1st Monday cases: (June 10)

Republic v. Pagadian City Timber] License agreements arenot contracts within the purview of the due process and thenonimpairment of contracts clauses enshrined in theConstitution.A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the dueprocess clauseit is only a license or a privilege, which can bevalidly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or publicwelfare.

Republic v. Pagadian Facts: The Republic of the Philippines, through the DENR, executed an Industrial Forest Management Agreement (IFMA), with Pagadian City Timber, for the former to develop, utilize, and manage a specified forest area covering 1,999.14 hectares located in Barangays Langapod, Cogonan, and Datagan, Municipality of Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur, for the production of timber and other forest products subject to a productionsharing scheme. The Pagadians required Comprehensive Development and Management Plan (CDMP) was approved by the DENR. But, the Subanen Tribe complained that respondents failed to implement the CDMP, disrespected their rights as indigenous people and employed armed men. This prompted DENR to issue an order creating a regional team to evaluate and assess the IFMA. The DENR requested for a representative of Pagadian to appear before them, upon compliance with which, a conference was held between the parties and they found inventoried various equipment, seedlings, infrastructures, etc. and found that the area covered was beyond that stipulated in the IFMA. An evaluation team was dispatched to the area concerned for inspection and assessment, in the presence of the IFMA holder, representatives, laborers and other personnel on the area. In the conduct of the same, the team found that the mango seedlings are not satisfactory and they had failed to develop the area. Finally, the team conducted an exit conference with the CENR Officer, and the IFMA holder where the tentative and general findings of the evaluation and assessment was laid-out and presented to the body. On the basis of their findings, the team required Pagadian to explain why they failed to comply with the CDMP. But, because of the influx of more complaints from the locals, DENR issued notice of cancellation to Pagadian because of their failure to comply with the agreement. This was objected to by respondent and appeal was made to the Office of the President. The order of cancellation was affirmed by the OP, but was reversed by the CA. Issues: W/N the IFMA is a privilege granted by the State, which may be revoked without violating the nonimpairment clause. Held: Yes. The IFMA is a timber license, and as such, the non-impairment clause may not be invoked in the present case. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause. Even assuming arguendo that an IFMA can be considered a contract or an agreement, we agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that the alleged property rights that may have arisen from it are not absolute. All Filipino citizens are entitled, by right, to a balanced and healthful ecology as declared under

Section 16,[29] Article II of the Constitution. This right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment, particularly our diminishing forest resources. To uphold and protect this right is an express policy of the State.The DENR is the instrumentality of the State mandated to actualize this policy. It is "the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Thus, private rights must yield when they come in conflict with this public policy and common interest. They must give way to the police or regulatory power of the State, in this case through the DENR, to ensure that the terms and conditions of existing laws, rules and regulations, and the IFMA itself are strictly and faithfully complied with. The CA decision is reversed and set aside, and the decision of the Office of the President is reinstated.

DENR et al VS. YAP et al DENR et al VS. YAP et al G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008 FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801. Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and others filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by Public Land Act and Revised Forestry Code, as amended. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, declaring that, PD 1810 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as amended. The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA. On In 2004, the appellate court affirmed in totothe RTC decision. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45. On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and disposable). On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions ISSUE: the main issue is whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay.

HELD: petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed.

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines apublic forest as a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, such classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain. A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming such presumption is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof. Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801. NOTES: 1. Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of Public Land Act, gave the Executive Department, through the President, the exclusiveprerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public domain. 2. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land

registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks, do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry is particularly instructive: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or timber land as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land. 3. All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess. For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead or sales patent, subject to the conditions imposed by law. More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one such bill now pending in the House of Representatives.

Cario vs Insular Government, 41 Phil 935 Posted by Pius Morados on November 21, 2011

(Land Titles and Deeds Native Title) Facts: An Igorot applied for the registration of a certain land. He and his ancestors had held the land as owners for more than 50 years, which he inherited under Igorot customs. There was no document of title issued for the land when he applied for registration. The government contends that the land in question belonged to the state. Under the Spanish Law, all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with permit private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription against the Crown. Issue: WON the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine. Held: No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his land. The United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared: It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. There is an existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.

Lee Hong Hok vs David

G.R. No. L-30389, Dec. 27, 1972

FACTS:This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano David acquired lawful title thereto, pursuant to hismiscellaneous sales application. After approval of his application, the Director of Lands issued an orderof award and issuance of sales patent, covering said lot by virtue of which the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent. The Register of Deeds thenissued an original certificate of title to David. During all this time, Lee Hong Kok did not oppose nor fileany adverse claim.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lee Hong Kok may question the government grant.

HELD: Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture andNatural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent.This was not done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that thepatent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof norhad they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings after claiming it as their private property.The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformitywith the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the governmentand set aside, the defendant cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the granteeand the government. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals of January 31, 1969 and its resolutionof March 14, 1969 are affirmed.

Jun 8, 2008 Lee Hong Kok vs. David G.R. No. L-30389, Dec. 27, 1972

Distinction between IMPERIUM and DOMINIUM Only the government can question a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a government grant.

FACTS: This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano David acquired lawful title thereto, pursuant to his miscellaneous salesapplication. After approval of his application, the Director of Lands issued an order of award and issuance of sales patent, covering said lot by virtue of which the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent. The Register of Deeds then issued an original certificate of title to David. During all this time, Lee Hong Kok did not oppose nor file any adverse claim. ISSUE: Whether or not Lee Hong Kok may question the government grant

HELD: Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. This was not done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings after claiming it as their private property. The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government. IMPERIUM vs. DOMINIUM: The government authority possessed by the State which is appropriately embraced int eh concept of sovereignty comes under the heading of imperium; its capacity to own or acquire property under dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the State in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution.

Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. vs. CA G.R. No. 50464, Jan. 29, 1990

FACTS: Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. is the recipient of a Sales Patent issued by the Bureau of Lands over two parcels of land in Bataan. An OCT was thereby issued. The Solicitor-General filed an action for reversion on the ground that the lots were forest lands and therefore inalienable. CA ruled, upholding the Solicitor-General's contention. ISSUE: Whether or not land is alienable

HELD: The SC affirmed. Our adherence to the Regalian Doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands to the dominion of the State. Thus, before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural purposes, there must be a positive act from the Government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not confer any validity on such title if the property covered by the title or patent is part of the public forest.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER Co. INC., ETC.

146 SCRA 509

DATE: December 29, 1986

PETITIONER: The Director of Lands

RESPONDENTS: Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., Etc.

PONENTE: J. Narvasa

FACTS: The Director of Lands appealed the judgement of the Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela ordering the registration in favor of Acme Plywood &

Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 sqm., acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the indigenous Dumagat Tribe and owners of the lots-in-question from time immemorial, on October 29, 1962. This was accordingly only registered on July 17, 1982 long after the aegis of the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the ruling in the case, Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome (114 SRC 799) should be overturned in light of jurisprudence. Whether or not the conversion of the land in question is recognized. Whether or not the provision barring private companies and associations from purchasing public alienable lands in 1973 Constitution is applicable retroactively.

RULING: HELD. In light of the jurisprudence traced from Carino v. Insular Govt, to Susi v. Razon, to Herico v. Dar, the court overturned the decision on Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, stating that a possession is said to be prescriptively acquired by the operation of the Public Lands Act, upon conclusively presumed fulfillment of all the necessary conditions for a Government Grant. Thus, the land in question effectively ceased to be of the public domain and was therefore classified as private property at the moment of the sale through the continuous and unchallenged possession of the bona fide right to ownership from Meralcos predecessors-interest. There being no law prohibiting the sale of private lands to privately held corporations, the court thus overturned the decision. HELD. Referring to the ruling in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, the land held by the Infiels since time immemorial was effectively deemed as private land, by the operation of the law, ipso jure. Thus, at the moment of the sale, ACME Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., Etc. therefore, purchased private property. There being no ruling in the 1935 Constitution prohibiting this sale, this was held to be valid. NO. Acme had already obtained vested rights under the 1935 Constitution when it purchased the land from the Infiels. The provision in the 1973 Constitution prohibiting the purchase of alienable public lands by private corporations or associations cannot be retroactively applied.

Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City

G.R. No. 73974, May 31, 1995

Regalian Doctrine Burden of Proof of private ownership rests on plaintiff Doctrine of indefeasibility of Torrens title, exception

FACTS: Petitioner was awarded a 17-hectare parcel of land, by virtue of which he was issued an OCT. Through an investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, it was found that the free patent acquired by Petitioner was fraudulent. A case for falsification of public documents was filed by Petitioner was acquitted of the crime. Subsequently, the Solicitor-General filed a complaint against Petitioner, praying for the declaration of nullity of the Free Patent and the OCT. Petitioner's main contention was that the land in question was no longer within the unclassified public forest land because by the approval of his application for Free Patent by the Bureau of Lands, the land was already alienable and disposable public agricultural land. He also claimed that the land was a small portion of Lot 5139, an area which had been declared disposable public land by the cadastral court. ISSUE: Whether or not the land is alienable and disposable public land

HELD: Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise clearly appearing to be privately-owned are presumed to belong to the State. Forest lands, like mineral or timber lands which are public lands, are not subject to private ownership unless they under the Constitution become private properties. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. The task of administering and disposing lands of the public domain belongs to the Director of Lands, and ultimately the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Classification of public lands is, thus, an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no

authority to do so. Thus, in controversies involving the disposition of public agricultural lands, the burden of overcoming the presumption of state ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the private claimant. In the present case, Petitioner failed to present clear, positive and absolute evidence to overcome said presumption and to support his claim. Moreover, the fact the Petitioner acquired a title to the land is of no moment, notwithstanding the indefeasibility of title issued under the Torrens System. The indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by one who procured the same by means of fraud. Fraud here means actual and extrinsic -an intentional omission of fact required by law. Petitioner committed fraud by his failure to state that the land sought to be registered still formed part of the unclassifiedforest lands.

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 128017. January 20, 1999] RAMON ITURALDE, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO FALCASANTOS, respondent. DECISION PARDO, J.: The case is an appeal via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals reversing that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Basilan province, and dismissing petitioner's complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land with the improvements existing thereon, situated at Barangay Upper Baas, municipality of Lantawan, province of Basilan, with an area of 7.1248 hectares. The facts may be related as follows: On October 17, 1986, petitioner acquired by purchase from the heirs of Pedro Mana-ay a parcel of land located at Baas, Lantawan, Basilan Province, with an area of 6.0000 hectares, more or less, more particularly described as follows: "A parcel of land, situated at Baas, Lantawan Basilan. Bounded on the North by property of Alejandro Marso; on the East by property of Ramon Bacor; on the South by property of Atty. Ricardo G. Mon and on the West by property of Librada Guerrero. Containing an area of 6.0000 hectares, more or less."

However, on November 3, 1986, respondent applied with the Bureau of Lands in Isabela, Basilan province, for the award to him of the same parcel of land under free patent. On November 17, 1986, petitioner filed a protest to such application. On February 7, 1989, the Regional Director of Lands rendered a decision giving respondent a period of one hundred twenty (120) days to exercise the right to repurchase the land by reimbursing petitioner of all expenses he incurred in the purchase of the property in question, and held in abeyance respondent's application for free patent. On October 11, 1989, the Regional Director issued an order declaring that respondent had waived his right of repurchase, and rejected his application for free patent for lack of interest, and allowed petitioner to file a public land application for the subject land. On May 8, 1990, the Regional Director ordered respondent to vacate the land in question, but respondent refused. On July 24, 1990, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Basilan province, a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession with preliminary injunction of the subject parcel of land. In answer to the complaint, respondent alleged that the land occupied by him belonged to the Republic of the Philippines, and that he had introduced improvements thereon such as coconut and other fruit trees. After trial on the merits, on March 20, 1993, the trial court rendered decision declaring petitioner the owner and possessor of the subject parcel of land with all the improvements existing thereon, situated at Barangay Upper Baas, municipality of Lantawan, province of Basilan, with an area of 3.1248 hectares, and ordering respondent to vacate the land in question, to pay petitioner the amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) as attorneys fee, the amount of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) as litigation expenses, and three hundred pesos (P300.00) as judicial cost. In due time, petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals. On December 20, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered decision reversing the appealed decision, and entering a new judgment dismissing petitioner's complaint without prejudice to any action that petitioner may take if the subject land was declassified from forest land to alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Hence, the present recourse. Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the trial court's decision in his favor and dismissing the complaint because when the Director of Lands allowed petitioner to file a public land application for said property, it was equivalent to a declaration that said land was no longer part of the public domain.

We deny the petition. The Court of Appeals correctly held that "the evidence is unrebutted that the subject land is within the Forest Reserve Area as per L.C. Map No. 1557 certified on August 13, 1951."[1] and, hence, not capable of private appropriation and occupation.[2] In Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon, we held that "Forest lands, like mineral or timber lands which are public lands, are not subject to private ownership unless they under the Constitution, become private properties. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.[3] In Sunbeam Convenience Foods Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we said: Thus, before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain."[4] Hence, a positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.[5] And the rule is Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.[6] What is more, there is yet no award or grant to petitioner of the land in question by free patent or other ways of acquisition of public land. Consequently, he can not lawfully claim to be the owner of the land in question. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 42306, dismissing the complaint of petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Basilan province, in Civil Case No. 441-63. No costs. SO ORDERED.

SYNOPSIS Petitioner acquired by purchase a 6-hectare land located at Baas, Lantawan, Basilan Province on October 17, 1986. However, said lot was applied with the Bureau of Lands by respondent for a free patent. The same was dismissed by the Regional Director of Lands for failure to exercise the right to repurchase and allowed petitioner to file a public land application for the subject land. Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession against respondent. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner who was declared the owner and possessor of the subject land. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the appealed decision in finding that the land is within the forest reserve area, hence, not capable of private appropriation and occupation. Hence, this

recourse, petitioner by claiming that allowance of the Director of lands to file a public land application for said property is equivalent to a declaration that said land was no longer part of the public domain. Lands within the forest reserve are not capable of private appropriation and occupation; that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes; and that possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. SYLLABUS 1. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; LANDS WITHIN FOREST RESERVE, NOT CAPABLE OF PRIVATE APPROPRIATION AND OCCUPATION. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the evidence is unrebutted that the subject land is within the Forest Reserve Area as per L.C. Map No. 1557 certified on August 13, 1951.1 and, hence, not capable of private appropriation and occupation. In Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon, we held that Forest lands, like mineral or timber lands which are public lands, are not subject to private ownership unless they under the Constitution, become private properties. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. 2. id.; id.; declassification of public lands; positive act from government, indispensable. In Sunbeam Convenience Foods Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we said: Thus, before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. Hence, a positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. 3. ID.; POSSESSION; POSSESSION OF FOREST LANDS HOWEVER LONG, CANNOT RIPEN INTO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP. The rule is Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.

HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES, INC.G.R. No. 162243, December 3, 2009 Chico-Nazario, J.:

Doctrine:

A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause. Facts: PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43converted into an IFMA.PICOP filed before the (RTC) City a Petition for Mandamus

against then DENR Sec Alvarez for unlawfully refusing and/or neglecting to sign and execute the IFMA contract of PICOP even as thelatter has complied with all the legal requirements for the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43, asamended, into an IFMA.The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the trialcourt is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then PresidentFerdinand Marcos, to enter into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP. Issue: Whether the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause by which thegovernment may be bound (for the issuance of the IFMA) Held: NO. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract within the purviewof the non-impairment clause is edifying. We declared:

Needless to say, all licenses may thus berevoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected bythe due process clause of the Constitution.

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No lawimpairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." cannot be invoked.The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking assuringPICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an interpretation wouldresult in the complete abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control andsupervise the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources in the area

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS Case Digest

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS [267 SCRA 408; G.R. No. 122156; 3 Feb 1997]

Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of thePhilippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Issue: Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void. Held: The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.

The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.

According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question.

The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the equity of said hotel to fall within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and controlling stock. The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be interpreted as proFilipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from granting rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too.

PALOMO v. CA G.R. No. 95608 January 21, 1997

FACTS: Diego Palomo is the owner of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order No. 40. On 1916, he ordered the registration of these lands and donated the same to his heirs, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months before his death in April 1937. Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay on May 1970. The

Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953. Sometime in July 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park," under the control, management, protection and administration of the defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of the public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Law nor registerable under the Land Registration Act. The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real estate taxes thereon and introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land to guarantee a loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.

ISSUE: Whether or not forest land may be owned by private persons.

HELD: The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain. It is in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registerable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. There is no question that the lots here forming part of the forest zone were not alienable lands of the public domain. As to the forfeiture of improvements introduced by petitioners, the fact that the government failed to oppose the registration of the lots in question is no justification for petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. JUDGE FLORELIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME

114 SCRA 799

DATE: June 29, 1982

PETITIONER: Manila Electric Company

RESPONDENTS: Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch XV and Republic of the Philippines

PONENTE: J. Aquino

FACTS:

The Manila Electric Company purchased two lots (165 sqm.) with an assessed value of P3270 in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses on August 13, 1976, who had consequently purchased it from Olympia Ramos on the 3rd of July 1947, the original owner of the land even before 1941. They consequently filed for the confirmation of title on Dec. 1, 1976, a motion that was rejected by the Court of First Instance. The Meralco consequently filed an appeal with the following contentions: The land after having been possessed by Olimpia Ramos and the Piguing spouses for more than thirty years had essentially been converted to private land by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Thus, the constitutional prohibition banning a private corporation from acquiring alienable public land is not applicable. It had invoked section 48b of the Public Land Law, not for itself, but for the Piguing spouses who, as Filipino citizens, could secure a judicial confirmation of their imperfect title to the land

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Meralco, as a juridical person, is qualified to apply for a judicial confirmation of an imperfect/incomplete title. Whether or not the conversion of the land in question is recognized. Whether or not the conversion of the land from public to private property is contingent on the judicial confirmation of title.

RULING:

NO. According to Sec. 48b of the Public Lands Act, the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified from applying for the judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Furthermore, according to J. Aquino, Article XIV Sec. 14 of the 1973 Constitution prohibits private corporations from hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, not to exceed 1000 hectares in area. In fine, only natural persons and citizens of the Philippines are allowed to apply for confirmation under the PLA. NO. It was held that the conversion from public land to private property is contingent upon (1) fulfilling the necessary condition of possession by the predecessors-in-interest for the statutory period of 30 years; and (2) the judicial confirmation of the title by the Court of First Instance. C.J. Fernando concurred with the decision, but accepted that a conversion indeed took place. HELD. This was maintained in the ruling of J. Aquino. C.J. Fernando, J. Abad Santos and J. De Castro, concurred accordingly. J. Teehankee dissented and traced the line of jurisprudence from Carino to Susi to Herico which maintained that the conversion or acquisition effectively happens by the operation of law, ipso jure, as soon as it can be conclusively presumed, juris et de jure, that all the conditions for the confirmation of the grant have been met. According to his reasoning, upon the fulfillment of the aforementioned conditions, the confirmation of an imperfect title is only a formality.

Land Titles And Deeds Case Digest: Director Of Lands V. IAC (1986) G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986 Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and Deeds)

FACTS: Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and AcerInfiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela

donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of ISSUES: W/N the land is already a private land - YES W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations applies- NO HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc YES already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law 2. NO If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares

Ong Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 341; GR No. 113472, December 20, 1994 Posted by Pius Morados on November 28, 2011 (Land Titles and Deeds Aliens disqualified from acquiring public and private lands)

Facts: Petitioner and respondent disputed over a parcel of land. Respondent contends that she bought the said land from a certain Ong Joi Jong, evidenced by a notarized deed of sale; and entrusted the administration of the same to petitioner, a Chinese citizen and the brother of respondents husband. Petitioner on the other hand claims that she bought the disputed land from the same vendor and the sale is evidenced by a photocopy of a deed of sale.

Issue: WON an alien may acquire lands in the Philippines by virtue of a Deed of Sale.

Held: No. Whether or not said deed of sale is genuine, the Constitution provides that aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands, hence disqualified also in acquiring private lands. The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire lands of the public domain.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-6776 May 21, 1955

THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL, petitioner-appellee, vs. UNG SIU SI TEMPLE, respondent-appellant. Alejo F. Candido for appellant. Office of the Solicitor General Querube C. Makalintal and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for appellee. REYES, J.B.L., J.: The Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal refused to accept for record a deed of donation executed in due form on January 22, 1953, by Jesus Dy, a Filipino citizen, conveying a parcel of residential land, in Caloocan, Rizal, known as lot No. 2, block 48-D, PSD-4212, G.L.R.O. Record No. 11267, in favor of the unregistered religious organization "Ung Siu Si Temple", operating through three trustees all of Chinese nationality. The donation was duly accepted by Yu Juan, of Chinese nationality, founder and deaconess of the Temple, acting in representation and in behalf of the latter and its trustees.

The refusal of the Registrar was elevated en Consultato the IVth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila. On March 14, 1953, the Court upheld the action of the Rizal Register of Deeds, saying: The question raised by the Register of Deeds in the above transcribed consulta is whether a deed of donation of a parcel of land executed in favor of a religious organization whose founder, trustees and administrator are Chinese citizens should be registered or not. It appearing from the record of the Consulta that UNG SIU SI TEMPLE is a religious organization whose deaconess, founder, trustees and administrator are all Chinese citizens, this Court is of the opinion and so hold that in view of the provisions of the sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the Philippines limiting the acquisition of land in the Philippines to its citizens, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital stock of which is owned by such citizens adopted after the enactment of said Act No. 271, and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Krivenko vs. the Register of Deeds of Manila, the deed of donation in question should not be admitted for admitted for registration. (Printed Rec. App. pp 17-18). Not satisfied with the ruling of the Court of First Instance, counsel for the donee Uy Siu Si Temple has appealed to this Court, claiming: (1) that the acquisition of the land in question, for religious purposes, is authorized and permitted by Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission, providing as follows: SECTION 1. It shall be lawful for all religious associations, of whatever sort or denomination, whether incorporated in the Philippine Islands or in the name of other country, or not incorporated at all, to hold land in the Philippine Islands upon which to build churches, parsonages, or educational or charitable institutions. SEC. 2. Such religious institutions, if not incorporated, shall hold the land in the name of three Trustees for the use of such associations; . . .. (Printed Rec. App. p. 5.) and (2) that the refusal of the Register of Deeds violates the freedom of religion clause of our Constitution [Art. III, Sec. 1(7)]. We are of the opinion that the Court below has correctly held that in view of the absolute terms of section 5, Title XIII, of the Constitution, the provisions of Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission must be deemed repealed since the Constitution was enacted, in so far as incompatible therewith. In providing that, Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines, the Constitution makes no exception in favor of religious associations. Neither is there any such saving found in sections 1 and 2 of Article XIII, restricting the acquisition of public agricultural lands and other natural resources to "corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens" (of the Philippines).

The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not suffice to escape the Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its members are of foreign nationality. The purpose of the sixty per centum requirement is obviously to ensure that corporations or associations allowed to acquire agricultural land or to exploit natural resources shall be controlled by Filipinos; and the spirit of the Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, the controlling membership should be composed of Filipino citizens. To permit religious associations controlled by non-Filipinos to acquire agricultural lands would be to drive the opening wedge to revive alien religious land holdings in this country. We can not ignore the historical fact that complaints against land holdings of that kind were among the factors that sparked the revolution of 1896. As to the complaint that the disqualification under article XIII is violative of the freedom of religion guaranteed by Article III of the Constitution, we are by no means convinced (nor has it been shown) that land tenure is indispensable to the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession or worship; or that one may not worship the Deity according to the dictates of his own conscience unless upon land held in fee simple. The resolution appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION VS. LUI SHE 1967 SEPTEMBER 12

FACTS: Justina Santos y Canon Faustino and her sister Lorenza were the owners in common of a piece of land in Manila. The sisters lived in one of the houses, while Wong Heng, a Chinese, lived with his family in the restaurant. Wong had been a long-time lessee of a portion of the property, having a monthly rental of P2,620. On September 22, 1957 Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property as her sister died with no other heir. Then already well advanced in years, being at the time 90 years old, blind, crippled and an invalid, she was left with no other relative to live with, but she was taken cared of by Wong. "In grateful acknowledgment of the personal services of the Lessee to her," Justina Santos executed on November 15, 1957, a contract of lease in favor of Wong, covering the portion then already leased to him and another portion fronting Florentino Torres street. The lease was for 50 years, although the lessee was given the right to withdraw at any time from the agreement; the monthly rental was

P3,120. Ten days later (November 25), the contract was amended so as to make it cover the entire property, including the portion on which the house of Justina Santos stood, at an additional monthly rental of P360. On December 21 she executed contract giving Wong the option to buy the leased premises for P120,000, payable within ten years at a monthly installment of P1,000. The option was conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship,a petition for which was then pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. On November 18, 1958 she executed two other contracts, one extending the term of the lease to 99 years, and another fixing the term of the option at 50 years. Both contracts are written in Tagalog. In two wills executed on August 24 and 29, 1959, she bade her legatees to respect the contracts she had entered into with Wong, but in a codicil of a later date (November 4, 1959) she appears to have a change of heart. Claiming that the various contracts were made by her because of machinations and inducements practised by him, she now directed her executor to secure the annulment of the contracts. Both parties however died, Wong Heng on October 21, 1962 and Justina Santos on December 28, 1964. Wong was substituted by his wife, Lui She, the other defendant in this case, While Justina Santos was substituted by the Philippine Banking Corporation. Justina Santos maintained now reiterated by the Philippine Banking Corporation that the lease contract should have been annulled along with the four other contracts because it lacks mutuality, among others Paragraph 5 of the lease contract states that "The lessee may at any time withdraw from this agreement." It is claimed that this stipulation offends article 1308 of the Civil Code which provides that "the contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them."

ISSUES: 1. (OBLICON ISSUE) Was the insertion in the contract of a resolutory condition, permitting the cancellation of the contract by one of the parties, valid? 2. (RELATED, but Consitutional Issue) Was the contract between Wong (Lui She) and Justina Santos (Phil. Banking) enforceable?

RULING: 1. Yes. In the early case of Taylor vs. Uy Tiong Piao, the Supreme Court said:

Article 1256 [now art. 1308] of the Civil Code in our opinion creates no impediment to the insertion in a contract for personal service of a resolutory condition permitting the cancellation of the contract by one of the parties. Such a stipulation, as can be readily seen, does not make either the validity or the fulfillment of the contract dependent upon the will of the party to whom is conceded the privilege of cancellation; for where the contracting parties have agreed that such option shall exist, the exercise of the option is as much in the fulfillment of the contract as any other act which may have been the subject of agreement. Indeed, the cancellation of a contract in accordance with conditions agreed upon beforehand is fulfillment Further, in the case at bar, the right of the lessee to continue the lease or to terminate it was so circumscribed by the term of the contract that it cannot be said that the continuance of the lease depends upon his will. At any rate, even if no term had been fixed in the agreement, this case would at most justify the fixing of a period but not the annulment of the contract. 2. No. The contract of lease, as in this case, cannot be sustained. However, to be sure, a lease to an alien for a reasonable period was valid, so was an option giving an alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship. But if an alien was given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it became clear that the arrangement was a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divested himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right to dispose of it (jus disponendi) rights the sum total of which make up ownership. It was just as if today the possession is transferred, tomorrow, the use, the next day, the disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up are consolidated in an alien. And yet this was just exactly what the parties in this case did within this pace of one year, with the result that Justina Santos' ownership of her property was reduced to a hollow concept. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the Philippines, is indeed in grave peril. The contracts in question are annulled and set aside; the land subject-matter of the contracts was ordered returned to the estate of Justina Santos as represented by the Philippine Banking Corporation.