Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2009
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Incentives Problem
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Residual Loss
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it
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it
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B0
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.
.
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.2
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DACC
DACC
1
PRD
RVOL
SIZE2
LEV
PRD
,1219-
RVOL
,1640
,1603
SIZE2
,0243
,0203
,1562
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,1070
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.
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2,064
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28,559
5
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-
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.
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8,376
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,23
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29509840
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9418658
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80341532
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6
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8,335
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1
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243
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% 65,4
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.
.
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) (11-4 *
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206
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351
176
175
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%45,8
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702
321
381
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T-test ) (1
) (2
)
(.000 .%5
T-test :
Mean
Difference
,05376
Sign
.000
)(12-4
DACC Equal variances
t
assumed
3,558
) (Chi2
) (,019 .%5
)(13-4
)Asymp. Sig. (2-sided
,019
df
1
Value
5,516
Pearson ChiSquare
:
.
.1 - .
.
(Income- Increasing
)discretionary accruals
. .
- .
)(14-4
1,718
2
3,437
0.000 39,752
,04323
348
15,043
350
18,480
) (14-4
0.000 .(39,752) F
- .
)(15-4
41,3
R2
18,6
18,1
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) (%18,1 )
( %18,1 )
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)(16-4
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B0
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)(t-stat
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B1
,05541
,019
+
)(2,353
)(t-stat
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+
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)(t-stat
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) (,350 ,05541 ) (.000 ,019 .%5
.
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)
( ) (
:
.
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4
346
350
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26
0.00
0
4,322
14,159
18,480
) (17-4
0.000 .(26,402) F
- .
)(18-4
48,4
R2
22,5
23,4
,20229
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) (%22,5 )
( %22,5
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.
) (19-4
,573)(3,940-
,05277
)(2,283
,318
)(7,864
,04618
)(2,644
,210
)(3,871
.000
B0
)(t-stat
B1
)(t-stat
B2
,023
.000
)(t-stat
B3
)(t-stat
B4
,009
.000
)(t-stat
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( ) (,318 ,05277
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) (,04618
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350
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22
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- .
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R2
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23,1
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( )
( %23,1 )
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- .
)(22-4
B0
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B1
,05244
)(2,278
)(t-stat
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,318
)(7,900
B2
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,05428
)(3,037
B3
)(t-stat
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,212
)(3,931
B4
)(t-stat
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4,49-E-10
)(1,962-
B5
)(t-stat
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)
( ) (,05244 ,318
) (,023 .000 ) (
. :
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.
.
- .
)(23-4
1,978
7,594
9,572
2
348
350
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45,315
0.000
) (23-4
0.000 .(45,315) F
.
)( 24-4
R2
45,5
20,7
20,2
,1477
) (24-4 R2 ) (%20,7
) (%20,2 )
( %20,2 )
( ).(,1477
- .
)(25-4
,05244
)(4,039
,126)(7,021-
,127)(3,072-
0.000
B0
)(t-stat
0.000
B1
)(t-stat
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B2
)(t-stat
) (,127- 126- ) (,002 0.000 .%5
.
.2 .
)
( :
-
4
2,229
346
7,343
350
9,572
)(26-4
) (26-4
0.000 .(26 ,254) F
- .
)(27-4
48,3
,557
,02122
F
,254
26
R2
23,3
22,4
0.000
,14568
) (27-4 R2 ) (%23,3
) (%22,4 )
( ) ( %22,4
) ( ).(,14568
- ) (
.
) (28-4
,323
)(2,617
,121)(6,784-
,117)(2,858-
,0390)(2,643-
,08815
)(2,562
B0
)(t-stat
B1
)(t-stat
B2
)(t-stat
B3
)(t-stat
B4
)(t-stat
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-
.000
,005
,009
,011
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( ) (,117- ,121-
) .(,005 .000
.
.
)-
(,0390 ) (,009 .%5
.
) (,08815 ) (,011 . %5
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)
)
( ) (
(
.
- .
)(29-4
2,265
7,307
9,572
5
345
350
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,02118
21,389
0.000
) (29-4
0.000 .(21,389) F
- .
)(30-4
48,3
R2
23,7
,14553
22,6
) ( 30-4 R2 ) (%23,7
) (%22,6 )
( )
( %22,6 )
( ).(,14553
- .
)(31-4
,354
)(2,821
,122)(6,853-
,121)(2,948-
,0430)(2,858-
,08868
)(2,579
1,034E-10
)(1,308
B0
)(t-stat
B1
)(t-stat
B2
)(t-stat
B3
)(t-stat
B4
)(t-stat
B5
)(t-stat
,005
+
.000
,003
,005
,010
)
( ) (,121- ,122-
) (,003.000 ) (
) (,08868 ,0430- ),005
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.
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) Income- decreasing
.(discretionary accruals )
(
.
.
" "
:
:
.
.
.
.
. :
:
Deterministic Models
Stochastic Models
:
) (
:
) (
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.
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.
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).(Extraordinary
.
.
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.
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Jones . Dechow et al. ,1995 .
:
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.
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78
1999 2007
.
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.1
) (
) (.000 ,019 .
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.2 78 ) (
.
.1
.
.2 .
.1
.
.2
.
.3
.4
.
:
)( :
.1 " 1990 " .
.2 "2006 "
.
.3 "2009
" Windows Spss
.
)( :
.4 "1999
"
.
.5 "1988
"
.
.6 " 2006
"
.
.7 " 1993
"
.
.8 " 1991
"
.72
.9 " 2004
.
.10 " 2001
"
.
.11 " 2004
"
.
.12 "1999
"
.
.13 "1997
"
.
)( :
.20 "2007
"
.
.21 " 1993
"
.
.22 "2002
"
.
.23 " 2005
"
.
.24 " 1999
"
.
.25 " 1996
"
.
.26 "2008
: "
.
)( :
"
. 8-7
:
(A):BOOKS
1. Watts,R.L.,
and
J.L.
Zimmerman
,(1986),"Positive
Accounting Theory" Prentice- Hall, Englewood Cliffs,NJ
(B):BERIODICALS
PP
CEO
Pay
",Journal
Economics,Vol.43,pp. 69-93.
of
Accounting
and
(C):OTHERS
68.Ahmed, S., J. Lobo and J. Zhou, (2005)," Job Security and
Income Smoothing: an Empirical Test of The Fudenberg and
Tirole (1995) model", Available at:
http://Papers.ssrn.com/SOL3/ Results.cfm?Request Time
out =50000000 .
69.Belski, W.H., and J.A. Brozovsky,(2002)," Ethical
Judgments in Accounting : an Examination on the Ethics of
1
) (2007-1999
4
) (2007-1999
5
) (2007-1999
:
: