SP smn Cones vmconer | cosnrenss px Er ONGRESS AND PRESSURE GROUPS: IBBYING IN A MODERN DEMOCRACY or-tme COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE BY THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS JUNE 1986 Printed for the use of the Committee on Gorernmental Affairs ‘Pore te Supine of Dass, Gmgrinn Sles Oto ‘US Goverunt Pring Of, Wahingen DC 2UG2 a oy Mo Svan “CouurTER oN ob YennMENTAL AFFAIRS ~WItLAME-woROfiY, Jn, Delaware, Charman TED STEVENS, Alashe THOMAS F. BACLETON, Missur) GHARLES NeC. MATIIIAS, Ja, Maryland LAWTON CHILES Posie WILLIAM 8. COHEN, Maine SAM NUNN, Goergn DAVE DURENDERGER, Minneots JOHN GLENN, Ohio WARIEN B RUDMAN, New Kampshire CARE LEVIN. Mrsigan ‘THAD COCHRAN, Masicipph ALBERT GORE, de "Tennesce Prawns G, Po, Chief Counsel end Stef Disctor Maxsanar P.Chiosiaw, Aovority Sif? reco Suncomnirrrex ow Tyrancoventatenrat, Retanions DAVE DURENBERGER, Minnesota, Chainnan ITED STEVENS, Alaska LAWTON CHILES, Flere THAD COCHRAN, Misisipp SAM NUNN, Geena 10m, Steff Dirwtor ‘Minority Stef? Director ‘Auove BM Grioano, Chi Clark vl . bo F566 STKE 1 6g ; Gib LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL US. Sexare, ‘Scnconomrrer oN IvreRGovERNMENTAT. RELATIONS, Conmartae ON GovERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC, May 1986. Hon, Waa V. Rom, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Washington, DC. Dean Mr. Cuaman: I am herewith transmitting for printing as 4 conunittee print a study entitled “Congress and Pressure Grony Lobbying in a Modern Democracy.” This study was done by ‘Congressional Research Service at my request as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations. I would like 10 ac, knowledge, in particular, the assistance of Richard Sachs of the Congressional Research Service, who served on detail to the sul. ‘committee during the course of oversight hearings on the 1946 Fed. eral Regulation of Lobbying Act. Mr. Sachs is the principal author of thie study with coutributions by Joseph Cantor and ‘Thomes Neale of CRS, Given the continuing interest in lobbying reform and campaign finance, I believe this study will be useful as a committee print for both Members of Congress and the Executive Branch Dave Dursngencer, Chairman, Subcommittee on International Relations. Enclosure,PREFACE ‘The part that interest groups and lobliyists play in shaping U.S. public policy has been a subject for discussion and debate for over two hundred years, It is an immense topic in terms of its historical range: James Madiscn considered as.q matter of the first impor- tance the question of balancing the selfish wishes of the “factions” with what would be best for the new nation. Though more often than not associated with its more shadowy aspects, lobbying is a re- curring leitmotif in the drama of American politics; lobbyists are prominent in the economic expansion of the new republic, in the social movements of the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centur- ies, and in the current era of economic redistribution. The subject bears directly upon constitutional freedoms of petition, speech and assembly, and the limits of these freedoms and the manner in which they may be regulated. Political analysts and philosophers have evolved complex theories of government and democracy itself, based on relationshipe between intorest groups and goverament Although pressure group activity in the Fedora agencies has in greased in recent yecrs, Congress romains the primary target. In it relationships with pressure groupe, Congrest rafts the com: plex relationships of individuals and groups in society. Often, Con- gress is both willing suitor and an unhappy victim of pressure groups. Depending upon time, place and circumstance, it weleomes the assistance that groups provide or it assails them for selfishness and obstructionism. In its criticisms of pressure groups, it some- times fails to distinguish between the process of group pressure and what a group stands for. To a degree, Congress controls the lobbyists. It prohibits some groups from ‘lobbying entirely (certain tax-exempt, non-profit groupe), allows a certain amount of lobbying by other groupe (cer- tain tax-exempt, non-profit groups), and permits virtually unfet- fered lobbying by a third large clasp of organizations. To differing degrees, it controls the amount and type of lobbying that can be done under a Federal contract by defense contractors, civilian con- tractors and non-profit grantees. Congress statutorily prohibits the use of appropriated funds for lobbying, but has difficulty drawing the line at where information exchange ends and lobbying begins: for example, it has traditionally provided office space for Pentagon liaison offices, whose job in large part is to promote the Depart- ment of Defense's legislative agenda. Congressional investigations of alleged lobbyist improprieties or illegalities often place. Mem- bers, themselves, at the center of attention, since they are the lob- byiste’ target. Even in their ordinary, day-today relationships with lobbyists, Members of Congress must make ethical and moral judg- ‘ments about the nature of special interest influence.vw Efforts by Congress to make lobbyists disclose some of their ac- tivities have met with more failure than success. In this regard, Congress must contend with two compelling and conflicting points of view: first, that the Congress and the public are well-served by the disclosure of private pressures on public issues, and second, that almost all lobbying is constitutionally protected. ‘These efforts to require disclosure focus even more sharply the complexities and conflicts of Congress-pressure group relationships. ‘The single omnibus disclosure statute—the 1946 Federal Regula- tion of Lobbying Act (2 U.S.C. 261-270)—was substantially nar- rowed by a 1954 Supreme Court. decision.! As a result of the Court’s decision, present implementation of the act poorly reflects the oxtent of lobbying i AWashington;, that is, many, who as generally seem to be lobbyists are no longer required to regisler under the law. To some, this is as it should be; the Court has pro- tected the primacy of the individual’s right to petition. Over the years, however, other Members of Congress have sought to provide @ more accurate picture of lobbying pressures. Often, these efforts for change have been precipitated by political scandal involving ac: cusations of lobbyist im ies. At those times, congressional investigations, have result in recommendations to expand the law's coverage. Public sentiment in the aftermath of scandal has often favc 2 broader law. In recent years, following the Water- gate and Koreagate scandals, the House approved a new diccloaure bill twice and the Senate once, but no law was enacted. After years of debate and political controversy, Congress has yet to find a bal. ance between the desirability of disclosure and the protection of ithe complenly of Congres relations complexity of pressure: p relationships, particu- larly as reflected by. governmental. ‘offorts ‘to control lobbying, is one theme of this report. Another is that Congress could continue its efforts to strengthen the Lobbying Act ‘Chapter one reviews the history of lobbying in America, early ef- forts by Congress to control lobbyists, and the debate over whether interest groups are a positive or a harmful force in the American governmental system; it also sketches some of the techniques that comprise the job of the lobbyist. Chapter two decribes the growth of lobbying in recent years, the professional representation of increasingly diverse social and eco- nomic interests, and the scope of regulations by which Congress has sought lobbyist aecountability Chapter three analyzes the 1946 Lobby Act, its origins in con- gressional inve gations of lobbying in the 1930s, its swift passage as part of the 1946 Legislative ‘ization Act, its diminish- ‘ment by the Supreme Court, and subsequent efforts to revitalize it. Chapter four analyzes the major rationales for disclosure, includ- ing the Supreme Court's determination in its 1954 decision and current theories of pro-disloaure advocates, The chapter seeks to determine. if there is a middle ground between First Amendment rights and the need to .be informed about private ‘pressures on "US Harry 841 US 61211960, vu Public policies where Congress could agree upon an effective for of disclosure, Chapter five atterapts a Jook into the future of lobbying and Con gress pressure group relationships. It draws upon several views 0 the future of interest groups in society and questions whethe lobby disclosure would have a role in the pressure group politics o the future. Chapter six concludes the report by offering a range of option for congressional action. These options extend from repealing th 1946 Act entirely, through broadening the 1946 Act by mandatin, criminally enforced disclosure requirements, to a system of volun tary disclosure. ie Primary source for this report is the hearings held by th Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on oversight of th 1946 Federal Regulstion of Lobbying Act, on November 15 and 16 19832 The hearings were significant for several reasons. First unlike past hearings on this issue, these were not precipitated by accusations of lobbyist impropriety, but by the committee's belie that the issue of lobbyist disclosure could best be considered in ar atmosphere of restraint and deliberation. Second, unlike most pas inquiries, witnesses included not only affected parties, but expert from the academic community and noted practitioners of the lobby ing profession. Not since the broad investigations of a 1950 Hous Select Committee on Lobbying—informally called the Buchanat Committee after Chairman Frank Buchanan of Pennsylvania—ha the issue recvived such a comprehensive review.” Thitd, the hear {nga i not focus on one bill of 1, but sought to accumulate 4 body of information from which futuré proposals could be devel In addition to congressional and other ‘public documents, the report relies on works from the disciplines of political science, soc! ology and political story. In diseusing fhe history of lobby dele sure, this paper relies particularly on study prepared for the 197 Commission on the Operation of the Senate.* 2S, Congo, Senate, Commitee on Governmental Afr. Overight of the 1948 Fader Regulation of Labytog At Hsaringy, Bah inet, 1082 Washington, US, Gov Pet Of 06d 5 pore ched we 186 Eaby Hoornge ee ra cores, rum, Sues Crmltae on Uv Avi The ol of tabring Repreentalle Ss Goveroment. Hearings Sit Congres Ss ton ash Waance Gop Beit Om 860 Ut p Grater Sed au 1900 Buchan Hearse) - US. Congress Sate. Cnniion ae the Operation ofthe Senate Senators OMe, Ethic, nd Pree lace Prt, th Congres, Bd soion, 1577 Washingion, US. Gove Brn ‘say ‘Com (tt, 1p 150192 Horner, cited su 077 Commence