spread to other parties. The weakening of the Central authority, and in some cases, of the state authority, was considered by the regional and state leaders of all parties as vital to enhancing their own authority and power, and they did not hesitate from propagating regionalism among the people. Moreover, the creation of more and more states means more Governors, more Chief Ministers, more Ministers and more MLAs, and these were what the politicians in India cared for. The narrow and sectarian instincts of the ignorant masses were at times stirred up by the professional politicians to serve their own narrow ends, and on minor pretexts or grounds, they got ready to break the heads of their own fellowmen and destroy their hearths and homes, sometimes in the name of community, sometimes in the name of language and very often, in the name of their region or state. The evidence of this assertion was that regional disturbances and agitations occurred only when political leaders and political parties worked up the passions of the people in that direction.
304
Democratic Decentralisation-Structure, Pattern and Trends
305
8
DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALISATIONSTRUCTURE, PATTERN AND TRENDS
INTRODUCTION The 1950 Constitution of India promoted the establishment of village panchayats but entrusted local self-government to the states. Although this directive principle was followed to some extent, it was not universally adopted. However in1992 the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the constitution gave recognition and protection to local governments. ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE The main division is between rural and urban areas. Urban local government is single tiered, with three categories of authorities: Nagar Panchayats (emergent urban areas), municipal councils and municipal corporations. There are 3,694 local government bodies in the urban sector. In the rural sector local government may be single-tiered, two-tiered or three-tiered according to state (see Table 2).14 There are gram panchayats (villages with an average population of around1,000), the panchayat samitis (around 100 villages) and the zilla panchayats (around 1,000 villages or 1,000,000 people). There are some 6,459 zilla panchayats, 5,930 panchayat samitis and 240,588 gram panchayats across India. DEMOCRATIC AND POLITICAL STRUCTURES IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT All councillors are directly elected by a first-past-the-post system. One-third of all seats are reserved for women. There are
further reserved places for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, determined by their proportion of the local population. The places reserved for scheduled castes and tribes must also adhere to the one-third allocation to women. Mayors are elected both directly and indirectly in the urban sector. Mayors and councillors are elected for a fiveyear term of office. In the urban sector there are single member wards throughout. The average number of elected members per authority is 21.15 In the urban sector, all municipalities are required to establish ward committees chaired by the local ward councillor, with the election of ward officers defined in state municipal law. These structures are consultative and also play a role in monitoring the delivery of services. They have no budget to spend. All states have legislation making these obligatory, but few have yet been established.16 Councils work within a committee system, in which councillors deliberate and report with recommendations to full council for decisions.17 In the rural sector women make up 31.3 per cent of all councillors.18 In the urban sector they make up one-third. By law it should be one-third across all local government bodies. The women members elected under the reserved places represent a ward like any other member. Six months prior to local elections, one-third of the wards are earmarked for women representatives. At the following election these wards lose their women-only status, and a further third of the municipality's or panchayat's wards are designated for women candidates only. URBAN COUNCILS The following standing committees are obligatory: finance, education, water supply and sanitation, and housing. The standing committees are deliberative bodies only. Decision-making powers remain with the full council. Councils have the discretion to establish a wide range of other committees. In two states, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh, a mayor-in-council system has been introduced. These mayors are directly elected for five years with executive powers. In other municipal bodies mayors are elected for one year at a time. In some they are elected for two years-half the full term of the council. Where there is a mayor-in-council system, a cabinet-style executive committee is appointed by the mayor.
306
307
PANCHAYATI SYSTEM IN THE RURAL AREAS The panchayats are situated in the rural areas of India. In twenty-two states there are three tiers in the panchayati system, in one (Goa) there are two tiers, and in five (Jammu and Kashmir, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland) there is one. States with populations of less than two million are not required to adopt the three-tiered system. They are not strictly hierarchically organised, rather there is a division of duties between them. There is limited coordination role for higher levels of the panchayati authorities (see Annex A). State law establishes mandatory committees; consequently this may vary from state to state. However, generally all have executive committees. The zilla parishads are required to have general, finance and audit, planning, social justice, education, health, agriculture and industrial committees. The gram panchayats have production, social justice and amenities committees. Most states provide the panchayats with little discretion to establish other committees. Councillors are elected for five-year terms. The elections for council leader can be direct or indirect, depending on state law. Honoraria are determined by the state government LOCAL GOVERNMENT STAFFING Local government staff are not recruited by a central Indian body. However in some states there is a body for recruitment, in others staff are recruited directly by the local authorities. The body responsible for recruitment is also responsible for disciplining and dismissal matters. There are a number of officers required by law in the different types of local councils, including municipal commissioner in the municipal corporations, executive officer in the municipalities, health officer and sanitary inspector. The head of the paid service is normally referred to as the chief executive officer. The staffing structure of first tier councils differs from state to state, but generally the municipal commissioner is the head of the administrative service of the municipal corporations, assisted by deputy municipal commissioners and other officers. The health officer is responsible for area health services. The staffing structures of second tier
councils (municipalities) differ from state to state, but generally the executive officer is the head of the administrative service, assisted by deputy executive officers and other officers. The health officer is responsible for health services in the municipal area. INDEPENDENT SCRUTINY Citizens' charters have been put in place in the cities. Citizens can appeal to the municipality for redress, or to the state ministry responsible for local government. DISTRIBUTION OF SERVICE DELIVERY COMPETENCE Local government is responsible for a limited number of services-water supply and sanitation, waste disposal and management, burials, street lighting and roads. More recently it has been given a greater role in economic development and, in the urban sector, has been given specific responsibility for poverty alleviation. It has a role in providing lower level education, the secondary and tertiary levels being the responsibility of the states. Local government shares responsibility for public health and environmental protection with the states. PANCHAYATI RAJ SYSTEM The Three-tier Panchayati Raj The Panchayati Raj is a three-tier system. It has Panchayats at the root or village level, Block Samitis at the Block or Tehsil level and the Zilla Parishads at the district level. In the previous chapter, you have read about the Village Panchayats, which are the basic units of Panchayati Raj. The Block Samiti or the Khand Samiti is the second layer of the three-tier system of Panchayati Raj. The Zilla Parishad or the District Council is the top layer in the threetier system of Panchayati Raj. All the three institutions together look after the needs and problems of the rural areas and they are together called the Panchayati Raj. THE BLOCK SAMITIS The Block Samitis in some areas are also called the Khand Samitis, while in others they are also called the Prakhand Samitis.
308
309
The Block Samiti is an important link between the village Panchayat on the one side and the Zilla Parishad on the other. Composition: The members of the Block Samitis are not elected directly. The Pradhans and the Panchas of the Village Panchayats within the Block choose their representatives to the Block Samitis. Besides these elected representatives, there are other members of the Block Samitis as well. They are: (i) Chairmen of the Town Area Committees and the Notified Area Committees within the Block. (ii) All the-members of the Lok Sabha, the Rajya Sabha, the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council elected from the Block concerned. (iii) If there are no representatives of women and' Scheduled Castes in the Block Samiti then these members are appointed by the District Officer concerned. There must be two women members and four members as representatives of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in a Block Samiti. The members of the Block Samiti elect a Block Chairman or the Block Pramukh and a Vice-Chairman. The Chairman or the Block Pramukh looks after the work of the Block Samiti and if the members are not satisfied with his work they have the right to remove him by passing a vote of No-Confidence against him. In his absence, the Vice-Chairman looks after the work of the Block Samiti. The term of a Block Samiti is five years. Functions: One of the main functions of the Block Samiti is to obtain money from the Government for various programmes to develop the Block. The Block Samitis also provide services of experts to village Panchayats of their area who give advice to the Panchayat Committees for their development. For this purpose, the Block Samitis have various experts such as agricultural experts, an engineer, an educational expert, a veterinary doctor and many other experts to give advice on various works of rural development. These experts frequently visit the villages and tell the people how
to get more production by using improved seeds and manures, how to improve the breed of their cattle, how to learn scientific methods of cultivation and how to make use of the different family welfare programmes. Sources of Income-Broadly, the income of the Block Samitis comes from two sources(i) Taxes, (ij) Government assistance. The Block Samitis levy taxes on lands and houses, cattle and fairs and raise funds from the village for providing them expert services. The government assistance comes in the form of grants-in-aid from the State Governments. THE ZILLA PARISHAD The Zilla Parishad or the District Council is the highest institution of the Panchayati Raj in India. Just as the Block Samitis coordinate the development activities of all the Panchayats in their areas, similarly the Zilla Parishads coordinate the activities of the Block Samitis in the whole district. Composition: The composition of the Zilla Parishad is somewhat similar to the composition of a Block Samiti, though on a bigger scale. It is composed of the following members: (i) The Chairmen of the Block Samitis in the district. (ii) Members of the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha represent the district. (iii) Members of the Vidhan Sabha and Vidhan Parishkd from the district. (iv) Representatives of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. (v) Representatives of women. The Zilla Parishad elects its Chairman and a Vice-Chairman. The Chairman presides over the meetings. The Zilla Parishad and the Block Samitis appoint different committees for efficient and smooth functioning of various 'programmes. These sub-committees are composed from among the members themselves to look after such developmental works as education, sanitation, public health, agricultural production, finance, social welfare and family planning.
310
311
The Government appoints a Secretary of the Zilla Parishad who is a permanent employee of the Parishad. He maintains records and accounts. Functions of the Zilla Parishad: The Zilla Parishad is the apex organisation of the three tier system of Panchayati Raj. Its main function is to help the village panchayats and the Block Samitis and to coordinate their work. It also gives advice to the government on the work of the Panchayats and the Block Samitis. It prepares plans for the comprehensive development of the whole district. It takes steps to increase agricultural production and to improve sanitation in the rural areas. It constructs good roads in villages. Implementation of five-year Plans and other plans for rural development are the responsibility of the Zilla Parishad. Sources of Income: Its main sources of income are the following: 1. Financial grants from the Government. 2. Rent from the property owned by the Zilla Parishad. 3. Taxes levied on properties and fairs, etc. SIGNIFICANCE OF PANCHAYATI RAJ The Panchayati Raj has many achievements to its credit: (1) The Panchayati Raj system has brought about political awakening in rural India. (2) The Panchayati Raj has brought the government close to the people. (3) The Panchayats have succeeded in improving the condition of their respective villages by taking up welfare activities. (4) Primary and adult schools run by the Panchayats have spread literacy and education among the rural people. (5) The Panchayats have succeeded in drawing the attention of the government officials to their problems. Gram Sabha Gram Sabha is a body consisting of persons registered in the electoral rolls of a village or a group of villages which elect a
Panchayat. A vibrant and enlightened Gram Sabha is central to the success of the Panchayati Raj system. The year 1999-2000 has thus been declared as the "Year of the Gram Sabha". State Governments have been urged: o To vest in the Gram Sabha, powers on the lines envisaged in the Provisions of the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996. o To make a mandatory provision in the Panchayati Raj Act for holding Gram Sabha meetings throughout the country on the occasion of the Republic Day, Labour Day, Independence Day and Gandhi Jayanti. o To make a mandatory provision in the Panchayati Raj Act specifying separately, the quorum for Gram Sabha meetings, for ordinary meetings, meetings convened for special purposes and re-convened meetings due to cancellation of and earlier meeting for want of quorum. o To make members of the Gram Sabhas aware of their powers and responsibilities with a view to ensuring mass participation, particularly of the hitherto marginalised, groups, such as women and SCs/STs. o To lay down procedures for the Gram Sabha to effectively carry out social audit of beneficiary oriented development programmes of the Ministry or Rural Development, particularly the legal powers of the Gram Sabha to order recovery or punishment for financial mismanagement. o To evolve a plan of action for generating wide publicity for Gram Sabha meetings. o To evolve guidelines/procedures for holding Gram Sabha meetings and a model list of business for such meetings. o To generate awareness as to the rights of the Gram Sabha with respect to control over natural resources, land records and conflict resolution. The Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, 1992 envisages empowered Panchayats as institutions of selfgovernment at the village level capable of: o Planning and executing village level public works and their maintenance.
312
313
o Ensuring welfare of the people at the village level including health, education, communal harmony, social justice particularly gender and caste based discrimination, dispute resolution, welfare of children, especially the girl child. The Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, 1992 also envisages empowered Gram Sabhas as the Parliament of the People at the grassroots level to whom the Gram Panchayats are solely accountable. Office Bearers of the Panchayats Village Pradhan or Sarpanch: The members of the Village Panchayat elect one of their members as Sarpanch or the Pradhan who is the Head-Panch or the President of the Panchayat. It is his duty to call the meetings of the Panchayat and to preside over these meetings. The Panchayat Secretary: the District Magistrate or the Deputy Commissioner appoints The Panchayat Secretary. He is a salaried officer who maintains the records and the registers of the work done by the Panchayat. He also prepares accounts, etc. He is a permanent employee. Generally, he looks after the work of two or three Panchayats. Functions of the Village Panchayat The functions of a Village Panchayat can be divided into two categories: (i) Essential or Compulsory, and (ii) Optional or Voluntary. Essential or Compulsory Functions: The essential or compulsory functions of the Village Panchayats are as follows: 1. Construction and maintenance of village roads and waterways. 2. Construction of culverts and roads. 3. Planting of trees. 4. Construction and repair of village wells and tanks. 5. Provision of clean drinking water. 6. Provision of lights on roads and streets.
7. Sanitation and public health. 8. Supervision over the work of the government servants such as the Patwari, the Lekhpal, the police constable, the chowkidar, the vaccinator or the peon, and to report any complaint against them to the higher authorities. 9. Supervision of the Primary Schools. Optional or Voluntary Functions: The optional or voluntary functions of the Panchayats are as follows: 1. Management of hospitals and maternity centers. 2. Management of village markets. 3. Management of veterinary hospitals for the treatment of cattle. 4. Supply of good seeds and fertilizers. 5. Organizing recreation and entertainment programmes, such as Akharas, or village sports. 6. Opening and maintaining libraries. 7. Holding of village fairs. Sources of Income: For all these functions, the Panchayat needs money. The various sources of its income are the following: 1. Taxes on houses and shops. 2. Taxes on fairs and markets. 3. Fees realized from registration of sale and purchase of cattle. 4. Income from the sale of public property. 5. Government grants The Nyaya Panchayat Generally, there is one Nyaya Panchayat for three or four villages. Each Village Panchayat elects some members to the Nyaya Panchayat. No person can be a member of both the Panchayat Samiti and the Nyaya Panchayat at the same time.
314
315
The Nyaya Panchayats can hear only such petty cases as tress pass, minor thefts and other cases of simple nature, whether civi I or criminal. They can impose fines up to one hundred rupees. If a party is not satisfied with its judgement, it can go in appeal to the High Court. The \ ~yaya Panchayat cannot send a person to prison. The establishment of the Nyaya Panchayats has a great significance for the poor people because they save them from undue expenditure and litigation on minor disputes. The cases tried by these Panchayats are decided quickly and there is little chance of misleading the panchayat by telling lie Panchayati Raj Institutions since 1959 As the working of Panchayati Raj Institutions since 1959 has been argued as successful in a few states and a failure in most of the states. It means that the system has been experiencing ups and downs. Although, the concept of Panchayati Raj is a State subject but basically each state is free to evolve its own system depending upon Local needs, circumstances administrative conveniences and experiences. With the result, we have a variety of Panchayati Raj institutions with all kinds of combinations and permutations. In fact, their success or failure depends upon their structure, powers, function leadership, finances and state control. In a big country like India, changes in different aspects of these bodies have been taking place as per the changing circumstances. Although the whole activities of Panchayati Raj institutions are broad based but their resource base are very weak. As things stand today, the local economy is very weak which indicates that Panchayati Raj Institutions have very limited scope to impose taxes in their jurisdiction. Introduction of Panchayati Raj was hailed as one of the most important political innovations in independent India. It was also considered as a revolutionary step. Panchayati Raj is a system of local self-government where in the people take upon themselves the responsibility for development. It is also a system of institutional arrangement for achieving rural Development through people's initiative and participation. Panchayati Raj involves a three-tier structure of democratic institutions at district, block and village
levels namely, Zilla Parishad, Panchayat Samiti and Village Panchayats respectively. These institutions are considered as training ground for democracy and gives political education to the masses. These institutions were established in 1959 based on the philosophy of decentralization 4 and gram swaraj. Rural development plans and programmes are implemented at this level so that fruits of development can accrue to the community directly. Both the Central and State Governments have appointed several Committees and Commissions for reviewing5 and recommending reforms to strengthen Panchayati Raj during the last three decades. Panchayati Raj that emerged in the states is substantially in tune with Balwant Rai Mehta team recommendations though there are distinguishing differences from state to state. Another Committee of Panchayati Raj appointed by the Central Government under the Chairmanship of Shri Ashok Mehta in 1978 is very important as it reviewed the system of Panchayati Raj in different states in the country and recommended a different structure of Panchayati Raj. Starting with Rajstahan several states introduced Panchayati Raj in quick succession. In a handsome tribute, Prof. Maddick 7 describing the Mehta report "as an outstanding document and model of the way in which the growth of democratic institutitons in the country one of vital importance. while inaugurating Panchayati Raj at Nagour, Rajstahan on October 2, 1959, Nehru 8 said with understandable enthusiasm, "we are going to lay the foundation of democracy or Panchayati Raj in India,". The focus was still on community projects and N.E.S and he thought that the reason for slow progress was dependence on official Machinary, a situation which would be remedied, by Panchayati Raj. At a Seminar in Jaipur in Dec, 1964 Balwant Rai Mehta clearly stated that community development is the object, the purpose, and Panchayati Raj is the instrument for implementing the programme. The draft fifth plan stated "The basic concept behind establishing Panchayati Raj was to create rural local self government agencies reasonable for discharging certain selected
316
317
functions pertaining to development. Panchayati Raj is the instrument of community development, the apparatus of rural local self government a means of reorganising district administration not adequately people oriented in its traditional form and an agent of state government for certain purposes. After the death of Nehru both national and inter national problems, and understandable anxiety over performance on the development front; served to weaken this faith and Panchayati Raj came under attack. During that time Hanson clearly stated, "if Panchayati Raj was to function effectively, within a reasonably short span of time, as a development institution, its introduction had to be accompanied by revolutionary changes in the social and economic structure of the village. However, a little later, Panchayati Raj is hailed as the most important political invention of independent India, because through it, the massess of Indian people are beginning, for the first time in their history, to experience the realities of democracy, in however, contradictory of distorted form. Process of Decline After the mid sixties, the process of decline started. In many states a tendency to postpone the Panchayati Raj elections indefinitely was noticeable. In some states, parallel bodies came to be set up at the district level, thus reducing the role of Panchayati Raj in development planning & implementation. Main Problems Started with great hope and enthusiasm some of the major problems and short comings that devoted in the working Panchayati Raj institutions can be identified as: (i) Election not being held on a regular basis. (ii) Lack of adequate transfer of powers and resources to Panchayati institutions. (iii) Lack of Panchayati Raj bodies to generate their own resources such as tax on sale land. (iv) Non-Representation of woman and weaker sections in the elected bodies.
Revival of Panchayati Raj The G.V.K. Rao committee 10 appointed by the Planning Commission in 1985 to review the existing administrative arrangements for rural development strongly recommended for the revival of Panchayati Raj institutitons all over the Country & highlighting the need to transfer power of state to democratic bodies at the Local level. The government of India their set up committee in June 1986 headed by L.M. Singvi. To prepare a concept paper on the revitalization of the Panchayati Raj institutions, the Committee recommended that the Panchayati Raj should be constitutionally recognized, protected and preserved by the inclusion of a new chapter in the constitution. It also suggested a constitutional provision to ensure regular, free and fair elections for Panchayati Raj institutions. Accepting these recommendations of the Committee the central government headed by late Rajiv Gandhi brought in the Constitution 12 64th amendment Bill which was passed by the Lok Sabha on the 16th August 1989. This was comprehensive Bill covering all vital aspects of PRI 'S. Unfortunately, this Bill could not be enacted as it was not approved by the Rajya Sabha. In the year 1990, the issues relating to strengthening of Panchayati Raj institutions were considered afresh and based on detailed discussions in the Cabinet committee set up for this purpose. It was considered that a constitution Amendment Bill may be drawn up afresh. The matter was brought up before a Conference of Chief Ministers held in June, 1990 presided over by the then Prime Minister. The Conference endorsed the proposals for the introduction of Constitution Amendment Bill and also the model guidelines with the modification that the number of tiers in the Panchayati Raj structure, may be left to be decided by the State governments and the arrangement for conduct of elections for PRI's may also be left to be made by the state themselves. The Constitutitons Amendment Bill and model guidelines were approved by the Cabinet in July 1990 and it was decided that there should be a Common Constitution Amendment Bill both for PRI's and Urban Local bodies.13 Further modifications were made in the Bill on the basis of the discussions with the leaders of various political parties.
318
319
73rd and 74th Constitution Amendment perspective & Rebirth of Panchayati Raj: The Constitution 74th Amendment Bill introduced in the Lok Sabha on September 7, 1990 it could not however, be taken up in view of the political changes. A Comprehensive amendment was introduced in the form of Constitution Seventy Second Amendment Bill 1991 by the then government. The Constitution 72nd Amendment Bill was passed in the Lok Sabha on Dec. 23, 1992. 73rd Amendment Act 1992 has came into effect from April 24, 1993. The Constitution 73rd 14 Amendment Act 1992 indicates states to establish three tier system of strong viable and responsive panchayats at the Village, intermediate and district levels. The Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act, 1992 and the Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992 have added new Parts IX and IX A to the Constitution. Under these two parts, we have as many as 34 new articles-243 to 243ZG-and two new schedules viz. schedules 11 and 12. The 73rd Amendment gives constitutional recognition to the Panchayats and the 74th Amendment to the Municipalities. Thus, to the Union and the States, a third tier of governmental instrumentalities has been added. There is nothing entirely new about the institutions of Panchayats and Municipalities. Both these have existed for long. There were local self government and Panchayati Raj laws in many parts of India. But, unfortunately these institutions were not able to function satisfactorily for any length of time. Often, they stood superceded. Despite the Gandhian approach of treating the villages as units of polity and Gandhi's love for Panchayati Raj institutions, Dr. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly did not favor them and even said some very harsh things like their being dens of corruption, localism, backwardness etc. Finally, as a compromise or a concession to Gandhi's views, article 40 was included under the non-enforceable Part V on the Directive Principles of State Policy. It said that the state shall take steps to organize Village Panchayats and endow them with necessary authority "to function as units of self-government". Hardly any attention was paid to article 40 until Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi took serious interest and initiative to bring forward a constitutional amendment. It was, however opposed on grounds
of its being an effort to reach the Panchayats directly, bypassing the States. The amendment finally became a reality during Narasirnha Rao's time. The seventy-third and seventy-fourth constitutional amendments have made some fundamental changes in our political structure and in the status of local institutions. These institutions now have constitutional protection. The two amendments provide for the state legislatures making their own laws under the constitutional provisions for establishing Panchayats, Municipalities, etc. and conferring on them such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of selfgovernment. In every State, a threetier system is envisaged. Panchayats are to be established at the Village and district levels and at the intermediate level. States which have a population of less than two million, need not have the intermediate level Panchayats. The important thing is that now Panchayats have to be elected directly by the people in the same manner as members of the popular houses at the Union and State levels are elected i.e. through territorial constituencies. For a Village Panchayat, the electorate would be the Gram Sabha which would consist of those registred in the electoral rolls. These Panchayats cannot remain superceded for long; fresh elections would have to be held within six months of the dissolution of a Panchayat. Secondly, in all panchayats, seats would be reserved for women, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. There shall be a fixed five year term for all Panchayats. They shall have their own budget, power of taxation and list of items in their jurisdiction. In their respective areas, the Panchayats shall be able to formulate their own development plans and implement them. Every State shall have a State Election. Commissioner for conducting Panchayat elections and I every five years a State Finance COmp1ission shall be constituted to take stock of the economic condition of the Panchayats. Similarly, in the 74th Amendment, there are provisions for the setting up of Nagar Palikas and Nagar Panchayats. In the matter of reservations, elections, power of taxation, formulation and implementation of development projects, constitution of a Finance Commission, fixed term, etc., the provisions are very similar to those in the 73rd Amendment in respect of Panchayats
320
321
Under the distribution of legislative powers between ! the Union and the States, local government in both rural and urban areas has been in the exclusive State List. As it is, all the Statessome reluctantly-have already passed legislation as required under the new constitutional provisions. Elections to local bodies have also been held in almost all the States. Bihar is an exception. Also; the 73rd and 74th Amendments do not apply to the States of Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Jammu and Kashmir, the Union Territory of Delhi, hill areas in Manipur and Darjeeling in W. Bengal. Also, these do not apply unless extended to Scheduled Areas and Tribal Areas under article 244. The Constitution (Eightythird Amendment of the year 2000 has added a clause to article 243M to provide that reservation of seats for the Schduled Castes under article 243D shall not apply to the State of Arunachal Pradesh. It was hoped that the new Panchayats and Municipalities would begin a new era of real representative and participatory democracy with nearly three and a half million elected representatives-one third of them women-involved in the business of governance all over India thereby bringing power to the people where it belonged.As things stood, matters causing some concern were: (i) The Constitution (87th Amendment) Bill, 1999 introduced by the Minister for Rural Development on 16 December 1999 seeks to amend article 243 C of the Constitution with a view to give discretion to State Legislatures to provide that all the seats in panchayats at the intermediate and district levels shall be filled by persons elected as Chairpersons at the village level panchayats and intermediate level panchayats and also to provide discretion in the manner in which the Chairpersons of the panchayats at the intermediate level or the district level have to be elected as has been allowed in case of panchayats at the village level. The Amendment Bill followed a request contained in a resolution passed by the Andhra Assembly. The pending Bill is being used as an alibi for postponing elections to the district and intermediate level panchayats. (ii) The Area Development Scheme which places at the disposal of every member of Union Paliament a sum of
Rupees two crares every year for being spent in his! her area on his/her recommendation on items mentioned in the guide list. There are similar schemes placing funds at the disposal of MLAs at the level of States. All the Items on which these large funds can be spent at the discretion of MPs and MLAs are covered by the eleventh and twelfth schedules of the Constitution listing schemes to be entrusted to the Panchayats, Municipalities etc. The Area Development Schemes and the like are tantamount to legislators' foray into the area of executive functions. Secondly, this may seem to be an affront to and a violation of the federal scheme as also of the basic spirit of Panchayati Raj institutions. (iii) Much can be said for and against the ex-officio membership of local Lok Sabha members and M.L.A.s on the district and intermediate level panchayats. (iv) The ground realities indicate that, for their own reasons, those elected to Parliament and State Legislatures-the M.P.s, M.L.A.s and M.L.C.s-have not (v) The details of functioning of the Local Government institutions are largely left to the initiative of the State Governments and are to be settled by them. The States have passed vastly varied laws according to their own perception of what and how much can be devolved on the local authorities. While the States naturally want the Union to transfer more of effective legislative, executive and financial powers in wider areas to them, the question is to what extent they would be themselves willing to decentralise further down and share effective power with local self-government institutions. So far as the 73rd and 74th Constitution Amendments are concerned, these do not themselves confer any powers on panchayats and Municipalities Reservation for Woman in Panchayati Raj Institutions The Constitution 73rd Amendment Act in order to revive the existing Panchayati Raj system due to its structural and functional inadequacies has made mandatory on the part of the states that they would reserve a minimum of 30 per cent of seats to woman
322
323
in their Panchayati Raj institutions so as to involve actively in the decision making process. In accordance with the 73rd Amendment 33 per cent of seats have been reserved for rural woman in the Panchayati Raj Institutions. The Statutory reservation of seats for woman in Panchayati Raj bodies has provided an opportunity for their formal involvement in the development and political processes at the grass root level thereby to enabling them to influence the decision making process in the local governments. Implications of constitutional 73rd & 74 Amendment: The 73rd & 74th Constitutional Amendment 16 has been made to many weakness. It has certain features which are binding on the state legislature where they can go to discretion: I. Constitutional Status to Panchayati Raj Institutions. II. Reservation of Seats for Weaker Section of Society. III. Direct Election of Panchayati Raj, every five years at all levels. IV. Finance Commission to be set up by State Government to devolve funds and suggest ways of financing V. Election Commission at State Level to Conduct Panchayati Raj Elections. All these elected bodies have now, been in position for more than five years. It is thus, important to verify whether the aims and objectives of the Constitutional amendment and the aspirations generated by it have been met and if so, to what extent. Various discussions, debates, conferences are being organized to see and many issues are debated for new experience. Panchayati Raj Institutions I. Devolution of finances to PRI's bodies. II. Exercise of Power and responsibility by Panchayati Raj Institution. III. What has been the impact of the reservations especially for woman and to what extant this has helped the weaker section of society. IV. Whether the PRI's in the new set up have improved their position regarding devolution of powers and financial resources in view of setting up State Finance and Election Commissions.
V. What sort of training and orientation 18 would be required for the newly elected Panchayati Raj bodies. In a net-shell the 73rd Amendment had aroused a lot of expectations and it is to be expected that it would usher Panchayati Raj Institutions in a new and dynamic role. The PRI in the district comprises of one Zilla Parishad at the district level, 7 Panchayat Samitis/ 4 Block Advisory Committee (BAC) at the Block level and 155-Gram Panchayats/ 167 ADC Villages at the village level. The Chief Executive Officer (DM & Collector) Zilla Parishad, Additional Chief Executive Officer (ADM & Collector) Zilla Parishad and Secretary Zilla Parishad (Member Secretary) are the Official Members in the Executive Committee of Zilla Parishad. The Executive Officer (Block Development Officer) Panchayat Samiti and the Secretary (Panchayat Extension Officer-Member Secretary) are the Official Members in the Executive committee of the Panchayat Samitis. It consists of 21 directly elected members and 24 Ex-officio members. The Chairman of the different Panchayat Samitis/ BACs of the district, the MLAs elected from the constituencies falling under District and MPs of the two parliamentary constituencies constitute the Ex-officio members. All the Panchayat Samitis in the district is being constituted from 22 directly elected members and 29 Ex-officio members. Each Panchayat Samiti and Zilla Parishad consist of 7 Standing Committees. (i) Finance, Audit and Planning Committee (to be known as Finance Committee). (ii) Education, Environment, Cultural, Health and Sports Affairs Committee (to be known as Education and Health Committee). (iii) Communication, Rural Electrification and nonconventional Energy Committee (to be known as Works Committee) (iv) Industries including Cottage Industry and Sericultlural Committee (to be known as Industries Committee). (v) Social Justice Committee. (vi) Agricultural, Food, Irrigation, Cooperation, Fisheries and Animal Husbandry Committee (to be known as Agriculture Committee).
324
325
(vii) Poverty Alleviation Programme, Social and Farm Forestry, Rural Housing and Drinking Water Committee (to be known as Poverty alleviation Committee). The number of members to be elected for each standing committee and the Zilla Parishad has been notified by the State Government. The Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti and the Sabhadhipati and the Sahakari Sabhadhipati of the Zilla Parishad are the Ex-officio members of the Standing Committees of the Panchayat Samities or the Zilla Parishad as the case may be. Also, the Chairman of the Panchayat Samiti and the Sabhadhipati of Zilla Parishad shall be the President of the Standing Committee in Finance, Audit and Planning of the Panchayat Samiti or the Zilla Parishad, as the case may be. In case of Hrishyamukh Panchayat Samiti and Amarpur Panchayat Samiti, a member of the Panchayat Samiti other than the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman shall be eligible to serve on maximum 3 Standing Committees. In case of other Panchayat Samitis, no member other than the Chairman and the ViceChairman shall be eligible to serve on more than 2 Standing Committees. Similarly, in case of DTZP, no member other than the Sabhadhipati and the Sahakari Sabhadhipati shall be eligible to serve on more than 2 Standing Committees. The Ex-officio members of the Panchayat Samiti or Zilla Parishad could be elected as Members and Presidents of Standing Committees of Panchayat Samiti or Zilla Parishad, except, as the President of Standing Committee for Finance, Audit and Planning. The elections of the members of the Standing Committees and their respective Chairmans and Vice Chairman's are to be held after every 2 years for Panchayat Samiti and 5 years for Zilla Parishad. Project Director DRDA, District Panchayat Officer, District Planning Officer, Deputy registrar of Co-operative Societies, Development Officer Institutional Finance, District Statistical Officer, Lead Bank officer, Senior Deputy Collector looking after Revenue Section of the Office of the DM & Collector and a nominated Professor/ Assistant Professor of Economics are the Official Members of the Finance Standing Committee. The Official Members of Education and Health Standing Committee comprises of Chief Medical Officer, Deputy Director
of Education, District Level Officer from Science and Technology Department, Assistant Director of ICAT Department, Deputy Director of Physical Education, District Inspector of Social Education, one nominated Headmaster and Representative of the Ramkrishna Mission. The Official Members of Works Standing Committee comprises of Superintending Engineer (PWD), Superintending Engineer (Electrical), District Level Officer of the Science and Technology Department, Executive Engineer RD Department, Senior Deputy Collector looking after Development Section of the office of the DM & Collector and the Executive Engineer (PWD) from different Divisions of the district. Project Director DRDA, General Manager District Industries Centre, Officer-in-Charge of the Cluster Constituted for development of Sericulture and Handloom of the District, Representative of KVIC and the Assistant Marketing Officer / Assistant Development Officer of THHDC LTD constitutes the Official Members in Industry Standing Committee. District Tribal Welfare Officer, any Member of the Mahila Commission, District Inspector of Social Education, Representative of State Social Welfare Board for the district and representative of the Ramkrishna Mission constitutes the Official Members in Social Justice Standing Committee. The Official Members of Agriculture Standing Committee comprises of Senior Collector looking after the Food and Civil Supplies in the office of the DM & Collector, Executive Engineer of concerned MIFC Division, Deputy Registrar Cooperative Societies Deputy Director of Agriculture, Horticulturist, Deputy Project Officer (Soil Conservation), Deputy Director of Fisheries and the Deputy Director of Animal Resources Development. The Official Members of Poverty Alleviation Standing Committee is constituted of the Conservator of Forest, Additional District Magistrate & Collector, Project Director DRDA, Executive Engineer RD Division, Deputy Director of Fisheries, Horticulturist and the Executive Engineer PHE. The Gram Panchayats in the non-tribal areas and the ADC villages in the tribal areas are directly responsible to the villagers for all the development activities of their electoral constituency. The Gram Panchayat is regularly
326
327
conducting Gram Sabha, a forum of active participation by the electorates in the constituency. The following agendas are being normally laid down and discussed in the Gram Sabha: (a) Accounts of income & expenditure of the Gram Panchayat. (b) Annual Administrative Report for the last financial year. (c) Last Audit Note and resolutions regarding rectification. (d) Budget of the Gram Panchayat for the current financial year. (e) Details of the receipt of fund and developmental activities taken up and completed during the last financial year. (f) Likely receipt of fund and proposed developmental activities to be taken up during the current financial year. As per the provisions of Panchayat Act, Gram Sansad has also been constituted at the Gram Panchayat Constituency level (Wards) to involve citizens more in the development aspects of the Gram Panchayat. NEED AND IMPORTANCE OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT A local government is an institution, which is constituted to look into local problems and to provide bare amenities to the people of a village, a town or a city. A local government has a great importance of its own because of the following reasons. Firstly, local people know their problems well and hence it is only they who can solve them better by taking part in the local government. Secondly, the local people can get their work done better, quicker and cheaper at local level. Thirdly, the participation of local people in the local government generates the spirit of cooperation and hence the people readily pay their taxes. Fourthly, the local government also provides sufficient scope to the elected representatives of the local people to acquire training and experience in administration. It is interesting to note that Jawaharlal Nehru, our first Prime Minister, had worked as a Chairman of the Allahabad Municipal Committee during the British rule and acquired much experience of administration from there. Lastly, the local government also lightens the burden of the Central and State Governments.
THE STATE GOVERNMENT AND PANCHAYATI RAJ The State Government has been given the power to pass the law for constituting the different institutions of Panchayati Raj.The State Government helps the Panchayats by giving them financial grants to carry out their plans for the village improvement. The State Government keeps a strict watch on the work of Panchayati Raj institutions and appoints a Secretary to maintain accounts and keep records of the work done by these institutions. At the district level, the Collector or the Deputy Commissioner looks after their work and coordinates the work of Panchayati Raj and the district administration. However, at the Block level, the Block Development Officer or B.D.O does same work. RELATIONSHIP OF THE LOCAL BODIES WITH THE STATE/ CENTRAL GOVERNMENT The State or the Central Government keeps some sort of control over the working of the local bodies, whether in the urban or the rural areas. In some states, there is also a Minister for Local self-government who keeps a control on these local bodies. The State Government keeps a strict watch on the finances of the local bodies. While the Government gives them grants, the State officials regularly check their accounts. The permission of the State Government is quite essential for levying any new tax or raising any loan from the public. Above all, the very life of a local body depends on the goodwill of the State Government. The State Government can dissolve any municipality or a corporation if its working is not found satisfactory. But there exist cordial relations between the local bodies and the State Government because both aim at the welfare of the people. The State Government intervenes only as a last resort when a local body fails to serve the people in a right manner. To sum up, we can say that local bodies are the most important organizations in a democracy. They not only promote a sense of cooperation among the people to solve their own common problems but also train them for higher responsibilities in State and Central Government.
328
Indian Experience with Democracy and Development
329
while the measures of land reforms were adopted at rural level; programmes of massive industrialization was launched at urban level.
9
INDIAN EXPERIENCE WITH DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT
INTRODUCTION In 1947 there was much that was old and much that was new. There was also a trauma of partition. Those at the helm had to steer between the conflicting pressure of self-reliance, defence, development and income generation for the masses. The quest for a new identity was not a simple process entailing mere political independence from foreign rule. There were the rising aspirations of the people and the knowledge that these aspirations of the people and the knowledge that these aspirations could be satisfied. At the same time was the fact that political style of Indian people, on the whole, had not been terribly ideological. It was a perfect amalgamation of ideology, culture, and historical experiences. In such milieu, with the proclamation of the new constitution on January 26, 1950, India became the largest democracy of the world. The most important task between the government was to bring social and economic changes. The government realized that this is possible only through centralized planning. It was, therefore, felt that India should endeavor to break new grounds by experimenting with economic planning under a democratic pattern of socialism. Then, though our society was highly characterised by poverty and illiteracy, our founding fathers of the constitution took courageous steps to adopt adult franchise and to follow the practise of secularism to strengthen our national unity. In economic sector,
No doubt that we embarked on the path of development in social, economic and political realm. But it seems that though the super-structure seems to have strengthened, the foundations have progressively undermined. CONFLICT BETWEEN REGENERATION AND DECAY A critical study of Indian politics over the last fifty years confirms that a lot about the 'decay' of political institutions-both formal institutions of union as well as state and informal institutions has been witnessed. Their autonomy, cooperate substance, organizational complexity, flexibility and strength, and their capacity to respond to social groups have been eroded. Decay also entails degeneration in the behaviour of individuals and groups. Corrupt, unconstitutional and willfully destructive acts have become more common among politicians, bureaucrats and others. Politics and business have acquired a common objective-the profit. Elections have become ends in themselves. The Indian leadership completely ignored, in actual practise, the need for making the democratic system fully serviceable to all sections of people. There has been a dangerous erosion of people's faith in the ability of the civil administration to deliver the goods. According to Rajni Kothari almost entire institutional order has very nearly broken down and undergone a series of changes;1. Displacement off a cabinet system by a Prime Ministerial system of governance, 2. Abrogation of Parliamentary supremacy over the executive by first permitting the brute use of party majorities by the executive wing and then undermining the simple mechanics by frequent resources to defections, 3. To erosion of the federal frame work by recourse to similar practices engineered from the very apex of the system, 4. The undermining of judicial independence and probity by executive manipulation of the concept of parliamentary supremacy.
330
331
5. The uncalled for use of presidential powers first by the PM and then by the President and 6. Above all, the systematic erosion of party system. Decay is not, however, the only trend in India's recent history. Certain countervailing trends also exit, the most important being the tendency towards political regeneration. This is the reverse of political decay. It means the restoration of the capacity of state institutions and political parties to respond creatively to social groups. According to Professor James Manor, more decay has occurred in the past years than political regeneration leading to accommodation, accountability and legal procedures, between the society and state. In his views, there are at least six types of political regeneration, some of which overlap. They are: (i) the rebuilding of decayed institutions, (ii) the creation of new institutions, (iii) the creation of new programmes which enhance the capacity of the state to respond creatively to society, (iv) the reassertion of political or legal or constitutional norms when they are in doubt, (v) processes by which an existing institution steps in to perform tasks that are supposed to be performed and may once have been performed by other decayed or incapable institutions, and (vi) processes by which an existing institution is strengthened so that it can perform tasks that no other institution has previously performed. But the process of regeneration vas eroded due to the factors such as the' failure of the party system the leadership crisis, rise of corruption in public life, on life ratio of caste politics and criminalisation of politics, the failures of mixed economy, etc. Here, the two current events, which are relevant to the 21st Century should be referred to. The first is the relentless push of the global economy and communications, supported avidly by our rapidly growing middle class, competitive markets and social democracy. This phenomenon has influenced the middle-class
values and culture leading to the homogeneous global culture. The second tendency is the growing consciousness of religious identity, which is leading to fundamentalist and separatist attitudes. The revival of religion as influenced the process of secularisation. It has encouraged conflicts, instability, divisiveness, rigidity and irrationality in Indian polity, against the norms relating to accountability, legality, peace, stability integration and flexibility. In India, the rise of tribalism ethnicity and fundamentalism seem to go against secularisation and integration. Liberalism has lost the importance. The first vision was provocatively enunciated a few years ago by Francis Fukayama, a fellow of the Rand Corporation and a US state department official. He prophesied that with the collapse of communism, and in the absence of a competing ideology, liberal democracy based on five markets would sweep the globe. As a result, the world would 'increasingly become a homogeneous middle class culture, in which there would be no place for global conflict. Opposed to this utopia is the vision of Samuel Huntington, a professor at Harward, who argues that instead of tending to a universal, homogeneous culture, the world is becoming increasingly fundamentalist and separate. He defines the post Cold War world into eight, distinct civilisations-the West, Islam, Confucian, Hindu, Japanese, Latin American, Slavic Orthodox and possibly African. He believes that civilization consciousness is increasing. And conflict between civilisation will supplant ideological conflict and become the dominate form of global conflict. Like that of the growing fundamentalist movements in Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, Confucian values or Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan, the BJP as being the largest party in India leads to the movements of Hinduism. Everywhere is the young college educated middle class professionals who seem to be most active in such movements. If the economic stagnation is taken away, illiteracy and poverty is eradicated and rapid growth is registered in the future, we have good reasons to expect that the lives of the majority in the 21st century will be freer, more humane and prosperous than in the previous decades. Ongoing institutional decay can be controlled by creativity and strong
332
333
political will by our leadership. The most devastating result of the collapse of a whole system of governance is filled by the BJP and its exhorts, providing an alternative to the system, setting the stage for virtually two-party system, though this change-over overlooks the fundamentally varied and federal framework.3 Today, by contrast, biggest vacuum is a social vacuum, because of the rise of the new social scenario and the economic challengei.e. the new rise of regionalism, ethnicity, the interplay of religion and class and the growing assertion of the Muslims and tribals. In this "vacuum", the most dismal has been the relation between Muslims and the Congress, followed by the dalits and the adivasis in the aftermath of the demolition of the Babri Masjid OR December 6, 1992. The 1991 election was an aberration, as a result of Rajiv Gandhi's assassination, in which the Congress system failed to save its demise as Churchill-was reluctant to do vis-a-vis the British Empire. PANCHAYATI RAJ INSTITUTIONS ARE STILL MISGOVERNED Fifty years after Independence, India has shown remarkable resilience in working its democratic system. What is more important is that India has now embarked upon a historic change in its institutional framework of governance after the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution. This has heralded a system of multi-level governance from the Union to the State, to the district, to the panchayat samiti and finally to the village panchayat, besides the municipal bodies. There is no other parallel in human history where over three million elected representatives operate the political system of the country including one million women. In fact, the decentralised process has been set into motion, but the structural and procedural machanisms have eroded the spirit of the 73rd and 74th Amendment Acts. Our political parties are least interested in the empowerment of citizen, especially the women class, at the local levels. They do not like to see them coming to power.. As regards to the functioning of our Panchayati Raj system, the mention of the two major social failures is important. One concerns gender inequity, i.e. disparity between women and men
and this extensive gender-based inequality can be seen even in the elementary matter of health-care and nutrition in many regions of the country. By and large, the rural Indian women today do not see their situation as one of painful inequity and do not pine for reform, even though the process of politicising of rural population has set in. They still do not value the importance of their freedom or status to their counterpart (men). The second failure relates to illiteracy prevailing in India. Since Independence in 1947, India has made a considerable progress in higher education, but remarkably little in elementary schooling. In the last census, in 1981, only 41 per cent of the adult population was found to be literate, while the proportion of literacy among women was only 28 per cent. Elementary education has never received quite importance that other social objectives have enjoyed in Indian public policy. For example, the reservation policy. Despite this, it has been observed that the Indian illiterate is not acutely unhappy about his being illiterate, and seeking education is not one of the more intense desires of the deprived Indians.4 Against this background, John Rawls's theory of justice, which has contributed greatly to radical regeneration of modern political philosophy and ethics or importance of individual freedom and safeguard the priority of primary goods, appear to have lost the meaning, because of the variations in sex, age, inherent characteristics, environmental differences, etc., that are prevailing among and within the groups of people. One of the reasons for detailment of the women's reservation Bill 1998, is insecurity among men. Men have started seeing the impact of women panchayat leaders in local bodies. Thanks to the one-third reservation for women in Panchayats, making them capable of battling age-old prejudices at home. Even then, elected Panchayat women leaders are facing unrecordable obstacles and challenges such as physical threats, harassment, character assassination from male colleagues, etc. They are sexually exploited by male officials when they approach them for work. Uncomfortable at dealing with women leaders, the BDOs or other officers often brush them off saying, 'As you are illiterate, send your husband. Likewise, in most cases a coterie of male members have conspired to bring a No-confidence motion against women
334
335
'Pradhans and Sarpanchs', threatening them to act as they (male) went to operate the accounts of Pass-books. Caste discrimination still prevails at the level of gram panchayats because of the failure of the system and proxies for men. The SC/ST women are doubly humiliated and discriminated against by their male colleagues and officials. The democratic decentralization process has taken its roots, of course, through the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments. But the ground reality is that the grassroots administration has virtually collapsed in most of the country. The administration is unresponsive to the basic needs of the masses. Fifty years after the Independence, our most villages are without the drinking water, schools without teachers and health-centres, without doctors. The bureaucracy is not prepared to hand over their powers to the elected members at the grassroots level. The interference of the state government is a constant phenomenon in the affairs of appointments, postings or transfers. Consequently, our mission to mobilise panchayats and Anganwadi's plans for the implementing of the schemes and programmes of girl-child education, eradication of poverty and illiteracy has not fairly fulfilled. The grassroots bodies, therefore, are in a shambles in the absence of the administrative and financial autonomy to be granted to them. Mass-empowerment has yet not been geared up against the trends of centralisation, casteism and feudalism. Without autonomy, no accountability can be laid down. India have some lessons to learn from the historic Scottish referendum in which Scotland's district identity and culture has been honoured in social sector against the direct control of imperial Government of England. Now Scotland enjoys full autonomy to deal with the areas like primary education, health, law and order, police system and other ethnic issues. It is a fit case of devolution against over-centralisation. IN SOCIALISM CASTEISM At a time when casteism is equated with Mandalism or Mayawati's version of Dalit liberalization, we are reminded to reconsider the thought of India's greatest socialist, Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru, whose perception of 'socialism' was perceived to be a sort
of 'secular Brahmanism' of the modem India. The recent alienation of the backward castes and Dalits from the Congress Party is, in essence, a rejection of Nehruvian Brahminism. According to Swaminathan S. Ankleswariaaiyar, (Swaminomics of the Sunday Times, November 10, 1997), the dominating castes of Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Brahmans re-attempted to keep continue the exploited masses of Dalit, Shudras, labour and artisan classes in modern India through secular socialism to carve out their share of influence. The base of it was 'power' and 'wealth' of the upper castes of Brahmins (Priests), Kshatriyas (warrior landlords) and Vaishyas (trader-money lenders). The modern India created the new class of Brahmins on the basis of the British education. His analysis is that the modern education created a new Brahminical class of the above cited castes and they paid homage to a new God called 'Socialism'. Their base was not the old caste-based Brahminism (Be it Pt. Nehru or EMS Namboodripad or Jyoti Basu, etc. who were Brahmins) but under a new secular variety of ideology. That was the situation when India became independent. The backward castes and dalits had for centuries cried out for salvation from the Thakur and Bania. And the secular Brahmin offered to be the saviour. Pt. Nehru and his socialist comrades offered a new deal to the oppressed masses through land reforms a dominant public sector, and egalitarian laws. He told the masses, 'concentrate power in our hands and we will lead you to the promised land'. He got the mandate, and so socialism arrived in India in 1950s. Pt. Nehru did not impose government's intervention on the people. The people themselves cried out for the state intervention to save them from the Bania and Thakur. Zamindari abolition gave the Shudras land, and gradually shudra castes (Yadavs, Vokkaligas, Nadars, et. al.) became dominant castes in rural areas over the whole country. New laws against untouchability and job and Parliamentary reservation for Harijans and tribals provided them some succour. So they voted the secular Brahmins back to power, repeatedly. It was irony that the socialist brand politicians of 1950s and 1960s gradually succumbed to the temptation of office, thus abandoning morality or, dharma (duty or selfless service). They
336
337
revolved around the special relationship with 'power' and 'wealth' to perpetuate the sphere of influence of masses through the electorate politics. The Nehru family background helped the Congress to alive the pattern of old casteism (Brahman) through Indianised socialism. They used increasingly controls in the holy name of socialism and created patronage networks in Indian politics, without the care of the quality of the governance. Under the impact of the reservation policy, especially after the fallout of the Mandal Commission report, these Dalit and backward classes soon realized where were they being taken for a ride. They refused to depend on them, because they saw that bad governance was there to stay. This resulted in the rise of casteist outfits like the Samajvadi Party, the BSP, Janata Dal(R), etc. in North India. Thus, casteist socialism stands altered in India and it has lost the credibility to face the effect of market economy and liberalisation. It is distressing that their Chief Ministers have not been able to address the social evils such as land reforms, child exploitation, atrocities on women, population growth, backwardness, working labour conditions, caste discrimination, etc. in the rural life, which have circumscribed our path of growth and development. It is afraid that the process of liberalization and the rise of market economy is likely to re-establish the privilege position of upper castes and their dominance over Indian politics. It is to be seen how the multitude of backward/ dalit castes will remain free from the influence of upper castes and how the dalit leadership will be able to have a social democracy in Indian political system. Mere vote-bank or reservation policy is not going to help them to solve the existing social evils. Social awareness is the only solution for which both education and development are a must. REVIEW THE RESERVATION POLICY As we have completed 50 years of Independence and we have shifted from mixed economy to the 'Democratic Capitalism' through privatisation and liberalisation based on market economy, a fresh look at the policy of reservation policy is the need of the hour. It is to be analysed whether it has yielded the desirable
results and to rationalise it for the benefit of those for whom it was claimed to be implemented. The fruits of reservation are being reaped only by the second generation of those who themselves had availed its benefits and are well to do. These people are depriving the really downtrodden for whom the policy was intended. There is no justification for giving reservation benefits to the children of those who have already improved their lot. Instead, the benefit should be passed on to their other, less privileged, brethren who really need it. Lok Sabha Speaker P.A. Sangma has rightly pointed out that the reservation policy has blunted the competitive edge of students from the north-east. It is time to review reservation in scientific and technical fields and in the matter of service promotions. The present policy is nothing but a vote-catching gimmick. It is not serving the interests of those who genuinely deserve it. Now is the time to prepare our youth to be competitive and achieve world class standards in every field rather than offer them crutches which would make them parasites on society at the tax payer's cost. Democratic capitalism does not celebrate the heroship of caste or religion based on feudal society. Instead, values, personal liberty, etc. are accorded. Therefore, India needs to prepare the ground realities for the democratic capitalist society, so that poverty can be taken away with and the mass education encouraged, especially the girl-child education, but the colonial-based infrastructure and the feudal pattern shall have to be dismantled. The objective of distributive justice and self-reliance must be kept in mind. Deng Xiao Peng's example of the People's China shifting the feudal agrarian economy into the egalitarian command economy and then partially given a liberal dose of capitalist enterprise is before us to inspire. It is known as market Socialism, thereby China is planning to meet the problem of unemployment and other social tensions. It is futile to think that reservation policy alone can emancipate the under-privileged attitude of the more advanced castes and classes. Educational facilities can help to expose social position. Social securities must be ensured.
338
339
WOMEN EMPOWERMENT The women empowerment issue has been a matter of serious debate since the UF Government mooted a plan to provide some reserved seats for. women in the Parliament and the state assemblies, notwithstanding the fact that educationally backward and politically corrupt country like ours, the plight of women, in every walk of life is the worst. We have been boasting about their empowerment. But can a handful of women solve the problems of the majority of working women? Equality for women remains a distant dream. In this context, two categories of women have made an entry into politics. First, women from well-to-do families. Second, women who have their husbands in a political party, such as Mrs. Rabri Devi. They are neither politically independent in their thinking nor socially conscious about the conditions of women in the countryside. The first priority of women legislator should be to educate women and liberate them from religious orthodoxy, ignorance, and superstition. Unless educated women come forward with honesty and sincerity to alleviate the sufferings of the poor and illiterate women, empowerment of a few women will not lead to progress. Equality can be brought about or sustained only by ensuring equal opportunities for all. Men have failed in this process. Now it is the turn of women as a class. In terms of social transformation, the role of the Supreme Court of India and its rulings in upholding the claims of the divorced Hindu and Muslim wives have been landmark to strengthen the position of women in society, vis-a-vis the existing personal laws of the respective communities. In all the rulings favouring women, the apex court has sought the application of existing legislation on gender issues and to modernize them on the basis of the principle of equality before the law. But our political parties have shown scant respect to these verdicts visa-vis the women's legal rights. Assuming the role of the Supreme Court as social reformer has evoked protest in political circles. An eventual uniform civil code, therefore, remains a distant dream in our political set-up. Women's non-violent movement can only stir a wave against the prevailing feudalism, casteism and traditionalism in society.
The status of women in society is not decided by the number of seats they occupy in the legislature. In the advanced countries like the US, Japan and Singapore where women representation is 11 %, 8% and 3% respectively. But the status of the condition of women in these countries is well and good, because of education and development. Likewise, it is also not proven that only women can strive for amelioration of the conditions of women. Mrs. Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minister of the country for seventeen years. But what did she do for enhancing the status of women is well known. Unless social attitudes towards women change radically, spurt of violence against women can not be stopped. The attitude of police personnel and judicial officers cannot be expected to be different from the very society they come from. Therefore, what really needed for women is to be educated and economically self-reliant. There is a need to have 'code of crime' against women approved by the Parliament, and job opportunities should be provided for women in the services like police and Judiciary, alongwith simplifying the procedures of system of administration of justice. For the women empowerment, I am of the opinion that grassroot women's movements in India should be synthesised with the social movements theory, development theory and theories of the State. For this, the urgent need is to mobilise resources for poor women and to facilitate their participation in the development process. With the help of the new economic policy, investment through MNCs and market economy, the leadership of grassroot activism should be linked with socioeconomic problems facing the rural India. LAW COMMISSION'S REPORT ON ELECTORAL REFORMS India has been listed as the seventh most corrupt country in the world. Even our Prime Minister and politicians have acknowledged corruption at all levels, but they have been helpless to contain the fallout of it on our polity. Corruption has constituted a threat to our security concerns. Much efforts have been made for radical electoral reforms and to make elections free and fair. The nexus between corruption, criminality and politics has been exposed by the Election Commission in its statistics that 40 MPs
340
341
and nearly 700 MLAs are currently facing criminal, murder, decoity, theft and rape charges. The statement has given a clear picture of the nexus of criminality and politics. The Law Commission has proposed a sweeping set of electoral reforms, including a 25 per cent increase in the strength of the Lok Sabha and state assemblies. Another key suggestion made specifically to curb splits and mergers-is that once a member is elected on a ticket of a particular political party, he or she must remain in that party until the House is dissolved. The proposals have been made in a working paper submitted to the government by the Law Commission's chairman B. P. Jeevan Reddy to elicit the opinion and provoke a public debate on electoral systems. To prevent criminals from entering politics, the Commission recommends that those against whom charges have been framed by a court be debarred from seeking elections. Also proposed is a quantum jump in deposits to discourage too many Independents from crowding the electoral fray. The Commission has incorporated provisions of the 1990 Bill, which contained the original suggestions made by the Goswami Committee. The Commission would make its final recommendations only after getting a feedback from political parties the EC, Bar Association and eminent media personalities. The Commission proposes introduction of a "list system in addition to the existing 'first-past the-post' systems to curb the wastage of votes polled under the present system. Candidates often won with a mere 30 to 35 per cent of the votes cast, in which rest the votes cast in favour of other candidates were wasted. Surprisingly, an increase in the Lok Sabha and state assemblies is not an important as is to curb the trend of defections under the Anti-Defection law, and to prevent a flood of criminals against potential candidates on the eve of elections. The Law Commission should distinguish between non-serious rich candidates and serious poor candidates. The bounded-labour type of system should be banned and the party-system structure must be democratised under the constitutional law. It is pathetic that the government of the day appears to wish its hands off any responsibility of curbing criminalisation of politics, as the government hardly did
anything to the proposals made by the Election Commission on Sept. 16, 1997, vis-a-vis Section 8 of the RP Act, 1951. Apart from the suggestions mooted by the Law Commission, sweeping overhaul of administrative laws, as highlighted by the P.C. Jain report, is the need of the day. This Jain Commission was appointed by the Centre on May 8, 1998 to review of the existing administrative laws under the chairmanship of a former Secretary to the Union Government, Mr. P.C. Jain, and it has submitted its report on 30 Sept., 1998. Accordingly, a complete overhaul of about 1300 laws/statutes/regulations that where enacted by the British rule needs updating as per our socio-economicadministrative needs. In short, the whole police-CBI-CVC structure operating in the country needs drastic changes. There is a need to revitalise the entire criminal and civil justice system, besides simplifying the procedures and processes laws are there, but they lack teeth when they come to deal with the people in power. In India, the decay in the functioning of party system began from the day, when 'conscience vote' plea was raised. It bogged down the party discipline and split party-unity as well, thus giving importance to individual at the cost of organisation. It weakened the leadership as well as inner-party democracy. The country has political parties but lacks the institutionalised party system. Our CEC, M.S. Gill, was shocked and surprised at the role of money in the Rajya Sabha elections held in June 1998. In these elections, in the states like Rajasthan, Maharashtra and Bihar the official candidates got defeated because of the cross-voting by the MLAs, who, it is alleged, exercised their right to vote under the influence of money. It was unfortunate that, on the one hand, our political parties talk of electoral reforms in general and arresting the use of money, muscle power. On the other, parties yield some immediate benefits of such malices. Money and muscle power and the cross-voting trend can be curbed only through the modification in the existing anti-defection law, which allows floor-crossing by a group of legislators while an 1n,dividual's similar act is taken as a crime. It is like permitting decoity but making theft a penal offence. The range of the Anti Defection Act, 1985, therefore, should be extended to the
342
343
crossvoting against the official candidate's defeat. A similar restriction is also needed for Independents joining any political party. A legislator can not be allowed to make the travesty of trust saddled on him by the electorate and at the same time defy honesty with impunity.6 The campaign to get rid Parliament of criminals will be effective only if it is accompanied by a campaign to put an end to the concept of a representative as trustee. Sovereignty must reside with citizens in theory and in practice. Though this is not the place to elaborate in details the kind of changes that are necessary, methods will have to be devised to give voters a say in the affairs of candidate selection. Ideally, all aspiring candidates should be known in the constituencies they want to represent and should have the endorsement of some section of the electors there. If this necessitates smaller constituencies, so be it. All candidates, whether from 'recognised' parties or not, should have the same access to State facilities and funds; an MP must win at least 50 per cent of votes polled to get elected. Such changes will not only help end the criminalisation of politics and make difficult for elected members to ride roughshod over the constituencies interests. Also, the privileges granted to them under Articles 105(1) and 218(1) must be reviewed, in order to make them subject to the rule of law. We were shocked at the developments that took place in Oct. 1997 in Uttar Pradesh, following the split in the BSP and defections in the Congress Party that led to the formation of Kalyan Singh's coalition Government, as the loopholes of the Anti-Defection Act, 1985, were used by the BJP and all the defectors were rewarded as ministers. The Speaker too was active in the game-plan of defections. Given this background, the Act must be reviewed, the Speaker's role should be subject to judicial scrutiny and the defectors must be held disqualified under the Act the movement they change the party label. POLITICISATION OF BUREAUCRACY Notwithstanding the widespread acceptance that India has entered an era of coalition politics, and the coalition pattern has started functioning in our federal set-up, our politicians, media
and service class leadership have not yet thought of as to how to neutralise the role of the bureaucracy in this new emerging situation. One of the-reasons for a failure of coalition politics has been the deep-rooted nexus between the politicians and bureaucrats, apart from the criminal elements. This is the direct fallout of politicisation of our civil services, which was done during the hay days of one-party rule dominance in India, especially when Mrs. Indira Gandhi advocated the philosophy of committed civil service to achieve the aims of socialist pattern of the society. Each time whenever a new coalition government comes to power, many senior officials are re-shifted. This is an acknowledgement that our civil servants are really not neutral and impartial. They are compelled to be loyal to a class of political masters. The pertinent question is whether the Indian coalition politics would leave the general administration at the disposal of the bureaucracy. Since in India there are no established political parties and the politicians have their linkages with organised crimes and big houses, an amoral approach cannot be applied with the Indian bureaucracy, which deals with big" houses and organised crimes. In the wake of liberalisation movement and the entry of the multinationals, the political-cum-administrative corruption may further increase to the extent that all the existing laws would be helpless to tackle a large number of unprincipled politicians and political parties. Therefore, the basic need of the hour is how to persuade our political parties to agree to insulate the bureaucracy from corruption. They may have some lessons from the industrial democracies, which have done studies to manage and combine reasonable efficiency in administration and business transactions and to inspire adequate level of confidence in their law and order. Though political corruption and an organised nexus exists there, it is not under effective control. India's bureaucracy should be trained in new ways and means in promoting the interests of the new socio-economic situations and making its accountable for the performance. Mention may be made of the guidelines issued by the Urban Affairs Minister, Ram Jethmalani on 5th October, 1998. The purpose of the guidelines has been to make the functioning of his Ministry
344
345
as open to public knowledge and scrutiny as possible. The transparency rule says, "India today ranks among one of the most corrupt countries in the world, due to lack of transparency. Corruption can be eradicated only if people have information. Right to information is the most fundamental right in a democracy. Most of the corruption takes place because of the secrecy with which we deal with the files. There is no reason for secrecy in a department like urban affairs and employment, where files are expected to be disposed of as per laid down rules. Unfortunately, the Union Minister was locked horns with top officials of his department on the question of transparent functioning. The Cabinet Secretary Mr. Prabhat Kumar, put on hold on those guidelines Note. The relationship between bureaucrats and their top political masters came under the spotlight. They-bureaucrats and Politicians-failed to play complementary roles to each other. It is a manifestation of the growing influence of bureaucracy over politics. Because of the emergence of insecurity in the civil services for the twin menace of deteriorating performance, political instability, frequent transfers and over-politicisation, the interest group among officials continue to insist on status quo, in spite of the fact that there is an urgent need to amend the statute to redefine the relations4ip between bureaucrats and their political masters in the new political situation and to make the administration more accountable, responsive and transparent. This will, of course, help us to put a check on corruption and to arrest the fallout of politician criminal bureaucrat nexus. Similarly, the Central Vigilance Commissioner, Mr. N. Vittal, prepared the seven point code of conduct for all the Public Sector Enterprises (PSUs) officials to revamp the entire administration and to infuse faith in the public officials, or a sense of accountability. The purpose of the 'Vittal document' is to have a humane administrative system against the poor quality of governance and the issue of corruption. His strategy is to make bureaucracy accountable, transparent, honest and considerate towards the rule of law. In the opinion of the CVC, India enjoys the notoriety of being the world's ninth most corrupt country because of the following five basic factors, namely:
(1) Scarcity of goods and service; (2) Lack of transparency; (3) Delay in procedure and redtapism; (4) Cushions of safety; and (5) The tribal instinct of people belonging to an organisation or a cadre to shield the black sheep amongst them. In the CVC's view, the most common form of corruption in the government department or financial institutions is collective corruption as well as 'exploitative corruption', which help the public servants to amass wealth by harassment or by virtue of position. And the CVC, too, is a product of these corrupt tendencies, which were revealed by former Union Home Secretary, Mr. N.N. Vohra in his report on 'criminalisation of politics', apart from the strictures passed by the Supreme Court of India in certain cases of corruption. In this backdrop, the Vittal document on the Code of Conduct and ethics for our officials may find good in terms of evolving certain basic norms for a healthy bureaucracy. It is to be seen how the ethics is enforceable in letter and spirit. Attention should be drawn at the poor or the tardy performance of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), which is finding it difficult to cope with the mounting work-load trusted upon it by the courts. The present strength of this central organisation is 5,630, which includes officers and other staff. Of this strength, only 1,050 odd persons are available for investigative work, while it is work involves use of man-hours of more than its capacity. Likewise, a large number of vacancies exist within the organisation. The vacancies at various levels are: Deputy Inspector General (DIG): 39 per cent, Superintendent of Police (SP): 33 per cent, Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP): 17 per cent and 18 per cent for the post of inspector prevailed upto Sept. 1998. The new CBI Director, Tri Nath Mishra, who took charge of the agency in March 1998, has initiated several steps to expedite the precessing of cases. The agency has also sought the setting up of more special courts so that CBI cases pending in other courts are decided quickly. It has also sought better facilities, so that more trained staff could be brought on deputation. Meanwhile,
346
347
the operation of the CBI has expanded much beyond its original character. Initially, it was created under the Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, to investigate corruption in the public sector and central government offices. But over the years even criminal cases and economic offences like those in non-banking sectors, which involve interrogation of people in thousands, have been added to its responsibilities. This has left the agency short of trained manpower. I believe that the hidden cleaves in the Constitution need to be explored before we give up and talk of a 'Second Republic' or rewriting the Constitution. Instead the options constitutionally available to the President need a more searching examination. The grey areas of permissible action and inaction of the head of state need exploration and elucidation. The future of coalition governance of the country would be better served when its President performs the role originally conceived for him-not that of a mere constitutional figurehead, but that of the constitutional conscience-keeper of the nation, because our elected President represents the collective will of the people. He can and must use it to temper with occasional excesses of its representatives, which seem to be unconstitutional, improper or even morally wrong on both the occasions. Our President K.R. Narayanan received appreciation when returned the central proposals relating to the use of Article 356 in UP and Bihar for reconsideration. FORMING NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC) The 12th Lok Sabha elections have thrown up an inconclusive verdict, then we have to learn to live with the coalition government governance. In this situation, the importance to have an apex body to deal with complex security issues in a coordinated fashion, can not be underestimated. Countries like the USA, UK and several others have similar bodies for consideration of security issues. In India, the V.P. Singh Government attempted to establish "two-tier NSC," but that was a half-hearted measure, it was never set-up. The way China and Pakistan have established a missile deal against India warrants the need to have more systematic and coordinated approach between different branches of the government on national security issues. Today, both kinds of
security-internal and external, in terms of South Asia is in danger. The country cannot ignore the drug menace, environmental problems, ethno communal problems and trans-border terrorism. However, care has to be taken that it is allowed to function as a neutral and autonomous body. This has been constituted on 19th September, 1998. CONSTITUTION IN COALITION ERA Since the 1980s, there has been continuous public debate within our country about the desirability of taking a second look at the Constitution of India, in the light of the rich experience of democratic practice gained since 1947. This debate has acquired a new urgency in recent years, partly because of the instability of apex politics and partly also, because legal experts, individual politicians and organised political groups within the country feel the need for some changes in our system of governance to render it more efficient and open to popular expectations. The BJP-led government is more concerned about the days-functional of our constitutional law, and to this effect it has set-up a commission to review the working of the present Constitution, which is the part of priorities of the BJP-led National Agenda for governance. According to Dr. Subhash C. Kashyup, the achievements and the functioning of our Constitution during the last half a century are most significant, as the purpose of it to keep India united and integrated from a highly heterogeneous has been achieved. Of course, the Constitution has been the greatest force and its political system remained a vibrant. Ever since it was enacted, it has been constantly under review through judicial interpretations and amendments from time to time. Even then, the decay in the functioning of key institutions has been a matter of serious concern since the single party dominance era has eclipsed and the coalition period less emerges as the alternative of the former. No constitution thus, is 'final' or it could be 'bind down', as society changes. Given this backdrop, the Constitution of India should be amended to keep abreast and the division of responsibilities given to the Executive, Parliament and Judiciary. It should be recast to solve the problems in the new context and changes.
348
349
However, utmost care should be taken that the reforms agenda is not purloined by the professional lawyers as in the words of Nehru, India's Constitution "was purloined." The proposed review should be without any pre-conditions or pre-conceived notions in regard to desirable changes. The Commission would have to keep an open mind, actively seek and welcome all suggestions and examine them dispassionately on merits for their potential to solve existing problems. Constitution is one matter where nothing should be done in a hurry. All proposals for constitutional changes have to be made with due regard to the 'basic features' doctrine even though these have not been so far defined by the Supreme Court in any majority judgement. These are to be determined in each case on merits and for example, include the principles like sovereignty, socialism, secularism democracy and republican character enshrined in the 'Preamble'. Constitutional revision does not necessarily imply any switch-over from Parliamentary pattern to Presidential system. Other democratic options and suggestions as discussed earlier should be accepted without biasedness and put into effect. A FUTURISTIC VISION Given prognosticative analysis, India needs to re-define its goals and objectives for the next century on the long-term basis. For the task of social, economic, administrative goal setting, we have to re-look at our Constitution to remove the anomaly and the prevailing inner, contradictions in the constitutional law, which adversely affects our developmental goals. The contradiction is in between the interests of individual, group and social order. Our social and economic goals should be so set to harmonise with administrative task and responsibilities. In terms of developmental goals in the era of capitalist economy and liberalization, the various facets of economic development such as growth, GDP-GNP, per capita income, national income, growth of trade and industry, the role of public and private sectors, distribution system, etc. must be linked up with Equality, Justice and Welfare. Focus should be on removing inequity, poverty and unemployment so as to enhance societal quality. Banishing poverty must be our main goal as poverty and unemployment have causal
relation. All the developmental objectives have to have a time dimension in terms of goal achievement and their effect on society. It is distressing that after a half century of Independence and process of democratic development, we are still faced with the question of poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, very strange form of coalitional politics and government incapacitated to handle the emerging challenges. In fact, our planning policy has been based on short-term goal; it is still defective and centralised. There have been overlapping in objectives and processes, and no proper attention has been given to tribal, urban and agricultural development. Therefore, in years to come, agricultural growth, labour-intensive manufactured export and regional disparity must receive utmost attention; landlordism must go and more intensives to agriculture be given. Infra-structure development in terms of road, water for irrigation and drinking, primary health, education and facilities, schooling, power supply, etc. must receive quick attention for the 21st century. Since we have shifted from a socialist pattern to nationalisation and to liberalisation and market economy in 199091, our planning policy must be recast in terms of the people's expectations and the emerging challenges. We have miserably failed to moderate the rise of population and to build empowerment of the poor, the weak and women and to ensure their participation effectively in the growth through substantial improvement in education, skill, health and infrastructural investment. Therefore, regional imbalances still persist and the impact of Green Revolution is unnoticeable, that is per capita income and the rates of economic growth could not decline the poverty line. Providing free elementary education upto the age of 14, to all children remained an empty dream. Therefore, there is an urgent need to link our challenges with that of the new planning designs and economic policies. Since we have accepted bureaucracy an instrument in the fulfilment of our goals, it must be made autonomous and accountable, especially in Public Sector, keeping in view the global competitiveness. Red-tape system will have to be removed completely, as this factor has eroded the importance of cost; time efficiency, profitability and credibility of the civil services as a whole. Therefore, the veil of secrecy in governmental
350
Bibliography
351
functioning must be removed by transparency, openness and decentralisation. Sadly, there is an all round decay of ethics, morals and values because of the impact of westernisation. Our family-system is under severe strains. Caste and religion politics has hampered our development and growth, for which the factors like exploitation, illiteracy, scarcity, corrupt practices, excess population, poverty, etc., have been responsible. Therefore, our crucial question is as to how to ensure protection of the family as basic human and social institution for welfare, happiness and peace of individual members within the group and the society in the 21st century. If the 'family unit' is strengthened, India shall be able to preserve its cultural heritage and traditions and resist the impact of westernisation on our values, ethics and morals, which are rapidly in decay. Hence, Policy-makers must protect individual citizen interest through family group. With the help of the 'state system' and democratic processes, social security or concerns must be our vital goal in the next century. Here, the empirical studies made by Professor Amartya Sen, the Nobel Prize winner in economics in 1998, needs utmost attention. His theory of economics believes that the goal of the welfare of the poor can be achieved by the western model of economic growth. Globalisation can be a major force for prosperity only if it is backed by adequate national policies in a conductive social and economic environment; otherwise globalisation would be counter-productive for the country's economy and social security net. Our policies plans, goals and objectives should cautiously marry with the process of globalisation and liberalisation of western model. In short, our economic reforms, which are still sadly in a state of unfinished agenda, must be put in the top list of priority for our development and growth.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adam, R.: Elements of Government, New York, Random House, 1960. Ali, A.: Mandal Commission Controversy, Delhi, Ajanta Publications, 1991. Amartya Sen: Action and India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1999. Ashton, S.R.: British Policy Towards the Indian States, 1905-1939, London, Curzon, 1982. Austin, Granville: The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966. Barber B.R.: Strong Democracy. Participatory Politics for a New Age. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984. Bell, D.: The Coming of Post-industrial Society. A venture in social forecasting, New York, Basic Books, 1973. Benefits Agency: One stop. Benefits Agency delivery, Leeds, Benefits Agency, 1992. Best M.: The New Competition. Institutions of Industrial Restructuring, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990. Blau, M.: Bureaucracy in Modern Society, New York, Random House, 1956. Brierly, L.: The Law of Nations, New York, Oxford University Press, 1955. Burns D. Hambleton, R and Hoggett, P.: The Politics of Decentralisation, Basingstoke, MacMillan, 1994. Chandra, R.: Judicial System in India, Lucknow, Print House (India), 1992. Charles Howard McIlwain: Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1958. Chitta, R.: Mixo Polity and Political Modernisation, New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House PVT LTD, 1998.
352
Bibliography
353
Clarke M. and Stewart J.: The Public Service Orientation, Luton, Local Government Training Board, 1986. Cooper, T. L. : Handbook of Administrative Ethics, New York, Marcel Dekker, 2001. Datta, V.N.: Sati: Widow Burning in India, New Delhi, Manohar, 1990. Davies .A.: Telecommunications and Politics. The Secentralised Alternative, London, Pinter, 1994. Derrett, J. : Religion, Law, and the State in India, London, Faber, 1968. Donald E. : Public Personnel Management: Contexts and Strategies, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998. Doulton, A.: Government and Community Information Services, Oxford, Dragonflair and CDW & Associates, 1994. Efficiency Unit: Resource Management Systems, London, HMSO, 1995. Foreman-Peck J. and Millward, R: Public and Private Ownership of British Industry 1820-1990, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994. Friedrich, J.: Constitutional Government and Democracy, Boston, Ginn, 1950. Garrett, J.: Managing the Civil Service, London, Heinemann, 1980. Gawthrop, L.C. : Public Sector Management Systems and Ethics, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1984. Gerald, J. : Handbook of Research Methods in Public Administration, New York, Marcel Dekker, 1999. Goldman, H.: Co-ordination of Computerization of the Criminal Justice System, London, Home Office, 1986. Greer P.: Transforming Central Government: the Next Steps Initiative, Buckingham, Open University Press, 1994. Gyford J: The Politics of Local Socialism, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1985. Hammer M. and Champy, J.: Re-engineering the Corporation, New York, Harper Collins, 1993. Hans J. : Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York, Knopf, 1960. Hazard, J.N.: The Soviet System of Government, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1960.
Heimanson, Rudolph: Dictionary of Political Science and Law, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1967. James, C. : The Moral Economy of the Peasant, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1976. Jarillo, J.C.: Creating the Borderless Organization , Oxford, Butterworth-Heinemann, 1993. Jones, W.H.: The Government and Politics of India , London, Hutchinson, 1971. Keane J.: Democracy and Civil Liberty, London, Verso, 1988. Kenneth C. Wheare: Modern Constitutions, New York, Oxford University Press, 1951. Kumar, D.: Administration Report of the Political Agency, Agartala, Tripura State Cultural Research Institute & Museum, 1995. Lenneal, J. : Urban Administrators: The Politics of Role Elasticity, Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1988. Lingat, R.: The Classical Law of India, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973. Lipietz A.: Mirages and Miracles, London, Verso, 1987. Lucian, W. : Asian Power and Politics: the Cultural Dimensions of Authority, Cambridge, Belknap Press, 1985. Mackenzie, D.: Knowing Machines: Essays on Technical Change, London, Mit Press, 1996. Manpong, C. M.: District Administration in Arunachal Pradesh, New Delhi, Omsons Publications, 1993. Mary, W.: Asian Power and Politics: the Cultural Dimensions of Authority, Cambridge, Belknap Press, 1985. Michael, B.: The Politics of Succession in India, Connecticut, Greenwood, 1976. Morris, W.H.: The Government and Politics of India, London, Hutchinson, 1971. Norman, Uphoff: Local Organizations: Intermediaries in Rural Development, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1984. Peddleton, E.: Public Administration and the Public Interest, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936. Politt. C: Managerialism and the Public Services, Oxford, Blackwell, 1993.
354
Index
355
Prahlad, K.: Governance and Public Administration for Poverty Reduction, Salvador, Brazil, 1997. Riggs, F.: Administrative Reform and Political Responsiveness, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1970. Robert, T.: Practical Public Management, New York, Marcel Dekker, 1995. Rosen, P.: Societies and Military Power: India and its Armies, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1996. Rosenbloom, H. : Handbook of Regulation and Administrative Law, New York, Marcel Dekker, 1994. Rourke, E.: Bureaucratic Power in National Politics, Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1978. Scott, C. : The Moral Economy of the Peasant, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1976. Simon, D. : Public Administration, New York, Knopf, 1950. Stephen, P.: Societies and Military Power: India and its Armies, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1996. Sudarshan, R. : Human Development and Structural Adjustment, New Delhi, McMillan, 1993. Sullivan, N.: Bureaucrats and Policy Making, New York, Holmes & Meier, 1984. Thomas, R. : Elements of Government, New York, Random House, 1960. Thompson, J.: Organizations in Action, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1967. Thompson, V.: Public Administration, New York, Knopf, 1950. Victor G. : Law as a Political Instrument, New York, Random House, 1955. Vincent, R.: The French in India: From Diamond Traders to Sanskrit Scholars, Bombay, Popular Prakashan, 1990. Wade, R.: Public Bureaucracy and the Incentive Problem, Washington, D.C., World Bank, 1994. Whicker, L.: Handbook of Research Methods in Public Administration, New York, Marcel Dekker, 1999. Ziring, L.: An Introduction to Asian Politics, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1977.
INDEX
A
Adivasis, 332. Administrators, 139, 220, 224, 227. Advertisements, 44, 45, 204, 206. Agreements, 39. Akali Dal, 18, 26, 68, 69, 70, 77, 97, 126, 130, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 256, 257, 280, 299. All India Radio, 65, 175, 184, 250, 260. Ambedkar, 35, 76, 129, 318. Application, 12, 39, 151, 189, 202, 206, 338. Association, 39, 132, 135, 136, 137, 145, 340. 78, 79, 81, 113, 120, 124, 241, 245, 246, 247, 249, 250, 251, 252, 255, 256, 260, 269, 270, 279, 288, 289, 290, 293, 298, 300, 301, 315, 317, 327, 346. Chief Minister, 13, 24, 26, 27, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 61, 62, 63, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 127, 130, 191, 246, 247, 257, 259, 260, 263, 264, 266, 269, 270, 272, 274, 278, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 289, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 300. Citizenship, 123, 128, 270. Civilization, 238, 239, 331. Commencement, 34, 46, 47, 76, 286. Communication, 42, 255, 262, 290, 323. Communist Party, 2, 6, 10, 86, 96, 102, 109, 119, 120, 121, 284, 285, 294. Company, 65, 94, 204. Congress Party, 1, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 22, 28, 30, 48, 50, 55, 59, 60, 61, 63, 68, 92, 93, 99, 101, 111, 122, 196, 216, 231, 232, 278, 282, 285, 299, 303, 335, 342.
B
Bahujan Samaj Party, 118, 196. Bharatiya Janata Party, 103, 122. Boycott, 264, 269. British Rule, 98, 162, 225, 226, 230, 258, 302, 326, 341. Buddhism, 331. Business, 47, 98, 132, 136, 137, 179, 188, 221, 284, 311, 320, 329, 343.
C
Central Government, 2, 3, 25, 29, 34, 35, 49, 51, 52, 55, 56, 61, 63, 66, 76,
356
Constituent Assembly, 6, 33, 35, 318. Constitution of India, 147, 178, 304, 347. Construction, 47, 105, 300, 301, 302, 312. Conviction, 199, 200, 202. Corporation, 44, 135, 136, 184, 245, 327, 331. Council of Ministers, 57, 289. Council of States, 166. Courts, 38, 51, 58, 176, 183, 206, 255, 345. Criticism, 89, 91, 189. Culture, 4, 96, 97, 112, 193, 228, 231, 238, 239, 240, 243, 269, 328, 331, 334. Customs, 44, 230, 264.

40, 41, 43, 62, 63, 76, 77, 93, 100, 101, 111, 117, 170, 242, Evidence, 5, 59, 115, 117, 196, 198, 199, 201, Evolution, 15, 212. Exploitation, 224, 225, 302, 350. 64, 110, 299. 186, 303. 336,
Index
Governor, 10, 33, 41, 47, 57, 58, 66, 183, 260, 265, 267, 276, 284, 300. Gram Sabha, 310, 311, 319, 49, 263, 297, 326. Judgment, 196. Jurisdiction, 41, 58, 128, 183, 206, 314, 319.
357
182,
L
Laws, 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 136, 146, 151, 152, 153, 178, 184, 194, 200, 216, 234, 246, 318, 319, 321, 335, 338, 341, 343. Leaders, 5, 8, 14, 16, 17, 23, 25, 29, 48, 50, 53, 55, 58, 60, 61, 64, 67, 68, 69, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 88, 92, 93, 99, 100, 102, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 116, 118, 119, 128, 132, 133, 173, 185, 192, 194, 216, 218, 219, 223, 227, 230, 232, 233, 234, 236, 237, 242, 243, 253, 254, 256, 258, 259, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 268, 269, 273, 280, 282, 283, 285, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 294, 298, 302, 303, 317, 333. Legislation, 39, 40, 74, 113, 128, 133, 145, 164, 165, 196, 197, 216, 235, 305, 320, 338. Legislative Powers, 320. Legislature, 28, 36, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 49, 57, 77, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 128, 130, 132, 138, 139, 148, 149, 154, 155, 156, 157, 159, 162, 163, 170, 174, 178, 181, 191, 196, 216, 217, 246, 257, 281, 282, 289, 293, 322, 339. Liberty, 106, 337.
H
Harijans, 296, 335. High Court, 41, 65, 72, 80, 165, 176, 183, 263, 286, 297, 314. Hindus, 7, 27, 29, 219, 225, 227, 228, 229, 236, 237, 239, 240, 242, 244, 248, 280. 110, 284, 224, 232, 241,
F
Federalism, 36, 122. Federation, 5, 15, 32, 33, 35, 36, 109, 125, 130, 245, 246, 254, 281. Finance, 3, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 94, 138, 181, 216, 217, 305, 306, 309, 319, 322, 323, 324. Financial Relations, 43. Freedom, 41, 89, 92, 93, 99, 102, 117, 144, 167, 170, 259, 265, 269, 290, 326, 350. Fundamental Rights, 64.
I
Indian Constitution, 4, 6, 10, 12, 15, 35, 36, 38, 174, 246, 262. Indian Elections, 164, 169, 174, 175, 182. Indian Government, 6, 21, 27, 30, 362. Indian Independence, 34. Indian National Congress, 92, 99, 100, 101, 102, 107, 110, 112, 119, 120, 126. Indian Polity, 22, 57, 82, 255, 331. Indian Society, 22, 219, 221, 226, 228, 302. Indian States, 1, 7, 118. Industry, 2, 8, 9, 14, 20, 128, 137, 155, 223, 236, 269, 323, 325, 348. Institute, 184, 234, 257. Irrigation, 300, 301, 323, 349.
D
Dalits, 118, 129, 130, 201, 335. Distribution, 4, 33, 44, 47, 53, 54, 59, 180, 187, 243, 250, 251, 300, 307, 320, 348. Doordarshan, 175, 184. 332, 52, 211, 301,
G
Gandhi, 3, 6, 19, 20, 21, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 72, 73, 75, 76, 79, 92, 93, 94, 95, 100, 101, 102, 103, 109, 110, 111, 112, 115, 116, 117, 118, 127, 128, 199, 233, 256, 258, 261, 262, 264, 267, 281, 285, 294, 296, 299, 301, 317, 318, 339, 343. Governance, 32, 150, 185, 189, 192, 193, 197, 320, 329, 332, 336, 346, 347. 22, 30, 63, 77, 99, 104, 113, 122, 251, 263, 287, 311, 186, 198, 344,
E
Economic Development, 2, 17, 47, 54, 129, 242, 243, 245, 282, 307, 348. Election Commission, 118, 154, 164, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 187, 194, 198, 199, 201, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 217, 322, 339, 341. Emergency, 1, 5, 6, 12, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 25, 30, 38,
J
Janta Dal, 119, 121. Judgement, 36, 65, 66, 148, 150, 152, 314, 348.
358
Lok Sabha, 10, 16, 49, 63, 66, 73, 74, 75, 83, 105, 108, 110, 111, 117, 148, 164, 165, 167, 170, 171, 172, 175, 182, 198, 207, 216, 231, 233, 235, 245, 247, 266, 278, 285, 289, 291, 295, 309, 317, 318, 321, 340, 346. 64, 93, 112, 166, 174, 212, 242, 279, 308, 337,

Nehru, 7, 8, 48, 57, 99, 115, 117, 118, 126, 219, 245, 264, 266, 316, 326, 334, 335, 348. Nizam, 286. Nonviolence, 103. Nyaya Panchayat, 313. 100, 127, 315, 336,
Index
Parliamentary System, 164. Party System, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 107, 124, 133, 134, 330, 332, 341. Philosophy, 95, 102, 213, 228, 262, 315, 333, 343. Policy, 13, 14, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 57, 83, 85, 88, 90, 93, 98, 101, 120, 122, 123, 132, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 145, 184, 193, 226, 227, 230, 236, 239, 248, 250, 261, 265, 271, 291, 318, 333, 336, 337, 339, 349, 350. President, 31, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 47, 54, 56, 57, 58, 64, 67, 68, 72, 77, 78, 80, 82, 83, 88, 94, 105, 109, 110, 116, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170, 178, 179, 182, 183, 232, 237, 249, 253, 254, 255, 258, 265, 266, 284, 285, 297, 312, 324, 330, 346. Prime Minister, 3, 14, 20, 21, 22, 29, 48, 57, 58, 59, 62, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 77, 81, 92, 94, 99, 100, 102, 109, 116, 117, 118, 122, 166, 245, 250, 251, 256, 258, 261, 262, 263, 264, 267, 268, 281, 283, 284, 285, 289, 290, 294, 297, 299, 300, 317, 318, 326, 339. Privileges, 175, 190, 225, 240, 272, 342. Production, 2, 9, 23, 52, 243, 302, 306, 309, 310. Professions, 44, 46, 155, 156, 221, 222. Prohibition, 194. Promotion, 189, 231, 239. Protection, 24, 42, 51, 64, 233, 247, 263, 279, 297, 304, 307, 319, Provisions, 1, 12, 40, 43, 46, 52, 56, 128, 165, 195, 196, 198, 200, 211, 214, 216, 259, 267, 285, 287, 311, 320, 326, 340.
359
231, 289, 350. 44, 178, 201, 265, 319,
O
Occupation, 220, 237. Official Language, 95. Operations, 152, 182, 254, 259, 260, 261, 262, Opportunity, 7, 14, 48, 91, 124, 167, 186, 209, 322. 258, 267. 106, 238,
R
Rajya Sabha, 37, 38, 74, 113, 165, 166, 167, 171, 216, 217, 245, 279, 291, 299, 308, 309, 317, 341. Regional Parties, 13, 30, 96, 124, 193. Regionalism, 193, 244, 269, 272, 275, 290, 291, 293, 302, 303, 332. Relations, 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 32, 36, 39, 42, 43, 47, 49, 55, 56, 57, 58, 69, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 100, 102, 211, 220, 249, 251, 256, 296, 327. Relationship, 5, 31, 35, 47, 55, 56, 79, 81, 140, 154, 243, 276, 297, 327, 336, 344. Religion, 27, 97, 137, 155, 163, 169, 197, 218, 219, 220, 221, 225, 227, 228, 229, 231, 234, 236, 237, 240, 262, 271, 302, 331, 332, 337, 350. Research, 184, 234. Reservation, 74, 118, 163, 164, 165, 174, 211, 221, 231, 233, 320, 321, 322, 333, 335, 336, 337.
M
Management, 21, 138, 180, 182, 184, 235, 307, 313. Mass media, 184. Media Policy, 184. Minority Representation, 159, 161, 162, 163. Movements, 4, 5, 18, 19, 21, 23, 28, 145, 221, 222, 225, 228, 238, 257, 273, 331, 339. Mughal, 106, 236. Multi Party System, 85, 89. Municipalities, 79, 305, 306, 307, 318, 319, 320, 321. Muslim League, 126, 130, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235. Muslims, 13, 28, 29, 111, 113, 114, 115, 129, 130, 147, 219, 224, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 244, 286, 332.
P
Panchayat Samiti, 313, 315, 324, 332. Panchayati Raj, 307, 309, 311, 314, 315, 316, 318, 321, 322, 323, 332. Panchayats, 302, 304, 306, 308, 309, 310, 311, 313, 314, 315, 318, 320, 321, 323, 325, 333, 334. Parliament, 33, 36, 37, 38, 40, 42, 43, 45, 46, 52, 64, 68, 69, 107, 111, 112, 113, 115, 121, 123, 125, 126, 133, 134, 158, 164, 167, 168, 178, 179, 182, 183, 195, 196, 235, 239, 245, 246, 277, 279, 281, 285, 289, 291, 292, 293, 298, 312, 321, 338, 342, 347. 323, 310, 317, 327, 307, 312, 319, 327, 39, 47, 109, 117, 128, 165, 181, 232, 253, 287, 295, 339,
N
National Movement, 221, 226. National Parties, 31, 92, 95, 96, 99, 124, 175, 176, 204, 233. Nationalist Congress Party, 122.
360
Revolution, 3, 12, 102, 110, 152, 222, 236, 288, 349.

58, 59, 64, 66, 67, 181, 207, 234, 241, 245, 257, 258, 259, 261, 263, 267, 276, 279, 280, 281, 282, 288, 289, 291, 292, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 301, 302, 341. Union Territories, 60, 69, 70, 75, 76, 78, 81, 166, 180, 242, 274, 275, 277, 291, 292, 303. University, 231, 234, 235, 237, 241, 283, 284, 288, 297.
361
S
Samta Party, 119. Satyagraha, 233. Scheduled Castes, 74, 105, 111, 115, 129, 147, 165, 169, 171, 305, 309, 319. Single Party System, 85, 86, Society, 22, 80, 87, 94, 133, 134, 135, 137, 142, 143, 145, 150, 157, 159, 189, 192, 218, 219, 220, 221, 225, 226, 228, 242, 247, 275, 302, 322, 330, 337, 338, 339, 347, 349, 350. Speaker, 265, 337, 342. State Legislature, 41, 57, 130, 181, 246, 322. Struggles, 223, 225. Supreme Court, 36, 56, 58, 65, 66, 67, 69, 79, 165, 175, 178, 179, 196, 212, 251, 267, 287, 338, 345, 348. 106, 163, 308, 87. 131, 141, 152, 201, 222, 243, 328, 343,
V
Vice-President, 167, 168, 178. Vidhan Sabha, 73, 166, 171, 174, 175, 198, 309. Violation, 67, 73, 196, 206, 215, 217, 248, 259, 321. Violence, 10, 21, 51, 78, 82, 140, 141, 152, 187, 191, 238, 241, 247, 252, 253, 254, 255, 259, 260, 261, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 270, 280, 287, 288, 289, 295, 296, 297, 339.
128,
64, 114, 183, 286,
W
War of Independence, 32. Welfare, 14, 25, 34, 46, 50, 309, 310, 312, 325, 348, 350. Workers, 2, 51, 108, 135, 186, 208, 222, 225, 243, 302. 226, 327, 155, 226,
T
Trade, 2, 51, 136, 236, 12, 14, 20, 41, 47, 52, 132, 134, 135, 137, 139, 140, 229, 240, 263, 348.
U
Union Executive, 40, 43. Union Government, 38, 39, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55,
Z
Zamindars, 225, 228. Zilla Parishad, 191, 307, 308, 309, 310, 315, 323, 324.

Indian Government and Politics 4

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Indian Government and Politics 4

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CONTENTS

INDIAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Impact of Centre-state Relations on Indian Politics

Indian Government and Politics

Impact of Centre-state Relations on Indian Politics

Indian Government and Politics

Impact of Centre-state Relations on Indian Politics

Indian Government and Politics

Impact of Centre-state Relations on Indian Politics

Indian Government and Politics

Impact of Centre-state Relations on Indian Politics

Indian Government and Politics

Impact of Centre-state Relations on Indian Politics

Indian Government and Politics

Impact of Centre-state Relations on Indian Politics

Indian Government and Politics

Impact of Centre-state Relations on Indian Politics

Indian Government and Politics

Impact of Centre-state Relations on Indian Politics

Indian Government and Politics

Impact of Centre-state Relations on Indian Politics

Indian Government and Politics

Impact of Centre-state Relations on Indian Politics

Indian Government and Politics

Impact of Centre-state Relations on Indian Politics

Indian Government and Politics

Impact of Centre-state Relations on Indian Politics

Indian Government and Politics

Impact of Centre-state Relations on Indian Politics

Indian Government and Politics

Impact of Centre-state Relations on Indian Politics

Indian Government and Politics

Impact of Centre-state Relations on Indian Politics

Indian Government and Politics

Problems in Centre-state Relations

Indian Government and Politics

Problems in Centre-state Relations

Indian Government and Politics

Problems in Centre-state Relations

Indian Government and Politics

Problems in Centre-state Relations

Indian Government and Politics

Problems in Centre-state Relations

Indian Government and Politics

Problems in Centre-state Relations

Indian Government and Politics

Problems in Centre-state Relations

Indian Government and Politics

Problems in Centre-state Relations

Indian Government and Politics

Problems in Centre-state Relations

Indian Government and Politics

Problems in Centre-state Relations

Indian Government and Politics

Problems in Centre-state Relations

Indian Government and Politics

Problems in Centre-state Relations

Indian Government and Politics

Problems in Centre-state Relations

Indian Government and Politics

Problems in Centre-state Relations

Indian Government and Politics

Problems in Centre-state Relations

Indian Government and Politics