3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.1.
2.2.

3.

3.3.

3.1.

3.

3.2.

March 1, 2007

 3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.1.
2.2.

3.

3.3.

3.1.

3.2.

1.1.
1.2.
1.3.
1.4.

2.1.
2.2.

3.1.
3.2.
3.3.


3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.1.
2.2.

3.

3.3.

3.1.

3.2.

. ,
H,
L
H + L = 14.

U = U(L, M).

M = w H = w (14 L).

( 14 L )


(L , M )
.

24 14


3.

w w
?

. E E
.
, (
)
.

Outline
1.

1.2.
1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

2.

2.2.

2.1.

3.

3.3.

3.1.

3.2.

.
1

(cash transfer) (in-kind

transfer)
3.

Outline
1.

1.2.
1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

2.

2.2.

2.1.

3.

3.3.

3.1.

3.2.

BC,

AF C.

i , i , i
,
j , j , j


.


?

AD

 (price subsidy)
3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.1.
2.2.

3.

3.3.

00

3.1.

3.2.

AG.


(p ) RE
.


BC
,
E

(E ) .



.

AD


3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.1.
2.2.

3.

3.3.

3.1.

3.2.

(marginal benefit)
,

(willingness to pay)
.



(consumers
surplus) .
(producers
surplus)

,


(economic surplus)
.

3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.1.
2.2.

3.

3.3.

3.1.

3.2.

?
()
.



,
(equivalent variation)


.

()


?
.


3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.2.

2.1.

3.

3.2.
3.3.

3.1.

CV, EV I
x p p p
M .
U , U
.
0
x

1
x

CV = E (p1x , px , U1 ) E (p1x , px , U0 ) = M E (p1x , px , U0 )

= E (p0x , px , U0 ) E (p1x , px , U0 )
EV = E (p0x , px , U1 ) E (p0x , px , U0 ) = E (p0x , px , U1 ) M
= E (p0x , px , U1 ) E (p1x , px , U1 )

, Shepards Lemma = x (p , p , U)
.
E
px

Z
CV =

p0x
p1x

Z
xc (px , px , U0 )dpx ,

EV =

p0x
p1x

xc (px , px , U1 )dpx


3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

CV, EV II



.

(CS) ,
CS, CV, EV
.

px
6

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.1.
2.2.

3.

p0x
p1x

3.2.
3.3.

D
xd (px , px , M)

3.1.

xc (px , px , U0 )

xc (px , px , U1 )

x x
p p
0
x

1
x

EV = p0x BDp1x

CS = p0x ADp1x

CV = p0x ACp1x


3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.1.
2.2.

3.

3.3.

3.1.

3.2.

(network effects) :
.
(bandwagon effect):

.
.

.
(snob effect):

.
.

.


3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.2.

2.1.

3.

3.3.

3.1.

3.2.

.
: P = (P , P )
Q = (x , y ) , Q = (x , y )
P Q P Q ,
Q Q (Q is revealed preferred to
Q .) .
: Q Q , Q Q
, Q Q Q
Q Q
(Q is indirectly revealed preferred to Q .) .
xo

y0


3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.1.
2.2.

3.

3.2.
3.3.

3.1.

P Q
Q , P
Q
Q .
P Q < P Q
Q Q
. Q
Q
.
0


3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.1.
2.2.

3.

3.3.

3.1.

3.2.

Q
Q Q

Q
Q
.

.
P Q
P Q ,
Q Q .
P Q P Q P Q > P Q
(weak axiom) :
Q1
.
(strong axiom) :
Qn
Q0


3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.1.
2.2.

3.

3.3.

3.1.

3.2.

F
.



. ,




.


3.

Outline
1.

(Laspeyres quantity index) :

1.2.
1.3.
1.4.

LQ

1.1.

2.

2.2.

2.1.

PQ

3.1.

Px0 x0 + Py0 y0

P0 Q1
P0 Q0

(Paasche quantity index) :

.

3.

3.2.
3.3.

Px0 x1 + Py0 y1

Px1 x1 + Py1 y1
Px1 x0 + Py1 y0

P1 Q1
P1 Q0

.
P 1 .
. , L > 1
, P < 1 .
LQ 1
Q


3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.1.
2.2.

3.

3.3.

3.1.

3.2.


3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

,
.
(Laspeyres price index) :
.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.1.
2.2.

3.

3.3.

LP

Px0 x0 + Py0 y0

(Paasche price index) :

.

3.1.

3.2.

Px1 x0 + Py1 y0

PP

Px1 x1 + Py1 y1
Px0 x1 + Py0 y1

P1 Q0
P0 Q0

P 1 Q1
P 0 Q1

N N =
=

, .
M1
M0

PQ 1 N LP ,

Px1 x1 +Py1 y1
Px0 x0 +Py0 y0

LQ 1 N PP

P1 Q1
P0 Q0


3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.1.
2.2.

3.

3.2.
3.3.

3.1.

p, 1 p
, .

x, y
(lottery)

(x, y; p, 1 p) (x, y; p)

.
(x, y; p) = (y, x; 1 p)
x = (x, y; 1) = (y, x; 0)
y = (x, y; 0) = (y, x; 1)

b w
. , x
.
b%x%w

 I
3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.1.
2.2.

3.

3.3.

3.1.

3.2.

U() , U(b) = 1, U(w) = 0

.
(continuity) : x
0 p 1 .
x

x (b, w; px )

(1)

(b, w; p), (b, w; q)

p > q. ,
(unequal probability) :

(b, w; p)  (b, w; q)

p>q

(2)

 II
3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.1.
2.2.

3.

3.2.
3.3.

3.1.

x, y
(x, z; p) (y, z; p) . ,

(independence) :
xy

(x, z; p) (y, z; p)

(3)

(x, y; p)
.

(compound probabilities) :
x (b, w; px ), y (b, w; py )

(x, y; p) ((b, w; px ), (b, w; py ); p)

, b w

. ,
((b, w; px ), (b, w; py ); p) (b, w; ppx + (1 p)py )

(4)


3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.1.
2.2.

3.

3.2.
3.3.

3.1.

x (b, w; p ), y (b, w; p )
p U(x) p U(y)
.
(x, y; p) (b, w; pU(x) + (1 p)U(y))
(x, y; p) U(x, y; p)
.
x

U(x, y; p) = pU(x) + (1 p)U(y)

(5)

(5)
(x, y; p) x U(x) y
U(y) .
(expected utility function,
Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function) .

,
.

 I
3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.1.
2.2.

3.

3.3.

3.1.

,

. , x y U(x), U(y)
(x, y; p)
U(x, y; p) = pU(x) + (1 p)U(y)

(x, y; p) px + (1 p)y ,
()
. ,

3.2.

U[px + (1 p)y] > pU(x) + (1 p)U(y) = U(x, y; p)

(6)

(risk averse)
.

 II
3.

Outline
1.

1.2.
1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

2.

2.1.
2.2.

3.

3.2.
3.3.

3.1.

, ()

(risk loving)
.
U[px + (1 p)y] < pU(x) + (1 p)U(y) = U(x, y; p)

(7)

.
()
(risk neutral)
.


3.

Outline
1.

1.2.
1.3.
1.4.

U()
6
U(y)

2.

2.2.

2.1.

U[px + (1 p)y]





 c- 





pU(x) + (1 p)U(y)

3.

3.3.




3.1.

3.2.

U(M)





1.1.

U(x)

CE

px + (1 p)y

(M)
-


3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.1.
2.2.

3.

3.3.

3.1.

3.2.

.

.
(certainty equivalence) .
, (risk premium)

.
(x, y; p)
CE , c .


3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.1.
2.2.

3.

3.3.

3.1.

3.2.

w
L .
p.
, q
q .
.
U[(wLq+q), (wq) ; p] = pU[wL+(1)q]+(1p)U[wq]

U
= pU0 [w L + (1 )q] (1 ) + (1 p)U0 [w q] ()
q
= p(1 )U0 [w L + (1 )q] (1 p)U0 [w q] = 0.


3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.1.
2.2.

3.

3.3.

3.1.

3.2.

, 2
2 U
= p(1 )2 U00 [w L + (1 )q] + (1 p)2 U00 [w q] < 0
q2

,
U < 0 2 .
1 .
00

U0 [(w q) (L q)] (1 p)
=
U0 [w q]
p(1 )

(8)

 I
3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.1.
2.2.

3.

3.3.

3.1.

3.2.

?
q pq
0.
(8) 1 ,
L = q . ,
.
> p ?
( p)q > 0.
(8) 1 L > q
( U ). ,
.
< p ( p)q < 0
.
=p

 II
3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.1.
2.2.

3.

3.3.

3.1.

3.2.

?
q . q = 0
.
.
U0 (w L) (1 p)
=
U0 (w)
p(1 )

.

. ,
.
,
.

.

 3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.2.

2.1.

3.

3.3.

3.1.

3.2.

1
2
3
4
5

Chapter 6. # 3.
(3pts) Chapter 6. # 6.
(3pts) Chapter 7. # 6.
(3pts) Chapter 7. # 9.
(10pts) 3
(p , p , p ) = (2, 2, 1)
(x , x , x ) = (2, 0, 2) , (p , p , p ) = (1, 2, 2)
(x , x , x ) = (0, 1, 1) , (p , p , p ) = (1, 4, 1)
(x , x , x ) = (4, 0, 0) .
?
(3pts)

 3.

Outline
1.

1.3.
1.4.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.1.
2.2.

3.

3.3.

3.1.

3.2.

SJ YJ
. SJ YJ 5
60%, 1 40% . SJ
M U(M) = M.
(1) YJ 2 , SJ YJ
? 3?
(2) SJ YJ . , p
x p .
(15pts) 100
M
U(M) = M . ,
36 20%
.
(1)
?
(2) B 18%, 20%
.
(3)
?
(20pts) 400