Compiled Case Digest in Persons and Family Relation Civil Code, Family Code

Persons and
Family
Relation
Compliled Case Digest
Bautista, Bryan, Bautista, Paulo, Bilas, Gelliane Christine, Bogbog, Aleli,
Bolide, Rouelli Gift, Corres, Kaiser John, De Guzman, Mageryl Shay, Diaz,
Charina, Donggayao, Bryan Christopher Gironella, Jsa Noble, Mabitazan,
Tedd, Macarimpas, Raihanah Sarah, Narag, Janro, Reyes, Jareed, Rosario,
Keouh, Savellano, Michael Nio Jesus, Solda, Ace Aries
Case Title
EFFECTIVITY
Lara v. Del Rosario
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY
Tanada v. Tuvera
Philippines International Trading Corp. v. Angeles
National Electrification Administration v. Gonzaga
Basa v. Mercado
Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives
Inc. v. Energy Regulatory Commission
COMPUTATION OF TIME
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown
People v. Del Rosario
G.R./SCRA No.
94 Phil 778
136 SCRA 27
G.R.
108461
No.
G.R.
158761
No.
G.R.
LNo.
42226
G.R.
192717
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
162155
L-7234
PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW

D.M. Consunji Inc v. Court of Appeals
People v. Gasacao
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
137873
168445
PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION
Yao Kee v. Sy Gonzales
Laureno v. Court of Appeals
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee v. V.P.
Eusebio Construction Inc.
PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS
Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals
Bernabe v. Alejo
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Stockholders
of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc.
Montanez v. Cipriano
Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice
WAIVER OF RIGHTS
Guy v. Court of Appeals
Persons and Family Relation
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
L55960
114776
140047
112193
140500
181556
181089
188056
163707
1
F.F. Cruz & Co.., Inc. v. HR Construction Corp.

People v. Morial
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
187521
129295
EXPRESS AND IMPLIED REPEAL

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown
Magkalas v. National Housing Authority
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
162215
5
138823
EFFECT OF REPEAL OF REPEALING LAW

Garcia v. Sandiganbayan
G.R.
No.
165835
STARE DECISIS
Ting v. Velez-Ting
Negros Navigation Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
166562
110398
LAW OF THE CASE

Fulgencio v. National Labor Relations
G.R.
No.
141600
OBITER DICTUM
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals
Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals
Ayala Corporation v. Rosa-Diana Realty and Development
Corporation
DURA LEX SED LEX
People v. Veneracion
CONCEPT OF CUSTOMS
Yao Kee v. Sy Gonzales
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
142947
146486
134284
249 SCRA 251

G.R.
No.
L55960
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
L30642
G.R.
No.
L24170
G.R.
No.
124371
EQUITY IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW

Floresca v. Philex Mining Corp.
Ursua v. Court of Appeals
112170
APPLICATION OF PENAL LAWS, EXCEPTIONS

Asaali v. Commissioner of Customs
NATIONALITY/ CITIZENSHIP THEORY
Llorente v. Court of Appeals
INCIDENTS OF SUCCESSION
Miciano v. Brimo
G.R.
No.
L22595
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
L16749
L23768
L27860
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
L68470
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
132344
17
RENVOI
Aznar v. Garcia
Bellis v. Bellis
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin
FORMS, SOLEMNITIES OF CONTRACTS, WILLS
Van Dorn v. Romillo
Bank of America NT and SA v. American Realty Co.
133876
PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS

University of the East v. Jader
G.F. Equity Inc. v. Valenzona
Go. V. Cordero
Villanueva v. Rosqueta
Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corp.
156841
164703
180764
184315
DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA

Custodio v. Court of Appeals
Equitable Banking Corporation v. Calderon
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
116100
156168
VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA

Hotel Nikko v. Reyes
G.R.
No.
154259
LIABILITY OF EX-MALEFICIO OR EX-DELICTO

Manuel v. People of the Philippines
Romero v. People of the Philippines
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
165842
167546
ACTS CONTRA BONOS MORES

Pe v. Pe
G.R.
No.
L17396
G.R.
No.
L14628
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals
Galang v. Court of Appeals

Gasheem Shookagt Baksh v. Court of Appeals
Wassmer v. Velez
Natividad v. Tunac
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
L17248
97336
L20089
143130
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Shinryo Company Inc. v. RRN Inc.
Car Cool Philippines v. USHIO Realty and Development
Corporation
Elegir v. Philippine Airlines
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
172525
138088
181995
PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE

Valenzuala v. Court of Appeals
G.R.
No.
L56168
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Concepcion v. Court of Appeals
Padalhin v. Lavina
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
120706
183026
NON-FEASANCE, MISFEASANCE, MALFEASANCE

Philex Mining Corp. v. Commisioner of Internal Revenue
G.R.
No.
125704
ACTION FOR DAMAGES BASED ON CRIME

Manantan v. Court of Appeals
Nuguid v. Nicdao
People v. Agacer
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
107152
150758
177751
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (OTHER SOURCES OF

OBLIGATIONS)
People v. Bayotas
Cancio, Jr. v. Isip
Heirs of Guaring v. Court of Appeals
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
102007
133978
108395
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (DEFAMATION, FRAUD,

PHYSICAL INJURIES)
Arafiles v. Philippine Journalists, Inc.
G.R.
No.
150256
International Flavors and Fragrance (Phils.) Inc. v. Argos

Ruiz v. Ucol
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
130362
L45404
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (VIOLATION OF

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS)
Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corp.
Cojuanco v. Court of Appeals
Manila Electric Company v. Castillocase
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
141309
119398
182976
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (QUASIDELICTS/TORTS)

Barredo v. Garcia
Safeguard Security Agency v. Tangco
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
48006
165732
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
City of Pasig v. COMELEC
Beltran v. People
Merced v. Diez
Donato v. Luna
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals
PRESUMPTIVE CIVIL PERSONALITY
Geluz v. Court of Appeals
RESTRICTIONS OR MODIFICATION ON CAPACITY TO
ACT
Catalan v. Basa
Domingo v. Court of Appeals
Mendezona v. Ozamis
Oposa v. Factoran Jr.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
165732
125646
L15315
L53642
150758
2 SCRA 801
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
159657
127540
143370
101083
KINDS OF DOMICILE
Marcos v. COMELEC
G.R.
No.
119976
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals

Bernabe v. Alejo
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
112193
140500
DEFINITION AND NATURE OF MARRIAGE

G.R.
No.
Adm.
No.
Ancheta v. Ancheta
Abadilla v. Tabiliran
145370
MTJ92-716
PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF EXISTENCE AND

VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE
Dela Rosa v. Heirs of Rustia vda. De Damian'
Eugenio v. Velez
Balogbog v. Court of Appeals
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
155733
85140
83598
LEGAL CAPACITY
Silverio v. Republic
Republic v. Cagandahan
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
174689
166676
AUTHORITY OF SOLEMNIZING OFFICER

Beso v. Judge Daguman
A.M.
No.
Aranes v. Occiano
A.M.
No.
MTJ991211
MTJ021390
MARRIAGE LICENSE
Alcantara v. Alcantara
Republic v. Court of Appeals
Carino v. Carino
Sy v. Court of Appeals
Sevilla v. Cardenas
Abbas v. Abbas
G.R.
167746
No.
477 SCRA 277
G.R.
132529
No.
330 SCRA 550
G.R.
167684
No.
G.R.
183896
No.
MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE

REQUIREMENT
Manzano v. Sanchez
A.M.
No.
MTJ001329
6
Ninal v. Badayog
Cosca v.Palaypayon
G.R.
No.
A.M.
No.
133778
MTJ92-721
MARRIAGE CEREMONY
Morigo v. People
G.R.
No.
145226
A.M.
No.
A.M.
No.
MTJ94-963
MTJ96-963
G.R.
No.
135216
THREE-FOLD LIABILITY
Moreno v. Bernabe
Navarro v. Domagtoy
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE
Vda. De Jacob v. Court of Appeals
FOREIGN DIVORCE
Republic v. Iyoy
Republic v. Obrecido III
Van Dorn v. Romillo
San Luis v. San Luis
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas
Garcia-Recio v. Recio
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
152577
154380
L68470
133743
186571
138322
NO MARRIAGE LICENSE
Atienza v. Brillantes
A.M.
No.
MTJ92706
BIGAMOUS/ POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES

Enriquez Vda. De Catalan v. Catalan Lee
Quita v. Court of Appeals
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals
Jarillo v. People of the Philipppines
Macarrubo v. Macarrubo
Weigel v. Sempio Dy
Montanez v. Cipriano
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
A.C.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
183622
124862
150758
164435
6148
L53703
181089
7
No.
VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES
Republic v. Nolasco
Bienvenido v. Court of Appeals
Manuel v. People of the Philippines
Republic v. Bermudes
Calisterio v. Calisterio
Republic v. Granada
G.R.
94053
No.
477 SCRA 277
G.R.
111717
No.
G.R.
165842
No.
G.R.
160258
No.
G.R.
136467
No.
G.R.
187512
No.
MARRIAGE IN VIOLATION OF ART. 40 FC

Domingo v. Court of Appeals
Atienza v. Brillantes
G.R.
No.
A.M.
No.
108481
8
MTJ92706
CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals and Lao
Santos v. Court of Appeals
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals
Yambao v. Republic of the Philippines
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
119190
112019
126010
184063
GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL

INCAPACITY
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina
Barcelona v. Court of Appeals
Tongol v. Tongol
Marcos v. Marcos
Te v. Te
Agraviador v. Agraviador
Marable v. Marable
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
108763
130087
157610
136490
161793
170729
178741
Aurelio v. Aurelio
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
175367
159594
OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL

INCAPACITY
Republic v. Encelan
Mendoza v. Republic
Republic v. Galang
Ochosa v. Alano
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes
Toring v. Toring
Ligeralde v. Patilunghug
Suazo v. Suazo
Aspillaga v. Aspillaga
Alcazar v. Alcazar
Najera v. Najera
Halili v. Santos-Halili
Paras v. Paras
Zamora v. Court of Appeals
Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris
Antonio v. Reyes
Carating v.-Siayngco v. Siayngco
Villalon v. Villalon
Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals
Republic v. Quintero-Hamano
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
170022
157649
168796
167459
185286
165321
168796
164493
170925
174451
164817
165424
147824
141917
162368
155800
158896
167206
127358
149498
9
Dedel v. Court of Appeals

Republic v. Dagdag
Pesca v. Pesca
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
151867
109975
136921
ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF

MARRIAGE, GROUNDS
Mallion v. Alcantara
G.R.
No.
141528
G.R.
No.
112597
PROPER ACTION AND PROCEDURE

Leonor v. Court of Appeals
PARTIES
Juliajvo-Llave v. Republic
Enrico v. Heirs of Medinaceli
Catalan v. Court of Appeals
Ninal v. Badayog
Carlos v. Sandoval
Ablaza v. Republic
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
169766
173614
167109
133778
179922
158298
APPEARANCE OF THE STATE

Maquilan v. Maquilan
Republic v. Cuison-Melgar
Malcampo-Sin v. Sin
Tuason v. Court of Appeals
Corpus v. Ochotorena
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
A.M.
No.
155409
139676
137590
116607
RTJ-041861
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT ON THE

PLEADINGS
Pacete v. Carriaga
G.R.
No.
L53880
FINAL JUDGMENT AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS

Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis
Ty v. Court of Appeals
G.R.
No.
G.R.
138509
127406
10
No.
EFFECTS
Valdes v. RTC and Valdes
Dino v. Dino
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
122749
178044
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES, CONCEALMENT

Villaneva v. Court of Appeals
Anaya v. Palaroan
Buccat v. Buccat-Mangonon
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
132955
L27930
47101
FORCE, INTIMIDATION, UNDUE INFLUENCE

Villaneva v. Court of Appeals
Macarrubo v. Macarrubo
Reyes v. Zaballero
G.R.
No.
A.C.
No.
G.R.
No.
132955
6148
L-3561
DOCTRINE OF TRIENNIAL COHABITATION

Alcazar v. Alcazar
Jimenez v. Canizares
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
174451
132955
L12790
LEGAL SEPARATION, GROUNDS

Ong Eng Kiam v. Ong
Gaudioncio v. Penaranda
Prima Partosa-Jo v. Court of Appeals
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
15320
79284
82606
DEFENSES, CONDONATION/ PARDON

Arroyo v. Court of Appeals
Ginez v. Bugayong
People v. Zapata
De Ocampo v. Florenciano
DEFENSES, CONSENT
Matubis v. Praxedes
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
96602
L10033
L-3047
L13553
L11
People v. Schneckenburger
People v. Sensano
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
11766
48183
37720
DEFENSES, MUTUAL GUILT

Benedicto v. De La Rama
G.R.
No.
1056
G.R.
No.
L13553
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
L10699
L13553
L29138
DEFENSES, COLLUSION
DEFENSES, PRESCRIPTION
Brown v. Yambao
Contreras v. Macaraig
ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION, PROCEDURE
Banez v. Banez
Lapuz Sy v. Eufemio
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
132592
L30977
MANDATORY COOLING-OFF PERIOD

Araneta c. Concepcion
Somosa-Ramos v. Vamenta Jr.
Pacete v. Carriaga
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
L-9667
L34132
L53880
NECESSITY OF TRIAL AND INTERVENTION OF STATE

Pacete v. Carriaga
G.R.
No.
L53880
LEGAL SEPARATION PENDENTE LITE

Sabalones v. Court of Appeals
Espiritu and Layug v. Court of Appeals
Lapuz Sy v. Eufemio
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
106169
115640
L30977
DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION

Laperal v. Republic
Siochi v. Gozon
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
L18008
169900
12
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES

Pelayo v. Lauron
Go v. Court of Appeals
Arroyo v. Vasquez-Arroyo
Illusorio v. Bildner-Illusorio
Goitia v. Campos Rueda
Cuenca v. Cuenca
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
129295
114791
17014
139789
11263
L-7231
PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION TO EACH OTHER

Arcaba v. Vda De Batocael
Matabuena v. Cervantes
Harding v. Commercial Union Assurance Company
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
146683
L28771
12707
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY, COMPONENTS

Navarro v. Escobido
Imani v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
153788
143286
187023
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY, EXCLUDED

PROPERTY
Ching v. Court of Appeals
Tan v. Court of Appeals
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
124642
120594
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY, DISSOLUTION

In Re Muller v. Muller
G.R.
No.
149615
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, COMPONENTS

Dela Pena v. Avila
Titan Construction Co. v. David
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
187490
169584
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, LIABILITIES

Ayala Investment & Development Co. v. Court of Appeals
G.R.
No.
188305
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, DISPOSITION
13
Heirs of Go, Sr. v. Servavio

Ros v. Philippine National Bank
Siochi v. Gozon
Aggabao v. Parulan
Fuentes v. Roca
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
157537
170166
169900
165803
178902
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, DISSOLUTION

Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v Pascual
G.R.
No.
163744
G.R.
No.
176556
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, LIQUIDATION

Quiao v. Quiao
VOID MARRIAGES OR LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIPS
Dino v. Dino
Maxey v. Court of Appeals
Carino v. Carino
Valdes v. RTC and Valdes
Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals
Maquilan vs. Maquilan
Gonzales vs. Gonzales
Mercado-Fehr vs. Fehr
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
178044
L45870
132529
122749
127358
155409
159521
152716
BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIPS

Carino v. Carino
Tumlos v. Fernandez
Francisco v. Master Iron Works
Joaquino v. Reyes
Saguid vs. Court of Appeals
Juaniza v. Jose
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
132529
137650
151967
154645
150611
L5012714
28
Adriano v. Court of Appeals
COVERAGE OF FAMILY RELATIONS
Guerrero v. Regional Trial Court
SUITS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY
Hiyas v. Acuna
Hontiveros v. Regional Trial Court
Vda. De Manalo v. Court of Appeals
PROHIBITED COMPROMISE
Mendoza v. Court of Appeals
FAMILY HOME
Trinidad-Ramos v. Pangilinan
Modequillo v. Breva
Josef v. Santos
Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Product, Inc.
Gomez v. Sta. Ines
Manacop v. Court of Appeals
Taneo v. Court of Appeals
Fortaleza v. Lapitan
G.R.
No.
124118
229 SCRA 274

500 SCRA 514
309 SCRA 340
G.R.
129242
No.
475 SCRA 1
19 SCRA 756
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
185920
86355
165060
172263
132537
97898
108532
178288
KINDS/ STATUS OF CHILDREN

De Asis v. Court of Appeals
Fernandez v. Fernandez
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
108532
143256
ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY, GROUNDS

Concepcion v. Court of Appeals
Angeles v. Maglaya
Jao v. Court of Appeals
Babiera v. Catotal
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
123450
153798
L49162
138493
15
ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY

Liyao, Jr.v. Tanhoti-Liyao
De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
138961
142877
ACTION TO CLAIM LEGITIMACY

Tijing v. Court of Appeals
G.R.
No.
125901
VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION
Cabatania v. Court of Appeals
Eceta v. Eceta
Alberto v. Court of Appeals
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
124814
157037
86639
COMPULSORY RECOGNITION
Rivero v. Court of Appeals
People v. Bayani
People vs. Manahan
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
141273
120894
128157
PROOF OF ILLEGITIMACY
Nepomuceno v. Lopez
Rivera vs. Heirs of Villanueva
Cruz v. Cristobal
Perla v. Baring
G.R.
181258
No.
496 SCRA 135
G.R.
140422
No.
G.R.
172471
No.
PROBATIVE VALUE OF DNA TESTS IN PATERNITY

CASES
Tijing v. Court of Appeals
Agustin v. Court of Appeals
Herrera v. Alba
People v. Vallejo
Estate of Ong v. Diaz
G.R.
125901
No.
460 SCRA 315
460 SCRA 197
G.R.
144656
No.
G.R.
171713
No.
COMPULSORY RECOGNITION
Guy v. Court of Appeals
Marquino v. Itermediate Appelaye Court
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
163707
72078
16
Tayag v. Tayag-Gallor
G.R.
No.
174680
RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

Briones v. Miguel
Republic v. Abadilla
Verceles v. Posada
People v. Glabo
Tonog v. Court of Appeals
Mossesgeld v. Court of Appeals
Silva v. Court of Appeals
David v. Court of Appeals
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
156343
133054
159785
129248
122906
111455
114742
111180
RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN

De Santos v. Angeles
Abadilla v. Tabiliran
WHO MAY ADOPT
Republic v. Toledano
Republic v. Alarcon-Vergara
G.R.
105619
No.
249 SCRA 448
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
100835
94147
95551
REQUIREMENTS FOR ADOPTION

In re: adoption of Michelle and Michael Lim
Landingin v. Republic
Cang v. Court of Appeals
Department of Social Welfare and Development v. Belen
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
A.M.
No.
168992
164948
105308
RTJ-961362
NATURE AND EFFECTS OF ADOPTION

Republic v. Hernandez
In re: adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
117209
103695
148311
17
No.
G.R.
No.
Teotico v. Del Val
L18753
RESCISSION OF ADOPTION
Lahom v. Sibulo
G.R.
No.
143989
G.R.
No.
131286
SUPPORT
Lam v. Chua
WHO IS ENTITLED TO SUPPORT
Briones v. Miguel
Quimiging v. Icao
Francisco v. Zandueta
Santero v. Court of Appeals
Gotardo v. Buling
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
156343
L26795
43794
L61700
165166
WHEN DEMANDABLE
Lacson v Lacson
G.R.
No.
150644
WHO MUST PAY SUPPORT

Lim v. Lim
Verceles v. Posada
Mangonon v. Court of Appeals
De Guzman v. Perez
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
163209
159785
125041
156013
RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS WHO PAY

Lacson v. Lacson
G.R.
No.
150644
SUPPORT PENDENT LITE

Estate of Ruiz v. Court of Appeals
G.R.
No.
118671
G.R.
No.
L48219
G.R.
No.
114742
SUPPORT DURING PROCEEDINGS

Reyes v. Ines-Luciano
CHARACTERISTICS OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Silva v. Court of Appeals
18
WHO EXERCISES PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND

CUSTODY
Tonog v. Court of Appeals
Vancil v. Belmes
Bondagjy v. Fouzi Ali Bondagjy
Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals
Sombong v. Court of Appeals
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
122906
133323
140817
116773
111876
TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE

Gamboa-Hirsch v. Court of Appeals
Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto
Golangco v. Court of Appeals
David v. Court of Appeals
Espiritu v. Court of Appeals
Perez v. Court of Appeals
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
174485
154994
113054
124724
111180
115640
118870
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PERSONS EXERCISING

PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Libi v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Tamargo v. Court of Appeals
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
70890
85044
SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY

Aquinas School v. Inton
St. Joseph's College v. Miranda
St. Mary's Academy v. Carpitanos
Amadora v. Court of Appeals
Salvosa v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Philippine School of Business Administration v. Court of
Appeals
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
184202
182353
143363
L47745
L70458
84698
19
USE OF SURNAME BY WOMEN

Remo v. Scretary of Foreign Affairs
Yasin v. Judge Shari's District Court
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
169202
94986
USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN

In re: adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
In re Julian Lim Wang
In re Change of name of Maria Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte
USE OF DIFFERENT NAME
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
People v. Estrada
Ursua v. Court of Appeals
148311
159966
L51201
164368
112170
AMMENDMENTS/ CORRECTIONS OF ENTRIES

Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo
Lee v. Court of Appeals
In re change of name of Julian Wang
Silverio v. Republic
Republic v. Cagandahan
Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himalayan City
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
No.
189476
118387
159966
174689
166676
181174
EFFECTIVITY
LARA vs. DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. L-6339
April 20,
1954
Facts:
In 1950 defendant Petronilo Del Rosario, Jr., owner of twenty-five taxi
cabs or cars, operated a taxi business under the name of Waval Taxi. He
20
employed among others three mechanics and 49 chauffeurs or drivers, the

latter having worked for periods ranging from 2 to 37 months. On
September 4, 1950, without giving said mechanics and chauffeurs 30 days
advance notice, Del Rosario sold his 25 units or cabs to La Mallorca, a
transportation company, as a result of which, according to the mechanics
and chauffeurs above-mentioned they lost their jobs because the La
Mallorca failed to continue them in their employment. They brought this
action against Del Rosario to recover compensation for overtime work
rendered beyond eight hours and on Sundays and legal holidays, and one
month salary (mesada) provided for in article 302 of the Code of Commerce
because the failure of their former employer to give them one month
notices. Subsequently, the three mechanics unconditionally withdrew their
claims. So only the 49 drivers remained as plaintiffs.
Issue:
Whether or not the claim of the plaintiffs-appellants for overtime
compensation under the Eight-Hour Labor Law is valid.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the month pay (mesada) under article
302 of the Code of Commerce, article 2270 of the new Civil Code (Republic
Act 386) appears to have repealed said Article 302 when it repealed the
provisions of the Code of Commerce governing Agency. This repeal took
place on August 30, 1950, when the new Civil Code went into effect, that is,
one year after its publication in the Official Gazette. The alleged termination
of services of the plaintiffs by the defendant took place according to the
complaint on September 4, 1950, that is to say, after the repeal of Article
302 which they invoke. Moreover, said Article 302 of the Code of
Commerce, assuming that it were still in force speaks of salary
corresponding to said month. commonly known as mesada. If the
plaintiffs herein had no fixed salary either by the day, week, or month, then
computation of the months salary payable would be impossible. Article 302
refers to employees receiving a fixed salary.
21
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY
LORENZO M. TAADA vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915
April 24,
1985
Facts:
Petitioners herein are seeking a writ of mandamus to compel public
officials to publish and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and
administrative orders. Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that this
case has no legal personality or standing. Further, they argued that the
publication in the Official Gazette in necessary for the effectivity of the law
where the law themselves provides for their own effectivity dates.
Issue:
Whether or not the presidential decrees in question which contain
special provisions as to the date they are to take effect still need to be
published in the Official Gazette.
Ruling:
Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where
the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date, for then the
date of publication is material for determining the date of the effectivity
which must be 15 days following the completion of its publication, but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it goes to effect. Article 2
does not prevent the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even
if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The publication of all
presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures, or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose burdens on
the people, such as tax revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published
on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concern. The
Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application,
which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.
22
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION vs.HON.
PRESIDING JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES
G.R. No. 108641
October
21, 1996
Facts:
PITC issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which
applications to the PITC for importation from the Peoples Republic of China
must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed export program of
Philippine products. PITC barred Remington and Firestone from importing
products from China on the ground that they were not able to comply with
the requirement of the said administrative order. Thereafter they filed a
petition for prohibition and mandamus against the said order of PITC in
which the trial court upheld and declared to be null and void for being
unconstitutional. The court contends further authority to process and
approve applications for imports SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations
pursuant to LOI 144 has already been repealed by EO 133 issued on
February 27, 1987. Hence, the PITC filed a certiorari seeking the reversal of
the said decision.
Issue:
Whether or not PITCs Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that PITC is empowered to issue such order;
nevertheless, the said AO is invalid within the context of Article 2 of the
New Civil Code. The Court cited Tanada vs Tuvera which states that all
statues including those of local application and private laws shall be
published as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after
publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. The AO under
consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its
effectivity since it is punitive in character.
23
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY
NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION vs. VICTORIANO
B. GONZAGA
G.R. No. 158761
December 4, 2007
Facts:
On November 13, 2000, respondent Victoriano B. Gonzaga filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for membership in the Board of Directors of
Zamboanga Del Sur II Electric Cooperative, Inc., District II (ZAMSURECO).
Later that day, the screening committee resolved to disqualify respondent
because his spouse was an incumbent member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Diplahan, Zamboanga del Sur. Based on the Electric Cooperative Election
Code (ECEC), promulgated by petitioner National Electrification
Administration (NEA), a candidate whose spouse occupies an elective
government position higher than Barangay Captain is prohibited to run as
director of an electric cooperative. ZAMSURECOs by-laws, however, do not
provide for such ground for disqualification. Respondent averred that the
ECEC was null and void because it had not been published. NEA, on the
other hand, failed to prove whether the ECEC was indeed published in a
newspaper of general circulation as required by the New Civil Code and the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Issue:
24
Whether or not Electric Cooperative Election Code was null and void
for not complying with the publication requirement.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Electric Cooperative Election Code was
null and void for not complying with the publication requirement. It
observed that while ZAMSURECO complied with the requirements of filing
the code with the University of the Philippines Law Center, it offered no
proof of publication neither in the Official Gazette nor in a newspaper of
general circulation. Without compliance with the requirement of
publication, the rules and regulations contained in the ECEC cannot be
enforced and implemented. Article 2 of the New Civil Code provides that
laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. Covered by this rule are
presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated
by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose
is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
The ECEC applies to all electric cooperatives in the country. It is not a mere
internal memorandum, interpretative regulation, or instruction to
subordinates. Thus, the ECEC should comply with the requirements of the
Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987.
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY
JOAQUINA BASA, ET AL., vs. ATILANO G. MERCADO
G.R. No. L-42226
26, 1935
July
Facts:
Hon. Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of Pampanga CFI, allowed and
probated the last will and testament of Ines Basa, decedent. The same judge
also approved the account of the administrator of the estate, declared him
the only heir, and closed the administration proceedings. Joaquin Basa, et
al., filed a motion to reopen the proceedings, alleging that the court lacked
jurisdiction because there was failure to comply with the requirements as to
the publication of the notice of hearing.
They contended that the hearing took place only twenty-one days
after the date of first publication instead of three full weeks. Moreover, the
25
Ing Katipunan where the notice was published was not a newspaper of
general circulation as contemplated by law.
Issues:
a) Whether
or
not
there
was
compliance
with
the
publication requirement
b) Whether or not Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation
Ruling:
The language used in section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does
not mean that the notice, referred to therein, should be published for three
full weeks before the date set for the hearing of the will. In other words, the
first publication of the notice need not be made 21 days before the day
appointed for the hearing.
The records show that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general
circulation in view of the fact that it is published for the dissemination of
local news and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list
of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals and that the
trial court ordered the publication to be made in Ing Katipunan precisely
because it was a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of
Pampanga.
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN TAGALOG ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE,
INC. vs. ENERGY REGULATROY COMMISSION
G.R. No. 192117
September 18, 2012
26
Facts:
Petitioners Batangas I Electric Cooperative, Inc., Quezon I Electric
Cooperative, Inc., Quezon II Electric Cooperative, Inc. and Pampanga Rural
Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. are rural electric cooperatives established
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 269 or the National Electrification
Administration Decree. BATELEC I, QUEZELCO I and QUEZELCO II are
members of the Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives, Inc.
PRESCO is a member of the Central Luzon Electric Cooperatives
Association, Inc. Petitioners are engaged in the distribution of . On 8
December 1994, R.A. No. 7832 was enacted. The law imposed a limit on the
recoverable rate of system lossthat may be charged by rural electric
cooperatives to their consumers. The Implementing Rules and Regulations
of R.A. No. 7832 required every rural electric cooperative to file with the
Energy Regulatory Board on or before 30 September 1995, an application
for approval of an amended PPA Clause incorporating the cap on the
recoverable rate of system loss to be included in its schedule of rates. On 8
June 2001, R.A. No. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001
was enacted. Section 38 of the EPIRA abolished the ERB, and created the
Energy Regulatory Commission. The powers and functions of the ERB not
inconsistent with the provisions of the EPIRA were transferred to the ERC,
together with the applicable funds and appropriations, records, equipment,
property and personnel of the ERB. All electric cooperatives were directed
to implement the PPA in the manner the then Energy Regulatory Board had
prescribed. Subsequently, the ERC issued policy guidelines on the treatment
of discounts extended by power suppliers. Petitioners attack the validity of
the 22 March 2006 Order, 16 February 2007 Order, 7 December 2005
Order, and 27 March 2006 Order of the ERC directing the refund of overrecoveries for having been issued pursuant to ineffective and invalid policy
guidelines. Petitioners assert that the policy guidelines on the treatment of
discounts extended by power suppliers are ineffective and invalid for lack of
publication, non-submission to the U.P. Law Center, and their retroactive
application.
Issue:
Whether the policy guidelines issued by the ERC on the treatment of
discounts extended by power suppliers are ineffective and invalid for lack of
publication, non-submission to the University of the Philippines (U.P.) Law
Center, and their retroactive application.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that publication is a basic postulate of
procedural due process. Article 2 of the Civil Code, as amended by Section
1 of Executive Order No. 200, states that "laws shall take effect after fifteen
27
days following the completion of their publication either in the Official

Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it
is otherwise provided." Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative
powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. However, there
are several exceptions to the requirement of publication such as an
interpretative regulation. It seeks to regulate only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the general public. The policy guidelines of
the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are
interpretative regulations. The policy guidelines merely interpret R.A. No.
7832 and its IRR, particularly on the computation of the cost of purchased
power. The policy guidelines did not modify, amend, or supplant the IRR.
Hence, it is exempt from the publication requirement.
28
COMPUTATION OF TIME
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PRIMETOWN
PROPERTY GROUP, INC.
G.R. No. 162155
August
28, 2007
Facts:
On April 14, 1998 Primetown Property Group. Inc. filed its final
adjusted return. On March 11, 1999 Gilbert Yap, vice chair of Primetown
Property Group. Inc., filed for the refund or tax credit of income tax paid in
1997. However, it was not acted upon. Thus Primetown filed a petition for
review but the Court of Tax Appeals dismissed it claiming that it was filed
beyond the two-year reglementary period provided by section 229 of the
National Internal Revenue Code. The Court of Tax Appeals further argued
that in National Marketing Corp. vs. Tecson the Supreme Court ruled that a
year is equal to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap
year.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents petition was filed within the two-year
reglementary period.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the petition was filed within the twoyear reglementary period because Article 13 of the New Civil Code that
provides that a year is composed of 365 years is repealed by Executive
Order 292 or the Administrative Code of the Philippines. Under Executive
Order 292, a year is composed of 12 calendar months.
29
COMPUTATION OF TIME
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PAZ M. DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. L-7234
May 21, 1955
Facts:
On May 28, 1953, Paz M. Del Rosario committed slight physical
injuries. The information was filed on July 27, 1953. Thereupon, the accused
filed a motion to quash the information to ground that the offense charged
had already prescribed in accordance with Article 90 and 91 of the Revised
Penal Code. The municipal court sustained this motion and dismissed the
case. Thus, this appeal of dismissal is made directly to the court.
Issue:
Whether or not the offense charged to the plaintiff-appellant had
already prescribed.
Ruling:
The offense have not yet prescribed because the provision in the
Revised Penal Code does not provide the computation of month therefore it
must be supplied by Article 13 of the Civil Code which provides for the
computation of years, months, days and nights. According to Article 13 of
the Civil Code a month is a 30-day month not the solar or civil month.
Further, the Supreme Court held that the case took effect on May 28, 1953
after the New Civil Code take effect so the new provisions should apply.
30
PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW, EXCEPTIONS

D.M. CONSUNJI, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO
G.R. No. 137873
April
20, 2010
Facts:
Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors
from the Renaissance Tower, to his death. Jose Juegos widow then filed a
petition for damages in the Regional Trial Court against the deceased
employer. The employer raised the defense that Maria Juego already availed
of the benefits provided by the State Insurance Fund. Considering the
ruling in Pacarra vs. Cebu Autobus Company, an injured worker has a
choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the
Workmens Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action
against the tort fees for higher damages but he cannot pursue both actions
simultaneously. The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the
widow Maria Juego. On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is prohibited from recovering damages
under the Civil Code.
31
Ruling:
No. Respondent is not barred from recovering damages under the
Civil Code although she has already availed the benefits of the State
Insurance Fund. The respondents case is an exception because private
respondent was not aware of petitioners negligence when she filed her
claim for benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She was not only ignorant
of the facts, but of her rights as well. The decision of the court is affirmed.
PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW, EXCEPTIONS

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLORENCIO GASACAO
G.R. No. 168445
November
11, 2005
Facts:
Capt. Florencio O. Gasacao was the crewing manager of Great
Eastern Shipping Agency, Inc., which company was headed by his nephew.
On August 4, 2000 appellant and Jose Gasacao were charged with Large
Scale Illegal Recruitment. The appellant was arrested while his nephew
remained at large. The lower court found Capt. Gasacao guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of large scale illegal recruitment. The Court of Appeals
also affirmed the decision. Hence, Capt. Gasacao appealed to the Supreme
Court claiming that he cant be held liable for illegal recruitment because
he was just a mere employee of the manning agency. He also claimed that
he was not aware of the law against prohibition on bonds and deposits
32
under section 60 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations implementing R.A.

8042.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
large scale illegal recruitment.
Ruling:
There is no merit in appellants contention that he was just a mere
employee of the manning agency because he was the companys crewing
manager. As testified by the witnesses, the accused appellant actively
participated in the recruitment process from receiving job applications,
interviewing the applicants, and informing them of the agencys
requirement of payment of performance or cash bond prior to the
deployment. The Supreme Court held further that appellants defense of
ignorance is not commendable as provided for by Article 3 of the Civil Code
which states that ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith. The defense of goodwill is neither unavailable because the
appellant failed to deploy the complainants without valid reasons.
YAO KEE vs. AIDA SY-GONZALES
G.R. No. L-55960
24, 1988
November
Facts:
33
Sy Kiat, a Chinese National died on January 17, 1977, leaving behind

real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth more or less Php
300,000. Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe, and
Rodolfo Sy filed a petition alleging that they are the children of the
deceased with Asuncion Gillego. However, Yao Kee testified that she was
married to Sy Kiat on Jan. 19, 1981 through a Chinese marriage with Sze
Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Chun Yen as their children. Petitioners provided
that fact of marriage through evidences like Yao Kees and Gan Chings
testimony, Sy Kiats Master Card of Registration stating his marriage with
Yao Kee, and the certificate by the Embassy of the Peoples Republic of
China affirming the fact of the marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee was valid.
Ruling:
Under Article 71 of the Civil Code to establish the validity of foreign
marriages the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact must be
proven and the alleged foreign marriage must be proven by convincing
evidence. The petitioners have provided the fact of marriage however the
same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage with Chinese
Law or custom. In such absence of foreign law, the doctrine of processual
presumption must be applied. The Supreme Court then held that in the
absence of a foreign law it must be presumed as the same as ours. In the
Philippine Laws, a marriage cannot be valid without the presence of a
solemnizing officer; therefore the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee was null
and void.
34
LAUREANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 114776
2, 2000
February
Facts:
Menandro Laureano was employed with the Singapore Airlines
Limited on 1979. However because of the recession that hit the Airline
Industry sometime in 1982, Defendant Company initiated cost-cutting
measures such as terminating its A-300 pilots including the plaintiff.
Subsequently, plaintiff filed a case of illegal dismissal against defendant.
Laureano then cited Singapore Laws to his case since he was employed in
the Singapore Airlines Ltd.
Issue:
a) Whether or not Singaporean Laws shall be applied in this case.
b) Whether or not there was illegal dismissal on the part of Singapore
Airlines Ltd.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that foreign laws must be proved as fact in
order to employ them. The plaintiff was not able to prove the applicability of
the laws of Singapore that he cited to his case. Under the principle of
processual presumption, if foreign laws are not proved as facts it will be
presumed as the same as ours. Hence, Philippine Laws should apply.
Further, under Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, the
petitioners action for damages due to illegal dismissal has already
prescribed having been filed on January 8, 1987, or more than four (4) years
after the effective date has prescribed.
35
PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE
CORPORATION vs. V.P. EUSEBIO CONSTRUCTION, INC.
G.R. No. 140047
July
13, 2004
Facts:
On November 8, 1980, State Organization of Buildings, Ministry of
Housing, and Construction, Baghdad, Iraq, awarded the construction of the
Institute of Physical TherapyMedical Rehabilitation Center, Phase II, in
Baghdad, Iraq, to Ajyal Trading and Contracting Company, a firm duly
licensed with the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce.
On March 7, 1981, in behalf of Spouses Eduardo and Iluminada
Santos, 3-Plex International, Inc a local contractor engaged in construction
business, entered into a joint venture agreement with Ajyal. However since
it was not accredited under the Philippine Overseas Construction Board, it
had to assign and transfer all its right to VPECI and entered into an
agreement that the execution of the project will be under their joint
management. To comply with the requirements of performance bond, 3-Plex
and VPECI applied for the issuance of a guarantee with Philguarantee, a
government financial institution empowered to issue guarantees for
qualified Filipino contractors to secure the performance of approved service
contracts abroad. Subsequently, letters of guarantee were issued by
Philguarantee to the Rafidain Bank of Baghdad. Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait was
engaged to provide a counter-guarantee to Rafidain Bank, but it required a
similar counter-guarantee in its favor from the Philguarantee. The Surety
Bond was later amended to increase the amount of coverage and to change
the bank in whose favor the petitioner's guarantee was issued, from
Rafidain Bank to Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait. SOB and the joint venture VPECI
and Ajyal executed the service contract for the construction of the
project. However, they were not able to start the project on schedule
because of that surety bond was also extended and the Advance Payment
Guarantee was extended three times more until it was cancelled
for reimbursement.
36
On 26 October 1986, Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait sent a telex call to the

petitioner demanding full payment of its performance bond counterguarantee. VPECI advised the Philguarantee not to pay Al Ahli Bank
because efforts were being exerted for the amicable settlement of the
Project. VPECI received another telex message from Al Ahli Bank stating
that it had already paid to Rafidain Bank but VPEIC insisted on not paying
however Central Bank authorized the remittance to Al Ahli Bank.
Philguarantee informed VPECI that it would remit payment to Al Ahli Bank,
and reiterated the joint and solidary obligation of the respondents to
reimburse the Philguarantee for the advances made on its counterguarantee but they failed to pay so a case was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Philippine laws or Iraqs laws should be applied in
determining VPECI's failure to pay in the performance of its obligations
under the service contract.
Ruling:
Yes. In this case, the laws of Iraq bear important link to the contract,
since one of the parties is the Iraqi Government and the place of
performance is in Iraq. Consequently, the problem of whether respondent
VPECI evaded its obligations may be determined by the laws of Iraq.
However, those foreign laws of Iraq were not properly alleged and prove.
Under the doctrine of processual presumption, where a foreign law is not
pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign
law is the same as ours. Further, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner
guarantor should have waited for the natural course of guaranty. Petitioner
as a guarantor cannot be compelled to pay the creditor SOB unless the
property of the debtor VPECI has been exhausted and all
legal remedies against the said debtor have been resorted to by the
creditor. It could also set up compensation as regards what
the creditor SOB may owe the principal debtor VPECI. In this case,
however, the petitioner has clearly waived these rights and remedies by
making the payment of an obligation that was yet to be shown to be
rightfully due the creditor and demandable of the principal debtor.
37

JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 112193
March 31,
1996
Facts:
In 1959, Jose M. Aruego Sr., a married man, had an amorous
relationship with Luz M. Fabian until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of
this relationship were born Antonio Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego. On March
7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of
successional rights was filed by the minors, Antonia and Evelyn. However,
Jose Aruego Jr., and the petitioners also filed a complaint to declare the
private respondents as illegitimate children of their defunct father. The
lower court decided that Antonia Aruego is an illegitimate daughter or Jose
Aruego Sr., and Luz M. Fabian and that she is entitled to a share of equal to
38
one-half portion of share of the legitimate. So the petitioners filed a motion

for partial reconsideration alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the
trial court over the complaint by virtue of the passage of E.O. 209 or the
Family Code of the Philippines. It was denied, hence this petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the provisions of the Family Code be applied
retroactively.
Ruling:
Private respondents action for compulsory recognition as an
illegitimate child was brought under Book I, Title VIII of the Civil Code on
Persons under Art. 285 thereby stating that the recognition of natural
children is brought only the lifetime of the presumed parents except when
the parents die during the minority of the child. Petitioners, on the other
hand submit that with the New Family Code on August 31, 1988, the trial
court lost jurisdiction on the ground of prescription. Further, the Family
Code provides that it shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
impair the vested right of others. The Supreme Court held that the present
law which is the Family Code cannot be applied retroactively because its
application will impair the vested right of the respondent to have her case
decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code which has vested to her by the
fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code.

BERNABE vs. ALEJO
G.R. No. 140500
January
21, 2002
39
Facts:
Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary,
Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981and was named
Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe died as well as his legitimate wife,
leaving Ernestina Bernabe the sole surviving heir.
Carolina, in behalf of her son, filed a complaint praying that Adrian be
declared an acknowledged child of the deceased and also be given the share
of Bernabes estate. Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint and said
that the death of the putative father had barred the action. Further, under
the law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be
brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent to give the latter an
opportunity to either affirm or deny the childs filiation.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the rights of Adrian are governed
under Article 285 of the Civil Code which allows an action for recognition to
be filed within 4 years after the child has attained the age of majority and
that subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away his right.
Issue:
Whether or not Adrian Bernabe may be declared an acknowledged
illegitimate son.
Ruling:
The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still
a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new
code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that illegitimate children
are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family
being aware of their existence. Furthermore, the grounds or instances for
the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the filiation
of spurious children. Hence, the petition was denied and assailed decision
was affirmed.
40

PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION vs.
STOCKHOLDERS OF INTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC.
G.R. No. 181556
December 14,
2009
Facts:
The
Central
Bank
of
the
Philippines,
now
known
as BangkoSentralngPilipinas, filed on June 17, 1987 with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of
Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (Intercity Bank) alleging that said
bank was already insolvent and its continuance in business would involve
probable loss to depositors, creditors and the general public. The trial court
gave it due course.Petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation was
eventually substituted as the therein petitioner, liquidator of Intercity Bank.
In the meantime, Republic Act No. 9302 which provides that After the
payment of all liabilities and claims against the closed bank, the
Corporation shall pay any surplus dividends at the legal rate of interest,
from date of takeover to date of distribution, to creditors and claimants of
the closed bank in accordance with legal priority before distribution to the
shareholders of the closed bank. Relying on Republic Act No. 9302 PDIC
filed on August 8, 2005 a Motion for Approval of the Final Distribution of
Assets and Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings
Issue:
Whether or not Section 12 of RA 9302 should be applied retroactively
in order to entitle Intercity Bank creditors to surplus dividends.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Statutes are prospective and not
retroactive in their operation, they being the formulation of rules for the
future, not the past. Hence, the legal maxim lex de futuro, judex de
praeterito the law provides for the future, the judge for the past, which is
articulated in Article 4 of the Civil Code: Laws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided. The reason for the rule is the
tendency of retroactive legislation to be unjust and oppressive on account of
its liability to unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior
transactions. Further, a perusal of RA 9302 shows that nothing indeed
therein authorizes its retroactive application. In fact, its effectivity clause
indicates a clear legislative intent to the contrary, Section 28. Effectivity
Clause. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following the completion
of its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.
41

MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTANEZ vs. LOURDES TAJOLOSA
CIPRIANO
G.R. No. 181089
October
22, 2012
Facts:
On April 8, 1976, Lourdes Tajolosa married Socrates Flores. On
January 4, 1983 Lourdes re-married Silverio V. Cipriano. In 2001,
respondent filed a Petition for the Annulment in the Regional Trial Court in
the ground of psychological incapacity as defined in Article 36 of the Family
Code. On July 8, 2003, the marriage was declared null and void. On May 14,
2004, Silverios daughter filed a complaint of bigamy against Lourdes under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Lourdes then contended that sine her
two marriages were contracted prior to the Family Code, Article 40 cannot
be retroactive effect because it will impair her right to remarry without
need of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. The RTC
dismissed the complaint ruling that the existing law at the time of the
second marriage do not require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a
condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage. The complainant
then filed a motion for reconsideration but the decision rendered was again
in favor of the respondent. Hence, this petition was filed.
Issue:
Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment
of the Family Code is a valid defense for the crime of bigamy.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the subsequent judicial declaration of
the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated.
The Supreme Court ruled further that what is required for a crime of
42
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the
second marriage is contracted. Even the accused eventually secured a
declaration that his first marriage is a void ab initio, the first and second
marriage was subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. Also, Art.
40 should be applied retroactively because it does not prejudice or impair
the right of anyone. The petition is thereby granted.

DACUDAO vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 188056
2013
January 8,
Facts:
Petitioners were among the investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles,
Jr. and his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies allegedly defrauded
through the Legacy Group's "buy back agreement" that earned them check
payments that were dishonored. After their written demands for the return
of their investments went unheeded, they initiated a number of charges for
syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Davao City on February 6, 2009.
On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of
Justice (DOJ) Order No. 182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional State
Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City Prosecutors to forward all
cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the
DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action. Thereafter, the
petitioners directly went to the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to respondent Secretary of Justice
grave abuse of discretion in issuing DOES No 182. They further argued that
43
DO No. 182 was an obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule against
enactment of laws with retroactive effect.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of DOJ Order No. 182 should cover only
future cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al., not those already being
investigated.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that as a general rule, laws shall have no
retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist, and one such exception
concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a remedial
statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not
create new rights or take away vested rights but only operates in
furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation of already existing rights.A
statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage.
All procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The
retroactive application is not violative of any right of a person who may feel
adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right generally attaches to or arises
from procedural laws. Therefore DOJ Order No. 182 can be applied
retroactively in the cases the petitioners filed against Delos Angeles.
WAIVER OF RIGHTS
MICHAEL C. GUY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 163707
September 15, 2006
Facts:
On October 29, 1992, Sima Wei died in Makati City leaving an estate
valued 10 million more or less. His known heirs are his spouse Shirley Guy
with their children five children. On June 13, 1997, private respondents
Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei represented by their mother
Remedios filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional
Trial Court alleging that they are duly acknowledged illegitimate children of
44
Sima Wei. However, petitioner and co-heirs alleged that private

respondents claim had been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished by Remedios June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim
stating that in exchange for the financial and educational support received
from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of
Sima Wei and any and all liabilities.
The petition was denied in the lower court and the motion for
reconsidered dismissed in the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition was
made.
Issue:
Whether or not the Release and Waiver of Claim bar respondents from
claiming successional rights.
Ruling:
The Release and Waiver of Claim does not bar respondents from
claiming successional rights because it does not state with clarity the
purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received Php
300,000 and an educational plan for her daughters. The document does not
specifically mention private respondents hereditary rights, hence it cant be
construed as a waiver of successional rights. The Supreme Court held that
under Art. 1044 of the Civil Code any inheritance left to minors or
incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parent or guardian. Parents
may repudiate the inheritance only by judicial authorization. Not having
been judicially approved, the release and waiver claim is null and void. The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
WAIVER OF RIGHTS
F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC. vs. HR CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
45
G.R. No. 187521
March 14,
2012
Facts:
Sometime in 2004, FFCCI entered into a contract with the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for the construction of
the Magsaysay Viaduct, known as the Lower Agusan Development Project.
On August 9, 2004, FFCCI, in turn, entered into a Subcontract Agreement
with HR Construction Corporation (HRCC) for the supply of materials, labor,
equipment, tools and supervision for the construction of a portion of the
said project called the East Bank Levee and Cut-Off Channel in accordance
with the specifications of the main contract. Pursuant to the Subcontract
Agreement, HRCC would submit to FFCCI a monthly progress billing which
the latter would then pay, subject to stipulated deductions, within 30 days
from receipt thereof.
The parties agreed that the requests of HRCC for payment should
include progress accomplishment of its completed works as approved by
FFCCI. Additionally, they agreed to conduct a joint measurement of the
completed works of HRCC together with the representative of DPWH and
consultants to arrive at a common quantity. Thereafter, HRCC commenced
the construction of the works pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement.
However, before the project was completed, HRCC pursuant to the
arbitration clause in the subcontract agreement filed with the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission a complaint praying that FFCI pay the
overdue application plus legal interests they have not paid. FFCCI
maintained that HRCC failed to comply with the condition stated under the
Subcontract Agreement for the payment of the latters progress billings, i.e.
joint measurement of the completed works, and, hence, it was justified in
not paying the amount stated in HRCCs progress billings.
Issue:
Whether or not FFCCI is already barred from contesting HRCCs
valuation of the completed works having waived its right to demand the
joint measurement requirement.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that FFCCI had waived its right to demand
for a joint measurement of HRCCs completed works under the Subcontract
Agreement. Further, on account of its failure to demand the joint
measurement of HRCCs completed works, had effectively waived its right
to ask for the conduct of the same as a condition sine qua non to HRCCs
submission of its monthly progress billings. Basically, the instant issue calls
for a determination as to which of the parties respective valuation of
accomplished works should be given credence. FFCCI claims that its
46
valuation should be upheld since the same was the result of a measurement
of the completed works conducted by it and the DPWH.
On the other hand, HRCC maintains that its valuation should be
upheld on account of FFCCIs failure to observe the joint measurement
requirement in ascertaining the extent of its completed works. FFCCI
admits that in all three instances where it paid HRCC for its progress
billings, it never required compliance with the aforequoted contractual
provision of a prior joint quantification. Such repeated omission may
reasonably be construed as a waiver by FFCCI of its contractual right to
require compliance of said condition and it is now too late in the day to so
impose it. Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides that rights may be
waived unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals or good customs. The tribunal cannot see any such violation in this
case.
47
WAIVER OF RIGHTS
PEOPLE vs. MORIAL
G.R. No. 129295
August
15, 2001
Facts:
Edwin Morial, Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abinon were convicted
of Robbery with Homicide. During the custodial investigation, Leonardo
Morial made an extrajudicial confession admitting to the crime. However,
later on, he recanted his confession saying that the police tortured him into
admitting the crime. On appeal, Morial moved to quash the extrajudicial
confession claiming that such confession was made without the assistance
of counsel given him by the police was not present during the whole
interrogation. He left to attend some personal matters while the
interrogation of Morial was still going on. However, said attorney claimed
that he was present when Morial signed the admission.
Issue:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession can be used as evidence
against the accused.
Ruling:
The extrajudicial confession cannot be used against the accused. An
excused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel
assisting him from the very start until the termination of such investigation.
An effective and vigilant counsel necessarily and logically requires that the
lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the
confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until
the signing of the confessant answers the first question asked by the
investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession.
Section 2A of RA No 7438 requires that any person arrested, detained or
48
under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel. In the

absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted.
Additionally, there was an invalid waiver of the right to counsel since this
right cannot be waived unless the same is made in writing and in the
presence of counsel. No such written and counseled waiver of these rights
was offered in evidence.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PRIMETOWN
G. R. No. 162155
August
28, 2007
Facts:
On April 14, 2000, the Taxpayer filed its petition for review claiming
refund based on its final adjusted return filed on April 14, 1998, Counting
365 days a year pursuant to Article 13 of the Civil Code, the CTA found that
the petition was filed beyond the two year respective period equivalent to
730 days for filing the claim under Section 229 of the NIRC, ruling that the
petition was filed 731 days after the filing of the return.On Appeal, the CA
reversed the CTA and ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not
distinguish between a regular year and a leap year.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the CTA.
Ruling:
49
The SC affirmed the CA's reversal but ruled that the basis for the
reversal is EO 292 of the Administrative Code of 1987, a more recent law,
which provides that a year is composed of 12 calendar months.
Section 31 provides that a year shall be understood to be 12
calendar months. Both article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter the
computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to
365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the
Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar
months and the number of days is irrelevant. There obviously exists a
manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the
Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, the
Supreme Court held that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the
computation of legal periods.
Using this, the petition was filed on the last day of the 24th month
from the day the taxpayer filed its final adjusted return.

MAGKALAS vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 138823
September 17, 2008
Facts:
Plaintiff and her predecessors-in-interest have been occupying a lot
designated as TAG-77-0063, Block 1, Barangay 132, located at the corner of
50
109 Gen. Concepcion and Adelfa Streets, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, for
the past 39 years.
On March 26, 1978, P.D. No. 1315 was issued expropriating certain
lots at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In the same Decree, the National
Housing Authority (NHA) was named Administrator of the Bagong Barrio
Urban Bliss Project with the former to take possession, control (sic) and
disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of demolition.
During the Census survey of the area, the structure built by the plaintiff was
assigned TAG No. 0063. After conducting studies of the area, the NHA
determined that the area where plaintiffs structure is located should be
classified as an area center (open space). The Area Center was determined
in compliance with the requirement to reserve 30% open space in all types
of residential development.
Plaintiff, together with Mr.& Mrs. Josefino Valenton and Mr.& Mrs. Rey
Pangilinan, through counsel, filed an appeal from the decision to designate
the area where the plaintiff and the two other spouses have erected
structures, as an Area Center. The said appeal was denied by the NHA. In a
letter, dated August 6, 1985, the NHA sent a Notice of Lot Assignment to
plaintiff recognizing the latter as a Censused Owner of a structure with TAG
No. 0063-04 which was identified for relocation.
On August 23, 1985, plaintiff filed a Complaint for Damages with

prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and writ of Preliminary
Injunction against the NHA with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City.
The Order denying plaintiffs prayer for issuance of a writ of

preliminary injunction was appealed, by way of Petition for Certiorari, to the
Court of Appeals (docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 33833). On March 10,
1999, the trial court promulgated its assailed decision dismissing
petitioners complaint. Petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied by the trial court in its Order dated May 14, 1999.
Hence, this petition for review of the said decision and order of the RTC.
51
Issue:
Whether or not the demolition or relocation of the petitioners
structure will violate the vested rights of the petitioner over the acquired
property under the social justice clause of the constitution.
Ruling:
Petitioner maintains that she had acquired a vested right over the
property subject of this case on the ground that she had been in possession
of it for forty (40) years already. Thus, to order her relocation and the
demolition of her house will infringe the social justice clause guaranteed
under the Constitution.
Petitioners contentions must necessarily fail. The NHAs authority to

order the relocation of petitioner and the demolition of her property is
mandated by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1315. Under this Decree, the
entire Bagong Barrio in Caloocan City was identified as a blighted area and
was thereby declared expropriated. The properties covered under P.D. No.
1315 included petitioners property. The NHA, as the decrees designated
administrator for the national government, was empowered to take
possession, control and disposition of the expropriated properties with the
power of demolition of their improvements.
P.D. No. 1315 explicitly vests the NHA the power to immediately take
possession, control and disposition of the expropriated properties with the
power of demolition. Clearly, the NHA, by force of law, has the authority to
order the relocation of petitioner, and the demolition of her structure in
case of her refusal as this is the only way through which the NHA can
effectively carry out the implementation of P.D. No. 1315.
52
Inasmuch as petitioners property was located in the area identified as

an open space by the NHA, her continued refusal to vacate has rendered
illegal her occupancy thereat. Thus, in accordance with P.D. No. 1472,
petitioner could lawfully be ejected even without a judicial order.
Neither can it be successfully argued that petitioner had already acquired a
vested right over the subject property when the NHA recognized her as the
census owner by assigning to her a tag number (TAG No. 77-0063).
EFFECT OF REPEALING LAW ON LAW FIRST REPEALED

GARCIA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 165835
June
22, 2005
53
Facts:
This is a petition filed by Clarita Garcia, wife or retired Major General
Carlos F. Garcia, with application for injunctive relief in order issued by the
Fourth Division of Sandiganbayan denying the motion to quash or dismiss
Civil Case No. 0193. This is a suit for the forfeiture commenced by the
Republic against petitioner and her immediate family.
The forfeiture suit was to recover unlawfully acquired funds and
properties that the Garcias allegedly acquires and amassed. Then Republic
then filed the Sandiganbayan through the OMB a petition for forfeiture of
those alleged unlawfully acquires properties of the Garcias. The case was
docketed as civil case 0193(forfeiture I) and subsequently another case of
forfeiture involving the same parties was filed docketed as Civil Case
0196(forfeiture II). Thus the two cases were consolidated for convenience
and clarity. Before the filing of Forfeiture II but subsequent to the filing of
Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the Garcias with violation of RA
7080(plunder) and the case raffled to the second division of SB. The plunder
charge covered substantially the same properties identified in both
Forfeiture I and II.
Petitioner now contends, after denying there motion to dismiss the
Forfeiture I case, that the plunder case and the Forfeiture I case should be
consolidated in the second division of SB pursuan to R 8249. On May 20,
2005, the SB 4th Division denied the motion for the reason that the
forfeiture case is not the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the criminal case of plunder.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitions for
forfeiture under RA 1379.
Ruling:
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over forfeiture proceedings
pursuant to RA 1379. Forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem and civil in
nature. It is a divestiture of property without compensation in consequence
of an offense.
54
STARE DECISIS
TING vs. VELEZ-TING
G.R. No. 166562
2009
March 31,
Facts:
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to
petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen
filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She
claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the
time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became
manifest thereafter.
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its decision declaring
the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC
gave credence to Dr. Onates findings and the admissions made by Benjamin
in the course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
On October 19, 2000, the petitioner appealed to the CA, reversing the
trial courts decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of
psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been realized
Ruling:
No. By the very nature of case involving the application of Article 36,
it is logical and understood to give weight to the expert opinions furnished
by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in
order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedent, gravity and
incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while
highly advisable, are not conditions in granting petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but
not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In
fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination
of the person concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any
other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not
solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality
of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
55
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to
present professional and expert opinion of psychiatrists tracing the root
cause, gravity and incurability of a partys alleged psychological incapacity,
then such expert opinion should be presented and according, be weighed
by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.
The petition for review on certiorari is granted.
STARE DECISIS
NEGROS NAVIGATION CO. vs COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 110398
November
7, 1997
Facts:
In April of 1980, private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from
the Negros Navigation Co., Inc. four special cabin tickets (#74411, 74412,
74413 and 74414) for his wife, daughter, son and niece who were going to
Bacolod City to attend a family reunion. The tickets were for Voyage No.
457-A of the M/V Don Juan, leaving Manila at 1:00 p.m. on April 22, 1980.
The ship sailed from the port of Manila on schedule.
At about 10:30 in the evening of April 22, 1980, the Don Juan collided
off the Tablas Strait in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban City, an oil tanker
owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a result, the M/V Don
Juan sank. Several of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy. The
bodies of some of the victims were found and brought to shore, but the four
members of private respondents families were never found.
Private respondents filed a complaint on July 16, 1980 in the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34, against the Negros Navigation, the
Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), and the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking damages for the death of
Ardita de la Victoria Miranda, 48, Rosario V. Miranda, 19, Ramon V.
Miranda, Jr., 16, and Elfreda de la Victoria, 26. In its answer, petitioner
admitted that private respondents purchased ticket numbers 74411, 74412,
74413 and 74414; that the ticket numbers were listed in the passenger
manifest; and that the Don Juan left Pier 2, North Harbor, Manila on April
22, 1980 and sank that night after being rammed by the oil tanker
M/T Tacloban City, and that, as a result of the collision, some of the
56
passengers of the M/V Don Juan died. Petitioner, however, denied that the
four relatives of private respondents actually boarded the vessel as shown
by the fact that their bodies were never recovered. Petitioner further
averred that the Don Juan was seaworthy and manned by a full and
competent crew, and that the collision was entirely due to the fault of the
crew of the M/T Tacloban City.
On January 20, 1986, the PNOC and petitioner Negros Navigation Co.,
Inc. entered into a compromise agreement whereby petitioner assumed full
responsibility for the payment and satisfaction of all claims arising out of or
in connection with the collision and releasing the PNOC and the PNOC/STC
from any liability to it. The agreement was subsequently held by the trial
court to be binding upon petitioner, PNOC and PNOC/STC. Private
respondents did not join in the agreement.
Issues:
a) Whether the members of private respondents families were actually
passengers of the Don Juan;
b) Whether the ruling in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals, finding the crew
members of petitioner to be grossly negligent in the performance of
their duties, is binding in this case;
c) Whether the total loss of the M/V Don Juan extinguished petitioners
liability; and
d) Whether the damages awarded by the appellate court are excessive,
unreasonable and unwarranted.
Ruling:
First. The trial court held that the fact that the victims were
passengers of the M/V Don Juan was sufficiently proven by private
respondent Ramon Miranda, who testified that he purchased tickets
numbered 74411, 74412, 74413, and 74414 at P131.30 each from the
Makati office of petitioner for Voyage No. 47-A of the M/V Don Juan, which
was leaving Manila on April 22, 1980. This was corroborated by the
passenger manifest (Exh. E) On which the numbers of the tickets and the
names of Ardita Miranda and her children and Elfreda de la Victoria appear.
Second. In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in failing to
exercise the extraordinary diligence required of it in the carriage of
passengers, both the trial court and the appellate court relied on the
findings of this Court in Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which
case was brought for the death of other passengers. In that case it was
found that although the proximate cause of the mishap was the negligence
of the crew of the M/T Tacloban City, the crew of the Don Juan was equally
57
negligent as it found that the latters master, Capt. Rogelio Santisteban, was
playing mahjong at the time of collision, and the officer on watch, Senior
Third Mate Rogelio De Vera, admitted that he failed to call the attention of
Santisteban to the imminent danger facing them. This Court found that
Capt. Santisteban and the crew of the M/V Don Juan failed to take steps to
prevent the collision or at least delay the sinking of the ship and supervise
the abandoning of the ship.
Third. The next issue is whether petitioner is liable to pay damages
notwithstanding the total loss of its ship. The issue is not one of first
impression. The rule is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that a shipowner may be held liable for injuries to passengers notwithstanding the
exclusively real and hypothetic nature of maritime law if fault can be
attributed to the ship-owner.
Fourth. Petitioner contends that, assuming that the Mecenas case
applies, private respondents should be allowed to claim only P43,857.14
each as moral damages because in the Mecenas case, the amount
of P307,500.00 was awarded to the seven children of the Mecenas
couple. Under petitioners formula, Ramon Miranda should receive P43,
857.14, while the De la Victoria spouses should receive P97, 714.28.
LAW OF THE CASE

FULGENCIO vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
58
G.R. No. 141600

September 12, 2003
Facts:
Petitioners failed to indicate in their petition with the CA the dates
showing when they received notice of the NLRCs June 16, 1998 Decision,
and the date when they filed a motion for reconsideration therefrom, in
violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended.
Petitioners also failed to include in their petition the required explanation
under Section 11, Rule 13 of the same Rules as to why personal service
upon the respondents was not resorted to; hence, the dismissal thereof by
the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not strict adherence to technicalities in the application of
the provisions of the Rules of Court impede the cause of justice.
Ruling:
Rules of procedure applied in a very rigid, technical sense override
substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for
the court to excuse a technical lapse the parties a review of the case on
appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on
technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false
impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more
delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.
59
OBITER DICTUM
VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 142947
2002
March 19,
Facts:
In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in Puerto
Princesa. In November 1992, Orly filed to annul the marriage. He claimed
that threats of violence and duress forced him to marry Lilia. He said that
he had been receiving phone calls threatening him and that Lilia even hired
the service of a certain Ka Celso, a member of the NPA, to threaten him.
Orly also said he was defrauded by Lilia by claiming that she was pregnant
hence he married her but he now raises that he never impregnated Lilia
prior to the marriage. Lilia on the other hand denied Orlys allegations and
she said that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage and she
showed 14 letters that shows Orlys affection and care towards her.
Issue:
Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the case at bar.
Ruling:
The SC ruled that Orlys allegation of fraud and intimidation is
untenable. On its face, it is obvious that Orly is only seeking to annul his
marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending appealed bigamy case to be
dismissed. On the merits of the case, Orlys allegation of fear was not
concretely established. He was not able to prove that there was a
reasonable and well-grounded reason for fear to be created in his mind by
the alleged intimidation being done against him by Lilia and her party. Orly
is a security guard who is well abreast with self-defense and that the threat
he so described done against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate him
from freely marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as well. His
allegation that he never had an erection during their sexual intercourse is
incredible and is an outright lie. Also, there is a prolonged inaction on the
part of Orly to attack the marriage. It took him 4 and half years to file an
action which brings merit to Lilias contention that Orly freely cohabited
with her after the marriage.
60
OBITER DICTUM
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 146486
March 4,
2005
Facts:
The enumeration in the Constitution of the impeachable officers is
exclusive. The Ombudsman is only one man, not including his Deputies.
Thus, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable.
On 29 December 1999, twenty- two officials and employees of the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, led by its two directors,
filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an
investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman for
the Visayas, herein private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed (1) sexual
harassment against Rayvi Padua- Varona, mulcting money from confidential
employees: James Alueta and Eden Kiamco and (3) oppression against all
employees in not releasing P7,200.00 in benefits of OMB- Visayas
employees on the date the said amount was due for release. Fact-finding
investigation was conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman and the report
was referred by the Ombudsman to a constituted Committee of Peers which
initially recommended that the investigation be converted into one solely for
purposes of impeachment. However, this recommendation was denied by
the Office of the Ombudsman and following the stand of the Office of the
Ombudsman that the Deputy Ombudsmen and The Special Prosecutor are
not removable through impeachment. On 18 December 2000, despite the
61
expiration of private respondent Mojica's term of office, the Court of

Appeals nevertheless rendered the assailed Decision on the grounds of
public interest. CA ruled that the Deputy Ombudsman is an impeachable
officer. Thus, OMB's appeal.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the Ombudsmans Deputies are impeachable.
b) Whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman may be held criminally and/or
administratively liable.
Ruling:
Order of the CA is reversed and set aside. The complaints in Criminal
Case No.OMB-0-00-0616 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316
is reinstated and the Office of the Ombudsman is ordered to proceed with
the investigation relative to the above cases. The Deputy Ombudsman is not
an impeachable officer. Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states
that The President, the Vice- President, the members of the Supreme
Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman
may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from Office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment.
Records of the Constitutional Commission, as well as the opinions of
leading commentators in Constitutional Law reveal that the term
Ombudsman in Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution refer to the rank
in itself. The Ombudsman is only one man, not including his Deputies.
Leading legal luminaries on the Constitution are one in their opinion as to
whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree
that the enumeration impeachable officers in Section 2, Article XI of the
1986 Constitution, are exclusive. In their belief, only the Ombudsman, not
his deputies, is impeachable. Thus, where the issue involved was not raised
nor presented to the court and not passed upon by the court in the previous
case, the decision in the previous case is not stare decisis of the question
presented.
Criminal and Administrative Liability of Deputy Ombudsman As to
whether or not the private respondent, then Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas, may be held criminally and/or administratively liable, we likewise
resolve the issue in favor of the petitioner. The rule that an impeachable
officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which
constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office.
Hence, the moment he is no longer in office because of his removal,
resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to his criminal
prosecution in the courts. Nor does retirement bar an administrative
62
investigation from proceeding against the private respondent, given that, as

pointed out by the petitioner, the formers retirement benefits have been
placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act.
OBITER DICTUM
AYALA CORPORATION vs. ROSA-DIANA REALTY AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 134284
December
1, 2000
Facts:
63
Petitioner Ayala Corporation was the registered owner of a parcel of

land located in Alfaro Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City. On April 20,
1976, Ayala sold the lot to Manuel Sy married to Vilma Po and Sy Ka
Kieng married to Rosa Chan. The Deed of Sale executed between Ayala
and the buyers contained Special Conditions of Sale and Deed
Restrictions. Among the Special Conditions of Sale were: a) the vendees
shall build on the lot and submit the building plans to the vendor before
September 30, 1976 for the latters approval b) the construction of the
building shall start on or before March 30, 1977 and completed before
1979. Before such completion, neither the deed of sale shall be registered
nor the title released even if the purchase price shall have been fully paid
and c) there shall be no resale of the property.
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of restriction can be enforced by Ayala
Corporation.
Ruling:
Contractual obligations between parties have the force of law
between them and absent any allegation that the same are contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy, they must be complied
with in good faith. The party guilty of violating the deed of restrictions may
only be held alternatively liable for substitute performance of its
obligation, that is, for the payment of damages.
64
DURA LEX SED LEX

PEOPLE vs. VENERACION
G.R. No. 119987-88
October 12, 1995
Facts:
On August 2, 1994, four accused were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape with homicide of a seven year old girl in the RTC presided by
Judge Lorenzo P. Veneracion. Respondent judge however, refused to impose
the corresponding penalty of death and he rather imposed reclusion
perpetua to each of the accused. The city prosecutor filed a motion for
reconsideration praying that the penalty of death be imposed upon the four
accused. The respondent judge refused to act.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge can impose penalty lower than that
prescribed by law.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the
judge should impose the proper penalty provided for by the law on the
accused regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs. In this case the
respondent judge must impose the death penalty. This is consistent in the
rule laid down in the Civil Code Article 9 that no judge or court shall decline
to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of
the laws.
65
CONCEPT OF CUSTOMS
YAO KEE vs. SY GONZALES
G.R. No. L-55960
24, 1988
November
Facts:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 leaving behind
properties here in the Philippines.Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a
petition for the grant of letters of administration alleging that they are the
children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. The petition was opposed
by Yao Kee et al alleging that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of the deceased
whom he married in China. The trial court rendered decision in favor of the
opposition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, modifying
the decision declaring the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee as not has been
proven valid in accordance with the laws of China. Hence, both parties
moved for reconsideration to which the Supreme Court granted.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in
accordance with Philippine laws.
Ruling:
Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and
proven as any other fact. To establish the validity of marriage, the existence
of foreign law as a question of fact and the alleged marriage must be proven
by clear and convincing evidence.For failure to prove the foreign law or
custom and consequently of the marriage, the marriage between Yao Kee
66
and Sy Kiat in China cannot be recognized in the jurisdiction of Philippine

courts.

FLORESCA vs. PHILEX MINING CORP.
G.R. No. L-30642
1985
April
30,
Facts:
Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex
Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working
at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28,
1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the
mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of
government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to
take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men
working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant
to the Workmens Compensation Act before the Workmens Compensation
Commission. They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex
for additional damages. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued
because the petitioners have already claimed benefits under the WCA.
Issue:
67
Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time
sue.
Ruling:
Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for
benefits under the WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a
civil case before the regular courts. Conversely, if they sued before the civil
courts then they would also be estopped from claiming benefits under the
WCA. The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this
deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then
they may have not availed of such a remedy. However, if in case theyll win
in the lower court whatever award may be granted, the amount given to
them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they
would go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may
be defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the
human being. The spirit of the law insures mans survival and ennobles him.
As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth life.

URSUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 112170
10, 1996
April
Facts:
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was convicted for violation of Sec. 1 of CA
No. 142, as amended by RA 6085 otherwise known as An Act to Regulate
the Use of Aliases by the RTC of Davao City which was affirmed by the CA.
Allegedly petitioner when asked by his counsel to take his letter of request
68
to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firms messenger Oscar
Perez had personal matters to attend to, instead of writing his name wrote
the name Oscar Perez when he was requested to sign. However, Loida
Kahulugan who gave him the copy of complaint was able to know through
Josefa Amparo that petitioner is not Oscar Perez. Loida reported the matter
to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be
accordingly charged. Petitioner comes for review of his conviction to the SC
as he reasserts his innocence.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Cesario Ursua should be acquitted on the
ground that he was charged under the wrong law.
Ruling:
The SC held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime charged. Time
and again the SC has decreed that the statutes are to be construed in the
light of the purposes to be achieved and the evil sought to be remedied.
Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in
mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended
scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the
statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction,
injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers.
APPLICATION OF PENAL LAWS, EXCEPTION

ASAALI vs. COMMISSION OF CUSTOMS
69
G.R. No. L-24170

16, 1968
December
Facts:
The SC held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime charged. Time
and again the SC has decreed that the statutes are to be construed in the
light of the purposes to be achieved and the evil sought to be remedied.
Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in
mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended
scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the
statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction,
injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers.
Issue:
Whether or not the interception and seizure by custom officials on the
high seas is valid on the contention that the seizure was affected outside
our territorial waters.
Ruling:
The SC held that it is a settled doctrine of International Law that a
state has the right to protect itself and its revenues, a right not limited to its
own territory but extending to the high seas. The Revised Penal Code leaves
no doubt as to its application and enforceability not only within the
Philippines, its interior waters and maritime zone but also outside of its
jurisdiction while on Philippine ship.
70
NATIONALITY/CITIZENSHIP THEORY
LLORENTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124371
23, 2000
November
Facts:
Petitioner Paula Llorente was married to a US Navy enlisted
serviceman Lorenzo Llorente, in Nabua, Camarines Sur, on February 22,
1937. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for the US and Paula
stayed in the conjugal home in Nabua. Lorenzo became an American citizen
on November 30, 1943. Upon the liberation of the Philippines (1945),
Lorenzo was granted by the US Navy to visit his wife in the Philippines and
found out that Paula was living in with Lorenzos brother Ceferino. In
December 1945, Paula gave birth to Crisologo with the birth certificate
saying that the child was illegitimate, and the fathers name was left blank.
On February 2, 1946, Paula and Lorenzo had a written agreement,
dissolving their marital union, suspending his support upon her, and waiving
his authority to file a case of adultery against her. Lorenzo returned to
the US and filed for a divorce in 1951 which was granted in 1952.On
January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno, in the Philippines; after
which, they bore three children: Raul, Luz, and Beverly. In 1981, Lorenzo
executed a will, bequeathing all his property to Alicia and three children.
Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died in 1985.
On Sept. 4, 1985, Paula filed with the RTC of Iriga a petition for
letters of administration over Lorenzos estate, contending that she was
Lorenzos surviving spouse.In 1987, the RTC granted her petition, stating
that Lorenzos divorce decree was void and inapplicable in
the Philippines and therefore his marriage to Alicia was void. The RTC
entitled Paula to one-half of their conjugal properties, and one-third of the
estate the two-thirds would be divided equally among the illegitimate
children. Paula was appointed as legal administrator of the estate.
Issue:
Whether or not Paula Llorente was entitled to inherit from the estate
of Lorenzo Llorente.
Ruling:
Since Lorenzo was an American citizen, issues arising from the case
are governed by foreign law. The CA and RTC called to the for the renvoi
71
doctrine, where the case was referred back to the law of the decedents
domicile, in this case, the Philippine law. Most US laws follow the
domiciliary theory. Thus, the Philippine law applies when determining the
validity of Lorenzos will. The case was remanded to the RTC for the ruling
on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
INCIDENTS OF SUCCESSION, EXCEPTION

MICIANO vs. BRIMO
G.R. No. L-22595
1, 1927
November
Facts:
Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of the
estate. Juan Miciano, the judicial administrator of the estate left filed a
scheme of partition. However, Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the
deceased, opposed it. Brimos opposition is based on the fact that the
partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimos will
which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for
which reason they are void as being in violation of Article 10 of the Civil
Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to govern
his testamentary disposition.
Ruling:
Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen, though he declared in his will that
Philippine laws must govern the disposition of his estate; however, it must
not prejudice the heir or legatee of the testator. Therefore, the testators
national law must govern in accordance with Article 10 of the Civil
Code.Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said
that it be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the
Philippine Island, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall
be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in
72
any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.

Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good
morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary
dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial
administrator, in such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the
legatees.
RENVOI
AZNAR vs. GARCIA
G.R. No. L-16749
31, 1963
January
Facts:
Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to
California where he resided for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the
Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. In his will, he
instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen
(legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of
Helen Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Counsel for Helen claims that
under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California law should be
applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of
the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the
national law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate children not being
entitled to anything under California law.
73
Issue:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in
determining the successional rights of his heirs.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to
Helen said in effect that there are two rules in California on the matter; the
internal law which applies to Californians domiciled in California and the
conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside of California. Christensen
being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed.
The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings the
determination of the successional rights under Philippine law only.
RENVOI
BELLIS vs. BELLIS
G.R. No. L-23678
1967
June
6,
Facts:
Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United
States. By his first wife whom he divorced he had five legitimate children,
by his second wife, who survived him, he had three legitimate children, and
three illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing
74
of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In
both wills, his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate
children opposed the will on the ground that they have been deprived of
their legitimates to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to
be applied.
Issue:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the
successional rights of the illegitimate children.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their
legitimes under the Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there
are no legitimes.The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there
are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of
the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be
applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable
the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions,
with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and
(d) the capacity to succeed.
Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found.
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RENVOI
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK vs. ESCOLIN
G.R. No. L-27860
March 29, 1974
Facts:
Linnie Jane Hodges, a married woman and a citizen of Texas, USA,
was a domiciliary of the Philippines at the moment of her death. With
respect to the validity of certain testamentary provisions she had made in
favor of her husband, a question arose as to what exactly were the laws of
Texas on the matter at the precise moment of her death (for while one
group contended that the Texan law should result to renvoi, the other group
contended that no renvoi was possible).
Issue:
Whether or not Texas Law should apply.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter,
is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented
in the probate court. Texas law at the time of her death (and not said law at
any other time).
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FORMS, SOLEMNITIES OF CONTRACTS, AND WILLS

ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.
G.R. No. L-68470
October 8, 1985
Facts:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while
private respondent is a citizen of the United States; they were married in
Hong Kong in 1972. Thereafter, they established their residence in the
Philippines and begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18,
1975. Subsequently, they were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982,
and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van
Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in
Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City,
stating that petitioners business in Ermita, Manila is their conjugal
property; that petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the business
and that private respondent be declared to manage the conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case contending that the cause of action is
barred by the judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court
wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The denial now is the subject of
the certiorari proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to
the alien spouse.
Ruling:
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15
of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
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which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid

according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American Law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he
is bound by the decision of his own countrys court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
stopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.
FORMS, SOLEMNITIES OF CONTRACTS, AND WILLS

BANK OF AMERICA, NT and SA vs. AMERICAN REALTY
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 133876
December
1999
29,
Facts:
Petitioner Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) is an international
banking and financing institution duly licensed to do business in the
Philippines. As borne by the records, BANTSA and BAIL on several
occasions granted three major multi-million United States (US) Dollar loans
to the following corporate borrowers: (1) Liberian Transport Navigation,
S.A.; (2) El Challenger S.A. and (3) Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., all of
which are existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of
Panama and are foreign affiliates of private.
As security, the latter mortgaged a property located in the Philippines
owned by herein respondent ARC. ARC is a third party mortgagor executed
two real estate mortgages, dated 17 February 1983 and 20 July 1984, over
its parcels of land including improvements thereon, located at Barrio Sto.
Cristo, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, and which are covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-78759, T-78760, T-78761, T-78762 and T-78763.
78
The debtors failed to pay. Thus, petitioner filed collection suits in

foreign courts to enforce the loan. Subsequently, it filed a petition in the
Sheriff to extra-judicially foreclose the said mortgage, which was granted.
On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig RTC,
Branch 159, an action for damages against the petitioner, for the latters act
of foreclosing extra-judicially the real estate mortgages despite the
pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection of the
principal loan.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners act of filing a collection suit against the
principal debtors for the recovery of the loan before foreign courts
constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.
Ruling:
Yes.In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage
creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action
or debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may
pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause
of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is
complete in itself.In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English
Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in said foreign law
would still not find applicability.Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or
contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum,
the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy
and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the
principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a
single cause of action.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application
would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To
give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment
79
or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of

Conflict of Laws.Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST vs. ROMEO A. JADER
G.R. No. 132344
February 17,
2000
Facts:
80
Romeo Jader graduated at UE College of law from 1984-19988.

During his last year, 1st semester, he failed to take the regular final
examination in Practical Court 1where he was given an incomplete grade
remarks. He filed an application for removal of the incomplete grade given
by Prof. Carlos Ortega on February 1, 1988 which was approved by Dean
Celedonio Tiongson after the payment of required fees. He took the exam
on March 28, 1988 and on May 30, 1988 the professor gave him a grade of
5.The commencement exercise of UE College of law was held April 16,
1988, 3PM. In the invitation, his name appeared. In preparation for the bar
exam, he took a leave of absence from work from April 20- Sept 30, 1988.
He had his pre-bar class review in FEU. Upon learning of such deficiency,
he dropped his review classes and was not able to take the bar exam. Jader
sued UE for damages resulting to moral shock, mental anguish, and serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and sleepless nights
when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations due to UEs
negligence.
Issue:
Whether UE should be held liable for misleading a student into
believing JADER satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is
not the case. Can he claim moral damages?
Ruling:
Supreme Court held that petitioner was guilty of negligence and this
liable to respondent for the latters actual damages. Educational institutions
are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait
for the latter to inquire from the former. However, respondent should not
have been awarded moral damages though JADER suffered shock, trauma,
and pain when he was informed that he could not graduate and will not be
allowed to take the bar examinations as what Court of Appeals held because
its also respondents duty to verify for himself whether he has completed
all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a
senior law student, he should have been responsible in ensuring that all his
affairs specifically those in relation with his academic achievement are in
order. Before taking the bar examinations, it doesnt only entail a mental
preparation on the subjects but there are other prerequisites such as
documentation and submission of requirements which prospective examinee
must meet. Wherefore, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed with modification. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum
of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with
81
legal interest of 6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the
complaint until fully paid; the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
as attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. The award of moral damages is
deleted.
GF EQUITY, INC. vs. VALENZONA
G.R. No. 156841
June 30,
2005
Facts:
GF Equity, represented by its Chief Financial Officer, W. Steven
Uytengsu, hired Valenzona as head coach of the Alaska basketball team in
the PBA under a contract of employment. He was tasked to coach at all
practices and games scheduled for the Alaska team, coach exhibition
games, coach if invited to participate in any all-star game, attending every
event conducted, play-off games, etc.
He was also tasked to comply with all requirements respecting to the
conduct of its team and players, to implement. He also agreed to report
from time to time as fixed by the corporation in good physical condition,
give his best services, loyalty, to be neatly and fully attired in public and to
conduct himself on and off the court according to the highest standards of
honesty, morality, fair play and sportsmanship, and not to do anything
detrimental to the best interest of the corporation.
He also agreed to endorse the corporations products in commercial
advertising, promotions, will allow himself to be taken pictures with others
for still photographs, motion pictures or TV. For his services, he will be paid
P35, 000.00 monthly, net of taxes, provide him with a service vehicle and
gasoline allowance. The contract was for two (2) years starting January 1,
1988 to December 31, 1989, with the condition that if at any time during
the contract, the coach fails to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability
to coach the team, the contract can be terminated by the corporation.
(Paragraph 3)
Before signing the contract, Valenzona consulted his lawyer who
pointed out that the contract was one-sided, but still, Valenzona acceded to
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the terms of the contract as he had trust and confidence in Uytengsu who
recommended him to GF Equity.
Alaska placed third both in the open and all-Filipino PBA Conference
in 1988, he was advised of the termination of his services by way of a letter
dated September 26, 1988, invoking their right as specified in paragraph 3
of the contract and to return the service vehicle no later than September
30, 1984. He will still be paid the balance of P75, 868.38 for his services.
Six (6) years after or on July 30, 1994, Valenzonas counsel demanded from
GF Equity payment of compensation arising from the
arbitrary and
unilateral termination of his employment. But GF Equity refused the claim.
Valenzona filed before the RTC of Manila a complaint for breach of contract
with damages, ascribing bad faith, malice and disregard to fairness and to
the rights of the plaintiff by unilaterally and arbitrarily pre-terminating the
contract without just cause and legal and factual basis. He prayed award
for damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and cost
of the suit. He challenged the condition in paragraph 3 as lacking the
elements of mutuality of a contract, a clear transgression of Art. 1308 of the
NCC and reliance thereon did not warrant his unjustified and arbitrary
dismissal.
GF Equity maintained that it merely exercised its right under the
contract to pre-terminate Valenzona due to incompetence, and that he was
guilty of laches, in any event, complaint should be instituted before a labor
arbiter. The trial court dismissed the complaint on June 28, 1997 and it
declared Valenzona as fully aware of the bargain. The CA reversed the
RTCs decision and ordered GF Equity to pay him damages. The CA
concluded that GF Equity abused its right by arbitrarily terminating
Valenzonas employment, finding Valenzonas claim for damages as valid.
The court ordered GF Equity to pay compensatory damages, moral
damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not, the CA concluded wrongly from established facts in a
manner violative of applicable laws and established jurisprudence.
Ruling:
83
GF Equity argued that it entered into a contract protected by law, as it

was not contract to law, morals, good customs public policy or public order,
hence, no bad faith. Valenzona is guilty of laches for his unexplained
inaction of six (6) years.
In the case at bar, paragraph 3 gives GF Equity the unbridled
prerogative to pre-terminate the contract irrespective of the soundness,
fairness, or reasonableness, or even lack of bass of its opinion. To validate
the paragraph would open the gate for arbitrary and illegal dismissals, for
void contractual stipulations would be used as justification therefor.
Laches applies to equity, prescription applies to law. The claims was
filed within the statutory period of prescription, doctrine of laches cannot
be applied. The action was filed for breach of contract, way well within the
prescriptive period of ten (10) years, considering he filed the action six (6)
years from the date of his cause of action.
Valenzona is entitled to recover actual damages, however, award for
moral damages, exemplary damages, must be set aside, as there is no
showing that GF Equity acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive
manner. Attorneys fees are awarded because GF Equity refused to pay the
balance of Valenzonas salaries therefore to protect himself, was compelled
to litigate.

GO vs. CORDERO
G.R. No. 164703
May 4,
2010
Facts:
Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of Pamana
Marketing Corporation (Pamana), ventured into the business of marketing
inter-island passenger vessels. After contacting various overseas fast ferry
manufacturers from all over the world, he came to meet Tony Robinson, an
Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is the Managing
Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA).
84
After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson, lawyers

of Allan C. Go who is the owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City,
a single proprietorship; Cordero was able to close a deal for the purchase of
two (2) SEACAT 25 as evidenced by the Memorandum of Agreement dated
August 7, 1997. Accordingly, the parties executed Shipbuilding Contract No.
7825 for one (1) high-speed catamaran (SEACAT 25) for the price of
US$1,465,512.00. Per agreement between Robinson and Cordero, the
latter shall receive commissions totaling US$328,742.00, or 22.43% of the
purchase price, from the sale of each vessel.
However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with
Robinson when he was informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila Philippines
that Go was canvassing for a second catamaran engine from their company
which provided the ship engine for the first SEACAT 25. Padua told
Cordero that Go instructed him to fax the requested quotation of the second
engine to the Park Royal Hotel in Brisbane where Go was then staying.
Cordero tried to contact Go and Landicho to confirm the matter but they
were nowhere to be found, while Robinson refused to answer his calls.
Cordero immediately flew to Brisbane to clarify matters with Robinson, only
to find out that Go and Landicho were already there in Brisbane negotiating
for the sale of the second SEACAT 25. Despite repeated follow-up calls, no
explanation was given by Robinson, Go, Landicho and Tecson who even
made Cordero believe there would be no further sale between AFFA and
ACG Express Liner.
On August 21, 1998, Cordero instituted Civil Case No. 98-35332
seeking to hold Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho liable jointly and
solidarily for conniving and conspiring together in violating his exclusive
distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights, thus
depriving him of his due commissions. Robinson filed a motion to dismiss
grounded on lack of jurisdiction over his person and failure to state a cause
of action, asserting that there was no act committed in violation of the
distributorship agreement. Said motion was denied by the trial court on
December 20, 1999. Robinson was likewise declared in default for failure to
file his answer within the period granted by the trial court. As for Go and
Tecson, their motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action
was likewise denied by the trial court on February 26, 1999. Subsequently,
they filed their Answer denying that they have anything to do with the
termination by AFFA of Corderos authority as exclusive distributor in the
85
Philippines. On the contrary, they averred it was Cordero who stopped

communicating with Go in connection with the purchase of the first vessel
from AFFA and was not doing his part in making progress status reports
and airing the clients grievances to his principal, AFFA, such that Go
engaged the services of Landicho to fly to Australia and attend to the
documents needed for shipment of the vessel to the Philippines. In any case,
Cordero no longer had cause of action for his commission for the sale of the
second vessel under the memorandum of agreement dated August 7, 1997
considering the termination of his authority by AFFAs lawyers on June 26,
1998.
On May 31, 2000, the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of
Plaintiff and against defendants Allan C. Go, Tony Robinson, Felipe
Landicho, and Vincent Tecson. On January 29, 2001, the CA rendered
judgment granting the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 60354 and
setting aside the trial courts orders of execution pending appeal.The case
before the Supreme Court is a consolidation of the petitions for review
under Rule 45 separately filed by Go (G.R. No. 164703) and Cordero (G.R.
No. 164747).
Issue:
a) Whether petitioner Cordero has the legal personality to sue the
respondents for breach of contract; and
b) Whether the respondents may be held liable for damages to Cordero
for his unpaid commissions and termination of his exclusive
distributorship appointment by the principal, AFFA.
Ruling:
While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach
of contract because only parties can breach contractual provisions, a
contracting party may sue a third person not for breach but for inducing
another to commit such breach. The elements of tort interference are: (1)
existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person
of the existence of a contract; and (3) interference of the third person is
without legal justification.
The presence of the first and second elements is not disputed.
Through the letters issued by Robinson attesting that Cordero is the
exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines, respondents were clearly
aware of the contract between Cordero and AFFA represented by Robinson.
86
In fact, evidence on record showed that respondents initially dealt with and
recognized Cordero as such exclusive dealer of AFFA high-speed catamaran
vessels in the Philippines.
In that capacity as exclusive distributor,
petitioner Go entered into the Memorandum of Agreement and Shipbuilding
Contract No. 7825 with Cordero in behalf of AFFA.
The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with
contractual relations cannot be held liable for more than the amount for
which the party who was inducted to break the contract can be held liable.
Respondents Go, Landicho and Tecson were therefore correctly held liable
for the balance of petitioner Corderos commission from the sale of the first
SEACAT 25, in the amount of US$31,522.09 or its peso equivalent, which
AFFA/Robinson did not pay in violation of the exclusive distributorship
agreement, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from June 24, 1998
until the same is fully paid. Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral
damages may be recovered under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
87

TITUS B. VILLANUEVA vs. EMMA M. ROSQUETA
G.R. No. 180764
19, 2010
January
Facts:
Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta (Rosqueta), formerly Deputy
Commissioner of the Revenue Collection and Monitoring Group of the
Bureau of Customs (the Bureau), tendered her courtesy resignation from
that post on January 23, 2001, shortly after President Gloria MacapagalArroyo assumed office. But five months later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew
her resignation, claiming that she enjoyed security of tenure and that she
had resigned against her will on orders of her superior.
Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil Valera
(Valera) to respondent Rosquetas position. Challenging such appointment,
Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition, quo warranto, and injunction
against petitioner Titus B. Villanueva (Villanueva), then Commissioner of
Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and Valera with the Regional Trial
Court. Petitioner Villanueva, Valera, and the Secretary of Finance
challenged the injunction order before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP 66070. On September 14, 2001 the CA issued its own TRO, enjoining the
implementation of the RTCs injunction order. But the TRO lapsed after 60
days and the CA eventually dismissed the petition before it.
But the RTC dismissed respondent Rosquetas complaint, stating that
petitioner Villanueva committed no wrong and incurred no omission that
entitled her to damages. The RTC found that Villanueva had validly and
legally replaced her as Deputy Commissioner seven months before the
Bureaus centennial anniversary. But the CA reversed the RTCs decision,
holding instead that petitioner Villanuevas refusal to comply with the
88
preliminary injunction order issued in the quo warranto case earned for
Rosqueta the right to recover moral damages from him.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner Villanueva liable in
damages to respondent Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary injunction
order that the RTC issued in the quo warranto case (Civil Case 01-101539),
thus denying her of the right to do her job as Deputy Commissioner of the
Bureau and to be officially recognized as such public officer.
Ruling:
Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil
Code, a person must, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good
faith. He would be liable if he instead acts in bad faith, with intent to
prejudice another. Complementing this principle are Articles 20 and 21 of
the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers
because of such abuse of right or duty.
But petitioner Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice
that the OSG gave him. Surely, a government official of his rank must know
that a preliminary injunction order issued by a court of law had to be
obeyed, especially since the question of Valeras right to replace respondent
Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved. That petitioner Villanueva
ignored the injunction shows bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who
remained in the eyes of the law the Deputy Commissioner.
ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO vs. THE MANILA CHRONICLE
PUBLISHING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 184315
November 25, 2009
Facts:
In his Complaint, plaintiff Alfonso T. Yuchengco alleges that in the last
quarter of 1994, Chronicle Publishing Corporation ("Chronicle Publishing"
for brevity) published in the Manila Chronicle a series of defamatory
articles against him. In two of the subject articles (November 10 and 12,
1993 issues), he was imputed to be a "Marcos crony" or a "MarcosRomualdez crony," which term according to him is commonly used and
understood in Philippine media to describe an individual who was a
recipient of special and underserving favors from former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and/or his brother-in-law Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez due to special and extra-ordinary closeness to either or both,
and which favors allowed an individual to engage in illegal and dishonorable
business activities.
89
The subject articles insinuated that he personally and intentionally

caused the failure of Benguet Corporation and that if even if he ever
assumed control of Oriental, it would suffer the same fate as the former.
According to him, at the time he assumed chairmanship of Benguet
Corporation, it was already experiencing financial downturns caused by
plummeting world prices of gold and unprofitable investments it ventured
into. Moreover, one of the articles portrayed him as being an unfair and
uncaring employer when the employees of Grepalife Corporation, of which
he is the Chairman, staged a strike, when the truth being that he had
nothing to do with it. And that if his group takes over Oriental, it will
experience the same labor problems as in Grepalife.
In their Answer, the defendants deny liability claiming that the subject
articles were not defamatory since they were composed and published in
good faith and only after having ascertained their contents. In any event,
they claim that these articles are privileged and/or constitute reasonable
and balance[d] comments on matters of legitimate public interest which
cannot serve as basis for the finding of libel against them. They likewise
alleged that they were acting within the bounds of constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of libel.
Ruling:
In sum, this Court upholds the ruling of the trial court and the Court
of Appeals that the subject articles contain defamatory imputations. All of
the following imputations: (1) the labeling of Yuchengco as a Marcos crony,
who took advantage of his relationship with the former President to gain
unwarranted benefits; (2) the insinuations that Yuchengco induced others to
disobey the lawful orders of SEC; (3) the portrayal of Yuchengco as an
unfair and uncaring employer due to the strike staged by the employees of
Grepalife; (4) the accusation that he induced RCBC to violate the provisions
of the General Banking Act on DOSRI loans; and (5) the tagging of
Yuchengco as a "corporate raider" seeking to profit from something he did
not work for, all exposed Yuchengco to public contempt and ridicule, for
they imputed to him a condition that was dishonorable.
There is, thus, a presumption of malice in the case of every
defamatory imputation, where there is no showing of a good intention or
justifiable motive for making such imputation.In the instant case, there is
preponderance of evidence showing that there exists malice in fact in the
writing and publication of the subject libelous articles. When malice in fact
is proven, assertions and proofs that the libelous articles are qualifiedly
privileged communications are futile, since being qualifiedly privileged
90
communications merely prevents the presumption of malice from attaching

to a defamatory imputation.
Neither is there any reason for this Court to reverse the findings of
the trial court and the Court of Appeals that there was actual malice on the
part of the respondents. As held by the courts a quo, Yuchengco was able to
show by the attendant circumstances that respondents were animated by a
desire to inflict unjustifiable harm on his reputation, as shown by the timing
and frequency of the publication of the defamatory articles. Finally, even if
we assume for the sake of argument that actual malice was not proven in
the case at bar, we nevertheless cannot adhere to the finding of the Court of
Appeals in the Amended Decision that the subject articles were fair
commentaries on matters of public interest, and thus fell within the scope of
the third type of qualifiedly privileged communications.
In view of the foregoing, this Court is constrained to grant the instant
Petition and reinstate the Decision of the trial court, as previously affirmed
by the Court of Appeals in its original Decision. This Court, however, finds
the award of damages in the total amount of One Hundred Million Pesos by
the trial court to be rather excessive given the circumstances.
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CUSTODIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 116100
1996
February 9,
Facts:
Respondents owned a parcel of land wherein a two-door apartment
was erected. Said property was surrounded by other immovables owned by
petitioners, spouses Custodio and spouses Santos. As an access to P. Burgos
Street from the subject property, there are two possible passageways. The
first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters
distant from Mabasas residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in
between the previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is
about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasas residence to P.
Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less
than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in
length, has to be traversed. Petitioners constructed an adobe fence in the
first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first
constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is also along
the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and
even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was
enclosed. As a result, the tenants left the apartment because there was no
longer a permanent access to the public street. Respondents then filed an
action for the grant of an easement of right of way. The trial court ordered
the petitioner to give respondents a permanent access to the public street
and that in turn, the respondent will pay a sum of Php 8,000.00 to the
petitioner as an indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. On
appeal by the respondent to the CA, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed, such that a right of way and an award of actual, moral and
exemplary damages were given to the respondents. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the award of damages is proper?
Ruling:
No. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of
action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to
the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong,
does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the
remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. There is a
material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal
invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results
from the injury, and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded
for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a
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legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. In
order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of
duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff. There must be a
concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person
causing it.
In the instant case, although there was damage, there was no legal
injury. Contrary to the claim of respondents, petitioners could not be said to
have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle of
abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is
essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should
have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to
the plaintiff. The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is
a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy
and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by
law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence
their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that (e)very owner
may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live
or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes
constituted thereon.
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to
any servitudes. There was no easement of way existing in favor of private
respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that respondents had no
existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of
the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after
payment of just compensation. It was only that decision which gave private
respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of the
compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to
interfere in the exercise of said right. The proper exercise of a lawful right
cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie, although the act
may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded. One
may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the
means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in
the latters favor. An injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum
absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual
resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful means.
93

EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION vs. CALDERON
GR. No. 156168
December 14,
2004
Facts:
Jose T. Calderon is a businessman engaged in several business
activities here and abroad, either in his capacity as President or Chairman
of the Board thereon. He is also a stockholder of PLDT and a member of the
Manila Polo Club, among others. He is a seasoned traveler, who travels at
least seven times a year in the U.S., Europe and Asia. On the other hand,
Equitable Banking Corporation is one of the leading commercial banking
institutions in the Philippines, engaged in commercial banking, such as
acceptance of deposits, extension of loans and credit card facilities, among
others.Sometime in September 1984, Calderon applied and was issued an
Equitable International Visa card. The said Visa card can be used for both
peso and dollar transactions within and outside the Philippines.
The credit limit for the peso transaction is twenty thousand pesos;
while in the dollar transactions, Calderon is required to maintain a dollar
account with a minimum deposit of $3,000.00, the balance of dollar account
shall serve as the credit limit.In April 1986, Calderon together with some
reputable business friends and associates went to Hongkong for business
and pleasure trips. Specifically on 30 April 1986, Calderon accompanied by
94
his friend, Ed De Leon went to Gucci Department Store located at the

basement of the Peninsula Hotel Hongkong. There and then, Calderon
purchased several Gucci items (t-shirts, jackets, a pair of shoes, etc.). The
cost of his total purchase amounted to HK$4,030.00 or equivalent to
US$523.00. Instead of paying the said items in cash, he used his Visa card
to effect payment thereof on credit. He then presented and gave his credit
card to the saleslady who promptly referred it to the store cashier for
verification.
Shortly thereafter, the saleslady, in the presence of his friend, Ed De
Leon and other shoppers of different nationalities, informed him that his
Visa card was blacklisted. Calderon sought the reconfirmation of the status
of his Visa card from the saleslady, but the latter simply did not honor it and
even threatened to cut it into pieces with the use of a pair of scissors.Deeply
embarrassed and humiliated, and in order to avoid further indignities,
Calderon paid cash for the Gucci goods and items that he bought.
Issue:
Whether or not Calderon can be indemnify with damages.
Ruling:
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt
or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not
the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases the consequences
must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for
damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or
wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the
injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted
from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff- a
concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person
causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the
premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there
must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that
breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty
should be the proximate cause of the injury.
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VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA

HOTEL NIKKO vs. REYES
GR. No. 154259
February 28,
2005
Facts:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari regarding the reversing
decision of the Court of Appeals in the decision of the Trial Court and thus,
96
making the petitioners liable for damages through the abusive conduct of
petitioner Lim, imposing upon them P200,000 as exemplary damages,
P200,000 as moral damages, and P10,000 as attorneys fees.
Plaintiff Roberto Reyes (Amay Bisaya) was having coffee at the Nikko
Hotel lobby on October 13, 1994 at around six in the morning when Dr.
Violeta Filart, a long-time friend, approached him and invited him to a party
at the penthouse where the hotels former managers birthday was being
celebrated. He consented and carried the latters present. At the party,
when he was helping himself at the buffet table, Ruby Lim, one of the
petitioners, approached him and asked him to leave in a loud voice enough
to be heard by those around the buffet table. Then, a Makati policeman
accompanied the embarrassed Amay Bisaya in leaving the penthouse.
Ruby Lim accepted the fact that she asked Mr. Reyes to leave but not
in the manner he claimed. She said she politely asked Mr. Reyes to finish his
food and leave the party as the celebrant wants the party to be intimate,
and that he was not invited. On the other hand, Dr. Filart denied Amay
Bisayas claim that she invited him to the party.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Lims conduct was abusive enough to make the
petitioners liable for damages caused to plaintiff.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that any damage which Mr. Reyes might
have suffered through Ms. Lims exercise of a legitimate right done within
the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.
The plaintiff failed in proving the ill-motive of the petitioners. It was
from his confession that when Ms. Lim approached him, they were very
close that they nearly kissed each other. Considering the closeness of
defendant Lim to plaintiff when she requested the latter to leave the party,
it is apparent that the request was meant to be heard by him only and there
could have been no intention on her part to cause him embarrassment. It
was plaintiffs reaction to the request that must have made the other guests
aware of what transpired between them. Had plaintiff simply left the party
as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out. Therefore,
we find the petitioners not guilty of violating Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code.
97
LIABILITY EX-MALEFICIO OR EX-DELICTO

EDUARDO MANUEL vs. PEOPLE
GR. No. 165842
November 29,
2005
Facts:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court
of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
convicting the petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus
Gaa on July 18, 1975, who, according to the former, was charged with
estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was never seen again by him
after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the
latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got
married through a civil wedding in BaguioCity without Gandaleras
knowledge of Manuels first marriage. In the course of their marriage,
things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already
married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy
against Eduardo Manuel. The latters defense being that his declaration of
single in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he
believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not
know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first
marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against him
sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years,
and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he
was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private
complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. The
CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTCs decision.
Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary
reward for moral damages was affirmed.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of
law when it ruled that petitioners wife cannot be legally presumed
dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial
declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of
the Family Code.
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b) Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of

law when it affirmed the award of Php200,000.00 as moral damages
as it has no basis in fact and in law.
Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to
have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private
complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused
is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates
malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse
because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem
excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present
spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment
declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being
charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce
evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse
who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is
later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be
convicted of the crime. The court rules against the petitioner.
The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit
before, during and after his marriage with the private complainant were
willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. The Court
thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public policy as they
undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and
the interest and general welfare of society. Because the private complainant
was an innocent victim of the petitioners perfidy, she is not barred from
claiming moral damages. Considering the attendant circumstances of the
case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just
and reasonable.
99
LIABILITY EX-MALEFICIO OR EX-DELICTO

SONNY D. ROMERO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 167546
July 17,
2009
Facts:
On April 1, 1999 at around 12:00 noon, the JC Liner driven by
petitioner Sonny Romero and the Apego Taxi driven by Jimmy Padua figured
in a head-on collision along Governor Jose Fuentebella Highway at
Barangay Hibago, Ocampo, Camarines Sur. The bus was bound for Naga
City while the taxi was going in the opposite direction of Partido Area. The
collision resulted in the death of Gerardo Breis, Sr., Arnaldo Breis, Gerardo
Breis, Jr., Rene Montes, Erwin Breis and Jimmy Padua. Luckily, Edwin Breis
and his son Edmund Breis survived although they sustained serious injuries.
As a consequence, petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple serious physical
injuries with damage to property in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Ocampo, Camarines Sur. After trial on the merits, the MTC acquitted
petitioner of the crime charged in a decision dated November 9, 2000.
Petitioner was, however, held civilly liable and was ordered to pay the heirs
of the victims the total amount of P3,541,900 by way of actual damages,
civil indemnity for death, moral damages, temperate damages and loss of
earning capacity.
100
Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur

which on July 17, 2001, affirmed the MTC judgment in toto. Refusing to give
up, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March 3, 2005, the CA
rendered the assailed decision affirming the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners acquittal freed him of civil liability?
Ruling:
In view of the pronouncements of the MTC and the RTC, the Supreme
Court agrees with the conclusion of the CA that petitioner was acquitted not
because he did not commit the crime charged but because the RTC and the
MTC could not ascertain with moral conviction the wanton and reckless
manner by which petitioner drove the bus at the time of the accident. Put
differently, petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, his civil liability for the death,
injuries and damages arising from the collision is another matter. While
petitioner was absolved from criminal liability because his negligence was
not proven beyond reasonable doubt, he can still be held civilly liable if his
negligence was established by preponderance of evidence. In other words,
the failure of the evidence to prove negligence with moral certainty does
not negate (and is in fact compatible with) a ruling that there was
preponderant evidence of such negligence. And that is sufficient to hold him
civilly liable.
ACTS CONTRA BONOS MORES

CECILIO PE ET AL. vs. ALFONSO PE
G.R. No.L-17396
1962
May 30,
Facts:
Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the
time of her disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and
unmarried. Defendant is a married man and works as agent of the La Perla
Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan,
Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying
with her parents in the same town. Defendant was an adopted son of a
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Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because of

such fact and the similarity in their family name, defendant became close to
the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their family. Sometime in
1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he
wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in
love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only in the town
of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school.
They exchanged love notes with each other the contents of which reveal not
only their infatuation for each other but also the extent to which they had
carried their relationship. The rumors about their love affairs reached the
ears of Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was
forbidden from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. The
plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a
Chinese national. The affair between defendant and Lolita continued
nonetheless.
Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and
sisters at their residence at 54-B Espaa Extension, Quezon City. On April
14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After she left, her brothers
and sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone.
However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's
aparador. Said note, written on a small slip of paper approximately 4" by 3"
in size, was in a handwriting recognized to be that of defendant's. The
disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI
but up to the present there is no news or trace of her whereabouts.
The
trial court said: "In the absence of proof on this point, the court may not
presume that it was the defendant who deliberately induced such
relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the uncertainties and sometimes
inexplicable mysteries of the human emotions. It is a possibility that the
defendant and Lolita simply fell in love with each other, not only without any
desire on their part, but also against their better judgment and in full
consciousness of what it will bring to both of them. This is specially so with
respect to Lolita, being an unmarried woman, falling in love with defendant
who is a married man."
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to moral, compensatory,
exemplary and corrective damages.
102
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the circumstances under which
defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion
than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the
latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the
fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he
wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of
his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access because he was
a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two
eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs
not only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio
school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of
her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even
from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against
defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his
love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home.
Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than
that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy,
succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having
illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is
indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily,
he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the
new Civil Code.
103

FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ET
AL.
G.R. No. L-14628
September 30, 1960
Facts:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950,
Soledad then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and
petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go
around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no
promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and
became a life insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy
developed among her and the petitioner, since one evening in 1953, when
after coming from the movies; they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on
board M/V "Escao," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In
February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way,
whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was
born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However,
subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez.
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas filed with said of her child, Chris
Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of
promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed
willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry
the complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on
October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month,
which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month.
The judgment of the RTC is hereby rendered, declaring the child,
Chris Hermosisima, as the natural daughter of defendant, and confirming
the order pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to the said child, through
104
plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day
of every month sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of four
thousand five hundred pesos (P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory
damages; the sum of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) as moral damages;
and the further sum of five thousand pesos (P500.00) as attorney's fees for
plaintiff, with costs against defendant. On appeal taken by petitioner, the
Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the actual and
compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were increased to
P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
Issue:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for
breach of promise to marry?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that seduction does not exist in the present
case thus the petitioner is not morally guilty of seduction, not only because
he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant who
around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former
high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be when
she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also,
because, the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered
herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she
"wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they
had the benefit of clergy." Thus the complainant is not entitled to award of
damages.
105

BEATRIZ GALANG vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.
G.R. No.L-17248
January
29, 1962
Facts:
Rodrigo courted Beatriz in 1953 and they, thereafter, became
engaged, albeit Rodrigo's mother was opposed to their marriage; that on
April 15, 1955 Rodrigo and his father went to her house and her marriage
with Rodrigo were arranged, with the concurrence of her mother, appellant
Maximino Quinit having agreed to give dowry and to defray the expenses of
the marriage, with the exception of the wedding dress of appellee; that they
agreed to have the marriage celebrated in Baguio, for which reason on April
27, 1955, appellee, Rodrigo and the latter's father left for Baguio; that upon
arriving at Colorado Falls, however, Maximino made them alight from the
106
bus and took them to the house of Adolfo Dagawan with whom Maximino
agreed that appellee and Rodrigo would stay in said house, Maximino to pay
P5.00 daily for their lodging and asked Dagawan to make all arrangements
for their wedding in Baguio and to act as their sponsor; that after making
these arrangements Maximino left, while appellee and Rodrigo remained in
Dagawan's house where they lived as husband and wife until May 9, that on
May 7, appellee and Rodrigo, accompanied by Dagawan, went to Baguio to
secure a marriage license but failed because Rodrigo did not have a
residence certificate, although both prospective contracting parties signed
the corresponding application; that on May 9, on the pretext that he going
to their hometown to get his residence certificate, Rodrigo left Colorado
Falls and never returned; that when appellee returned to their hometown
(Sison, Pangasinan), she found out that Rodrigo's parents had sprinted him
away because, in their opinion, appellee's reputation was unsavory.
The Court of First Instance sustained plaintiff's pretense, but the
Court of Appeals considered her evidence unworthy of credence, and,
hence, absolved Maximino Quinit.
Issues:
Whether or not Rodrigo and Maximo Quinit are liable for damages
due to the alleged breach of promise to marry?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for
the reason that mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong.In the light of the clear and manifest intent of our law making body
not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral
damages made by the Court of First Instance is, accordingly, untenable.

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 97336
February
19, 1993
Facts:
107
Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October

27, 1987 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged breach of their
agreement to get married. She met the petitioner in Dagupan where the
latter was an Iranian medical exchange student who later courted her and
proposed marriage. The petitioner even went to Marilous house to secure
approval of her parents. The petitioner then forced the respondent to leave
with him in his apartment. Marilou was a virgin before she lived with him.
After a week, she filed a complaint because the petitioner started
maltreating and threatening her. He even tied the respondent in the
apartment while he was in school and drugged her. Marilou at one time
became pregnant but the petitioner administered a drug to abort the baby.
Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not
live with him since he is already married to someone in Bacolod. He
claimed that he never proposed marriage or agreed to be married neither
sought consent and approval of Marlious parents. He claimed that he
asked Marilou to stay out of his apartment since the latter deceived him by
stealing money and his passport. The private respondent prayed for
damages and reimbursements of actual expenses.
Issue:
Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause for
damages.
Ruling:
The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. The court held that when a man uses his promise of
marriage to deceive a woman to consent to his malicious desires, he
commits fraud and willfully injures the woman. In that instance, the court
found that petitioners deceptive promise to marry led Marilou to surrender
her virtue and womanhood.
Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a
deceptive ploy to have carnal knowledge with the woman and actual
damages should be paid for the wedding preparation expenses. Petitioner
even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of the country.
Therefore, SC set aside the decision of CA awarding damages to the
respondent.
108

WASSMER vs. VELEZ
G.R. No. L-20089
December
26, 1964
Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise
of love, decided to get married and set Sept. 4, 1954 as the big day. On
Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be saying that he wants to
postpone the marriage as his mother opposes it and that he is leaving. But
the next day, Sept. 3, he sent her a telegram and told her that nothing has
changed, that he is returning and he apologizes. Thereafter, Velez did not
appear nor was he heard from again. Wassmer sued him for damages. Velez
filed no answer and was declared in default.
Issue:
Is the case at bar a mere breach of promise to marry?
Ruling:
Surely, this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As
stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to
formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Art. 21 of the NCC which provides that "any person who willfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
109

NATIVIDAD vs. TUNAC
G.R. No. 143130
10, 2000
July
Facts:
Petitioner Elsa Natividad and respondent Ronald Tunac grew up
together in Barangay Quiling, Talisay, Batangas where their respective
parents resided. At age nineteen (19), the two became lovers. One day,
Ronald asked Elsa to go with him to his boarding house in Pasig City to get
the bio-data which he needed in connection with his application for
employment. Upon arrival at the boarding house, they found no one there.
Ronald asked Elsa to go with him inside his room and, once inside, started
kissing Elsa until he succeeded in making love with her. Elsa cried at the
loss of her virginity, but Ronald appeased her by promising to marry her.
Their intimate relations continued, resulting in Elsa getting pregnant
sometime in June 1992. Ronald reassured her, again promising her
marriage. True enough, on October 31, 1992, Ronald and his parents,
accompanied by several relatives numbering twenty in all, went to Elsa's
house and asked her parents for the hand of their daughter.The two families
agreed to have the wedding in January 1993 but Elsa's sister had gotten
married that year so they postponed it. Meanwhile, Elsa started living with
Ronald in the house of the latter's family while waiting for the baby to be
born. Unfortunately, on December 19, 1992, Elsa gave birth to a premature
baby which died after five (5) hours in the incubator. After Elsa's discharge
from the hospital, the two families decided that Elsa should go back to her
parents so her mother could take care of her during her postnatal period.
During said period, Ronald occasionally slept in Elsa's house.
It seems that after Elsa's miscarriage, a marked change in Ronald's
attitude towards the former occurred. In January of 1993, the Natividads
confronted the Tunacs. In that meeting, Ronald informed Elsa that he no
longer wanted to get married to her. Petitioners succinctly contend they are
suing respondents not merely because Elsa became pregnant but because
Ronald reneged on his promise to marry her after their agreement had
already been much publicized in their town.
Issue:
Whether or not Ronald performs moral seduction.
Ruling:
In the case at bar, it is clear that no moral seduction was employed by
Ronald, much less by his parents. Form the narration of the trial court, the
evident conclusion is that the two became lovers before they engaged in any
110
sexual intercourse. Also, the moral seduction contemplated by the Code

Commission in drafting Article 21 of the Civil Code is one where the
defendant is in a position of moral ascendancy in relation to the plaintiff. We
fail to see any of these circumstances in this case.
In addition, as the trial court noted, marriage plans were in fact
arranged between the families of the parties. That their relationship turned
sour afterwards, or immediately after Elsa's miscarriage, is already beyond
the punitive scope of our laws. This is simply a case of a relationship gone
awry.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
SHINRYO (PHILIPPINES) COMPANY, INC. vs. RRN INC.
G.R. No. 172525
October
20, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Shinryo (Philippines) Company, Inc. (hereinafter petitioner)
is a domestic corporation organized under Philippine laws. Private
respondent RRN Incorporated (hereinafter respondent) is likewise a
domestic corporation organized under Philippine laws. Respondent filed a
claim for arbitration against petitioner before CIAC for recovery of unpaid
account which consists of unpaid portions of the sub-contract, variations
and unused materials in the total sum of P5, 275,184.17 and legal interest
in the amount of P442, 014.73. Petitioner filed a counterclaim for
overpayment in the amount of P2, 512,997.96. The parties admitted several
facts before the CIAC. It was shown that petitioner and respondent
executed an Agreement and Conditions of Sub-contract. Respondent
signified its willingness to accept and perform for petitioner in any of its
projects, a part or the whole of the works more particularly described in
Conditions of Sub-Contract and other Sub-contract documents.
On June 11, 2002, the parties executed a "Supply of Manpower,
Tools/Equipment, Consumables for the Electrical Works-Power and
Equipment Supply, Bus Duct Installation" for the Phillip Morris Greenfield
Project (hereafter Project) covered by Purchase Order Nos. 4501200300000274 and 4501200300-000275 amounting to P15,724,000.00 and
P9,276,000.00 respectively, or a total amount of P25,000,000.00. The
parties also agreed that respondent will perform variation orders in the
Project. In connection with the Project, petitioner supplied manpower
chargeable against respondent. Respondent was not able to finish the entire
works with petitioner due to financial difficulties. Petitioner paid respondent
a total amount of P26,547,624.76. On June 25, 2005 [should read 2003],
respondent, through its former counsel sent a letter to petitioner
111
demanding for the payment of its unpaid balance amounting to

P5,275,184.17. Petitioner claimed material back charges in the amount of
P4,063,633.43. On September 26, 2003, respondent only acknowledged
P2,371,895.33 as material back charges. Thereafter, on October 16, 2003,
respondent sent another letter to petitioner for them to meet and settle
their dispute. On January 8, 2004, respondent sent another letter to
petitioner regarding the cost of equipment rental and the use of scaffolding.
Thereafter, on August 12, 2004, petitioner sent a letter to respondent
denying any unpaid account and the failure in their negotiations for
amicable settlement.
Issue:
Whether or not the Claimant's claim for inventory of excess materials
is constitutes to unjust enrichment.
Ruling:
No, the court of appeals committed a grave reversible error in
affirming that the CIAC award for the values of inventoried materials
considering that respondent RRN has no basis to claim because Engr.
Bonifacio admitted that respondent RRN failed to establish whether the
materials came from respondent or from petitioner and that it was
petitioner that actually installed the said materials as part of remaining
works that the petitioner took over from respondent rrn. The claim for the
value of inventoried materials is a doubled claim or a doubled entry because
in the computation of the final account, respondent RRN was credited the
full contract price and the cost of variations which included the inventoried
materials.
Despite petitioner's attempts to make it appear that it is advancing
questions of law, it is quite clear that what petitioner seeks is for this Court
to recalibrate the evidence it has presented before the CIAC. It insists that
its evidence sufficiently proves that it is entitled to payment for
respondent's use of its manlift equipment, and even absent proof of the
supposed agreement on the charges petitioner may impose on respondent
for the use of said equipment, respondent should be made to pay based on
the principle of unjust enrichment. Petitioner also questions the amounts
awarded by the CIAC for inventoried materials, and costs incurred by
petitioner for completing the work left unfinished by respondent.
112
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
CAR COOL Philippines, Inc. v. USHIO Realty and Development
Corporation
G.R. NO. 138088
January 23, 2006
Facts:
On December 19, 2005, USHIO Realty and Development Corporation
filed an ejectment case against CAR COOL Philippines Inc., to recover the
possession of a parcel of land at Quezon Avenue. USHIO Realty contends
that despite several and repeated demands and notices from the former
owners of the land, spouses Lopez, and also from the new owners, USHIO
Realty, CAR COOL still failed to vacate the property. On December 3, 1995
USHIO Realty sent the final demand to CAR COOL, giving a non extendable
113
15 days within which to vacate the property. CAR COOL refused to vacate
the property, hence the ejectment case.
The Metropolitan Trial Court rendered in the ejectment case in favor
of USHIO Realty. CAR COOL appealed to the Regional Trial Court which
rendered a decision affirming the decision of the MeTC. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision with modification, granting
rentals to USHIO Realty.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages by
way of rentals and attorneys fees in favor of USHIO Realty
Ruling:
USHIO Realty as the new owner of the property has a right to physical
possession of the said property. Since CAR COOL deprived USHIO Realty of
its property, CAR COOL should pay USHIO Realty rental as a reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the property. Contrary to CAR
COOLs contention the payment of damages in the form of rentals for the
property does not constitute unjust enrichment.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
ELEGIR vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.
G.R. No. 181995
July 16, 2012
114
Facts:
Petitioner Bibiano C. Elegir was hired by Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL)
as a commercial pilot, specifically designated as HS748 Limited First
Officer, on March 16, 1971. In 1995, PAL embarked on a refleeting program
and acquired new and highly sophisticated aircrafts. Subsequently, PAL
posts a bid for the opening of slots for the crew of the new aircrafts. Elegir
was one of those awarded with the opportunity.
Elegir, along with 7 other pilot, were sent for training in Seattle,
Washington, United States of America on May 8, 1995 for the necessary
training of his skills and knowledge to handle the new aircraft. He
completed his training on September 19, 1995. On November 5, 1996 after
rendering 25 years, 8 months, and 20 days of continuous service, the
petitioner applied for an optional retirement authorized under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between PAL and the Airline Pilots Association
of the Philippines (ALPAP). PAL asked him to reconsider his retirement in
that the company has yet to recover the cost of his training. In the event
that he finally decides to leave, PAL will deduct the unrecovered cost of his
training from his Retirement Pay. He decided to leave thereafter. Elegirs
counsel sent PAL a letter of correspondence stating that the cost of training
should not be deducted from his retirement pay.
Issue:
Whether or not PAL had the right to reimburse themselves from
Elegirs retirement pay the amount unrecovered from his training.
Ruling:
PAL had the right to be reimbursed. According to Article 22-23 of the
New Civil Code, they had the right to demand payment since Elegir will
unjustly enrich himself at the expense of PAL. Unjustly enriching is unduly
profiting ones self on something which does not meritoriously belong to
him, this is well enshrined in the Latin maxim, Nemo cum
alteriusdetrimentolocupletaripotest. Elgir has the right to retire since he
has reached a certain number of flight hours which is considered a long stay
in PAL, but his bid for the vacancy and his subsequent training sponsored by
PAL was put to waste when he decides to have an early retirement from PAL
after his training. It would be unfair for PAL if Elegir has gained new skills
for the service of PAL but then leave even after PAL has still not even
recovered the cost of training.
115
PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE
G.R. No. L-56168

22, 1988
VALENZUELA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

December
Facts:
Carlos Telosa is a farmer and a fisherman. He had very limited
education. Telosa initiated a loan with the Rural Bank of Lucena with a
contract of mortgage. The mortgage covered a parcel of land measuring
50,000 square meters. Several months later the Rural Bank of Lucena
experienced financial distress. The Central Bank appraised Rural Bank of
Lucians shareholders. It was found out in its investigation that key officers
of the bank had certain anomalies or had resorted to unsound banking
practices which were prejudicial to the government, the public, and its
creditors.
Rural Bank of Lucena has then undergone liquidation. It had received
orders to turn its non-monetary assets into cash to satisfy claims. Among
one of the accounts it decides to liquidate was the Telosa account in the
amount of Php 5000.00. Rural Bank of Lucena sent for a demand letter
asking for the payment of the account. Carlos Telosa thought that he owes
the bank only Php 300.00 and not Php 5000.00, so Telosa filed a protest on
the demand received. Meanwhile Carlos Telosa died in January 13, 1968.
The rural bank claiming that the payment was not fully paid petitioned the
foreclosure the Telosas land to satisfy the claim. The lot was then sold to
the highest bidder and was consequently registered in the Registry of Deeds
on September 11, 1972. Telosa now pray for the annulment of the land back
to them because they have already paid the loan of Php 300.00.
Issue:
Whether or not the state can intervene via parenspatriae for the
return of the Telosas land.
Ruling:
116
The state can protect its citizens; it is a supreme power the state can
exercise at any time the rights of its citizen is being prejudiced. The bank
took advantage of the Telosas by making a document that was not the
contract that they have agreed upon. Needless to state in this regard the
particular transaction was one of the fraudulent and anomalous
transactions involving the officer of the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. The state
can intervene because there has been a preponderance of proof that the
loan only amounts to Php 300.00 and not Php 5000.00. By virtue of the
power of the state the bank was ordered to return the land it extra judicially
settled.
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 120706
January 31, 2000
Facts:
Sometime in 1985, the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas are
living in an apartment being leased to them by Florence Bing Concepcion,
who also resides in the same compound where the apartment was located.
Nestor was engaged in the business of supplying government agencies and
private entities with office equipment, appliances and other fixtures on a
cash or credit basis. Bing joined the venture and contributed capital on the
condition that after her capital investment was returned to her, any profit
earned would be divided equally between her and Nestor.
Sometime in the second week of July 1985, Rodrigo Concepcion the
brother of the deceased husband of Bing accosted Nestor at the latters
apartment and accusing him of having adulterous relationship with Bing.
Rodrigo threatened that should something happen to Rodrigos sick mother,
in case the latter learned of the affair, he would kill Florence.
As a result of the incident, Nestor felt extreme embarrassment and
shame to the extent that he could no longer face his neighbors. Florence
117
also ceased to do business with him by not contributing capital anymore so

much so that the business venture was no longer feasible. To make matters
worse, the relationship between Allem and Nestor has soured from the
doubt of fidelity and frequent bickering and quarrels. Allem even expressed
her desire to leave her husband. Nestor was forced to demand from Rodrigo
damages and a public apology.
Issue:
Whether or not Nestors right to privacy had been shattered by
Rodrigo and is Nestor entitled to damages.
Ruling:
The court has ruled that Nestor is entitled to damages. Although the
defendant claims that there was neither violation done that was enlisted
under Article 26 and 2219 of the New Civil Code which constitute libel,
slander, or any other form of defamation nor does it involve prying into the
privacy of anothers residence, it was still adjudged that the act done was
form of that manner. The Code commission stresses in no uncertain terms
that the human personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human
personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human
amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and
civilization of every county, is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes
insufficiently protect a person from being unjustly humiliated, in short if
human personality is not exalted then the laws are indeed defective, thus,
under this article, the right of persons are amply protected, and damages
are provided for violations of a persons dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind. There is no question that Nestor suffered mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social humiliation as a
proximate result of petitioners abusive, scandalous, and insulting language.
Nestor, therefore is entitled to damages.
118
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
G.R. No. 183026

14, 2012
PADALHIN vs. LAVINA

November
Facts:
Lavina and Nestor were both diplomats assigned in Kenya as
Ambassador and Consul General, respectively. In the course of their stay at
Kenya , the residence of Lavina was raided twice. Prior to the raids,
BienvenidoPasturan delivered messages to the Filipino household helpers in
119
the ambassadors residence instructing them to allow the entry of an officer

who would come to take photographs of the ivory souvenirs kept therein.
The first raid was conducted while Lavina and his wife were attending a
diplomatic dinner. Officials from the Criminal Investigation Division
Intelligent Office of Kenya took picture of Lavinas house with the aid of
Lavinashouse helpers. The second raid again took place when Lavina was
not present at the house, pictures were taken.
Lavina received information from the DFA in Manila that an
investigation team was sent to Kenya to inquire into the complaints filed
against him by the employees of the Philippine Embassy in Kenya, own one
hand, and his own complaint against the spouses Padalhin. The
investigating team comprised by Manalo, Ebdalin, and Dizon entered the
Lavina residence without any search warrant, court order or letter from the
DFA Secretary. Lavina alleged that the team destroyed cabinet locks,
damaged furniture and took three sets of carved ivory tusk. Lavina
subsequently filed before the RTC for damages against the spouses
Padalhin, and the 3 members of the investigation team.
Issue:
Whether or not the unwarranted search and seizure made by the
petitioners violated Lavinas right to privacy.
Ruling:
The Article 26 of the civil code state the instances when a persons
right are disturbed. There is no doubt that the unwarranted seizures done
where against Lavinas privacy rights. The act was defended by Padalhin
stating that he had no malice or bad faith when he ordered the search and
seizure. The Supreme Court ruled that Nestors surreptitious acts negate
his allegation of good faith. If it were true that Lavina kept the ivories in his
diplomatic residence then, his behavior deserves condemnation. However,
that is not the issue in the case at bar. Nestor violated the New Civil Code
prescriptions concerning the privacy of ones residence and he cannot hide
behind the cloak of his supposed benevolent intentions to justify the
invasion. Damages are in order against the Padalhins.
120
NON-FEASANCE, MISFEASANCE, MALFEASANCE

PHILEX MINING CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE
G.R. No. 125704
August 28,
1998
Facts:
On August 5, 1992, the BIR sent a letter to Philex asking it to settle its
tax liability for the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quarter of 1991 as well as the 1st and 2nd
of 1992 in the total amount of P123,821.52. In a letter dated August 1992,
Philex protested the demand for payment of the tax liabilities stating it has
pending claims for VAT input/refund for taxes it paid for the years 1989 to
1991 in the amount of P119,977,032.02 plus interest. Therefore these
claims for tax credit/refund should be applied against the tax liabilities. BIR
stated that it was the mistake of its employees who in investigating tax
claims are seen to drag their feet needlessly.
Issue:
Whether or not the malfeasance of the employee justified the nonpayment of the taxes due by Philex.
Ruling:
The BIR being a collector of taxes has the right to demand for due
taxes. The non-payment of Philex cannot be justified by the lapse of duty by
the tax collector. The Officer having a mistake cannot be a reason not to pay
because it was in neglect of his duty. Philex regardless has to pay the taxes.
The taxes in the first place could not be subject to legal compensation
because taxes cannot be offset against claims of taxes by the government;
the relationship of the government and its taxpayers is not a debtor-creditor
relationship.
121
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM ACQUITTAL

MANANTAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 107125
January 29, 2001
Facts:
In the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal WilfredoAmbrocio
decided to catch shrimps at the irrigation canal at his farm. He invited the
deceased, Ruben Nicolas, who told him that they should borrow the Ford
Fiera of George Manantan. So Ambrocio and Manantan came to get Nicolas
at the Manantan Technical School.
When they arrived at the farm they had drank beer. At about 12:00
they went home. Then at about 2:00 or 3:00 P.M., Miguel Tabangin (Defense
Witness), Nicolas, and Ambrocio returned home with a duck. They ate and
drank up to 8:00 in the evening. Manantan, soon after, invited the others to
go bowling in Santiago. They went to Santiago and were not able to bowl
but rather decided to go to a night club. They decided to go home after the
festivities.
Manantan drove the car. Tabangin sat with Manantan at the front seat
while Nicolas and Ambrocio sat at the back seats. Manantan was driving at
a speed of about 40 kilometers per hour along the middle of the highway
because he was about to overtake a tricycle when they met a jeepney with
bright lights on. Manantan tried to swerve the car to the right to avoid the
collision but was no able to avoid the oncoming vehicle and the two vehicles
collided with each other at the center of the road. The men were brought to
the hospital but unfortunately Nicolas died. Ambrocio suffered minor
injuries to his head and legs.
The parents of the deceased filed a criminal case against Manantan
but the case was ruled in favor of Manantan for lack of proof beyond
122
reasonable doubt. The parents of the Ruben Nicolas now seek for the
enforcement of civil liability against Manantan. Manantan argues that he
can be held no longer be civilly liable since he was acquitted of the crime.
Issue:
Whether or not a suit for civil action for damages is barred by the
acquittal of an accused.
Ruling:
The answer at the case at bar is in the affirmative. The acquittal of
Manantan was due to reasonable doubts therefore civil action can prosper.
There exist two types of acquittal, the first is acquittal because the accused
was not the author of the crime or there is no crime while the second is the
acquittal due to reasonable doubts. In the former the criminal and civil
liability is extinguished while in the latter the criminal aspect is the only one
extinguished since civil liability merely requires preponderance of evidence.
The case prospers in pursuance of article 29 of the New Civil Code.
EXTINGUISHMENT OF CIVIL LIABILITY BY ACUITTAL
NUGUID vs. NICDAO
G.R. No. 150785
September 15,
2006
Facts:
The accused, Clarita Nicdao is charged with fourteen counts of
violation of Batas PambansaBilang 22 otherwise known as the Bouncing
Checks Law. Sometime 1996 from April to August thereof, Clarita Nicdao
and her husband went to Emma Nuguid. The petitioner asked if they could
borrow money to settle some obligations. Due to their close relationship,
Nuguid lent the Nicdao spouses money.
Nuguid released the loan in installment of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos until the amount reached to an aggregate of One Million One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos. Nuguid, to show good faith in her part,
issued Hermosa Saving Bank open-dated check in the same amount as the
loan. The checks are to be deposited in Nuguids account upon non-payment
of the amount within one year. In June 1997, Nuguid, together with Samson
Ching, demanded payment of the loan but Nicdao refused to acknowledge
the indebtedness. Nuguid then decided to deposit the checks in her account
123
in Chings account since it was Ching whom Nuguid got the money to loan
to Nicdao. The checks were all dishonored because of it being drawn
against insufficient funds (DAIF).
A verbal and written notice of dishonor was sent to Nicdao. This was
to give them chance to make good on their loan as represented in the
checks. The notice was for naught. Hence, a complaint was brought against
Nicdao for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. In the Regional Trial
Court Nicdao was found guilty of and was sentenced to pay the principal
plus interest and suffer imprisonment of one year per bouncing check for a
total of 14 years. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision due to
substantial fact that was overlooked by the trial court. Nuguid now filed for
a petition to the Supreme Court raising the issue for civil liability.
Issue:
a) Whether or not the civil liability was also extinguished upon the
acquittal of Nicdao of the violation of B.P. 22.
b) Whether or not interest is enforceable in the contract.
Ruling:
The civil liability was extinguished due to the findings of the Supreme
Court that Nicdao has already made overpayments of the amount due. The
acquittal was due to the reason that the crime was non-existent already
since payment were made over and above what was agreed upon. The
criminal and civil liability will not persist since there the checks were only
to be deposited upon non-compliance of the payment of the principal debt
Interest was being enforced by the Nuguid in the case. It was one of
the reasons why the debt of Nicdao was continually rising as payment are
applied first to interest. The interest was unconscionable. The Court ruled
that since the interest was not stipulated in writing, the debt remained in its
principal amount. The principal was actually paid in full already as per
Article 1956 of the Civil Code.
124
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM

DELICT
PEOPLE vs. AGACER
G.R. No. 177751
January 7,
2013
Facts:
The victim, CesarioAgacer, was clearing and preparing the soil
bedding section of his farm in preparation for the rice seedlings intended
for the coming planting season. Genesis Delanter, his brother Andy, Rafael,
125
and brother Roden were at the nearby rice field harvesting the palay that
Cesario had raised.
Suddenly, Florencio, Eddie, Elynor, Franklin, and Eric, all surnamed
Agacer, came out of the nearby banana plantation and went in the direction
of Cesario. The group of men then surrounded Cesario and intimidated him.
Cesario felt the hostilities and tried to get away. But the accused started fire
on Cesarios harvest which prompted Cesario to return for his burning
crops. While Cesario was trying to put the fire out, Florencio ordered to go
near Cesario. Eddie did what was told and pulled out a shotgun from the
rice sack that he was holding and shot Cesario on the left portion of his
chest. As Cesario fell, they fired then another shot inflicting mortal wounds
on Cesario. The gang of men then fled the scene. The Supreme Court
affirmed the guilt of the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil liability of the brothers arose upon the final
judgment of the Supreme Court of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court found them guilty and since the civil action for
damages was deemed instituted in the criminal action then their civil
liability has also been proven. According to Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Also
Article 20 of the Civil Code states that every person who, contrary to law,
willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter
for the same. And the same is strengthened finally by Article 1161 of the
Civil Code which states that civil obligation arising from criminal offenses
shall be governed by the penal laws. Underlying this principle is that a
person who is criminally liable is also civilly liable is the view that from the
standpoint of its effects, a crime has dual character; First, as an offense
against the state because of the disturbance of the social order, and second
as an offense against the private person injured by the crime.
DEATH AS A MODE OF EXTINGUISMENT OF CIVIL LIABILITY
126
PEOPLE vs. BAYOTAS

G.R. No. 102007
September 2,
1994
Facts:
The accused, Rogelio Bayotas, was charged with rape and eventually
convicted on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel Autajay.
Pending appeal of his conviction the accused died. The findings of the
National Bilibid Hospital declared him dead on February 4, 1992.
The Supreme Court in its resolution dated May 20, 1992 dismissed
the criminal aspect of the appeal but then required the Solicitor General to
file its comment on Bayotas civil liability arising from the crime. In the
Solicitor Generals comment the civil liability hasnt yet expired. The
solicitor general based its judgment on the case of People vs. Sendaydiego.
The counsel of the accused-appellant had a different view; where the death
occurred after final judgment the criminal and civil liability shall be
extinguished.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of Bayotas extinguished his criminal and
civil liability.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the accused. According to the
Supreme Court, the controlling statute was Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code. The provision states that death extinguishes the criminal aspect. In
the case at bar, there was no reservation of an independent civil action
against the accused; the criminal and civil aspects are therefore considered
as instituted in the criminal action. Since the civil action was anchored with
the criminal case then it follows that the death dissolves both civil and
criminal liability.
The Solicitor Generals dependence on the Sendaydiego case was
misplaced. What was contemplated in the Sendaydiego case was the civil
liability arising from other sources of obligation other than delicts. It is
therefore safe to say that what death extinguishes is criminal liability and
civil liability arising from delict only.
127
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION

CANCIO vs. ISIP
G.R. No. 133978
November 12,
2002
Facts:
The accused, EmerenciaIsip, was charged with 3 counts of violation of
B.P. 22, also known as the Bouncing Checks Law and 3 cases of Estafa. One
of the B.P. 22 cases was dismissed due to it being deposited before 90 days
from the date written on the check. The other two cases of B.P. 22 were filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga and were then
dismissed due to the failure of the prosecution to prosecute the crime.
Meanwhile the three cases of Estafa were filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Pampanga. After failing to present its second witness, the
prosecution dismissed the Estafa case. The prosecution reserved its right to
file a separate civil action from the said criminal cases. The court granted
the reservation. The criminal case of Estafa was then dismissed without
prejudice to the civil action. On December 15, 1997, petitioner filed the
instant case for the collection of the sum of money, seeking to recover the
amount of the check subject to the Estafa cases. Respondent then filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint contending that the petition is already
barred by the doctrine of Res Judicata.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents can file a separate civil action
regardless of the dismissal of the criminal case of estafa.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the civil action can prosper. The
reservation for civil action was made by the prosecution on time. According
128
to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that civil
liability is deemed instituted with the criminal case unless there is a
reservation of the right to file a separate civil action.
In the case at bar, the complaint is clearly based on culpa contractual.
The cause of action was the breach of the respondents breach of the
contractual obligation. Evidently, the petitioner was seeking to make good
the value written on the checks in exchange for cash. The case was not
anchored the criminal aspect of estafa but on the civil aspect of culpa
contractual. As such, it is distinct and independent from the estafa case
filed against the offender and may proceed regardless of the result of the
criminal proceedings.
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM ACQUITTAL

HEIRS OF GUARING vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 108395
March 7, 1997
Facts:
On November 7, 1987, the car driven by TeodoroGuaring Jr. collided
with the Philippine Rabbit Bus driven by Angelo Cuevas and with a Toyota
Cressida Car driven by Eligio Enriquez, along the North Luzon Expressway
in San Rafael, Mexico Pampanga. As a consequence, Guaring died.The trial
court ruled in favor of herein petitioners, but lost in the Court of Appeals
where the accused was acquitted based on reasonable doubt. This was
because it was found out that the deceased was the one who acted
negligently. The accused the claimed appealed in the court that the civil
case filed against him be extinguished since the extinguishment of his
criminal liability necessarily follows the extinguishment of his civil liability,
since his civil liability aroused from his criminal liability. The petitioners
disagreed on this ground, claiming that the civil case should pursue. This
was then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil liability of the accused is extinguished due to
his acquittal.
129
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the acquittal of the bus driver was based
on reasonable doubt, which means that the civil case for damages was not
barred since the cause of action of the heirs was based on quasi-delict. Even
if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi-delict, the
acquittal of the bus driver will not bar recovery of damages because the
acquittal was based not on a finding that he was not guilty but only on
reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held that the judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist.
Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in
civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the
accused is not criminal but only civil in nature as, for instance, in the
felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain
relatives who thereby incur only civil liability; and, where the civil liability
does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the
accused was acquitted.Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the
proceedings for the civil case of the said incident must continue for the
recovery of damages of the victims heirs. The case was remanded to the
trial court to determine the civil liability of the accused.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (DEFAMATION)

ARAFILES vs. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC.
G.R. No. 150256
March 25, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner CatalinoArafiles seeks a review of the CA decision which
dismissed his complaint for damages against respondents publisher
Philippine Journalists Inc, Manuel Villareal Jr., Editor Max Buan Jr. and
reporter Romy Morales. Respondent Morales wrote a report that appeared
on Peoples Journal Tonight, which related how EmelitaDespuig, an
employee of the National Institute of Atmospheric Sciences (NAIS) of PAG-
130
ASA, lodged a complaint against petitioner, a NAIS director, for forcible

abduction with rape and forcible abduction with attempted rape and the
supposed details of the rape. About a year after the report was published,
Arafiles instituted the complaint for damages, alleging that on account of
the grossly malicious and overly sensationalized reporting in the news
item, his reputation as a director of NAIS was injured, that he became the
object of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed
stalker and serial rapist and that the news deferred his promotion.
Issue:
Whether or not the article published constitute a libelous material,
which would make the editors liable for defamation.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the news article is not malicious.In
actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged
to contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole.In
order to ascertain the meaning of a published article, the whole of the
article must be considered, each phrase must be construed in the light of
the entire publication. The headlines of a newspaper must also be read in
connection with the language which follows.The presentation of the news
item subject of petitioners complaint may have been in a sensational
manner, but it is not per se illegal.
Respondents could of course have been more circumspect in their
choice of words as the headline and first seven paragraphs of the news item
give the impression that a certain director of the NIAS actually committed
the crimes complained of by Emelita. The succeeding paragraphs, in which
petitioner and complainant Emelita were eventually identified, sufficiently
convey to the readers, however, that the narration of events was only an
account of what Emelita had reported at the police headquarters.Every
citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we
do not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case,
had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press.
The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to
enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in
our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and editors
usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith
131
and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of

suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.
132
INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGANCES vs. ARGOS

G.R. No. 130362
September 10, 2001
Facts:
Merlin J. Argos and Jaja C. Pineda, general manager and commercial
director respectively of the International Flavors and Fragrances
Incorporated (IFFI) filed a libel case against Hernan H. Costa, the managing
director of IFFI after being described by the latter as pesona non grata in
his personal announcement after termination of their services. They later
filed a separate civil case for damages against Costa and IFFI in its
subsidiary capacity as employer with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
wherein IFFI moved to dismiss the complaint. The Regional Trial Court
granted IFFIs motion to dismiss for respondents failure to reserve its right
to institute a separate civil action. Upon a motion for reconsideration, the
Regional Trial Court granted Argos and Pinedas petition which was later
affirmed by the appellate court.
Issue:
Whether or not Argos and Pineda could sue IFFI for damages based
on subsidiary liability in an independent civil action.
Ruling:
IFFI, petitioner contends that respondents did not allege that IFFI
was primarily liable for damages and on the contrary, the complaint was
replete with references that IFFI was being sued for its subsidiary capacity.
Article 33 of the New Civil Code provides that in cases of defamation, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party. As ruled in Joaquin vs. Aniceto
however, article 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his
primary capacity. It does not apply to an action against the employer to
enforce its subsidiary civil liability as such liability arises only after
conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee
adjudged guilty of the wrongful act. Thus, the Supreme Court granted
IFFIs petition for dismissal.
133

RUIZ vs. UCOL
G.R. No.L-454404
August 7, 1987
Facts:
AgustinaTagaca, laundry-woman for plaintiff-appellant Atty. Jesus B.
Ruiz
filed
an
administrative charge
against
defendantappelleeEncarnacionUcol, a midwife in the health center of Sarratt, Ilocos
Norte. In an answer to the charges, Ucol alleged that Tagaca was a mere
tool used by Atty. Ruiz to get back to her because of a case filed by Ucols
husband against Ruiz. She was also alleged to have made remarks that Ruiz
instigated the complaint and fabricated the charges. The said case was
dismissed but Ruiz decided to file his own criminal case against Ucol based
on the alleged libelous portions of Ucols answer. After the trial, the lower
court rendered judgment acquitting Ucol on the ground that her guilt was
not established beyond reasonable doubt. Instead of appealing the civil
aspects of the case, Ruiz filed a separate complaint for damages. Ucol
moved for a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata which was then
granted by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte after being remanded
by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not Ruiz is barred by the criminal case of libel from filing
a separate civil action for damages.
Ruling:
Ruiz contends that there can be no res judicata in the case, since the
decision of the trial court did not pass upon the civil aspect of the criminal
case. Article 33 of the Civil Code which gives an offended party in cases of
defamation, among others, the right to file a civil action distinct from the
criminal proceedings is not without limitations. The Supreme Court found
that the appeal of Ruiz is without merit as records of the trial court manifest
134
that the suit being charged by Ruiz to be a harassment suit on the

followinggrounds. (1)Ruiz had something to do with the administrative
complaint, (2) Ruiz filed a criminal case for libel against Mrs. Ucols answer
in the administrative case after the administrative cases dismissal, (3) Ruiz
acted as a private prosecutor in the criminal caseactively handling as a
lawyer the very case where he was the complainant, and (4) After Ucol was
acquitted, Ruiz pursued his anger at the Ucols by filing a civil action for
damages.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHTS)
VINZONS-CHATO vs. FORTUNE TOBACCO
G.R. No. 141309
June 19, 2007
Facts:
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided
that locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and
taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of 55% provided that the
maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack. Prior to the
effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying Champion,
Hope, and More, all manufactured by Fortune, as locally manufactured
cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% Ad Valorem tax. Thus,
when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already covered. In
a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the
issuance of the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of
property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the
laws. For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that
respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 3793 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her
authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic
and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also
135
contended that the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation
of malice or bad faith.
Issue:
Whether or not an independent civil action under Article 32 of the
Civil Code would prosper against the petitioner.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner can be subject to a civil
action under Article 32 of the Civil Code. The general rule is that a public
officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising from the
just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned
tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of
the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been
caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic,
which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent.
However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her
personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope
of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for
official actions. Under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability
may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part
of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil
liability may arise where the subordinate public officers act is
characterized by willfulness or negligence.
The decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law, which
prevails over a general law, the Administrative Code. A quasi-delict has
been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right,
whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person,
property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil
liability in quasi-delict is determined by the conduct and not by the mental
state of the offender, and there are circumstances under which the motive
of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes
given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged
wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was
wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive,
does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of anothers
legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that
defendant acted without evil intent.
136

RIGHTS)
COJUANGCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 119398
1999
July 2,
Facts:
Eduardo Cojuangco is a known businessman-sportsman owing several
racehorses which he entered in the sweepstake races on March 6, 1986 to
137
September 18, 1989. Several of his horses won the races on various dates,
landing first, second or third places, respectively, and winning prizes
together with the 30% due for trainer and grooms. Unfortunately, the
winnings were being withheld on the advice of Presidential Commission on
Good Government Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz.
The Chairman of PCSO and the Private Respondent, Fernando O.
Carrascoso, offered to give back the winnings but it was refused by the
petitioner for the reason that the matter is already in court. The trial court
held that Carrascoso had no authority to withhold the winnings since there
was no writ of sequestration evidencing the orders of PCGG. Carrascoso
feared that if he did not withhold the winning he would be liable for neglect
of duty. Carrascoso maintained that bad faith did not attend his acts
therefore he is not liable for damages. In fact, Carrascoso stated that he
returned the principal amount of the winning evidencing his good faith.
Petitioner begs to differ.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to damages for the violation of
his constitutional rights to due process.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that petitioner is entitled for damages in
accordance with Article 32 of the Civil Code. Article 32(6) of the Civil Code
provides that any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstruct, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages, in this case the right against deprivation of
property without due process of law.
Carrascoso's decision to withhold petitioner's winnings could not be
characterized as arbitrary or whimsical, or even the product of ill will or
malice. He had particularly sought from PCGG a clarification of the extent
and coverage of the sequestration order issued against the properties of
petitioner. Although it is true that a public officer shall not be liable by way
of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official
duties, the Court nevertheless states that bad faith is not necessary in
praying for damages in Article 32 of the Civil Code. Under the Article, it is
not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith.To be
liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of
138
petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the

performance of one's duties.
A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there was no
writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of
petitioner. There was apparently no record of any such writ covering his
racehorses either. The issuance of a sequestration order requires the
showing of a prima facie case and due regard for the requirements of due
process.The withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a
properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his
property rights without due process of law.
139

RIGHTS)
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. CASTILLO
G.R. No. 182976
14, 2013
January
Facts:
Respondents are spouses engaged in the business of manufacturing
and selling fluorescent fixtures, office steel cabinets and related metal
fabrication under the name and style of Permanent Light Manufacturing
Enterprise. In the afternoon of April 19, 1994, Joselito Ignacio and Peter
Legaspi , Fully Phased Inspectors of Meralco sought permission to inspect
Permanent Lights electric meter. Ignacio and Legaspi, together with an
employee of Permanent Light, proceeded to check the electric meter. Upon
inspection, the MERALCO inspectors noticed that the electric meter was
tampered and right there and then took down the meter. It was found out
that indeed the meter has been tampered with.
Permanent Light agreed to pay the deficient bills. MERALCO installed
a new electric meter. The respondents alleged that the electric meter
registered unusually high readings. The petitioners are now requesting that
the old electric meter be re-installed since it shows a more accurate
reading. The respondents also pray for damages since the electric meter
was allegedly removed without following the required procedure. The RTC
ruled in favor of respondents entitled to damages. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision stating that the petitioner abused its rights when it
disconnected the electricity of Permanent Light. The petitioners raise the
issue of damages to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not MERALCO is liable for damages in for the violation of
the constitutional rights of the respondent.
140
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Permanent Light is entitled to
exemplary damages for the violation of their constitutional rights. The
Supreme Court based its judgment on Section 4 of Republic Act 7832 which
provides that taking down of tampered electric meter should be personally
witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized
representative of the Energy Regulatory Board. MERALCO failed to show
evidence that there was an officer of the law or a duly authorized
representative of ERB therefore there is no prima facie evidence that the
meter is tampered and they have no right to disconnect the electric meter.
Besides, even if there is prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity,
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7832 provides that even if flagrante delicto,
there must be still be a written notice or warning to the owner of the house
or the establishment concerned. In light or the following the Supreme Court
awards exemplary damages to Permanent Light for the recompense of their
injured rights. Article 32 of the Civil Code provides for awards of damages
in cases where the rights of individuals, including the right against
deprivation of property without due process of law are violated.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (QUASI-DELICTS/TORTS)
BARREDO vs. GARCIA
G.R. No. 48006
July 8, 1942
Facts:
At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanillas taxi collided with a
horse-drawn carriage thereby killing the 16 year old Faustino Garcia.
Faustinos parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their
right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After
the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo, the owner of the
taxi and the employer of Fontanilla. The suit was based on Article 1903 of
the civil code which provides that negligence of employers in the selection
of their employees can be civilly liable. Barredo assailed the suit arguing
that his liability is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should
have been filed against Fontanilla primarily and not him.
Issue:
Whether or not Barredo can be civilly liable for the crime committed
by his employee.
141
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Barredo can be civilly liable. He is
primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against
negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He
reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious
because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving his
sentence and has no property. It was also proven that Barredo is negligent
in hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had had
multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him, something he failed
to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a
separate civil action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable.
Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages arising from a criminal act,
but rather for his own negligence in selecting his employee under Article
1903.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (QUASI-DELICTS/TORTS)

SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY vs. TANGCO
G.R. No. 165732
December 14, 2006
Facts:
On November 3, 1997, Evangeline Tangco went to Ecology Bank,
Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advice of the
bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly
licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the same
outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was
stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to
142
deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with
his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.
Respondent filed a complaint for damages against Pajarillo for
negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to
observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage
committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages under quasidelicts.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that respondent is entitled to damages. It
ruled that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised
care in the selection of its employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there was no
sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's
evidence simply showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and
seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under the law; that
supervision includes not only the issuance of regulations and instructions
designed for the protection of persons and property, for the guidance of
their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such
regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.
CITY OF PASIG vs. COMELEC
143
G.R. No. 125646

September 10, 1999
Facts:
On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village
that they be separated from its mother Barangay Manggahan and Dela Paz,
City of Pasig, and to be converted and separated into a distinct barangay to
be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City of Pasig passed and approved
Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Karangalan in Pasig
City. Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter set for June
22, 1996.
Meanwhile on Sep. 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued
Ordinance No. 52 creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite for this
purpose was set for March 15, 1997.Immediately upon learning of such
Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the
respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions with the COMELEC on
June 19, 1996, and March 12, 1997, respectively. In both Petitions, the
Municipality of Cainta called the attention of the COMELEC to a pending
case before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of
boundary dispute. According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed
barangays involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of said
pending case. Hence, the scheduled plebiscites should be suspended or
cancelled until after the said case shall have been finally decided by the
court.
Issue:
Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of
Barangays Karangalan and Napico should be suspended or cancelled due to
a prejudicial question of territory.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that this is an exception to the general rule
of prejudicial questions and that the suspension or cancellation of the
plebiscite be granted. A case involving a boundary dispute between Local
Government Units presents a prejudicial question which must first be
decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may
be held.While it may be the general rule that a prejudicial question
contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into play where
both cases are civil, in the interest of good order, the SC can very well
144
suspend action on one case pending the outcome of another case closely
interrelated/linked to the first.
A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial
jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less
permanent natural boundaries. Primarily becauseterritorial jurisdiction is
an issue raised in a pending civil case, until and unless such issue is
resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed
barangays would only be an exercise in futility.
BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 137567
June 20,
2000
Facts:
Petitioner was married to Charmaine Felix on June 16, 1973. After 24
years of marriage and having four children, petitioner filed a petition for
nullity of marriage on ground of psychological incapacity. Charmaine on the
other hand filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against petitioner and
his paramour. To forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the
criminal complaint, petitioner filed for the suspension of the criminal case
on concubinage arguing that the civil case for the nullification of their
marriage is a prejudicial question.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage under
psychological incapacity is a prejudicial question to the criminal case of
concubinage.
Ruling:
The rationale on the existence of prejudicial questions is to avoid two
conflicting issues. Its requisites are 1) that a civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal action and 2) the
resolution of the issue determines whether or not the criminal action will
proceed. In the present case, the accused need not present a final
judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the
criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than the proof of a final
judgment. More importantly, parties to a marriage should not be allowed to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
competent courts. So long as there is no such final judgment the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes.
145
Therefore he who cohabits with a woman not his wife risks being
prosecuted for concubinage.
MERCED vs. DIEZ
G.R. No. L-15315
August 26, 1960
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of his marriage to Elizabeth
Ceasar alleging that he married Elizabeth by reason of force, threat and
intimidation upon his persons by Elizabeths relatives. Elizabeth on the
other hand filed a criminal complaint alleging that petitioner has been
previously married to one Eufrocina Tan. He now files a petition for the
suspension of the criminal case on grounds of prejudicial question.
Issue:
Whether or not an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial
question.
Ruling:
In order that a person may be held liable for the crime of bigamy, the
subsequent marriage must have all the essential elements of a valid
marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. One of the
essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of the
contracting parties must be freely given. Without the element of consent a
146
marriage would be illegal and void. Since the validity of the second
marriage is in question, subject of the action for bigamy, cannot be
determined in the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does not
lie unless all the elements concur, it is necessary then that a decision in a
civil action must first be secured.
DONATO vs. LUNA
G.R. No. L-53642
April 15,
1988
Facts:
An information for bigamy against herein petitioner was filed. It is
alleged that petitioner married Rosalindo Maluping on June 30, 1978, he
however married for the second time with Paz Abayan on September 26,
1978. Prior to the trial for the criminal case, petitioner filed a motion to
suspend on grounds of a prejudicial question. He claims that the civil case
for the nullity of his second marriage is a prejudicial question.
Issue:
147
Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage is a prejudicial

question to the criminal case of bigamy.
Ruling:
The issue of the nullity of the marriage in the civil case is not
determinative of petitioners guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. It is
noteworthy that the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the
ground that her consent was obtained through deceit was filed by Paz
Abayan, the second wife. He who contracts a second marriage before a
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy. The case for annulment of marriage can only be
considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused
only if it is proved that the petitioners consent to marriage was obtained
through duress, violence or intimidation. Such is not the case at bar.
Petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the
prosecution of the criminal case. Records reveal that prior to petitioners
second marriage he had been living with private respondent as husband and
wife for more than five years. He only came up with the story that his
consent to the marriage was secured through force, threat and intimidation
one year from the solemnization of the second marriage.
TENEBRO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 150758
February 18,
2004
Facts:
148
Petitioner contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990.

Less than a year after, petitioner told Leticia that he has been previously
married and that he is leaving to live with his first wife, Hilda Villareyes. On
January25, 1993 petitioner contracted yet another marriage with Nilda
Villegas. Ancajas learned of this third marriage she verified if the petitioner
is truly married to Hilda, to which it was affirmative. She then filed a
criminal complaint of bigamy against herein petitioner. His marriage to
Ancajas however was subsequently nullified on ground of psychological
incapacity while the criminal complaint was pending. He now raises the
defense that the bigamy is not committed in lieu of the nullity of the
marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the declaration of the nullity of marriage on ground of
psychological incapacity bars the prosecution of the crime of bigamy.
Ruling:
A marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void; the nullity of the second marriage is not per se an
argument for avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. The declaration of
nullity is absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are
concerned. There is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a
subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second
marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on ground of
psychological incapacity. Although the judicial declaration for nullity of
marriage retroacts to the date of the celebration of marriage insofar as the
vinculum between the spouses is concerned, the marriage is not without
legal effects. Among these effects is the liability of incurring criminal
liability for bigamy.
149
150
PRESUMPTIVE CIVIL PERSONALITY

GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R.No . L-16439
July 20,
1961
Facts:
Peitioner and Nita Villanueva were lovers. Before they were married
Nita got pregnant to which she had got an abortion from private respondent
Oscar Lazo. After Nitas marriage with plaintiff, she again became pregnant
but due to her work priorities, she again had again had abortion with the
same doctor. She had a third abortion done by the same. The plaintiff now
sues an award for damages against Doctor Oscar alleging that he did not
know of, nor gave his consent to the abortions. He is suing for damages for
the unborn child.
Issue:
Whether or not an action for damages can be instituted on behalf of
the unborn child.
Ruling:
No action for damages could be instituted in behalf of the unborn
child on account of the injuries it received; no such action could derivatively
accrue to its parents. No transmission of rights can take place from on due
to the lack of juridical personality. Article 40 of the Civil Code limits the
application of the presumptive civil personality by imposing the condition
that the child should be subsequently born alive. However, moral damages
could be awarded for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the
fetus on account of distress and anguish attendant to is lost, and the
disappointment of their parental expectations. The records do not bear such
case. It is clear that the husband is only intent on recovering money from
the doctor.
RESTRICTIONS OR MODIFICATION ON CAPACITY TO ACT

CATALAN vs. BASA
G.R. No. 159567
July 31,
2007
Facts:
Feliciano Catalan was discharged from military service due to his
psychological incapacity of schizophrenia on October 20, 1948. He married
Corazon Cerezo on September 1949. On June 1951 he donated a parcel of
land to his sister Mercedes Catalan. On December 1953 Feliciano was
declared incompetent and BPI was appointed as his guardian. Mercedes
sold the properties to herein respondents in 1979. In 1997, BPI, acting as
Felicianos guardian filed an action or declaration of nullity od documents
and recovery of possession and ownership alleging that the donation to
Mercedes was void ab initio as Feliciano not of sound mind when he
effected the donation, ipso facto, the sale to herein respondents are void ab
initio.
Issue:
Whether or not Felicianos donation is void for lack of consent due to
incapacity.
Ruling:
In order for a donation to be valid, the donors capacity to give
consent at the time of the donation is existing. There lies no doubt that
insanity impinges on consent freely given. However the burden of proving
such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it, if no sufficient proof to
this effect is presented, capacity is presumed. The evidence presented by
petitioners was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was
competent when he donated the property in question. A study of the nature
of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be presumed capable of
attending to his rights.

DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 127540
October 17,
2001
Facts:
Paulina Rigonan owns three parcels of land. She allegedly sold them
to spouses Felipe and Concepcion Rigonan who claim to be her relatives. In
1966, herein petitioners who claim to be her closest surviving relatives
allegedly took possession of the properties. Petitioners claim that the sale
was void for being spurious as well as lacking consideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale was void.
Ruling:
At the time of the execution of the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan
was already of advanced age and senile. She died an octogenarian. The
general rule is that a person is not incompetent to contract merely because
of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities. However when such
age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as to prevent the
person from properly , intelligently and firmly protecting her property
rights then she is undeniably incapacitated. The unrebutted testimony
shows that at the time of the execution of the deed, Paulina was already
incapacitated physically and mentally. She played with her waste and
urinated in bed. Given these circumstances, there is sufficient reason to
seriously doubt that she consented to the sale of and the price for her
parcels of land.

MENDEZONA vs. OZAMIZ
G.R. No. 143370
February 6,
2002
Facts:
Petitioners own a parcel of land and to remove a cloud on their said
respective titles caused by the inscription thereon of a notice of lis pendens
initiated a suit. They ultimately trace their ownership to a deed of sale
executed by Carmen Ozamiz. Respondents are now impugning the deed of
sale, alleging that Carmen Ozamiz was incapacitated at the time of the
execution of the sale.
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of sale is void due to the incapacity of the
seller.
Ruling:
The testimonies on record all made sweeping statements which failed
to show the true state of mind of Carmen Ozamiz at the time of the
execution of the disputed document. It has been held that a person is not
incapacitated to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of
physical infirmity. Only when such age or infirmity impair her mental
faculties to such extent as to prevent her from properly, intelligently and
fairly protecting her property rights is she considered incapacitated.
Respondents utterly failed to show adequate proof that at the time of the
sale on April 28, 1989 Carmen Ozamiz has allegedly lost control of her
mental faculties.

OPOSA vs. FACTORAN
G.R. No. 101083
July 10,
1993
Facts:
Petitioners are all minor duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. The minors further asseverate that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. They seek to cancel all
existing timber license agreements and restrain the Secretary of DENR
from issuing anymore TLAs in the protection of our forest reserves and
nature in general.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have the requisite standing and capacity to
sue.
Ruling:
Petitioner minors assert that they represent their generation as well
as generations yet unborn. The court finds no difficulty in ruling that they
can, for themselves, for other of their generations and for succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is

concerned.
KINDS OF DOMICILE
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 119976
September
18, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner filed for the candidacy of the position of Representative of
the First District of Leyte. Private respondent who was then the incumbent
representative filed a petition for the cancellation and disqualification
alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner satisfies the residency requirement or not.
Ruling:
Domicile includes the twin elements of 1) the fact of residing or

physical presence in a fixed place and 2) animus manendi or the intention of
returning there permanently. Residence implies the factual relationship of
an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a
given area. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law
is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose which the
resident has taken up his abode ends. If a persons intent be to remain, it
becomes his domicile. It is thus quite normal for an individual to have
different residences but have only one domicile. These concepts however
have evolved in political law to be used synonymously. When the
Constitution however speaks of residence in election law, it actually means
only domicile. An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived
and maintained residences in different places. Based on the evidence,
petitioner clearly only had numerous residences, but maintained her
domicile to be in Leyte.
ARUEGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 112193
March
13, 1996
Facts:
Jose Aruego Sr. had an amorous relationship with Luz Fabian out of
this were born two children. Jose died on March 30 1982. After his death
private respondents filed a case for declaration of acknowledgement as
illegitimate children. Petitioners herein are challenging such action
interposing that under the Family code the method by which respondents
can prove their filiation has already prescribed, that his while the putative
parent is alive.
Issue:
Whether or not the Family code finds a retroactive application in the
case.
Ruling:
Respondents are establishing their filiation by open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child under the Civil Code which
provides for four years before the attainment of age of majority. The Family
Code on the other hand provides that such manner of establishing filiation
can only be brought within the lifetime of the parent. The Family Code
cannot be applied in the case. Retroactive application cannot be applied if a
vested right is impaired or prejudiced in the process. The right of action of
the minor child for recognition has been vested by the filing of complaint in
court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior effectively of the Family
Code.
BERNABE vs. ALEJO
G.R. No. 140500
January 21,
2002
Facts:
Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary
Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 1981. The Fiscal died on
August 1993. On May 1994, Carolina in behalf of Adrian filed a complaint
for Adrian to be declared and acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal
Bernabe and such entitled to his share in the estate. Petitioners are
challenging the petition on grounds that the action has prescribed on
ground that the Family code has retroactive application and hence, the
manner of proving filiation by open and continuous possession of a status
of a legitimate child must have been brought within the lifetime of the
putative parent.
Issue:
Whether or not the Family code finds a retroactive application in the
case.
Ruling:
The right to an action for recognition which was granted by Article
285 of the Civil Code has already vested to Adrian prior the enactment of
the Family Code. A vested right is one which is absolute, complete and
unconditional to the exercise of which no obstacle exists and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency.
Certainly the retroactive effect of the family code finds no application in this
case.

ANCHETA vs. ANCHETA
G.R. No. 145370
March 4,
2004
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent got married on March 1959. They had eight
children. On December 1992, respondent left the conjugal home and
abandoned petitioner and their children. On January 1994, petitioner filed a
separate case for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and judicial
separation of property with a plea for support and pendent lite. On April
1994 the parties executed a compromise agreement. Respondent wanting to
marry again filed a declaration of nullity of his marriage with petitioner on
ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner was never served the
summons because of misrepresentation. She was declared in default and
the marriage declared void and null. Petitioner now seeks a new trial and
nullification of the decision declaring the marriage void on ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not there is basis for a new trial.
Ruling:
Petitioner was never served the summons; the trial court never gained
jurisdiction of her, hence the decision null and void. Article 48 of the Family
Code states that in cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage the court shall order the appearance of the prosecuting attorney
to avoid collusion and in Rule 18 Section 6 of the Rules of Court, it is
expressly stated that there can be no defaults in actions for annulments of
marriage or legal separation. The court just did the opposite as mandated
by the aforementioned provisions of law. Our Constitution is committed to
the basic policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our
family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract but a
social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The motion for a
new trial is granted.

ABADILLA vs. TABILIRAN
A.M. No. MTJ-92-716
1995
October 25,
Facts:
Petitioner is the assigned clerk of court at the sala of herein
respondent Judge. Respondent stands charged with gross immorality,
deceitful conduct and corruption unbecoming of a Judge. It is alleged that
he has scandalously and publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during
the existence of a previous marriage, represented himself as single in the
marriage contract with Priscilla. He also caused the registration of his three
illegitimate children as legitimate.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of the charges.
Ruling:
Respondent is guilty of gross immorality for having scandalously and
openly cohabited with said Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of his
marriage with Teresita Tabiliran. It makes mockery of the inviolability and
sanctity of marriage as a basic social institution. It is not only a civil
contract, but is a new relation, an institution on the maintenance of which
the public is deeply interested. Consequently every intendment of the law
leans towards legalizing matrimony. Respondent Judge is dismissed from
service.
PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF

MARRIAGE
DELA ROSA vs. HEIRS OF RUSTIA VDA. DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. 155733
January
27, 2006
Facts:
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died not only intestate, but they
died without descendants. Guillermo outlived Josefa by two years. Herein
petitioners and respondents are their respective relatives claiming rights to
their intestate estate. The alleged heirs of Josefa consist of her half and fullblood siblings, nephews. On Guillermos side, his sisters, nephews and
nieces, illegitimate child and de facto adopted child. The petitioner for
letters of administration stated that Guillermo and Rustia were never
married. Josefa Delgado estate claimants are her natural siblings. Josefa
was the daughter of Felisa by one Lucio Ocampo with five other children
without the benefit of marriage. Felisa had another son by way of Ramon
Osorio who is Luis Delgado, one of the claimants in Josefas estate. If Luis
Delgado is the legitimate child of Felisa she is barred from inheriting from
Josefa by the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate and
illegitimate families.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid marriage between Guillermo and
Josefa and between Felisa and Ramon.
Ruling:
Every intendment of the law leans towards legitimizing matrimony.
Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in
fact married.
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.Always presume
marriage. Several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage existed between Guillermo and Josefa. Their cohabitation of more
than 50 years cannot be doubted. Although a marriage contract is
considered primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof
that no marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of marriage
arises other evidences may be presented just as herein. The certificate of
identity issued to Josefa as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her
as Josefa Rustia, the declaration under oath of Guilermo that he was
married to Josefa buttress the presumption of the existence of marriage.
Guillermo and Josefa are married. Anent the marriage of Felisa by Ramon,
the factors and evidence presented sufficiently overcame the rebuttable
presumption of marriage. Hence Luis Delgado can inherit from Josefa.

MARRIAGE
EUGENIO vs. VELEZ
G.R. No. 85140
May 17, 1990
Facts:
Herein private respondents filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging
that their sister, Vitaliana, was forcibly taken from her residence sometime
in 1987 and was confined by herein petitioner in his residence in Misamis
Occidental. Unknown to respondents, Vitaliana has died and petitioner
refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana reasoning that the corpse cannot
be the subject of habeas corpus proceedings. As her common law husband,
petitioner now claims custody over Vitalianas body.
Issue:
Whether or not the common law husband has custody over Vitalianas
body instead of the immediate relatives.
Ruling:
Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and
woman not legally married who cohabit for years as husband and wife may
be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines. Notwithstanding, such relationship produces a community of
property and interest and there is authority in case law that exists to the
effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and the woman
living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage.
Herein petitioner had a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal
impediment which disqualified him from legally marrying Vitaliana. Custody
of the dead body must be awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters
pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code.

MARRIAGE
BALOGBOG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 83598
March, 7, 1997
Facts:
Petitioners are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Geneveva Arnibal
who died intestate. They had an older brother named Gavino but he died
predeceasing their parents. Private respondents on the other hand are the
alleged children of Gavino with Catalina Ubas and as such are entitled to
inherit from the estate of their grandparents. Petitioners aver that Gavino
did not marry hence barring respondents from inheriting from the estate.
Issue:
Whether or not there the presumption of marriage between Gavino
and Catalino was successfully overcome.
Ruling:
Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman
conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This
presumption is rebutted only by cogent proof of which the petitioners failed
to do so. Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of
marriage the failure to present it is no proof that no marriage took place.
Private respondents proved through testimonial evidence that Gavino and
Catalina were married and that their children were recognized as legitimate
children of Gavino. The law favors the validity of marriage because the
State is interested in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of it is a
matter of constitutional concern.
LEGAL CAPACITY
SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 174689
October 22,
2007
Facts:
Petitioner avers that he is a male transsexual. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation
culminating with sex reassignment surgery in Thailand. From then on,
petitioner deposed himself as female and got engaged. He now seeks to
have his name in his birth certificate changed and his sex from male to
female.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can change the entry of sex in his birth
certificate.
Ruling:
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his
sex reassignment. However a change of name does not alter ones legal
capacity or civil status. R.A. 9048 does not sanction such change of name
under such cause. It is further a substantial change for which the applicable
procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. However no reasonable
interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the
correction on the ground of sex reassignment. A persons sex is an essential
requisite in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a persons legal
capacity and civil status. To grant the changes sought by the petitioner will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family
relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment.
LEGAL CAPACITY
REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN
G.R. No. 166676
2008
September
12,
Facts:
Petitioner was born on January 1981 and was registered as a female
in the birth certificate. While growing up she developed secondary male
characteristics and was diagnosed with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
which is a condition where a person thus afflicted possess both male and
female characteristics. While maturing it was the male characteristics that
continued to develop and be pronounced and hence, he deposed himself as
a male person. He now seeks to alter his name of Jennifer to Jeff.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for the change of name can be effected.
Ruling:
Respondent undisputedly has CAH which involves intersex anatomy.
The court is of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally
intersex, the determining factor in his gender classification would be what
the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with
good reasons thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a
male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones
there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.
The petition is granted.
AUTHORITY OF SOLEMNIZING OFFICER

BESO vs. DAGUMAN
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211
2000
January 28,
Facts:
Petitioner and Bernardito Yman got married on August 28, 1997 by
herein respondent Judge. After the wedding herein petitioner was
abandoned by her husband hence prompting her to check with the Civil
Registrar to inquire regarding the marriage contract to which it was found
out that the marriage was no registered. She now filed this administrative
complaint against herein respondent Judge alleging that the marriage was
solemnized outside of his jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the Judge has authority to solemnize the marriage.
Ruling:
Article 7 of the Family Code provides that the Judge can solemnize a
marriage within the court jurisdiction. Considering that the respondent
Judges jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-TaranganPagsanjan Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize the
marriage in the City of Calabayog where herein marriage was solemnized.
AUTHORITY OF A SOLEMNIZING OFFICER

MERCEDITA MATA ARAES vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO
A.M. No.MTJ-02-1390
April 11, 2002
Facts:
On 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized petitioners
marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite
marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his
territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this
marriage until her husband passed away. However, since the marriage was
a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was
not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of
Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge should be sanctioned for
solemnizing marriage with lack of marriage license and beyond his
jurisdiction?
Ruling:
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the
authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to
solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by
the Supreme Court. In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of
respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the
law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but
nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
The respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00pesos
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
MARRIAGE LICENSE
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARAvs.ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and
COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 167746
August 28,
2007
Facts:
On December 8,1982, Rosita Alcantara (respondent) and Restituto
Alcantara (petitioner) went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of
looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a
person fixer who arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino
Navarro, a minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. The marriage
was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license.
The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC
BR Chapel. However, there was a marriage license obtained in Carmona,
Cavite but neither of the parties is a resident of Carmona, Cavite and they
never went to the said place to apply for a license with its local civil
registrar. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage
ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila on March
26, 1983 utilizing the same marriage license. The marriage license number
7054133 is not identical with the marriage license number which appears
in their marriage contract. There is also a case filed by the respondent
against herein petitioner before the MTC of Mandaluyong for concubinage.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between the petitioner and respondent is
void.
Ruling:
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized prior to the
effectivity of Family Code, the applicable law would be the Civil Code which
was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. A valid marriage license
is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of

which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in
relation to Article 53 of the same Code. The law requires that the absence of
such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the
very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no
such marriage license was issued to the parties. In the case at bar, the
marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a
marriage license number. Moreover, the certification issued by the local civil
registrar specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license
was issued further validating the fact that a license was issued to the
parties herein.
Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the
residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage
license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the
10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not
affect the validity of the marriage. The court still holds that there is no
sufficient basis to annul their marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal
requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the parties or party
responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally, administratively liable.
The discrepancy between the marriage license number in the

certification of the Municipal civil registrar, which states that the marriage
license number issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage
contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is number
7054033. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere
typographical error. It therefore does not detract from our conclusion
regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties.
The authority of the solemnizing officer shown to have performed a

marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the
contrary. The solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether
or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local
civil registrar. All the said officer needs to know is that the license has been
duly and regularly issued by the competent official. Lastly, the church
ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing
whatever irregularities or defect attended the civil wedding.
The instant petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the decision of the RTC of Makati City is affirmed.
MARRIAGE LICENSE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.COURT OF APPEALS and
ANGELINA M. CASTRO
GR No. 103047
September
2, 1994
Facts:
Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil
marriage with Edwin Cardenas. They did not immediately live together and
it was only upon Castro found out that she was pregnant that they decided
to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4 months.
Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her
brother with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby was brought in the US and in Castros earnest desire to
follow her daughter wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving
for US. She filed a petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of her
marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage license
issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven by the certification
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.
Issue:
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to
by Castro is sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued to
the parties prior to the solemnization of their marriage?
Rulings:
The court affirmed the decision of Court of Appeals that the
certification issued by the Civil Registrar unaccompanied by any
circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not issue a
marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the
testimony of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground
to deny her petition because of the peculiar circumstances of her case.
Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings,
which he chose to ignore.
Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and
testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently
established the absence of the subject marriage license.
MARRIAGE LICENSE
SUSAN NICDAO CARIOvs.SUSAN YEE CARIO
GR No. 132529
February 2, 2001
Facts:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted
two marriages; the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao
Cario, with whom he had two children. And the second was on November
10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario with whom he had no children
in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982. In
November 23, 1992, SPO4 Santiago Cario passed away under the care of
Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner
and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance
pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies.
On December 14, 1993, respondent filed the instant case for
collection of sum of money against the petitioner praying that petitioner be
ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six
thousand pesos. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money,
respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required
marriage license confirmed by the marriage certificate of the deceased and
the petitioner which bears no marriage license number and a certification
dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Manila
stating that they have no record of marriage license of the spouses Santiago
Cario and Susan Nicdao Cario who allegedly married in the said
municipality on June 20, 1969.
Issue:
Whether or not the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4
Santiago S. Cario are valid in determining the beneficiary of his death
benefits?
Ruling:
Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage and the absence thereof, subject
to certain exceptions, renders a marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar,
there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does
not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A
marriage license was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. The
records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased
bears no marriage license number and as certified by the Local Civil
registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license. The certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record
of all data to the issuance of a marriage license. Therefore, the marriage
between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased having been solemnized
without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages
exempt from the said requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
The declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage

of the deceased and petitioner does not validate the second marriage of the
deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage
was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the
marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab
initio. To reiterate, under article 40 of Family Code, for purposes of
remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable
property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership
of property, but rather, is governed by the provisions of articles 147 and 148
of the Family Code, wherein, the properties acquired by the parties through
their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. By intestate
succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal
heirs and respondent, not being the legal wife is not one of them.
Conformably, even if the disputed death benefits were earned by the
deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a coownership, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. There is no
allegation of bad faith in the present case; both parties of the first marriage
are presumed in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death benefits
under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property
regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by,
intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children.
MARRIAGE LICENSE
FILIPINA SYvs.COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 127263
April 12, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted
marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of our Lady of Lourdes in
Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two
children. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling.
Since then, the spouses lived separately and their two children were in the
custody of their mother. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for
legal separation before the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga and was later
amended to a petition for separation of property. Judgment was rendered
dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of

separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed
by the spouses. In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted
parricide against her husband. RTC Manila convicted Fernando only of the
lesser crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced him to 20 days
imprisonment. Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of absolute
nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological
incapacity on August 4, 1992. RTC and Court of Appeals denied the petition
and motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal by certiorari, petitioner
for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a
valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. The date of issue of
marriage license and marriage certificate is contained in their marriage
contract which was attached in her petition for absolute declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court. The date of the actual
celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage
certificate and marriage license are different and incongruous.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private
respondent is void from the beginning for lack of marriage license at
the time of the ceremony?
b) Whether or not the private respondent is psychologically
incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to warrant a
declaration of its absolute nullity?
Ruling:
A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the
marriage void ab initio. The pieces of evidence presented by petitioner at
the beginning of the case, plainly and indubitably show that on the day of
the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. The marriage
contract also shows that the marriage license number 6237519 was issued
in Carmona, Cavite yet neither petitioner nor respondent ever resided in
Carmona.
From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued
almost one year after the ceremony took place. Article 80 of the Civil Code
is clearly applicable in this case, there being no claim of exceptional
character enumerated in articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. The marriage
between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning. The
remaining issue on the psychological capacity is now mooted by the
conclusion of this court that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void
ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time their marriage was
solemnized.
Petition is granted. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973

between petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy is
hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time of
celebration.
MARRIAGE LICENSE
JAIME O. SEVILLA vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS
G.R. No. 167684
July 31, 2006
Facts:
On 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation
employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired
Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, Jaime and
Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a
certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On
the said date, the father of Carmelita caused Jaime and Carmelita to sign a
marriage contract before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to
Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to
Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil
Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the
solemnizing officer.
On March 28, 1994, a complaint was filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before
the RTC. In its Decision dated January 25, 2002, the RTC declared the
nullity of the marriage of the parties for lack of the requisite marriage
license. Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision
dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial
court. Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which
the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
Issue:
Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance
with law to the parties herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in
question?
Ruling:
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that
utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage
License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of regularity
of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the
certifications, is effectively rebutted.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of nonissuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed
true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence
of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot

easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of
entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact
leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to
be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
Therefore, the instant petition is denied.
MARRIAGE LICENSE
SYED AZHAR ABBAS vs. GLORIA GOO ABBAS
G.R. No. 183896
January 30, 2013
Facts:
Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino
citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the
Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. He arrived in the Philippines in December of
1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was at
his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F. Muoz St., Malate, Manila,
when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told
that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for
his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony.
During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he
did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later.
He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a
marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of
2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to
check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their
marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found.
The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number
appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No.
9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid
marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed thus their marriage on January 9, 1993
was void ab initio. Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal
the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal.
It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to
categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria
and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be
accorded probative value. The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial
and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married
and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 but
the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008 hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and setting
aside the decision of the RTC granting the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage?
Ruling:
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage
license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the
effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and
that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple,
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of
Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in
Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear
in the document.
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it
may well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a
bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of
the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the
weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage
license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to
procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a
formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void
ab initio.
The petition is therefore granted.
MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE REQUIREMENT

HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329
March 8, 2001
Facts:
Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late
David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel
Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born
out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted
another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.
When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to
know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract
clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated. For this act,
complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross
ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of

the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court
Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000.00, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with
more severely.
Respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the
dismissal of the complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of
the law?
Ruling:
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous
marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent
marriage null and void. In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he
known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him
from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny
knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the
same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed
and sworn to before him.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law
when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance
of the law excuses no one has special application to judges, who, under
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that
judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles. And when the
law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.
The recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby
ADOPTED,with theMODIFICATIONthat the amount of fine to be imposed
upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.00.
.
ENGRACE NIAL vs. NORMA BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778
2000
March 14,
Facts:
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26,
1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot
by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months
thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog
got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt
from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a
car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the
said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed
under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage
would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they
are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of
marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the second marriage is covered by the exception to
the requirement of a Marriage license?
b) Whether or not the petitioners have the personality to file a petition to
declare their fathers marriage void after his death?
Ruling:
The second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio
because of the absence of such element. In this case, at the time of Pepito
and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each
other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day.
From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even
assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter
both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in
the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito
had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence
of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by
either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".Only
the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested
party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects
except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged
spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint
contribution,and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as
provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51,
53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime
governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the
children conceived before its annulment is legitimate.
JUVY N. COSCA vs. HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721
September 30,
1994
Facts:
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein respondents were charged with
the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2)
falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of
an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond
received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6)
requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities.
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages
even without the requisite marriage license. Thus, these couples were able
to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to
respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license. It is alleged
that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7)
marriages in the month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at
most those marriages were null and void; that respondents likewise made it
appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but
the Notarial Register will show that there were one hundred thirteen (113)
documents which were notarized during that month; and that respondents
reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 for each document, although in fact
they collected P20.00 therefor and failed to account for the difference.
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court,
respondent judge forwarded to the Supreme Court the applications of Rodel
Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. However, they were surprised
when respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk of court on October 21,
1991. They later found out that respondent Baroy was the one appointed
because she gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent judge.
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural
Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is exempt by
law from the payment of said fees, and that while the corresponding receipt
was issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the amount to the Supreme
Court and, instead, she deposited the same in her personal account.
Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge and the clerk of court were
responsible of the complaints charged?
Ruling:
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office
charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by
propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every
employee should be an example of integrity, uprightness and
honesty.Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity. It
applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the
least of its personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of
ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently
provides that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid
marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily,
it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity
in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally
and administratively liable.
The Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge
Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the same
or similar offenses in the future will definitely be severely dealt with.
Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby dismissed from the service,
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment
in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
MARRIAGE CEREMONY
LUCIO MORIGO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 145226
February 6, 2004
Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were board mates at the house of
Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4)
years (from 1974-1978). After school year 1977-78, LucioMorigo and Lucia
Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984, LucioMorigo was surprised to
receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and
after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia
returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in
Canada, they maintained constant communication. In 1990, Lucia came
back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in
Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30,
1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. On
September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving
appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario
Court a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the
court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On
October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago

at the Virgensa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol to
seek the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with Lucia, on the
ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. On October 19,
1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in the Information filed by the
City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
The RTC of Bohol rendered a decision finding Lucio Morigo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy. Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CAG.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial court
rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between
Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took
place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and
executory. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC decision on the
criminal case.
Issue:
Whether or not Lucio Morigo is guilty of bigamy?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that there was no actual marriage ceremony
performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what
transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without
the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the
marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family
Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it,
"This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such
declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other
words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the
declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the
celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the
law, never married."
The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the
trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final
and executory. The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the
accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking,
the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first
marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage
being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the
beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking

this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was
not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria
Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an
essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction
for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to
speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
MARILOU NAMA MORENO vs. JUDGE JOSE C. BERNABE
A.M. No. MJT-94-963
July
14, 1995
Facts:
On October 4, 1993, Marilou and Marcelo Moreno were married
before respondent Judge Bernabe. Marilou avers that Respondent Judge
assured her that the marriage contract will be released ten (10) days after
October 4, 1993. Complainant then visited the office of the Respondent
Judge on October 15, 1993 only to find out that she could not get the
marriage contract because the Office of the Local Civil Registrar failed to
issue a marriage license. She claims that Respondent Judge connived with
the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to deceive her.
In his comment,Respondent denied that he conspired with the
relatives of Marcelo Moreno to solemnize the marriage for the purpose of
deceiving the complainant.The Respondent Judge contends that he did not
violate the law nor did he have the slightest intention to violate the law
when he, in good faith, solemnized the marriage, as he was moved only by a
desire to help a begging and pleading complainant who wanted some kind
of assurance or security due to her pregnant condition. In order to pacify
complainant, Marcelo Moreno requested him to perform the marriage
ceremony, with the express assurance that "the marriage license was
definitely forthcoming since the necessary documents were complete.
In its Memorandum dated January 17, 1995, the Office of the Court
Administrator recommended that Respondent be held liable for misconduct
for solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and that the
appropriate administrative sanctions be imposed against him.
Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of grave misconduct
and gross ignorance of the law by solemnizing the marriage without the
required marriage license?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Respondent Judge, by his own
admission that he solemnized the marriage between complainant and
Marcelo Moreno without the required marriage license, has dismally failed
to live up to his commitment to be the "embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence"and to his promise to be "faithful to the law."
Respondent cannot hide behind his claim of good faith and Christian
motives which, at most, would serve only to mitigate his liability but not
exonerate him completely. Good intentions could never justify violation of
the law. Respondent is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P10,000.00 and is

sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.
RODOLFO NAVARRO vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTAY
A.M. No. MJT-96-1088
July 19,
1996
Facts:
On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding
between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that
the groom is merely separated from his first wife. It is also alleged that he
performed a marriage ceremony between FlorianoDadorSumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994.
Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigaodel Norte. The wedding was
solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa,
which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta.
Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the
municipality of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte.
Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed
a complaint respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy for exhibiting gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office
and ignorance of the law.
Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross misconduct, as
well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance
of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our
attention are elementary and uncomplicated; prompting us to conclude that
respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the
law. The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at
least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary
laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and

applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles like the ones involved in instant case. It is not too much to expect
them to know and apply the law intelligently. Otherwise, the system of
justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors
committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at times
make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an
area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and ArlynBorga is considered
bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar
Tagadan and Ida Pearanda. The Office of the Court Administrator
recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and
a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question
resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the
necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said
recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying
the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB vs. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.
G.R. No. 135216
August
19, 1999
Facts:
Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased
Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various
estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract
between herself and the deceased. Defendant-appellee on the other hand,
claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he
presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding Judge Jose
L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by
deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil. During the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo, the defendant-appellee
Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceaseds
estate as Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro
questioned the validity of the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his
adoptive father Alfredo. Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for
Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction with damages questioning
appellee's claim as the legal heir of Alfredo. The Regional Trial Court
rendered a decision in favor of Pedro Pilapil and against TomasaGuison.
Such decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff TomasaVda. De
Jacob and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was valid?
b) Whether or not defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of
Alfredo E. Jacob?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the existence of a valid marriage is
established. It has been established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years. An affidavit to this
effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner. Clearly then, the marriage
was exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under
Article 76 of the Civil Code.The Civil Code governs this case, because the
questioned marriage and the assailed adoption took place prior the
effectivity of the Family Code.
On the second issue some considerations cast doubt on the claim of
respondent. The alleged Order was purportedly made in open court. In his
Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions
in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were criminal
cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty.Moreover, Judge Moya insisted
that the branch where he was assigned was always indicated in his
decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain this
information. Furthermore, Pilapils conduct gave no indication that he
recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he
signed and other acts that he performed thereafter. In the same vein, no
proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child.
Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management in Manila and the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued Certifications
that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob.
Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption
of respondent. The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the
person claiming such relationship. This Respondent Pilapil failed to do.
Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner shows that the alleged
adoption is a sham.
FOREIGN DIVORCE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRASUS L. IYOY
G.R. No. 152577
September 21, 2005
Facts:
Respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford

Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they
had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos who
are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent
Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant."
In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.),
leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old,
to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A.,
respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the
enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in
1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their
children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually
had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American
family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not
bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear
the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the
Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest
child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child,
Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her
American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the
surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For
the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she
was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint was filed,
it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and
there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent
Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and
dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity,
being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of
the Family Code.
On 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the
marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio. The Court of
Appeals rendered its decision affirming the trial courts declaration of the
nullity of the marriage of the parties.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the totality of evidence presented during trial is
insufficient to support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely?
b) Whether or not Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
Philippines is applicable to the case at bar?
Ruling:
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before

the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into question for being
self-serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He
submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the
recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between
respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16
December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their
eldest son, in which Fely used her American husbands surname. Even
considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to
respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not
enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that
prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation
wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other
a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal
interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of
respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her
divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not
established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that
she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for
the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband
in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American
citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino
citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on
family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when
she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do
not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could
not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
FOREIGN DIVORCE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III
G.R. No. 154380
October
5, 2005
Facts:
On May 24, 1981, CiprianoOrbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an,
Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter,
KristofferSimbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986,
Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer.
A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as
an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that
his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to
remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No
opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the
same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not CiprianoOrbecido III can remarry under Article 26 of
the Family Code?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that for his plea to prosper, respondent
herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an
American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce
as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such
foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.
Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his
former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise,
there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to
enter into another marriage. Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended
by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has
been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are
unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who
was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and
had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry.
Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondents
submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
EFFECTS OF FOREIGN DIVORCE

ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.
G.R. No. L-68470
October
8, 1985
Facts:
The petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent
is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in
1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the
Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and
December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada,
United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada,
this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in
Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City,
stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for
short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private
respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action
is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the
Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner
had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied
the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the
property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree
has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree affected the property regime of the
parties?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. The case involved a
marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was
subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter.
Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien
spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal
partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the
validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the
properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still
subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code
cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.
EFFECTS OF FOREIGN DIVORCE

EDGAR SAN LUIS vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS
G.R. No. 133743
February 6, 2007
Facts:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T.

San Luis, who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During
his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was
with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children,
namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11,
1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee
Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971,
Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America
(U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding
Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married
respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.
William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard,
Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived
with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On
December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Respondent alleged that she is the
widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was
residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro
Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse,
his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that
the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at
P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid
debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated
and that letters of administration be issued to her. On February 4, 1994,
petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and
failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for
letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna
because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He
further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of
his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. On February 15, 1994,
Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking
the dismissal of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an
Order denying the two motions to dismiss.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for
letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo
was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside
the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998
Issues:
a) Whether or not the venue was properly laid in the case
b) Whether or not respondent Felicidad has legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds that Felicisimo was a resident of
Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of
his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration
was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction
over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17,
1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had
territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as
per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the subject petition
was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
On the second issue, the Supreme Court held that respondent would
qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not
denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and
Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with
him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision
governs the property relations between parties who live together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void
from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both
of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not
necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts
and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the
portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the
contrary is proven. The case therefore is remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings on the evidence to prove the validity of the divorce
between Felicisimo and Merry Lee.
ACTION FOR RECOGNITION AND PROOF

GERBERT R. CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN TINOL STO. TOMAS
G.R. No. 186571
August
11, 2010
Facts:
Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000. On
January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a
Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional commitments,
Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the
Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to
discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce.
The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts
petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a
month later, on January 8, 2006. Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has
moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his
new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce
decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert
that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine
law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially
recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No.
4, series of 1982.
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC.
Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but
submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to
file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal
circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-ininterest with a similar prayer to Gerberts. In its October 30, 2008 decision,
the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not
the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the
Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry
under Philippine law.
Issue:
Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court qualifies its conclusion that the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with
the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to
dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability
of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself,
after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been
duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive
evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce,
purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1)
official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody
of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the
Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine Foreign Service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. The records show that Gerbert
attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the

Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply
dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we
deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine
whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law. The
petition was granted and the case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.
ACTION FOR RECOGNITION AND PROOF

GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO vs. REDERICK A. RECIO
G.R. No. 138322
October
2, 2001
Facts:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.They lived together
as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce,

purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family
court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown
by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian
government. Petitioner a Filipina and respondent were married on
January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan
City.In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as
"single" and "Filipino." Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and
respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations
secured in Australia.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy
respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married
her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's
marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.The trial court declared
the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia
was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended,
but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage;
that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it
based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The
Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial
union to nullify or annual.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson
was proven?
b) Whether or not the respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to
marry petitioner?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the divorce decree between respondent
and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian
family court.However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated. Fortunately for
respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its
admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local
Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.The trial court ruled that it was
admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.Hence, it was admitted in
evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to
object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of
the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. Compliance with the quoted articles
(11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no
longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992.Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and
clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.
Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states,
don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian,
respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris
that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
On the second issue, the Supreme Court held that there is absolutely
no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A
review of the records before this Court shows that only the following
exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a)
Exhibit "A" Complaint;(b) Exhibit "B" Certificate of Marriage Between
Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on
January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;(c) Exhibit "C"
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D.
Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;(d) Exhibit
"D" Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no
information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson
was in its records;and (e) Exhibit "E" Certificate of Australian Citizenship
of Rederick A. Recio;(2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" Amended Answer;(b)
Exhibit "S" Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in
the Family Court of Australia;(c) Exhibit "3" Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;(d) Exhibit "4" Decree Nisi of Dissolution
of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;and Exhibit "5"
Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio
and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995. Based on the records, the
Supreme Court cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner
on January 12, 1994. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that the
court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to
adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing
his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the
second marriage. The case is thus remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.
NO MARRIAGE LICENSE
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES,
JR.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706
March 29, 1995
Facts:
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro,
who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati,
Metro Manila. In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he
saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Thereafter, respondent
prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of
his children for him. Complainant claims that respondent is married to one
Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing in his 1986
and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to
De Castro and that the filing of the administrative action was related to
complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by De
Castro. Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although
he admits having five children with her. He alleges that while he and
Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town
mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a
marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent
went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5,
1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko
abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and
custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in
Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith
and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first
marriage was solemnized without a license.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code apply to respondent
considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by
the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in
1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Ruling:
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second
marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of
the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said
Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure.
Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the
application of Article 40 to his case. The fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. Respondent made a mockery of the
institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a
woman, who beget him five children. Respondent passed the Bar
examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. It is
evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for
membership in the legal profession.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must
be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of
his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is
no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A
judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the
performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial
guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat

in the judiciary.
BIGAMOUS/POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES
MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN vs. LOUELLA A. CATALANLEE
G. R. No. 183622
February
8, 2012
Facts:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly

obtaining a divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor,
he contracted a second marriage with petitioner herein. On November 18,
2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.Thereafter, petitioner filed a
Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. Respondent Louella A.
Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a
similar petition. The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered
an interested person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her contention,
respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against
petitioner. On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy.
Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then
pending action with the trial court in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor
against the deceased and petitioner.
On June 26, 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan
dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by
petitioner and granted that of private respondent. The CA held that
petitioner undertook the wrong remedy. Petitioner moved for a
reconsideration of this Decision. On June 20, 2008, the CA denied her
motion.Hence, this Petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce is valid.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that under the principles of comity, our
jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign
nationality. This doctrine was established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. wherein we said:It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best
evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a
written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign
country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or

document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country
by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family
Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine
personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.
Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the
political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed
from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their
adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his
allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to
Philippine personal laws.
Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity
of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of
administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
FE D. QUITA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN
G.R. No. 124862
December 22,
1998
Facts:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the
Philippines on 18 May 1941. Somewhere along the way their relationship
soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. On July 23, 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3)
weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but
their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for
the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On April 16, 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. Javier Inciong filed a
petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters
of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine
Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving
spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida
and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan
opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty.
Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of
the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino
Castillon. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother
of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
On the scheduled hearing, the trial court required the submission of
the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the
declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The
prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being submitted.
On November 27, 1987 only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the
intestate heirs of Arturo.
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were

allowed to present proofs that the recognition of the children by the
deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who was recognized as
his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth.
Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the
aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on April
22, 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the
existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the case should be remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings.
b) Who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of
the decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present
petition based on establish facts and admissions of the parties?
Ruling:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful
heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each
person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided
as in ordinary cases. Reading between the lines, the implication is that
petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from
Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to
establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth
of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial
evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or
opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her
claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao. The
doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their
divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of
this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the
time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner
could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior
marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a
bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and
83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can
inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.
The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of
the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null
and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as
intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its
previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to
the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and
Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of

Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however
emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should be
limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of
Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court
and to dismiss the present petition for forum shopping is denied.
VERONICO TENEBRO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 150758
February 18, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with
private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by
Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously
and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro
informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda
Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Invoking this previous marriage,
petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with

Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one
with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. When Ancajas
learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the
latter was indeed married to petitioner which was confirmed by Villareyes.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. On
November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54,
rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the Court a
quo convicting petitioner of the crime of bigamy despite non-existence
of the first marriage and insufficiency of evidence.
b) Whether or not the Court erred in convicting the petitioner for the
crime of bigamy despite the clear proof that the marriage between the
accused and private complainant had been declared null and void.
Ruling:
The Court held that after a careful review of the evidence on record,
we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment. Under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his
or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both
documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first marriage between
petitioner and Villareyes. All three of these documents fall in the category of
public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public
documents are applicable to all. The documents issued by the National
Statistics Office merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no
record of such a marriage. The marriage contract presented by the
prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence
than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the
marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in
the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar
as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. As such, this Court

rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to
prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article
36 of the Family Code. The States penal laws protecting the institution of
marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special
contract between spouses, and punish an individuals deliberate disregard
of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which
petitioner has undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners
marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites
for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential
(legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in
the presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the
solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the
parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing
officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).Under Article 5 of the
Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards
not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37and 38may
contract marriage.As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for
the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record,
petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to
Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. The act of the accused
displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State
does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the
key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual manifests
a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the States basic social
institution, the States criminal laws on bigamy step in.

VICTORIA S. JARILLO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164435
September
29, 2009
Facts:
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a
civil wedding ceremony. On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo
again celebrated marriage in a church wedding ceremony. Appellant
Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel
Ebora Santos Uy. In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil
Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied by the same court. On appeal to the CA, petitioners
conviction was affirmed in toto. In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003, declaring
petitioners 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on
the ground of Alocillos psychological incapacity. Said decision became final
and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner
invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her
conviction. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in
rendering their decision.
Ruling:
Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall
be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this
case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first
marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
Petitioners conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners two marriages to
Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The
moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one

having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was
already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second
marriage, petitioners marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared
null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and
subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioners
marriage to Uy make any difference. Petitioners defense of prescription is
likewise doomed to fail.
Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an
erroneous penalty under the Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is
mistaken. The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall
be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall
be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code
for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime. However, for humanitarian
purposes, and considering that petitioners marriage to Alocillo has after all
been declared by final judgment to be void ab initio on account of the
latters psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was
subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce the
penalty imposed by the lower courts.
Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, as maximum.

FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO vs. ATTY. EDMUNDO L.
MACARRUBO
A.C. No. 6148
February
27, 2004
Facts:
Florence Teves Macarrubo (complainant), by herself and on behalf of
her two children, filed on June 6, 2000 a verified complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo (respondent) with the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP), alleging that respondent deceived her into
marrying him despite his prior subsisting marriage with a certain Helen
Esparza.
Complainant averred that he started courting her in April 1991, he
representing himself as a bachelor; that they eventually contracted
marriage which was celebrated on two occasions; and that although
respondent admitted that he was married to Helen Esparza on June 16,
1982, he succeeded in convincing complainant, her family and friends that
his previous marriage was void. Complainant further averred that
respondent entered into a third marriage with one Josephine T. Constantino;
and that he abandoned complainant and their children without providing
them any regular support up to the present time, leaving them in precarious
living conditions. After hearing during which both complainant and
respondent took the witness stand, the Investigating Commissioner
rendered a Report and Recommendation that the said respondent is
suspended for three months for gross misconduct reflecting unfavorably on
the moral norms of the profession.
The final disposition of the present administrative case is now before
this Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Edmundo Macarrubo is guilty of gross
misconduct.
Ruling:
Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not
determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an affidavit of
withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course,then the
judgment of annulment of respondent's marriage does not also exonerate
him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof
- clear preponderance of evidence - in disciplinary proceedings against
members of the bar is met, then liability attaches.
The disturbing fact that respondent was able to secure the annulment
of his first two marriages and is in the process of procuring the annulment
of his third bears noting. Contrary to the finding of the Investigating
Commissioner, respondent, by his own admission, contracted a third
marriage.
Such pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions
of marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing
of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and
well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a
whole. This must be checked if not stopped. As officers of the court, lawyers
must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be perceived
to be of good moral character and must lead a life in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. The moral delinquency that
affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such, including that
which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage,
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community.
There can then be no other fate that awaits respondent, as a
consequence of his grossly immoral conduct, than to be disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law.

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL vs. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY
G.R. No. L-53703
August
19, 1986
Facts:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl
Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his
marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian
Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva
Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's
previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having
been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon
City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage
claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband
Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union.
Issue:
Was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds the petition devoid of merit.There is no need
for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force
committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the
marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and
therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is
clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her
first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80,
Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing
prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for
then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a
judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she
would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of
petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
The petition is dismissed.

MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAES vs. LOURDES TAJOLOSA
CIPRIANO.
G.R. No. 181089
October
22, 2012
Facts:
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in
Lezo, Aklan. On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said
marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San Pedro,
Laguna. In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch
256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the
ground of the latters psychological incapacity. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of
Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an Amended Decision declaring the
marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. On May 14, 2004,
petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montaez, Silverios daughter from the first
marriage, filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a
Complaint for Bigamy against respondent.
On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through
counsel, filed a Motion to Quash Information (and Dismissal of the Criminal
Complaint) alleging that her marriage with Socrates had already been
declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak
of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that the basic
element of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is therefore
wanting. She also claimed that since the second marriage was held in 1983,
the crime of bigamy had already prescribed.
On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order dismissing
the case. Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the
prosecution, but opposed by respondent. In a Resolution dated January 2,
2008, the RTC denied the same ruling, among others, that the judicial
declaration of nullity of respondent's marriage is tantamount to a mere
declaration or confirmation that said marriage never existed at all, and for
this reason, her act in contracting a second marriage cannot be considered
criminal.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in quashing the Information for bigamy
filed against respondent.
Ruling:
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally
married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the
second marriage or subsequent marriage.It is essential in the prosecution
for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage.
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second
marriage with Silverio in 1983, her first marriage with Socrates celebrated
in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had not yet been annulled or
declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the elements of bigamy
were alleged in the Information. Here, at the time respondent contracted
the second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet
been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not
change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the
subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of
the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged
were sufficiently alleged.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists.Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The petition is granted.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGORIO NOLASCO
G.R. No. 94053
March 17, 1993
Facts:
Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet
Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's
port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived
with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they returned
to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after
his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married
Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr.
Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he
obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with
his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working
overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that
Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that
Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately
asked permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in
November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself
whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that
all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road,
Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet
Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired
from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of
the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared
presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null
and void.The trial court granted Nolasco's petition.The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently
established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
Issue:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is
already dead.
Ruling:
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41
of the Family Code which provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence
of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
The Family Code prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is
already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be
granted. As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4)
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive
years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where
there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee
is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search

for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded
belief" that she is dead.In the case at bar, the Court considers that the
investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain
Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a
reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. The Court also
views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information
as to her personal background even after she had married respondent too
convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be
said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which
respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost
these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion
that he had inquired from their friends of her whereabouts, considering that
respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony. The Court of
Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during
trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be
rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous with credibility
Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law,
his petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied.
The law does not view marriage like an ordinary contract. In fine,
respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required
by law that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the
issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively
dead.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 159614
December
9, 2005
Facts:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A. Julaton. On May 28, 2001,
the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a Motion to Dismissthe petition, which was, however, denied by
the court.
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on
January 20, 1995 in Catbalogan, Samar.He testified that, on February 6,
1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening and he berated her for being
always out of their house. Alan narrated that, when he reported for work
the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later
in the day, Lea was nowhere to be found.However, Lea did not return to
their house anymore.Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to
look for Lea, but his mother asked him to leave after the town fiesta of
Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. He failed to find
out Leas whereabouts despite his repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided
to work as a part-time taxi driver. On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Leas
disappearance to the local police station.
After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
nor the Solicitor General adduced evidence in opposition to the petition. On
January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in granting the petition.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. The spouse present is, thus, burdened to
prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may
contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a
well-grounded belief. Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting
the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or
circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to
elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth.
Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions,
attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the
conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends
to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their
intentions, competence evidence on the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and
honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the
absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already
dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of
death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a
great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of
the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by
present spouse.In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent
failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition
in the RTC, that his spouse Rosalia (Lea) Julaton was already dead.
NENITA BIENVENIDO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LUISITA
CAMACHO and LUIS FAUSTINO C. CAMACHO
G.R. No. 111717
October
24, 1994
Facts:
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3,
1942. On February 6, 1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being
dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho contracted another marriage with respondent
Luisita C. Camacho (Luisita) with whom he had been living since 1953 and
by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Faustino C. Camacho
(Chito) born on May 22, 1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan
where Aurelio and Luisita had been living since 1958.
There were instances during Luisita and Aurelio's marriage when,
because of their quarrels, one or the other left the dwelling place for long
periods of time. In her case Luisita stayed on those occasions at various
times in Davao City, Hongkong or Japan.In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner
Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her husband, Luis
Rivera. Aurelio courted her and apparently won her heart because from
June 1968 until Aurelio's death on May 28, 1988, he lived with her, the last
time in a duplex apartment on 84 Scout Delgado Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner's daughter, Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelio's son, Chito,
who lived with them for about a year in 1976.
On April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the lot on Delgado
Street in which they were staying from the owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and
Suzette Infante-Moozca. In the deed of sale and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 288350 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, issued in his
name, Aurelio was described as single.On November 26, 1984, Aurelio
executed a deed of sale of the property in favor of petitioner Nenita in
consideration of the sum of P250,000.00, by virtue of which Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 326681 was issued in petitioner's name on January
11, 1985. Between 1985 and 1987 Nenita and Luisita came to know each
other. On May 28, 1988, Aurelio died. Petitioner, using her Loyola Life Plan
and Aurelio's account in the PCI Bank, took care of the funeral
arrangements. Respondent Luisita was then in the United States with
respondent Chito, having gone there, according to her, at the instance of
Aurelio in order to look for a house in San Francisco so that Aurelio could
follow and rejoin them. Upon learning of the death of Aurelio she and her
son Chito came home on May 30, 1988. She had the remains of Aurelio
transferred from the Loyola Memorial Chapels, first to the St. Ignatius
Church and later to the Arlington Memorial Chapels. Luisita paid for the
funeral services.
Respondent Luisita was granted dealt benefits by the Armed Forces of
the Philippines as the surviving spouse of Aurelio. Soon she also claimed
ownership of the house and lot on Scout Delgado Street in which Nenita
had been living. The two met at a barangay conciliation meeting but efforts
to settle their dispute failed.
On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought this case in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, seeking the annullment of the sale
of the property to petitioner and the payment to them of damages. Luisita
alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and that in any event it was
On August 29, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision upholding the
sale of the property to petitioner and dismissing the complaint of Luisita. It
found the deed of sale in favor of petitioner to be genuine and respondents
Luisita and Chito to be in estoppel in not claiming the property until 1988
despite knowledge of the sale by the late Aurelio who had represented
himself to be single. Respondents moved for a reconsideration but the trial
court denied their motion. On appeal the respondents prevailed. On June 4,
1993, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and
declared respondents to be the owners of the house and lot in dispute.
Issue:
Whether or not Aurelios marriage to respondent Luisita is valid.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court findsthe petition to be meritorious. This Court
finds that the presumption of the validity of the marriage between Aurelio
and Luisita has not been successfully assailed by appellee. Art. 83 of the
Civil Code provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during
the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other
than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news
of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been

absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and
believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting
such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall
be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court.
In the case at bar, the burden of proof was on respondents to show
that Luisita and Aurelio's marriage falls under any of these exceptions in
order to be considered valid. They failed to discharge this burden. Instead
the contrary appears. What applies in this case, therefore, is the general
rule, i.e., since Aurelio had a valid, subsisting marriage to Consejo Velaso,
his subsequent marriage to respondent Luisita was void for being
bigamous.Consequently, there is no basis for holding that the property in
question was property of the conjugal partnership of Luisita and the late
Aurelio because there was no such partnership in the first place. In the
second place, until otherwise shown in an appropriate action, the sale to
petitioner must be presumed. Petitioner's ownership is evidenced by a deed
of absolute saleexecuted with all the solemnity of a public document and by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 issued in due course in her
name.Petitioner is in possession of the property. It was error for the Court of
Appeals to annul petitioner's title at the instance of one whose marriage to
the seller is void.
Indeed, the property in question was acquired by Aurelio during a
long period of cohabitation with petitioner which lasted for twenty years
(1968-1988). While petitioner knew respondent Chito to be Aurelio's son
way back in 1976, there is nothing to show that she knew Aurelio to be
married to Luisita. To the contrary, Aurelio represented himself to be single.
As far as petitioner was concerned, Chito could have been Aurelio's child by
a woman not his wife. There was, therefore, no basis for the Court of
Appeals' ruling that Nenita was not a buyer in good faith of the property
because she ought to have known that Aurelio was married to Luisita.

EDUARDO P. MANUEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 165842
November 29,
2005
Facts:
On July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaa before Msgr.
Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a municipality of the
Province of Rizal.He met the private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in
Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan
City for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a
Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo
went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another, they
went to a motel where, despite Tinas resistance, Eduardo succeeded in
having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions,
assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to
Baguio City to meet Tinas parents, and was assured by them that their son
was still single.Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first
week of March 1996. They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge
Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61.
It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was "single."
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married
life. Through their joint efforts, they were able to build their home in
Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started
making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year.
Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would
slap her.Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and
did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries
from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that
Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of
the marriage contract.She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she
learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged
their own vows.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding
Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. On June 18, 2004, the
CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification
as to the penalty of the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners wife cannot be legally presumed dead
under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of
presumptive death as provided under Article 41 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit.The reason why bigamy is
considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage
established by law.The phrase "or before the absent spouse had been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings" was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because
the drafters of the law were of the impression that "in consonance with the
civil law which provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a
number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment
of marriage should be a justification for bigamy."
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is

burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she has been legally married; and (b)
he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage
having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the
celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.It is essential in
the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the
essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the
first marriage.
The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the
absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from
the pains and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely because
he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good
faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.The requirement of
judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution, the "State shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution." Marriage is a social
institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the
interest of society require that the marital relation should be surrounded
with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed and
the causes specified by law.The laws regulating civil marriages are
necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or general
welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the
validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by
encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the
welfare of the community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing
spouses and an approving State. On marriage, the parties assume new
relations to each other and the State touching nearly on every aspect of life
and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to
innocent parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well take
means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive evidence
of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent
spouseafter the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such
means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the
presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the present spouse
contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of
the first spouse.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO
G.R. No. 160258
January
19, 2005
Facts:
Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino and her husband were married
on June 12, 1987. Because of her husbands violent character, Gloria found
it safer to leave him behind and decided to go back to her parents together
with her three (3) children. In order to support the children, Gloria was
compelled to work abroad. From the time of her physical separation from
her husband in 1991, Gloria has not heard of him at all. She had absolutely
no communications with him, or with any of his relatives. On August 14,
2000, nine (9) years after she left her husband, Gloria filed a verified
petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
In a decision dated November 7, 2001, the RTC, finding merit in the
summary petition, rendered judgment granting the same. In a decision
dated September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals, treating the case as an
ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure, denied the Republics appeal and accordingly affirmed the
appealed RTC decision.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the Court of Appeals duly acquired jurisdiction over
the appeal on a final and executory judgment of the Regional Trial
Court
b) Whether or not the factual and legal bases for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code were
established in this case.
Ruling:
The Court rules against petitioner Republic. Article 238 of the Family
Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY
LAW, sets the tenor for cases covered by these rules. In Summary Judicial
Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within
which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered
thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are

"immediately final and executory". It was erroneous, therefore, on the part
of the RTC to give due course to the Republics appeal and order the
transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment
which, by express provision of law, is immediately final and executory. The
Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of
presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to
appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001. But, if only to set the records
straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar, let it be
stated that the RTCs decision dated November 7, 2001, was immediately
final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was erroneous for the OSG
to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto. The
Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and should have
dismissed the appeal outright on that ground.
The Court, therefore, finds in this case grave error on the part of both
the RTC and the Court of Appeals. To stress, the Court of Appeals should
have dismissed the appeal on ground of lack of jurisdiction, and reiterated
the fact that the RTC decision of November 7, 2001 was immediately final
and executory.
As it were, the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error
when it failed to dismiss the erroneous appeal of the Republic on ground of
lack of jurisdiction because, by express provision of law, the judgment was
not appealable.

ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO
G.R. No. 136467
April
6, 2000
Facts:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several
parcels of land with an estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was
survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta Calisterio.Teodorico was
the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James
William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds
disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta
were married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta
having priorly secured a court declaration that James was presumptively
dead.
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a
surviving sister of Teodorico, filed a petition entitled, "In the Matter of
Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia
Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of
Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent
Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and
void.
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her

first marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's
absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years
before she contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to
be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in the
administration of the estate of the decedent.
On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing
jointly Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., and respondent Marietta administrator and
administratrix, respectively, of the intestate estate of Teodorico. On 17
January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of
petitioner Antonia. On 31 August 1998, the appellate court reversed the
lower courts decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between the deceased Teodorico and
respondent Marietta is valid, that, in turn, would be determinative of her
right as a surviving spouse.
Ruling:
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is
Article 83 of the New Civil Code which provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during
the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other
than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at
the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of
the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for
less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so
by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage,
or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The
marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until
declared null and void by a competent court.
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted
during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the
prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved. A judicial declaration of
absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed
period of absence is met.
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's
first husband, James William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared
for more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in
1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having
been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed
valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive
death of James Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having
been adduced to indicate another property regime between the spouses,
pertains to them in common. Upon its dissolution with the death of
Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in two equal portions
one portion going to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the
estate of the deceased spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a
surviving spouse over the net estate of the deceased, concurring with
legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces (the latter by right of
representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the brothers and sisters or
nephews and nieces, being entitled to the other half. Nephews and nieces,
however, can only succeed by right of representation in the presence of
uncles and aunts; alone, upon the other hand, nephews and nieces can
succeed in their own right which is to say that brothers or sisters exclude
nephews and nieces except only in representation by the latter of their
parents who predecease or are incapacitated to succeed. The appellate
court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion
of its judgment, successional rights, to petitioner's children, along with their
own mother Antonia who herself is invoking successional rights over the
estate of her deceased brother.
It is hereby DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's
estate pertains solely to petitioner to the exclusion of her own children.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA

G.R. No. 187512
June
13, 2012
Facts:
In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met
Cyrus Granada (Cyrus) at Sumida Electric Philippines, an electronics
company in Paranaque where both were then working. The two eventually
got married at the Manila City Hall on 3 March 1993. Their marriage
resulted in the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada.Sometime
in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to
Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she had
not received any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts
to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus
regarding the latters whereabouts, to no avail. After nine (9) years of
waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead.
On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as
presumptively dead.
In its 23 January 2009 Resolution, the appellate court granted
Yolandas Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing
Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,the CA ruled that a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary
proceeding.
Issues:
a) Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the
ground that the Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory
upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary
appeal.
b) Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the
Family Code based on the evidence that respondent presented.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirms the CA ruling with regard to the first
issue.Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article
41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding "as provided for" under the
Family Code. Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family
Code provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a
summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be
immediately final and executory.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern
summary court proceedings in the Family Code/By express provision of law,
the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately
final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be
had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of
the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party
may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals
in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if
the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent
with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence
does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From
the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the
Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in
the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the
proper subject of an appeal.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for
certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon,
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate
the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
On whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family
Code based on the evidence that respondent had presented. The belief of
the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and
whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not
the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent
spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent
spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner
points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to
locate her absent husband. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the
Petition. The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to
prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent spouse was already dead
prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively dead is
already final and can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, "[n]othing
is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and
executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer

be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what
is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law."
MARRIAGE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 40

ROBERTO DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 104818
September 17, 1993
Facts:
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed
a petition for "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of
Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that: they
were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as
evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage
License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a
previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which
marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage
only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from
January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia
and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the
one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since
1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent
upon her for support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she
purchased real and personal properties with a total amount of
approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and
administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month
vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she
further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties

without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and
thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to
take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the
possession and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-infact; and he is not authorized to administer and possess the same on
account of the nullity of their marriage.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appealsdismissed the petition. The
motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit.
Issues:
a) Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is
necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only
for purposes of remarriage.
b) Whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private
respondent to recover certain real and personal properties allegedly
belonging to her exclusively.
Ruling:
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private
respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one
Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the
beginning.Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is
a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. The invalidity of a
marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the
marriage invalid, except as provided in Article 41. The Court of Appeals
disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident
of their marriage such as the separation of their properties."
The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of
nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to
the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that
the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is
brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental
questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the respondent
court committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court
committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to
dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
MARRIAGE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 40

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES,
JR.
Adm. Matter No. MTJ-92706
March 29,
1995
Facts:
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro,
who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati,
Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which he purchased in 1987,

whenever he is in Manila. In December 1991, upon opening the door to his
bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even
alienated
the
affection
of
his
children
for
him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida
Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991
sworn statements of assets and liabilities. For his part, respondent alleges
that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of the
administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air
residence, which was disputed by De Castro. Respondent also denies having
been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her.
He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony
before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a
valid marriage for lack of a marriage license.
Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through
another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again,
neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned
respondent 19 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a
single parent. Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil
rites in Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all
good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because
his
first
marriage
was
solemnized
without
a
license.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of an immoral and illegal act by
cohabiting with De Castro.
Ruling:
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second
marriage. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of
the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said
Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure.
Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the
application of Article 40 to his case. Respondent is the last person allowed
to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and
employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who begot him five
children. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions
betrays his sinister motives and bad faith. It is evident that respondent
failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his
appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal act of
cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was already in the
judiciary. The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge
must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a private
individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by
his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all
times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life.
These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position
exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the judiciary.

CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI
G.R. No. 119190
January 16,
1997
Facts:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the
Manila Cathedral, Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage
Contract. After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at
the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of
defendant's mother. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place
where they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife,
they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an
uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to
join them. They stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this
period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant
avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a
rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same
room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But
during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between
them.
She claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor
did he see hers. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical
examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General
Hospital, on January 20, 1989. The results of their physical examinations
were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her
husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no
medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her
husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her.
For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet
homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed
the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream
of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a
Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the
country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no

collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated."After
trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as void. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence, the instant
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the refusal of private
respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological
incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds the petition to be bereft of merit.The case
has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to
be annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties.
When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have
never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling
the truth. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his
wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious
personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an
'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent
court made a finding on who between petitioner and private respondent
refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however,
that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action
to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the
psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with
the other becomes immaterial.If a spouse, although physically capable but
simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the
refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the
prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family
Code is "To procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the
integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation
is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family
Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection
between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order"
(Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared
with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in
marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an
ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the
natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of
creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures
the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and
private respondent. That is a shared feeling which between husband and
wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy
but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed
by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship.
Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who
view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime
social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties
found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied
judgment of respondent appellate court.

LEOUEL SANTOS vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND
JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS
G.R. No. 112019
January 4, 1995
Facts:
Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine
Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for
Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before
Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed,
shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the
latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July
1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos,
Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel
averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the
young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a
"quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple
should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia
would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own
parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to
work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months
after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the
first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon
the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got
a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program
under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up
to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in
touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity
of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in
its report to the court).
Issue:
Whether or not Leouels marriage with Julia can be declared invalid.
Ruling:
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in
ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than
expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its
application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code
Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs.
Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:The Committee did not
give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be
given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment
concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and
accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that
persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under
Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless,
cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the
interpretation or construction of the codal provision. So the progress was
from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was
altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the
conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of
psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able
to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit
oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and
other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which
is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists
of a real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be
compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver
the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself
must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the
community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation
and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a
psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these
obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not
constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder
which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II,
Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared
invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is
afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the
person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being
bound by these duties.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should
continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our
Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code. The
above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our
laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold
on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can

come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate,
in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can
always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
The petition is denied.

LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 126010
December
8, 1999
Facts:
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C.
Hernandez were married and three children were born to them. On July 10,
1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, a petition seeking the
annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of
psychological incapacity of the latter. She claimed that private respondent,
after they were married, cohabited with another woman with whom he had
an illegitimate child, while having affairs with different women, and that,
because of his promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health by
infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease (STD). Petitioner prayed
that for having abandoned the family, private respondent be ordered to give
support to their three children in the total amount of P9,000.00 every
month; that she be awarded the custody of their children; and that she be
adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel of land located in Cavite.
On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the
petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner. Petitioner appealed
to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30, 1996, rendered its decision
affirming the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent
should be annulled on the ground of private respondent's psychological
incapacity.
Ruling:
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held:"Psychological

incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment
of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to
the most serious cases of personality, disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage,
like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders
the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur
only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however,
do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder,
indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established,
every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and
other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully
examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is
peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might
be helpful or even desirable.
The Court, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of
respondent Court of Appeals whose conclusions, affirming the trial court's
finding with regard to the non-existence of private respondent's
psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage, are entitled to great
weight and even finality.
The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass
upon petitioner's contentions on the issue of permanent custody of children,
the amount for their respective support, and the declaration of exclusive
ownership of petitioner over the real property. These matters may more
appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation,

dissolution of property regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner
may bring.

YAMBAO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 184063
January 24. 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Cynthia E. Yambao and respondent Patricio E. Yambao
married on December 21, 1968. On July 11, 2003, after 35 years of
marriage and three children raised into adulthood, petitioner filed a petition
before the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, praying the marriage be
declared null and void due to her husbands psychological incapacity
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner claims that her
marriage is marred by bickering, quarrels and recrimination because of the
respondents difficulty to find a stable job, failure in the family business,

refusal to change childrens diapers while petitioner was still recovering
from her Caesarean operation, insecurity and jealousy towards
acquaintances and relatives, eating and sleeping all day, gambling, and
threats to kill her. She then consulted with a psychiatrist who concluded
that the respondent suffered from Dependent Personality Disorder. On
February 9, 2007, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. On April 16, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial
Courts Decision; hence, this petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of petitioners evidence establishes the
respondents psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations
of marriage.
Ruling:
No. Though there are existing antecedents, assumptions,
predilections, or generalizations, this case must be treated uniquely, given
its facts and idiosyncrasies. For marriage to be annulled under Article 36 of
the Family Code, it must be proven that the incapacitated spouse
manifested mental, not physical, incapacity causing him or her to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants. The spouse must suffer from a
mental incapacity so severe that he is and becomes unaware of his marital
and familial obligations. Psychological incapacity must be judged according
to:
(a) gravity,
(b)juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability.
Article 36 considers incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and
to assume basic marital obligations as totally different from mere difficulty,
refusal, neglect or ill will in the performance of marital obligations.
Incapacity is defined as:
(a) true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage;
(b)this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential
obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and
love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education
of offspring; and
(c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality.
All marriages go through bickerings, quarrels and recrimination and

rough patches. In this case, the respondent may not be the ideal husband
for petitioners exacting standards but they have gone through 35 years of
marriage and have raised 3 children into adulthood without any major
parenting problems. Moreover, respondent never committed infidelity or
physically abused the petitioner or their children. These facts do not prove
psychological incapacity.
GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
MOLINA
G.R. No. 108763
February 13, 1997
Facts:
On April 14, 1985, Roridel Olaviano Molina, respondent was married
to Reynaldo Molina at the Church of Saint Augustine, Manila. From their
marriage was borne a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina. After a
year of marriage, Reynaldo started exhibiting signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility. He preferred to spend more time with the company of his
friends and peers on whom he squandered money, he depended on his
parents for aid and assistance, ;and he was never honest with the family
finances. These circumstances led to frequent quarrels between the
petitioner and respondent. In February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his
job in Manila, making Roridel the sole breadwinner.
On October 1986, they were both estranged from each other. In
February 1986, Roridel moved back to Baguio with her parents and a few
weeks later Reynaldo abandoned Roridel and left Albert in her custody.
Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as
husband and wife because of Roridels strange behavior and insistence to
leave his group of friends eve after their marriage, Roridels refusal to
perform some of her marital duties like cooking meals, and Roridels failure
to run the household and handle their finances. On May, 1991, the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio rendered judgment and declared the marriage void.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Regional Trial Courts decision.
Issue:
Whether or not opposing and conflicting personalities is equivalent
to psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
No. Psychological incapacity must be judged according to: (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. In this case, there was no
clear showing of the psychological incapacity but the mere showing of
difficulty, refusal, neglect and irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities which do not constitute psychological incapacity. In this case,
it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities
and duties as married persons. Essentially, it must be shown that they are
incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.

Although there was evidence that the couple could not get along or are
incompatible with each other, there was no evidence of the gravity of the
psychological incapacity; neither its juridical antecedence nor incurability.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological, not physical.
The following guidelines must be proved in invoking psychological
incapacity:
(1)The burden of proof to show nullity of the marriage lies in
the plaintiff;
(2)The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
a. Medically or clinically identified,
b. Alleged in the complaint,
c. Sufficiently proven by experts, and
d. Clearly explained in the decision.
(3)The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriage.
(4)Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable.
(5)Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
(6)The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children.
(7)Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.
(8)The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.

BARCELONA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 130087
September 24, 2003
Facts:
Diana M. Barcelona, petitioner, and Tadeo R. Bengzon, respondent
were legally married at Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship. They
established their residence at Quezon City and begot five children. The
couple had frequent quarrels because Diana was from a rich family, was a
disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house playing
tennis all day. During a family crisis where Diana suffered from several
miscarriages and during sickness of a child, the petitioner would withdraw
herself and would not talk to the husband. During her pregnancy, she would
insist the husband to offer her more freedom and leave their conjugal
dwelling. The husband would eventually leave and the both of them would
eventually become estranged from each other.
On March 29, 1995, respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon filed a Petition for
Annulment of Marriage on the grounds of psychological incapacity against
petitioner Diana M. Barcelona. On July 21, 1995, respondent filed a second
Petition for Annulment of Marriage against the petitioner. Petitioner filed a

Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the second petition fails to state a
cause of action and that it violated Supreme Court Circular No. 04-49 in
failing to state the filing of a previous petition for annulment of marriage, its
termination and status.
On September 18, 1996, in an Order (first Order) Judge Julieto P.
Tabiolo deferred resolution of the Motion until the parties have ventilated
their arguments in a hearing. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
However, on January 21, 1997, the trial court through Pairing Judge
Rosalina L. Luna Pison issued an Order (second Order) denying the motion
for reconsideration on the ground that when the ground for dismissal is the
complaints failure to state a cause of action, the trial court determines such
fact solely from the petition itself. According to Judge Pison, a perusal of the
allegations in the second petition shows that petitioner has violated
respondents right, thus resulting to a cause of action. Judge Pison also
rejected petitioners claim that respondent was guilty of forum shopping
explaining that when respondent filed the second petition, the first petition
was no longer pending and was dismissed without prejudice.
The Court of Appeals affirmed with the Regional Trial Courts decision
that the allegations in the second petition state a cause of action sufficient
to sustain a valid judgment if proven true as well as the decision that the
respondent has not committed forum shopping.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the second petition for annulment sufficiently states
the cause of action.
b) Whether or not the respondent violated Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-49 in failing to state the filing of a
previous petition for annulment of marriage, its termination and
status.
Ruling:
Yes. The second petition states a legal cause of action since it states
the legal right of respondent, the correlative obligation of the petitioner,
and the act or omission of the petitioner in violation of the legal right. After
Santos and Molina, the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages provided that expert
opinions need not be alleged, to wit:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages
x x x.
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family

Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that
either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at
the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its celebration.
No. The first petition was already dismissed without prejudice.

Therefore, there is no litis pendentia since respondent has already
withdrawn and caused the dismissal of the first petition when he
subsequently filed the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because
the dismissal order was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal
without prejudice.

TONGOL vs. TONGOL
G.R. No. 157610
October 19, 2007
Facts:
On August 27, 1967, petitioner Orlando G. Tongol and respondent
Filipinas M. Tongol were married. From their marriage they begot four
children.
On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the Regional Trial Court,
Makati a verified petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Filipinas on the ground that she is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with her essential marital obligations.
In his petition, Orlando stated that he and Filipinas marriage was
objected by the latters family. The continuous interference of Filipinas
parents, their attempts to break up their union and their influence on
Filipinas made their marriage an unhappy one. Because of the influence of
Filipinas parents, she regarded Orlando with contempt. When Orlando
started a junk shop business, he was met with ridicule, instead of
encouragement, from his wife. Eventually, his junk shop business flourished
and became profitable enough for Orlando to embark on a new business
venture by putting up a pharmaceutical company. Filipinas became
interested and began to interfere with the operation of the business;
however, the employees of the company were aloof. She also resented that
her husband was getting along with the employees and, as a result, was the
subject of their frequent and continued quarrels. She even suspected
Orlando of diverting the income of his business to his relatives. The
continued fighting persisted and affected their children.
Filipinas, in her counter-petition claimed that the marriage was,
indeed, fruitless; however, this was the fault of Orlandos psychological
incapacity. In 1990, Orlando decided to live separately from Filipinas and on
May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of their
conjugal partnership gains, granted by the Makati Regional Trial Court.
Evidence for Orlando consisted of his testimony, his sisters, his
employees, and Dr. Cecilia Villegas psychological examination of both
parties. Meanwhile, evidence for the respondent only consisted of her
testimony.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the Regional Trial Courts decision in toto.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated.
Ruling:
No. First, psychological incapacity must be more than just difficulty,
refusal or neglect. Second, the personality disorder or psychological
incapacity of the respondent must be grave enough to bring about her
disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Third, there was
no evidence that the psychological incapacity is incurable. Fourth, the
psychological incapacity considered in Article 36 must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage like, in this case, the family business. Marriage obligations must
correspond to the management of the household and the provision of
support for the family. Fifth, marital obligations must not only include the
spouses obligation to the spouse but also that to her children. No evidence
was shown that the respondent was negligent in the rearing and care of her
children as enumerated in Article 220 of the Family Code. Although, the
respondent exhibited Inadequate Personality Disorder, there was no
evidence to prove that, indeed, the respondent was incapacitated or
incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

MARCOS vs. MARCOS
G.R. No. 136490
October 19, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos
married twice. First was on September 6, 1982, with Judge Eriberto H.
Espiritu as solemnizing officer of the marriage held at the Municipal Court
of Pasig and second was on May 8, 1983 by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar,
Command Chaplain at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in
Malacaang Park, Manila. They were both military personnel. They begot 5
(five) children. Wilson left military service in 1987 and started a business
that did not prosper. Brenda put up a business until she was able to put up a
trading and construction company.Their frequent quarrels stemmed from
the petitioners urges on respondent to be gainfully employed to convince
their children that their father, as the breadwinner, is the head of the family
and a good provider. Because of Wilsons failure to provide for his family, he
began beating the children for slight mistakes and forcibly having sex with
his already weary wife. The tipping point was when they had a quarrel on
October 16, 1994 when she did not want him to stay in their house
anymore. Wilson became violent and inflicted physical harm on her and her
mother. The following day, Brenda and her children sought refuge at her
sisters house. On October 19, 1994, she was diagnosed with contusions
from the bitter quarrel. The Regional Trial Court found respondent to be
psychologically incapacitated. The Court of Appeals negated the Regional
Trial Courts ruling.
Issues:
a) Whether or not personal medical or psychological evaluation is a
requirement for the declaration of psychological incapacity.
b) Whether or not the demeanor or behaviors of the respondents
determine psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
No. The guidelines in Santos and Molina do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated
even if the root cause be medically or clinically identified. What is most
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
partys psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination is not necessary.
No. Although the respondent failed to provide material support to the
family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, these do
not necessitate psychological incapacity. The evidence presented do not
zero in on the Santos and Molina guidelines on psychological incapacity.
The behaviors can be attributed to the respondents loss of employment for
a period of more than six years. It was from this that he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support and leave the
family home. Therefore, his psychological incapacity can be traced to this
certain period and not before the marriage nor during the inception of the
marriage. Equally important, the condition was not proven to be incurable,
especially now that he is again gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
TE vs. TE
G.R. No. 161793
February 13, 2009
Facts:
In January 1996, Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te decided to court
Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te after seeing her in a Filipino-Chinese
association in their college. He decided to court Rowena after learning that
her close friend had a boyfriend. They shared the same angst towards their
families and developed a closeness with each other. In March 1996, Rowena
asked Edward that they elope despite being bickering about being young
and jobless. Edward eventually gave in to Rowenas plans, left Manila, and
sailed for Cebu that month with P80,000 pension. He provided the traveling
money and she purchased their boat ticket. Because of their house
accommodation, daily sustenance and joblessness, their pension lasted for
only a month. After Edward proceeded to his parents home, Rowena kept
on telephoning him and threatening him that she would commit suicide.
Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncles place.
On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to court to get
married. He was 25 years old and she was 20. They continued to stay at her
uncles place but he Edward was being treated like a prisoner. In one
instance, Rowena insisted Edward to claim his inheritance so they could live
independently but this request was angrily denied by his father who insisted
that Edward go home else, he would be disinherited. After a month, Edward
escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle and stayed with his parents. His
family hid him from Rowena when she called. In June 1996, Edward was
able to talk to Rowena but, unmoved by Edwards persistence that they live
together, she decided that they should separate ways. On January 18, 2000,
Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for
the annulment of his marriage with Rowena on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
On August 23, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted an
investigation report stating that it could not determine if there was
collusion between the parties and therefore, recommended trial on the
merits. Upon the findings of the clinical psychologist of psychological
incapacity of Edward (dependent personality disorder) and Rowena
(narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder), the Regional Trial Court
declared the marriage null and void. However, the Appellate Court reversed
and set aside the Trial Courts decision on the ground that the clinical
psychologist did not examine the respondent and merely banked on the
testimony of the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity given the petitioners totality of evidence.
Ruling:
Yes. The courts must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties. The psychological assessment adequately,
sufficiently and decisively points to Edwards dependent personality
disorder and Rowenas narcissistic and anti-social personality disorder.
Also, the Regional Trial Court viewed, at first-hand, the witnesses
deportment. With Edwards affliction of dependent personality disorder, he
cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing
love and respect and rendering help and support because he is unable to
make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make
most of his important decisions, tends to agree with people even when he
believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers
to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people,
feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with
fears of being abandoned. The petitioner followed everything dictated to
him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no
sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has
no goals and clear direction in life.Rowenas affliction with antisocial
personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital
obligations.
This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others,
her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her
tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional
behavioral limitations imposed by society.Moreover, as shown in this case,
respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in
manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing
suicide.Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable
psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage they contracted on April
23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void, reversing and setting aside the
decision of the appellate court.

AGRAVIADOR vs. AGRAVIADOR
G.R. No. 170729
December 8, 2010
Facts:
In 1971, Petitioner Enrique A. Agraviador met respondent Erlinda
Amparo-Agraviador at a beerhouse where Erlinda worked. The petitioner
was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau of Customs while the
respondent was a 17-year old waitress. They soon entered a common-law
relationship. On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent married in
a ceremony officiated by Reverend Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo
Manila. The petitioners family was apprehensive because of the nature of
the respondents work and that she came from a broken family. They begot
four (4) children. On March 1, 2001, Enrique filed with the Regional Trial
Court a petition of the nullity of his marriage with Erlinda. Petitioner
alleged that Erlinda was carefree, irresponsible immature and whimsical,
and refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away
from their conjugal dwelling for long periods of time; had an affair with a
lesbian; did not take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in
order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family name Agraviador
in her activities. Enrique also claimed that Erlinda refused to have sex with
him since 1993 because she became very close to a male tenant in their
house, discovered their love notes, and even caught them inside his room
several times. Respondent denied that she engaged in extra-marital affairs
and maintained that it was Enrique who refused to have sex with her. She
claimed that the petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled because
he wanted to marry their former household helper, Gilda Camarin. She
added that she was the one who took care of their son at the hospital before
he died. The Regional Trial Court ordered to investigate if collusion existed
between parties. On November 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court then
allowed the petitioner to present his evidence ex parte. The petitioner
presented testimonial and documentary evidence as well as a certified true
copy of their marriage contract and the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr.
Juan Cirilo L. Patac which found that respondent was afflicted with mixed
personality disorder. The Appellate Court, however, reversed and set aside
the Regional Trial Courts decision on the grounds that the psychiatric
evaluation report failed to establish that the mental incapacity was serious,
grave and permanent.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established the respondents

Ruling:
No. The petitioners testimony established difficulty, refusal, and
neglect. However, it did not reveal utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. Moreover, Dr. Patacs
psychological report only enumerated the respondents behavioral defects
but failed to prove the gravity or seriousness of the psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity must be judged according to: (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Additionally, the Molina case set
stricter guidelines in establishing psychological incapacity:
(1)The burden of proof to show nullity of the marriage lies in the
plaintiff;
(2)The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
a. Medically or clinically identified,
b. Alleged in the complaint,
c. Sufficiently proven by experts, and
d. Clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological, not physical.
(3)The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
(4)Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.
(5)Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6)The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children.
(7)Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.
(8)The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
These guidelines were incorporated with the basic requirements

established in Santos. In Marcos v. Marcos, it was no longer necessary for
the defendant or respondent spouse to be personally examined by a
physician or psychologist. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce
expert opinion under Article 36 of the Family Code so long as gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. In Ngo Te v.
Yu-Te, Ting vs. Velez-Ting, and Suazo vs. Suazo. the Molina precedent was
flexibly applied (yet never abandoned) instead of used as a strict criteria or
straightjacket.

MARABLE vs. MARABLE
G.R. No. 178741
January 17, 2011
Facts:
In 1967, petitioner Rosalino L. Marable and respondent Myrna F.
Marable met while still classmates studying at Arellano University. He only
became attracted to her only after they happened to sit beside each other in
a passenger bus. Despite having a girlfriend, petitioner courted the

respondent and eventually became sweethearts with Myrna demanding
more love, time and attention from Rosalino who appreciated this gesture.
On December 19, 1970, the two eloped and were married in civil rites at
Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. This was followed by a
church wedding on December 30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa
Bilibid Prison. They begot five children. The relationship turned sour. Verbal
and physical quarrels increased when their eldest daughter transferred
from several schools because of juvenile misconduct and had an unwanted
teenage pregnancy. Rosalino then sought for peace, love and affection from
a relationship with another woman. Myrna eventually found out about the
affair. These aggravated their quarrels. Their business ventures failed.
Rosalino felt unloved, unwanted, and unappreciated; felt indifferent toward
the respondent; left the conjugal home; gave up all properties; and
converted to Islam after dating several women. On October 8, 2001,
petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with
respondent on grounds of psychological incapacity. Petitioner also alleged
that his family background from a poor family and his father being a
compulsive gambler and womanizer, made him obsess for attention and
strive for success only to find himself in misery and loneliness because of
the void in his relationship with his family. To support these, petitioner
presented the Psychological Report of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag and stated that he
suffered from Antisocial Personality Disorder. The Regional Trial Court
rendered a Decision annulling the marriage while the Court of Appeals
reversed the said decision.
Issues:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established psychological
incapacity therefore rendering the marriage null and void.
Ruling:
No. The findings of Dr. Tayags psychological report merely made a
general conclusion that the petitioner suffered from Anti-Social Personality
Disorder; however, it failed to prove the root cause of the psychological
incapacity. It also failed to fit into the framework of the Molina Doctrine.
Moreover, there was no factual basis that the petitioner was a socially
deviant, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful person. In fact, he
was proven to act responsibly during the marriage by working hard to
provide for his family especially his children. Petitioner also tried to make it
appear that his family background was one of the reasons why he engaged
in extra-marital affairs when, actually, he was simply dissatisfied with his
marriage. He was also shown to have learned from his extra-marital affairs
and has immediately terminated them.
In short, petitioners marital infidelity, their squabbles, and conflicts in
child-rearingdoes not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological
disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal

obligations. It has been held in various cases that sexual infidelity, by itself,
is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological
incapacity.It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.That
not being the case with petitioner, his claim of psychological incapacity
must fail. It bears stressing that psychological incapacity must be more than
just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. In Santos v. Court of Appeals,the intention of
the law is to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

AURELIO vs. AURELIO
G.R. No. 175367
June 6, 2011
Facts:
On March 23, 1988, petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida
Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married. They begot two sons. On May 9, 2002,
respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the basis of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. The psychological assessment revealed
that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with
Narcissistic features as seen from her quick changes in temperament, selfindulgence, intolerance, and inability to delay her needs. On the part of the
petitioner, it has been revealed in the same assessment that he suffers from
Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder as seen from his lack
of drive to discern the plight of his working wife, consistent jealousy and
distrust toward his wife, arrogance and insensitivity toward his wife. These
findings were found to be grave, incorrigible, and incurable. On November
8, 2002, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. On January 14, 2003, the
Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision denying the motion. On February
21, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and found that
respondents petition for declaration for nullity of marriage complied with
the Molina Doctrine and that the merits of the case depend upon the proofs
presented in trial. On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the Regional
Trial Court decision to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari. On
October 6, 2005, Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
Issues:
Whether or not the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
valid.
Ruling:
Yes. For a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage to be valid, it
must comply with the standards or criteria set by the Molina Doctrine.
Petitioner asserts that the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
invalid because it did not comply with the following cited in the Molina
Doctrine: (a) root cause of the psychological incapacity, (b) gravity of such
illness, and (c) non-compliance of marital obligations. First, the root cause
of the psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. The
root cause being their family backgrounds, as determined by a competent
and expert psychologist. Second, the petition establishes that the
respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic
Features as well as the petitioner suffers from Passive Aggressive
(Negativistic) Personality Disorder which are conditions that are allegedly
grave, incorrigible and incurable. Lastly, the Court also finds that the
essential marital obligations were not complied with. Petition for dismissal
is denied.

REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DE QUINTOS, JR.
G.R. No. 159594
November 12, 2012
Facts:
Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. and Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos were
married on March 16, 1967 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor
of Lingayen Pangasinan. They were not blessed with children due to
Catalinas hysterectomy after her second miscarriage. On April 6, 1998,
Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage,
citing Catalinas psychological incapacity to comply with her essential
marital obligations. Eduardo testified that Catalinas psychological
incapacity manifested when she always left their house without his consent;
engaged in petty arguments with him; constantly refused to do household
chores or take care of their adopted daughter; gossiping with the neighbors;
gambling; and abandoning their conjugal home to live with Bobbie Castro. A
neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes revealed that
Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Psychiatric Disorder and was not
curable. These manifested through her immaturity that rendered her
psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital obligations. Catalina did
not interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her share
in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan.The
Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Eduardo; however, the Court of
Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Issues:
Ruling:
No. First, Catalinas supposed behavior was not corroborated by
others and, therefore, was not established. Eduardos testimony was selfserving. Second, Dr. Reyes neuro-psychiatric evaluation was ostensibly
vague on the root cause, gravity, and incurability of the disorder. Dr. Reyes
merely established that Catalina was immature and childish and that her
immaturity and childishness could no longer be treated due to Catalinas
reaching of an age of maturity. Thirdly, Dr. Reyes had only one interview
with Catalina and, therefore, lacked depth and objectivity which would have
been achieved if her report corroborated not only with Eduardos
statements but also with interviews by other persons. Fourth, no proof was
made to establish the natal or supervening disabling factor which effectively
incapacitated Catalina from complying with her basic marital functions. In
this case, the Court cited Santos and Molina in setting the criteria or
standards to dispute psychological incapacity.
OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

REPUBLIC vs. ENCELAN
G.R. No. 170022
January 9, 2009
Facts:
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita and the union bore two
children, Maricar and Manny. To support his family, Cesar went to work in
Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi
Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez.
Sometime in 1991, Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children
and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On
June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the
declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolitas psychological
incapacity.
Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that
Alvin used to be an associate in her promotions business. She insisted that
she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she left their home
because of irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law. At the trial,
Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolitas infidelity and subsequent
abandonment of the family home. He testified that he continued to provide
financial support for Lolita and their children even after he learned of her
illicit affair with Alvin.
Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report on Lolita

prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the National Center for Mental
Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering from any form of
major psychiatric illness," but had been "unable to provide the expectations
expected of her for a good and lasting marital relationship"; her
"transferring from one job to the other depicts some interpersonal problems
with co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions"; and
"her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work
out a good marital and family relationship."
In its June 5, 2002 decision, the RTC declared Cesars marriage to

Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to declare Lolita psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The CA
originally set aside the RTCs verdict, finding that Lolitas abandonment of
the conjugal dwelling and infidelity were not serious cases of personality
disorder/psychological illness. In its amended decision,the CA found two
circumstances indicative of Lolitas serious psychological incapacity that
resulted in her gross infidelity: (1) Lolitas unwarranted refusal to perform
her marital obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolitas willful and deliberate act of
abandoning the conjugal dwelling. OSG filed the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesars marriage
to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
No. In interpreting Article 36 of the Family Code, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates
"downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the
basic marital obligations", not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden
of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the
celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the
errant spouse.Cesar testified on the dates when he learned of Lolitas
alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home, as well as his
continued financial support to her and their children even after he learned
of the affair, but he merely mentioned in passing Lolitas alleged affair with
Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.Sexual infidelity and
abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity; simply grounds for legal separation. To
constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness
and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that
completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential
marital obligations.No evidence on record exists to support Cesars
allegation that Lolitas infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of
any psychological illness.
Dr. Flores observation on Lolitas interpersonal problems with coworkers does not suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she was
at the time of her marriage psychologically incapacitated to enter into a
marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a wifes
psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her
professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities
are poles apart from their marital counterparts. Dr. Flores further belief
that Lolitas refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work
out a good marital relationship is a mere generalization unsupported by
facts.

MENDOZA vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 157649
November 12, 2012
Facts:
Petitioner Arabelle J. Mendoza and private respondent Dominic C.
Mendoza met in 1989 upon his return to the country from his employment
in Papua New Guinea. They had been next-door neighbors in the apartelle
they were renting while in college she, at Assumption College while he, at
San Beda taking a business management course. After a month of courtship,
they became intimate which led to the pregnancy with their Daughter
Alyssa Blanca. They got married when she was eight months into her
pregnancy in civil rites solemnized in Pasay City, June 24, 1991, after which
they moved to her place, remaining dependent on their parents for support.
Dominic remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support
until he finished college in October 1993. She took on various jobs, being
the one with the fixed income, she shouldered all of the familys expenses
(i.e., rental, food, other bills and their childs educational needs). In
September 1994, she discovered his illicit relationship with Zaida,
Dominics co-employee at Toyota Motors. Eventually, communication
between them became rare until they started to sleep in separate rooms,
thereby affecting their sexual relationship.
In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as a
birthday present and later asked her to issue two blank checks for the cars
insurance coverage, only to find out that the checks were not paid for the
cars insurance coverage but for his personal needs. Worse, she also found
out that he did not pay for the car itself, forcing her to rely on her father-inlaw to pay part of the cost of the car, leaving her to bear the balance.
To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment after
he ran away with P164,000.00 belonging to his employer. He was criminally
charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa, for which he
was arrested and incarcerated. She and her mother bailed him out of jail,
but discovered that he had also swindled many clients some of whom were
even threatening her, her mother and her sister.
On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal home because

Arabelle asked him for "time and space to think things over." A month later,
she refused his attempt at reconciliation, causing him to threaten to commit
suicide. At that, she and her family immediately left the house to live in
another place concealed from him.
On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the
declaration of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic based on his
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition. In the RTC, petitioner
presented herself as a witness, together with a psychiatrist, Dr. Rocheflume
Samson, and Professor Marites Jimenez. On his part, Dominic did not
appear during trial and presented no evidence. On August 18, 2000, the
RTC found all characteristics of psychological incapacity gravity,
antecedence, and incurability as set forth in Molina and declared the
marriage between petitioner and Dominic an absolute nullity. On March 19,
2003 the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of
the RTC.
Issue:
Ruling:
No. The findings of Dr. Samson were one-sided, self-serving and

uncorroborated because only Arabelle was evaluated. Dr. Samson even
conceded that there was a need to verify her findings concerning Dominics
psychological profile which were colored by Arabelles ill-feelings toward
him during her evaluation. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot
be equated with psychological incapacity. Santos v. Court of Appeals sets
the guidelines for psychological incapacity as characterized by (a) gravity
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." These guidelines do not
necessarily require the root cause to be medically or clinically identified
by a physician or a psychologist. What is important is that totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to. Finally, petitioner contends that the Courts Resolution in
A.M. No. 02-11-10 rendered appeals by the OSG no longer required. On the
contrary, the Resolution explicitly requires the OSG to actively participate in
all stages of the proceedings as seen in its provisions.

REPUBLIC vs. GALANG
G.R. No. 168335
June 6, 2011
Facts:
On March 9, 1994, respondent Nestor Galang and Juvy married in
Pampanga. They lived in Nestors fathers house in San Francisco,
Mabalacat, Pampanga. Nestor worked as an artist-illustrator at the Clark
Development Corporation, earning P8,500.00 monthly. Juvy, stayed at home
as a housewife. Christopher is their only child.
On August 4, 1999, Nestor filed with the RTC a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy, under Article 36 of the
Family Code, as amended. He alleged that Juvy was psychologically
incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage because she
was a kleptomaniac and a swindler. The respondents testimony showed that
Juvy: (a) refused to wake up early to prepare breakfast; (b) left their child to
the care of their neighbors when she went out of the house; (c) squandered
a huge amount of the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her; (d)
stole the respondents ATM card and attempted to withdraw the money
deposited in his account; (e) falsified the respondents signature in order to
encash a check; (f) made up false stories in order to borrow money from
their relatives; and (g) indulged in gambling.According to the respondent,
Juvy suffers from mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted
discernment and total lack of care, love and affection towards him and their
child. He posited that Juvys incapacity was extremely serious and
appears to be incurable.Prosecutor Angelito I. Balderama formally
manifested, on October 18, 1999, that he found no evidence of collusion
between the parties. The RTC set the case for trial in its Order of October
20, 1999. The respondent presented testimonial and documentary evidence
to substantiate his allegations.
Aside from his testimony, the respondent also presented Anna Liza S.
Guiang, a psychologist, who testified that she conducted a psychological
test on the respondent. According to her, she wrote Juvy a letter requesting
for an interview, but the latter did not respond.
On January 22, 2001, the RTC nullified the parties marriage. On
November 25, 2004, the CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto explaining
that Juvys indolence and lack of responsibility coupled with her gambling
and swindling undermined her capacity to comply with her marital
obligations. The testimony of psychologist Anna Liza S. Guiang
characterized Juvys condition as permanent, incurable and existing at the
time of celebration of her marriage with respondent.
Issue:
Ruling:
No. The testimony of the petitioner only showed isolated incidents,
not recurring acts. Psychological incapacity must be more than difficulty,
refusal or neglect. It is essential that he or she must be shown to
be incapable of complying with the responsibility and duty as a married
person because of some psychological, not physical, illness. In other words,
proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person an adverse
integral
element
in
the
personality
structure
that
effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage had to be shown. The psychological
test was uncorroborated and one-sided; therefore, biased towards Juvys
negative traits. First, the psychologist did not identify the types of
psychological tests to determine the root cause of Juvys psychological
condition. Second, the report failed to prove the gravity or severity of Juvys
condition. Lastly, the report failed to prove incurability. The psychologists
testimony was totally devoid of any information or insight into Juvys early
life and associations, how she acted before and at the time of the marriage,
and how the symptoms of a disordered personality developed. Simply put,
the psychologist failed to trace the history of Juvys psychological condition
and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.

OCHOSA vs. ALANO
G.R. No. 167459
January 26, 2011
Facts:
Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa met Bona J. Alano in August 1973 he,
a young lieutenant in the AFP; she, a 17-year-old 1st year college drop-out.
They had a whirlwind romance that culminated into sexual intimacy and
eventual marriage on October 27, 1973 before the Honorable Judge Cesar
S. Principe in Basilan. The couple did not acquire any property. Neither did
they incur any debts. Their union produced no offspring. In 1976, however,
they found an abandoned and neglected one-year-old baby girl whom they
later registered as their daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste Alano
Ochosa.
During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the
Philippine archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with
him in his posts, preferring to stay in her hometown of Basilan. Neither did
Bona visit him in his areas of assignment, except in one (1) occasion when
Bona stayed with him for four (4) days.
Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion Commander of
the Security Escort Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were given
living quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City where they resided with their
military aides.In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged
participation in the failed coup detat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame.
Even at the onset of their marriage when Jose was assigned in various
parts of the country, Bona had illicit relations with other men. Bona
entertained male visitors in her bedroom whenever Jose was out of their
living quarters at Fort Bonifacio. On one occasion, Bona was caught by
Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having sex with Joses driver,
Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of Bonas sexual infidelity circulated in the
military community. When Jose could no longer bear these rumors, he got a
military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona.During their
confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal Gagarin who
also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away from their
living quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went to Basilan.In 1994,
Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is currently
supporting the needs of Ramona.
Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, seeking to
nullify his marriage to Bona on the ground of the latters psychological
incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage.In a Decision dated
11 January 1999, the trial court granted the petition and nullified the
parties marriage. The OSG appealed with the CA which granted the appeal,
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. There is inadequate credible evidence that her defects (sexual
disloyalty with Jose, sexual promiscuity with other men) were already
present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage. In other words, her
alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential requisite
of juridical antecedence. Verily, Dr. Elizabeth E. Rondain evaluated
Bonas psychological condition (Histrionic Personality Disorder) indirectly
from the information gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses. This
factual circumstance evokes the possibility that the information fed to the
psychiatrist is tainted with bias for Joses cause, in the absence of sufficient
corroboration. It is apparent from the above-cited testimonies that Bona,
contrary to Joses assertion, had no manifest desire to abandon Jose at the
beginning of their marriage and was, in fact, living with him for the most
part of their relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose drove her
away from their conjugal home in 1988. On the contrary, the record shows
that it was Jose who was constantly away from Bona by reason of his
military duties and his later incarceration. A reasonable explanation for
Bonas refusal to accompany Jose in his military assignments in other parts
of Mindanao may be simply that those locations were known conflict areas
in the seventies. Any doubt as to Bonas desire to live with Jose would later
be erased by the fact that Bona lived with Jose in their conjugal home in
Fort Bonifacio during the following decade. In view of the foregoing, the
badges of Bonas alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity
and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time
after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.

CAMACHO-REYES vs. REYES
G.R. No. 185286
August 18, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon
Reyes at the University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they
were both nineteen (19) years old. Petitioner and respondent got marriedon
December 5, 1976. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months
pregnant and employed at the Population Center Foundation.Thereafter,
they lived with the Ramons family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses
were shouldered by Ramons parents, and the couples respective salaries

were spent solely for their personal needs.
Financial difficulties started. A year into their marriage, the monthly
allowance ofP1,500.00 from respondent stopped because Ramon resigned
from his familys business. Because of this, Ramon engaged into (1) a
fishpond business in Mindoro and eventually, (2) a scrap paper and carton
trading business which both failed..To prod respondent into assuming more
responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live separately from her inlaws. After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence
and, this time, moved in with Maria Socorros mother where petitioner
continued to carry the financial burdens
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having
an extra-marital affair. One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the
parties marriage was a surgical operation on petitioner for the removal of a
cyst where respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply
read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that he
accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room.
As a last resort, petitioner approached respondents siblings and
asked them to intervene, Adolfo Reyes, respondents elder brother, and his
spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter group, invited,
sponsored and scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and
respondent, but these did not improve the parties relationship as
respondent remained uncooperative. In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to
Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment; however, respondent
resisted and did not continue with the clinical psychologists
recommendation to undergo psychotherapy.At about this time, petitioner,
with the knowledge of respondents siblings, told respondent to move out of
their house. With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not
improve. Neither did respondents relationship with his children.
Finally, in 2001, petitioner filed before the RTC a petition for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage with the respondent, alleging the
latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations
under Article 36 of the Family Code. RTC affirmed petitioner. CA reversed
and set aside RTCs decision.
Issue:
Ruling:
Yes. The lack of personal examination and interview of the

respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality disorder, does
not per se invalidate the testimonies of Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno and
Dr. Cecilia C. Villegas. Neither do their findings automatically constitute
hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence. The clinical
psychologists and psychiatrists assessment were not based solely on the
narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as
respondents own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of
petitioner), testified on their own observations of respondents behavior and
interactions with them, spanning the period of time they knew him. Dr.
Natividad A. Dayans recommendation that respondent should undergo
therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that respondents
psychological incapacity is incurable.
In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three
reports and the respective testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and
Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2) these problems
include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards
providing the needs of his family; several failed business attempts;
substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations.
It is true that a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists diagnoses that
a person has personality disorder is not automatically believed by the courts
in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical
psychologists or psychiatrists finding of a personality disorder does not
exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by
one of the parties or both parties psychological incapacity. In the case at
bar, however, even without the experts conclusions, the factual
antecedents (narrative
of
events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to
the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential marital obligations. In the instant case, respondents
pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to
perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic
financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed
business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job
that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges
of estafa.

TORING vs. TORING
G.R. No. 165321
August 3,
2010
Facts:
Petitioner Ricardo P. Toring was introduced to Teresita M. Toring in
1978 at his aunts house in Cebu. Teresita was then his cousins teacher in
Hawaiian dance and was conducting lessons at his aunts house. They
became sweethearts after three months of courtship and eloped soon after,
hastened by the bid of another girlfriend, already pregnant, to get Ricardo
to marry her.
Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978 before Hon.

Remigio Zari of the City Court of Quezon City. They begot three children:
Richardson, Rachel Anne, and Ric Jayson.
On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding,

Ricardo filed a petition for annulment before the RTC. He claimed that
Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the
celebration of their marriage. Before the RTC, Ricardo offered in evidence
their marriage contract; the psychological evaluation and signature of his
expert witness, psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran, and his and Dr. Albarans
respective testimonies.
Ricardo alleged that Teresita was an adulteress and a squanderer

that she was very extravagant, materialistic, controlling and demanding. He
was an overseas seaman, and he regularly sent money to his wife to cover
the familys living expenses and their childrens tuition. However, not only
did she fail at paying the rent, utilities and other living expenses, she also
she incurred debts from other people and failed to remit amounts collected
as sales agent of a plasticware and cosmetics company. Also, during one of
his visits to the country, he noticed that Teresitas stomach was slightly
bigger. He tried to convince her to have a medical examination but she
refused. Her miscarriage five months into her pregnancy confirmed his
worst suspicions. Ricardo alleged that the child could not have been his, as
his three instances of sexual contact with Teresita were characterized by
withdrawals; other than these, no other sexual contacts with his wife
transpired, as he transferred and lived with his relatives after a month of
living with Teresita in Cebu. Ricardo reported, too, of rumors that his wife
represented herself to others as single, and went out on dates with other
men when he was not around.
Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran diagnosed Teresita with Narcissistic Personality

Disorder.
Issue:
Whether or not Teresita should be deemed
incapacitated to comply with essential marital obligations.
psychologically
Ruling:
No. Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation merely relied on Ricardo
and Richardsons testimonies. The mere narration of the statements of
Ricardo and Richardson, coupled with the results of the psychological
tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, does not constitute
sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder. Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come
from persons intimately related to them, such as relatives, close friends or
even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the allegedly
incapacitated spouses condition at or about the time of marriage, or to
subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already
present at the time of marriage. Richardson, the spouses eldest son, would
not have been a reliable witness as he could not have been expected to
know what happened between his parents until long after his birth. He
merely recounted isolated incidents. The root cause must be alleged and not
just the manifestations during the marriage described as refusal,
difficulty or neglect.

LIGERALDE vs. PATALINGHUG
G.R. No. 168796
April 15,
2012
Facts:
Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. They were blessed
with four children. Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home at 4:00
oclock in the morning. Her excuse was that she had watched a video
program in a neighboring town, but admitted later to have slept with her
Palestinian boyfriend in a hotel. In the midst of these, Silvinos deep love for
her, the thought of saving their marriage for the sake of their children, and
the commitment of May to reform dissuaded him from separating from
her. He still wanted to reconcile with her. May was back again to her old
ways. This was demonstrated when Silvino arrived home one day and
learned that she was nowhere to be found. He searched for her and found
her in a nearby apartment drinking beer with a male lover. Later, May
confessed that she had no more love for him. They then lived separately.
Silvino referred the matter to Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio for psychological
evaluation. The psychologist certified that May was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations; that the
incapacity started when she was still young and became manifest after
marriage; and that the same was serious and incurable. On October 22,
1999, the RTC declared the marriage of Silvino and May null and void. The
Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess jurisdiction.
(b)Whether or not May is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. On procedural grounds, the Court agrees with the public
respondent that the petitioner should have filed a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 instead of this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
For having availed of the wrong remedy, this petition deserves outright
dismissal.In order to avail of the special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petitioner must clearly show that the
public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction. By grave abuse of
discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion and hostility. In sum, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to
lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary or whimsical exercise of power.
These were not proven in the close scrutiny of the records.
No. (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,

sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the
incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of
the marriage; (4) such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable; and (5) such illness must be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage (Republic v. Court of Appeals). The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its
incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the
evidence presented during trial. An adulterous life is not tantamount to
psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36. Petitioner must be
able to establish that respondent's unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a
disordered personality, which makes her completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state.

SUAZO vs. SUAZO
G.R. No. 164493
March 10,
2010
Facts:
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June
1985; they were residents of Laguna at that time. After months of
courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and some friends. Having
been gone for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and
after finding them, brought them back to Bian, Laguna. Soon thereafter,
Jocelyn and Angelitos marriage was arranged and they were married
on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Bian.
Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived
with Angelitos parents after their marriage. They had by this time stopped
schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for Angelitos relatives as
household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was most
of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels
often resulted because of Jocelyns efforts.
Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found
another woman with whom he has since lived. They now have children.
Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed
with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code, as amended. She claimed that Angelito was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. In addition to the above historical narrative of their relationship,
she alleged in her complaint that from the start of their marriage until their
separation in July 1987, their relationship has been marred with bitter
quarrels that caused unbearable physical and emotional pain inflicted upon
by Angelito; that one of the main reasons for their quarrels was Angelitos
refusal to work, his indolence and excessive drinking; and that Angelitos
psychological incapacity started at the time of their marriage and proves to
be continuous, permanent and incurable.
In the RTC, Jocelyn reiterated the incidents of her physical beating by

Angelito but told the Court that she was not treated violently before the
marriage. Maryjane Serrano, Jocelyns aunt, corroborated Jocelyns
testimony. The psychologist testified that Angelito haed Chronic Antisocial
Disorder which was permanent and incurable. The RTC annulled the
marriage on the grounds provided by Santos v. Court of Appeals. The CA
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Angelito is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. Both the psychologists testimony and the psychological report did
not conclusively show the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelitos
alleged psychological condition. The psychologist derived all her
conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause
cannot of course be doubted. Jocelyn merely testified on Angelitos habitual
drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical
beatings she received from him all of which occurred after the marriage.
Significantly, she declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no
signs of violent behavior, assuming this to be indicative of a personality
disorder, during the courtship stage or at the earliest stages of her
relationship with him. She testified on the alleged physical beatings after
the marriage, not before or at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. She did not clarify when these beatings exactly took place
whether it was near or at the time of celebration of the marriage or months
or years after. This is a clear evidentiary gap that materially affects her
cause, as the law and its related jurisprudence require that the
psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while
indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show
psychological incapacity. Standing alone, physical violence does not
constitute psychological incapacity.

ASPILLAGA vs. ASPILLAGA
G.R. No. 170925
October
26, 2009
Facts:
Rodolfo Aspillaga met Aurora Apon sometime in 1977 while they
were students at the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy and Lyceum of
the Philippines, respectively. Rodolfo courted her and five months later, they
became sweethearts. Thereafter, Aurora left for Japan to study Japanese
culture, literature and language. Despite the distance, Rodolfo and Aurora
maintained communication.
In 1980, after Aurora returned to the Philippines, she and Rodolfo got
married. They begot two children, but Rodolfo claimed their marriage was
tumultuous. He described Aurora as domineering and frequently
humiliated him even in front of his friends. He complained that Aurora was
a spendthrift as she overspent the family budget and made crucial family
decisions without consulting him. Rodolfo added that Aurora was tactless,
suspicious, given to nagging and jealousy as evidenced by the latters filing
against him a criminal case (concubinage) and an administrative case. He
left the conjugal home, and filed on March 7, 1995, a petition for annulment
of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part
of Aurora. He averred that Aurora failed to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage.
Aurora, for her part, alleged that sometime in 1991, Rodolfo gave her
a plane ticket to Japan to enable her to assume her teaching position in a
university for a period of three months. In August 1991, upon her return
to Manila, she discovered that while she was in Japan, Rodolfo brought into
their conjugal home her cousin, Lecita Rose A. Besina, as his
concubine. Aurora alleged that Rodolfos cohabitation with her cousin led
to the disintegration of their marriage and their eventual separation. In
May 1992, Rodolfo abandoned their conjugal home to live with
Besina. Aurora claimed custody of the children.
Psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Eduardo Maaba revealed that both
parties suffered psychological handicaps traced from unhealthy
maturational development. Both had strict, domineering, disciplinarian role
models. However, respondents mistrust, shallow heterosexual relationships
resulted in incapacitation in her ability to comply with the obligation of
marriage. RTC found the parties psychologically incapacitated. The CA
reversed and set aside the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the parties are psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. Psychological incapacity is not mere difficulty, refusal, or
neglect. Noteworthy, as aptly pointed out by the appellate court, Rodolfo
and Aurora initially had a blissful marital union for several years. They
married in 1982, and later affirmed the ceremony in church rites in 1983,
showing love and contentment with one another after a year of
marriage. The letter of petitioner dated April 1, 1990 addressed to
respondent revealed the harmonious relationship of the couple continued
during their marriage for about eight years from the time they married each
other.
From this, it can be inferred that they were able to faithfully comply
with their obligations to each other and to their children. Aurora was
shown to have taken care of her children and remained faithful to her
husband while he was away. She even joined sales activities to augment the
family income. She appeared to be a very capable woman who traveled a
lot and pursued studies here and abroad. It was only when Rodolfos acts of
infidelity were discovered that the marriage started to fail. While
disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects
of ones marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a

ground to declare a marriage null and void. At this juncture while this Court
is convinced that indeed both parties were both found to have psychological
disorders, nevertheless, there is nothing in the records showing that these
disorders are sufficient to declare the marriage void due to psychological
incapacity. Incurability was not proven. Incompatibility or irreconcilable
differences could not be equated with psychological incapacity.

ALCAZAR vs. ALCAZAR
G.R. No. 174451
13, 2009
October
Facts:
Petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar alleged in her Complaint that
she was married to respondent Rey C. Alcazar on 11 October 2000 by Rev.
Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the latters residence. After their
wedding, petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondents parents. Thereafter, the
newlyweds went back to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner
at
the
latters
abode
at 2601-C
Jose
Abad
Santos
Avenue,
Tondo, Manila. On 23
October
2000,
respondent
left
for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in
a furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not
communicate with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call
respondent for five times but respondent never answered. About a year and
a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner that
respondent was about to come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was
surprised why she was not advised by respondent of his arrival.
Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent
arrived in the Philippines, the latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C
Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to
his parents house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that
respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner went to see her
brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was not
aware of respondents whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent had been
living with his parents since his arrival in March 2002.
Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in
the Philippines, he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that
respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with
her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to
paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family
Code). There was also no more possibility of reconciliation between
petitioner and respondent.
During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita
Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and clinical psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag)
as witnesses. The psychologist diagnosed the respondent to have
Narcissistic Personality Disorder. The RTC denied petitioners complaint for
annulment of her marriage. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but
was denied. The CA affirmed RTCs decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Rey is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. Article 46 of the Family Code contemplates an annulment of
marriage on the ground ofincapacity to consummate specifically denoting
the permanent disability on the spouses to perform and complete the act of
sexual intercourse. What petitioner was actually seeking was the
declaration of nullity of marriage contemplated by Article 36 of the Family
Code. Nevertheless, Article 36should refer, rather, to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
Petitioners evidence, particularly her and her mothers testimonies, merely
established that respondent left petitioner soon after their wedding to work
in Saudi Arabia; that when respondent returned to the Philippines a year
and a half later, he directly went to live with his parents in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, and not with petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that
respondent also did not contact petitioner at all since leaving for
abroad. These testimonies though do not give us much insight into
respondents psychological state. Tayag, in evaluating respondents
psychological state, had to rely on information provided by petitioner.
Hence, we expect Tayag to have been more prudent and thorough in
her evaluation of respondents psychological condition, since her source of
information, namely, petitioner, was hardly impartial. The psychologist
failed to trace Reys experiences in childhood, did not describe the pattern
of behavior that led her to conclude that, indeed, Rey was suffering from
Narcissistic Personality disorder; and did not relate how this rendered him
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal, or a neglect in
the performance of some marital obligations.

NAJERA vs. NAJERA
G.R. No. 164817
July 3, 2009
Facts:
On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal
Separation, with Application for Designation as Administrator Pendente
Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains.Petitioner alleged that she and
respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is
presently living in the United States of America (U.S.A). They were married
on January 31, 1988. They are childless. Petitioner claimed that at the time
of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of the
marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after marriage.
On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Orderterminating the pre-trial
conference after the parties signed a Formal Manifestation/Motion, which
stated that they had agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership of gains
and divide equally their conjugal properties.Psychologist Cristina Gates
testified that the chances of curability of respondents psychological
disorder were nil. Its curability depended on whether the established
organic damage was minimal -- referring to the malfunction of the
composites of the brain brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana,
which possibly afflicted respondent with borderline personality disorder and
uncontrollable impulses.Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the
PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan, testified that on July 3, 1994, he received a
complaint from petitioner that respondent arrived at their house under the
influence of liquor and mauled petitioner without provocation on her part,
and that respondent tried to kill her. The complaint was entered in the
police blotter.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of petitioners evidence was able to prove

that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the totality
of the evidence submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage .The root cause of respondents alleged
psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

HALILI vs. SANTOS- HALILI
G.R. No. 165424
June 9, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner and the respondent married on July 4, 1995 at the City Hall
of Manila. After the wedding, they continued to live with their respective
parents and never lived together but maintained their relationship
nonetheless.Petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City a
petition for the nullity of their marriage on the ground that the respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations.
He also pointed out that they never lived together as husband and wife and
they never consummated their marriage. On April 17, 1998, the Regional
Trial Court declared thatthe marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent is null and void. The respondents appealed to the Court of
Appeals, on January 26, 2004. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside
the decision of the Regional Trial Court on the ground that totality of
the evidence presented failed to established petitioner's psychological
incapacity. The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court for
reconsideration. On June 9, 2009, the Supreme Court set aside the decision
of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the decision of the Regional Trial
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented is sufficient to prove
that the petitioner suffered from psychological incapacitywhich effectively
prevented him to comply from his essential marital obligations.
Ruling:
Yes, because ultimately the psychologist sufficiently established that
petitioner had psychological condition that was grave andincurable and had
a deeply rooted cause and that already existed at the time of the celebration
of his marriage to the respondent.

PARAS vs. PARAS
G.R. No 147824
August 2, 2007
Facts:
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J.
Paras in Bindoy, Negros Oriental. They begot four (4)children, namely:
Raoul (deceased), Cindy Rose (deceased), Dahlia, and Reuel. Twenty-nine
(29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993,Rosa filed with the Regional Trial
Court a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo,under Article
36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She was then a
student of San Carlos University, Cebu City. He courted her, frequently
spending time at her "Botica." Eventually, in 1964, convinced that he loved
her, she agreed to marry him. Their wedding was considered one of the
"most celebrated" marriages in Bindoy. Sometime in 1975, their daughter
Cindy Rose was afflicted with leukemia. It was her family who paid for her
medication. Also in 1984, their son Raoul was electrocuted while Justo was
in their rest house with his "barkadas." He did not heed her earlier advice to
bring Raoul in the rest house as the latter has the habit of climbing the
rooftop. To cope with the death of the children, the entire family went to the
United States. However, after three months, Justo abandoned them and
left for the Philippines. Upon her return to the Philippines, she was shocked
to find her "Botica" and other businesses heavy in debt and he disposed
without her consent a conjugal piece of land. At other times, he permitted
the municipal government to take gasoline from their gas station free of
charge. His act of maintaining a mistress and siring an illegitimate child
was the last straw that prompted her to file the present case. She found that
after leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching.
Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a babygirl, Cyndee Rose,
obviously named after her (Rosa) and Justos deceased daughter Cindy Rose
Paras.
He also denied forging her signature in one mortgage transaction. He
maintained that he did not dispose of a conjugal property and that he and
Rosa personally signed the renewal of a sugar crop loan before the
banks authorized employee. He did not abandon his family in the United
States. For his part, he was granted only three (3) months leave as
municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus, he immediately returned to
the Philippines. He spent for his childrens education. At first, he resented
supporting them because he was just starting his law practice and besides,
their conjugal assets were more than enough to provide for their needs. He
admitted though that there were times he failed to give them financial
support because of his lack of income. What caused the inevitable family
break-out was Rosas act of embarrassing him during his birthday
celebration in 1987. She did not prepare food for the guests. When
confronted, she retorted that she has nothing to do with his birthday. This
convinced him of her lack of concern. This was further aggravated when she
denied his request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in a
mountainous and NPA-infested area. As to the charge of concubine, he
alleged that Jocelyn Ching is not his mistress, but her secretary in his Law
Office. She was impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain GrelleLeccioness.
Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.
After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision
upholding the validity of the marriage. On December 8, 2000, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the present case, holding that "the
evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the standards required by law
to decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justos alleged defects
oridiosyncrasies "were sufficiently explained by the evidence," Rosa
contends that this Courts factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 fordisbarment
are conclusive on the present case. Consequently, the Court of Appeals
erred in rendering contrary factual findings. Also, she argues that she filed
the instant complaint sometime in May, 1993
Issues:
a) Whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are
conclusive on the present case;
b) Whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert
testimony on the root cause of Justos alleged psychologicalincapacity
is necessary; and
c) Whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological
incapacity on the part of Justo.
Ruling:
A reading of the Court of Appeals Decision shows that she has no
reason to feel aggrieved. In fact, the appellate court evenassumed that her
charges "are true," but concluded that they are insufficient to declare the
marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Justo's alleged
infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged abandonment of their
family home are true,such traits are at best indicators that he is unfit to
become an ideal husband and father. However, by themselves, these
grounds areinsufficient to declare the marriage void due to an incurable
psychological incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do
notmanifest that he was truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants
that he must assume and discharge as a married person. Whilethey may
manifest the "gravity" of his alleged psychological incapacity, they do
not necessarily show incurability, such that while hisacts violated the
covenants of marriage, they do not necessarily show that such acts show an
irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which prevents him
from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the future.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically

or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts, and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacitymust be psychological -- not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince thecourt that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known
theobligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of suchincapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis, neverthelesssuch root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may begiven by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.

ZAMORA vs. ZAMORA
G.R. No. 141917
February 7,
2007
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent were married on June 4, 1970 in Cebu City.
After their marriage, they lived together at No. 50-AGorordo Avenue, Cebu
City. The union did not produce any child. In 1972, private respondent left
for the United States to work as anurse. She returned to the Philippines for
a few months, and then left again in 1974. Thereafter, she made periodic
visits to Cebu Cityuntil 1989, when she was already a U.S. citizen. Petitioner
filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage anchored on
thealleged "psychological incapacity" of private respondent, as provided for
under Article 36 of the Family Code. To support his position,he alleged that
his wife was "horrified" by the mere thought of having children as evidenced
by the fact that she had not bornepetitioner a child. Furthermore, he also
alleged that private respondent abandoned him by living in the United
States and had in fact become an American citizen; and that throughout
their marriage they lived together for not more than three years.
Respondentdenied that she refused to have a child. She portrayed herself as
one who loves children as she is a nurse by profession and that shewould
from time to time borrow her husbands niece and nephews to care for
them. She also faulted her husband for the breakup of their marriage,
alleging that he had been unfaithful to her. He allegedly had two affairs with
different women, and he begot at leastthree children with them. On June 22,
1995, the trial court rendered its decision. The plaintiff consented
to defendants trip to theUnited States in 1974. She [defendant] wanted to
earn money there because she wanted to help her husband build a big
house at theBeverly Hills, Cebu City. The plaintiff himself admitted that he
has a
child,
and
the
court
is also
convinced
that
he
has
two children.However, nothing in the evidence of plaintiff shows that
the defendant suffered from any psychological incapacity or that she failed
tocomply with her essential marital obligations. There is no evidence of
psychological incapacity on the part of defendant so that shecould not carry
out the ordinary duties required in married life. Neither has it been shown
that there was an incurable defect on thepart of defendant.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapplied facts of weight and
substance affecting the result of the present case;
b) Whether or not the presentation of psychologists and/or psychiatrists
is still desirable, if evidence in this case already showsthe
psychological incapacity of private respondent;
c) Whether or not private respondents refusal to live with petitioner

under one roof for more than twenty (20) years, her refusalto bear
children with petitioner, and her living a solitary life in the United
States for almost three (3) decades are enough indications
of psychological incapacity to comply with essential marital
obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
The Courts merely said in that case that "the well-considered opinions
of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons withexpertise in psychological
disciplines might be helpful or even desirable." However, no expert opinion
is helpful or even desirable todetermine whether private respondent has
been living abroad and away from her husband for many years; whether
she has a child;and whether she has made her residence abroad permanent
by acquiring U.S. citizenship.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by
any party who, at the time of the celebration, waspsychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if suchincapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.
A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege
the complete facts showing that either or both partieswere psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of
marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its celebration.

FERRARIS vs. FERRARIS
G.R. No. 162368
July 17,
2006
Facts:
Armida and Brix are a showbiz couple. The couples relationship
before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well about a year
or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, Armida
was happy and contented with her life in the company of Brix. Armida even
admits that Brix was a responsible and loving husband. Their problems
began when Armida started doubting Brix fidelity. It was only when they
started fighting about the calls from women that Brix began to withdraw
into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital
obligations. Brix could not understand Armidas lack of trust in him and her
constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Brix could not
relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. Armida presented a psychological
expert (Dr. Dayan) who finds Brix to be a schizoid and a dependent and
avoidant type. This is evidenced by Brixs leaving-the-house attitude
whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks,
the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his
preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family.
Issue:
How shall psychological incapacity be proven?
Ruling:
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to aserious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanentas to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies,
or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders,
there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this
reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its
understanding of the human personality. However, the rootcause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must
be fully explained, which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.Quite
apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioners evidence showed that
respondents alleged failure to perform his so-called marital obligations was
not at all a manifestation of some deep-seated, grave, permanent and
incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the couples relationship before

the marriage and even during their brief union (for well about a year or so)
was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was
happy and contented with her life in the company of respondent.
Infact, by petitioners own reckoning, respondent was a
responsible and
loving
husband.
Their
problems
began
when
petitionerstarted doubting respondents fidelity. It was only when they
started fighting about the calls from women that respondent began
towithdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so- called
marital obligations. Respondent could not understandpetitioners lack of
trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions
irrational. Respondent could not relate to heranger, temper and jealousy.At
any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that
respondent has a mixed personality disorder called"schizoid," and why he is
the "dependent and avoidant type." Notably, when asked as to the root
cause of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayans answer
was vague, evasive andinconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can be
part of his family upbringing" She stated that there was a history
of respondents parents having difficulties in their relationship. But this
input on the supposed problematic history of respondentsparents also came
from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was really
"a natal or supervening disablingfactor" on the part of respondent, or
an "adverse integral element" in respondents character that effectively
incapacitated him fromaccepting, and, thereby complying with,
the essential marital obligations. We find respondents alleged mixed
personality
disorder,
the
"leaving-the-house"
attitude
whenever
they quarreled, the violenttendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual
infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to
spend moretime with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal orunwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
While petitioners marriage with the respondent failed and appears to
be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy however isnot always to have
it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An
unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not anull and void marriage. No less
than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of
the family; it decreesmarriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to
be"protected" by the state. Petition dismissed with finality.

ANTONIO vs. REYES
G.R. No. 155800
March 10, 2006
Facts:
Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of
age met in 1989. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married at
Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at Pasig in
December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months later. Reyes
persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other events or things. She even did
not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented to her
husband as adopted child of their family. They were separated in August
1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good in
November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his
marriage with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Issue:
Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for
declaring their marriage null and void.
Ruling:
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the

obligations of marriage as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them.
The petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a psychiatrist and
clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy
of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on
his wifes behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity.
Respondents fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of
fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that
made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of
giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes
psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that
was sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of respondents
psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause
was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their
consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit
the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and
respect. Furthermore, Reyes case is incurable considering that petitioner
tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remain unchanged.
Hence, the court concludes that petitioner has established his cause
of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs. SIAYNGCO
G.R. No. 158896
October 27, 2004
Facts:
Juanita Carating-Siayngco was married to Manuel Siayngco. Their
marriage did not produce children however, the adopted a boy. Manuel,
after being married for 24 years filed a petition to the court seeking the
nullification of their marriage by reason of psychological incapacity
exhibited through over domineering attitude and causing him
embarrassment and humiliation. The lower court denied his petition. The
CA on the other hand reversed the decision relying on the doctors findings
that both parties are psychologically incapacitated.
Issue:
Whether or not one or both of the parties were proven psychologically
incapacitated sufficient to warrant the nullification of their marriage.
Ruling:
The court ruled in the negative. Manuels relationship with another
was caused merely by his sexual infidelity which does not fall within the
purview of psychological incapacity. This action caused by his desire to have
children which he himself admitted. The testimonies of the doctor failed to
show that this infidelity is caused by a psychological illness or disorder. It is
necessary that it his by reason of a psychological disorder that he will be
completely unable to perform his marital obligations. With regard to
Juanita, Manuel failed to show that her actions constitute psychological
incapacity that would render her unable to perform her marital obligations
and that a doctor has in fact stated otherwise. The evidence adduced failed
to show sufficiently that the couple or either of the spouse were
psychologically incapacitated, rather it showed that they were merely
having the marital trouble of becoming strangers to each other and wanting
to get out of it. The marriage thus cannot be declared null and void

VILLALON vs. VILLALON
G.R. No. 167206
2005
November 18,
Facts:
On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition for the
annulment of his marriage to respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City where it was docketed as JDRC No. 3917
and raffled to Branch 69. As ground therefor, petitioner cited his
psychological incapacity which he claimed existed even prior to his
marriage.On September 25, 1996, respondent filed an answerdenying
petitioners allegations. She asserted that her 18-year marriage to
petitioner has been fruitful and characterized by joy, contentment and
hopes for more growth in their relationship and that their marital
squabbles were normal based on community standards. Petitioners success
in his professional life aided him in performing his role as husband, father,
and provider. Respondent claimed that petitioners commitment to his
paternal and marital responsibilities was beyond reproach.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to
testify on his alleged psychological disorder of Narcissistic Histrionic
Personality Disorder with Casanova Complex. Dr. Dayan described the
said disorder as a pervasive maladaptation in terms of interpersonal and
occupational functioning with main symptoms of grand ideation about
oneself, self-centeredness, thinking he is unique and wanting to always be
the one followed, the I personality. A person afflicted with this disorder
believes that he is entitled to gratify his emotional and sexual feelings and
thus engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person with Casanova
Complex exhibits habitual adulterous behavior and goes from one
relationship to another.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate courts
decision which was denied in an order dated October 28, 2004. Thus,
petitioner took this recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, asserting
that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that he failed to prove his
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Villalon is null and void on the
grounds of psychological incapacity of the husband.
Ruling:
No, the totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding
that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital
obligations. On the contrary, what is evident is the fact that petitioner was a
good husband to respondent for a substantial period of time prior to their
separation, a loving father to their children and a good provider of the
family. Although he engaged in marital infidelity in at least two occasions,
the same does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological
disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal
obligations. The same appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction
with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in petitioners
personal history. The petition has no merit.

BUENAVENTURA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 127358
March 31, 2005
Facts:
July 12 1992, Noel Buenaventura filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground that he and his wife were psychologically
incapacitated. The Regional Trial Court in its decision declared the
marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.
The court ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership
property; ordered petitioner a regular support in favor of his son in the
amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises,
and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother. Petitioner
appealed before the Court of Appeals and while the appeal was pending, the
Court of Appeals, upon respondents motion issued a resolution increasing
the support pendants like to P20, 000. The Court of Appeals dismissal
petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision.
Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.
Ruling:
The general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void
ab initio, the property regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and
distributed is that of equal co-ownership. Since the properties ordered to be
distributed by the court were there, both by the Regional Trial Court and
the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties,
the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate
property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in
said distribution.

REPUBLIC vs. QUINTERO-HAMANO
GR No. 149498
May 20, 2004
Facts:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of
nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the
ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a common-law
relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter,
Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then
gave birth on November 16, 1987. In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in
MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage, Toshio returned to
Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with
his family. Toshio sent money for two months and after that he stopped
giving financial support. She wrote him several times but never
respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the
country but did not bother to see her nor their child.
Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons
issued to him remained unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex
parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The
motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of the
petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio
15 days to file his answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days
from publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer the case to the
prosecutor for investigation.
Issue:
Whether or not abandonment
by
one
spouse
tantamount
to
Ruling:
The court find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of
proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible
but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological
illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no
other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a
psychological disorder.
Abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no
showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the
context of legal separation. It cannot presume psychological defect from the
mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the
celebration of the marriage. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to
meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he

must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not
physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and
complying with the obligations essential to marriage. In proving
psychological incapacity, the court finds no distinction between an alien
spouse and a Filipino spouse. It cannot be lenient in the application of the
rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated
happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to
determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies
of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining
psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of
nationality.
DEDEL vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 151867
January
29, 2004
Facts:
David Dedel and Sharon Corpuz were married on September 28, 1996
and May 20, 1967 in a civil and church wedding, respectively. They had four
children. David instituted a case for the nullity of their marriage on account
of Sharons psychological incapacity to perform basic marital obligations.
He claimed that Sharon had extra-marital affairs with several men including
a dentist in the AFP, a lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command, and
a Jordanian national. Despite the treatment by a clinical psychiatrist,
Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian, whom she
married and with whom she had two children. When the Jordanian national
left the country, Sharon returned to David bringing along her two children
by the Jordanian national. David accepted her back and even considered the
illegitimate children as his own. However, Sharon abandoned David to join
the Jordanian national with her two children. Since then, Sharon would only
return to the country on special occasions. Dra. Natividad Dayan testified
that she conducted a psychological evaluation of David and found him to be
conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks
and projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in
whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dra. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering
from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of
infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for
remorse even bringing with her the two children of the Jordanian to live
with David. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage
like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are
indications of the said disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. The trial court declared their
marriage null and void on the ground of the psychological incapacity of
Sharon to perform the essential obligations of marriage. While the Court of
Appeals set aside the trial courts judgment and ordered the dismissal of the
petition. Davids motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, he appealed
to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Sharons infidelity is equivalent to psychologically
incapacity.
Ruling:
No. Sharons infidelity is not equivalent to psychologically incapacity.
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental, not physical,
incapacity that causes a party to be truly in cognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. The law intended to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Sharons sexual
infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.
Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated
with psychological incapacity.
It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality, which make the respondent completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth,
immaturity or sexual promiscuity. At best, the circumstances relied upon
by David are grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code not for declaring a marriage void. The grounds for legal separation,
which need not be rooted in psychological incapacity, include physical
violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like. Decision affirmed.
Petition is denied.

REPUBLIC v. DAGDAG
G.R. No. 109975
February 9,
2001
Facts:
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino
Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church
in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of on October 20, 1988. Erlinda
and Avelino begot two children. The birth certificates were issued by the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva
Ecija also on October 20, 1988. A week after the wedding, Avelino started
leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months,
suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then disappear again. During the
times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with
friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to
sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries to
her.
In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that
they heard from him. Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some
crime, and that he escaped from jail and remains at large to-date. In July
1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by
publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation. On
the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel
appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law as her only
witness.
The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor
until January 2, 1991 to manifest in writing whether or not he would present
controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said
manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The
Investigating Prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there
was no collusion between the parties.
However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of
evidence. Without waiting for the investigating prosecutors manifestation,
the trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under
Article 36. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside
Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since
he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting
controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is
not in accordance with the evidence and the law. Since the trial court
denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed to
the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that Avelino
Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to
perform the duties and obligations of a married person but because he is
emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.
Issue:
Whether or not Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated.
Ruling:
Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag contracted marriage on
September 7, 1975. They begot two children. A week after the wedding,
Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would from time
to time, disappear and suddenly reappear for a few months. He was always
drunk and would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and inflict
physical injuries on her if she refused. On October 1993, he left his family
and was never heard from him again. Erlinda was forced to work and
learned that Avelino was imprisoned and that he escaped from jail. Erlinda
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the grounds
of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons
was served by publication. Upon trial, Erlinda presented Virginia Dagdag
who attested to the psychological incapacity of Avelino. The trial court
rendered a decision in favor of respondent without waiting for the
prosecutors manifestation. The Court of Appeals affirmed trials court
decision. The court contented that Erlinda failed to comply with guideline
No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be
medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no
psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological
incapacity of her husband. Furthermore, the allegation that the husband is a
fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. The investigating
prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controversy
evidence since the trial courts decision was prematurely rendered.

PESCA vs. PESCA
G. R. No. 136921
17, 2001
April
Facts:
The case at bar is a petition for certiorari of the Decision of the Court
of
Appeals.
Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a union that begot four
children. She contends that respondent surprisingly showed signs of
psychological incapacity to perform his marital obligations starting 1988.
His true color of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible
husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was
a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 oclock in the
afternoon until 1:00 oclock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at
least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At
one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill
her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not
spared from physical violence.
Petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house
of her sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways.
Two months later, she returned home to give him a chance to change. But,
to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. On the morning of 22
March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the
presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. He was
imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries.
Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity.
The trial court declared their marriage to be null and void ab initio on the
basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of
Appeals, which in turn reversed the decision of the trial court. Thus, the
marriage of respondent and petitioner still subsists.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the appellate court erred in reversing the decision of
the trial court.
b) Whether or not the guidelines in the case of Republic vs. Court of
Appeals and Molina should be taken to be merely advisory and not
mandatory in nature.
Ruling:
The appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there was
absolutely no evidence showed and proved by petitioner the psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent. Article 36 of the Code has not been
meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. Psychological incapacity,
as laid down in the case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals and further
explained in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, refer to no less than
a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
The doctrine of stare decisis, ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code,
expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal
maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The
interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted
and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the
statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself
later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may
have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the
old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the
familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit. The petition was denied.
GROUNDS FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE

MALLION vs. ALCANTARA
GR No. 141528
October 31, 2006
Facts:
Oscar Mallion filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court seeking a
declaration of nullity oh his marriage with Editha Alcantara due to
psychological incapacity. The RTC denied the petition. As the decision
attained finality, Mallion filed another petition for a declaration of nullity of
marriage, this time alleging that his marriage was null and void due to
the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license.
Issue:
Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of
nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition
for declaration of nullity on the grounds ogf lack of marriage license?
Ruling:
Res judicataapplies.
Mallion is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of acti
on which is the nullity of marriage. When the second case was filed based
on another ground, there is a splitting of a cause of action which
is prohibited. He is estopped from asserting that the first marriage had no
marriage license because in the first case he impliedly admitted the same
when he did not question the absence of a marriage license.
PROPER ACTION AND PROCEDURE FOR DECLARATION OF

NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
LEONOR vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R No. 112597
April 2, 1996
Facts:
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari assailing the validity of the
judgment of the lower court. It was shown that she was married to the
private respondent and they had three kids. While her husband was
studying and working abroad, he cohabited with another woman. This
prompted her to file for separation and alimony against her husband. Her
husband in return filed a divorce case against her in Swiss Courts,
contending that their marriage was void for absence of valid marriage
certificate. The Swiss Court held infavour of the private respondent.
Subsequently the Private Respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of
the marriage certificate in the Philippines. The trial court granted his
petition and denied Petitioners appeal. The Petitioner filed a special civil
action for certiorari in the CA, but the latter denied the same. She filed this
petition with the Supreme Court to assail the validity of CAs decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring the marriage null
and void?
Ruling:
Yes. Rule 108 as the basis of the private respondents contention is
untenable. The Court explained that the Rule only applies to cases
concerning typographical or other clerical errors in the marriage contract.
It does not apply to cases where the status of the parties and their children
shall be affected. The Supreme Court held in favour of the petitioner
contending that A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at
all.
PARTIES FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE

LLAVE vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 169766
30, 2011
March
Facts:
Around
11
months
before
his
death,
Sen.
Tamano
married Estrellita twice initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on
May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony
officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In
their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was indicated as
divorced. Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole
world as Sen. Tamanos wife, and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A.
Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own
behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamanos legitimate children with
Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the
declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for
being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda
on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained
subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.
Issue:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano
was bigamous.
Ruling:
Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zorayda and late Sen.
Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano
subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was
celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in
force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims
alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one
marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the
Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to
Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that
codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita.
Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to marriage and
divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is
a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or

this Code in any part of the Philippines. But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not
provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and
Muslim rites.

ENRICO vs. HEIRS OF MEDINACELI
G.R. No. 173614
28, 2007
September
Facts:
Spouses Uelogio Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-medicani were
married on June 14 1962. They had seven children, herein respondents.
Trinidad died on may 1 2004 and on august 26 2004, Eulogio marries
petitioner Lolita Enrico on february 10 2005. respondent filed an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage between Eulogio and Lolita on two
grounds:
1) that the marriage was entered into without the requisite marriage
license and
2) lack of a marriage ceremony due to Eulogio's illness.
Enrico contended that she has been living with Eulogio for 21 years
hence exempt from getting a marriage license under Art. 34 of the Family
Code. More importantly, she sought the dismissal of his action on the
ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an
action for the declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant to AM 02-11-10 SC
which provides in sec. 2 (a) that the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of a void marriage may be filled solely by the husband or the wife.
The heirs invoked the ruling in the case of Ninal vs. Bayadog.
Issue:
a) Whether or not the marriage between Eulogio and Enrico is exempt
from securing marriage license.
b) Whether or not the respondent heirs can assail the validity of said
marriage after the death of Eulogio.
Ruling:
Petition is dismissed.
Under Art. 34 of the family code, a man and a woman who have been
living together for at least five years without any legal impediments are
exempt from securing a marriage license. The said exemption cannot
possibly apply because the second marriage contracted by Eulogio with
Enrico took place barely 3 months after Trinidad dies. Moreover, the
respondent heirs have no standing to assail the validity of the second
marriage even after te death of their father, Eulogio.
While it is true that Ninal vs. Bayadog allowed the heirs therein to file
a petition for the declaration of nullity of the Father's 2nd marriage after
the death, the court held that the same rule cannot be applied for the
reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the family code.
Nonetheless, the heirs are not left without remedy. They can still
protect their successional rights as compulsory or intestate heirs of Eulogio
by questioning the validity of his second marriage with Enrico, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity, but in a proceeding for the settlement
of the estate deceased father filed in the regular courts.

CATALAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 167109
2007
February 6,
Facts:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June
4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United
States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After
38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988. On June
16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Petitioner contends that said marriage was bigamous since Merope
had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City
against Orlando and Merope.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of
bigamy?
Ruling:
A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other
actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest and must be based on a cause of action. A petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife. Petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of
marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce
decree and the foreign law allowing it. After all, she may have the
personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage
even after the divorce decree becomes absolute. We note that it was the
petitioner who alleged in her complaint that they acquired American
citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree.
It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and
mere allegation is not evidence
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of
additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando
was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted
the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce
decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos
remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents marriage as
bigamous and void ab initio.

NIAL vs. BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778
14, 2000
March
Facts:
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26,
1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to
her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year and 8 months
thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog
got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt
from securing a marriage license.
After Pepitos death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that
the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
Issue:
What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the
Civil Code (now Article 34 of the Family Code) to warrant the counting of
the 5-year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license.
Ruling:
The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back
from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union
had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should
be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.
Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first

spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of
absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.
In this case, at the time Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot
be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least
5 years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage
was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about 20
months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he
started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived
with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful
spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual
severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as husband
and wife.
Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is
not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is
void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
CARLOS vs. SANDOVAL
G.R. No. 179922
December 16, 2008
Facts:
Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who
each have three parcels of land by virtue of inheritance. Later Teofilo died
intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad Sandoval and their son,
Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilos death, two parcels of land were registered
in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August 1995, Carlos commenced
an action against respondents before the court a quo. In his complaint,
Carlos asserted that the marriage between his late brother and Felicidad
was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He
likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor
the adoptive father of Teofilo Carlos II. He argued that the properties
covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by
respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.
Issue:
a) Whether or not Court of Appeals should apply the Rule 35 of the Rules
of Court
b) Whether or not both parties should file for declaration of absolute

nullity of void marriages
Ruling:
The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be
proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is
allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed. Carlos argues that the CA
should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary
judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings. Petitioner is
misguided. Whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary
judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered
by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and
summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage and even in annulment of marriage
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be

filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases
commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2)
Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code. Under
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. A
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may
file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief
that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or
intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their
predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of
the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
PARTIES
ABLAZA vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 158298
August 11, 2010
Facts:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late
brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and
Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license
being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void
ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted
that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without
any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by
Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest;
and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the
marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the
death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.
Issue:
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother
Ruling:
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was
contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil
Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having
the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
Pursuant to the provisions of the old Civil Code, the presence of
descendants,
ascendants,
or
illegitimate
children
of
the
deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to
the deceased's estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to
bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano
had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate),
and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano's surviving heir.
The petition is returned to the RTC for further proceedings of the case.

VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN
G.R. No. 155409
June 8, 2007
Facts:
Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who
once had a blissful married life and out of which were blessed to have a son.
However, their once sugar coated romance turned bitter when petitioner
discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her
paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery
against private respondent and the latters paramour. Consequently, both
the private respondent and her paramour were convicted of the crime
charged and were sentenced to suffer an imprisonment ranging from one
(1) year, eight (8) months, minimum of prision correccional as minimum
penalty, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty one (21) days, medium
of prision correccional as maximum penalty.
Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains and Damages on June 15, 2001 with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 3 of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, docketed as Civil Case
No. 656, imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner.
During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent
entered into a Compromise Agreement. The said Compromise Agreement
was given judicial imprimatur by the respondent judge in the assailed
Judgment On Compromise Agreement, which was erroneously dated
January 2, 2002.
Issue:
Whether the partial voluntary separation of property made by the
spouses pending the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.
Ruling:
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance
shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the
subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due
notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to
the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is
disputed. Where a subsequent marriage is terminated because of the
reappearance of an absent spouse; while Article 63 applies to the effects of
a decree of legal separation. The present case involves a proceeding where
the nullity of the marriage is sought to be declared under the ground of

psychological capacity.
Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable. The
Compromise Agreement partially divided the properties of the conjugal
partnership of gains between the parties and does not deal with the validity
of a marriage or legal separation. It is not among those that are expressly
prohibited by Article 2035. Moreover, the contention that the Compromise
Agreement is tantamount to a circumvention of the law prohibiting the
guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing
law and jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification.
Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be
effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The
questioned Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved is exactly
such a separation of property allowed under the law. This conclusion holds
true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was
still pending. However, the Court must stress that this voluntary separation
of property is subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal
partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to
Article 136 of the Family Code.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORMA CUISON-MELGAR
G.R. No. 139676
March 31, 2006
Facts:
On March 27, 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married before the
Catholic Church in Dagupan City. Their union begot five children. On
August 19,1996, Norma filed for declaration of nullity of her marriage on
the ground of Eulogios psychological incapacity to comply with his
essential marital obligations. According to Norma the manifestations of
Eulogios psychological incapacity are his immaturity, habitual alcoholism,
unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, laziness, and abandonment of his family
since December 27, 1985.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is
in the nature contemplated by Article 36.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court set aside and reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals. The marriage between Norma and Eulogio is valid. The immaturity,
habitual alcoholism, laziness, jealousy and abandonment of respondent do
not constitute psychological incapacity. The Court ruled that it is not enough
to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable
of doing so because of some psychological, not physical, illness. In other
words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively

incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage had to be shown. A cause has to be
shown and linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.

FLORENCE MALCAMPO-SIN vs. PHILIPP T. SIN
G.R. No. 137590
March 26, 2001
Facts:
On January 4, 1987, Florence and respondent Philipp Sin, a
Portuguese citizen, were married at St. Jude Catholic Parish in San Miguel,
Manila. On September 20, 1994, Florence filed with the RTC, Pasig City, a
complaint for declaration of nullity of Marriage against Philipp. Trial
ensued and the parties presented their respective evidences.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in not ordering a prosecuting attorney
or fiscal on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
Ruling:
Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state
to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have

ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for his
agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records
are bereft of an evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of
the case thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals.

EMILIO R. TUASON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 116607
April 10, 1996
Facts:
Maria Victoria Lopez and Emilio Tuason were married on June 3,1972.
Lopez alleged that at the time of the marriage. Emilio was already
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations that became manifested afterwards. The same resulted in
violent fights. Emilio was also said to be using prohibited drugs, he was a
womanizer and gave minimal support to the family. Likewise, he became
spendthrift and abusive of his administration of the conjugal partnership by
alienating some of their assets without Victorias consent. Attempts for
reconciliation failed because Emilios refusal to reform. In the prayer of
Victoria for annulment of marriage, she further prayed for powers of

administration to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation. At
variance, Emilio denied the imputation against him. Thereafter, trial ensued
and Victoria presented four witnesses including documentary evidence
consisting of newspaper articles of Emilios relationship with other women,
his apprehension for illegal possession of drugs and copies of prior church
annulment decree. After Victoria rested her case, reception for Emilios
evidence was scheduled. It was postponed and on the reset date, he failed
to appear. The court then declared Emilio to have waived his right to
present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision.
On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the
nullity of Victorias marriage to Emilio and awarded custody of the children
to Ms. Lopez. Emilio filed a petition for relief from judgment but was
denied.
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under
the circumstance of the case where petitioner was declared in default due
to non-appearance during the hearing.
Ruling:
Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, governs a petition
for relief from judgment. Under the rules, a final and executor judgment or
order of the Regional Trial Court may be set aside on the ground of fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner must
assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense
or cause of action. If the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear
and determine the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted
therein. Furthermore, the failure of counsel to notify his client on time of an
adverse judgment to enable the latter to appeal there from is negligence
that is not excusable. Similarly inexcusable is the failure of a counsel to
inform the trial court of his clients confinement and medical treatment as
the reason for his non-appearance at the scheduled hearings. Indeed, a
petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy, allowed only in
exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy.

MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS vs. JUDGE WILFREDO G. OCHOTORENA
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861

July 30, 2004
Facts:
Mrs. Macias asserts before the Court that the respondent judge's
actuations constitute bias, partiality and conduct unbecoming a judge.
Moreover, according to her, what is more glaring and conclusive from the
records is that the respondent is grossly ignorant of the law and procedure.
For these administrative lapses, Mrs. Macias concludes that the Court
should sanction him.
The conclusion is amply supported by the Court of Appeals' Decision
which states that the respondent judge totally disregarded Mrs. Macias'
right to due process when he proceeded with the trial on the merits of the
case completely ignoring the fact that her Motion to Dismiss, which was
filed within the 30-day reglementary period, was still pending resolution.
The respondent judge disregarded the provisions of Section 1, Rule 18
of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, which states that: "After the last
pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the duty of the plaintiff to
promptly move ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial." Considering that
the last pleading was Mrs. Macias' Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge
should have first resolved the motion and then waited for Mr. Macias'
motion to set the case for pre-trial.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and incompetence.
Ruling:
Under Section 3 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, gross ignorance of the law is considered a serious offense, for which
a penalty of either dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits,
suspension from office for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six
(6) months or a fine of more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) but
not exceeding Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) may be imposed. With
this, Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of
the law and incompetence and is hereby FINED the amount of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be taken from the amount earlier withheld
from his retirement benefits. The Fiscal Management Office of the OCA is
DIRECTED to immediately release to the respondent judge the remaining
balance of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) from the aforesaid retained
amount, unless there are other valid reasons for its further retention.
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

PACETE vs. CARRIAGA
G.R. No. L-53880
March 17, 1994
Facts:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico
Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation
between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She
averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and
they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a
second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such
marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was
impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an
extension within which to file an answer, which the court partly granted.
Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the
defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter,
the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the
court forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs evidence during the
hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court
rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17, 1980.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying
petitioners motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring
petitioners in default and in rendering its decision.
Ruling:
The Civil Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In
case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties
exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for
the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not
fabricated.
The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state
attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of
annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is
more than a mere contract. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of
the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must
in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of
the petition, obviously in order to provide the parties a cooling-off
period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the
parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is
further or underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of
marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, if the defendant in an action
for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court
shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not collusion
between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the
State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. BOBIS
G.R. No. 138509
July 31, 2000
Facts:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one
Maria Dulce Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled the same
respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda MarbellaBobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain
Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioners complaint a n information for
bigamy was files against respondent. Sometime thereafter, respondent
initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his
first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage
license. Respondent filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the
criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case as a prejudicial
question.
Issue:
Whether or not the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity
of the marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the
criminal case of respondent
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ordered the Trial Court to immediately proceed
with the Criminal Case. A pending civil case is not a prejudicial question. A
prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. I t is a question based on a

fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.

TY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 127406
November 27, 2000
Facts:
In 1977, private respondent Edgardo Reyes married Ana Maria
Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony. A church wedding ensued. However,
the Juvenile and Domestic Relatives want to declare their marriage null and
void ab initio lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding was also
declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.
In 1979, before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna
Maria, Edgardo Reyes married Ofelia Ty in a ceremony officiated by a
judge, then a church wedding followed. In 1991, Edgardo reyes filed a civil
case with the Regional Trial Court praying that his marriage with Ofelia be
declared null and void on the ground that here was no marriage license
when they got married. He also averred at that time he married Ofelia, the
decree of nullity of the marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only when his
civil marriage to petitioner, Ofelia Ty, null and void ab initio. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision
Issue:
Whether or not the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required
before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly
Ruling:
The second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979,
before the case of Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in
Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon, wherein there was no need for judicial
declaration of nullity of a marriage for lack of license and consent, before
such person may contract a second marriage. The first marriage of private
respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for
judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second
marriage. In this case therefore, the Court concluded that private
respondents second marriage to Ofelia Ty is valid.
Moreover, the provision of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
applied where to do so would prejudice the vested rights of a party and her
children. As held in Jison versus Court of Appeals, the Family Code has
retroactive effect unless there is impairment of vested rights.
Petition
subsisting.
granted,
judgment
and
resolution
declared
valid
and
EFFECTS
VALDES vs. RTC AND VALDES
G.R. No. 122749
July 31, 1996
Facts:
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5, 1971.
Begotten during their marriage were five children. In a petition dated June
22, 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant
to article 36 of the Family Code. After hearing the parties following the
joinder of issues, the marriage of Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez is

declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground of
their mutual Psychological Incapacity to comply with their essential marital
obligations. The three older children shall choose which parent they would
want to stay with, the younger children shall be placed in the custody of
their mother. The petitioner and respondent are directed to start
proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties.
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification on that portion directing
compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted
that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in unions without marriage.
Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint
affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father Antonio Valdes.
Issue:
Whether the trial court failed to apply the correct law that should
govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation wherein a marriage
is declared null and null and void because of Psychological Incapacity on the
part of either or both parties to the contract.
Ruling:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage,
regardless of cause thereof, the property relation of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 137 or Article
148. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to
have obtained through their joint efforts.The rules set up to govern
liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of
gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages are
irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exist between
common-law spouses.
EFFECTS
ALAIN M. DIO vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIO
G.R. No. 178044

January 19, 2011
Facts:
Alain M. Dio and Ma. Caridad L. Dio were childhood friends and
sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to
separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live
together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor
Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias City. Petitioner filed an action for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against respondent. Extrajudicial service of summons
was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of the petition,
was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the
summons, respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the
reglementary period. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a
petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which was
granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also
learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V.
Alcantara. The Office of the Las Pias prosecutor found that there were no
indicative facts of collusion between the parties and the case was set for
trial on the merits. Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist,
submitted a psychological report establishing that respondent was suffering
from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her
system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondent's
disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable. In its 18 October 2006
Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent
was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital
obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court made mistake when it ordered that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties' properties.
Ruling:
Yes, petitioner's marriage to respondent was declared void under
Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. What governs
the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent
are the rules on co-ownership. The property relations of parties in a void
marriage during the period of cohabitation are governed either by Article
147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and
the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the
Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Partition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings. It is not necessary to
liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
FRAUD, ARTICLES 45 PARAGRAPH 3 AND 46, FC

G.R. No. 132955
October 27, 2006
Facts:
Respondent Villadores is one of the accused in the crime of Illegal
Falsification of Public Documents. It appears that petitioner Villanueva filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal against several parties and among them is
the IBC 13. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner. IBC 13
appealed to National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). IBC 13 filed a
surety bond but this document was found to be falsified. The two complaints
for falsification of document was brought before Manila prosecutors office
and dismissed the charges against Atty. Eulalio Diaz III and respondent
Villadores. The petitioned filed for review of the case with the DOJ, the
latter affirmed the dismissal of Atty. Diaz III but ordered the inclusion of
respondent Villadores as an accused in the two criminal cases. Accordingly,
the original informations were amended to include the respondent among
those charged. Following the arraignment, the private prosecutor, Rico and
Associates, filed a new Motion to Admit Amended Informations alleging
damages sustained by the petitioner as a result of the crimes committed by
the accused. The motion was admitted by the trial court. The respondent
moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Subsequently,
respondent moved for the disqualification of Rico and Associates and the
appellate court pronounced that petitioner did not sustain any damages for
the crime committed by the respondent and the same has redounded to his
benefit. Rico and Associates opposed such pronouncement since it is a mere
obiter dictum.
Issue:
Whether or not the pronouncement of appellate court that petitioner
Villanueva is not an offended party is a mere obiter dictum.
Ruling:
The pronouncement of appellate court that petitioner Villanueva is not
an offended party is not a mere obiter dictum. An adjudication on any point
within the issue presented by the case cannot be considered as obiter
dictum, and this rule applies to all pertinent questions, although incidentally
involved, which are presented and decided in the regular course of the
consideration of the case and led up to the final conclusion and to any
statement as to matter on which the decision is predicated. Hence, in the
instant case, the pronouncement of the appellate court is not an obiter
dictum as it touched upon a matter clearly raised by respondent Villadores
in his petition assailing the admission of the amended informations.
Argument on whether petitioner Villanueva was the offended party was,
thus, clearly raised by respondent. The body of decision contains the
discussion on that point and it clearly mentioned certain principles of law.

ANAYA vs. PALAROAN
G.R. No. L-27930
November 26, 1970
Facts:
Plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on December
4, 1953; that defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the
marriage on January 7, 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained
through force and intimidation. Fernando had divulged to Aurora that
several months prior to their marriage he had a pre-marital relationship
with a close relative of his; and that the non divulgement to her of the
aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part of the defendant that
definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail even
before it had hardly commencedPlaintiff herein from going thru the
marriage that was solemnized between them constituted FRAUD in
obtaining her consent, She prayed for the annulment of the marriage and
for moral damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his premarital relationship with anither woman is a ground for annulment of
marriage
Ruling:
Non-disclosure of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another
woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a
ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of
the Article, providing that no other misrepresentation or deceit as to

chastity shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage.

BUCCAT vs. MANGONON DE BUCCAT
G.R. NO. 47101
25, 1941
April
Facts:
On March 1938, Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat
first met, then they came engaged September of the same year. After few
months later, on November 26, 1938, they got married.However, after 89
days of their marriage dated February 23, 1939, Luida gave birth to a son.
After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life
with her. On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on
the grounds that when he agreed to married Luida, she assured him that
she was a virgin.
The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.
Issue:
Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccats marriage be granted on
the grounds that Luida concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?
Ruling:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage,
a sacred institution in which the State is interested and where society
rests.In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was
concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for annulment. It
was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect
anything about Luidas condition considering that she was in an advanced
stage of pregnancy (highly developed physical manifestation, ie. enlarged
stomach ) when they got married.
SC affirmed the lower courts decision. Costs to plaintiff-appellant.

G.R. No. 132955
October 27, 2006
Facts:
Respondent Villadores is one of the accused in the amended in
formations in Criminal Cases entitled, People of the Philippines v. Atty.
Tomas Bernardo, Roque Villadores, Alberto Adriano and Rolando Advincula
for Falsification of Public Document before the RTC of Manila. It appears
that petitioner Villanueva Jr. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
several parties among them IBC 13.When the labor arbiter ruled in favor of
petitioner Villaneva Jr. IBC 13 appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission. Thus the two complaints for falsification of public document
were filed before the Manila City Prosecutors Office. The charges against
Respondent Villadores and Atty. Eulalio Diaz 111 were dismissed by the City
Prosecutors Office.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in failing to appreciate that Francisco
Villanueva Jr. was in fact an aggrieved party.
Ruling:
Francisco Villanueva is not the offended party in these cases. It must
be underscored that it was IBC 13 who secured the falsified surety bond for
the purpose of the appeal it had taken from an adverse judgment of the
labor case filed by Villanueva. We see no reason how Villanueva could have
sustained damages as a result of the falsification of the surety appeal bond
and its confirmation letter when it could have redounded to his own benefit
if the appeal would be dismissed as a result of the forgery. If there be
anyone who was prejudiced, it was IBC 13 when it purchased a fake surety
bond.

MACCARUBO vs. MACCARUBO
A.C. No. 6148
February 27,
2004
Facts:
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Edmundo Maccarrubo.

Complainant Florencie Maccarrubo averred that she was started courting
by respondent Atty. Edmundo Maccarrubo in April 1991, he representing
himself as a bachelor; that they eventually contracted marriage which was
celebrated on two occasions administered by Rev. Rogelio J. Bolivar, the first
on December 18, 1991 in the latters Manila office, and the second on
December 28, 1991 at the Asian Institute of Tourism Hotel in Quezon City;
and that although respondent admitted that he was married to Helen
Esparza on June 16, 1982, he succeeded in convincing complainant, her
family and friends that his previous marriage was void. Complainant further
averred that respondent entered into a third marriage with one Josephine T.
Constantino; and that he abandoned complainant and their children without
providing them any regular support up to the present time, leaving them in
precarious living conditions. But respondent filed a petition for nullity of
marriage since it was contracted with vitiated consent.
Issue:
Whether or not the disbarment case be dismissed basing it from the
courts declaration of nullity of the marriage.
Ruling:
While the marriage between complainant and respondent has been
annulled by final judgment, this does not cleanse his conduct of every tinge
of impropriety. He and complainant started living as husband and wife in
December 1991 when his first marriage was still subsisting, as it was only
on August 21, 1998 that such first marriage was annulled, rendering him
liable for concubinage. Such conduct is inconsistent with the good moral
character that is required for the continued right to practice law as a
member of the Philippine bar. It imports moral turpitude and is a public
assault upon the basic social institution of marriage. Hence the respondent
was disbarred for gross misconduct.

REYES VS. ZABALLERO
G.R. No. L-3561
May 23,
1951
Facts:
This case originated from a loan of P6,500 with interest at 10 per cent
per annum payable in advance, made by Dr. Ceasar Reyes to Agripino
Zaballero on October 1, 1942. Zaballero secured the payment with a first
mortgage on ten parcels of land.
The installments due for 1942 and 1943 totaling the sum of P1,300
plus interest were paid in Japanese Military Script and the Payments were
unreservedly accepted. On November 30, 1944, Zaballero offered to pay the
third installments and its interests which fell due on October of the same
year, but Reyes refused to accept on the ground that it was immoral and
unjust that the payment be made in Japanese Military notes which had
considerably devaluated, and that he had an option according to the
contract to have the payment in Philippine or United States currency.
Zaballero announced that the next day he would tender the whole balance.
Reyes, acting upon advice given by his attorneys to whom he had
meanwhile resorted for guidance, received the money and executed the
notarial deed of release of the real estate mortgage. On the same day, he
received payment, the mortgagee (Reyes), executed an affidavit in secret,
without defendants knowledge, before a Notary Public stating that he had
accepted under protest the payment of P5,200 plus interest in the sum of
P612, and that he had deposited the whole amount paid by the debtors.
Issue:
What constitutes Duress or Intimidation?
Ruling:
According to the Civil Code, there is Duress or intimidation when one
of the contracting parties is inspired by a rational and well-grounded fear or
suffering an imminent and serious injury to his person or property, of his
spouse, descendants and ascendants. Mere reluctance does not detract
from the voluntariness of ones acts. There is a distinction between a case
where a person gives his consent reluctantly and even against his good
sense and judgment, and where he, in reality, gives no consent at all, as
where he executed a contract or performs an act against a pressure which
he cannot resist. It is clear that one acts as voluntarily and independently in
the eye of the law when he acts reluctantly and with hesitation as when he
acts spontaneously and joyously. Legally speaking he acts as voluntarily and
freely when he acts wholly against his better sense and judgment as when
he acts in conformity with them. Between the two acts there is no difference
in law.
IMPOTENCY, ARTICLE 45 PARAGRAPH 5, FC

ALACAZAR vs. ALACAZAR
G.R. No. 174451
October
13, 2009
Facts:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late
brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The petitioner alleged that
the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated
without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January
9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been
solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the
surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled
him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his
death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person,
himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano,
due to the marriage being void ab initio.
Issue:
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother
Ruling:
`Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was
contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil
Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having
the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
Pursuant to the provisions of the old Civil Code, the presence of

descendants,
ascendants,
or
illegitimate
children
of
the
deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to
the deceased's estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to
bring the action hinges upon a prior determinationof whether Cresenciano
had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate),
and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano's surviving heir.
The petition is returned to the RTC for further proceedings of the case.

G.R. No. 132955
October 27, 2006
Facts:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia CanalitaVillanueva got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On
November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for
annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress
forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not
get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her
after the marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's child
died during delivery on August 29, 1988.
On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the
dispositive portion of which states:1) Dismissing the above-entitled case;
and 2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in the
amount of P100,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00,
and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts dismissal of the petition and the
award of attorneys fees and costs, but reduced the award of moral and
exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. The Court
of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant
petition for review based on the following assigned errors:
Issue:
Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of
vitiated consent
Ruling:
The Court is not convinced that appellants apprehension of danger to
his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter
voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he
was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a
bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that
appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the
proper way to keep himself out of harms way. For sure, it is even doubtful if
threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he
never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the
police regarding the activities of those who were threatening him. And
neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to solemnizing
their marriage.

JOEL JIMENEZ vs. REMEDIOS CAIZARES
G.R. No. L-12790
31, 1960
August
Facts:
Plaintiff Joel Jimenez in a complaint prays for a decree annulling his
marriage to the defendant Remedios Caizares upon the ground that the
office of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a
male organ or penis for copulation; that the condition of her genitals as
described above existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist; and
that for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after
they had been married.
Defendant however failed to submit her answer within the required

period. Thereafter, the Court entered an order requiring the defendant to
submit to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to
determine her physical capacity for copulation. This was not followed by the
defendant however. Moreover, the defendant was not present during the
scheduled hearings. Because of this, the judge ordered a judgment
annulling the marriage of the parties. The city attorney then filed a motion
for reconsideration on the ground that defendants impotency has not been
satisfactorily proven since the defendant refused to undergo the physical
examination.
Issue:
Whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength
only of the lone testimony of the husband-plaintiff.
Ruling:
Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is
deeply interested. The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain
its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the state
are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest of each and every member
of the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would
shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. The incidents of
the status are governed by law, not by will of the parties. The law
specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved to exist by
indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage.
In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was
decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give
testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he
sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to
have been satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of
the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking
part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in
court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption
arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred
because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and
would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by
competent authority.
"Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The
presumption is in favor of potency." The lone testimony of the husband that
his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear
asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.
GROUNDS FOR LEGAL SEPARATION
ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG vs. LUCITA G. ONG
G.R. No. 153206
October
23, 2006
Facts:
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong and Lucita G. Ong were
married on July 13, 1975 They have three children: Kingston, Charleston,
and Princeton who are now all of the age of majority. Thereafter, Lucita filed
a Complaint for Legal Separation alleging that her life with William was
marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive
conduct; William would also scold and beat the children at different parts of
their bodies using the buckle of his belt; whenever she tried to stop William
from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her and box her; on
December 9, 1995, William hit her on the stomach and she bent down
because of the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and
asked her to leave the house; she then went to her sisters house in Binondo
where she was fetched by her other siblings and brought to their parents
house in Dagupan; the following day, she went to her parents doctor, Dr.
Vicente Elinzano for treatment of her injuries.
William for his part denied all the allegations. While he admits that he
and Lucita quarreled on December 9, 1995, at their house at Tondo, he
claimed that he left the same, stayed in their Greenhills condominium and
only went back to their Tondo house to work in their office below.
Both the lower courts and the appellate court issued a decree of legal
separation due to the repeated physical abuses felt by both Lucita and their
children. William on the other hand maintains that the real motive of Lucita
and her family in filing the case is to wrest control and ownership of
properties belonging to the conjugal partnership which were acquired
through his sole efforts also, William reiterated that Lucita cannot file the
petition since it Lucita who abandoned their conjugal dwelling.
Issue:
Whether nor not the defenses of William are valid.
Ruling:
William posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal
separation is in order for her side of the family to gain control of the
conjugal properties; that Lucita was willing to destroy his reputation by
filing the legal separation case just so her parents and her siblings could
control the properties he worked hard for. The Court finds such reasoning
hard to believe. What benefit would Lucita personally gain by pushing for
her parents and siblings financial interests at the expense of her marriage?
What is more probable is that there truly exists a ground for legal
separation, a cause so strong, that Lucita had to seek redress from the
courts. The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his
reputation and label him as a wife-beater and child-abuser also does not
elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would be such a smear on his
reputation then it would not be because of Lucitas decision to seek relief
from the courts, but because he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first
place.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has
abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted,
following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal
separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal
separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is
abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. As it was
established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does
not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.

FROILAN C. GANDIONCO vs. HON. SENEN C. PEARANDA
G.R. No. 79284
November 27,
1987
Facts:
Private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed a complaint
against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a
petition for support and payment of damages. Private respondent also filed
a criminal complaint against petitioner for concubinage. Respondent Judge
then issued a decree ordering petitioner to provide support to the private
respondent.
In this recourse, petitioner contends that the civil action for legal
separation and the incidents consequent thereto, such as, application for
support pendente lite, should be suspended in view of the criminal case for
concubinage filed against him the private respondent since the civil action
arises from the criminal action of concubinage. Petitioner also argues that
his conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured before the action
for legal separation can prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action for
legal separation is his alleged offense of concubinage.
Issue:
Whether or not the contention of petitioner is valid, that the civil
action for legal separation should first be suspended and that he must first
be convicted before deciding upon the said civil action.
Ruling:
A civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed
ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage,
because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability arising from
the offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are
related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the
right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of offsprings,

support, and disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse,
among others. An action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability,
in the main, but is aimed at the conjugal rights of the spouses and their
relations to each other.
Also, a decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may
be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal
separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. To this end,
the doctrine in Francisco vs. Tayao has been modified, as that case was
decided under Act. No. 2710, when absolute divorce was then allowed and
had for its grounds the same grounds for legal separation under the New
Civil Code, with the requirement, under such former law, that the guilt of
defendant spouses had to be established by final judgment in a criminal
action. That requirement has not been reproduced or adopted by the
framers of the present Civil Code, and the omission has been uniformly
accepted as a modification of the stringent rule in Francisco v. Tayao.

PRIMA PARTOSA-JO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
HO HANG
G.R. No. 82606
December 18,
1992
Facts:
Petitioner was legally married to Jose Jo alias Ho Hang.However, in
1980, the petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of
conjugal property, in addition to an earlier action for support, also against
him. The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly. Thereafter, the judge
rendered a decision of legal separation between the spouses and further
ordered the payment of support by Ho Hang to petitioner. However, there
was no definite disposition for the judicial separation of their property.
Hence, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals seeking
for the judicial separation of their conjugal properties.
The Court of Appeals however dismissed the complaint for judicial
separation of property for lack of a cause of action and on the ground that
separation by agreement was not covered by Article 178 of the Civil Code
since the separation of the conjugal property was agreed by the
spouses.When their motions for reconsideration were denied, both parties
came to this Court for relief.
Issue:
Whether or not the courts erred in finding that the judicial separation
of property was not allowed.
Ruling:
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has
left the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning. The spouse
who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed
within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts
shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the
conjugal dwelling.Under the this provision, the aggrieved spouse may
petition for judicial separation on either of these grounds: 1. Abandonment
by a spouse of the other without just cause; and 2. Failure of one spouse to
comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if
she said spouse does not leave the other spouse.
The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had
already rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal
home in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita. The fact
that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no
intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. Moreover, beginning 1968
until the determination by this Court of the action for support in 1988, the
private respondent refused to give financial support to the petitioner. The
physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private
respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute
abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal
property.
In addition, the petitioner may also invoke the second ground allowed
by Article 128, for the fact is that he has failed without just cause to comply
with his obligations to the family as husband or parent. Apart from refusing
to admit his lawful wife to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City, Jo has
freely admitted to cohabiting with other women and siring many children by
them. It was his refusal to provide for the petitioner and their daughter that
prompted her to file the actions against him for support and later for
separation of the conjugal property, in which actions, significantly, he even
denied being married to her. The private respondent has not established any
just cause for his refusal to comply with his obligations to his wife as dutiful
husband.
CONDONATION/PARDON
EDUARDO ARROYO, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 96602
November 19,
1991
Facts:
Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery against his
wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo committed on 2 November 1982
in the City of Baguio. Both defendants pleaded not guilty and after trial, the
RTC convicted petitioner and Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri of adultery. According to
the facts of the case, the accused Ruby Neri in the company of a friend went
to Baguio City and proceeded at Mines View Park Condominium. At 7:00 in
the evening, co-accused Eduardo Arroyo entered the unit and thereafter
proceeded inside the master's bedroom where Ruby Neri and her friend was
waiting. Ruby Neri's friend was thereafter instructed to leave the room.
After 45 minutes, both Ruby Neri and Eduardo Arroyo came out from the
room and joined Ruby Neri's friend at the living room.
Both Ruby Neri and Eduardp Arroyo filed a motion for reconsideration
contending that a pardon has been extended by Ruby Neri's husband and
that her husband had later contracted marriage with another woman. As
proof of this, Ruby Neri showed the Affidavit of Desistance made by Dr.
Neri.
Issue:
Whether or not the Affidavit of Desitance executed by Dr. Neri
signifies pardon.
Ruling:
The rule on pardon is found in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides: "ART. 344. The crime of adultery and concubinage shall not
be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. The
offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both
parties, if they are both alive, nor in any case, if he shall have consented or
pardoned the offenders."
While there is a conceptual difference between consent and pardon in
the sense that consent is granted prior to the adulterous act while pardon is
given after the illicit affair, nevertheless, for either consent or pardon to
benefit the accused, it must be given prior to the filing of a criminal
complaint. In the present case, the affidavit of desistance was executed only
on 23 November 1988 while the compromise agreement was executed only
on 16 February 1989, after the trial court had already rendered its decision
dated 17 December 1987 finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.
It should also be noted that while Article 344 of the Revise Penal Code
provides that the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted without the
offended spouse's complaint, once the complaint has been filed, the control
of the case passes to the public prosecutor. Enforcement of our law on
adultery is not exclusively, nor even principally, a matter of vindication of
the private honor of the offended spouse; much less is it a matter merely of
personal or social hypocrisy. Such enforcement relates, more importantly, to
protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the
preservation of which the State has the strongest interest; the public policy
here involved is of the most fundamental kind.
The same sentiment has been expressed in the Family Code of the
Philippines in Article 149: "The family, being the foundation of the ration, is
a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects."
Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice
or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect.
CONDONATION/PARDON
BENJAMIN BUGAYONG vs. LEONILA GINEZ
G.R. No. L-10033
28, 1956
December
Facts:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was
married to defendant Leonila Ginez. Immediately after their marriage, the
couple lived with their sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. After
some time, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed
her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in
Asingan, Pangasinan.
Afterwards, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from some
anonymous writers informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife.
Benjamin Bugayong then went to Asingan, Pangasinan and sought for his
wife. Both husband and wife then proceeded to the house of Pedro
Bugayong, a cousin of Benjamin, where they stayed and lived for 2 nights
and 1 day as husband and wife. Then they returned to the plaintiff's house
and again passed the night therein as husband and wife. On the third day,
Benjamin tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he
received that she had committed adultery but, instead of answering his
query, she merely packed up and left, which he took as a confirmation of the
acts of infidelity imputed on her. After that and despite such belief, plaintiff
exerted efforts to locate her.
Benjamin then filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife,
who timely filed an answer vehemently denying the averments of the
complaint and stating than she was condoned by her husband.
Issue:
Whether or not there was condonation in this case.
Ruling:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a
ground for legal separation. A detailed examination of the testimony of the
plaintiff-husband, clearly shows that there was a condonation on the part of
the husband for the supposed "acts of infidelity amounting to adultery"
committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the
infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by the defendant, a
reconciliation was effected between her and the plaintiff. The act of the
latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went
with him and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro
Bugayong and together they slept there as husband and wife for one day
and one night, and the further fact that in the second night they again slept
together in their house likewise as husband and wife all these facts have
no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation
between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by
the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came
to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.It has been held in a
long line of decisions of the various supreme courts of the different states of
the U. S. that 'a single voluntary act of sexual intercourse by the innocent
spouse after discovery of the offense is ordinarily sufficient to constitute
condonation, especially as against the husband'. In the lights of the facts
testified to by the plaintiff-husband, of the legal provisions above quoted,
and of the various decisions above-cited, the inevitable conclusion is that
there is condonation.
CONDONATION/PARDON
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GUADALUPE ZAPATA
G.R. No. L-3047
16, 1951
May
Facts:
A complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against
Guadalupe Zapata, his wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for
cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse during the period from
the year 1946 to 1947. The complaint was filed on March 14, 1947 whereby
Dalmacio Bondoc knows his codefendant to be a married woman. The
defendant wife entered the plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer four
months which penalty she served. In the same court, on September 17,
1948, the offended husband filed another complaint for adulterous acts
committed by his wife and her paramour from March 1947 to September
1948. Each of the defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint of the
ground that they would be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. The trial court upheld the contention of the defendants and
quashed the second complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the second complaint be quashed for double jeopardy.
Ruling:
A second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts not
included in the first complaint does not constitute a violation of the double
jeopardy clause of the constitution is that, if the second complaint places
the defendants twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, the
adultery committed by the male defendant charged in the second complaint,

should he be absolved from, or acquitted of, the first charge upon the
evidence that he did not know that his codefendant was a married woman,
would remain or go unpunished. The defense set up by him against the first
charge upon which he was acquitted would no longer be available, because
at the time of the commission of the crime charged in the second complaint,
he already knew that this defendant was a married woman and he
continued to have carnal knowledge of her.
Even if the husband should pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon
would not exempt the wife and her paramour from criminal liability for
adulterous acts committed after the pardon was granted because the
pardon refers to previous and not to subsequent adulterous acts.
The order appealed from, which quashed the second complaint for
adultery, is hereby reversed and set aside, and trial court directed to
proceed with the trial of the defendants in accordance with law, with costs
against the appellees.
CONDONATION/PARDON
JOSE DE OCAMPO vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO
G.R. No. L-13553
February
23, 1960
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938. They begot
several children who are now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff
discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by
maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the
defendant carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to
Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year.
Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant was going
out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of
June, 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left
plaintiff and since then they had lived separately.
On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit
relations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff
signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which

defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with
adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff a petition for legal
separation. Defendant poses as defense that plaintiff condoned her
adulterous acts with Nelson Orzame since plaintiff never sought for her
after having discovered her adulterous acts.
Issue:
Whether or not plaintiff condoned the acts of defendant.
Ruling:
We do not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and
take her home (after the latter had left him in 1952) constituted
condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with Orzame. It will be
remembered that she "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and after
he had discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his
duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return.
Two decisions are cited wherein from apparently similar
circumstances, this Court inferred the husband's consent to or condonation
of his wife's misconduct. However, upon careful examination, a vital
difference will be found: in both instances, the husband had abandoned his
wife; here it was the wife who "left" her husband.
Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition
we hereby reverse the appealed decision and decree a legal separation
between these spouse, all the consequent effects.
CONSENT AND FORMS

SOCORRO MATUBIS vs. ZOILO PRAXEDES
G.R. No. L-11766
25, 1960
October
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were legally married on January 10, 1943. For
failure to agree on how they should live as husband and wife, the couple
agreed to live separately from each other, which status remained
unchanged until the present. On April 3, 1948, plaintiff and defendant

entered into an agreementwhich provides among others that neither of
them can prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage or any other
crime arising from their separation.
In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting with one Asuncion
Rebulado and said Asuncion gave birth to a child. It was shown also that
defendant and Asuncion deported themselves as husband and wife and were
generally reputed as such in the community.
Plaintiff thereafter filed an action for legal separation against the
defendant. The trial court however dismissed the action on the ground that
under Art. 102 of the new Civil Code, an action for legal separation cannot
be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff
became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date
when the cause occurred. The plaintiff became aware of the illegal
cohabitation of her husband with Asuncion Rebulado in January, 1955. The
complaint was filed on April 24, 1956. The present action was, therefore,
filed out of time. Also, article 100 of the new Civil Code provides that the
legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided
there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.
As shown in the facts, the plaintiff has consented to the commission of
concubinage by her husband as proven by their agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff condoned the acts of the defendant.
Ruling:
An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year
from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause
and within five years from after the date when cause occurred.The
complaint was filed outside the periods provided for by the above Article. By
the very admission of plaintiff, she came to know the ground (concubinage)
for the legal separation in January, 1955. She instituted the complaint only
on April 24, 1956. It is to be noted that appellant did not even press this
matter in her brief.
The very wording of the agreement gives no room for interpretation
other than that given by the trial judge. Condonation and consent on the
part of plaintiff are necessarily the import of the agreement. The
condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed. Article
100 Civil Code, specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed
only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or
consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having condoned and/or consented
in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy.
CONSENT AND FORMS

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODOLFO A.
SCHNECKENBURGER, ET AL
G.R. No. L-48183
November
10, 1941
Facts:
On March 16, 1926, the accused Rodolfo A. Schneckenburger married
the compliant Elena Ramirez Cartagena and after seven years of martial
life, they agreed, for reason of alleged incompatibility of character, to live
separately each other and on May 25, 1935 they executed a document
which in part recites en completa libertad de accion en calquier acto y
todos concepto.
On June 15, 1935, the accused Schneckenburger, secured a decree of
divorce from the civil court of Juarez, Bravos District, State of Chihuahua,
Mexico. Subsequently, he contracted another marriage with his co-accused,
Julia Medel and since then they lived together as husband and wife.
Complainant then instituted two actions against the accused, one for
bigamy and the other for concubinage. The accused posed as defense the
act of condonation made by the complainant.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid condonation in this case.
RULING:
The Court believes and so holds that the accused should be acquitted
of the crime of concubinage. The document executed by and between the
accused and the complaint in which they agreed to be "en completa libertad
de accion en cualquier acto y en todos conceptos," while illegal for the
purpose for which it was executed, constitutes nevertheless a valid consent
to the act of concubinage within the meaning of section 344 of the Revised
Penal Code. There can be no doubt that by such agreement, each party
clearly intended to forego to illicit acts of the other.
The second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
provides: The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without
including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he
shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.As the term "pardon"
unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission, "consent" must
have been intended agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the
offense prior to its commission. No logical difference can indeed be
perceived between prior and subsequent consent, for in both instances as
the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she
becomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of
the wrong. We, therefore, hold that the prior consent is as effective as
subsequent consent to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense.
The Court reiterate that the agreement should be misconstrued as
legalizing an agreement to do an illicit act, in violation of law. Our view
must be taken only to mean that an agreement of the tenor entered into
between the parties herein, operates, within the plain language and
manifest policy of the law, to bar the offended party from prosecuting the
offense. If there is anything morally condemnatory in a situation of his
character, the remedy lies not with us but with the legislative department of
the government. What the law is, not what it should be, defines the limits of
our authority.
CONSENT AND FORMS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. URSULA SENSANO
G.R. No. L-37720
March 27, 1933
Facts:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919.
They had one child. Shortly after the birth of his child, the husband left his
wife to go to the Province of Cagayan where he remained for three years
without writing to his wife or sending her anything for the support of
herself and their son. Poor and illiterate, without relatives upon whom she
could call, she struggled for an existence for herself and her son until a fatal
day when she met the accused Marcelo Ramos who took her and the child
to live with him.
On the return of the husband (in 1924), he filed a charge against his
wife and Marcelo Ramos for adultery and both were sentenced to four
months and one day. The court, in its decision, stated the following: "In the
opinion of the court, the husband of the accused has been somewhat cruel
in his treatment of his wife having abandoned her as he did." After
completing her sentence, the accused left her wife. She thereupon appealed
to this municipal president and the justice of the peace to send for her
husband so that she might ask his pardon and beg him to take her back. At
the house of the president she begged his pardon and promised to be a
faithful wife if he would take her back.
He refused to pardon her to live with her and said she could go where
she wished, that he would have nothing more to do with her, and she could
do as she pleased. Abandoned for the second time, she and her child went
back to her co-accused Marcelo Ramos (this was in the year 1924) and they
have lived with him ever since. The husband, knowing that she resumed
living with her codefendant in 1924, did nothing to interfere with their
relations or to assert his rights as husband. Shortly thereafter he left for the
Territory of Hawaii where she remained for seven years completely
abandoning his said wife and child. On his return to these Islands, he
presented the second charge of adultery here involved with the sole
purpose, as he declared, of being able to obtain a divorce.
Issue:
Whether or not the husband is still entitled to his relief
Ruling:
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without
including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he
shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
Apart from the fact that the husband in this case was assuming a mere pose
when he signed the complaint as the "offended" spouse, we have come to
the conclusion that the evidence in this case and his conduct warrant the
inference that he consented to the adulterous relations existing between the
accused and therefore he is not authorized by law to institute this criminal
proceeding.We cannot accept the argument of the Attorney-General that the
seven years of acquiescence on his part in the adultery of his wife is
explained by his absence from the Philippine Islands during which period it
was impossible for him to take any action against the accused. There is no
merit in the argument that it was impossible for the husband to take any
action against the accused during the said seven years.
RATIONALE OF RECRIMINATION/MUTUAL GUILT
BENEDICTO vs. DE LA RAMA
G.R. NO. L-1056
December
8, 1903
Facts:
Plaintiff and Defendant were married on July 1891.Both were happily
living together until August of 1892 when the defendant without any
previous warning, took his wife to the house of her parents and left her
there. It was found out that in plaintiffs complaint for separation, she
charges defendant of committing adultery with Gregoria Bemejo. The lower
courts believed such adulterous acts committed by the defendant.
On the part of the defendant however, he stated that the reason why
he left his wife was because he received a letter made by the plaintiff
herself, addressed to a Spanish civil guard named Zabal who was her lover.
When the defendant asked plaintiff regarding the said letter, she admitted
the genuineness of the letter, fell upon her knees, and implored him to
pardon her. That same day he took her to the home of her parents, told what
had occurred, and left her there. The mother testified that about a year
after her daughter was returned to her she heard that the defendant
believed that illicit relations existed between Zabal and the plaintiff on
account of a certain letter.
Issue:
Whether or not mutual guilt was committed by both parties in this
case
Ruling:
It is expressly provided in Law 8, title 2, partida 4, as follows: For the
sin of each one of them is of itself a bar to an accusation against the
other.The Courts conclusion is that neither one of the parties is entitled to
a divorce. Section 497authorizes us in cases of this kind "to make such
findings upon the facts and render such final judgment as justice and equity
require." The judgment below is reversed, and we find from the evidence
the following facts: The allegations of the complaint as to the marriage of
the parties and as to the acts of adultery committed by the defendant are
true as therein stated except as to the date of the adultery committed with
Gregoria Bermejo. The plaintiff, in the summer of 1892, at Talisay, in the
Province of Occidental Negros, committed adultery with one Zabal, a
corporal of the civil guard.
As conclusion of law from the foregoing facts we hold that neither
party is entitled to judgment of divorce against the other; that judgment be
entered that the plaintiff take nothing by her action or the defendant by his
cross demand, and that neither party recover of the other any costs either
in this court or the Court of First Instance.
COLLUSION
G.R. No. L-13553
February
23, 1960
Facts:
adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a
petition for legal separation.
Issue:
Whether or not collusion existed in this case.
Ruling:
Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement between
husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to
be represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to
suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other
to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the
acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce.
In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to
make it appear that a matrimonial offense had been committed although it
was not, or if the parties had connived to bring about a legal separation
even in the absence of grounds therefor. Here, the offense of adultery had
really taking place, according to the evidence. The defendant could not have
falsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send
her to jail the moment her husband requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She
could not have practiced deception at such a personal risk.
In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred
from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus
enables the other party to procure evidence necessary to prove it
PRESCRIPTION
WILLIAM H. BROWN vs. JUANITA YAMBAO
G.R. No. L-10699
October 18, 1957
Facts:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to obtain legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita
Yambao. He alleged under oath that while interned by the Japanese
invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas internment
camp, his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of
whom she begot a baby girl. Brown learned of his wifes misconduct only in
1945, upon his release from internment. Thereafter the spouse lived
separately. Yambao however testified that after liberation, Brown lived
martially with another woman and had begotten children by her.
The court denied the legal separation filed on the ground that Browns
action had already prescribed.
Issue:
Whether or not the action had already prescribed.
Ruling:
The court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's
action was already barred, because Brown did not petition for legal
separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's
adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. Under
Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal separation cannot be filed
except within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of
the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause
occurred. Appellant's brief does not even contest the correctness of such
findings and conclusion.
The courts can take cognizance of prescription as a defense because
actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of marriage,
involve public interest and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be
issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.
PRESCRIPTION
G.R. No. L-13553
February
23, 1960
Facts:
adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a
petition for legal separation. Both lower and appellate courts denied the
petition on the ground that there was confession of judgment.
Issue:
Whether or not there was confession of judgment.
Ruling:
Art. 100 of the Civil Code do not exclude, as evidence, any admission
or confession made by the defendant outside of the court. It merely
prohibits a decree of separation upon a confession of judgment. Confession
of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and
confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly
agreeing to the plaintiff's demand. This is not present in this case. Yet, even
supposing that the above statement of defendant constituted practically a
confession of judgment, inasmuch as there is evidence of the adultery
independently of such statement, the decree may and should be granted,
since it would not be based on her confession, but upon evidence presented
by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or
mainly on defendant's confession. If a confession defeats the action ipso
facto, any defendant who opposesthe separation will immediately confess
judgment, purposely to prevent it.
The mere circumstance that defendants told the Fiscal that she "like
also" to be legally separated from her husband, is no obstacle to the
successful prosecution of the action. When she refused to answer the
complaint, she indicated her willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does
not order the dismissal. Allowing the proceeding to continue, it takes
precautions against collusion, which implies more than consent or lack of
opposition to the agreement.
PRESCRIPTION
ELENA CONTRERAS vs. CESAR J. MACARAIG
G.R. No. L-29138
29, 1970
May
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952. Out of their
Marriage, three children were born. All the children are in the care of
plaintiff wife.In September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car,
told plaintiff that defendant was living in Singalong with one Lily Ann
Alcala. Defendant would be away for a month, and would be home for three
days. During these times defendant was home, plaintiff refrained from
verifying Lubos report in her desire not to anger defendant.
Plaintiff also heard rumors that Lily Ann Alcala gave birth to a baby.
Plaintiff then entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with
defendant and to convince him to return to his family. Defendant however
told his father that he could not do anything. Thereafter, plaintiff met with
Lili Ann Alcala. The latter informed that former that she was willing to give
defendant but it was defendant who refused to break relationship with her.
In the early part of December, 1963, plaintiff went to talk to defendant
at his place of work where plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily
Ann Alcala and to return to the conjugal home, assuring him that she was
willing to forgive him. Defendant informed plaintiff that he could no longer
leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.On December
14, 1963, plaintiff instituted the present action for legal separation.
Issue:
Whether or not prescription has already set in
Ruling:
The requirement of the law that a complaint for legal separation be
filed within one year after the date plaintiff become cognizant of the cause
is not of prescriptive nature, but is of the essence of the cause of action. It
is consonant with the philosophy that marriage is an inviolable social
institution so that the law provides strict requirements before it will allow a
disruption of its status.The only question to be resolved is whether the
period of one year provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code should be
counted, as far as the instant case is concerned from September 1962 or
from December 1963. After a careful review of the record, We are
persuaded that, in the eyes of the law, the only time when appellant really
became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the early part of
December 1963 when plaintiff pleaded the defendant to give up Lily Ann
Alcala.
From all the foregoing We conclude that it was only on the occasion
mentioned in the preceding paragraph when her husband admitted to her
that he was living with and would no longer leave Lily Ann to return to his
legitimate family that appellant must be deemed to be under obligation to
decide whether to sue or not to sue for legal separation, and it was only
then that the legal period of one year must be deemed to have commenced.
The one year prescriptive period is thus followed in this case.
PROCEDURE OF ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION
AIDA P. BAEZ vs. GABRIEL B. BAEZ
G.R. No. 132592
23, 2002
January
Facts:
On September 23, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20,
decided Civil Case No. CEB-16765, decreeing among others the legal
separation between petitioner Aida Baez and respondent Gabriel Baez on
the ground of the latters sexual infidelity; the dissolution of their conjugal
property relations and the division of the net conjugal assets; the forfeiture
of respondents one-half share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the
common children.
Defendant then filed a Notice of Appeal before the appellate court.
Petitioner however contends that an action for legal separation is among
the cases where multiple appeals may be taken. She concludes that
respondents appeal should have been dismissed for his failure to file the
record on appeal within the reglementary period.
Issue:
Whether or not multiple appeals form part of the procedure for legal
separation cases.
Ruling:
In said case, the two issues raised by therein petitioner that may
allegedly be the subject of multiple appeals arose from the same cause of
action, and the subject matter pertains to the same lessor-lessee
relationship between the parties. Hence, splitting the appeals in that case
would only be violative of the rule against multiplicity of appeals.
The same holds true in an action for legal separation. The issues
involved in the case will necessarily relate to the same marital relationship
between the parties. The effects of legal separation, such as entitlement to
live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community or
conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children, follow from the
decree of legal separation. They are not separate or distinct matters that
may be resolved by the court and become final prior to or apart from the
decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents of legal
separation. Thus, they may not be subject to multiple appeals.
PROCEDURE OF ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION

CARMEN LAPUZ SYvs. EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY
G.R. No. L-30977
January
31, 1972
Facts:
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal
separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging that they were married
civilly on 21 September 1934; that they had lived together as husband and
wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they
had no child; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a
Chinese woman named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or about
March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation,
which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio
should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio however counter-claimed for the
declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on
the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to
Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok. On May 31,
1969, petitioner died in a vehicular accident. Respondent moved to dismiss
the case on the ground that the death abated the action for legal separation.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an
action for legal separation, abate the action
Ruling:
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the
bed-and-board separation of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code
of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the
innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its
Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop
or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation
already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of
one party to the action causes the death of the action itself ... When one of
the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage is
dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the
spouse takes place during the course of the suit (Article 244, Section 3).
The action is absolutely dead
Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction
of law, and an action for divorce is a proceeding brought for the purpose of
effecting a dissolution of that relation. The action is one of a personal
nature. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the
parties to such action abates the action, for the reason that death has
settled the question of separation beyond all controversy and deprived the
court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of the parties to the action and
of the subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason the courts are
almost unanimous in holding that the death of either party to a divorce
proceeding, before final decree, abates the action.
However, it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains (or of the absolute community of property), the loss of
right by the offending spouse to any share of the profits earned by the
partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy from
the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in
favor of the offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and
disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code article, are vested
exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature and intent,
such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or
transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that "is not
thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of the
Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action through a substitute of
the deceased party.

LUIS MA. ARANETA vs. HONORABLE HERMOGENES CONCEPCION
G.R. No. L-9667
July
31, 1956
Facts:
The main action was brought by the husband against his wifefor legal
separation on the ground of adultery. The wife however filed an omnibus
petition to secure custody of their three minor children, a monthly support
of P5,000 for herself and said children, and the return of her passport. The
husband opposed the petition, denying the misconduct imputed to him and
alleging that the wife had abandoned the children. The respondent judge
resolved the omnibus petition granting custody of the children to the wife
and a monthly allowance of P2,300.00 for support for her and her children.
The main reason given by the judge, for refusing the huisbands
request that evidence be allowed to be introduced on the issues, is the
prohibition contained in Article 103 of the Civil Code, which reads as
follows: ART. 103. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried
before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the six month cooling-off period be followed
Ruling:
It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103
(Civil Code) is evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible a
reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their grievances against
each other in court may only fan their already inflamed passions against one
another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them opportunity
for dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry
out legislative policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions
such as the determination of the custody of the children and alimony and
support pendente lite according to the circumstances. (Article 105, Civil
Code.) The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the
court according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts
close their eyes to actual facts, rank in justice may be caused.
Take the case at bar, for instance. Why should the court ignore the
claim of adultery by the husband in the face of express allegations under
oath to that effect, supported by circumstantial evidence consisting of letter

the authenticity of which cannot be denied. And why assume that the
children are in the custody of the wife, and that the latter is living at the
conjugal dwelling, when it is precisely alleged in the petition and in the
affidavits, that she has abandoned the conjugal abode? Evidence of all these
disputed allegations should be allowed that the discretion of the court as to
the custody and alimony pendente lite may be lawfully exercised.
Thus the determination of the custody and alimony should be given
effect and force provided it does not go to the extent of violating the policy
of the cooling off period. That is, evidence not affecting the cause of the
separation, like the actual custody of the children, the means conducive to
their welfare and convenience during the pendency of the case, these
should be allowed that the court may determine which is best for their
custody.
LUCY SOMOSA-RAMOS vs. THE HONORABLE CIPRIANO VAMENTA,
JR.
G.R. No. L-34132
July 29, 1972
Facts:
On June 18, 1971, petitioner filed in the sala of respondent Judge
against respondent Clemente Ramos for legal separation, on concubinage
on the respondent's part and an attempt by him against her life being
alleged. She likewise sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal
and exclusive property, then under the administration and management of
respondent Clemente Ramos. There was an opposition to the hearing of
such a motion based on Article 103 of the Civil Code. Thereafter, petitioner
received an order of respondent Judge granting the motion of respondent
Ramos to suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory
preliminary injunction. That is the order complained of in this petition for
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of
an action for legal separation before the lapse of six months from the filing
of the petition, would likewise preclude the court from acting on a motion
for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to
such a suit.
Ruling:
After a careful consideration of the legal question presented, it is the
holding of this Court that Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to
the hearing motion for preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the
six-month period.The court where the action is pending according to Article
103 is to remain passive. It must let the parties alone in the meanwhile. It is
precluded from hearing the suit. There is then some plausibility for the view
of the lower court that an ancillary motion such as one for preliminary
mandatory injunction is not to be acted on. If it were otherwise, there would
be a failure to abide by the literal language of such codal provision. That the
law, however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial
power to assert itself are discernible from what is set forth in the following
article. It reads thus: "After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the
spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their
respective property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal
partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint
another to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall have
the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose
of the income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders of the
court."There would appear to be then recognition that the question of
management of their respective property need not be left unresolved even
during such six-month period. An administrator may even be appointed for
the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute
limitation from which the court suffers under the preceding article is
thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be heard. There is
justification then for the petitioner's insistence that her motion for
preliminary mandatory injunction should not be ignored by the lower court.
There is all the more reason for this response from respondent Judge,
considering that the husband whom she accused of concubinage and an
attempt against her life would in the meanwhile continue in the
management of what she claimed to be her paraphernal property, an
assertion that was not specifically denied by him.
ENRICO L. PACETE vs. HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR.
G.R. No. L-53880
March 17, 1994
Facts:
In Concepcion Alanis complaint, she averred that she was married to
Pacete on 30 April 1938; that Pacete subsequently contracted (in 1948) a
second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion; that she learned of such
marriage only on 01 August 1979; that during her marriage to Pacete, the
latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds
and several motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of
property either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his children with
Clarita and other dummies.
The defendants asked for a motion of extension if their time to file

their answers, which was granted by the judge. However, defendants still
failed to file their respective answers. Thus, Alanis asked that defendants be
declared in default which was approved by the judge. Thereafter, Alanis
submitted all evidences favoring her. Thus, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the declaration of default is proper
Ruling:
Art. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.In case of non-appearance
of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire
whether or not collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion,
the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care
that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the
intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for
legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88), is to
emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social
institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or
interruption cannot be made to depend upon the parties themselves.
It is consonant with this policy that the inquiry by the Fiscal should be
allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate whether the
proceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified or not. Article
103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates
that an action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six
months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously in order
to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should
take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is
further underscored by the inclusion of the following provision in Rule 18 of
the Rules of Court: Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulments of
marriage or for legal separation. If the defendant in an action for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not collusion
between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the
State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of
marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's
interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave the
matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone
dictate.
NECESSITY OF TRIAL AND INTERVENTION OF STATE
ENRICO L. PACETE vs. HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR.

G.R. No. L-53880
March 17, 1994
Facts:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico
Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation
between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She
averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and
they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a
second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such
marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was
impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an
extension within which to file an answer, which the court partly granted.
Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the
defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter,
the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the
court forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs evidence during the
hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court
rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying
petitioners motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring
petitioners in default and in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980 which
decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and
void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.
Ruling:
The Civil Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In
case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties
exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for
the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not
fabricated. The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the
state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and
of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage
is more than a mere contract.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code,
further mandates that an action for legal separation must in no case be
tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,
obviously in order to provide the parties a cooling-off period. In this
interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or
underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court
which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for
legal separation. Therefore, if the defendant in an action for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the
parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order
to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
SAMSON T. SABALONES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-SABALONES
G.R. No. 106169
February
14, 1994
Facts:
As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries
during his successive tours of duties, petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to
his wife, herein respondent Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones, the administration
of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years. Sabalones retired as
ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife
and their children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial
authorization to sell a building and lot located at #17 Eisenhower St.,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, belonging to the conjugal partnership.
He claimed that he was sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone
without any income, and that his share of the proceeds of the sale to defray
the prohibitive cost of his hospitalization and medical treatment. In her
answer, the private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a
counterclaim for legal separation.
The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject
properties for almost nineteen years now, apparently without complaint on
the part of the petitioner. He has not alleged, much less shown, that her
administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership. What he
merely suggests is that the lease of the Forbes Park property could be
renewed on better terms, or he should at least be given his share of the
rentals.
In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal
separation and order the liquidation of their conjugal properties, with
forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of his adultery. She also
prayed that it enjoin the petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the
occupants of the Forbes Park property and b) disposing of or encumbering
any of the conjugal properties. The petitioner now assails this order,
arguing that since the law provides for a joint administration of the conjugal
properties by the husband and wife, no injunctive relief can be issued
against one or the other because no right will be violated. In support of this
contention, he cites Art. 124 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the injunction ha permanently installed the
respondent wife as the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets.
Ruling:
The Court has carefully considered the issues and the arguments of
the parties and finds that the petition has no merit. We agree with the
respondent court that pending the appointment of an administrator over the
whole mass of conjugal assets, the respondent court was justified in
allowing the wife to continue with her administration. It was also correct,
taking into account the evidence adduced at the hearing, in enjoining the
petitioner from interfering with his wife's administration pending resolution
of the appeal.
The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the
conjugal properties as clearly provided in the above-cited Article 124 of the
Family Code. However, Article 61, also above quoted, states that after a
petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the
absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of
the spouses or a third person to act as the administrator.
While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has
been made, such designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court
denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also
disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was in effect
approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent
wife the preliminary injunction now under challenge.

REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and TERESITA MASAUDING
G.R. No. 115640
March 15,
1995
Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first
met in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel
Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital.
Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo was
sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to
maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. On 1986, their
daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a brief vacation
in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return
to the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the
name Reginald Vince, was born on 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to

separate. Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly
pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back
to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but
because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent
back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his
sister, Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the
petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain
custody over the children, thus starting the whole proceedings now
reaching this Court. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas
corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and
Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them
but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be
approved by the Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain
custody over the children be granted.
Ruling:
The SC dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother
and retain the custody of the children to the father. The illicit or immoral
activities of the mother had already caused emotional disturbances,
personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values against the
children.
The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the
parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all
indications, Reynaldo is a fit person. The children understand the
unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their
emotional growth by her behavior.

CARMEN LAPUZ SY vs.EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO
G.R. No. L-30977
31, 1972
January
Facts:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio
Eufemio on August 1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934
and canonically after nine days. They had lived together as husband and
wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband
abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner
then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named
Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal
separation, which among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio
should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go
Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence.
However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled
to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on
May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio
moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the
grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided
in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the
action for legal separation. Petitioners counsel moved to substitute the
deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
Issue:
Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for
legal separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved
property rights.
Ruling:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff,
even if property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree
of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such
rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree,
these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during
the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing
a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential
rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of
Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and
academic and there could be no further interest in continuing the same
after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any
property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper
action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

ELISEA LAPERAL vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHIPPINES
G.R. No. L-18008
October
30, 1962
Facts:
On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in the Court of First Instance of
Baguio (Sp Proc. No. 433) a petition which reads: That petitioner's maiden
name is ELISEA LAPERAL; that on March 24, 1939, she married Mr.
Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial decision entered on this Honorable
Court on January 18, 1958, in Civil Case No. 356 of this Court, entitled
'Enrique R. Santamaria vs. Elisea L. Santamaria' Mr. Enrique Santamaria
was given a decree of legal separation from her; that the said partial
decision is now final; That during her marriage to Enrique R. Santamaria,
she naturally used, instead of her maiden name, that of Elisea L.
Santamaria; that aside from her legal separation from Enrique R.
Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him for many years now; That
in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. Enrique R.
Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live with him for many years, it is
desirable that she be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted to
resume using her maiden name, to wit: ELISEA LAPERAL.
Petitioner respectfully prayed that after the necessary proceedings
are had, she be allowed to resume using her maiden name of Elisea Laperal.
The petition was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that
the same violates the provisions of Article 370 (should be 372) of the Civil
Code, and that it is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will
prevail over the specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard
to married woman legally separated from his husband.
Ruling:
In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation,
there being no severance of the vinculum. The finding that petitioners
continued use of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her
finances was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of the
decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership
between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated.
Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the
conjugal assets.
Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a

change of the name of Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for
an easy circumvention of the mandatory provision of Art. 372.
Petition was dismissed.

SIOCHI vs. GOZON
G.R. No. 169900
March
18, 2010
Facts:
Alfredo and Elvira are married. Winifred is their daughter. The
property involved in this case is a 30,000 sq. m. lot in Malabon which is
registered in the name of Alfredo. The property regime of the couple is
conjugal partnership of gains.Elvira filed for legal separation. B filed a
notice of lis pendens over the title of the lot in Malabon. While the legal
separation case was still pending, Alfredo entered into an agreement with
Mario who paid P5 million in earnest money and took possession of the
property. Title still with notice of lis pendens.
Cavite RTC granted legal separation. CPG was dissolved and
liquidated. Alfredo, the guilty spouse, did not receive his share in the net
profits, which instead went to their daughter, Winifred. Cavite RTC ruled
land in Malabon as conjugal property. Alfred executed a Deed of Donation
over the property in favour of Winifred. Malabon RTC issued new TCT in the
name of Winifred without annotating the agreement between Alfredo and
Mario Siochi, nor the notice of lis pendens filed by Elvira, the wife. Then,
through an SPA, Winifred gave authority to her father, Alfred, to sell the lot.
Alfred sold it to Inter-Dimensional Realty for P18 million. A TCT was issued
to Inter-Dimensional Realty. Mario filed a case with Malabon RTC (property
was in Malabon) to Annul donation to Winifred, Annul the Sale to InterDimensional, and to remove notice of lis pendens over title of land. Malabon
RTC upheld original agreement to buy and sell between Mario and Alfredo
and declared void the sale by Alfredo and Winifred to Inter-Dimensional.
However, Court of Appeals said agreement between Mario and Alfredo is
void because (1) it was entered into without the consent of Elvira, Alfredos
wife; and, (2) Alfredos undivided share has been forfeited in favour of
Winifred by the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the agreement between Mario and Alfredo valid?

Ruling:
The SC says the CA was right in declaring the sale between Mario and
Alfredo as void. Under Art 124 of the Family Code, if one of the spouses was
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration.
These powers, however do not include the power to dispose or encumber
the properties which require a court order or the written consent of the
other spouse. The agreement is void in its entirety, not just to the share of
the husband, Alfredo. The Court however said that the CA erred in saying
that the undivided share of Alfredo was forfeited in favour of Winifred. As
regards Marios contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which
may be perfected by Elviras acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the
fact that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and
then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.
The Court said the CA erred in saying that Alfredo forfeited his
share in the conjugal property as a result of the grant of legal separation by
the Cavite RTC. Art 63 (Effects of legal separation) in relation to Art 43(2)
(Effects of termination of subsequent marriage) provides that the guilty
spouse in legal separation forfeits his share in the net profits of the
property. The Court said, Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is
not Alfredos share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the
net profits of the conjugal partnership property. Thus, as regards this
point, the CA erred. Inter-Dimensional says it is a buyer in good faith. SC
says no. Inter-Dimensional knew of the notice of lis pendens.

PELAYO vs. LAURON
G.R. No. 129295
August
15, 2001
Facts:
On November 23, 1906, a physician named Arturo Pelayo filed a
complaint against Marelo Lauron and Juana Abellana. On the night of
October 13th of the same year, the plaintiff was called to render medical
assistance to the defendants daughter-in-law, who was about to gie birth.
After the consultation of Dr. Escao, it was deemed that the operation was
going to be difficult for child birth, but regardless, Dr. Pelayo proceeded
with the job of operating on the subject and also removed the afterbirth.
The operation went on until morning, and on the same day, visited several
times and billed the defendants the just amount of P500 for the services
rendered to which defendants refused to pay. In answer to the complaint,
counsel for the defendants denied all of the allegation and alleged as a
special defense, that their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the
said childbirth, that when she was alive she lived with her husband
independently and in a separate house without any relation whatever with
them, and that, if on the day when she gave birth she was in the house of
the defendants, her stay their was accidental and due to fortuitous
circumstances. Therefore, he prayed that the defendants be absolved of the
complaint with costs against the plaintiff.
Issue:
Can the defendants be held liable to pay for the obligation?
Ruling:
No. According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are
created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and by illicit acts and
omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.
Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined
in the code or in special laws, etc., are the only demandable ones.
Obligations arising from contracts have legal force between the contracting
parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations. (Arts.
1090 and 1091.) The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness was
comprised among the mutual obligations to which the spouses were bound
by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.) If every obligation consists
in giving, doing or not doing something (art. 1088), and spouses were
mutually bound to support each other, there can be no question but that,
when either of them by reason of illness should be in need of medical
assistance, the other was under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the
necessary services of a physician in order that health may be restored, and
he or she may be freed from the sickness by which life is jeopardized. The
party bound to furnish such support was therefore liable for all expenses,
including the fees of the medical expert for his professional services. In the
face of the above legal precepts, it was unquestionable that the person
bound to pay the fees due to the plaintiff for the professional services that
he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants during her childbirth,
was the husband of the patient and not her father and mother- in-law of the
defendants herein.

NANCY GO and ALEX GO vs COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 114791
29, 1997
May
Facts:
In 1981, Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong contracted with Nancy Go for
the latter to film their wedding. After the wedding, the newlywed inquired
about their wedding video but Nancy Go said its not yet ready. She advised
them to return for the wedding video after their honeymoon. The newlywed
did so but only to find out that Nancy Go can no longer produce the said
wedding video because the copy has been erased. The Ongs then sued
Nancy Go for damages. Nancys husband, Alex Go, was impleaded. The trial
court ruled in favor of the spouses Ong and awarded in their favor, among
others, P75k in moral damages. In her defense on appeal, Nancy Go said:
that they erased the video tape because as per the terms of their
agreement, the spouses are supposed to claim their wedding tape within 30
days after the wedding, however, the spouses neglected to get said wedding
tape because they only made their claim after two months; that her husband
should not be impleaded in this suit.
Issue:
Whether or not Nancy Go is liable for moral damages.
Ruling:
Yes. Her contention is bereft of merit. It is shown that the spouses
Ong made their claim after the wedding but were advised to return after
their honeymoon. The spouses advised Go that their honeymoon is to be
done abroad and wont be able to return for two months. It is contrary to
human nature for any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video
coverage of their wedding; the fact that the Ongs filed a case against Nancy
Go belies such assertion. Considering the sentimental value of the tapes and
the fact that the event therein recorded a wedding which in our culture is
a significant milestone to be cherished and remembered could no longer
be reenacted and was lost forever, the trial court was correct in awarding
the Ongs moral damages in compensation for the mental anguish, tortured
feelings, sleepless nights and humiliation that the Ongs suffered and which
under the circumstances could be awarded as allowed under Articles 2217
and 2218 of the Civil Code. Anent the issue that Nancy Gos husband should
not be included in the suit, this argument is valid. Under Article 73 of the
Family Code, the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in
business without the consent of the husband. In this case, it was shown that
it was only Nancy Go who entered into a contract with the spouses Ong
hence only she (Nancy) is liable to pay the damages awarded in favor of the
Ongs.

ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ-ARROYO
G.R. No. 17014
August 29,
1921
Facts:
Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and
lived in Iloilo City. They lived together with a few short intervals of
separation. On July 4, 1920, defendant Dolores went away from their
common home and decided to live separately from plaintiff. She claimed
that she was compelled to leave on the basis of cruel treatment on the part
of her husband. She in turn prayed for a decree of separation, a liquidation
of their conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and
permanent separate maintenance. CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and
she was granted alimony amounting to P400, also other fees Plaintiff then
asked for a restitution of conjugal rights, and a permanent mandatory
injunction requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal home and live
with him as his wife.
Issues:
a) Whether or not defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal
home
b) Whether or not plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal
rights or absolute order or permanent mandatory injunction
Ruling:
The wife had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty
done by plaintiff to defendant was greatly exaggerated. The wife was
inflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an
aggravated degree. No sufficient cause was present. Courts should move
with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance
of the wife since this recognizes the de facto separation of the two parties.
Continued cohabitation of the pair must be seen as impossible, and
separation must be necessary, stemming from the fault of the husband. She
is under obligation to return to the domicile. When people understand that
they must live togetherthey learn to soften by mutual accommodation that
yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they become good husbands
and wivesnecessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it
imposes (Evans v. Evans)
On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the
province of the courts to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and
render conjugal rights to, the other. In the case of property rights, such an
action may be maintained. Said order, at best, would have no other purpose
than to compel the spouses to live together. Other countries, such as
England and Scotland have done this with much criticism. Plaintiff is
entitled to a judicial declaration that the defendant absented herself without
sufficient cause and it is her duty to return. She is also not entitled to
support.

ILUSORIO vs. BILDNER
G.R. No. 139789
May 12,
2000
Facts:
Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and
lived together for a period of thirty years. Out of their marriage, the spouses
had six children. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for
undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived in Makati when he was in Manila and
in Ilusorio penthouse when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand,
Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. When Potenciano arrived from United States
and lived with Erlinda in Antipolo City for five months. The children, Sylvia
and Lin, alleged that their mother overdosed their father with an
antidepressant drug which the latters health deteriorated. Erlinda filed
with RTC of Antipolo City a petition for guardianship over the person and
property of her husband due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor
eyesight and impaired judgment. Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City
and instead lived in a condominium in Makati City after attending a
corporate meeting in Baguio City. With these, Erlinda filed with CA a
petition for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband and also for the
reason that respondent refused petitioners demands to see and visit her
husband and prohibiting Potenciano from living with her in Antipolo City.
Issue:
Whether or not Erlinda Ilusorio may secure a writ of habeas corpus to
compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss.
Ruling:
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person
there from if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the
restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom
of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not
merely nominal or moral. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to
compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by
compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other
means process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to
the man and womans free choice. Therefore, a petition for writ of habeas
corpus is denied.

GOITIA vs. CAMPOS-RUEDA
G.R. No. 11263
November 2,
1916
Facts:
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7,
1915, and immediately thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle
San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month, when the
plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. Eloisa Goitia, plaintiffappellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda, defendant, were legally married in the
city of Manila. They established their residence 115 Calle San Marcelino,
where they lived together. The allegations of the complaint were that the
defendant, one month after they had contracted marriage, demanded
plaintiff to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs in
which the latter reject the said demands. With these refusals, the defendant
got irritated and provoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed.
Unable to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and
cease of maltreating her, plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode
and take refuge in the home of her parents. The plaintiff appeals for a
complaint against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile.
However, the defendant objects that the facts alleged in the complaint do
not state a cause of action.
Issue:
Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugal
domicile.
Ruling:
Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation,
the rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of
the parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those
rights, duties and obligations. When the object of a marriage is defeated by
rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of
no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable.
The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may
fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining
her in his own home at his option. However, the option given by law is not
absolute. The law will not permit the defendant to evade or terminate his
obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leave the conjugal
abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the defendant,
Beatriz may claim support from the defendant for separate maintenance
even outside of the conjugal home.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES: MARITAL

COMMUNICATION RULE
CUENCA vs. CUENCA
G.R. No. L-72321
1988
December
8,
Facts:
Private respondents Restituto Cuenca and Meladora Cuenca claimed
ownership over the subject parcels of land on the ground that they are the
legitimate children of Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon, both deceased,
owners of the subject parcels of land. They alleged that some of the parcels
are paraphernal property of Maria while all the others are conjugal
properties of Maria and Agripino They also alleged that Agripino Cuenca
and Engracia Basadre were not legally married because at the time they
lived together Agripino was married to a certain Jesusa Pagar.
On the other hand, the petitioners (defendants below) Diosdidit,
Baldomero, Filomeno Elpidio, Aida, Anita and Engracia Vda.de Cuenca
denied the legitimacy of the marriage between Agripino Cuenca and Maria
Bangahon as well as the legitimacy of the plaintiffs as children of the
couple. They claimed that Agripino Cuenca and their mother Engracia
Basadre were legally married and that they are the legitimate children of
the couple. They contend that the subject parcels of lands are conjugal
properties of Agripino and Engracia.
That parcel of land situated in Rendon, Butuan, Agusan, planted to
rice with irrigation under the present possession of the heirs, bounded on
the North by Mariano Agagdang on the East by Clerencia Tagonsod on the
South by Suatan River and on the West by Mariano Agagdang containing an
area of 1.2500 hectares, more or less, under Tax Dec. 3055, assessed at
P250.00 by the property records of Agusan.
That parcel of land situated in Rendon, Butuan, Agusan, planted to
coconut, under the present possession of the heirs, bounded on the North
by Maximo Bangahon, on the East, by Sergio Pagar, on the South, by

Macaria Agagdang on the West, by Folgencio Buyan, containing an area of
1.1722 hectares, more or less, assessed at P670.00 by Tax Dec. No. 4026 of
Agusan belong to Maria Bangahon as her inheritance from her parents. This
declaration against interest is further reiterated by Agripino Cuenca in that
judicial settlement and sale executed by him on October 19, 1950. These
two documents, as rightly contended by the plaintiffs, are ample proofs that
the properties in question described in par. 2 of the complaint, belong
exclusively to Maria Bangahon as her paraphernal property, a fact declared
by no less than the husband himself in a declaration against his interest. It
was error for the trial court to unceremoniously brush aside the importance
of the declaration of Agripino Cuenca in the extrajudicial settlement of the
estate of Maria Bangahon. These public documents carry sufficient
evidentiary weight to prove the origin of the properties in question and the
nature of their ownership as properties brought into the marriage by Maria
Bangahon to Agripino Cuenca as against the bare testimony of the
defendants and their witnesses, More importantly, Juan Buyan and former
Judge Francisco Ro.
Issue:
Whether or not the parcels of lands are conjugal properties of
Agripino and Engracia
Ruling:
The records show that defendant Bartolome Sanchez upon
manifestation of his counsel is no longer a necessary party as Engracia
Basadre-Cuenca has repurchased that portion of the land in question sold to
Bartolome Sanchez making plaintiffs' claim against defendant Bartolome
Sanchez moot and academic.
Our review of the evidence shows that Agripino Cuenca in his lifetime
expressed in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Maria Bangahon
executed on June 13, 1950 before Notary Public Francisco Ro. Cupin (Exh.
"C") that:
Parcel of agricultural land situated in Pinamangculan Butuan, Agusan,
planted to coconut, under the present possession of the heirs of Maria
Bangahon, bounded on the North, Lot No. 3062, Lucio Plaza, Lot No. 4319,
A. Cuenca, portion of Lot No. 3063, in the possession of A. Cuenca, on the
south Road, on the West by Lot No. 3057, S. Dumanon 3058, B. Adormio,
3059, A. Cuenca and east portion of Lot No. 3063, containing an area of six
(6) hectares, more or less (This is a portion of Lot No. 3063, Pls-22 of Cad.
of Municipality of Butuan which parcel of land belongs exclusively to Maria
Bangahon during her lifetime and which property is separate from the
conjugal property of the marriage of said Maria Bangahon and Agripino

Cuenca. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "All property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife," In the
cases of Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, (153 SCRA 435
[August 31, 1987); Magallon v. Montejo (146 SCRA 282 [December 16,
1986]) and Maramba v. Lozano (20 SCRA 474 [June 29, 1967]) this Court
ruled that the presumption refers only to the property acquired during
marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when
property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.
In the case at bar, the documents sought to be presented as newly
discovered evidence do not show that the claims to the subject parcels
consisting of homestead lands were perfected during the marriage of
Agripino Cuenca and petitioner Engracia Basadre. The perfection of the
homestead claims is considered the time of acquisition of the properties.
The fact that these parcels were surveyed for Agripino Cuenca and
approved during the marriage of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner Engracia
Basadre is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the parcels
were the conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia. Moreover, the
documents show that 5 of the 8 parcels covered by the documents are titled
in the name of either respondent Meladora Cuenca or respondent Restituto
Cuenca. The presumption cannot prevail "when the title is in the name of
only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. Under
the circumstances of this case, the non-applicablility of the presumption
should also be upheld.
In the light of these findings a new trial would only be an unnecessary
exercise and ineffective. The documents sought to be presented during a
new trial would not in any way change the result. The motion for new trial
was correctly denied although not for the reason given by the respondent
court.
RELATION BETWEEN SPOUSES: PROHIBITION AGAINST

DONATION TO EACH OTHER
ARCABA vs. VDA. DE BATOCAEL
G.R. No. 146683
22, 2001
November
Facts:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the
registered owners of two lots in Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of
Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her share of the
property. Thereafter, Francisco registered the lot in his name. Having no
children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece
Leticia, the latters cousin Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, to take
care of his house and store.
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the
relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia said that the previous
party was lovers since they slept in the same room while Erlinda claimed
that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. On the other hand,
Cirila said she was mere helper and that Francisco was too old for her.
A few months before Franciscos death, he executed an instrument
denominated Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in which he ceded a portion of
the lot together with is house to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the
same instrument. The deed stated that the donation was being made in
consideration of the faithful services she had rendered over the past ten
years. Thereafter, Francisco died and the respondents filed a complaint
against Cirila for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos,
recovery of possession and damages. Respondents, who are nieces,
nephews and heirs by intestate succession of Francisco, alleged that Cirila
was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void
under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late
Francisco Comille be declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence that two
persons lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the
inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by one in favor of the
other is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Therefore, respondents having proven by preponderance of evidence

that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage, the donation inter vivos is considered null and void.

MATABUENA vs. CERVANTES
G.R. No. L-28771
March
31, 1971
Facts:
Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period,
Felix Matabuena donated to respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were
married. After the death of Felix Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner, sought
the
nullification
of
the donation citing Art.133 of the
Civil Code
Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void.
The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition
because the donation was made at the time the deceased and Respondent
were not yet married and were simply cohabitating.
Issue:
Whether or not the prohibition applies to donations between live-in
partners.
Ruling:
Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is
within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written.
Since
the
reason
for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to p
revent the possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being
exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reason why this prohibition
shall not apply also to common-law relationships. The court, however,
said that the lack of the donation made by the deceased to
Respondent does not necessarily
mean
that the
Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the
relationship between Felix and Respondent were legitimated by marriage.

HARDING vs. COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY
G.R. No. 12707
August
10, 1918
Facts:
In February 1916, Mrs. Harding applied for car insurance for a
Studebaker she received as a gift from her husband. She was assisted by
Smith, Bell and Co which was the duly authorized representative (insurance
agent) of Commercial Union in the Philippines. The cars value was
estimated with the help of an experienced mechanic (Mr. Server) of the
Luneta Garage. The car was bought by Mr. Harding for P2,800.00. The
mechanic, considering some repairs done, estimated the value to be at
P3,000.00. This estimated value was the value disclosed by Mrs. Harding to
Smith, Bell and Co. She also disclosed that the value was an estimate made
by Luneta Garage (which also acts as an agent for Smith, Bell and Co).
In March 1916, a fire destroyed the Studebaker. Mrs. Harding filed an
insurance claim but Commercial Union denied it as it insisted that the
representations and averments made as to the cost of the car were false;
and that said statement is a warranty. Commercial Union also stated that
the car does not belong to Mrs. Harding because such a gift [from her
husband] is void under the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Mrs. Harding is entitled to the insurance claim.
Ruling:
Yes. Commercial Union is not the proper party to attack the validity of
the gift made by Mr. Harding to his wife.
The statement made by Mrs. Harding as to the cost of the car is not a
warranty. The evidence does not prove that the statement is false. In fact,
the evidence shows that the cost of the car is more than the price of the
insurance. The car was bought for P2,800.00 and then thereafter, Luneta
Garage made some repairs and body paints which amounted to P900.00. Mr.
Server attested that the car is as good as new at the time the insurance was
effected.
Commercial Union, upon the information given by Mrs. Harding, and
after an inspection of the automobile by its examiner, having agreed that it
was worth P3,000, is bound by this valuation in the absence of fraud on the
part of the insured. All statements of value are, of necessity, to a large
extent matters of opinion, and it would be outrageous to hold that the

validity of all valued policies must depend upon the absolute correctness of
such estimated value.
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY (COMPONENTS)

NAVARRO vs. ESCOBIDO
G.R. No 153788
November
27, 2009
Facts:
Private respondent (Karen Go) files a complaint with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of replevin against petitioner (Navarro) for the seizure of
2 motor vehicles under lease agreement. Petitioner maintains among others
in the case at bar that the complaints were premature because no prior
demand was made on him to comply with the provisions of the lease
agreements before the complaints for replevin were filed.
Issue:
Whether or not prior demand is a condition precedent to an action
for a writ of replevin.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner erred in arguing that prior demand is required before
an action for a writ of replevin is filed since we cannot liken a replevin
action to an unlawful detainer.
For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file
an affidavit and bond, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which
states:
Sec. 2.Affidavit and bond.
The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some
other person who personally knows the facts:
(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed,
particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfullydetained by the adverse party,
alleging the cause of detention thereof according to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax
assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or
preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodialegis, or if so
seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and
(d) The actual market value of the property.
The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in
double the value of the property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned,
for the return of the property to the adverse party if such return be
adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may
recover from the applicant in the action.
The SC held that there is nothing in the afore-quoted provision which

requires the applicant to make a prior demand on the possessor of the
property before he can file an action for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior
demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.

VILLANUEVA MIJARES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 143286
April
2000
12,
Facts:
Felipe Villanueva left a 15,336-square-meter parcel of land in Kalibo,
Capiz to his eight children: Simplicio, Benito, Leon, Eustaquio, Camila,
Fausta and Pedro. In 1952, Pedro declared under his name 1/6 portion of
the property (1,905 sq. m.). He held the remaining properties in trust for his
co-heirs who demanded the subdivision of the property but to no avail. After
Leons death in 1972, private respondents discovered that the shares of
Simplicio, Nicolasa, Fausta and Maria Baltazar had been purchased by Leon
through a deed of sale dated August 25, 1946 but registered only in 1971.
In July 1970, Leon also sold and partitioned the property in favor of
petitioners, his children, who thereafter secured separate and independent
titles
over
their
respective
proindiviso
shares.
Private respondents, who are also descendants of Felipe, filed an
action for partition with annulment of documents and/or reconveyance and
damages against petitioners. They contended that Leon fraudulently
obtained the sale in his favor through machinations and false pretenses. The
RTC declared that private respondents action had been barred by res
judicata and that petitioners are the legal owners of the property in
question in accordance with the individual titles issued to them.
Issue:
Whether or not laches apply against the minors property that was
held
in
trust.
Ruling:
No. At the time of the signing of the Deed of Sale of August 26,1948,
private respondents Procerfina, Prosperedad, Ramon and Rosa were
minors. They could not be faulted for their failure to file a case to recover
their inheritance from their uncle Leon, since up to the age of majority, they
believed and considered Leon their co-heir administrator. It was only in
1975, not in 1948, that they became aware of the actionable betrayal by
their uncle. Upon learning of their uncles actions, they filed for recovery.
Hence, the doctrine of stale demands formulated in Tijam cannot be applied
here. They did not sleep on their rights, contrary to petitioners assertion.
Furthermore, when Felipe Villanueva died, an implied trust was
created by operation of law between Felipes children and Leon, their uncle,
as far as the 1/6 share of Felipe. Leons fraudulent titling of Felipes 1/6
share was a betrayal of that implied trust.

IMANI vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY
G.R. No. 187023
November 17,
2010
Facts:
On August 28, 1981, Evangeline D. Imani (petitioner) signed a
Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favor of respondent Metropolitan Bank
& Trust Company (Metrobank), with Cesar P. Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto
C. Dazo, Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales, Jr., and Nicolas Ponce as her
co-sureties. As sureties, they bound themselves to pay Metrobank whatever
indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not exceeding Six
Million Pesos (P6, 000,000.00).
Later, CPDTI obtained loans of P100,000.00 and P63,825.45,
respectively. The loans were evidenced by promissory notes signed by Cesar
and Nieves Dazo. CPDTI defaulted in the payment of its loans. Metrobank
made several demands for payment upon CPDTI, but to no avail. This
prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit against CPDTI and its sureties,
including herein petitioner. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 15717.
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
Metrobank.
The dispositive portion of the (1) Under the First Cause of Action, the
sum of P175,451.48 plus the stipulated interest, penalty charges and bank
charges from March 1, 1984 and until the whole amount is fully paid; (2)
Under the Second Cause of Action, the sum of P92,158.85 plus the
stipulated interest, penalty charges and bank charges from February 24,
1985, and until the whole amount is fully paid; (3) The sum equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the total amount due under the First and Second Cause of
Action; and (4) Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit and
expenses of litigation.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in ruling the levy on execution and the
auction sale, and for canceling the certificate of sale that occurs in the
petitioners conjugal partnership.
Ruling:
Petitioner takes exception to the CA ruling that she committed a
procedural gaffe in seeking the annulment of the writ of execution, the
auction sale, and the certificate of sale. The issue on the conjugal nature of
the property, she insists, can be adjudicated by the executing court; thus,
the RTC correctly gave due course to her motion. She asserts that it was
error for the CA to propose the filing of a separate case to vindicate her
claim.
We agree with petitioner.
The CA explained the faux pas committed by petitioner in this Under
[Section 16, Rule 39], a third-party claimant or a stranger to the foreclosure
suit, can opt to file a remedy known as terceria against the sheriff or officer
effecting the writ by serving on him an affidavit of his title and a copy
thereof upon the judgment creditor. By the terceria, the officer shall not be
bound to keep the property and could be answerable for damages. A thirdparty claimant may also resort to an independent separate action, the
object of which is the recovery of ownership or possession of the property
seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arising from wrongful seizure and
detention of the property despite the third-party claim. If a separate
action is the recourse, the third-party claimant must institute in a forum of
competent jurisdiction an action, distinct and separate from the action in
which the judgment is being enforced, even before or without need of filing
a claim in the court that issued the writ. Both remedies are cumulative and
may be availed of independently of or separately from the other. Availment
of the terceria is not a condition sine qua non to the institution of a
separate action.
It is worthy of note that Sina Imani should have availed of the remedy
of terceria authorized under Section 16 of Rule 39 which is the proper
remedy considering that he is not a party to the case against petitioner.
Instead, the trial court allowed [petitioner] to file an urgent motion to
cancel and nullify the levy of execution the auction sale and certificate of
sale over TCT No. T27957 [P](M).Petitioner then argues that it is the
ministerial duty of the levying officer to release the property the moment a
third-party claim is filed.
It is true that once a third-party files an affidavit of his title or right to
the possession of the property levied upon, the sheriff is bound to release
the property of the third-party claimant unless the judgment creditor files a
bond approved by the court. Admittedly, [petitioners] motion was already
pending in court at the time that they filed the Affidavit of Crisanto Origen,
the former owner, dated July 27, 2005.
ABSOLUTE COMMUINTY PARTY (EXCLUDED PROPERTY)

CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124642
February
23, 2004
Facts:
On September 1978, Philippine Blooming Mills Company (PBMCI)
obtained a 9-million peso loan from Allied Banking Corporation
(ABC).Alfredo Ching together with two other persons executed a continuing
guarantee with ABC binding themselves jointly and severally liable for the
PBMCI obligations.The extent of their guarantee is up to 38 million pesos.
PBMCI failed to settle the loans which amounted to P12,612,972.88
(exclusive of interests, penalties and other bank charges.)Together with the
writ of preliminary attachment, the sheriff levied (seized) the 100,000
common shares of City Corporation stocks registered solely to Alfredo
Ching.Mrs. Ching filed a petition to set aside the levy of the 100,000
common shares.According to her, the shares were purchased out of the
conjugal funds.She also argued that the loan of PBMCI did not redound to
the benefit of the conjugal partnership (or family).
Issue:
Whether or not the argument of Mrs. Ching is tenable.
Ruling:
Yes.. ABC has the burden of proof to show that the common shares
registered solely to the name of Alfredo Ching were owned by the latter.
Just because Mr. Chings name appeared as the sole registrant of the shares
in the corporate books of CityCorp, that doesnt mean that it is his exclusive
property and not to the conjugal partnership.
As held in the case of Ayala Investment and Development Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals, the court said that signing as a surety is certainly not
an exercise of an industry or profession. It is not embarking in a business.
For the conjugal partnership to become liable, it is important to show
that the family received benefits and advantages from the liability incurred.
There is no presumption that when a husband entered into an
accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership
would be benefited.
The benefits must be those directly resulting from the loan.
Therefore, Mr. Alfredo Chings common shares must not be levied
because he is not the sole owner of such stocks. The shares belong to the
conjugal partnership.
Under Article 121 of the Family Code.
EXCLUDED PROPERTY
TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 120594
10, 1997
June
Facts:
Petitioner ChiaoLiong Tan claims to be the owner of a motor vehicle,
particularly described as Isuzu Elf van, 1976 Model that he purchased in
March 1987. As owner thereof, petitioner says he has been in possession,
enjoyment and utilization of the said motor vehicle until his older brother,
Tan Ban Yong, the private respondent, took it from him.
Petitioner relies principally on the fact that the van is registered in his
name under Certificate of Registration. He claims in his testimony before
the trial court that the said motor vehicle was purchased from Balintawak
Isuzu Motor Center for a price of over P100, 000. 00; that he sent his
brother to pay for the van and the receipt fro payment was placed in his
name because it was his money that was used to pay for the vehicle; that he
allowed his brother to use the van because the latter was working for his
company, the CLT Industries; and that his brother later refused to return
the van to him and appropriated the same for himself.
On the other hand, private respondent testified that CLT Industries is
a family business that was placed in petitioners name because at that time
he was then leaving for the United Stated and petitioner remaining Filipino
in the family residing in the Philippines. When the family business needed a
vehicle in 1987 for use in the deliver of machinery to its customers, he
asked petitioner to look for a vehicle and gave him the amount of P5,000.00
to be deposited as down payment for the van, which would be available in
about a month. After a month, he himself paid the whole price out of a loan
of P140, 000.00 from his friend Tan Pit Sin. Nevertheless, respondent
allowed the registration of the vehicle in petitioners name. It was also their
understanding that he would keep the van for himself because CLT
Industries was not in a position to pay him. Hence, from the time of the
purchase, he had been in possession of the vehicle including the original
registration papers thereof, but allowing petitioner from time to time to use
the van for deliveries of machinery.
After hearing, the trial court found for the private respondent. Finding
no merit in the appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trail court.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner-appellant
ownership over the subject motor vehicle.
established
proof
of
Ruling:
No. Petitioner did not have in his possession the Certificate of
Registration of the motor vehicle and the official receipt of payment for the
same, thereby lending credence to the claim of private respondent who has
possession thereof, that he owns the subject motor vehicle. A certificate of
registration of a motor vehicle in ones name indeed creates a strong
presumption of ownership. For all practical purposes, the person in whose
favor it has been issued is virtually the owner thereof unless proved
otherwise. In other words, such presumption is rebuttable by competent
proof.
The New Civil Code recognizes cases of implied trusts other than
those enumerated therein. Thus, although no specific provision could be
cited to apply to the parties herein, it is undeniable that an implied trust
was created when the certificate of registration of the motor vehicle was
placed in the name of the petitioner although the price thereof was not paid
by him but by private respondent. The principle that a trustee who puts a
certificate of registration in his name cannot repudiate the trust relying on
the registration is one of the well-known limitations upon a title. A trust,
which derives its strength from the confidence one reposes on another
especially between brothers, does not lose that character simply because of
what appears in a legal document.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.
DISSOLUTION
IN RE ELENA BUEANAVENTURA MULLER vs. HELMUT MULLER
GR. No. 149615
August 29,
2006
Facts:
Elena Muller, petitioner, got married in to Helmut Muller, a German
national, on Hamburg dated Sept. 22, 1989. Then they resided there in a
house owned by Helmut s parents but later on sometime 1992 they
permanently resided in the Philippines. Helmut inherited the house in
Germany from his parents which he subsequently sold and used the
proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo as well as for the
construction of a house. That property was registered in the name of Elena
Muller. During their marriage they had some incompatibilities and Helmut
was alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment. With that, the
spouses eventually got separated. On September 26, 1994, Helmut,
respondent, filed a petition for separation of properties before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City.
RTC terminated the regime of absolute community of property. It
ruled that the separation of properties shall be applied between the
petitioner and respondent. The RTC ordered the equal partition of personal
properties located within the Philippines, except those acquired by
gratuitous title during their marriage. In relation to the property,
respondent cannot recover his funds expensed since it was a violation
of Section7, Article XII of the Constitution which prohibits aliens from
procuring private lands.
The Court of Appeals ruled that there was no provision in the

Constitution which specifically prevents Helmut from procuring private
land. With that decision it also ordered Elena to reimburse him accordingly.
Issue:
Whether or not Helmut Muller, respondent, is entitled to be
reimbursed by Elena Muller, petitioner, with the funds used to purchase the
property in Antipolo and to construct the house.
Ruling:
No, Helmut cannot seek reimbursement because it was clear that he
willingly and knowingly bought the property using the proceeds of his sold
inherited property in Germany despite the constitutional prohibition. It is
provided in the Constitution that alien cant own lands here in the
Philippines and this provision is absolute only to the exception of lands here
in the Philippines inherited. With that violation he is not favored in any way
in the case. Also, reimburse is considered a fruit of the property, with that
Helmut cant claim the fruits as well.
COMPONENTS OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP GAINS

ANTONIA R. DELA PEA vs GEMMA REMILYN C. AVILA
G.R. No. 187490
February 8, 2012
Facts:
A parcel of residential land, together with the improvements in
Marikina City was previously registered in the name of petitioner Antonia R.
Dela Pea (Antonia), married to Antegono A. Dela Pea (Antegono). On 7
May 1996, Antonia obtained from A.C. Aguila & Sons, Co. (Aguila) a loan in
the sum of P250,000.00 secured by a Promissory Note and notarized Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage over the property.
On 4 November 1997, Antonia executed a notarized Deed of Absolute
Sale over the property to Gemma Remilyn C. Avila (Gemma with that it
resulted to naming Gemma as the owner of the subject realty on the
Registry of Deeds. On 26 November 1997, Gemma also constituted a real
estate mortgage over said parcel to Far East Bank and Trust Company [now
Bank of the Philippine Islands] (FEBTC-BPI), to secure a loan facility

evidenced by the Promissory Notes
On 3 March 1998, in the meantime, Antonia filed with the Register of
Deeds of Marikina an Affidavit of Adverse Claim that she was the true and
lawful owner of the property which had been titled in the name of Gemma.
Gemma failed to pay the principal as well as the accumulated interest and
penalties on the loans she obtained hence, FEBTC-BPI caused the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted over the
property. FEBTC-BPI later consolidated its ownership over the realty and
caused the same to be titled in its name.
On 18 May 1998, Antonia and her son filed against Gemma the
complaint for annulment of deed, claiming that the subject realty was
conjugal property.
Issue:
Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Antonia to
Gemma is null and void
Whether or not the FEBTC-BPI is a mortgagee/purchaser in bad faith.
Ruling:
No, Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife. Although it is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired
with funds of the partnership, proof of acquisition during the marriage is an
essential condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the
conjugal partnership.
Since foreclosure of the mortgage is but the necessary consequence
of non-payment of the mortgage debt,FEBTC-BPI was, likewise, acting well
within its rights as mortgagee when it foreclosed the real estate mortgage
on the property upon Gemmas failure to pay the loans secured thereby.
COMPONENTS OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP GAINS

TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs. MANUEL DAVID SR.
G.R. No. 169548
March 15,
2010
Facts:
Manuel A. David, Sr. (Manuel) and Martha S. David (Martha) were
married on March 25, 1957. In 1970, the spouses acquired a lot located at
White Plains, Quezon City. In 1976, the spouses separated, and no longer
communicated with each other. March 1995, Manuel discovered that
Martha had previously sold the property to Titan Construction Corporation
(Titan) with which the previous title registered in the Register of Deeds was
replaced. March 13, 1996, Manuel filed a Complaintfor Annulment of
Contract against Titan CC. Manuel alleged that the sale executed by Martha
in favor of Titan was without his knowledge therefore void. He prayed that
the Deed of Sale be invalidated, that the property be returned to the
spouses with a new title be issued in their names.
Titan claimed that it was a buyer in good faith and for value because
it relied on a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) by Manuel which authorized
Martha to dispose of the property on behalf of the spouses. Manuel claimed
that the SPA was spurious, and that the signature purporting to be his was a
forgery; hence, Martha was wholly without authority to sell the property.
Subsequently, Manuel filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended
Complaintwhich was granted by the trial court. Thus, on October 15, 1996,
Manuel filed an Amended Complaint. Martha failed to file an answer so she
was declared in default.
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of sale is null and void.
Ruling:
Yes, since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal
partnership, the sale to Titan required the consent of both spouses. Article
165 of the Civil Code expressly provides that the husband is the
administrator of the conjugal partnership. Likewise, Article 172 of the
Civil Code ordains that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership
without the husbands consent, except in cases provided by law. Similarly,
Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any disposition or encumbrance
of conjugal property must have the written consent of the
other spouse, otherwise, such disposition is void.
LIABILITIES/ CHARGES
AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 1185305
February
12, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC)
granted a loan to Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) amounting
P50,300,000.00 loan. Respondent Alfredo Ching, Exec. Vice President PBM,
executed security agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making
him jointly and severally liable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM
failed to pay the loan with that, AIDC filed a complaint against PBM and
Ching.
In the RTCs decision it ordered PBM and Ching to jointly and
severally pay AIDC the principal amount plus the interests. RTC issued a
writ of execution of pending appeal. Then, deputy sheriff Magsajo caused
issuance and service upon respondents- Ching spouses of a notice of sheriff
sale on three of their conjugal properties.
Spouses Ching filed a case of injunction against petitioner alleging
that petitioner cannot enforce the judgment against conjugal partnership
levied on the ground that the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of
the said conjugal partnership. Upon application of private respondents, the
RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to prevent Magsajo from
proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of execution and with the sale
of the said properties at public auction.
Issue:
Whether or not the loan acquired by PBM from Ayala Investments as
guaranteed by Alfredo Ching be redounded to the conjugal partnership of
the spouses.
Ruling:
The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of
PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. AIDC
failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains. PBM as a corporation has a personality distinct and
separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they happened to be
stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt
and right of recourse to Ching as surety is only to the extent of his
corporate ownership.
The contract of loan between AIDC and PMB guaranteed by Ching

was clearly for the benefit of PMB and not for the Ching with his family.
Ching only signed as a surety for the loan contracted with AIDC in behalf of
PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or
profession. With that, the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for
the surety agreement which was clearly for the benefit of PBM.
DISPOSITION
THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. vs. ESTER L. SERVACIO
G.R. No. 157537
September 7, 2011
Facts:
Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land to Protacio B. Go, Jr.
(Protacio Jr.). Twenty three years later Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his
father, Protacio Go Sr. (Protacio Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two
parcels of land (the property). Marta Barola Go died wife of Protacio, Sr.
Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go sold a portion of the property to Ester L.
Servacio (Servacio).
The petitioners, Heirs of Go Sr., demanded the return of the property,
but Servacio did not follow their demand in which the petitioners decided to
sue Servacio. According to the petitioners, they contend that with the
Protacio Jr.s renunciation, the property became conjugal property of the
spouses Go Sr. and his wife. They also contend that the sale of the property
to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property
between spouses Go Sr. and his Marta was null and void.
RTC affirmed the validity of the sale declaring that the property was
the conjugal property of Protacio Sr. and Marta, not then exclusive property
of Protacio Sr., because the sale includes the children of Marta, that the
participation had been by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta- that
under Article 160 of the Civil Code. The law states that when the property
all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage is conjugal
unless there is a proof that the property thus acquired pertained exclusively.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale by Protacio Sr with some of his children to
Servacio was void because it was made without prior liquidation.
Ruling:
No. Since Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the affectivity
of the Family Code. Their property relation was properly considered as a
conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code. With Martas death, the
conjugal partnership was dissolved pursuant to Article175 (1) of the Civil
Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and
the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the
conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation.
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of
Martas share in the conjugal partnership, could not claim title to any
specific portion of Martas share without an actual partition of the property
being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all
that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Martas share and as a coowner he could sell his undivided share, he had the right to freely sell and
dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.
DISPOSITION
JOE A. ROS vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK - LAOAG BRANCH
G.R. No. 170166
April
6, 2011
Facts:
Joe Ros obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on
October 14, 1974 and as security for the loan, petitioner, Ros, executed a
real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land with all the. Upon maturity,
the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial
sale, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB, Laoag as the highest
bidder. After the lapse of one (1) year without the property being redeemed,
the property was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB, Laoag
Branch on August 10, 1978.
Estrella Agueta, wife of Joe Ros claims that she has no knowledge of
the loan obtained by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage
instituted on the conjugal property. On January 13, 1983, spouses Ros and
Agueta filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and
consolidation of the property interposing the defense that her signatures
affixed on the documents were forged and that the loan did not redound to
the benefit of the family. PNB seeks for the dismissal of the complaint for
lack of cause of action, and insists that it was petitioners own acts of
omission that bar them from recovering the subject property on the ground
of estoppel, laches, abandonment and prescription.
The Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioners declaring deed of real
estate mortgage Null and Void and ordered the Register of Deeds to rename
the title of the lot to the petitioners. Upon PNBs appeal, the Appellate
Court reversed the decision of the Trial Court and dismissed the complaint
of the petitioners. The Petitioners then petitioned for review to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the debt/loan was chargeable to the conjugal property.
Ruling:
Yes. At the time of the mortgage the Civil Code was the applicable law.
Article 161 of the Civil Code enumerated the instances of which the
spouses-conjugal partnership shall be liable and paragraph (1) one of the
said provision states all debts and obligations contracted by the husband
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the
wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the
partnership. The loan was used for additional working capital for their
family business hence, it is considered that such loan was acquired for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership and not merely for the benefit of Ros.
DISPOSITION
MARIO SIOCHI vs. ALFREDO GOZON
G.R. No. 169900
2010
March 18,
Facts:
A parcel of land was registered TCT No. 5357 in the name of
AlfredoGozon. On 23 December 1991, Elvira Gozon, Alfredos wife, filed a
petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo. After a month,
Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, which was then annotated on the title of
the land. While the legal separation case of the spouses was still pending,
Alfredo and Mario Siochi entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell which
was also annotated on the title of the land. After granting the decree of
legal separation, Alfredo executed a Deed of Donation over the property in
favor of their daughter, Winifred Gozon. The Register of Deeds of Malabon,
cancelled TCT No. 5357 and issued TCT No. M-10508 in the name of
Winifred, without annotating the Agreement and the notice of lis pendis on
TCT No.M-10508.
October 26, 1994 when Alfredo sold the property to Inter-Dimensional
Realty, Inc (IDRI). Through a Special Power of Attorney executed in favor of
Winifred. Subsequently, the Register of Deeds of Malabon cancelled TCT
No. M-10508 and issued TCT No. M-10976 to IDRI. Mario then filed a
complaint for Specific Performance and Damages, Annulment of Donation
and Sale with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order.
Issues:
a) Whether or not Mario can invoke his right over the property due to
the Agreement to Buy and Sell he entered with Alfredo.
b) Whether or not IDRI can invoke right over the property due to the
Sale entered with Alfredo.
Ruling:
No. Alfredo was the sole administrator of the conjugal
property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated in fact, was
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property. Still,
Alfredo cant sell said property without the written consent of Elvira or
given authority of the court. Without consent or authority, the agreement is
void.
No. IDRI is not a buyer in good faith. IDRI had actual knowledge of
facts regarding the property hence it should seek further inquiries about
the vendors title to the property. Besides, had IDRI been more prudent
before buying the property, it would have discovered that Alfredos donation
of the property to Winifred was without the consent of Elvira. Under Article
125 of the Family Code, a conjugal property cannot be donated by one
spouse without the consent of the other spouse. Clearly, IDRI was not a
buyer in good faith.
DISPOSITION
SPOUSES AGGABAO vs. PARULAN, JR.
G.R. No. 165803
September 1, 2010
Facts:
Real estate broker Marta Atanacio offered 2 lots to the spouses
Aggabao on January 1991. On February 2, 1991, the petitioners met up with
Elena Parulan at the site of the property and showed them the following
documents: (a.) Owners original copy of the TCT of the 2 lots; (b.) tax
declarations; (c.) a copy of the special power of attorney dated January 7,
1991 executed by Dionisio Parulan authorizing Elena to sell the property.
On March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the final amount of
their balance to Elena, who executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor.
However, Elena did not turn over the owners duplicate copy of the TCT
claiming that said copy was in the possession of a relative who was then in
Hongkong. She assured them that the owners duplicate copy of TCT would
be turned over after a week.
On March 19, 1991, TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued in
the name of the petitioners. Elena did not turn over the duplicate owners
copy of TCT as promised. Thus, on April 15, 1991, Dionisio commenced an
action vs Elena Parulan and the Aggabao spouses praying for the
declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma.
Elena, and the cancellation of the title issued to the petitioners by virtue
thereof. In turn, the petitioners, Aggabao spouses and Elena Parulan, filed
on July 12, 1991 their own action for specific performance with damages
against the respondent. On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 136, in Makati City annulled the deed of absolute sale executed in
favor of the petitioners.
Issue:
Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the
Family Code should apply to the sale of the conjugal property executed
without the consent of Dionisio?
Ruling:
The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the
effectivity of the Family Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article
124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any alienation or encumbrance
of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is
governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership

property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife
for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date
of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance
without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors.
Next, according to Article 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of
the Family Code may apply retroactively provided no vested rights are
impaired. Herein, however, the petitioners did not show any vested right in
the property acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their situation
from the retroactive application of the Family Code. Also, the petitioners
failed to substantiate their contention that Dionisio, while holding the
administration over the property, had delegated to his brother, Atty. Parulan,
the administration of the property, considering that they did not present in
court the SPA granting to Atty. Parulan the authority for the administration.
DISPOSITION
MANUEL FUENTES vs. CONRADO ROCA
G.R. No. 178902
21, 2010
April
Facts:
Sabina Tarroza owned a land in Canelar, Zamboanga City and she sold
it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. Six
years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel
and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses) and eventually they entered into
an agreement. After 6 months, a new title was issued in the name of the
spouses
who
immediately
constructed
a
building
on
the
lot. Thereafter Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who died
nine months afterwards.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario,
namely, respondents (collectively, the Rocas), filed an action for annulment
of sale and re-conveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses before
the RTC. The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since
Tarcianos wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on
the affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the property
be reconvened to them upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes
spouses paid Tarciano.The spouses denied the Rocas allegations. They
presented Atty. Plagata who testified that he personally saw Rosario sign
the affidavit at her residence. All the same, the Fuentes spouses pointed out
that the claim of forgery was personal to Rosario and she alone could
invoke it. Besides, the four-year prescriptive period for nullifying the sale on
ground of fraud had already lapsed.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the signature of Rosario representing her consent was
forged.
b) Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that
sale to the spouses already prescribed?
c) Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had,
could bring the action to annul that sale?
Ruling:
Yes it was forged as the Supreme Court ruled. A defective notarization
will merely strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a
private instrument that falsified jurat, taken together with the marks of
forgery in the signature, dooms such document as proof of Rosarios
consent to the sale of the land. That the Fuentes spouses honestly relied on
the notarized affidavit as proof of Rosarios consent does not matter. The
sale is still void without an authentic consent.
No. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold
the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few
months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. The Family
Code applied for this case. The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title
VI, Book I of the Civil Code on Property Relations between Husband and
Wife. Further, the Family Code provisions were also made to apply to
already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested rights.
Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the
wife who gave no consent may assail her husbands sale of the real
property. It simply provides that without the other spouses written consent
or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. Here,
the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment
of sale and re-conveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without
their mothers (his wifes) written consent. The passage of time did not
erode the right to bring such an action.
Yes. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning.
Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario
despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the
property to their heirs.
DISSOLUTION
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO.vs. NICHOLSON PASCUAL
G.R. No. 163744
February
29, 2008
Facts:
Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga got married on
1985. During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen
Sering a 250-square meter lot in with an apartment standing thereon. On
year 1994, Florencia filed suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity on part of Nelson under Article 36 of

the Family Code. RTC declared the marriage null and void. Also, it ordered
the dissolution and liquidation of the ex- spouses' conjugal partnership of
gains. The spouses werent able to liquidate their conjugal partnership even
after the declaration of their legal separation.
Sometime in 1997, Florencia with Sps. Norberto and Elvira Oliveros
obtained a loan from petitioner, Metrobank secured the obligation several
Real Estate Mortgage (REM) on their properties including one involving the
lot bought from Sering and showed a waiver made in favor of Florencia,
covering the conjugal properties with her ex-husband, but did not
incidentally include the lot in question (bought from Sering).
When Florencia and Sps. Oliveros failed to pay their loan due,
Metrobank initiated foreclosure proceedings and caused the publication of
auction sale on 3 issues of the REMs. Nicholson filed a Complaint to
declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property alleging that
the property, which is conjugal, was mortgaged without his consent.
Metrobank in its answer: Alleged that the lot registered in the name of
Florencia was paraphernalia. Metrobank also asserted having approved the
mortgage in good faith. Florencia was declared in default for failure to file
an answer within reglementary period. RTc declared the REM Invalid and
Metrobank is mortgagee in bad faith on account of negligence. The CA
affirmed the RTCs decision. Petitioner then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage between the
respondents dissolved the regime of community of property of the
spouses.
b) Whether the lot in question was conjugal and rendered the REM over
the lot invalid.
Ruling:
No. The mere declaration of nullity of marriage, without more, does
not authomatically result in a regime of complete separation when it is
shown that there was no liquidation of the conjugal assets.While the
declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their
marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the
properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal
properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership.
No.Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property relationship
between the former spouses, where:Each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto and
he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the coowners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her undivided
interests in the disputed party even without the consent of Nicholson.
However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2
undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage contract
insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null
and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undivided
half.
LIQUIDATION
BRIGIDO QUIOA vs. RITA QUIAO
G.R. No. 176556
July
4, 2012
Facts:
Respondent Rita Quiao, the offended spouse, filed a legal separation
against the petitioner Brigido Quiao on October 26, 2000 before the RTC.
The decision of the court dated October 10, 2005 declared the legal
separation, custody of children to Rita, equal partition on the personal and
real properties, and forfeiture on the part of Brigido the net profits earned
from the conjugal properties in favor of the common children. Neither party
filed a Motion for Reconsideration and appealed within the required period
for legal separation. December 12, 2005, Rita filed a Motion for Execution
and was later on granted.
Brigido file a Motion for Clarification on the net profit earned. The
Court defined it asthe remainder of the properties of the parties after
deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts
basing on Articles 63 and 43 of the Family Code. Brigido filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on September 8, 2006. Though the petition was after the
required prescriptive period, the court granted the petition since its
purpose was to clarify the meaning of the net profit earned. With that on
November 8, 2006 the court ordered that the net profit earned be based
on the Article 102 of the family Code.
November 21, 2006, the respondent, Rita, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (MR) praying for the reversal of the Nov. 8, 2006 court
order. The Court then granted the MR. Brigido then filed a Petition for
Review questioning the following: dissolution and liquidation of the common
properties, meaning of the net profit earned, and the law governing the
property relation between him and Rita.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can question decision by the RTC dated
October 10, 2005.
Ruling:
No. Brigido wasnt able to timely appeal the decision of the court
dated October 10, 2005, thus, the decision on that date is deemed final and
executory hence, he had slept on his right to question.The respondent tied
the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of the exchange of
marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A.
No. 386) and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the
property relations between the petitioner and the respondent is the system
of relative community or conjugal partnership of gain. And under this

property relation, "the husband and the wife place in a common fund the
fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or
industry." The husband and wife also own in common all the property of the
conjugal partnership of gains. the time of the dissolution of the petitioner
and the respondent's marriage the operative law is already the Family Code,
the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is
Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family
Code. The latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of
the Family Code "this Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other law."
VOID MARRIAGES OR LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIPS

ALAIN DIO vs. MA CARIDAD DIO
G.R. No. 178044
19, 2011
January
Facts:
Petitioner Alain M. Dio and respondent Caridad L. Dio have beenchi
ldhood friends and sweethearts. They lived together for ten years thensepar
ated. After two years, they reunited and later on decided to get married.
However, Alain filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of marriage based
on the psychological incapacity (Article 36 of the Family Code) of Caridad.
Healleged that Caridad failed to give him love and support throughout
theirmarriage and was irresponsible, unfaithful, and prodigal. He also
alleged that Caridad tends to be violent toward him. Extrajudicial service of
summons was sent to Caridad who was living in the United Stated at that
time. She did file any answer within the reglementary period. It was also
learned that she already filed a divorce in the United States, which was
granted by the Superior Court of California, and is now married to another
man. The prosecutor of Las Pias declared that there was no collusion
between the two parties.
A
psychological
report
was
submitted
stating that Caridad was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder
which rooted from her early formative years and which was founded to be
long-lasting and incurable.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree
of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code.
Ruling:
Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must
be present: 1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each
other; 2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and 3.
Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void. All
these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article
147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between Alian and
Caridad. The Court agrees with Alain that the trial court erred in ordering
that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after
liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties properties under
Article 147 of theFamily Code. The ruling has no basis because Section
19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and
148 of the Family Code. Section19(1) of the Rule provides: Sec. 19.
PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE

MARGARET MAXEY vs THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-45870
May
11, 1984
Facts:
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in 1903.
They were united in 1903 in a marriage performed "in the military fashion".
During the period of their (Melbourne and Regina) cohabitation, or in 1911
and 1912, respectively, the late Melbourne Maxey acquired the parcels of
land before their 1919 church marriage. Regina Morales Maxey died in
1919 sometime after the church wedding. The husband remarried and in
1953, his second wife Julia Pamatluan, using a power of attorney, sold the
properties to the respondent spouses, Mr. and Mrs. Beato C. Macayra.
Plaintiffs, children of Maxey and Morales, instituted the present case
on January 26, 1962, before the Court of First Instance of Davao, praying
for the annulment of the documents of sale covering the subject parcels of
land and to recover possession thereof with damages from the herein
defendants-spouses, alleging, among others, that the aforesaid realties were
common properties of their parents, having been acquired during their
lifetime and through their joint effort and capital.
The trial court applied Article 144 of the Civil Code which provide
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are
not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. Thus,
the property in question is owned both by Maxey and Morales in which the
sale of the property by Maxey alone was invalid.
The Court of Appeals adjudged that the property was exclusive
property of Melbourne Maxey thus the sale was valid making the buyer,
Spouses Macayra, the absolute owner of the land.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the military fashion marriage of Maxey and
Morales was recognized as valid.
b) Whether or not the property in question is co-owned by Maxey and
Morales applying Article 144 of the Civil Code.
Ruling:
No. Maxey and Morales were legally married at a church wedding
solemnized on February 16, 1919. Since Act No. 3613 was approved on
December 4, 1929 and took effect six months thereafter, it could not have
applied to a relationship commenced in 1903 and legitimized in 1919

through a marriage performed according to law. The marriage law in 1903
was General Order No. 70. There is no provision in General Order No. 68 as
amended nor in Act No. 3613 which would recognize as an exception to the
general rule on valid marriages, a so called "Military fashion" ceremony or
arrangement.
Yes. As far as there was no vested right that would be impaired or
prejudiced by applying Article 144 then it shall be applied retroactively. The
properties were sold in 1953 when the new Civil Code was already in full
force and effect. Neither can this be said of the rights of the private
respondents as vendees insofar as one half of the questioned properties are
concerned as this was still open to controversy on account of the legitimate
claim of Regina Morales to a share under the applicable law. The disputed
properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and the estate of
his late wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold. Technically speaking,
the petitioners should return one-half of the purchase price of the land
while the private respondents should pay some form of rentals for their use
of one-half of the properties. Equitable considerations, however, lead us to
rule out rentals on one hand and return on the other.

SUSAN NICDAO CARIO vs. SUSAN YEE CARIO
GR No. 132529
February 2,
2001
Facts:
SPO4 Santiago CArio married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June
20, 1969, with whom he had two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On
November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cario also married respondent Susan Yee. In
1988, SPO4 Cario became bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis, and
died on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his
medical and burial expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary
benefits and financial assistance from various government agencies
pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from
MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee received a
total of P21,000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance.
On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against
NIcdao, praying that Nicdao be ordered to return to her at least one-half of
the P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For failing to file her answer, NIcdao
was declared in default.
Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during
the subsistence of and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity
of the marriage between Nicdao and Cario. But she claimed good faith,
having no knowledge of the previous marriage until at the funeral where
she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. Yee
submitted that Carios marriage to Nicdao was void because it was
solemnized without the required marriage license.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void.
b) Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is entitled
to collect the death benefits from government agencies despite the
nullity of their marriage.
Ruling:
No. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the
parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of
the case. Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence therof, subject
to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.
No. It does not follow, however, that since the marriage of Nicdao
and the deceased was void ab initio, the death benefits would now be
awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for
purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage; otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. One of
the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the
property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime.
Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable
property regime would be not absolute community nor conjugal partnership
of property, but governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the
Family Code, on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.

ANTONIO VALDES vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
G.R. No. 122749
31, 1996
July
Facts:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and
begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of
nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which
was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of
their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding
the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without
marriage. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint
affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
Issue:
Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of
the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the
rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party
who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

NOEL BUENAVENTURA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. Nos. 127358 & G.R. Nos. 127449
March 31, 2005
Facts:
Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground that both he and his wife were psychologically
incapacitated. The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage entered into
between petitioner and respondent null and violation ordered the
liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered
petitioner a regular support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000
monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises, and awarded the
care and custody of the minor to his mother. Petitioner appealed before the
CA. While the appeal was pending, the CA, upon respondents motion issued
a resolution increasing the support pendants. The CA dismissal petitioner
appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision. Petitioner
motion
for
reconsideration
was
denied,
hence
this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.
Ruling:
Yes. Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a
bigamous marriage, the provisions of article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42
and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute
community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do not
apply. Rather the general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is
declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable to be liquidated,
partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were
found, both by the RTC and the CA, to have been acquired during the union
of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of
a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or
involved in said distribution.
VOID MARRIAGES
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN
G.R. No. 155409
June 8, 2007
Facts:
Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who
once had a blissful married life and out of which were blessed to have a son.
However, their once sugar coated romance turned bitter when petitioner
discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her
paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery
against private respondent and the latter's paramour. Consequently, both
accused were convicted of the crime charged.
Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains and Damages imputing psychological incapacity on the
part of the petitioner. During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and
private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the repudiation of the
AGREEMENT. This motion was denied. Petitioner then filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals on the ground that the
conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery disqualify her from
sharing in the conjugal property. The Petition was dismissed.
Issue:
Is the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery a
disqualification for her to share in the conjugal property?
Ruling:
No. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil
interdiction. Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the
consequences of civil interdiction:
Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. Civil interdiction shall deprive the
offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority,
or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital
authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of
such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be
read with Article 43 of the same Code. The latter provides:
Art. 43. Prision correccional Its accessory penalties. The penalty
of prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public
office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said
imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the
disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the
principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the
pardon.
It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA that the crime of
adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which
deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of
such property inter vivos.
VOID MARRIAGES
BARRETO GONZALES vs. GONZALES
G.R. No. 159521
March 7, 1933
Facts:
The plaintiff & defendant were both citizens of the Philippines,
married & lived together fromJanuary 1919 until Spring of 1926. After
which they voluntary separated & have not lived together as man & wife,
they had 4 minor children together. After negotiations, both parties
mutually agreed to allow Manuela Barreto (plaintiff) for her &
her childrens support of P500 (five hundred pesos) monthly which to be
increased in cases of necessity & illness, and that the title of certain
properties be put in her name.
Shortly after the agreement, Augusto Gonzales (defendant), when to
Reno, Nevada & secured inthat jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the
ground of desertion dated November 28, 1927. Onthat same date he went
through the forms of marriage with another Filipino citizen as well & had
3children with her. When Gonzales left the Philippines, he reduced the
amount he had agreed to pay monthly for thesupport of Manuela Barreto &
her children & has not made the payments fixed in the Renodivorce as
alimony. Gonzales came back to the Philippines in August 1928 and shortly
after, Barreto brought anaction at the CFI-Manila requesting to confirm &
ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courtsof Nevada & invoked sec 9
of Act 2710. Such is requested to be enforced, and deliver to theGuardian
ad litem the equivalent of what would have been due to their children as
their legalportion from respective estates had their parents died intestate
on November 28, 1927, they alsoprayed that the marriage existing between
Barreto & Gonzales be declared dissolved & Gonzalesbe ordered to pay
Barreto P500 per month, counsel fees of P5000 & all the expenses incurred
ineducating the 3 minor sons. The guardians of the children also filed
as intervenors in the case.
After the hearing, the CFI-Manila granted the judgement in favor of
the plaintiff & intervenors, butreduced the attorneys fees to P3000 instead
& also granted the costs of the action against thedefendant, Hence, this
appeal by Gonzales saying that the lower court erred in their decision.
Issue:
Whether or not any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the
Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a
cause, and under conditions for which the courts of the PhilippineIslands
would grant a divorce.
Ruling:
No. The lower court erred in granting the relief as prayed for on
granting the divorce, because: The court said that securing the jurisdiction
of the courts to recognize & approve the divorcedone in Reno, Nevada
cannot be done according to the public policy in this jurisdiction on
thequestion of divorce. Its clear in Act No. 2710 & court decisions on cases
such as Goitia VS. Campos Rueda that theentire conduct of the parties from
the time of their separation until the case was submitted prayingthe
ratification of the Reno Divorce was clearly a circumvention of the law
regarding divorce & willbe done under conditions not authorized by our
laws. The matrimonial domicile of the couple had always been the
Philippines & the residence acquiredby the husband in Reno, Nevada was a
bona fide residence & did not confer jurisdiction upon thecourt of that state
to dissolve the matrimonial bonds in which he had entered in 1919.
Art 9 & Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Law of the Philippines
does not allow such to bedone, the effect of foreign divorce in the
Philippines says that litigants cannot compel thecourts to approve of their
own actions or permit the personal relations of the Citizens of the
Philippines to be affected by decrees of divorce of foreign courts in manner
which out government believes is contrary to public order & good morals.
VOID MARRIAGES
MERCADO-FEHR vs. FEHR
G.R. No. 152716
October 23, 2003
Facts:
In March 1983, after 2 years of long-distance courtship, Elna left
Cebuand moved in with Bruno in Manila. They had their first child in
December thesame year. They purchased a condominium unit (Suite 204) at
LGCcondominium by a contract TO sell dated July 26, 1983. They got
married inMarch 1985. In 1998, trial court declared the marriage between
Elna and Bruno,void ab initio under FC 36 and subsequently ordered the
liquidation of theirconjugal partnership. The court found Suite 204 to be
exclusive property of Bruno because it was purchased on installment basis
using Brunos exclusivefunds prior to the marriage. Their properties

were also divided into 3 (1/3-Elna;1/3-Bruno; 1/3-2 children).
Issue:
Whether or not Suite 204 is Brunos exclusive property
Ruling:
No. The Family Code, Article 147 applies in this case because 1) both
of them were capacitated tomarry each other; 2) they lived exclusively as
husband and wife; and 3) theirunion is without the benefit of marriage or
their marriage is void. Evidenceshows that the property was acquired
during their cohabitation and in applyingFC 147, the rules on co-ownership
should govern. Suite 204 must be consideredas common property of Elna
and Bruno. 3-way partition of properties does not apply also. Property
regime should be divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership
BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS, ETC. RELATIONSHIPS

SUSAN NICDAO-CARINO vs. SUSAN YEE CARINO
GR No. 132529
February 2, 2001
Facts:
SPO4 Santiago CArio married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20,
1969, with whom he had two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November
10, 1982, SPO4 Cario also married respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4
Cario became bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis, and died on

November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical
and burial expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and
financial assistance from various government agencies pertaining to the
deceased. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCVI,
commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee received a total of
P21,000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance.
On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against
NIcdao, praying that Nicdao be ordered to return to her at least one-half of
the P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For failing to file her answer, Nicdao
was declared in default. Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased
took place during the subsistence of and without first obtaining a judicial
declaration of nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and Cario. But she
claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous marriage until at
the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of the
deceased. Yee submitted that Carios marriage to Nicdao was void because
it was solemnized without the required marriage license.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void;
b) Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is entitled to
collect the death benefits from government agencies despite the
nullity of their marriage.
Ruling:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void.
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes,
such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime,
or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case.
Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence therof, subject to certain
exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. It does not follow, however,
that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void ab initio, the
death benefits would now be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40
of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior
judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before
a party can enter into a second marriage; otherwise, the second marriage
would also be void.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the
separation of the property.
BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS, etc. RELATIONSHIPS

GUILLERMA TUMLOS vs.SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and
LOURDES FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 137650
April 12, 2000
Facts:
On July 5, 1996, the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute
owners of an apartment building located at ARTE SUBDIVISION III, Lawang
Bato, Valenzuela, Metro Manila; that through tolerance they had allowed
Guillerma, petitioner, Toto and Gina Tumlos to occupy the apartment
building for the last seven (7) years, since 1989, without the payment of any
rent; that it was agreed upon that after a few months, defendant Guillerma
Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while the other promised to pay
P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which agreement was not complied with
by the said defendants.
She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of
action against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject premises as
evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a covendee of the property in question together with Mario Fernandez.
Mario Fernandez and Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and that
they acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was further
alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their
two (2) children for around ten (10) years, and that Guillerma administered
the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments,
until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his
marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Guillerma Tumlos is the co-owner of the
property by virtue of cohabiting with Mario Fernandez who is legally
married to Lourdez Fernandez.
Ruling:
In the present case Article 148 of the family Code shall apply. Article
148 states that In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding
Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to

absence of proof to the contrary,
shares are presumed to be equal.
apply to joint deposits of money and
their respective contributions. In the

their contributions and corresponding
The same rule and presumption shall
evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in

the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage.
Guillerma Tumlos fail to present an evidence of her actual
contribution to the purchase of the property. In Article 148 did not include
also administration of the property as contribution, it is unsubstantiated.

JOSEFINA C. FRANCISCO vs. MASTER IRON WORKS
G.R. No. 151967
February 16, 2005
Facts:
On January 15, 1983, Eduardo and Josefina Francisco got married. On
August 31, 1984, Josefina purchased two parcels of lands. The Registry of
Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of title in the name of Josefina Castillo
Francisco married to Eduardo G. Francisco. On January 13, 1986, Josefina
mortgaged the said property to Leonila Cando. It appears that Eduardo
affixed his marital conformity to the deed.
On June 11, 1990, Eduardo bought 7,500 bags of cement from Master
Iron Works and Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay the
same. The court issued writ of execution levying the two parcel of land as
for payment to MIWCC.
On July 3, 1994, Josefina executed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim
over the two parcel of land in which she claimed that they were her
paraphernal property, and that her husband had no proprietary right or
interest over them as evidenced by his affidavit of waiver, a copy of which
she attached to her affidavit.
Before she could commence presenting her evidence against MIWCC,
Josefina filed a petition to annul her marriage to Eduardo in the RTC of
Paraaque, on the ground that when they were married on January 15,
1983, Eduardo was already married to one Carmelita Carpio.
On September 9, 1996, the RTC of Paraaque rendered judgment,
declaring the marriage between Josefina and Eduardo as null and void for
being bigamous.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject properties were paraphernal property of
Josefina and cannot be held liable for the Eduardos personal obligations.
Ruling:
No. The subject properties are not the paraphernal property of
Josefina and can be held to answer the liabilities of Eduardo.
Even though Eduardo and Josefinas marriage is bigamous, the
properties cannot be held conjugal, Josefina failed to adduce preponderance
of evidence that she contributed money, property or industry in the
acquisition of the subject property and hence, is not a co-owner of such.
Also, the Court doubted that when she acquired the property at 23 years of
age, she had enough funds to pay for it. Her claim that the funds for the
property were provided by her mother and sister, the Court believed, was
just an afterthought.

MILAGROS JOAQUINO a.k.a. MILAGROS J. REYES vs. LOURDES
REYES, MERCEDES, MANUEL, MIRIAM and RODOLFO JR.
G.R. No. 154645
July 13, 2004
Facts:
In the marriage between Lourdes Reyes and the deceased husband
Rodolfo Reyes, Rodolfo has an illicit relationship with Milagros Joaquino.
The deceased allegedly "put into custody" some of the couple's conjugal
properties to Milagros.
On July 12,1979, there is a transfer of property in favor of the
petitioner and for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 90293 of the
Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District IV was issued in the name of
petitioner Milagros B. Joaquino. The complainant alleges that that the funds
used to purchase the property were conjugal funds and earnings of the
deceased.
The complaint finally alleges that the deceased had two cars in
petitioners possession and that the real and personal properties in
petitioners possession are conjugal partnership properties of the spouses
Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo A. Reyes and one-half belongs exclusively to
respondent Lourdes P. Reyes and the other half to the estate of Rodolfo A.
Reyes to be apportioned among the other respondents as his forced heirs.
Respondents therefore, pray that the property covered by T.C.T. No. 90293
be declared conjugal property of the spouses Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo
A. Reyes and that petitioner be ordered to reconvey the property in
respondents favor; that the two cars in petitioners possession be delivered
to respondents and that petitioner be made to pay actual, compensatory and
moral damages to respondents as well as attorneys fees.
Issue:
Whether or not the common law relationship between Milagros
Joaquino and the deceases validates her claim of ownership.
Ruling:
No. Under Article 145 of the Civil Code, a conjugal partnership of
gains (CPG) is created upon marriage and lasts until the legal union is
dissolved by death, annulment, legal separation or judicial separation of
property. Conjugal properties are by law owned in common by the husband
and wife. As to what constitutes such properties are laid out in Article 153
of the Code, which we quote:
"(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the
spouses, or of either of them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage,
coming from the common property or from the exclusive property of
each spouse."
Moreover, under Article 160 of the Code, all properties of the
marriage, unless proven to pertain to the husband or the wife exclusively,
are presumed to belong to the CPG. For the rebuttable presumption to
arise, however, the properties must first be proven to have been acquired
during the existence of the marriage.
In default of Article 144 of the Civil Code, Article 148 of the Family
Code has been applied. Thus, when a common-law couple has a legal
impediment to marriage, only the property acquired by them -- through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry -- shall be
owned by them in common and in proportion to their respective
contributions. Milagros likewise failed to prove that she was indeed
financially capable of purchasing the house and lot, that she actually
contributed to the payments, and that she was employed any time after
1961 when the property was purchased. The Certification and Affidavits
stating that she borrowed money from her siblings and had earnings from a
jewelry business were also deemed to have no probative values, they were
not cross-examined by the respondents.

JACINTO SAGUID vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 150611
June 10, 2003
Facts:
Gina S. Rey, private respondent and seventeen years old, was married
but separated de facto from her husband. Sometime in July 1987, she met
Jacinto, petitioner, after a brief courtship they decided to cohabit as
husband and wife. In 1996, the couple decided to end up their nine-year
cohabitation.
On January 9, 1997, respondent filed a complaint for Partition and
Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner in
the RTC. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of the personal
properties she contributed during her cohabitation with Jacinto and the
amount of 70,000.00 representing her contribution to the construction of
their house be reimbursed to her.
Issue:
Whether or not Gina Rey is entitled to the ownership of the personal
properties and reimbursement of her contributions to the construction of
their house.
Ruling:
Yes, Gina is entitled to the ownership of the personal properties and
reimbursement of her contributions to the construction of their house.
It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry
each other because the former was validly married to another man at the
time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime therefore is
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage,
relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and
multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, "only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions..."Proof of actual
contribution is required.
The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the
parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership
absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint

account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount
of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family
Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties respective
contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal.

VICTOR JUANIZA vs. EUGENIO JOSE
G.R. No. L-50127-28
March 3, 1979
Facts:
In November 23, 1967, the defendant Jose, registered owner and
operator of a passenger jeepney, involved in an accident of collision with a
freight train of the Philippine National Railways which resulted in the death
to seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of its passengers. At that time
the defendant is legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting
with Rosalia Arroyo for sixteen years.
The court charged the defendant and Rosalia Arroyo for damages.
Motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia Arroyo praying that
the decision be reconsidered insofar as it condemns her to pay damages
jointly and severally with her co-defendant, but was denied. The lower court
based her liability on the provision of Article 144 of the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code is applicable in a case
where one of the parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to
marry.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the co-ownership contemplated in
Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and the woman living
together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Since
Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment
for him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under the provision of the
Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs
to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife. There is therefore no
basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages arising from the death of, and
physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of the jeepney, which figured in
the collision.

MARINO, RENATO, LETICIA, IMELDA, ALICIA, LIGAYA, and
ZENAIDA, all surnamed ADRIANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124118
March 27, 2000
Facts:
On October 29, 1933 Lucio Adriano and Gliceria Dorado got
married. Sometime in 1942 or prior thereto, Lucio and Gliceria separated,
and Gliceria settled in Rizal, Laguna where she died on June 11, 1968. On
November 22, 1968, or five months after the death of Gliceria, Lucio
married Vicenta. On October 10, 1980, Lucio executed a last will and
testament disposing of all his properties, and assigning among others, his
second wife Vicenta and all his children by his first and second marriage as
devisees and legatees.
On February 11, 1981, Lucio died and private respondent Celestina
Adriano, who was instituted in Lucio's will as its executrix, filed a petition
for the probate of the will on February 18, 1981 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Lucena City. The RTC allowed the probate of the will.
On August 17, 1988, and while the proceedings for settlement of
estate were pending before the RTC, petitioners instituted an action for
annulment of Lucio Adriano's will. In the complaint plaintiffs-petitioners
alleged that before the marriage of Lucio and their mother, Vicenta, on
November 22, 1968, the two lived together as husband and wife and as
such, acquired properties which became the subject of inventory and
administration.
Issue:
Whether or not the estate of Lucio are conjugal properties of his first
marriage.
Ruling:
Yes. The co-ownership in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that
the man and woman living together as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage must not in any way be incapacitated to marry. Considering that
the property was acquired in 1964, or while Lucio's marriage with Gliceria
subsisted, such property is presumed to be conjugal unless it be proved that
it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. As found by both the

trial court and respondent court in this case, not only did petitioners fail to
overcome the presumption of conjugality of the disputed property, private
respondents have also presented sufficient evidence to support their
allegation that the property was in fact purchased by Lucio with proceeds of
the conjugal fund of his first marriage.
Although in cases of common-law relations where an impediment to
marry exists, equity would dictate that property acquired by the man and
woman through their joint endeavor should be allocated to each of them in
proportion to their respective efforts, petitioners in the instant case have
not submitted any evidence that Vicenta actually, contributed to the
acquisition of the property in question.
COVERAGE OF FAMILY RELATIONS

GAUDENCIO GUERRERO vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS
NORTE
G.R. No. 109068
January 10, 1994
Facts:
Guerrero and Pedro are brothers in law, their respective wives being
sisters. Filed by petitioner as an accion publicana against private
respondent, this case assumed another dimension when it was dismissed by
respondent Judge on the ground that the parties being brother-in-law the
complaint should have alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted
towards a compromise.
Issue:
Whether or not brothers by affinity are considered members of the
same family.
Ruling:
Considering that Art. 151 starts with the negative word No, the
requirement is mandatory for that the complaint or petition, which must be
verified, should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been
made but that the same failed, so that If it is shown that no such efforts
were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
No. The court already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon that the enumeration of
brothers and sisters as members of the same family does not comprehend
sisters-in-law

HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. vs. HON. EDMUNDO T.
ACUA
G.R. No. 154132
August 31, 2006
Facts:
On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed
with the RTC of Caloocan City a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan
Bank, Inc. (petitioner), his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria
Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of
mortgage contending that he did not secure any loan from petitioner, nor
did he sign or execute any contract of mortgage in its favor; that his wife,
acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who were the ones
that benefited from the loan, made it appear that he signed the contract of
mortgage; that he could not have executed the said contract because he
was then working abroad.
On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that private respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code
wherein it is provided that no suit between members of the same family
shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the
same have failed.
Issue:
Whether or not necessity of earnest effort is needed.
Ruling:
No. Article 151 of the Family Code provides as follows: No suit
between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear
from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown
that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed. This
rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise
under the Civil Code. Article 222 of the Civil Code from which Article 151 of
the Family Code was taken, essentially contains the same provisions, to wit:
No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family
unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article
2035. In the case of Martinez v. Martinez ruled that Article 151 of the
Family Code applies to cover when the suit is exclusively between or among
family members.
Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members
of the same family, the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that
earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the action can

prosper.

SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, and, SPOUSES GREGORIO HONTIVEROS
and TEODORA AYSON
G.R. No. 125465
June 29,1999
Facts:
Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for
damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora
Ayson. The petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land
in Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the land as a result of
the filing of the land registration case.
In the reply, private respondents denied that they were married and
alleged that Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was single. They also
denied depriving petitioners of possession of and income from the land. On
the contrary, according to the private respondents, the possession of the
property in question had already been transferred to petitioners by virtue of
the writ of possession. Trial court denied petitioners motion that while in
the amended complaint, they alleged that earnest efforts towards a
compromise were made, it was not verified as provided in Article 151.
Issue:
Whether or not the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to
lack of efforts exerted towards a compromise as stated in Article 151.
Ruling:
No. Supreme Court held that the inclusion of private respondent
Teodora Ayson as defendant and Maria Hontiveros as petitioner take the
case out of the scope of Article 151. Under this provision, the phrase
"members of the same family" refers to the husband and wife, parents and
children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether
full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not
given any legal effect in this jurisdiction.
Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in the
complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria
Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros,
are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family.

PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S.
MANALO, and ISABELITA MANALO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 129242
January 16, 2001
Facts:
Troadio Manalo died intestate on February 14, 1992. His wife, Pilar S.
Manalo, and his eleven children, who are all of legal age, survived him. At
the time of his death, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in
Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name
and style Manalo's Machine Shop.
The eight of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo filed a
petition with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila of the judicial
settlement of the estate of their late father and for the appointment of their
brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator.
The trial court issued an order and set the reception of evidence of the
petitioners therein. However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of
general default aside herein petitioners who were granted then 10 days
within which to file their opposition to the petition. Several pleadings were
subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the
filling of an Omnibus Motion.
Issue:
Whether or not the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where
earnest efforts toward compromise should first be made prior the filing of
the petition.
Ruling:
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an
action or proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief were
sought in the complaint or petition, shall be controlling. The careful
scrutiny of the petition for the issuance of letters of administration,
settlement and distribution of the estate belies herein petitioners claim that
the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The provision of Article
151 is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. It is clear from the term
suit that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or
other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy that the
law affords him for the redress of an injury or enforcement of a right.
It is also the intention of the Code Commission as revealed in the
Report of the Code Commission to make the provision be applicable only to
civil actions. The petition for issuance of letters of administration,
settlement, and distribution of estate is a special proceeding and as such a
remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right,

or a particular fact. Hence, it must be emphasized that herein petitioners
are not being sued in such case for any cause of action as in fact no
defendant was pronounced.

NICANOR T. SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CONSUELAO T.
SANTOS-GUERRERO and ANDRES GUERRERO
G.R. No. 134787
November 15, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos and private respondent Consuelo T.
Santos-Guerrero are brother and sister, born to spouses Urbano Santos and
Candelaria Santos, now both deceased. Sometime in 1956, Nicanor,
Consuelo and eight of their siblings, executed a "Basic Agreement of
Partition" covering properties they inherited from their parents.
Two years later, Consuelo, joined by her husband, herein respondent
Andres Guerrero (collectively, the "Guerreros"), filed suit with the then
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal against petitioner Nicanor and two (2)
other brothers, for recovery of inheritance.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 222 of the New Civil Code in relation to
Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court has no application
Ruling:
A lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than
between strangers.Thus, the provision making honest efforts towards a
settlement a condition precedent for the maintenance of an action between
members of the same family. As it were, a complaint in ordinary civil actions
involving members of the same family must contain an allegation that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made pursuant to Article
222of the Civil Code, now pursuant to Article 151 of the Family
Code.Otherwise, the complaint may be dismissed under Section 1(j), Rule
16 of the Rules of Court.Admittedly, the complaint filed in this case contains
no such allegation. But a complaint otherwise defective on that score may
be cured by the introduction of evidence effectively supplying the necessary
averments of a defective complaint.
PROHIBITED COMPROMISE
CECILIO MENDOZA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and
LUISA DE LA ROSA MENDOZA
G.R. No. L-23102
April 24, 1967
Facts:
In the complaint, private respondent, Luisa De La Rosa Mendoza
averred that she was married to Cecilio Mendoza on 2 September 1953,
that they lived together as husband and wife until 14 July 1954, when the
husband departed for the United States to further his studies and practice
his profession. Since then, defendant Mendoza, without justifiable cause or
reason deliberately abandoned and neglected plaintiff and despite repeated
demands by plaintiff, defendant has failed and refused, and still fails and
refuses, to provide for the maintenance and support of plaintiff, who is
allegedly to be pregnant, sickly and without any source of revenue, while
defendant (now petitioner) is employed in a hospital in the United States.
Issue:
Whether or not the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where
earnest efforts toward compromise should first be made prior the filing of
the petition, and invoking Article 222 of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines.
Ruling:
Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines requires that before a
suit between members of the same family (in this case between husband
and wife) is filed or maintained, it must appear that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, and the only way to make it so appear when
the suit isfiledis by a proper averment to that effect in the complaint. Since
the law forbids a suit being initiated filed or maintained unless such efforts
at compromise appear, the showing that efforts in question were made is a
condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action. It follows that
the failure of the complaint to plead that plaintiff previously tried in earnest
to reach a settlement out of court renders it assailable for lack of cause of
action and it may be so attacked at any stage of the case even on appeal.
While the Supreme Court agree that petitioner's position represents a
correct statement of the general rule on the matter, we are nevertheless
constrained to hold that the Court of Appeals and the Court of First
Instance committed no error in refusing to dismiss the complaint, for on its
face, the same involved a claim for future supportthat under Article 2035 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines cannot be subject of a valid compromise,
and is, therefore, outside the sphere of application of Article 222 of the
Code upon which petitioner relies. This appears from the last proviso of said
Article 222, future support.
FAMILY HOME
JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS vs. DANILO PANGILINAN
G.R. No. 185920
July 20, 2010
Facts:
Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M.
Ramos Electric, Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos, the patriarch
of herein petitioners. The labor arbiter ordered Ramos and the company to
pay the respondents back-wages, separation pay, 13th month pay & service
incentive leave pay. The decision became final and executory so a writ of
execution was issued which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos
name situated in Pandacan.
Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence,
exempt from execution to satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the
company moved to quash the writ of execution. Respondents argued that it
is not the family home there being another one in Antipolo and that the
Pandacan address is actually the business address. The motion was denied
and the appeal was likewise denied by the NLRC.
Issue:
Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid.
Ruling:
Yes. For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction
must be made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and
what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his
successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable.
If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code
or before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either
judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and
233 of the Civil Code. Meanwhile, Articles 240 to 242 governs extrajudicial
constitution.
On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extra
judicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was
constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154
actually reside therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse,
its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must
not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located.
Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as
provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable
must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. In both instances, the claim
for exemption must be proved.
In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was
constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply
with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no
proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extra judicially
constituted as the Ramos family home, the law protecting the family home
cannot apply thereby making the levy upon the Pandacan property valid.
FAMILY HOME
JOSE MODEQUILLO vs. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO
SALINAS
G.R. No. 86355
May 31, 1990
Facts:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion
Malalag, Davao del Sur on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose
Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan,
Malalag, Davao del Sur also registered in the latters name. A motion to
quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where
the family home is built since 1969 prior the commencement of this case
and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under
Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof,
and that the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not
one of those enumerated. With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged
that it is still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the
original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority.
The residential house in the present case became a family home by
operation of law under Article 153.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is deemed to be a family home.
Ruling:
The petitioners contention that petitioner and his family should
consider it a family home from the time it was occupied in 1969 is not well
taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides that the provisions
of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar as said
provisions are applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall
have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed
to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the
execution for payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the
Code. The said article simply means that all existing family residences at
the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes
and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code. The debt and liability, which was the basis of the
judgment, was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code. This does
not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.
FAMILY HOME
ALBINO JOSEF vs. OTELIO SANTOS
G.R. No. 165060
November 27, 2008
Facts:
In Civil Case No. 95-110-MK, Petitioner Albino Josef was the
defendant, which is a case for collection of sum of money filed by herein
respondent Otelio Santos, who claimed that petitioner failed to pay the shoe
materials which he bought on credit from respondent on various dates in
1994. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City found petitioner
liable to respondent. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the trial courts decision in Toto. Petitioner filed before this Court a
petition for review on certiorari, but it was dismissed in a Resolution dated
February 18, 2002. The Judgment became final and executory on May 21,
2002.
A writ of execution was issued on August 20, 2003and enforced on
August 21, 2003. On August 29, 2003, certain personal properties subjects
of the writ of execution were auctioned off. Thereafter, a real property
located at Marikina City was sold by way of public auction to fully satisfy
the judgment credit.
On November 5, 2003, petitioner filed an original petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals, questioning the sheriffs levy and sale
of the abovementioned personal and real properties. Petitioner claimed that
the personal properties did not belong to him but to his children; and that
the real property was his family home thus exempt from execution.
Issue:
Whether or not the levy and sale of the personal belongings of the
petitioners children as well as the attachment and sale on public auction of
his family home to satisfy the judgment award in favor of respondent is
legal.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the family home is the dwelling place of
a person and his family, a sacred symbol of family love and repository of
cherished memories that last during ones lifetime. It is the sanctuary of
that union which the law declares and protects as a sacred institution; and
likewise a shelter for the fruits of that union. It is where both can seek
refuge and strengthen the tie that binds them together and which ultimately
forms the moral fabric of our nation. The protection of the family home is
just as necessary in the preservation of the family as a basic social
institution, and since no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the
family shall be recognized or given effect, the trial courts failure to observe
the proper procedures to determine the veracity of petitioners allegations,

is unjustified.
The same is true with respect to personal properties levied upon and
sold at auction. Despite petitioners allegations in his Opposition, the trial
court did not make an effort to determine the nature of the same, whether
the items were exempt from execution or not, or whether they belonged to
petitioner or to someone else.
FAMILY HOME
SPOUSES AUTHER G. KELLEY, JR. and DORIS A. KELLEY vs.
PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. and JORGE A. RAGUTANA
G.R. No. 172263
July 9, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. (Auther) acquired agricultural chemical
products on consignment from respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in
1989. Due to Authers failure to pay despite demand, PPI filed an action for
sum of money against him in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. After
trial on the merits, the RTC Makati City decided in favor of PPI and issued a
writ of execution. After being belatedly informed of the said sale, petitioners
Auther and his wife Doris A. Kelley filed a motion to dissolve or set aside the
notice of levy in the RTC Makati City on the ground that the subject
property was their family home which was exempt from execution.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is the family home of the
petitioners.
Ruling:
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home
judicially or extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity
of the Family Code (August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of
law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered
family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code.
The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the
family home as such and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein.Moreover, the debts for which the family home is made
answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that
is, if it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged family home must
be shown to have been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially
pursuant to the Civil Code.
The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly
provides for the following exceptions: Article 155. The family home shall be
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the
family home; (3) For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises before or
after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics,
architects, builders, material men and others who have rendered service or
furnished material for the construction of the building.
FAMILY HOME
MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ and EUGENIA SOCORRO C. GOMEZSALCEDO
vs. ROEL, NOEL and JANNETTE BEVERLY STA. INES and HINAHON
STA. INES
G.R. No. 132537
October 14, 2005
Facts:
Purificacion dela Cruz Gomez (deceased), mother of Mary Josephine
C. Gomez and Eugenia Socorro C. Gomez-Salcedo, entrusted rice land in
Nueva Vizcaya to Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines. Josephine and Socorro
demanded for an accounting of the produce of said rice lands while under
the management of Marietta and for the return of the Transfer Certificate
Title (TCT) of the property.
Trial court rendered judgment against Marietta and ordered her to
deliver the owners copy of the TCT and pay damages. In order to satisfy
damages, a writ of execution was issued, by virtue of which, a parcel of land
in Nueva Vizcaya registered in Mariettas name was sold at a public auction
wherein Josephine was the highest bidder. Mariettas husband, Hinahon
together with their children, filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale
before the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya on the ground that said house and lot sold
during the public auction is their family residence and is thus exempt from
execution under Article 155 of the Family Code. Respondents assert that the
house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their
family home from the time they occupied it in 1972
Issue:
Whether or not the property can be sold.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that under article 155 of the Family
Code, the family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale, or
attachment, except for, among other things, debts incurred prior to the
constitution of the family home. While the respondent contends that the
house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their
family home in 1972, it is not deemed constituted as such at the time
Marietta incurred her debts.
Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as the family
home only upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. The
complaint against Marietta was instituted in 1986 to for acts committed as
early as 1977, thus, her liability arose years before the levied property was
constituted as the family home in 1988. The liability incurred by Marietta
falls within the exception provided for in Article 155 of the Family Code:
debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home.
FAMILY HOME
FLORANTE F. MANACOP vs. COURT OF APPEALS and E & L
MERCANTILE, INC.
G.R. No. 97898
August 11, 1997
Facts:
Petitioner Florante F. Manacopand his wife Eulaceli purchased on
March 10, 1972 a residential lot with a bungalow, in consideration of
P75,000.00.On March 17, 1986, Private Respondent E & L Merchantile, Inc.
filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc.
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila to collect an
indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and
his company entered into a compromise agreement with private respondent,
the salient portion of which provides: That defendants will undertake to pay
the amount of P2,000,000.00 as and when their means permit, but
expeditiously as possible as their collectibles will be collected. On April 20,
1986, the trial court rendered judgment approving the aforementioned
compromise agreement. It enjoined the parties to comply with the
agreement in good faith. On July 15, 1986, private respondent filed a motion
for execution which the lower court granted. However, execution of the
judgment was delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on several vehicles and
other personal properties of petitioner. In partial satisfaction of the
judgment debt, these chattels were sold at public auction for which
certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff.
On August 1, 1989, petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash
the alias writs of execution and to stop the sheriff from continuing to
enforce them on the ground that the judgment was not yet executory. They
alleged that the compromise agreement had not yet matured, as there was
no showing that they had the means to pay the indebtedness or that their
receivables had in fact been collected.
Issue:
Whether or not the final and executory decision promulgated and a
writ of execution issued before the effectivity of the Family Code can be
executed on a family home constituted under the provisions of the said
Code.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that Under the Family Code, a family
home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied
as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or
extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in
the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus,
the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest
before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the
home.
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows: Art. 155. The
family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the
constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the
premises before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborer,
mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have
rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
The exemption provided, as aforestated is effective from the time of the
constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein. In the present case, the residential
house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether
judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by
operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed
constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila
Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).
FAMILY HOME
PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA T. CATUBIG and
HUSBAND, CILIA T. MORING and HUSBAND vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and ABDON GILIG
G.R. No. 108532
March 9, 1999
Facts:
As a result of a judgment in Civil Case No. 590 (for recovery of
property) in favor of private respondent, two (2) of petitioners' properties
were levied to satisfy the judgment amount of about P5,000.00: one was a
parcel of land located in Barrio Igpit, Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental
with an area of about five (5) hectares, and the other was the family home
also located at Igpit, Opol, Misamis Oriental. The subject properties were
sold at public auction on February 12, 1966 to the private respondent as the
highest bidder. Consequently, after petitioners' failure to redeem the same,
a final deed of conveyance was executed on February 9, 1968, definitely
selling, transferring, and conveying said properties to the private
respondent.
To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an action on November
5, 1985 (docketed as Civil Case No. 10407) to declare the deed of
conveyance void and to quiet title over the land with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. In their complaint, it was alleged that petitioners are
the children and heirs of Pablo Taneo and Narcisa Valaceras who died on
February 12, 1977 and September 12, 1984, respectively. Upon their death,
they left the subject property covered by OCT No. P-12820 and Free Patent
No. 548906. Considering that said property has been acquired through free
patent, such property is therefore inalienable and not subject to any
encumbrance for the payment of debt, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No.
141. Petitioners further alleged that they were in continuous, open and
peaceful possession of the land and that on February 9, 1968. Deputy
Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay issued a Sheriffs Deed of Conveyance in
favor of the private respondent over the subject property including their
family home that was extra judicially constituted in accordance with law. As
a result of the alleged illegal deed of conveyance, private respondent was
able to obtain in his name Tax Declaration No. 851920 over the land, thus
casting a cloud of doubt over the title and ownership of petitioners over said
property.
Issue:
Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the applicable law, therefore, in the case
at bar is still the Civil Code where registration of the declaration of a family
home is a prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law provides certain instances
where the family home is not exempted from execution, forced sale or
attachment. The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo
constituted the house in question, erected on the land of Plutarco Vacalares,
as the family home. The instrument constituting the family home was
registered only on January 24, 1966. The money judgment against Pablo
Taneo was rendered on January 24, 1964. Thus, at that time when the
"debt" was incurred, the family home was not yet constituted or even
registered. Clearly, petitioners' alleged family home, as constituted by their
father is not exempt as it falls under the exception of Article 243 (2).
FAMILY HOME
SPOUSES CHARLIE FORTALEZA and OFELIA FORTALEZA vs.
SPOUSES RAUL LAPITAN and RONA LAPITAN
G.R. No. 178288
August 15, 2012
Facts:
Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza obtained a loan from spouses
Rolando and Amparo Lapitan (creditors). As security, spouses Fortaleza
executed on January 28, 1998 a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over their
residential house and lot situated in Barrio Anos, Municipality of Los Baos,
Laguna (subject property). When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the
indebtedness including the interests and penalties, the creditors applied for
extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage before the Office of
the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Calamba City. The public auction
sale was set on May 9, 2001.
At the sale, the creditors son Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife Rona
emerged as the highest bidders. Then, they were issued a Certificate of
Salethat was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba City. The
one-year redemption period expired without the spouses Fortaleza
redeeming the mortgage. Thus, spouses Lapitan executed an affidavit of
consolidation of ownership on November 20, 2003 and the registration of
the subject property in their names on February 4, 2004. Despite the
foregoing, the spouses Fortaleza refused spouses Lapitans formal
demandto vacate and surrender possession of the subject property.
Issue:
Whether or not the Honorable court of appeals gravely erred in not
holding that the petitioners were prevented by the respondent from
exercising their right of redemption over the foreclosed property by
demanding a redemption over the foreclosed property by demanding a
redemption price of a highly equitable and more than double the amount of
the foreclosed property, especially that the foreclosed mortgaged property
is the family home of petitioners and their children.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Article 155(3) of the Family Code
explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts secured by
mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution." In this case,
there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January 28,
1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property, which was
even notarized by their original counsel of record. And assuming that the
property is exempt from forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did not set up and
prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced sale before it was sold at
the public auction.
KIND/STATUS OF CHILDREN
MANUEL DE ASIS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 127578
February
15, 1999
Facts:
Vircel D. Andres, as the legal guardian of the minor, Glen Camil
Andres de Asis, filed an action for maintenance and support against Manuel
de Asis. She alleged that Manuel is the father of Glen but as a father, he
failed to provide support to his child. Manuel countered that he is not the
father of the child and so he has no obligation to support mentioned child.
Thereafter, Vircel moved for the dismissal of the case because of the
father's judicial declaration denying that he is the father of subject minor
child. Six years later, Vircel filed a similar complaint against the putative
father. Manuel moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of res
judicata.
Issue:
a.) Whether or not the civil status of a son or his filiation and paternity
could be left to the will or agreement of his parents.
b.) Whether or not the child is barred from filing an action to ask for
support from his alleged father due to the dismissal of the first case
filed.
Ruling:
No, a childs civil status or his filiation and paternity cannot be left to
the will of his parents. Such issue must be judicially established and it is for
the court to declare its existence or absence. In the case at bar, the civil
status of a son having been denied, and this civil status, from which the
right to support is derived being in issue, no conclusion could be given to
such a denial until an authoritative declaration has been given.
No, the child is not barred from filing an action to ask for support. The
right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third
person. Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise.
The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to
maintain his existence, he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right
for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself. The
right to life cannot be renounce; hence, support which is the means to
attain the former, cannot be renounced.
KIND/STATUS OF CHILDREN
RODOLFO FERNANDEZ, et al. vs. ROMEO FERNANDEZ, et al.
G.R. No. 143256
August
28, 2001
Facts:
The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia
being childless by the death of their son, purchased from a certain Miliang
for P20.00 a one month baby boy. The boy being referred to was later on
identified as Rodolfo Fernandez, the herein appellant. Appellant was taken
care of by the couple and was sent to school and became a dental
technician. He lived with the couple until they became old and disabled. On
August 31, 1989, after the death of Dr. Jose, appellant and Generosa de
Venecia executed a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition dividing and allocating
to themselves the estate left by the deceased. Same day, Generosa sold her
share to Rodolfos son, Eddie Fernandez. After learning the transaction,
Romeo, Potenciano, Francisco, Julita, William, Mary, Alejandro, Gerardo,
Rodolfo and Gregorio, all surnamed Fernandez, being nephews and nieces
of the deceased Jose K. Fernandez, their father Genaro being a brother of
Jose, filed on September 21, 1994, an action to declare the Extra-Judicial
Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio. They claimed that
Rodolfo is not a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of spouses Dr. Jose
Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia Fernandez, hence Rodolfo could not
inherit from the spouses.
Issue:
Whether or not Rodolfo is a legitimate or a legally adopted child of
Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia Fernandez.
Ruling:
No, Rodolfo is neither a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of Jose
Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia Fernandez. Rodolfo failed to come up
with evidences to prove his filiation. The only public document he could
show was the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights under Act No.
897. 897. Such is a public document but nevertheless, it was not executed
to admit the filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with him. Rodolfo also claims that
he enjoyed and possessed the status of being a legitimate child of the
spouses openly and continuously until they died. Open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child is meant the enjoyment by the
child of the position and privileges usually attached to the status of a
legitimate child such as bearing the paternal surname, treatment by the
parents and family of the child as legitimate, constant attendance to the
child's support and education, and giving the child the reputation of being a
child of his parents. However, it must be noted that possession of status of a
child does not in itself constitute an acknowledgment; it is only a ground for
a child to compel recognition by his assumed parent. His baptismal
certificate, although public documents, is evidence only to prove the
administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the
veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with respect to his
kinsfolk. It may be argued that a baptismal certificate is one of the other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws of proving filiation
but in this case, the authenticity of the baptismal certificate was doubtful
when Fr. Raymundo Q. de Guzman of St. John the Evangelist Parish of
Lingayen-Dagupan, Dagupan City issued a certification on October 16, 1995
attesting that the records of baptism on June 7, 1930 to August 8, 1936
were all damaged. The pictures he presented do not also constitute proof of
filiation.
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 123450
August 31, 2005
Facts:
Gerardo B. Concepcion and Ma. Theresa Almontewere married on

December 29, 1989. A year later, they begot Jose Gerardo. On December 19,
1991, Gerardo filed a petition to annul his marriage to Ma. Theresa on the
ground of bigamy. This was because it was found out that Ma. Theresa had
already married a Mario Gopiao nine years before their marriage. Such
marriage of Ma. Theresa to Mario was never annulled. The trial court ruled
that Gerardo and Ma. Theresas marriage was bigamous and that her
marriage to Mario is valid and subsisting. It declared the child as being
illegitimate. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts decision but on
appeal, reversed its ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of
Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the child born out of a bigamous marriage is
considered legitimate.
b) Whether or not Gerardo could assail Jose Gerardos legitimacy.
Ruling:
Yes, a child born out of a bigamous marriage is considered legitimate.
The legitimacy would come from the validity of the first marriage and not on
the bigamous marriage for that bigamous marriage is void from the very
beginning(ab initio). Ma. Theresa was married to Mario Gopiao, and that
she had never entered into a lawful marriage with the Gerardo since the socalled marriage with the latter was void ab initio. Ma. Theresa was
legitimately married to Mario Gopiao when the child Jose Gerardo was born
on December 8, 1990. Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo under the law
is the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage between Ma.
Theresa and Mario Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate child
of the void and non-existent marriage between Ma. Theresa and
Gerardo.The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article
164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the
marriage of his parents is legitimate.
As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of
legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides that the child shall be
considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
No, Gerardo is not in a position to assail Jose Gerardos legitimacy. He
has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma.
Theresas husband Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the
legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife.Impugning the
legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in
exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa
was void from the very beginning; he never became her husband and thus
never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.

BELEN SAGAD ANGELES vs. ALELI CORAZON ANGELES MAGLAYA
G.R. No. 153798
September
2,
2005
Facts:
Francisco M. Angeles died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City of
Manila, leaving behind four parcels of land and a building, among other
valuable properties. Respondent Aleli claims that she is the sole legitimate
child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and, together with petitioner,
Belen S. Angeles, decedents wife by his second marriage, are the surviving
heirs of the decedent. For this matter, respondent prays that she be made
administratrix of Franciscos estate. Petitioner Belen opposed respondents
claim, alleging that the respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco
for, although she was recorded as Franciscos legitimate daughter, the
corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Belen petitioner
further alleged that respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate
child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the marriage
contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable
document to prove such union.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Aleli could validly claim that she is the
legitimate daughter of Francisco Angeles.
Ruling:
No, respondents legitimacy was impugned, and for failing to establish
the presumption of her legitimacy, she could not validly claim that she is the
legitimate child of the deceased. The presumption of legitimacy under
Article 164 of the Family Code may be availed only upon convincing proof of
the factual basis- that the childs parents were legally married and that
his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that
marriage. In the case at bar, respondent failed to prove such legal marriage
of her parents, for she failed to show any marriage certificate or marriage
contract. She failed to present any priest, judge, mayor, or other
solemnizing authority to the witness box to declare that he solemnized
the marriage between her parents. Clearly, therefore, respondent could not
be vested with the legal presumption of legitimacy which, as above
explained, should flow from a lawful marriage between Francisco and

Genevova.
Article 172 of the Family Code provides that the legitimate filiation of
a child can be established by any of the modes therein defined even without
direct evidence of the marriage of his/her supposed parents. But respondent
failed to prove her legitimacy even in this aspect. Respondent presented, in
support of her claim of legitimacy, a copy of her Birth Certificate dated
November 23, 1939 issued by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila. But
such birth certificate was not signed by her putative father. Jurisprudence
teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating proof of
paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father
and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses.

JANICE MARIE JAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. L-49162
28, 1987
July
Facts:
In 1967, Arlene Salgado was introduced to PericoJao. After such
introduction, Jao courted Arlene. Not long thereafter, they had sexual
intercourse and subsequently, they lived together. 1968, Arlene became
pregnant. Jao paid for all the expenses related to Arlenes pregnancy but
when the child, Janice was born, Jao insisted that she could not be the
father of such child. When the case was filed with the RTC, the RTC ordered
the NBI for a group blood testing. The group blood testing result showed
that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Jao and Arlene.
Issue:
Whether or not group blood testing could be conclusive evidence to
impugn the legitimacy of Janice.
Ruling:
Yes, group blood testing could be admitted as conclusive evidence to
impugn the legitimacy of Janice. For the past three decades, the use of
blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has already become an
important legal procedure. There is now almost universal scientific
agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity,
although inconclusive as to paternity that is, the fact that the blood type
of the child is a possible product of the mother and alleged father does not
conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the blood
type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother
and that of the alleged father are cross matched, then the
child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.
Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in man
which can be transmitted through heredity. Although the presence of the
same type of blood in two persons does not indicate that one was begotten
by the other, yet the fact that they are of different types will indicate the
impossibility of one being the child of the other. Thus, when the supposed
father and the alleged child are not in the same blood group, they cannot be
father and child by consanguinity.

TEOFISTA BABIERA vs. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL
G.R. No. 138493
June 15, 2000
Facts:
TeofistaBabiera claims that she was born to the spouses Eugenio and
HermogenaBabiera then 65 and 54 years old respectively, at the time of her
birth. PresentacionBabiera-Catotal, daughter of the late spouses Eugenio
and Hermogena counters this claim, saying that she saw with her own eyes
that Teofista was actually born to their housemaid named Flora Guinto.
Presentacion testified that Teofista was born through the help of a hilot
and that her mother Flora forged the Teofistas birth certificate, making it
appear that HermogenaBabiera was the mother by forging Hermogenas
signature. Presentacion further claims that Teofistas real surname is
Guinto, her mother being single; the father, a carpenter, refused to sign the
birth certificate. Teofista on her defense, claims that Presentacion has no

legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the
Family Code which states that only the father could impugn the child's
legitimacy, and that the same was not subject to a collateral attack.
Issue:
Whether or not such petition may prosper considering Teofistas claim
that Presentacion has no legal capacity to file the instant petition and can
the presumption of regularity in the issuance of her birth certificate be
upheld.
Ruling:
Yes, the petition may prosper. The case at bar is not covered by Article
171 for the prayer therein is not to declare that Teofista is an illegitimate
child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter's child
at all. The present action does not impugn Teofistas filiation to Spouses
Eugenio and HermogenaBabiera, because there is no blood relation to
impugn in the first place. Presentacion only aims to assail and cancel
Teofistas birth certificate for the void and simulated birth certificate of the
latter would affect the formers hereditary rights.
Also, Teofistas birth certificate cannot be taken into consideration for
there were already irregularities regarding the birth certificate itself. It was
not signed by the local civil registrar.More importantly, the Court of Appeals
observed that the mothers signature therein was different from her
signatures in other documents presented during the trial. The most
significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of
HermogenaBabiera which states that she did not give birth to Teofista, and
that the latter was not hers nor her husband Eugenios.

WILLIAM LIYAO, JR. vs. JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, et al.
G.R. No. 138961
March 7, 2002
Facts:
Corazon Garcia alleges that she was cohabiting with William Liyao
from 1965 up to Williams death in December, 1975 even though Corazon is
still legally married but living separately to a Ramon Yulo. William Liyao
himself was legally married to Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao at the time of his
cohabitation with Corazon. Corazon and deceased lived together with the
company of Corazons two children from her subsisting marriage- Enrique
and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo. In 1974, they begot a child, William
Liyao, Jr. It was alleged that William Liyao paid for all the expenses for the
subsistence of William Jr. and also that of Corazon and her two children
from her subsisting marriage during their cohabitation. William Jr. was said
to be in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of
said William Liyao, having been recognized and acknowledged as such child
by the decedent during his lifetime. Upon the death of his alleged father,
William Jr. prays that he be recognized as an illegitimate child and an heir
by the family of the deceased from his subsisting marriage. The deceaseds
legitimate children on their part, alleges that the deceased could not have
fathered petitioner for their father and mother have never been separated.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner may impugn his legitimacy with that of his
mothers subsisting marriage and establish his claim of filiation with the
late William Liyao.
Ruling:
Holding that Corazons marriage with Ramon Yulo is still subsisting, it
is presumed that petitioner is the legitimate child of Ramon Yulo and not the
illegitimate child of William Liyao. Under the New Civil Code, a child born
and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. This
presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the
odium of illegitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however,
is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the
contrary. Article 255 of the New Civil Code provides: Children born after
one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and
before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. No evidence other than that of
physical impossibility of the husband having access to his wife within the
first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the
birth of the child can be admitted. Such physical impossibility may be
caused by: (a) By the impotence of the husband; (b) by the fact that husband
and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible;
(c) by the serious illness of the husband.
Petitioner cannot impugn his own legitimacy. Article 255 of the Civil
Code provides that only the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the
conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code can impugn such
legitimacy. And, in the case at bar, the petition was initiated by petitioner
himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and
Bernadette Yulo who are the undisputed children of Corazon and Ramon
Yulo. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation.
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS vs. ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN
GAMBOA DIZON
G.R. No. 142877
October 2, 2001
Facts:
Danilo and Carolina de Jesus were married on 23 August 1964. It was
within this marriage that the petitioners, Jinkie and Jacqueline were born.
In 1991 though, Juan Dizon acknowledged petitioners as his own
illegitimate children through a notarized document. Thereafter, Juan died
intestate and petitioners filed a prayer that they be given their legitime and
be recognized as illegitimate children by the surviving spouse and
legitimate children of Juan Dizon.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners legitimacy as children of Danilo may be
impugned and they be recognized as illegitimate children of Juan Dizon.
Ruling:
No. The petitioners were born under the subsisting marriage of Danilo
and Carolina. It is presumed that children born in wedlock are legitimate.
This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is
physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120
days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due
to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with
his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are living separately in such a
way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. And only the
father, or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an
appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Since the
petitioners failed to show records of the impossibility of their parents
access to each other during the first 120 days of the 300 days which
preceded their birth, they cannot assail their presumed legitimacy. Failing
therefore to impugn their legitimacy, petitioners cannot claim that they are
the acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased, Juan Dizon.
ACTION TO CLAIM LEGITIMACY

EDGARDO A. TIJING vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 125901
March 8, 2001
Facts:
Edgardo and BienvenidaTijing are husband and wife, they have six
children, youngest of whom is Edgardo Tijing Jr. In August 1989, Angelita
Diamante fetched Bienvenida for an urgent laundry job. Bienvenida left to
Angelita her 4-month old child, Edgardo Jr. as she usually let Angelita take
care of her child while she was doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned
from work to get her son, Angelita was nowhere to be found, and despite
her and her husbands efforts, they could not locate Angelita and their
childs whereabouts.
Four years later, Bienvenida read about the death of Tomas Lopez, the
common-law husband of Angelita, whose interment is in Bulacan. She went
there and allegedly saw her son Edgardo Jr., now named John Thomas
Lopez. John is now being claimed by Angelita as her own son, sired by her
common-law husband Tomas Lopez during their cohabitation. Bienvenida
now alleges that the child cannot possibly be born to Angelita and Tomas for
it was the latters own brother who admitted that Tomas was rendered
sterile, caused by an accident. Tomas begot no children from his legal
marriage nor with the cohabitation with Angelita. Tomas brother even
testified that Tomas himself admitted to him that the subject child was
adopted.
Issue:
Who among the claimants is the true parent of the subject child.
Ruling:
Bienvenida. It was Bienvenida who was able to produce the competent
evidences to establish the childs filiation with her and her husband. She
substantiated her claim with sufficient clinical records, presenting the
proper and credible witnesses who assisted her in her childs birth. Not to
mention the fact that it could be readily observed that Bienvenida and the
child have strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head
shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent
and material evidence to establish parentage. Whereas, Angelita had been
known to have undergone ligation years before the alleged birth of the child
and the admission of Tomas own brother that Tomas was sterile makes it
impossible that he and Angelita could have produced subject child. More
importantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private
respondent were legally married which is false because even private
respondent had admitted she is a common-law wife. This false entry puts to
doubt the other data in said birth certificate.
KINDS OF RECOGNITION
CAMELO CABATANIAvs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124814
October 21, 2004
Facts:
Florencia is the mother of the respondent. Her husband left her in
1981 and she was hired as petitioners household help. It was then that
petitioner and Florencia had sexual intercourse. After a month, petitioners
wife noticed that Florencia is pregnant. For this reason, petitioners wife
dismissed Florencia and told her to go home. Petitioner was surprised when
Florencia demanded from him support for their alleged child. Petitioner
refused, denying paternity and claimed that Florencia was already pregnant
when they had sexual intercourse. During trial, Florencia claimed that
petitioner voluntarily recognized respondent when he rented a house for
her after the dismissal and misrepresented herself as a widow when in fact
her husband is still alive. Trial court brushed this misrepresentation and
used as one of its bases of its decision the similarities on personal
appearances of the petitioner and respondent and favored the respondents
claim.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent may compulsorily be recognized by

petitioner.
Ruling:
No. Respondent failed to show conclusive evidence as to establish his
filiation with petitioner. Aside from Florencias self-serving testimony that
petitioner rented a house for her, private respondent failed to present
sufficient proof of voluntary recognition. A certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of
paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in
the preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority
to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third
person.
More importantly, the fact that Florencias husband is living and there
is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption
that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though Florencia
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress. Only the husband or in exceptional cases, his heirs may
impugned the presumed legitimacy of the child.
With regards the personal appearance of the child, the Supreme Court
provided that in this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or
similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and
filiation before the courts of law.
ROSALINA P. ECETA vs.MA. THERESA VELL LAGURA ECETA
G.R. NO. 157037
May
20, 2004
Facts:
Isaac and Rosalina married in 1926. The begot a child named Vicente.
When Isaac died, he left behind properties to which Rosalina and Vicente
were the compulsory heirs. Thereafter, Vicente also died but he had an
illegitimate daughter, Ma. Theresa. Thus, the latter is a compulsory heir
together with Rosalina. Theresa then filed for a petition that she be made
co-owner of a property which was originally owned by Isaac, passed to

Rosalina and Vicente upon his death. Ma. Theresas contention was that she
should be made as co-owner by virtue of her fathers death. During pre-trial,
Rosalina already admitted that she is the grandmother of Ma. Theresa. On
appeal though, she questions the alleged filiation and whether if such could
be established by mere birth certificate and by her admission during the
trial.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents filiation to her alleged father could be
established by the birth certificate and by the admission made.
Ruling:
Yes. Ma. Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente
through the duly authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed
respondents birth certificate thereby acknowledging that she is his
daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his
paternity over Ma. Theresa, thus, the filiation of illegitimate children, like
legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation
in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2)
any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself,
a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child. In fact, any authentic
writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself
a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial
approval.
MA. THERESA R. ALBERTO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 86639
June 2, 1994
Facts:
Aurora Reniva and Juan M. Alberto had a child born out of wedlock in
the person of the petitioner. Accordingly, petitioner used "Alberto" as her
surname in all her school records and correspondences. On September 18,
1967, Juan M. Alberto, felled by a bullet from an assassins gun, died
intestate. His widow, Yolanda R. Alberto, filed a petition for the
administration of his estate. The petition was granted but was reopened as
petitioner filed a motion that she be declared to have acquired the status of
a natural child and be entitled to share in the estate of the deceased. The
court favored the petitioner but CA reversed such ruling.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner be declared to have acquired the status of a
natural child.
Ruling:
Yes. During his lifetime, deceased acted in such a manner as to evince
his intent to recognize petitioner as his flesh and blood, first, by allowing
her from birth to use his family name; second, by giving her and her mother
sums of money by way of support and lastly, by openly introducing her to
members of his family, relatives and friends as his daughter. Supplementing
such unmistakable acts of recognition were those of his kin and gang mates,
and openly visiting his daughter in school, had meetings with her at the
MOPC, manifesting open acceptance of such relationship. Taken altogether,
the claimed filiation would be hard to disprove.
Deceased died during the minority of the petitioner, thus, Art 285 of
the Civil Code allows her to file an action for recognition 4 years from the
time she reaches majority age. Such motion was filed seasonably before the
expiration of the 4-yr period.
JOSE RIVERO, JESSIE RIVERO and AMALIA RIVEROvs. COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 141273
May
17, 2005
Facts:
Benito DyChiao, Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with
Shirley Arevalo. They begot a son, BenedickArevaloDyChiao. When Benito
Sr. died, Benedick, through her natural mother and guardian ad litem, being
a minor, filed a complaint on his behalf, against the legitimate children of
the deceased for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child and that he
be given his share in the estate left by the deceased. This was opposed by
Mary Jane, daughter of the deceased, but later on signed a compromise
agreement with Benedick, recognizing the latter as illegitimate son of her
father and giving him his share in the estate. Attached to the agreement
was a SPA appointing Mary Jane to represent her brothers who are confined
in a mental hospital. Such compromise agreement was approved by the
court, thus requiring the compulsory recognition of Benedick. Thereafter,
the Dy-Chiao brothers, through their uncle, assailed such compromise
agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not the recognition of Benedicks illegitimacy by Mary
Jane is valid based on the compromise agreement made.
Ruling:
No. Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no
compromise upon the civil status of persons shall be valid. As such,
paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be
judicially established, and it is for the court to determine its existence or
absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Further,
such recognition is ineffectual because under the law, the recognition must
be made personally by the putative parent and not by any brother, sister or
relative.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SGT. MORENO BAYANI
G.R. No. 120894
October 3,
1996
Facts:
Victim Ma. Elena Nieto, then 15 yrs old, was living with her paternal
grandmother together with her siblings as their parents were abroad.
Appellant frequented their house as he was a neighbor and a kumpadre of
her paternal uncles. One day, appellant asked victims grandmother for her
consent to let victim accompany him to visit a friend. Victims grandmother
consented. After visiting his friend who was allegedly his mistress, appellant
invited her to have lunch in a hotel restaurant but victim declined and
suggested they go home. Appellant however said they would still visit
another friend. Turns out, the building they went to was a motel, where
appellant deceived the friend they were going to visit was in the 2 nd floor.
When appellant opened a room, he forcibly let victim in and succeeded in
having carnal knowledge with her, intimidating and threatening her with a
gun pointed at her. After his lust was sated, he threatened to kill her and
her family if ever shell divulge the incident. Victim did not divulge the
incident because of fear, until it became apparent that she was pregnant.
She was then sent to another place for her safety and as the trial ensued,
appellants contention was that victim consented to the act, she being the
appellants mistress. The trial court found him guilty of rape.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant may be made to compulsorily recognize the
child borne of his crime.
Ruling:
No. Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty
of rape, seduction, or abduction, shall be sentenced to: (a) indemnify the
offended woman; (b) acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should
prevent him from so doing; and (c) in every case, to support the
offspring. While under Article 283 of the Civil Code, the father is obliged to
recognize the child as his natural child in cases of rape, abduction, and
seduction when the period of the offense coincides, more or less, with the
period of the conception. It has been held, however, that acknowledgment
is disallowed if the offender is a married man, with only support for the
offspring as part of the sentence. Therefore, under article 345 of the
Revised Penal Code, the offender in a rape case who is married, as in the
case at bar, can only be sentenced to indemnify the victim and support the
offspring, if there be any.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.MANUEL MANAHAN
G.R. No. 128157
September 29, 1999
Facts:
Victim TeresitaTibigar, then 16 yrs old was working at a canteen as
stay-in waitress, and sleeps at the 2nd floor of the canteen. Manahan is the
brother-in-law of the owner of the canteen. He and his wife lives
temporarily with the owner as his wife was then pregnant. One night, as
victim was sleeping, she was suddenly awakened when she felt someone
beside her. When she opened her eyes, she saw that it was Manahan who
immediately placed himself on top of her. Victim tried to shout but accused
covered her mouth. She tried to free herself but to no avail. In her
weakened state, accused succeeded in raping her. Thereafter, he left her.
Within the month, victim left the canteen and returned to her parents. The
incident resulted to her pregnancy, thus, she was forced to divulge the rape
incident to her parents. They then filed a criminal complaint against
accused. The accused on his part, alleged that they were lovers and that the
sexual congress between them were consensual. The court favored the
testimony of the victim and convicted accused of rape.
Issue:
Whether or not accused may be made to compulsorily recognize the

child borne of his crime.
Ruling:
No. Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty
of rape shall also be sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the
law should prevent him from doing so," and "in every case to support the
offspring." In the case at bar, compulsory acknowledgment of the child
Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment in doing so as
it appears that the accused is a married man
BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO vs. ARHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ, represented
by her mother ARACELI LOPEZ
G.R. No. 181258
March 18, 2010
Facts:
Respondent Arhbencel claims to be the illegitimate child of petitioner,
Ben-hur. She therefore filed a complaint for recognition. What she presents
to the court as evidence is her birth certificate which had not been signed
by her alleged father as the latter allegedly refused to do so. Another
evidence that she adduced was a handwritten note by the petitioner
obligating himself to give her financial support in the amount of P1,500 on
the 15th and 30th days of each month.
Issue:
Whether or not evidences adduced by respondent is sufficient proof of

illegitimacy.
Ruling:
No. Art 175 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children may
establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children. Thus such is to be based on Art 172 which
provides that filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In
the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws. In the case at bar, the adduced evidence which is the note
written by the alleged father, does not contain any statement whatsoever
about Arhbencels filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not a competent
evidence of illegitimate filiation as an admission of filiation in a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
Under Art 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a
parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of
filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must
be the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child
whose filiation is admitted by the putative father is considered acceptable
evidence. In the present case, the note cannot be accorded the same weight
as the notarial agreement to support the child for it is not even notarized.
Further, the notarial agreement must be accompanied by the putative
fathers admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. Here,
however, not only has petitioner not admitted filiation through
contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it.
Lastly, the copy of her Certificate of Birth, has no probative value to
establish filiation to petitioner, the latter not having signed the same.
ELINO RIVERA, et al. vs. HEIRS OF ROMUALDO
VILLANUEVA represented by MELCHOR VILLANUEVA, et al.
G.R. No. 141501
July 21, 2006
Facts:
Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva without the benefit of marriage
because the latter was married to one Amanda Musngi. They allegedly had
an illegitimate daughter, respondent Angelina. Thereafter, Gonzales died
intestate. Villanueva and respondent Angelina then executed an
extrajudicial settlement of Gonzales' estate, some were allegedly acquired
during the cohabitation. In this document, Villanueva, for the amount
of P30,000, conveyed his interests in the estate to Angelina.
Petitioners who are Gonzales half-brothers contested such extrajudicial settlement and questioned Angelinas illegitimacy.Angelina adduced
her birth certificate to prove her filiation.
Issue:
Whether or not the adduced birth certificate is able to prove
Angelinas filiation.
Ruling:
No. A close examination of the birth certificate reveals that
respondent Angelina was listed as "adopted" by both Villanueva and
Gonzales. It was previously held that the mere registration of a child in his
or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid
adoption, and does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child
and the legal rights of such child.
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima
facie evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of
the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested parties.
Angelina should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the
contents of her birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any
such evidence.
Lastly, Gonzales was already 44 years old and on the verge of
menopausal and that she had been living childless with Villanueva for 20
years at the time of the alleged birth. Thus, it was not sufficiently
established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales' biological daughter, nor
even her adopted daughter.
MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ, et al. vs. EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, et
al.
G.R. No. 140422
August 7, 2006
Facts:
Petitioners are the alleged children of Buenaventura during his first
marriage. Private respondents on the other hand, claim to be
Buenaventuras children from his second marriage. Long after their alleged
father died, petitioners learned that respondents had executed an
extrajudicial partition of a certain property belonging to their alleged father
and transferred such to their names. Such was contested by the petitioners
and filed a complaint to recover their alleged shares in the property.
To prove their filiation, petitioners presented their baptismal
certificates. Such contention was also confirmed by witnesses presented
during the trial.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged filiation of the petitioners to Buenaventura
was sufficiently proven.
Ruling:
Yes. Article 172 of the Family Code provides that the filiation of
legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission
of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the
foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open
and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
"Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws,"
may consist of the childs baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family
bible in which the childs name has been entered, common reputation
respecting the childs pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission.
In the case at bar, the baptismal certificates of respondents were
adduced. In the case of Mercedes, she produced a certification issued by
the Local Civil Registrar attesting to the fact that records of birth for the
year she was born were all destroyed. A witness was also presented who
testified that petitioners enjoyed that common reputation in the community
where they reside as being the children of Buevaventura. Testimonies of
witnesses were also presented to prove filiation by continuous possession of
the status as a legitimate child. The foregoing evidences thus suffice to
prove that petitioners are children of the late Buenaventura.
ANTONIO PERLA vs. MIRASOL BARING, et al.
G.R. No. 172471
November 12, 2012
Facts:
Mirasol alleges that she and Antonio cohabited for about 2 years. As a
result, Randy was born to her. However, when Antonio landed a job as
seaman, he left them and refused to give support to their son. Antonio for
his part, denied that they ever cohabited although admitted that he had a
one night stand with Mirasol. During the trial, Mirasol presented Randys
birth and baptismal certificates. She avers that she and Antonio supplied
the information indicated in the certificates, as the hilot who assisted her
went to Antonios house to solicit the said information. Randy also testified,
saying that he even had a vacation at her aunt, Antonios sister for a week
with which he 1st met Antonio, calling him Papa and while the latter hugged
him, he promised to support Randy.
Issue:
Whether or not Randys filiation to Antonio was sufficiently proven.
Ruling:
No. Respondents failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to
Antonio. The rules for establishing filiation are found in Arts.175 and 172 of
the Family Code. Whereas, in the case at bar, the birth and baptismal
certificates presented have no probative value to establish the alleged
filiation since the Antonio had not signed them. It is settled that such
evidences adduced identifying the putative father is not competent evidence
of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in
their preparation. Mirasol failed to present the mentioned hilot to prove her
claim that it was Antonio who supplied the information in the certificates.
Besides, they do not contain Antonios signature and that there were also
inconsistencies such as Antonios middle name, signifying that he had no
hand in their preparation.
Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his filiation. The single
instance of Antonios hug and promise to support Randy cannot be
considered as proof of continuous possession of the status of a child. To
emphasize, the fathers conduct towards his son must be spontaneous and
uninterrupted for this ground to exist. Whereas, except for this mentioned
single instance, there were no other acts of Antonio treating Randy as his
son.
Lastly, assuming that Antonio indeed had sexual contact with Mirasol,
still, none of these sexual congresses could have led to the conception of
Randy who was born two years later.
PROBATIVE VALUE OF DNA TESTS IN PATERNITY CASES

EDGARDO A. TIJING, et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 125901
March 8, 2001
Facts:
Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing are husband and wife, they have six
children, youngest of whom is Edgardo Tijing Jr. In August 1989, Angelita
Diamante fetched Bienvenida for an urgent laundry job. Bienvenida left to
Angelita her 4-month old child, Edgardo Jr. as she usually let Angelita take
care of her child while she was doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned
from work to get her son, Angelita was nowhere to be found, and despite
her and her husbands efforts, they could not locate Angelita and their
childs whereabouts.
Four years later, Bienvenida read about the death of Tomas Lopez, the
common-law husband of Angelita, whose interment is in Bulacan. She went
there and allegedly saw her son Edgardo Jr., now named John Thomas
Lopez. John is now being claimed by Angelita as her own son, sired by her
common-law husband Tomas Lopez during their cohabitation. Bienvenida
now alleges that the child cannot possibly be born to Angelita and Tomas for
it was the latters own brother who admitted that Tomas was rendered
sterile, caused by an accident. Tomas begot no children from his legal
marriage nor with the cohabitation with Angelita. Tomas brother even
testified that Tomas himself admitted to him that the subject child was
adopted.
Issue:
Who among the claimants is the true parent of the subject child.
Ruling:
Bienvenida. She presented sufficient clinical records, presenting the
proper and credible witnesses who assisted her in her childs birth. Not to
mention that it could be readily observed that Bienvenida and the child have
strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes.
Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and
material evidence to establish parentage. Whereas, Angelita had been
known to have undergone ligation years before the alleged birth of the child
and the admission of Tomas own brother that Tomas was sterile makes it
impossible that he and Angelita sired subject child. More importantly, the
birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent
were legally married which is false because even Angelita had admitted she
is a common-law wife. This false entry puts to doubt the other data in said
birth certificate.
In this case, the Supreme Court made mention of the DNA test for
identification and parentage testing. The DNA from the mother, the alleged
father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. The use of DNA test as
evidence is still open to challenge, but as the appropriate case comes,
courts should not hesitate to rule on its admissibility. Though it is not
necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful
to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.
RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE

AGUSTIN V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 162571
June 15, 2005
Facts:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son, Martin sued Martins alleged

biological father, petitioner Agustin, for support and support pendente lite
before the RTC. The respondents alleged that the petitioner impregnated
her and bore a son Martin out of wedlock. The babys birth certificate was
purportedly signed by the petitioner as the father. Arnel even shouldered
the prenatal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests
for Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and even
suggested to have the child committed for adoption.
The petitioner denied having sired Martin because his affair and
intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in 1998, long before Martins
conception. He admitted that their affair started in 1993 but theirs was an
on-and-off relationship. He terminated the affair when he was unable to
bear the prospect of losing his wife and family. Finally, the petitioner claims
that the signature and the community tax certificate attributed to him in the
acknowledgement of Martins birth certificate were falsified.
The private respondents moved for the issuance of an order directing
the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule
28 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner opposed said motion invoking his
constitutional right against self-incrimination and stating that there was no
cause of action, considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a
forgery and that under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to
support if not recognized by the putative father.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and
ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the
expense of the applicants. CA affirmed the trial court.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the respondent court erred in denying the petitioners
MTD.
b) Whether or not the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA
paternity testing and was a form of unreasonable search.
Ruling:
No. The trial court properly denied the petitioners motion to dismiss
because the private respondents complaint on its face showed that they
had a cause of action against the petitioner. The elements of a cause of
action are: (1) the plaintiffs primary right and the defendants
corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission
of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated.
The cause of action is determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by
the facts alleged.
No. In Ople v. Torres, the Supreme Court struck down the proposed
national computerized identification system embodied in Administrative
Order No. 308, we said:In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the
right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right
is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that
enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right
must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and
the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and
seizures, and the infringement of privacy of communication where the
constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioners case
involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against
self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.

HERRERA V. ALBA
G.R. No. 148220
June 15, 2005
Facts:
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba (respondent),
represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition
for compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner. On 7
August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied
that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical
contact with respondents mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity
testing to abbreviate the proceedings. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described
the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an
accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.Petitioner opposed DNA
paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability.
Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right
against self-incrimination.
In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted
respondents motion to conduct DNA paternity testing on petitioner,
respondent and Armi Alba.Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
the 3 February 2000 Order. He asserted that under the present
circumstances, the DNA test is compelled to take would be inconclusive,
irrelevant and the coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen,
unconstitutional.In an Order dated 8 June 2000, the trial court denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
On 29 November 2000, the appellate court issued a decision denying
the petition and affirming the questioned Orders of the trial court. The
appellate court stated that petitioner merely desires to correct the trial
courts evaluation of evidence. Thus, appeal is an available remedy for an
error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. The appellate court also stated that the proposed DNA
paternity testing does not violate his right against self-incrimination
because the right applies only to testimonial compulsion. Finally, the

appellate court pointed out that petitioner can still refute a possible adverse
result of the DNA paternity testing.
Issue:
Whether or not DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to
determine filiation.
Ruling:
Before discussing the issues on DNA paternity testing, we deem it
appropriate to give an overview of a paternity suit and apply it to the facts
of this case. We shall consider the requirements of the Family Code and of
the Rules of Evidence to establish paternity and filiation.Filiation
proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to
secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support,
or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges
that the putative father is the biological father of the child. There are four
significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties
have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and child.
A prima facie case exists if a woman declares that she had sexual
relations with the putative father. In our jurisdiction, corroborative proof is
required to carry the burden forward and shift it to the putative
father.There are two affirmative defenses available to the putative father.
The putative father may show incapability of sexual relations with the
mother, because of either physical absence or impotency. The putative
father may also show that the mother had sexual relations with other men
at the time of conception.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is
presumed legitimate. The childs legitimacy may be impugned only under
the strict standards provided by law.Finally, physical resemblance between
the putative father and child may be offered as part of evidence of paternity.
Resemblance is a trial technique unique to a paternity proceeding.
However, although likeness is a function of heredity, there is no
mathematical formula that could quantify how much a child must or must
not look like his biological father. This kind of evidence appeals to the
emotions of the trier of fact.
In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the four
aspects. Armi Alba, respondents mother, put forward a prima facie case
when she asserted that petitioner is respondents biological father. Aware
that her assertion is not enough to convince the trial court, she offered
corroborative proof in the form of letters and pictures. Petitioner, on the
other hand, denied Armi Albas assertion. He denied ever having sexual
relations with Armi Alba and stated that respondent is Armi Albas child
with another man. Armi Alba countered petitioners denial by submitting
pictures of respondent and petitioner side by side, to show how much they
resemble each other.
Paternity and filiation disputes can easily become credibility contests.
We now look to the law, rules, and governing jurisprudence to help us
determine what evidence of incriminating acts on paternity and filiation are
allowed in this jurisdiction.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS GERRICO VALLEJO
G.R. No. 144656
May 9, 2002
Facts:
On July 10, 1999 9-year old Daisy Diolola went to her neighbors
house to seek help in an assignment. It was a Saturday. Gerrico Vallejo, the
neighbor, helped Daisy in her assignment. At 5pm of the same day, Daisys
mom noticed that her child wasnt home yet. She went to Vallejos house
and Daisy wasnt there. 7pm, still no word of Daisys whereabouts. The next
morning, Daisys body was found tied to a tree near a river bank.
Apparently, she was raped and thereafter strangled to death.
In the afternoon of July 11, the police went to Vallejos house to
question the latter as he was one of the last persons with the victim. But
prior to that, some neighbors have already told the police that Vallejo was
acting strangely during the afternoon of July 10. The police requested for
the clothes that Vallejo wore the day Daisy disappeared. Vallejo complied
and the clothes were submitted for processing.
The person who processed the clothing was Pet Byron Buan, a
Forensic Biologist of the NBI. At the instance of the local fiscal, he also took
mouth/cheek swabs from Vallejo and a vaginal swab from Daisys body for
DNA testing. Dr. Buan found that there were bloodstains in Vallejos
clothing Blood Type A, similar to that of the victim, while Vallejos Blood
Type is O. Buan also found that the vaginal swab from Daisy contained
Vallejos DNA profile.
Meanwhile, Vallejo already executed a sworn statement admitting the
crime. But when trial came, Vallejo insisted that the sworn statement was
coerced; that he was threatened by the cops; that the DNA samples should
be inadmissible because the body and the clothing of Daisy were already
soaked in smirchy waters, hence contaminated. Vallejo was convicted and
was sentenced to death by the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible as
evidence.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are
conclusive. The court reiterated that even though DNA evidence is merely
circumstantial, it can still convict the accused considering that it
corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in this rape-slay
case.The Supreme Court also elucidated on the admissibility of DNA
evidence in this case and for the first time recognized its evidentiary value
in the Philippines, thus: DNA is an organic substance found in a persons
cells which contains his or her genetic code. Except for identical twins, each
persons DNA profile is distinct and unique.When a crime is committed,
material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victims body
for the suspects DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is
then matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the
victim.
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists
between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples
collected are subjected to various chemical processes to establish their
profile.
ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG V. JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ
G.R. No. 171713

December 17, 2007
Facts:
A Complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support
pending litigation was filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne),
represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky), against
Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac
City.
As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she
and Rogelio got acquainted. This developed into friendship and later
blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was already married to a Japanese
national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19 February
1993 by Municipal Trial Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez.
From January
1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together.
From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived and
on 25 February 1998 was born at the Central Luzon Doctors Hospital,
Tarlac City.
Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky
home after delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal
expenses and provided for all of minor Joannes needs that is recognizing
the child as his.
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and
stopped supporting minor Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of
the child.Rogelio, despite Jinkys remonstrance, failed and refused and
continued failing and refusing to give support for the child and to
acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the heretofore
adverted complaint.On 28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order
of default and a motion for reconsideration seeking the courts
understanding, as he was then in a quandary on what to do to find a
solution to a very difficult problem of his life.
Issue:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred when it remanded the case
to the court a quo for DNA analysis despite the fact that it is no longer
feasible due to the death of Rogelio G. Ong.
Ruling:
As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of filiation
of minor Joanne for purposes of support in favor of the said minor. Filiation
proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to
secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support,
or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges
that the putative father is the biological father of the child. There are four
significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties

have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and child.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is
presumed legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his
status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:Article 167.
The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.
COMPULSARY RECOGNITION
MICHAEL GUY V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 163707
September 15, 2006
Facts:
The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of
Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufina Guy Susim). Private-respondents Karen and Kamille
alleged that they are the acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei
who died intestate. On June 13,1997 the minors were represented by their
mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration before the RTC of Makati City.
Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his
surviving spouse, filed for the dismissal of the petition alleging that his
father left no debts hence, his estate may be settled without the issuance of
letters administration. The other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss
alleging that the certification of non-forum shopping should have been
signed by Remedios and not by counsel.
Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by
reason of a Release of Claim or waiver stating that in exchange for financial
and educational assistance from the petitioner, Remedios and her minor
children discharged the estate of the decedent from any and all
liabilities.The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the
supplemental motion ruling that the mother is not the duly constituted
guardian of the minors hence, she could not have validly signed the waiver.
It also rejected the petitioner's objections to the certificate of non-forum
shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the lower court.
Issue:
Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance.
Ruling:
No, repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and
guardians must necessarily obtain judicial approval. Repudiation of
inheritance must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the best
interest of the ward. Not having been authorized by the court, the release
or waiver is therefore void. Moreover, the private-respondents could not
have waived their supposed right as they have yet to prove their status as
illegitimate children of the decedent. It would be inconsistent to rule that
they have waived a right which, according to the petitioner, the latter do not
have.
The court is not precluded to receive evidence to determine the
filiation of the claimants even if the original petition is for the issuance of
letters administration. Its jurisdiction extends to matters collateral and
incidental to the settlement of the estate, with the determination of heirship
included. As held in previous decision, two causes of action may be brought
together in one complaint, one a claim for recognition, and the other to
claim inheritance.
MARQUINO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
GR. No. 72078
June 27, 1994
Facts:
Respondent Bibiana filed action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation,
Annulment of Partition, Support and Damages against Eutiquio. Bibiana
was born on December 1926 allegedly of Eutiquio and in that time was
single. It was alleged that the Marquino family personally knew her since
she was hired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete. She
likewise received financial assistance from them hence, she enjoyed
continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged natural child by
direct and unequivocal acts of the father and his family. The Marquinos
denied all these. Respondent was not able to finish presenting her evidence
since she died on March 1979 but the sue for compulsory recognition was
done while Eustiquio was still alive. Her heirs were ordered to substitute
her as parties-plaintiffs.
Petitioners, legitimate children of Eutiquio, assailed decision of
respondent court in holding that the heirs of Bibiana, allegedly a natural
child of Eutiquio, can continue the action already filed by her to compel
recognition and the death of the putative parent will not extinguish such
action and can be continued by the heirs substituting the said deceased
parent.
Issues:
a) Whether or not right of action for acknowledgment as a natural child
be transmitted to the heirs and
b) Whether or not Article 173 can be given retroactive effect.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that right of action for the acknowledgment
as a natural child can never be transmitted because the law does not make
any mention of it in any case, not even as an exception. The right is purely
a personal one to the natural child. The death of putative father in an
action for recognition of a natural child cannot be continued by the heirs of
the former since the party in the best position to oppose the same is the
putative parent himself.
Such provision of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect
so as to apply in the case at bar since it will prejudice the vested rights of
petitioners transmitted to them at the time of death of their father.IAC
decision was reversed and set aside. Complaint against Marquino is
dismissed.
TAYAG vs. TAYAG-GALLOR
GR. No. 174680
March
24, 2008
Facts:
On January 15, 2001, respondent, Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, filed a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration over the estate of
Ismael Tayag. The respondent alleged that she is one of the illegitimate
children of the late Ismael Tayag and Ester Angeles.
On September 7, 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving behind
two real properties both of which are in the possession of petitioner, and a
motor vehicle which the latter sold on 10 October 2000 preparatory to the
settlement of the decedents estate. Petitioner allegedly promised to give
respondent and her brothers P100, 000.00 each as their share in the
proceeds of the sale. However, petitioner only gave each of them half the
amount she promised.
In a Motion dated August 31, 2001, petitioner reiterated her sole
ownership of the properties and presented the transfer certificates of title
thereof in her name. She also averred that it is necessary to allege that
respondent was acknowledged and recognized by Ismael Tayag as his
illegitimate child. There being no such allegation, the action becomes one
to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the
putative father. To prevent further encroachment upon the courts time,
petitioner moved for a hearing on her affirmative defenses.
The motion was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents petition for the issuance of letters of
administration sufficiently states a cause of action considering that
respondent merely alleged therein that she is an illegitimate child of the
decedent, without stating that she had been acknowledged or recognized as
such by the latter.
Ruling:
The appellate court held that the mere allegation that respondent is
an illegitimate child suffices. Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person. The Court, applying the provisions of the Family Code
which had then already taken effect, ruled that since Graciano was claiming
illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family
Code, i.e., open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child, the action was already barred by the death of the alleged father.
In contrast, respondent in this case had not been given the
opportunity to present evidence to show whether she had been voluntarily
recognized and acknowledged by her deceased father because of
petitioners opposition to her petition and motion for hearing on affirmative
defenses. There is, as yet, no way to determine if her petition is actually
one to compel recognition which had already been foreclosed by the death
of her father, or whether indeed she has a material and direct interest to
maintain the suit by reason of the decedents voluntary acknowledgment or
recognition of her illegitimate filiation.
BRIONES vs. MIGUEL
GR. No. 156343
October
18, 2004
Facts:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for
Habeas Corpus
to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin
Pineda.The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his
illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on
September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent
Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is presently
residing in Japan. The petitioner prays that the custody of his son Michael
Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological father and has demonstrated
his capability to support and educate him.
Issue:
Whether or not the natural father may be denied the custody and
parental care of his own child in the absence of the mother who is away.
Ruling:
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an
illegitimate child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the
Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that "illegitimate children
shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This
is the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity.
Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under
the age of majority was vested in the father or the mother recognizing
them. If both acknowledge the child, authority was to be exercised by the
one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both, the
rule as to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the latter case,
parental authority resided jointly in the father and the mother.

REPUBLIC vs. ABADILLA
GR. No. 133054
January
28, 1999
Facts:
Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
During their
cohabitation, Luzviminda begot two children, Emerson and Rafael. In the
Certificates of Birth of these two children, they were registered with the
surname Abadilla and the name of their father was entered as Herson
Abadilla. Moreover, the entry in the date and place of marriage of the
childrens parents appeared as June 19, 1987 at Dingras, Ilocos Norte.
On February 5, 1997, Gerson Abadilla, Luzviminda Celestino and their
two minor children, Emerson and Rafael,filed a petition for correction of the
birth certificates.The petition was granted.
The instant petition for review on certiorari is now being interposed by the
Office of the Solicitor General on the ground that the trial court committed
a reversible error when it allowed the deletion of the date and place of
marriage of parents from the birth certificates of minors Emerson C.
Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla but failed to order the change of the minors
surname from Abadilla to Celestino.
Issue:
Whether or not the court committed an error in their ruling of the
case.
Ruling:
Yes. According to Article 176 "Illegitimate children shall use zthe
surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of
each illegitimate child shall consist of one half of the legitime of a legitimate
child.Thus, as illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael should bear the
surname of their mother, Luzviminda Celestino.

VERCELES vs. POSADA
GR. No. 159785
April 27,
2007
Facts:
On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., Verceles fetched
Clarissa Posada from "My Brothers Place" where the seminar was being
held.Clarissa avers that he told her that they would have lunch at Mayon
Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they reached the
place her companions were nowhere. After Verceles ordered food, he
started making amorous advances on her. She panicked, ran and closeted
herself inside a comfort room where she stayed until someone knocked. She
said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she kept the
incident to herself. She went on as casual employee. One of her tasks was
following-up barangay road and maintenance projects.
On December 22, 1986, on orders of Verceles, she went to Virac,
Catanduanes, to follow up funds for barangay projects. At around 11:00
a.m. the same day, she went to Catanduanes Hotel on instructions of
petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress of her mission. They met
at the lobby and he led her upstairs because he said he wanted the briefing
done at the restaurant at the upper floor.
Instead, Verceles opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly
embraced her, as he told her that he was unhappy with his wife and would
"divorce" her anytime. He also claimed he could appoint her as a municipal
development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances. But again she
kept the incident to herself.Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her
menstruation, she said she wrote petitioner that she feared she was
pregnant.
Issue:
Whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate
child of petitioner was proven.
Ruling:
The letters are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which
establish Verna Aizas filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In
addition, the arrays of evidence presented by respondents, the dates,
letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and irrefutable
evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioners illegitimate child.
Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself
presented no evidence of his own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled
is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence,
are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and cannot be
given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses
who testify on affirmative matters.

PEOPLE vs. GLABO
GR. No. 129248
December 7, 2001
Facts:
One afternoon in October, 1991, 21-year old victim Mila Lobrico, a
mental retardate, and her 11-year old sister, Judith, were summoned by
Justiniano Glabo, their maternal uncle, to his house. He told them to wash
the clothes of his wife. After the two sisters finished their chore, accusedappellant ordered Judith to wash the dishes in the nearby creek, about 200
meters away from his house. When Judith was gone, accused-appellant
dragged Mila from the yard, where she was hanging the washed clothes,
into the house. He pushed her to the floor and made her lie down. He
undressed the victim, and then he inserted his penis into her private organ
and made push and pull motions. Mila was overpowered by accusedappellants brute strength. She shouted for help, but there were no
neighbors nearby.
Suddenly, it started to rain hard, so Judith had to run back to the
house for shelter. She went directly under the house, which was elevated 3
feet above the ground. While underneath the house, she heard someone
crying on the floor above. She looked up through the bamboo floor and saw
accused-appellant on top of her elder sister. Both were naked. Judith went
to the kitchen, and she saw accused-appellants penis as he stood up and

raised his briefs.
The two girls went home silently. They did not say a word about the
incident. However, the victim became pregnant as a result of the rape, and
after six months her condition could no longer be concealed. Severino
Lobrico, Milas father, confronted her, but she said nothing. It was her
sister, Judith, who told their father that accused-appellant raped Mila.
Severino brought Mila to the police and filed a complaint for rape before the
Municipal Trial Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the offspring is illegitimate.
Ruling:
Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil
liability that may be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b)
acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from
so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the passage of
the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children and
natural children by legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the
specie of illegitimate children. Since parental authority is vested by Article
176 of the Family Code upon the mother and considering that an offender
sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the power to exercise
parental authority over his children, no further positive act is required of
the parent as the law itself provides for the childs status. Hence, accusedappellant should only be ordered to indemnify and support the victims
child. However, the amount and terms of support shall be determined by
the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201
of the Family Code.

DINAH B. TONOG v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 122906
7, 2002
February
Facts:
Dinah gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate child
with Edgar V. Daguimol. The two cohabited for a time and lived with Edgar's
parents and sister. A year after Dinah left for US where she found work as a
registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care of her father and
grandparents. Edgar later filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin and
the trial court granted the petition and appointed Edgar as the legal
guardian. Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgment and the court set
aside the original judgment and allowed Dinah to file her opposition to
Edgar's petition. Edgar filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied
and the court issued a resolution granting Dinah's motion for custody over
Gardin.
Edgar filed a petition for certiorari before the CA who modified their
previous decision and granted Edgar custody over Gardin. Dinah contends
that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, as a matter of
law. As the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon
her as the mother of the illegitimate minor.
Issue:
Whether or not Dinah is entitled to the custody of Gardin.
Ruling:
No. The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a
tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. The
exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the
good of the child. A mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who
is below seven years of age for compelling reasons. Instances of
unsuitability are neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality,
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity,
and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than seven years of age,
a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that
choice. The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the childs
preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance,
custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person.
Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling
factor, SC find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father to
retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child
should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a
strange environment away from the people and places to which she had
apparently formed an attachment. Moreover, whether a mother is a fit
parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly entertained in the
special proceedings before the trial court.
MOSSESGELD vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR. No. 111455
December 23,
1998
Facts:
Marissa Alfaro Mossesgeld , single, gave birth to a baby boy on
December 2, 1989. The presumed father is Eleazar Siriban Calasan, a
married lawyer. The father signed the birth certificate of the child as the
informant, indicating hat the childs name is Jonathan Mossesgeld Calasan.
He also executed an affidavit admitting the paternity of the child. The
person in charge at the hospital refused to place the presumed
fathers surname as the childs surname in the certificated of live birth.
Thus, petitioner himself submitted the certificate to the office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong for registration.
Again, the municipal treasurer, as officer in charge of the local civil
registrars off ice, rejected the registration on the basis of the Civil
Registrar Generals Circular No. 4, which provides that under
Article 176 of the Family Code, illegitimate children born on or after
August 3, 1988 shall use the surname of their mother. Upon inquiring
about the status of the status of the registration of his child,
Calasan was furnished with a copy of the letter of the Civil Registrar
General denying the registration of the certificate of live birth on the
grounds that it is contrary to law. Calasan, thereafter, filed a petition for
mandamus with the Pasig RTC to compel the local civil registrar to register
the certificate of live birth of his illegitimate son using his surname. His
petition was denied. He filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to
for leave to amend the petition to substitute the childs mother as the
petitioner. His motion to amen was granted, but motion for reconsideration
was denied. He elevated the petition to the Court of Appeals, which
aff irmed the RTCs decision
Issue:
Whether or not mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil
Registrar to register thecertifi cate of live birth of an illegitimate
child using the alleged fathers surname where the latter admitted
paternity.
Ruling:
No. Local Civil Registrar correctly refused. Illegitimate children must
use the surname of their mother, regardless of whether or not they
had been acknowledged by their fathers in their record of birth. Article 176
of the Family Code effectively repealed Article 366 of the Civil Code, which
gives a natural child the right to use the surname of his/her father where
he/she has been acknowledged by both parents. Article 176 explicitly states
that illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, be under
her parental authority, and be entitled to support in conformity with

the provisions of the Family Code.

SILVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR. No. 114742
July17, 1997
Facts:
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an
unmarried local actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The
union saw the birth of two children: Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not
very long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It began, according to
Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous
objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that
she, in fact, had never stopped working throughout their relationship. At
any rate, the two eventually parted ways.
The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the
refusal of Gonzales to allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous
understanding, to have the children in his company on weekends. Silva
filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by
Gonzales who averred that Silva often engaged in "gambling and
womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social values of
the children.
Issue:
Whether or not the Father can visit his children.
Ruling:
The biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children
in view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of
parents over their children. This right is personal to the father; no other
person, like grandparents, can exercise this right for him.
Silva (the father) may have won with the Supreme Courts upholding of his
visitation rights, but this favorable decision did not prevent Suzanne (the
mother) in the exercise of her parental authority from immigrating to
Holland with her two children.

DAVID vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR. No. 111180
November 16,
1995
Facts:
Daisie David had an intimate relationship with her boss Ramon Villar,
who is married, and a father of 4 children, all grown-up. They first had a
son, Christopher, who was eventually followed by 2 more girls, Christine
and Cathy Mae. The relationship became known to Villars wife when Daisie
took Christopher J, to his house and introduced him to Villar's wife. After
this, Daisies were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were even
accepted by his legal family.
Then Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then 6 years old, to
go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar
refused to give Christopher back and had enrolled him at the
HolyFamilyAcademy for the next school year. Daisie filed a petition for
habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J. which the RTC granted, giving
custody to Daisie and ordering Villar to give temporary support of P3K a
month to the 3 kids and to pay the costs of suit.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not custody should be given to Daisie
Ruling:
Yes. CA ruling reversed, custody granted to Daisie and Villar ordered

to givetemporary support in the amount of P3K, pending the fixing of the
amount of support in an appropriate action. Christopher J. is an illegitimate
child since at the time of his conception, his father Villar, was married to
another woman other than his mother.
As such, pursuant to Art. 176, FC, he is under the parental authority
of his mother, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have
custody of him. And because she has been deprived of her rightful custody
of her child by Villar, Daisie is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus.
Rule 102, Sec. 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother
who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her
child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with
sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.
The fact that Villar has recognized the Christopher may be a ground for
ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of
the child. Under Article 213, FC, "no child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise."
GR. No. 105619
LEGITIMATED CHILDREN
DE SANTOS vs. ANGELES
December 12,
1995
Facts:
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona,
which union was blessed with a daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario
de Santos. After some time, their relationship became strained to the
breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor,
Conchita Talag, private respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal
dissolution of his first marriage by obtaining a divorce decree from a
Nevada court in 1949. Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry
private respondent, with whom he had been cohabiting since his de
factoseparation from Sofia. This union produced eleven children. On March
30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a month later, on April 23,
1967, Antonio and private respondent contracted a marriage in
TagaytayCity celebrated under Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981, Antonio
died intestate leaving properties

000,000.00.
with an estimated value of P15,
On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court for the issuance of
letters of administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of
her late husband's estate. She alleged, among other things, that the
decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten
surviving children, and petitioner. After six years of protracted intestate
proceedings, however, petitioner decided to intervene. Thus, in a motion she
filed sometime in November 1987, she argued inter aliathat private
respondent's children were illegitimate. This was challenged by private
respondent although the latter admitted during the hearing that all her
children were born prior to Sofia's death in 1967.
The court, declared private respondent's ten children legitimated and
thereupon instituted and declared them, along with petitioner and private
respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos. Hence, she filed the instant
petition for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that since only natural
children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as
legitimated her half brothers and sisters.
Issue:
Whether or not natural children by legal fiction be legitimized.
Ruling:
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born
outside wedlock of parents, who, at the time of the conception of the former,
were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.
In other words, a child's parents should not have been disqualified to marry
each other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a "natural child."
In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to
private respondent and deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and
born when the latter's valid marriage to petitioner's mother was still
subsisting. That private respondent and the decedent were married abroad
after the latter obtained in Nevada,U.S.A. a decree of divorce from his
legitimate wife does not change this fact, for a divorce granted abroad was
not recognized in this jurisdiction at the time. Evidently, the decedent was
aware of this fact, which is why he had to have the marriage solemnized in
Tokyo, outside of the Philippines. It may be added here that he was likewise
aware of the nullity of the Tokyo marriage for after his legitimate, though
estranged wife died, he hastily contracted another marriage with private
respondent, this time here in Tagaytay, attention must be drawn to the fact
that this case has been decided under the provisions of the Civil Code, not
the Family Code which now recognizes only two classes of children:
legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural children by legal fiction" are nothing if

not pure fiction.
LEGITIMATED CHILDREN
ABADILLA vs. TABILIRAN

AM No. MTJ-92-716
October
25, 1995
Facts:
Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint against Judge
Tabiliran on the grounds of gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and
corruption unbecoming of a judge. With respect to the charge on gross
immorality, she contended that the judge scandalously and publicly
cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during subsistence of his marriage with
Teresita Banzuela. Tabiliran and Priscilla got married in May 1986. On the
other hand, with respect to the charge on deceitful conduct, petitioner
claims that the judge caused his 3 illegitimate children with Priscilla be
registered as legitimate by falsely executing separate affidavits stating the
delayed registration was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or
oversight when in fact, he knew these children cannot be legally registered
as legitimate. The judge averred that 25 years had already elapsed since
the disappearance of her wife in 1966 when he married Priscilla hence the
cohabitation was neither bigamous nor immoral. However, as early as
1970, based on the record, Priscilla had begotten her 3 children.
Issue:
Whether or not the 3 children can be considered legitimate.
Ruling:
The 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered
legitimate since the time they were born, there was an existing valid
marriage between Tabiliran and Teresita. Only natural children can be
legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of
the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other, are natural.
Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only children conceived and
born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may
be legitimated. Reasons for this limitation:
1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;
2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional
rights;
3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;
4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous
children as it will destroy the sanctity of marriage;
5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years
after the birth of the child.
ADOPTED CHILDREN
REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR. No. 100835
1993
October 26,
Facts:
James Hughes, a natural born citizen of the UnitedStates of America,
married Lenita Mabunay, a Filipino Citizen,who herself was later
naturalized as a citizen of that country.The spouses jointly filed a petition
with the RTC to adopt theminor niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been
living withthe couple even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors,
aswell as their parents, gave consent to the adoption. The RTCrendered a
decision granting the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Can the spouses adopt the minors.
Ruling:
While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt under
any of the exceptional cases, Lenita, however, can qualify. Lenita may not
thus adopt alone since Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband
and the wife, a condition that must be read alongtogether with Article 184.
Art 185 provides: Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the
following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate
child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the
other. As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603 had
thus made it mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt when one of
them was an alien. The law was silent when both spouses were of the same
nationality. The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article
185 thereof now expresses the necessity for joint adoption by the spouses
except in only two instances: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own
legitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child
of the other. It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on the
subject of parental authority, can aptly find governance. Article 186. In case
husband and wife jointly adaptor one spouse adopts the legitimate child of
the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in
accordance with this Code.
ADOPTED CHILDREN
REPUBLIC vs. TOLEDANO
GR.No. 94147
June 8,
1994
Facts:
Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens filed a
petition to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala. They are physically,
mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12)
year old minor. Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 upto the
present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and
custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption.
His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to
poverty and inability to support and educate her son. The RTC granted the
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the spouses can adopt Solomon.
Ruling:
Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as "The Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses
Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.Article 184,
paragraph three of Executive Order No. 209expressly enumerates the
persons who are not qualified to adopt, An alien, except: (a) A former
Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who
seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One
who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her
spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the

foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the
rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law. Private
respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify
pursuant to paragraph three of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former
Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the
petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating
Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It
reads: Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the
following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate
child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the
other. Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a
condition that must be read along together with Article 184.
ADOPTED CHILDREN
REPUBLIC vs. ALARCON VERGARA
GR. No. 95551
March 20,
1997
Facts:
On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due
Dye filed a petition before the RegionalTrialCourtofAngelesCity to adopt
Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old, respectively,
younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr, a member of the United
States Air Force, is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in
Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized
American. They have two children. Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their
natural parents, gave their consent to the adoption.
The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question of law,
contending that the spouses Dye are not qualified under the law to adopt
Maricel and Alvin Due. As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino
citizens.
Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an alien is
disqualified from adopting the minors Maricel and Alvin Due because he
does not fall under any of the three afore quoted exceptions in the law. He is
not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity.
Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's legitimate child. Although he seeks to
adopt with his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he is not married to a
Filipino citizen, for Rosalina was already a naturalized American at the time
the petition was filed, thus excluding him from the coverage of the
exception. The law here does not provide for an alien who is married to a
former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a
relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens
may not adopt.
On her own, Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the
law mandates joint adoption by husband and wife, subject to exceptions.
Article 29 of Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code)
retained the Civil Code provision that husband and wife may jointly adopt.
The Family Code amended this rule by scrapping the optional character of
joint adoption and making it now mandatory.
Issue:
Whether or not the adoption is valid.
Ruling:
Article 185 of the Family Code provides: Husband and wife must
adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child;
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other."
None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina Dye, for
they did not petition to adopt the latter's child but her brother and sister.
Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will
sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with
compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is
intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate
children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court's
decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it
cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial
legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended,
we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses' petition for adoption.

IN RE: ADOPTION OF MICHELLE LIM AND MICHAEL JUDE LIM
GR No. 168992-93
May 21,
2009
Facts:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with

Primo Lim but were childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by
Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD.
The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the
parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American
Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the
children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who
simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for
adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then
25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven
months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave
their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.
Ruling:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had
already remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3
instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly
adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental authority. The use of the word
shall signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This
is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child
to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural
to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario
will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as
an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of
RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the aliens
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental
authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes
caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and
development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.

LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC
GR No. 164948
June 27, 2006
Facts:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a
petition for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the
formers brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when
her brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for
their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2
children by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time
she left up to the institution of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother
passed away, the minors were being supported by the petitioner and her
children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption. A Social
Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption
and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the
adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children,
she voluntarily consented. However, petitioner failed to present the said
social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of
Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for adoption be granted without the written
consent of the adoptees biological mother
Ruling:
No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the
biological parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The
written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written consent of
the biological parents cannot be obtained. The general requirement of
consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural
parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to
insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the
manner of the proposed adoption. The written consent of the biological
parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Indeed,
the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be
obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-
establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the

written consent of Amelia Ramos to adopt. Moreover, abandonment means
neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and
support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the
care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements
of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of
adoption.

CANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 105308
September 25, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married
on January 27, 1973, begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3,
1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on
January 3, 1981. During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couples
relationship was undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie
learned of her husbands alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a
family friend of the Clavanos.
Upon learning of her husbands alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed
a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite with the then
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebuwhich rendered a decision
approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that they
agreed to live separately and apart or from bed and board. Petitioner then
left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie
before the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court
issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the three minor
children to Anna Marie, reserving rights of visitation at all reasonable
times and places to petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a
naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and
never remarried.Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner
immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition thereto,
alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano
were financially capable of supporting the children while his finances were
too meager compared to theirs, he could not in conscience, allow
anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children.
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to

reacquire custody over his children alleging that Anna Marie had
transferred to the United States thereby leaving custody of their children to
private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect,
relinquished custody over the children and, therefore, such custody should
be transferred to the father. The court then directed the Clavanos to deliver
custody over the minors to petitioner.
Issue:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of
a natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them?
Ruling:
This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals
failed to appreciate facts and circumstances that should have elicited a
different conclusion on the issue of whether petitioner has so abandoned his
children, thereby making his consent to the adoption unnecessary. In its
ordinary sense, the word abandon means to forsake entirely, to forsake or
renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of
putting under a ban. The emphasis is on the finality and publicity with
which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence, the
meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim ones
rights or interests. In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the
act of abandonment imports any conduct of the parent which evinces a
settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims to the child. It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and
legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children.
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioners conduct did not
manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims over his children as to constitute abandonment. Physical
estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically
absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural
and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He
maintained regular communication with his wife and children through
letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to
their whims. t abandoned them.The questioned Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith,
Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse
respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately
executory.

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT vs.
JUDGE ANTONIO M. BELEN
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1362
July
18, 1997
Facts:
Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of
whom are naturalized American citizens, filed a verified petition for
adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea. Respondent Judge
Belen granted the petition after finding that petitioner spouses were highly
qualified to adopt the child as their own, basing his decree primarily on the
"findings and recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on

the one hand and the adoptee on the other hand have already developed
love and emotional attachment and parenting rules have been demonstrated
to the minor." On these considerations, respondent judge decided and
proceeded to dispense with trial custody. He asserted that the DSWD
findings and recommendations are contained in the "Adoptive Home Study
Report" and "Child Study Report" prepared by the local office of the DSWD
through respondent Elma P. Vedaa. However, when the minor Zhedell
Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel clearance from the
DSWD in order to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the DSWD
found that it did not have any record in its files regarding the adoption and
that there was never any order from respondent judge for the DSWD to
conduct a "Home and Child Study Report" in the case. Furthermore, there
was no directive from respondent judge for the social welfare officer of the
lower court to coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the required
reports for said minor's adoption.
Issue:
May a decree of adoption be granted on the basis of case study
reports made by a social welfare officer of the court?
Ruling:
No. Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides in no
uncertain terms that:
No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social
Welfare, or the Social Work and Counseling Division, in case of Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts, has made a case study of the child to be
adopted, his natural parents as well as the prospective adopting parents,
and has submitted its report and recommendations on the matter to the
court hearing such petition. The Department of Social Welfare shall
intervene on behalf of the child if it finds, after such case study, that the
petition should be denied. Circular No. 12, as a complementary measure,
was issued by this Court precisely to obviate the mishandling of adoption
cases by judges, particularly in respect to the aforementioned case study to
be conducted in accordance with Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603
by the DSWD itself and involving the child to be adopted, its natural
parents, and the adopting parents. It definitively directs Regional Trial
Courts hearing adoption cases:
(1) To NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development, thru

its local agency, of the filing of adoption cases or the pendency thereof
with respect to those cases already filed;
(2) To strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33 of the
aforesaid decree . . .
The Staff Assistant V. (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if
any, shall coordinate with the Ministry of Social Services and Development
representatives in the preparation and submittal of such case study. .The
error on the part of both respondent judge and social worker is thus all too
evident. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course that respondent
judge should have taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the
commencement of Special Proceeding No. 5830 so that the corresponding
case study could have been accordingly conducted by said department
which undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that
possessed by the court social welfare officer, to make the proper
recommendation. Moreover, respondent judge should never have merely
presumed that it was routinely for the social welfare officer to coordinate
with the DSWD regarding the adoption proceedings. It was his duty to
exercise caution and to see to it that such coordination was observed in the
adoption proceedings, together with all the other requirements of the law.
By respondent's failure to do so, he may well have wittingly or
unwittingly placed in jeopardy the welfare and future of the child whose
adoption was under consideration. Adoption, after all, is in a large measure
a legal device by which a better future may be accorded an unfortunate
childlike Zhedell Bernardo Ibea in this case. Treading on equally sensitive
legal terrain, the social welfare officer concerned, respondent Elma P.
Vedaa, arrogated unto herself a matter that pertained exclusively to the
DSWD, her task being to coordinate with the DSWD in the preparation and
submission of the relevant case study reports, and not to make the same
and recommend by herself the facts on which the court was to act.
ACCORDINGLY, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely by this Court,
respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38,
of Lingayen, Pangasinan is hereby CENSURED for violating Article 33 of
Presidential Decree No. 603 and Circular No. 12 of this Court; and
respondent Elma P. Vedaa, Social Welfare Officer II of the Office of the
Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of

REPRIMANDED for violating Circular No. 12.
Lingayen,
Pangasinan,
is

REPUBLIC vs. HERNANDEZ
GR No. 117209
February 9,
1996
Facts:
The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome
Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change of the
first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname
Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption. Petitioner
opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition
for adoption objecting to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the
petitions for the change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these
petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change
of name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are
different from and are not related to each other, being respectively
governed by distinct sets of law and rules. Petitioner further contends that
what the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a
matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural
consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of
the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a
substantial change of ones legal name, a petition for change of name under
Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and
adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied.
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for

adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule
2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid
multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted
and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the
Rules against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as
two separate but related causes of action in a single petition.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the
change of the given or proper name if the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
Ruling:
No. Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal
effect of adoption: (1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be
a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal
rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child,
including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to
bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It
is the change of the adoptees surname to follow that of the adopter which
is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must
specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed
for by petitioner. However, the given or proper name, also known as the first
or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally
registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does
not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptees registered
Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon
the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption.
Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding,
such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in
this case, cannot properly be granted.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil
register is the name appearing therein. If a change in ones name is desired,
this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive
and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name
under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons
or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined. A
petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance

with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court
with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete
special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A
fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider
it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be
to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available
under our remedial law system.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 103695
March 15,
1996
Facts:
The petition below was filed on September 21 1988 by private
respondents spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the
adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old, who had been living
with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old.
When private respondents were married on January 19, 1986, the minor
Midael C. Mazon stayed with them under their care and custody. Private
respondents prayed that judgment be rendered:
a) Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all
intents and purposes;
b.) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child;
and
c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the
petitioners and that the first name this was mistakenly registered as
MIDAEL be corrected to MICHAEL."
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his
contention that the correction of names cannot be effected in the same
proceeding for adoption. As additional ground for his appeal, he argued that
the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for adoption because in
the notice published in the newspaper, the name given was "Michael,"
instead of "Midael," which is the name of the minor given in his Certificate
of Live Birth.
On January 23, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
decision of the RTC. The Court of Appeals ruled that the case of Cruz
v. Republic, invoked by the petitioner in support of its plea that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, was inapplicable because
that case involved a substantial error. Like the trial court, it held that to
require the petitioners to file a separate petition for correction of name
would entail "additional time and expenses for them as well as for the
Government and the Courts."
Issue:
Does the trial court have jurisdiction over the present case?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the RTC correctly granted the petition
for adoption of the minor Midael C. Mazon and the Court of Appeals, in
affirming the decision of the trial court, correctly did so. With regard to the
second assignment of error in the petition, we hold that both the Court of
Appeals and the trial court erred in granting private respondents' prayer for
the correction of the name of the child in the civil registry. Contrary to what
the trial court thought, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies to this case
and because its provision was not complied with, the decision of the trial
court, insofar as it ordered the correction of the name of the minor, is void
and without force or effect. The trial court was clearly in error in holding
Rule 108 to be applicable only to the correction of errors concerning the
civil status of persons

IN RE: ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA
G.R. No. 148311
2005
March 31,
Facts:
Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate
child Stephanie Astorga Garcia. He averred that Stephanie was born on
June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been using her mothers middle name
and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting
parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name be changed to Garcia, her
mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig
his surname.
The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant
to article 189 of the Family Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie
Nathy Catindig. Honorato filed a motion for classification and/or
reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to use the surname of
her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or
jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological
mother as his middle name.
Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her
mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her
natural father.
Ruling:
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adapter for all intents and purposes pursuant to
Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of Article V of RA 8557.
Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie
is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her
father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the members
of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom
that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father.

TEOTICO vs. DEL VAL
G.R. No. L-18753
March 26,
1965
Facts:
Rene Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera.
The testatrix Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the
remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will. Vicente
Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the CIF of Manila
which was set for hearing after the requisite publication and service to all
parties concerned.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca
Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged
natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed
an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the
oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, allowed
the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, and the
oppositor amended her opposition by alleging the additional ground that the
will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court
rendered its decision admitting the will to probate but declaring the
disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that
the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's
heirs by way of intestate succession.
Issue:
Whether or not oppositor Ana del Val Chan has the right to intervene
in this proceeding.
Ruling:
Oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the
estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim
to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any
provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the
estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or
executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate
because she is not a co-owner thereof.
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an
adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship
established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and
does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted
child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is
created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As
a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives
of the adopter.
RESCISSION OF ADOPTION
LAHOM vs. SIBULO
G.R. No. 143989
July 14,
2003
Facts:
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December
of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of
adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. In
her petition, she averred. That despite the proddings and pleadings of said
spouses, respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom,
to the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter
died, and even before his death he had made known his desire to revoke
respondent's adoption, but was prevented by petitioner's supplication,
however with his further request upon petitioner to give to charity whatever
properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the future. Respondent
continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the feelings of
herein petitioner, and his records with the Professional Regulation
Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in
1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and activities in connection
with his practice of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.
That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city with
only her household helps to attend to her, has yearned for the care and
show of concern from a son, but respondent remained indifferent and would
only come to Naga to see her once a year. for the last three or four years,
the medical check-up of petitioner in Manila became more frequent in view
of a leg ailment, and those were the times when petitioner would need most
the care and support from a love one, but respondent all the more remained
callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is not expected of a
son.
That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner's
nephews and nieces whenever they would find time to visit her, respondent
alleging that they were only motivated by their desire for some material
benefits from petitioner.
That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a strained
and uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has
suffered wounded feelings, knowing that after all respondent's only motive
to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of
herein petitioner and her late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of
Civil Case No. 99-4463 for partition against petitioner, thereby totally
eroding her love and affection towards respondent, rendering the decree of
adoption, considering respondent to be the child of petitioner, for all legal
purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no more basis for its
existence, hence this petition for revocation,"
Issue:
Can the adoption be rescinded?
Ruling:
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a
consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the
adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless,
the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be
the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is
still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the
legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of
certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance,
upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted
child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from
having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
SUPPORT
LAM vs. CHUA
G.R. No. 131286
March 18,
2004
Facts:
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage by Adriana Chua
against Jose Lam in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109).
Adriana alleged in the petition that: she and Jose were married on January
13, 1984; out of said marriage, they begot one son, John Paul Chua Lam;
Jose was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage but said incapacity was not then apparent; such
psychological incapacity of Jose became manifest only after the celebration
of the marriage when he frequently failed to go home, indulged in
womanizing and irresponsible activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal
partnership of gains; in order to save what was left of the conjugal
properties, she was forced to agree with Jose on the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership of gains and the separation of present and future
properties; said agreement was approved by the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City (Branch 149) in a Decision dated February 28, 1994; they had
long been separated in bed and board; they have agreed that the custody of
their child will be with her, subject to visitation rights of Jose. Adriana
prayed that the marriage between her and Jose be declared null and void
but she failed to claim and pray for the support of their child, John Paul.
Issue:
Should Jose give the corresponding support
Ruling:
The Pasay RTC should have been aware that in determining the
amount of support to be awarded, such amount should be in proportion to
the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient,
pursuant to Articles 194, 201 and 202 of the Family Code. It is incumbent
upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence presented
before it. The evidence must prove the capacity or resources of both parents
who are jointly obliged to support their children as provided for under
Article 195 of the Family Code; and the monthly expenses incurred for the
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation of the child.
BRIONES vs. MIGUEL

G.R. No. 156343
October
18, 2004
Facts:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for
Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca
Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.
On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition to include
Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the respondents.
A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11, 2002
ordering the respondents to produce before this Court the living body of the
minor Michael Kevin Pineda on March 21, 2002 at 2:00 oclock in the
afternoon.
The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his
illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on
September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent
Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is presently
residing in Japan. Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody of her
minor child be given to her and invokes Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the
Family Code and Article 363 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
Issue:
Whether or not as the natural father, may be denied the custody and
parental care of his own child in the absence of the mother who is away.
Ruling:
Petitioner concedes that Respondent Loreta has preferential right
over their minor child. He insists, however, that custody should be awarded
to him whenever she leaves for Japan and during the period that she stays
there. In other words, he wants joint custody over the minor, such that the
mother would have custody when she is in the country. But when she is
abroad, he -- as the biological father -- should have custody.
According to petitioner, Loreta is not always in the country. When she
is abroad, she cannot take care of their child. The undeniable fact, he adds,
is that she lives most of the time in Japan, as evidenced by her Special
Power of Attorney dated May 28, 2001, granting to her sister temporary
custody over the minor.
At present, however, the child is already with his mother in Japan,
where he is studying,9 thus rendering petitioners argument moot. While the
Petition for Habeas Corpus was pending before the CA, petitioner filed on
July 30, 2002, an "Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure Order," alleging
therein that respondents were preparing the travel papers of the minor so
the child could join his mother and her Japanese husband. The CA denied
the Motion for lack of merit.
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an
illegitimate child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the
Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that "illegitimate children
shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This
is the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity

QUIMIGING vs. ICAO
G.R. No. L-26795
July 31,
2970
Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant,
were neighbors in Dapitan City and had close and confidential relations.
Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to have carnal
intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and
without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs
supplied by defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying.
Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages and attorneys
fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del
Norte on the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the
complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl
but the court ruled that no amendment was allowable since the original
complaint averred no cause of action.
Issue:
Whether or not, the CFI erred in dismissing Carmens complaint.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet
unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes
favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The conceive child may also receive donations and be
accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were
already born as prescribed in Article 742.
Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that
support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children does not
contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates article 40
aforementioned.
Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married
man forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a
clear violation of Carmens rights.

compensation for the damage caused.
Thus, she is entitled to claim
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside.
Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings
conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao.

FRANCISCO vs. ZANDUETA
G.R. No. 43794
August 9, 1935
Facts:
Eugenio Francisco, represented by his natural mother and curator ad
litem, Rosario Gomez, instituted an action for support against petitioner
Luis Francisco in a separate case, alleging that he is the latters
acknowledged son and as such is entitled to support. Luis denied the
allegation, claimed that he never acknowledged Eugenio as his son and was
not present at his baptism and that he was married at time of Eugenios
birth.
Despite the denial of paternity however, respondent judge Francisco
Zandueta issued an order granting Eugenio monthly pension, pendente lite.
Luis moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence the writ for
certiorari. Praying to have the trial transferred, counsel of herein petitioner,
in compromise, agreed that his client would pay the monthly pension during
the pendency of the case.
Issue:
Whether or not Eugenio Francisco is entitled to support without first
establishing his status as petitioners son
Ruling:
No. The answer as to whether or not petitioners counsel really
agreed to have him pay the pension during the cases pendency is not
necessary to the solution of the case. As in the case of Yangco vs Rohde, the
fact of the civil status must be proven first before a right of support can be
derived. The Court ruled that it is necessary for Eugenio to prove, through
his guardian ad litem, his civil status as the petitioners son. As such, no
right of support can be given because the very civil status of sonship, from
which the right is derived, is in question.
It held that (t)here is no law or reason which authorizes the granting
of support to a person who claims to be a son in the same manner as to a
person who establishes by legal proof that he is such son. In the latter case
the legal evidence raises a presumption of law, while in the former there is
no presumption, there is nothing but a mere allegation, a fact in issue, and a
simple fact in issue must not be confounded with an established right
recognized by a final judgment. Additionally, the respondent judge was
without jurisdiction to order for the monthly support in light of herein
private respondents absence of aforementioned status.

SANTERO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-61700
1987
September 14,
Facts:
Pablo Santero, the only legitimate son of Pascual and Simona Santero,
had three children with Felixberta Pacursa namely, Princesita, Federico and
Willie (herein petitioners). He also had four children with Anselma Diaz
namely, Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina, and Miguel (herein private
respondents). These children are all natural children since neither of their
mothers was married to their father. In 1973, Pablo Santero died.
During the pendency of the administration proceedings with the CFICavite involving the estate of the late Pablo Santero, petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court questioning the decision of
CFI-Cavite granting allowance (allegedly without hearing) in the amount of
Php 2,000.00, to private respondents which includes tuition fees, clothing
materials and subsistence out of any available funds in the hands of the
administrator. The petitioners opposed said decision on the ground that
private respondents were no longer studying, that they have attained the
age of majority, that all of them except for Miguel are gainfully employed,
and the administrator did not have sufficient funds to cover the said
expenses.
Before the Supreme Court could act on saod petition, the private
respondents filed another motion for allowance with the CFI-Cavite which
included Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito, all surnamed Santero, as children of
the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz, praying that a sum of Php
6,000.00 be given to each of the seven children as their allowance from the
estate of their father. This was granted by the CFI-Cavite.
Later on, the CFI-Cavite issued an amended order directing Anselma
Diaz, mother of private respondents, to submit a clarification or explanation
as to the additional three children included in the said motion. She said in
her clarification that in her previous motions, only the last four minor
children were included for support and the three children were then of age
should have been included since all her children have the right to receive
allowance as advance payment of their shares in the inheritance of Pablo
Santero. The CFI-Cavite issued an order directing the administrator to get
back the allowance of the three additional children based on the opposition
of the petitioners.
Issue:
a) Are the private respondents entitled to allowance?
b) Was it proper for the court a quo to grant the motion for allowance
without hearing?
Ruling:
Yes, they are entitled. Being of age, gainfully employed, or married
should not be regarded as the determining factor to their right to allowance
under Articles 290 and 188 of the New Civil Code.
Records show that a hearing was made. Moreover, what the said court
did was just to follow the precedent of the court which granted previous
allowance and that the petitioners and private respondents only received
Php 1,500.00 each depending on the availability of funds.
GOTARDO vs. BULING
G.R. No. 165166
August
15, 2012
Facts:
On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint

with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25,
for compulsory recognition and support aendent lite, claiming that the
petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze. In his answer, the petitioner
denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze. For the parties failure to amicably
settle the dispute, the RTC terminated the pre-trial proceedings. Trial on
the merits ensued.
The respondent testified for herself and presented Rodulfo Lopez as
witness. Evidence for the respondent showed that she met the petitioner on
December 1, 1992 at the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank,
Maasin, Southern Leyte branch where she had been hired as a casual
employee, while the petitioner worked as accounting supervisor.
The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the Municipal
Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte for damages against the petitioner
for breach of promise to marry. Later, however, the petitioner and the
respondent amicably settled the case. The respondent gave birth to their
son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. When the petitioner did not show up and
failed to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on July
24, 1995 demanding recognition of and support for their child. When the
petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent filed her complaint
for compulsory recognition and support aendent lite.
The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He
denied the imputed paternity, claiming that he first had sexual contact with
the respondent in the first week of August 1994 and she could not have
been pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or three (3) months) when he was
informed of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994. During the pendency of
the case, the RTC, on the respondents motion, granted a P2, 000.00
monthly child support, retroactive from March 1995.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should provide support.
Ruling:
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an
admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. We have held that
such other proof of ones filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family bible in which [his] name has been entered, common
reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies]
of witnesses, and other kinds of proof [admissible] under Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a

matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final
judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in
proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the
recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the
reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or
means of the person obliged to support.
WHEN IS SUPPORT DEMANDABLE

LACSON vs. LACSON
G.R. No. 150644
August
28, 2006
Facts:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are
legitimate daughters of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea
Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on December 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a
little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner
left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and
children to seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else.
For a month, they stayed with Leas mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with
her (Leas) mother and then with her brother Noel Daban. After some time,
they rented an apartment only to return later to the house of Leas mother.
As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to
1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling
place to another not their own.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is obliged to give support.
Ruling:
Petitioner admits being obliged, as father, to provide support to both
respondents, Maowee and Maonaa. It is his threshold submission, however,
that he should not be made to pay support in arrears, i.e., from 1976 to
1994, no previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand having been
made by the respondents. He invokes the following provision of the Family
Code to complete his point:Article 203 The obligation to give support shall
be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the
same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date
of judicial or extrajudicial demand.
To petitioner, his obligation to pay under the afore quoted provision
starts from the filing of Civil Case No. 22185 in 1995, since only from that
moment can it be said that an effective demand for support was made upon
him

LIM vs. LIM
G.R. No. 163209
October
30, 2009
Facts:
In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim
(Edward), son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children,
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl,
Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes
Park, Makati City, together with Edwards ailing grandmother, Chua Giak
and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edwards family business, which
provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the family
expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income.
On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence,
bringing the children with her (then all minors), after a violent
confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of
Chua Giak in what the trial court described "a very compromising
situation." Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward,
Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The trial court ordered Edward to
provide monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite.
Issue:
Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide
support to respondents.
Ruling:
By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants

to provide legal support to their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners
themselves admit as much they limit their petition to the narrow question
of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on
provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental
Authority, petitioners theorize that their liability is activated only
upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination or
suspension during the childrens minority. Because at the time respondents
sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their
children, petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latters
offspring ends with them.

VERCELES vs. POSADA
G.R. No. 159785
April 27,
2007
Facts:
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), young lass from the
barrio of Pandan, Catanduanes, sometime in 1986 met a close family friend,
petitioner Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor of Pandan. He then called on the
Posadas and at the end of the visit, offered Clarissa a job. Clarissa accepted
petitioners offer and worked as a casual employee in the mayors office
starting on September 1, 1986. From November 10 to 15 in 1986, with
companions Aster de Quiros, Pat del Valle, Jaime and Jocelyn Vargas, she
accompanied petitioner to Legaspi City to attend a seminar on town
planning. They stayed at the Mayon Hotel.
On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., petitioner fetched
Clarissa from "My Brothers Place" where the seminar was being held.
Clarissa avers that he told her that they would have lunch at Mayon Hotel
with their companions who had gone ahead. When they reached the place
her companions were nowhere. After petitioner ordered food, he started
making amorous advances on her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself
inside a comfort room where she stayed until someone knocked. She said
she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she kept the
incident to herself. She went on as casual employee. One of her tasks was
following-up barangay road and maintenance projects.
Issue:
Whether or not there is proof of filiation.
Ruling:
Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for establishing
filiation. They are as follows:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of
the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall
be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation
in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article
173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article
172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.
The letters, one of which is quoted above, are private handwritten
instruments of petitioner which establish Verna Aizas filiation under Article
172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the array of evidence presented by
respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, is
convincing, and irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioners
illegitimate child.
Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself
presented no evidence of his own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled
is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence,
are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and cannot be
given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses

who testify on affirmative matters

MANGONON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 125041
2006
June 30,
Facts:
On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her
then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and
Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati. In said
petition, it was alleged that on 16 February 1975, petitioner and respondent
Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in
Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent
Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the
required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11
August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of

their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to
petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny
Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private respondents had totally
abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina
were about to enter college in the United States of America (USA) where
petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to
and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts
(Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long Island University and
Western New England College. Despite their admissions to said universities,
Rica and Rina were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate
education because of the following:
i) The average annual cost for college education in the US is about
US$22,000/year, broken down as follows:
Tuition Fees US$13,000.00
Room & Board 5,000.00
Books 1,000.00
Yearly Transportation &
Meal Allowance 3,000.00
Total US$ 22,000.00
Or a total of US$44,000.00, more or less, for both Rica and Rina
Issue:
Whether or not Federico is obliged to provide support
Ruling:
In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not
avail himself of the second option. From the records, we gleaned that prior
to the commencement of this action, the relationship between respondent
Francisco, on one hand, and petitioner and her twin daughters, on the other,
was indeed quite pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among them
expressed profound feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for one
anothers well-being. The photographs presented by petitioner as part of

her exhibits presented a seemingly typical family celebrating kinship. All of
these, however, are now things of the past. With the filing of this case, and
the allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships
among the parties had certainly been affected. Particularly difficult for Rica
and Rina must be the fact that those who they had considered and claimed
as family denied having any familial relationship with them. Given all these,
we could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the
company of those who have disowned them.
Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our
bearings from the provision of the law mandating the amount of support to
be proportionate to the resources or means of the giver and to the
necessities of the recipient. Guided by this principle, we hold respondent
Francisco liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica
and Rina as support pendente lite. As established by petitioner, respondent
Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount given his various
business endeavors.

DE GUZMAN vs. PEREZ
G.R. No. 156013
July 25,
2006
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent Shirley F. Aberde became
sweethearts while studying law in the University of Sto. Tomas. Their
studies were interrupted when private respondent became pregnant. She
gave birth to petitioners child, Robby Aberde de Guzman, on October 2,
1987.
Private respondent and petitioner never got married. In 1991, petitioner
married another woman with whom he begot two children.
Petitioner sent money for Robbys schooling only twice the first in
1992 and the second in 1993. In 1994, when Robby fell seriously ill,
petitioner gave private respondent P7,000 to help defray the cost of the
childs hospitalization and medical expenses. Other than these instances,
petitioner never provided any other financial support for his son.
In 1994, in order to make ends meet and to provide for Robbys needs,
private respondent accepted a job as a factory worker in Taiwan where she
worked for two years. It was only because of her short stint overseas that
she was able to support Robby and send him to school. However, she
reached the point where she had just about spent all her savings to provide
for her and Robbys needs. The childs continued education thus became
uncertain.
Issue:
May a parent who fails or refuses to do his part in providing his child
the education his station in life and financial condition permit, be charged
for neglect
Ruling:
The law is clear. The crime may be committed by any parent. Liability for the
crime does not depend on whether the other parent is also guilty of neglect. The
law intends to punish the neglect of any parent, which neglect corresponds to the
failure to give the child the education which the familys station in life and financial
condition permit. The irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself from the
consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parents faithful compliance with
his or her own parental duties.
Petitioners position goes against the intent of the law. To allow the
neglectful parent to shield himself from criminal liability defeats the
prescription that in all questions regarding the care, custody, education and
property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
However, while petitioner can be indicted for violation of Article 59(4) of PD
603, the charge against him cannot be made in relation to Section 10(a) of
RA 7610 which provides:
SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and
Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Childs Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty
or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to
the childs development including those covered by Article 59 of PD
No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, shall suffer the penalty ofprision mayor in its minimum
period.
The law expressly penalizes any person who commits other acts of
neglect, child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the childs development including those covered by
Article 59 of PD 603 "but not covered by the Revised Penal Code." The
"neglect of child" punished under Article 59(4) of PD 603 is also a crime
(known as "indifference of parents") penalized under the second paragraph
of Article 277 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, it is excluded from the
coverage of RA 7610.
RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS WHO PAY

LACSON vs. LACSON
G.R. No. 150644
August 28, 2006
Facts:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are
legitimate daughters of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea
Daban Lacson. Maowee was born onDecember 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a
little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner
left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and
children to seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else.
For a month, they stayed with Leas mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with
her (Leas) mother and then with her brother Noel Daban. After some time,
they rented an apartment only to return later to the house of Leas mother.
As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to
1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling
place to another not their own.
It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not
badger her husband Edward for support, relying initially on his commitment
memorialized in a note dated December 10, 1975 to give support to his
daughters. As things turned out, however, Edward reneged on his promise
of support, despite Leas efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea
would admit, though, that Edward occasionally gave their children meager
amounts for school expenses. Through the years and up to the middle part
of 1992, Edwards mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small amounts to help in
the schooling of Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom eventually took up
nursing at St. Pauls College in Iloilo City. In the early part of 1995 when
Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint against Edward for
support before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, Maowee
was about to graduate.
In that complaint dated January 30, 1995, as amended, docketed as
Civil Case No. 22185, Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, averred that
their father Edward, despite being gainfully employed and owning several
pieces of valuable lands, has not provided them support since 1976. They
also alleged that, owing to years of Edwards failure and neglect, their
mother had, from time to time, borrowed money from her brother Noel
Daban. As she would later testify, Lea had received from Noel, by way of a
loan, as much as P400,000.00to P600,000.00.
In his Answer, Edward alleged giving to Maowee and Maonaa
sufficient sum to meet their needs. He explained, however, that his lack of
regular income and the unproductivity of the land he inherited, not his
neglect, accounted for his failure at times to give regular support. He also
blamed financial constraint for his inability to provide the P12,000.00
monthly allowance prayed for in the complaint.
As applied for and after due hearing, the trial court granted the
sisters Maowee and Maonaa support pendente lite at P12,000.00 per
month, subject to the schedule of payment and other conditions set forth in
the courts corresponding order of May 13, 1996. The RTC rendered on June
26, 1997 judgment finding for the plaintiff sisters, as represented by their
mother. In that judgment, the trial court, following an elaborate formula set
forth therein, ordered their defendant father Edward to pay them a specific
sum which represented 216 months, or 18 years, of support in arrears. In
time, Edward moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the
appellate court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Noel Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement
from the petitioner.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Pursuant to Article 207 of the Family Code, Noel Daban can rightfully exact
reimbursement from the petitioner. The provision reads:
When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails
to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may
furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from
the person obliged to give support.
Mention may also be made that, contextually, the resulting juridical
relationship between the petitioner and Noel Daban is a quasi-contract, an
equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly enriching himself at the
expense of another.
Petitioner, unlike any good father of a family, has been remiss in his
duty to provide respondents with support practically all throughout their
growing years. At bottom, the sisters have been deprived by a neglectful
father of the basic necessities in life as if it is their fault to have been born.
This disposition is thus nothing more than a belated measure to right a
wrong done the herein respondents who are no less petitioners daughters.
SUPPORT PENDENT LITE
ESTATE OF RUIZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 118671
January 29, 1996
Facts:
Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will where he named the
following as his heirs: (a.) Edmond Ruiz only son; (b.)
Maria Pilar Ruiz
adopted daughter; (c.)
Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria
Angeline - 3 granddaughters, all daughters of Ruiz. Testator bequeathed to
his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond
Ruiz executor of his estate. Hilario Ruiz died and the cash component of his
estate was immediately distributed among Ruiz and respondents. Edmond,
the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father's
holographic will. Four years after, Pilar filed before the RTC a petition for
the probate and approval of the deceaseds will and for the issuance of
letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz. Edmond opposed the petition on the
ground that the will was executed under undue influence. The house and lot
in Valle Verde, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to the 3 granddaughters
was leased out by Edmond to third persons. Probate court ordered Edmond
to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments
totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde
property. Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate
taxes on the real properties of the estate. The probate court approved the
release of P7,722.00. Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the
will. Probate court admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of
letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the
amount of P50,000.00 Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as
executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds. Prayed for release
of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court. Montes
opposed and praying that the release of rent payments be given to the 3
granddaughters. Probate court denied the release of funds and granted the
motion of Montes due to Edmonds lack of opposition. Probate Court
ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only "such amount as may
be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances for
support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to collation and
deductible from their share in the inheritance. CA sustained probate courts
order.
Issues:
Whether or not the probate court, after admitting the will to probate
but before payment of the estate's debts and obligations, has the authority:
a) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of
the testator's grandchildren
b) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs
c) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of
the will.
Ruling:
No. Grandchildren are not entitled
funds of the decedent's estate. The law
"widow and children" and does not
grandchildren, regardless of their minority
to provisional support from the

clearly limits the allowance to
extend it to the deceased's
or incapacity.
Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Allowance to widow and family. The widow and minor or incapacitated
children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall
receive therefrom under the direction of the court, such allowance as are
provided by law.
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate
properties can only be made:
a. after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration,
allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or
b. before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any
of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned
upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs, or when provision is made to meet those
obligations.
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles
to the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private
respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first publication
of the notice to creditors
c. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes
on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained.
d. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid
before distribution of the estate.
i. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post
a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax
obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the
inheritance.
ii. at the time the order was issued the properties of the
estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised.
The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic
validity and settles only the question of whether the testator, being of sound
mind, freely executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law
e. Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the
provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may be
raised even after the will has been authenticated
i. The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was

controverted by petitioner before the probate court in his
Reply to Montes' Opposition to his motion for release of
funds and his motion for reconsideration of the August 26,
1993 order of the said court.
ii. Therein, petitioner assailed the distributive shares of the
devisees and legatees inasmuch as his father's will
included the estate of his mother and allegedly impaired
his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother.
iii. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who
are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their distributive
shares in his estate, the probate court shall proceed to
hear and decide the same as in ordinary cases.
The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and
management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not
absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the
payment of the debts and expenses of administration
SUPPORT DURING PROCEEDINGS

REYES vs. INES-LUCIANO
G.R. No. L-48219
February 28, 1979
Facts:
Manuel Reyes attacked his wife twice with the intent to kill. A
complaint was filed on June 3, 1976: the first attempt on March was
prevented by her father and the second attempt, wherein she was already
living separately from her husband, was stopped only because of her
drivers intervention. She filed for legal separation on that ground and
prayed for support pendente lite for herself and her three children. The
husband opposed the application for support on the ground that the wife
committed adultery with her physician. The respondent Judge Ines-Luciano
of the lower court granted the wife pendente lite. The husband filed a
motion for reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not entitled to receive
such support during the pendency of the case, and that even if she is
entitled to it, the amount awarded was excessive. The judge reduced the
amount from P5000 to P4000 monthly. Husband filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA to annul the order granting alimony. CA dismissed the
petition which made the husband appeal to the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not support can be administered during the pendency of
an action.
Ruling:
Yes provided that adultery is established by competent evidence.
Mere allegations will not bar her right to receive support pendente lite.
Support can be administered during the pendency of such cases. In
determining the amount, it is not necessary to go into the merits of the
case. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other
documentary evidence appearing in the record. [The SC on July, 1978
ordered the alimony to be P1000/month from the period of June to February
1979, after the trial, it was reverted to P4000/month based on the accepted
findings of the trial court that the husband could afford it because of his
affluence and because it wasnt excessive.
CHARACTERISTICS OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY

SILVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 114742
July 17, 1997
Facts:
Carlitos Silva and Suzanne Gonzales had a live-in relationship and
they had two children, namely, Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Silva and
Suzanne eventually separated. Silva and Suzanne had an understanding
that Silva would have the children in his company on weekends. The legal
conflict began when Silva claimed that Suzanne broke that understanding
on visitation rights. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the
children before the Regional Trial Court Branch 78 of Quezon City. The
petition was opposed by Gonzales who claimed that Silva often engaged in
"gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and
social values of the children. The Quezon City RTC ruled in favor of Silva
giving him visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays.
The court however explicitly stated that in no case should Silva take
the children out without the written consent of Suzanne. Suzanne filed an
appeal from the RTCs decision to the Court of Appeals. In the meantime,
Suzanne had gotten married to a Dutch national. She eventually immigrated
to Holland with her children Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.
The Court of Appeals overturned the ruling of the Quezon City RTC.
The CA, stated that as alleged by Suzanne, Silvas womanizing would have a
negative influence on the children.
Issues:
a) Whether or not Silva has visitation rights.
b) Whether or not the mother has parental authority over the children.
Ruling:
The High Court set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals and
reinstated the Quezon City RTCs decision favoring Silvas visitation rights
on weekends with Suzannes written permission. The Supreme Court ruled
that the biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in
view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents
over their children. The Court clarified: Parents have the natural right, as
well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their children, see to their
proper upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare. This
authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents; neither
may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents are estranged and
their affection for each other is lost, their attachment to and feeling for
their offspring remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this
affinity to suffer, absent any real, grave or imminent threat to the well-being
of the child.
The mother has exclusive parental authority over her illegitimate child
(Art. 176 of the Family Code). The biological father has visitorial right over
his illegitimate children in view of the constitutionally protected inherent
and natural right of parents over their children. This right is personal to the
father; no other person, like grandparents, can exercise this right for him.
Silva (the father) may have won with the Supreme Courts upholding of his
visitation rights, but this favorable decision did not prevent Suzanne (the
mother) in the exercise of her parental authority from immigrating to
Holland with her two children. The right to visitation and the duty to pay
child support are distinct and separate. If the mother and the father of the
illegitimate child can agree on the terms and conditions of the visitation,
then there will be no problem. In case of disagreement however, the father
must file a petition asking the court to settle the terms and conditions.
PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY

TONOG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 122906
February 7, 2002
Facts:
In 1989, Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her
illegitimate daughter with Edgar V. Daguimol. A year after the birth of
Gardin, Dinah left for the USA where she found a work as
a registerednurse. Gardin was left in the care of her father and paternal
grandparents.
Edgar filed a petition forguardianship over Gardin in the RTC of
Quezon City. In March 1992, the court granted the petition and appointed
Edgar as legal guardian of Gardin. In May 1992, Dinah filed a petition for
relief from judgment. She averred that she learned of the judgment only on
April 1, 1992. The trial court set aside its original judgment and allowed
Dinah to file her opposition to Edgar's petition. Edgar, in turn, filed a motion
for reconsideration.
In 1993, Dinah filed a motion to remand custody of Gardin to her. In
1994, the trial court issued a resolution denying Edgar's motion for
reconsideration and granting Dinah's motion for custody of Gardin. Dinah
moved for the immediate execution of the resolution.
Edgar, thus, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Upon motion for
reconsideration, CA modified its decision and let Gardin remain in the
custody of Edgar until otherwise adjudged. Dinah appealed to the Supreme
Court, contending that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin, as
a matter of law. First, as the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers
parental authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate
minor. Second, Gardin cannot be separated from her since she had not, as
of then, attained the age of seven. Employing simple arithmetic however, it
appears that Gardin Faith is now twelve years old.
Issue:
Who is entitled to the temporary custody of the child pending the
guardianship proceeding?
Ruling:
In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the

welfare and well-being of the child. Statute sets certain rules to assist the
court in making an informed decision. Insofar as illegitimate children are
concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate
children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise,
Article 213 of the Family Code provides that [n]o child under seven years
of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise. It will be observed that in both provisions, a
strong bias is created in favor of the mother. This is especially evident in
Article 213 where it may be said that the law presumes that the mother is
the best custodian. As explained by the Code Commission: The general rule
is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen
her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a
mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed
by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the good of the child.
For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of
her child who is below seven years of age for compelling reasons.
Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment, unemployment and
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than seven
years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not
bound by that choice. The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding
the childs preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in
which instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third
person.
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary
custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for
guardianship before the trial court have not been terminated, and no
pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the
minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling
factor, we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father to
retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child
should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a
strange environment away from the people and places to which she had
apparently formed an attachment.
Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question
of fact to be properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial
court. It should be recalled that in a petition for review on certiorari, we
rule only on questions of law. We are not in the best position to assess the
parties respective merits vis--vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet
another sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin
Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her
preference and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent
should have the custody over her person.
For the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the
subject minor should remain with her father, the private respondent herein
pending final judgment of the trial court.

VANCIL vs. BELMES
G.R. No. 132223
June 19, 2001
Facts:
Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy
serviceman who died on 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two children
named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes.
Bonifacia obtained a favorable court decision appointing her as legal and
judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent.
On August 13, 1987, Helen submitted an opposition to the subject
guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar
petition for guardianship before the RTC of Pagadian City. On June 27,
1988, Helen followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of
Guardian and Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural
mother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the
subject minors at Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are
permanently residing. She also states that at the time the petition was filed,
Bonifacia was a resident of Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American
citizen.
On October 12, 1988, the trial court rejected and denied Helens
motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and
Vincent Jr. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision reversing
the RTC. Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at the time the case
reached the Supreme Court, the issue revolved around the guardianship of
Vincent.
Issue:
Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should
be his guardian?
Ruling:
Respondent Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has
the preferential right over that of petitioner Bonifacia to be his guardian.
Article 211 of the Family Code provides: "Art. 211. The father and the
mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their
common children. In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall
prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx." Indeed, being
the natural mother of minor Vincent, Helen has the corresponding natural
and legal right to his custody.
"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts
that the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the
natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound
public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state
or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental
relationship."
Bonifacia contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent.
Bonifacias claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by
way of substitute parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family
Code, thus: "Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the
parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. xxx."
Bonifacia, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute
parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of Helen.
Considering that Helen is very much alive and has exercised continuously
parental authority over Vincent, Bonifacia has to prove, in asserting her
right to be the minors guardian, Helens unsuitability. Bonifacia, however,
has not proffered convincing evidence showing that Helen is not suited to
be the guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia merely insists that Helen is morally
unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her live-in partner raped

Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a
subject of this guardianship proceeding.
Even assuming that Helen is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still
Bonifacia cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. She is an American
citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform
the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her
petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian
by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties
to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian.
There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint
residents only as administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding
the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon this question, the
courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of
deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in
complying with this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who
are not personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there
is no statutory requirement; the courts should not consent to the
appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not
personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here.

BONDAGJY vs. FOUZI ALI BONDAGJY
G.R. No. 140817
December 7, 2001
Facts:
Respondent Fouzi (then 31 years of age) and Sabrina (then 20 years of
age) were married on February 3,1988, at the Manila Hotel, Ermita, Manila
under Islamic rites. On October 21, 1987, or four (4) months before her
marriage, Sabrina became a Muslim by conversion. However, the
conversion was not registered with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines. Out of their union, they begot two (2) children, namely,
Abdulaziz, born on June 13, 1989, and Amouaje, born on September 29,
1990. The children were born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. At the time of their
marriage, unknown to petitioner, respondent was still married to a Saudi
Arabian woman whom he later divorced.
After their marriage, the couple moved in with respondent's family in
Makati City. In 1990, the parties migrated and settled in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia where they lived for more than two years.
Sometime in December 1995, the children lived in the house of Sabrina's
mother in 145 Tanguile Street, Ayala Alabang. Fouzi alleged that he could
not see his children until he got an order from the court. Even with a court
order, he could only see his children in school at De La Salle-Zobel, Alabang,
Muntinlupa City .
On December 15, 1996, Sabrina had the children baptized as
Christians and their names changed from Abdulaziz Bondagjy to Azziz
Santiago Artadi and from Amouaje Bondagjy to Amouage Selina Artadi.
Respondent alleged that on various occasions Sabrina was seen with
different men at odd hours in Manila,and that she would wear short skirts,
sleeveless blouses, and bathing suits. Such clothing are detestable under
Islamic law on customs. Fouzi claimed that Sabrina let their children sweep
their neighbor's house for a fee of P40.00 after the children come home
from school. Whenever Fouzi sees them in school, the children would be
happy to see him but they were afraid to ride in his car. Instead, they would
ride the jeepney in going home from school.
Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa
City an action for nullity of marriage, custody and support, ordered the
parties to maintain status quo until further orders from said court. On
March 2, 1999, petitioner filed another motion to dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case since P.D. No. 1083 is
applicable only to Muslims. On March 3, 1999, Fouzi filed an opposition to
the motion to dismiss and argued that at the inception of the case, both
parties were Muslims, Fouzi by birth and Sabrina by conversion.
The Shari'a District Court held that P.D. No. 1083 on Custody and
Guardianship does not apply to this case because the spouses were not yet
divorced. The Shari' a District Court found petitioner unworthy to care for
her children. The Shari'a Court found that respondent Fouzi was capable
both personally and financially to look after the best interest of his minor
children.
Issue:
Whether or not a wife, a Christian who converted to Islam before her
marriage to a Muslim and converted back to Catholicism upon their
separation, still bound by the moral laws of Islam in the determination of
her fitness to be the custodian of her children?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court in the case stated that the welfare of the minors is
the controlling consideration on the issue. The Court also said that the
factors that determine the fitness of any parent are: [1] the ability to see to
the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and [2]
the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and
financial support taking into consideration the respective resources and
social and moral situations of the parents.
The standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof, however, is
not restricted to Muslim laws. The Family Code shall be taken into
consideration in deciding whether a non-Muslim woman is incompetent.
What determines her capacity is the standard laid down by the Family Code
now that she is not a Muslim.
Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see
to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and
the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and
financial support taking into consideration the respective resources and
social and moral situations of the parents. Article 211 of the Family Code
provides that the father and mother shall jointly exercise parental authority
over the persons of their common children.
Similarly, P.D. No. 1083 is clear that where the parents are not
divorced or legally separated, the father and mother shall jointly exercise
just and reasonable parental authority and fulfill their responsibility over
their legitimate children.

SAGALA-ESLAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 116773
January 16, 1997
Facts:
Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. After their
marriage, the couple stayed with Teresita Eslao, mother of Reynaldo. The
couple had two children namely Leslie and Angelica. Leslie was entrusted to
the care and custody of Maria's mother while Angelica was entrusted with
her parents at Teresita's house.
Reynaldo died 4 years later. Maria
intended to bring Angelica to her mother's place but Teresita prevailed and
entrusted to the custody of Angelica. Maria returned to her mother's house
and stayed with Leslie. Years later, Maria married James Manabu-Ouye, a
Japanese-American orthodontist, and she migrated to US with him. A year
after the marriage, Maria returned to the Philippines to be reunited with
her children and bring them to US. Teresita, however, resisted by way of
explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was 10 days old and
accused Maria of having abandoned Angelica. The trial court rendered a
decision where Teresita was directed to cause the immediate transfer of
custody of the child to Maria. CA affirmed with the lower court's decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Teresita has the right to the custody of the child?
Ruling:
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right
attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a
waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and
surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather,
even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does
not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated
children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and
company. In this case, when Maria entrusted the custody of her minor child
to Teresita, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it
did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority.
Thus, Teresita does not have the right to the custody of the child.

SOMBONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 111876
January 31, 1996
Facts:
Petitioner was the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who was born on
April 23, 1987 in Taguig, Metro Manila. Sometime in November, 1987,
Arabella, then only six months old, was brought to the Sir John Clinic,
owned by Ty located at Caloocan City, for treatment. Petitioner did not have
enough money to pay the hospital bill in the balance of P300.00. Arabella
could not be discharged as a result.
Petitioner said that she paid 1,700 for the release even if the bill was
only 300. The spouses Ty, who had custody of the daughter, would not give
Arabella to her. Petitioner filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus against the
spouses Ty. She alleged that Arabella was being unlawfully detained and
imprisoned at the Ty residence. The petition was denied due course and
summarily dismissed, without prejudice, on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction given that the detention was in Caloocan.
Ty claimed that Arabella was with them for some time, but given to
someone who claimed to be their guardian.The Office of the City Prosecutor
of Kalookan City, on the basis of petitioners complaint, filed an information
against the spouses Ty for Kidnapping and Illegal Detention of a Minor
before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City. Ty then revealed that the
child may be found in quezon city. When Sombong reached the residence, a
small girl named Christina Grace Neri was found. Sombong claimed the
child to be hers even if she wasnt entirely sure that it was Arabella.
On October 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a
Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Regional Trial Court. The court ruled in
Sombongs favor and ordered the respondents to deliver the child. The
Appellate Court took cognizance of the following issues raised by
respondent: (1) The propriety of the habeas corpus proceeding vis-a-vis the
problem respecting the identity of the child subject of said proceeding; (2) If
indeed petitioner be the mother of the child in question, what the effect
would proof of abandonment be under the circumstances of the case; and
(3) Will the question of the childs welfare be the paramount consideration
in this case which involves child custody.
The RTC decision was reversed. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy for taking back
Arabella?
Ruling:
Yes but the requisites are not met. In general, the purpose of the writ
of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is
legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas
corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral,
illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists
as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint,
and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime
specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of
liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any

restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
To justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of
liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action. This is the basic requisite under the first part of Section
1, Rule 102, of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that except as
otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend
to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty.
In the second part of the same provision, however, Habeas Corpus
may be resorted to in cases where the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto. Thus, although the Writ of
Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if the restraint is voluntary, we have
held time and again that the said writ is the proper legal remedy to enable
parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the
custody of a third person of her own free will.
It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of
illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for
the availability of the writ as a remedy; rather, the writ of habeas corpus is
prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child.
The foregoing principles considered, the grant of the writ in the
instant case will all depend on the concurrence of the following requisites:
(1) that the petitioner has the right of custody over the minor; (2) that the
rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from the petitioner by the
respondent; and (3) that it is to the best interest of the minor concerned to
be in the custody of petitioner and not that of the respondent.
Petition is dismissed.

GAMBOA-HIRSCH vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 174485
July 11, 2007
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to set aside
the decision of the CA which granted private respondent Franklin joint
custody with petitioner Agnes of their minor daughter Simone.
Spouses Franklin and Agnes started to have marital problems as
Agnes wanted to stay in Makati City, while Franklin insisted that they stay
in Boracay Island. When Agnes came to their conjugal home in Boracay, and
asked for money and for Franklins permission for her to bring their
daughter to Makati City for a brief vacation she has an intention not to
come back to Boracay.
Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA for
Agnes to produce Simone in court; CA issued a Resolution which ordered
that a writ of habeas corpus be issued ordering that Simone be brought
before said court. CA granted Franklin joint custody with Agnes of their
minor child. Agnes filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
granted joint custody in utter disregard of the provisions of the Family
Code, as to minors seven (7) years of age and below.
Ruling:
The court held that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when
it granted joint custody of the minor child to both parents. The so-called
"tender-age presumption" under Article 213 of the Family Code may be
overcome only by compelling evidence of the mothers unfitness. The
mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or
more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment,
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease. Here, the mother was
not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her minor
child. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child
from the mothers custody. Sole custody over Simone Noelle Hirsch is
hereby AWARDED to the mother, petitioner Agnes Gamboa-Hirsch.

PABLO-GUALBERTO vs. GUALBERTO
G.R. No. 154994
June 28, 2005
Facts:
Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for
custody pendente lite of their almost 4 year old son, Rafaello, whom her
wife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and his school when she
left him.
The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since
the wife failed to appear despite notice. A house helper of the spouses
testified that the mother does not care for the child as she very often goes
out of the house and even saw her slapping the child. Another witness
testified that after surveillance he found out that the wife is having lesbian
relations.
The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and
this time awarded the custody of the child to the mother. Finding that the
reason stated by Crisanto not to be a compelling reason as provided in Art
213 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to
the mother.
Ruling:
Article 213 of the Family Code provided: Art 213. In case of
separation of parents parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
des granted by the court. The court shall take into account all relevant
consideration, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,
unless the parent chosen is unfit. No child under seven yrs of age shall be
separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise, This Court has held that when the parents separated,
legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of their
child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which
reads: Art 363. In all question on the care, custody, education and property
pf children, the latter welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be
separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds
compelling reason for such measure.

SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 113054
March 16, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a
nurse by profession, were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget
only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987. From the time
the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had
been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private
respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited
the Bedia household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private
respondents contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner
abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in
Bacong, Negros Oriental.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control
of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent. After an ex-parte hearing on October
8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day awarding custody of
the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated
April 30, 1992, respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's order.
Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the
appellate court to award custody of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the
Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of the Family Code,
substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when both
parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to
him, has not been successfully shown by private respondents.
Issue:
Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos,
Jr.
Ruling:
The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather,
even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does
not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Only in case of the
parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority
be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as
to remove petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant right to have
custody over the minor. Private respondents' demonstrated love and
affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred
over the grandparents.
The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there
is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to support
the boy. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable, it cannot be
construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against
him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as
serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would
help enhance the bond between parent and son. The Court also held that his
being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So
many men in uniform, who are assigned to different parts of the country in
the service of the nation, are still the natural guardians of their children.
Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy
from his in-laws, though unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest
custody from him.

GOLANGCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124724
December 22, 1997
Facts:
A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by private respondent
Lucia Carlos Golangco against petitioner Rene Uy Golangco before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. The couple had two children, Justin Rene
and Stefan Rafael. During the proceedings of the case, a hearing for
custody pendente lite of the two children was held. In an order dated July
21, 1994, the trial court awarded the two children to Lucia while Rene was
given visitation rights of at least one week in a month. Thereafter Rene
questioned the order dated July 21, 1994 with the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the petition and instead affirmed the
order of the trial court. Not contented, Rene appealed the resolution of the
Court of Appeals affirming the order dated July 21, 1994 before this Court.
On July 17, 1995, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for failure of
petitioner Rene to show that grave abuse of discretion had been committed
by the appellate court.
On August 15, 1995, Lucia filed with the trial court a motion for
reconsideration with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. She sought redress due to an alleged incident on July 5, 1995, in
which her estranged husband physically abused their son Justin. Due to the
incident, a criminal complaint for slight physical injuries was filed on July
1995 against Rene by his son Justin with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Makati on the basis of Justins complaint-affidavit. On August 16, 1995, the
trial court issued a temporary restraining order against him and set the
hearing of the motion. After it was decided in favor of Luisa, Rene filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court before
the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court in issuing the October 4, 1995 order.
Issue:
Whether or not Rene is denied of due process of law.
Ruling:
The trial court gave both parties the opportunity to present their
respective evidence and witnesses. An adequate hearing was conducted
and, based on the evidence, the trial court deemed it proper to grant the
writ of preliminary injunction.
The assessment and evaluation of evidence in the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction involves findings of facts ordinarily left to the trial
court for its conclusive determination.
It is a fundamental and settled rule that conclusions and findings of fact by
the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on
appeal, unless strong and cogent reasons dictate otherwise. This is because
the trial court is in a better position to examine the real evidence, as well as
to observe the conduct of the witnesses while testifying in the case.
This Supreme Court finds no justifiable reason or exception sufficient
to cause the reversal of the trial courts declaration in granting the writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioner. The petition was partially granted.

DAVID vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 111180
November 16, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent
Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a
married man and the father of four children, all grown-up. After a while, the
relationship between petitioner and private respondent developed into an
intimate one, as a r esult of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March
9, 1985 to them. Christo pher J. was followed by two more children, both
girls, namely Christine, born on
June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when
Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City
sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal wife. After this, the
children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were
eventually accepted by his legal family.In the summer of 1991, Villar asked
Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to
Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after th e trip, Villar refused to give back the
child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy
for the next school year. On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas
corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
Issue:
Whether or not Daisie is entitled to the custody of the child.
Ruling:
Yes. Daisie in turn filed this petition for review of the appellate court's
decision. Rule 102, 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of
habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which any person is d eprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." It is
indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of the
right to the custody of minor children is relevant in cases where the
parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from
each
other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation.
For example, in the case of Salvaa v. Gaela, it was held that the writ of
habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain the custody
of a minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a third
person of her free will because the parents were compelling her to marry a
man against her will.
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the
time of his conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was
married to another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant
to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority
of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such
authority, is entitled
to have custody of him. 2 Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of
her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Indeed, Rule 1021 1 makes no distinction between the case of a
mother who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of
her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested
with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her
child.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may
be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving
him custody of the child. Under Art.213 of the Family Code, "no child under
seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise."
Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that
purpose, the grant of support in this case is justified by the fact that private
respondent has expressed willingness to support the minor child. The order
for payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of
custody of the child. Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged to
give support can fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed by
the court or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person
who is entitled to support unless, in the latter case, there is "a moral or
legal obstacle thereto."
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J.,
being less than seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided
by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the
child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will have to
be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with
his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the
"choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is
unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to
have custody of her child. Indeed, ifprivate respondent loves his child, he
should not condition the grant of support for him on the award of his
custody to him (private respondent).

G.R.
March 15, 1995
ESPIRITU vs. COURT OF APPEALS

No.
115640
Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first
met in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel
Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital.
Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo was
sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to
maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. On 1986, their
daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a brief vacation
in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return
to the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the
name Reginald Vince, was born on 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to
separate. Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly
pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back
to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but
because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent
back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his
sister, Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the
petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain
custody over the children, thus starting the whole proceedings now
reaching this Court. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas
corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and
Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them
but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be
approved by the Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain
custody over the children be granted.
Ruling:
Supreme Court dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the
mother and retain the custody of the children to the father. The illicit or
immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional
disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values
against the children.
The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the
parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all
indications, Reynaldo is a fit person. The children understand the
unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their
emotional growth by her behavior.

PEREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R.No. 118870
March 29, 1996
Facts:
Ray Perez is a doctor practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife,
(petitioner) is a registered nurse. After six miscarriages, two operations
and a high-risk pregnancy, Nerissa finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New
York on July 20, 1992. Ray stayed with her in the U.S. twice and took care of
her when she became pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a
tourist visa and was not employed.
On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After
a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came
home only for a five-week vacation and that they all had round-trip
tickets. However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother
and promised to follow her with the baby. According to Ray, they had
agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was
in New York, she changed her mind and continued working. She was
supposed to come back immediately after winding up her affairs there.
When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray IIs first birthday, the
couple was no longer on good terms. They had quarrels. Nerissa did not
want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on her husbands meager
income of P5,000.00. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where he
could raise his son even as he practiced his profession. He maintained that
it would not be difficult to live here since they have their own home and a
car. Despite mediation by the priest, the couple failed to reconcile.
Nerissa filed a petition to surrender the custody of their son to her.
The trial court issued an Order awarding custody to Nerissa citing the
second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code which provides that no
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. Upon appeal by Ray
Perez, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts order and held that
granting custody to the boys father would be for the childs best interest
and welfare.
Issue:
Whether or not Nerissa has rightful custody of a child?
Ruling:
Yes. Aside from Article 213 of the Family Code, the Revised Rules of
Court also contains a similar provision. Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and
Custody of Minors) provides: SEC. 6. Proceedings as to child whose
parents are separated.Appeal. - When husband and wife are divorced or
living separately and apart from each other, and the questions as to the
care, custody, and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought
before a Court of First Instance by petition or as an incident to any other
proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony as may be pertinent,
shall award the care, custody, and control of each such child as will be for
its best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to
live with if it be over ten years of age, unless the parent chosen be unfit to
take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness,

incapacity, or poverty x x x. No child under seven years of age shall be
separated from its mother, unless the court finds there are compelling
reasons therefor.
The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a child under
seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word shall in
Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules
of Court connotes a mandatory character.
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be
separated from his mother finds its reason in the basic need of a child for
his mothers loving care. Only the most compelling of reasons shall justify
the courts awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his
mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past
the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a
mother of custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment,
unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable
disease.
It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost
consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the child. In fact, no
less than an international instrument, the Convention on the Rights of the
Child provides: In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a
primary consideration.
In the case, financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch
as both parties have demonstrated that they have ample means. Nerissas
present work schedule is not so unmanageable as to deprive her of quality
time with her son. Quite a number of working mothers who are away from
home for longer periods of time are still able to raise a family well, applying
time management principles judiciously. Also, delegating child care
temporarily to qualified persons who run day-care centers does not detract
from being a good mother, as long as the latter exercises supervision, for
even in our culture, children are often brought up by housemaids under the
eagle eyes of the mother.
Although Rays is a general practitioner, the records show that he
maintains a clinic, works for several companies on retainer basis and
teaches part-time. He cannot possibly give the love and care that a mother
gives to his child.
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL

AUTHORITY
LIBI vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R.No. 70890
September 18, 1992
Facts:
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi died, each
from a single gunshot wound from a revolver licensed in the name of
petitioner Cresencio Libi. The respondents, parents of Julie Ann, filed a case
against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latters
vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The trial court
dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the IAC set aside the judgment of the
lower court dismissing the complaint of Julie Anns parents.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly
interpreted by the respondent Court to make petitioners liable for vicarious
liability.
Ruling:
Yes. The petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in
not diligently supervising the activities of their son. Both parents were
wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the
activities of their son. The petitioners utterly failed to exercise all the
diligence of a good father of a family in preventing their son from
committing the crime by means of the gun which was freely accessible to
Wendell Libi because they have not regularly checked whether the gun was
still under lock, but learned that it was missing from the safety deposit box
only after the crime had been committed. The civil liability of parents for
quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180, is
primary and not subsidiary.
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL

AUTHORITY
TAMARGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R.No. 85044
June 3, 1992
Facts:
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998; Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10
years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which
resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed
with the RTC of Ilocos Sur by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's
adopting parent and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo,
Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara
Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of
the tragic incident.
Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed
a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings
before the then CIF of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was granted
that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. Respondent spouses
Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing
petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents,
namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties
to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents
from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was

then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not
ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition
for adoption. The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that
respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable
parties to the action.
Issues:
a) Whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to
appeal, may still file the instant petition.
b) Whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even through
petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time.
Ruling:
Supreme Court granted the petition. Retroactive affect may perhaps
be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential
to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted
child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been
retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with
liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they
could not have prevented would be unfair and unconscionable.
Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and
responsibilities of parents, their parental authority which includes
instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case at bar, during
the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged
with the natural parents. It follows that they are the indispensable parties
to the suit for damages. Parents and guardians are responsible for the
damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance
with the civil code.
AQUINAS SCHOOL vs. INTON
G.R. No. 184202
January 26, 2011
Facts:
This case is about the private schools liability for the outside
catechists act of shoving a student and kicking him on the legs when he
disobeyed her instruction to remain in his seat and not move around the
classroom. In 1998, Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three student at
Aquinas School (Aquinas). Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin
(Yamyamin), a religion teacher who began teaching at that school only in
June of that year, taught Jose Luis grade three religion class. Jose Luis left
his seat and went over to a classmate to play a joke of surprising him.
Yamyamin noticed this and sent him back to his seat. After a while, Jose Luis
got up again and went over to the same classmate. Yamyamin approached
the Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs several times. She also pulled and
shoved his head on the classmates seat. She also made the child copy the
notes on the blackboard while seating on the floor. Respondents Jose and
Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed an action for damages on behalf of their son
Jose Luis against Yamyamin and Aquinas before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City in Civil Case 67427. The Intons also filed a criminal
action against Yamyamin for violation of Republic Act 7610 to which she
pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly. With regard to the action for
damages, the Intons sought to recover actual, moral, and exemplary
damages, as well as attorneys fees, for the hurt that Jose Luis and his
mother Victoria suffered. The RTC dismissed Victorias personal claims but
ruled in Jose Luis favor, holding Yamyamin liable to him for moral damages
of P25,000.00, exemplary damages of P25,000.00, and attorneys fees of
P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit. They elevated the case to the CA to
increase the award of damages and hold Aquinas solidarily liable with
Yamyamin.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA was correct in holding Aquinas solidarily liable
with Yamyamin for the damages awarded to Jose Luis.
Ruling:
No. The school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement
with a congregation of sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the
congregation would send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis
to its students. Aquinas insists that it was not the school but Yamyamins
religious congregation that chose her for the task of catechizing the
schools grade three students, much like the way bishops designate the
catechists who would teach Religion in public schools. Aquinas did not have
control over Yamyamins teaching methods. The Intons had not refuted the
school directress testimony in this regard. Aquinas still had the
responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only qualified outside catechists
are allowed to teach its young students. In this regard, it cannot be said
that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the occurrence of improper conduct
towards the students by their religion teacher. They showed records,
certificates and diploma that Yamyamin is qualified to teach. There is no
question that she came from a legitimate congregation of sisters. They
provided Faculty Staff Manual in handling the students. They pre-approved
the content of the course she wanted to teach. They have a classroom
evaluation program for her unfortunately, she was new, therefore do not
have sufficient opportunity to observe her.

ST. JOSEPHS COLLEGE vs. MIRANDA
G.R. No. 182353
June 29, 2010
Facts:
While inside the premises of St. Josephs College, the class where
respondent Miranda belonged was conducting a science experiment about
fusion of sulfur powder andiron fillings under the tutelage of Rosalinda
Tabugo, she being the teacher and the employee, while the adviser is
Estafania Abdan.
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without
having adequately secured it from any untoward incident or occurrence. In
the middle of the experiment, Jayson, who was the assistant leader of one of
the class groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into the
test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one of his
group mates who moved it close and towards the eye of Jayson. At that
instance, the compound in the test tube spurted out and several particles of
which hit Jaysons eye and the different parts of the bodies of some of his
group mates. As a result thereof, Jaysons eyes were chemically burned,
particularly his left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery and had to
spend for his medication. Upon filing of this case [in] the lower court, his
wound had not completely healed and still had to undergo another surgery.
Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances,
[Jaysons] mother, who was working abroad, had to rush back home for
which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares and had to forego her salary from
November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of at least
P40,000.00.
Jason and his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish and
wounded feelings as a result of his injury due to the petitioners fault and
failure to exercise the degree of care and diligence incumbent upon each
one of them. Thus, they should be held liable for moral damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners were liable for the accident.
Ruling:
Yes. As found by both lower courts, proximate cause of the Jasons
injury was the concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent to foreseeable
mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science experiment.
Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care,
caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and
teachers. "The defense of due diligence of a good father of a family raised

by [petitioner] St. Joseph College will not exculpate it from liability because
it has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the supervision
of its teachers despite an apparent rigid screening process for hiring and in
the maintenance of what should have been a safe and secured environment
for conducting dangerous experiments. Petitioner school is still liable for
the wrongful acts of the teachers and employees because it had full
information on the nature of dangerous science experiments but did not
take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to students. Schools
should not simply install safety reminders and distribute safety instructional
manuals. More importantly, schools should provide protective gears and
devices to shield students from expected risks and anticipated dangers.
ST. MARYS ACADEMY vs. CARPITANOS
G.R. No. 143363
6, 2002
February
Facts:
Defendant-appellant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an
enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment
campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees
were studying. As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was
part of the campaigning group.
Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school
students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio
Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Dapitan City. The
jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the
same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as
a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the
injuries he sustained from the accident. The parents of Sherwin filed a case
against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel,
the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy before the
RTC of Dipolog City and claimed for damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner St. Marys Academy is liable for
damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
Ruling:
GRANTED and REMANDED to the RTC for determination of any
liability of the school. The Court held that for the school to be liable there
must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the
proximate cause of the injury caused because of negligence, must have
causal connection to the accident. There is no showing of such.
Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and

the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but
the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for
damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

AMADORA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-47745
1988
April 15,
Facts:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward
to the commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and in
the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school diploma. As
it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited
experience. While they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally
hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well.
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence.
Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil
action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys,
and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students,
through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was
later dropped. After trial, the CIF of Cebu held the remaining defendants
liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to the respondent court, however, the
decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved.
Issue:
Whether or not teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades

shall be liable for the death of Alfredo Amadora.
Ruling:
The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question
(Art. 2180) should apply to all schools, academic as well as nonacademic. Following the canon of reddendo singular singuli, where the
school is academic, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will
attach to the teacher in charge of such student. This is the general rule.
Reason: Old academic schools, the heads just supervise the teachers who
are the ones directly involved with the students.
Where the school is for arts and trades, it is the head and only he who
shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. Reason: Old schools
of arts and trades saw the masters or heads of the school personally and
directly instructed the apprentices.
Therefore, the heads are not liable. The teacher-in-charge is not also
liable because theres no showing that he was negligent in enforcing
discipline against the accused or that he waived observance of the rules and
regulations of the school, or condoned their non-observance. Also, the fact
that he wasnt present cant be considered against him because he wasnt
required to report on that day. Classes had already ceased.

SALVOSA vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. L-70458
October 5, 1988
Facts:
Petitioners in this case were impleaded in the civil case for damages
filed against Abon. Salvosa being the (Executive Vice President of
BCF).Jimmy Abon was a commerce student of the Baguio Colleges
Foundation. He was also appointed as armorer of the schools ROTC Unit.
As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from
the AFP. He received orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the
Commandant of the Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit, concurrent
Commandant of other ROTC units in Baguio and an employee (officer) of the
AFP. On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF,
Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio
with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the
ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon
was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide by Military
Commission No. 30, AFP.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B.
Abon for damages under Article2180 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of
the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon.
Ruling:
Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for
"damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody." The rationale of such liability is that so long
as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a
certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is]called upon to
exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student]."
Likewise, "the phrase used in[Art. 2180 'so long as (the students)
remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that
the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students
for as long as they are at attendance in the school , including recess
time." In line with the case of Palisoc , a student not "at attendance in the
school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A"recess," as the concept is embraced
in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of
temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains
within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises,
or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its
nature does not include dismissal.
Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of
a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the
"protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in the
law.
Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Jimmy B. Abon
cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the School," or in the
custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. . Logically, therefore,
petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable
with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION VS. COURT
OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 84698
February 4,
1992
Facts:
Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine School of
Business Administration. Assailants, who were not members of the schools
academic community, while in the premises of PSBA, stabbed Bautista to
death. This incident prompted his parents to file a suit against PSBA and its
corporate officers for damages due to their alleged negligence, recklessness
and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and
after the attack on the victim.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the compliant states
no cause of action against them based on quasi-delicts, as the said rule does
not cover academic institutions. The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise dismissed, and was
affirmed by the appellate court. Hence, the case was forwarded to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.
Ruling:
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual
relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict
do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations
arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual
obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract,
whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented
this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains
a contract.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
establishes the rule in in loco parentis. Article 2180 provides that the
damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the
educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or
students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist
in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were
not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.
But it does not necessarily follow that PSBA is absolved form liability.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there
is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations
which both parties is bound to comply with. For its part, the school
undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably
suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher
education or a profession. This includes ensuring the safety of the students
while in the school premises. On the other hand, the student covenants to
abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations.
Failing on its contractual and implied duty to ensure the safety of
their student, PSBA is therefore held liable for his death.
Petition denied.
USE OF SURNAME BY WOMEN, ARTICLES 370-373, CIVIL CODE
REMO vs. SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
G.R. No. 169202
March 5, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose
Philippine passport was then expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being
married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the following entries appears in her
passport: Rallonza as her surname, Maria Virginia as her given name,
and Remo as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her
passport, petitioner, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal
of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in
Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name and
surname in the replacement passport.
However, the petitioners request has been denied. With this reason, she
filed a petition to change her surname to her middle name in the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Maria Virginia can change her surname Rallonza to
her middle name Remo in her passport.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that once a married woman opted to
adopt her husbands surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use
of her maiden name, except in the cases enumerated in section 5(d) of RA
8239. these instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment,
or (4) nullity of marriage. since petitioners marriage to her husband
subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement
passport. otherwise stated, a married woman's reversion to the use of her
maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage.
Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the civil code, the provisions of
RA 8239 which is a special law specifically dealing with passport
issuance must prevail over the provisions of title xiii of the civil code which
is the general law on the use of surnames. a basic tenet in statutory
construction is that a special law prevails over a general law.
Wherefore, the court denied the petition andaffirmed the decision of
the Court of Appeals.
USE OF SURNAME BY WOMEN, ARTICLES 370-373, CIVIL CODE

YASIN vs. JUDGE SHARIA DISTRICT COURT
G.R. No. 94986
23, 1995
February
Facts:
Petitioner after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the
Code of Muslim Law of the Philippines, filed a petition to the respondent
court, a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname. The
petition was denied by the respondent court on the ground that the petition
is substantially for change of name and that compliance with the provisions
of Rule 103 Rules of Court on change of name is necessary if the position is
to be granted as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioners
maiden name and surname.
Issue:
Whether or not petition for resumption of maiden name and surname
is also a petition for change of name.
Ruling:
The court rules in the negative. Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on
change of name should not be applied to judicial conformation of the right
of divorced woman to resume her maiden name and surname. Wherefore
the petition is granted.
USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN, ARTICLES 364-369, CIVIL CODE

IN RE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
G.R. No. 148311
March 31, 2005
Facts:
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a
petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. He alleged therein among others, that Stephanie was born on June
26, 1994, that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has
been using her mothers middle name and surname, and that she is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that
Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia her mothers
surname and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his Surname.
The trial court rendered the assailed decision granting the adoption,
however, the trial Court did not allow the use of her mothers surname as
her middle name. Thus, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and
reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the
surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name.
Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her

mother, as her middle name, when she subsequently adopted by her natural
father.
Ruling:
As correctly submitted by parties, there is no law regulating the use of
a middle name. Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name
an adoptee may use. The Court ruled that since no law granting an
illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, as in this case, to use as
middle name the mothers surname, the Court found no reason why
Stephanie should not allowed to use her mothers surname Garcia as her
middle name.
NAMES AND SURNAMES: USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN

IN RE JULIAN LIN WANG
GR.No.159966
30, 2005
March
Facts:
Petitioner Julian Lin Wang a minor represented by his mother Anna
Lisa Wang filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of name of
entry in the civil registry of Julian Lin Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his
middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. Petitioner theorizes that it would be for
his best interest to drop his middle name as this would help him adjust more
easily to integrate himself into Singaporean society.
Issue:
Whether or not the law the law provides for his middle name to be
changed.
Ruling:
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be
proper and reasonable cause for which the change is sought. to justify a
request for the change of name, the petitioner must show not only some
proper reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his
true and official name. Among the grounds for the change of name which
have been held valid are:
a.) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce. b.) When the change results as a legal
consequence
c.) When the change will avoid confusion.
d.) When one has continuously used and been known since childhood
by a Filipino name and was not aware of the alien parentage.
e.) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name and
f.) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing
that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose.
NAMES AND SURNAMES: USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF
MARIA ESTRELLA VERONICA PRIMITIVA DUTERTE, ESTRELLA S.
ALFON
G.R. No. L-51201
May
29, 1980
Facts:
This is verified petition filed on April 28, 1978 by petitioner Maria
Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte through her counsel, Atty. Rosauro
Alvarez, praying that her name be changed from Maria Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon.
The notice setting the petition for hearing on December 14, 1978 at
8:30 o'clock in the morning was published in the Times Journal in its issues
of July 28, August 5 and 11, 1978 and a copy thereof together with a copy of
the petition was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (Exhibits C, C1, C-2 and C-3).
At the hearing of the petition on December 14, 1978, Atty. Rosauro
Alvarez appeared for the petitioner and Fiscal Donato Sor. Suyat, Jr.
represented the office of the Solicitor General, Upon motion of counsel for
the petitioner, without objection on the part of Fiscal Suyat, the Deputy
Clerk of Court was appointed commissioner to receive the evidence and to
submit the same for resolution of the Court.
From the testimonial and document evidence presented, it appears
that petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on May
15, 1952 at the U.S.T. Hospital (Exhibit A). She was registered at the local
Civil Registrar's Office as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte On June
15, 1952; she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte at
the St. Anthony de Padua Church Singalong, Manila. Her parents are
Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte has been taken
care of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon. Petitioner and her uncle, Hector
Alfon, have been residing at 728 J.R. Yulo Street corner Ideal Street,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila for twenty-three (23) years. When petitioner
started schooling, she used the name Estrella S. Alfon. She attended her
first grade up to fourth year high school at Stella Maris College using the
name Estrella S. Alfon (Exhibits E, E-1, E-2 and E-3). After graduating from
high school she enrolled at the Arellano University and finished Bachelor of
Science in Nursing. Her scholastic records from elementary to college show
that she was registered by the name of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has
exercised her right of suffrage under the same name. She has not
committed any felony or misdemeanor.
Issue:
Whether or not she may be allowed for the change of name and her
surname.
Ruling:
Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order
that such order has been published as directed and that the allegations of
the petition are true, the court shall if proper and reasonable cause appears
for changing the name of the petitioner adjudge that such name be changed
in accordance with the prayer of the petition.
The evidence submitted shows that the change of name from Maria
Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon is not proper and
reasonable with respect to the surname. The fact that petitioner has been
using a different surname and has become known with such surname does
not constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize and change
her surname to Alfon. The birth certificate clearly shows that the father of
petitioner is Filomeno Duterte. Petitioner likewise admitted this fact in her
testimony. To allow petitioner to change her surname from Duterte to Alfon
is equivalent to allowing her to use her mother's surname. Article 364 of the
Civil Code provides:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname
of the father. If another purpose of the petitioner is to carry the surname of
Alfon because her uncle who reared her since childhood has the surname
"Alfon" then the remedy is not a petition for change of name.
WHEREFORE, the petition insofar as the first name is granted but
denied with respect to the surname. Petitioner is authorized to change her
name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon
Duterte.
NAMES AND SURNAMES: USE OF A DIFFERENT NAME

PEOPLE vs. ESTRADA
G.R. No. 164368
2009
April
2,
Facts:
December 27, 1994, at the St. Johns Cathedral, Dagupan City, while
the sacrament of confirmation was being performed by the Bishop, a man
from the crowd walked towards the center of the altar and sat on the
Bishops chair. Crisanto Santillan, who was an assistant, saw this. He
requested the accused to vacate, but the latter refused. They called on the
guard. Despite repeated request, he did not move. As the guard was
attempting to strike the victim with his nightstick to make him leave
accused-appellant drew a knife and stabbed Mararac. He repeated it a lot.
After, he got up and shouted via the mic; No one can beat me here! SPO1
Francisco saw a man, with red stains on his shirt and a knife in one hand
sitting on a chair. He advised him to drop the knife. Accused-appellant
obeyed, Mararac, the security guard, was brought to the hospital where he
expired a few minutes upon arrival.
Accused-appellant, filed a Demurrer to Evidence where he claims
that: prosecution failed to prove murder; that there was unlawful
aggression by the victim; and that accused-appellant was of unsound mind.
Inspector Valdez (Jail warden) requested the court to allow accusedappellant, to be treated at the Baguio General Hospital to determine
whether he should remain in jail or be transferred to some other institution.
While motion for reconsideration was pending, counsel for accusedappellant filed a Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and
Psychiatric Examination. Appellants counsel informed the court that
accused-appellant had been exhibiting abnormal behavior for the past
weeks. There were 2 letters of the warden requesting the same. The trial
court denied reconsideration of the order denying the Demurrer to
Evidence. Dr. Maria Soledad Gawidan, a resident physician in the
Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio General Hospital, testified to the
accused being confined and diagnosed with Schizophrenic Psychosis,
Paranoid Typeschizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type.
The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld the
prosecution evidence and found accused-appellant guilty of the crime
charged and thereby sentenced him to death,
Issue:
Whether or not he was indeed insane
Ruling:
When a person commits a felonious act the act is presumed to have

been done voluntarily. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law
presumes that every person is of sound mind and that all acts are voluntary.
An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted
during a lucid interval. In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. Since the
presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an
exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. There
are certain circumstances that should have placed the trial court on notice
that appellant may not have been in full possession of his mental faculties
e.g. when he attacked Mararac, then went up the microphone.
Accused-appellants history of mental illness was brought to the
courts.
To test whether the accused would have a fair trial there are two
distinct matters to be determined (1) whether defendant is coherent to
provide his counsel with information necessary (2) whether he is able to
comprehend the significance of the trial and his relation to it. To put a
legally incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a
violation of the constitutional rights to a fair trial. The determination of
whether a sanity investigation or hearing should be ordered rests generally
in the discretion of the trial court. In the case at bar, when accusedappellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground of
accuseds mental condition, the trial court denied the motion after finding
that the questions propounded on appellant were intelligently answered by
him. The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions
asked by the trial court is not conclusive evidence that he was competent
enough to stand trial and assist in his defense. The trial court took it solely
upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The trial judge is
not a psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert equipped with the
specialized knowledge. If the medical history was not enough to create a
reasonable doubt in the judges mind of accused-appellants competency to
stand trial, subsequent events should have done so. One month after the
prosecution rested its case, there were letters requesting that accused be
confined in hospital, as well as the counsels filing of motion. And despite all
the overwhelming indications of accused-appellants state of mind, the
judge persisted in his personal assessment and never even considered
subjecting accused-appellant to a medical examination. To top it all, the
judge found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death!
At this late hour, a medical finding alone may make it impossible for
us to evaluate appellants mental condition at the time of the crimes
commission for him to avail of the exempting circumstance of insanity.
Nonetheless, under the present circumstances, accused-appellants
competence to stand trial must be properly ascertained to enable him to

participate in his trial meaningfully. Remanded to the court a quo for the
conduct of a proper mental examination on accused-appellant, a
determination of his competency to stand trial, and for further proceedings.
NAMES AND SURNAMES: USE OF A DIFFERENT NAME

URSUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 112170.
April 10, 1996
Facts:
Petitioner wrote the name Oscar Perez in the visitors logbook and
used the same in receiving the copy of a complaint against him at the Office
of the Ombudsman. This was discovered and reported to the Deputy
Ombudsman who recommended that the petitioner be accordingly charged.
Trial Court found the petitioner guilty of violating Sec.1 of C.A. No. 142 as
amended by R.A. No. 6085 otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Use
of Aliases. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with some
modification of sentence.
Issue:
Whether or not the use of alias in isolated transaction falls within the
prohibition of Commonwealth Act No. 142.
Ruling:
No. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of
the RTC was reversed and set aside and petitioner was acquitted of the
crime charged.
An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used
by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to
his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or
substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A mans name is
simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his
fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by
several different names and these are known as aliases. Hence, the use of a
fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single
instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by
this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall
within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in
the case at bench.
Time and again [courts] have decreed that statutes are to be
construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to
be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment
should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference
to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and
reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law,

such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as
amended under which he is prosecuted. Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a
penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor
of the accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for
the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by
conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court
limited.
AMENDMENTS/CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
REPUBLIC vs. COSETENG-MAGPAYO
G.R. No. 189476
February 2, 2012
Facts:
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson
Coseteng Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and
Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondents certificate of
live birth shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972. Claiming,
however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on
July 22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to
change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. In
support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the
National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does not
appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage. Respondent also submitted his
academic records from elementary up to college showing that he carried
the surname "Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his child where
"Coseteng" appears as his surname. In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections,
respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon Citys 3rd District
using the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG."
On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC, respondent amended
his petition by alleging therein compliance with the 3-year residency
requirement under Section 2, Rule 103] of the Rules of Court. The notice
setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published in the
newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6, 2008,
November 7-13, 2008, and November 14-20, 2008. And a copy of the notice
was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general
default was entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent to
present evidence ex parte. By Decision of January 8, 2009, the trial court
granted respondents petition. The Republic of the Philippines (Republic)
filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court by
Order of July 2, 2009, hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition
for review to the Court on pure question of law.
Issue:
a) Whether or not the petition for change of name involving change of
civil status should be made through appropriate adversarial
proceedings.
b) Whether or not the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it
directed the deletion of the name of respondents father from his birth
certificate.
Ruling:
The petition is impressed with merit. A person can effect a change of
name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious
grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a
legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all
in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname
causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of
name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest. Respondents reason for changing his name
cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds,
however.
The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of
the Philippines. In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella
Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since childhood in order to
avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely
sought to use the surname of her mother which she had been using since
childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled
to use her mothers surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was
justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however,
respondent denies his legitimacy.
The change being sought in respondents petition goes so far as to
affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his
legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant
respondents supplication. As earlier stated, however, the petition of
respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was
registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the
petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil
registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto.
Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and
distinct. Aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar
of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the case."A petition for
a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil registry should have
as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or
claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby."
Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different "potential
oppositors." The first notice is that given to the "persons named in the
petition" and the second (which is through publication) is that given to
other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be
considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That two sets of
notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the
subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for two periods
(for the two types of "potential oppositors") within which to file an
opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication). The
purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the
subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would
cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule
108 but were inadvertently left out.
LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 118387
October
11, 2001
Facts:
On 15 November 1985, a complainant for sum of money was filed by
the International Corporate Bank, Inc. against Sacoba Manufacturing Corp.,
Pablo Gonzales Jr., and Tomas Gonzales who, in turn, filed a third party
complaint against Alfa Integrated Textile Mills (ALFA), Ramon C. Lee
(ALFA's president) and Antonio DM. Lacdao (ALFA's vice president) on 17
March 1986. On 17 September 1987, Lee and Lacdao filed a motion to
dismiss the third party complaint which the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 58 denied in an Order dated 27 June 1988. On 18 July 1988, Lee and
Lacdao filed their answer to the third party complaint. Meanwhile, on 12
July 1988, the trial issued an order requiring the issuance of an alias
summons upon ALFA through the DBP as a consequence of Lee and
Lacdao's letter informing the court that the summons for ALFA was
erroneously served upon them considering that the management of ALFA
had been transferred to the DBP. In a manifestation dated 22 July 1988, the
DBP claimed that it was not authorized to receive summons on behalf of
ALFA since the DBP had not taken over the company which has a separate
and distinct corporate personality and existence. On 4 August 1988, the
trial court issued an order advising Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. to take
the appropriate steps to serve the summons to ALFA. On 16 August 1988,
Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. filed a Manifestation and Motion for the
Declaration of Proper Service of Summons which the trial court granted on
17 August 1988.
On 12 September 1988, Lee and Lacdao filed a motion for
reconsideration submitting that the Rule 14, section 13 of the Revised Rules
of Court is not applicable since they were no longer officers of ALFA and
Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. should have availed of another mode of
service under Rule 14, Section 16 of the said Rules, i.e., through publication
to effect proper service upon ALFA. On 2 January 1989, the trial court
upheld the validity of the service of summons on ALFA through Lee and
Lacdao, thus, denying the latter's motion for reconsideration and requiring
ALFA to file its answer through Lee and Lacdao as its corporate officers. On
19 January 1989, a second motion for reconsideration was filed by Lee and
Lacdao reiterating their stand that by virtue of the voting trust agreement
they ceased to be officers and directors of ALFA, hence, they could no
longer receive summons or any court processes for or on behalf of ALFA. In
support of their second motion for reconsideration, Lee and Lacdao
attached thereto a copy of the voting trust agreement between all the
stockholders of ALFA (Lee and Lacdao included), on the one hand, and the
DBP, on the other hand, whereby the management and control of ALFA
became vested upon the DBP. On 25 April 1989, the trial court reversed
itself by setting aside its previous Order dated 2 January 1989 and declared
that service upon Lee and Lacdao who were no longer corporate officers of
ALFA cannot be considered as proper service of summons on ALFA. On 15
May 1989, Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. moved for a reconsideration of the
Order which was affirmed by the court in is Order dated 14 August 1989
denying Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al.'s motion for reconsideration.
On 18 September 1989, a petition for certiorari was belatedly
submitted by Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. before the Court of Appeals
which, nonetheless, resolved to give due course thereto on 21 September
1989. On 17 October 1989, the trial court, not having been notified of the
pending petition for certiorari with the appellate court issued an Order
declaring as final the Order dated 25 April 1989. Sacoba Manufacturing, et.
al. in the said Order were required to take positive steps in prosecuting the
third party complaint in order that the court would not be constrained to
dismiss the same for failure to prosecute. Subsequently, on 25 October 1989
Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. filed a motion for reconsideration on which
the trial court took no further action. On 19 March 1990, after Lee and
Lacdao filed their answer to Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al.'s petition for
certiorari, the appellate court rendered its decision, setting aside the orders
of trial court judge dated 25 April 1989 and 14 August 1989. On 11 April
1990, Lee and Lacdao moved for a reconsideration of the decision of the
appellate court which resolved to deny the same on 10 May 1990. Lee and
Lacdao filed the petition for certiorari. In the meantime, the appellate court
inadvertently made an entry of judgment on 16 July 1990 erroneously
applying the rule that the period during which a motion for reconsideration
has been pending must be deducted from the 15-day period to appeal.
However, in its Resolution dated 3 January 1991, the appellate court set
aside the aforestated entry of judgment after further considering that the
rule it relied on applies to appeals from decisions of the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals, not to appeals from its decision to the
Supreme Court pursuant to the Supreme Court's.
Issue:
a) Whether the execution of the voting trust agreement by Lee and
Lacdao whereby all their shares to the corporation have been
transferred to the trustee deprives the stockholder of their positions
as directors of the corporation.
b) Whether the five-year period of the voting trust agreement in question
had lapsed in 1986 so that the legal title to the stocks covered by the
said voting trust agreement ipso facto reverted to Lee and Lacdao as
beneficial owners pursuant to the 6th paragraph of section 59 of the
new Corporation Code.
c) Whether there was proper service of summons on ALFA through Lee
and Lacdao, to bind ALFA.
Ruling:
Lee and Lacdao, by virtue of the voting trust agreement executed in
1981 disposed of all their shares through assignment and delivery in favor
of the DBP, as trustee. Consequently, Lee and Lacdao ceased to own at least
one share standing in their names on the books of ALFA as required under
Section 23 of the new Corporation Code. They also ceased to have anything
to do with the management of the enterprise. Lee and Lacdao ceased to be
directors. Hence, the transfer of their shares to the DBP created vacancies
in their respective positions as directors of ALFA. The transfer of shares
from the stockholders of ALFA to the DBP is the essence of the subject
voting trust agreement. Considering that the voting trust agreement

between ALFA and the DBP transferred legal ownership of the stocks
covered by the agreement to the DBP as trustee, the latter because the
stockholder of record with respect to the said shares of stocks. In the
absence of a showing that the DBP had caused to be transferred in their
names one share of stock for the purpose of qualifying as directors of ALFA,
Lee and Lacdao can no longer be deemed to have retained their status as
officers of ALFA which was the case before the execution of the subject
voting trust agreement. There is no dispute from the records that DBP has
taken over full control and management of the firm.
The 6th paragraph of section 59 of the new Corporation Code reads
that "Unless expressly renewed, all rights granted in a voting trust
agreement shall automatically expire at the end of the agreed period, and
the voting trust certificates as well as the certificates of stock in the name
of the trustee or trustees shall thereby be deemed cancelled and new
certificates of stock shall be reissued in the name of the transferors."
However, it is manifestly clear from the terms of the voting trust agreement
between ALFA and the DBP that the duration of the agreement is contingent
upon the fulfillment of certain obligations of ALFA with the DBP. Had the
five-year period of the voting trust agreement expired in 1986, the DBP
would not have transferred an its rights, titles and interests in ALFA
"effective June 30, 1986" to the national government through the Asset
Privatization Trust (APT) as attested to in a Certification dated 24 January
1989 of the Vice President of the DBP's Special Accounts Department II. In
the same certification, it is stated that the DBP, from 1987 until 1989, had
handled s account which included ALFA's assets pursuant to a management
agreement by and between the DBP and APT. Hence, there is evidence on
record that at the time of the service of summons on ALFA through Lee and
Lacdao on 21 August 1987, the voting trust agreement in question was not
yet terminated so that the legal title to the stocks of ALFA, then, still
belonged to the DBP.
It is a basic principle in Corporation Law that a corporation has a
personality separate and distinct from the officers or members who
compose it. Thus, the role on service of processes on a corporation
enumerates the representatives of a corporation who can validly receive
court processes on its behalf. Not every stockholder or officer can bind the
corporation considering the existence of a corporate entity separate from
those who compose it. The rationale of the rule is that service must be made
on a representative so integrated with the corporation sued as to make it a
priori supposable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he
should do with any legal papers served on him. Herein, Lee and Lacdao do
not fall under any of the enumerated officers. The service of summons upon
ALFA, through Lee and Lacdao, therefore, is not valid. To rule otherwise will
contravene the general principle that a corporation can only be bound by

such acts which are within the scope of the officer's or agent's authority.
IN RE CHARGE OF NAME OF JULIAN WANG
G.R. No. 159966 March 30, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his
mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for
change of name and/ or correction/ cancellation of entry in the Civil
Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle
name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang to Julian Lin Wang. Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best
interest to drop his middle name as this would help him to adjust easily to
and integrate himself into Singaporean society.
Issue:
Whether or not the law allows one to drop the middle name from his
registered name on the cause mentioned.
Ruling:
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be

proper and reasonable cause for which the change is sought. To justify a
request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or
compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which
have been held valid are:
a.) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable r extremely difficult to
write or pronounce;
b.) When the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
c.) When the change will avoid confusion;
d.) When the one has continuously used and been known since childhood
by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage;
e.) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and
f.) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing
that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that
the change of name would prejudice public interest.
SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
Facts:
Rommel Silverio filed a petition for the change of his gender and first
name in his birth certificate to facilitate his marriage with his fianc. A year
before, Silverio has underwent sex re-assignment surgery in Bangkok,
Thailand. In his petition, he wants to change his first name from Rommel
to Mely.
Issue:
Should the court allow the change of name?
Ruling:
No. The SC said that considering that there is no law recognizing sex
re-assignment, the determination of a persons sex at the time of birth, if
not attended by error, is immutable. It held that while petitioner may have
succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of
modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil
registry for that reason. There is no special law in the country governing
sex reassignment and its effect. This is fatal to petitioners cause.
The Court said that the change in gender sought by petitioner will have
serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences, i.e.,
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family
relations and substantially affect the public policy in relation to women in
laws such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,
certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code, etc.
REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN
G.R. No. 166676
September 12, 2008
Facts:
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a
petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 33, of Siniloan, Laguna; such that, her name be changed
to Jeff and her gender to male.
She was born in January 13, 1981, and was registered as female,
having the name Jennifer Cagandahan. While growing up, she was
diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperpplasia (CAH), a condition
where the person thus afflicted possesses both male and female
characteristics. She was also diagnosed to have clitoral hypertrophy, small
ovaries, no breast, and menstrual development. She alleged that for all
interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become
a male person.
Issue:
Whether or not the correction of entries in her birth certificate be
granted.
Ruling:
Yes. The court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of
the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to
outright denial. The Court views that where a person is biologically or
naturally intersex, the determining factor in his gender classification would
be what the individual, having reached the age of maturity, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex. The respondent here thinks of himself as a
male considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones.
There is preponderant biological support for considering him as a male.
MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA vs. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF

HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
G.R. No. 181174
December
4, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner, Ma. Cristinas husband, Pablo died on April 15, 2002 in a
vehicular accident in Indonesia. During the wake following the repatriation
of
his
remains
to
the
Philippines,
respondent
Lucille Titular began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin
Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Petitioner thereupon made
inquiries with the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental. Onthe annotation of Patricks birth certificate reflects Patrick as
having been acknowledged by Pablo (or Pablito)as son on January 13, 1997,
that he was legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of his parents on
April 22,1998 at Manila, and that he shall be known as Patrick Titular
Braza.Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing
that Pablo and Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her
co-petitioners (her three legitimate children with Pablo) to file on December
23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of Himalayan City, Negros
Occidental a petition to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in
the Local Civil Register.
Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the
supposed marriage between Lucille andPablo, said marriage being
bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma.
Cristinaand Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) thecorrection of the entriesin
Patrick's birth record with respect to hislegitimation, the name of the father
and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) adirective
to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor
Patrick, tosubmit Patrick to DNA testingto determine his paternity and
filiations; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as
stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, thedeclaration of the
marriage of Lucille andPablo as bigamous. TC dismissed the petition,
holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which
is notacting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction
over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the
legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test,
hence, the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial
action.MR was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the courtmay pass upon the validity of marriage and
questions on legitimacy even in anaction to correct entries in the civil
registrar.
Ruling:
No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial
court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacyand
filiations.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Courtvis a visArticle 412 of the Civil Code
charts the procedure by which anentry in the civil registry may be cancelled
or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generallybe used
only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors
in the civil registry. Aclerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk ora transcriber; a
mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of
name that isclearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the
parent. Substantial or contentiousalterations may be allowed only in
adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded
anddue process is properly observed. The petitioners cause of action
is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucilles marriage as
void forbeing bigamous and impugn Patricks legitimacy, which causes of
action are governed not by Rule 108 butby A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took
effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code,
respectively,hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as
expressly provided in said Code.It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally,
validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can bequestioned
only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through
collateral attacksuch as the petition filed before the courta quo.

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Persons and

PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW

Persons and Family Relation

F.F. Cruz & Co.., Inc. v. HR Construction Corp.

EXPRESS AND IMPLIED REPEAL

EFFECT OF REPEAL OF REPEALING LAW

LAW OF THE CASE

249 SCRA 251

EQUITY IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW

APPLICATION OF PENAL LAWS, EXCEPTIONS

Persons and Family Relation

PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS

DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA

VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA

LIABILITY OF EX-MALEFICIO OR EX-DELICTO

ACTS CONTRA BONOS MORES

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

Persons and Family Relation

Galang v. Court of Appeals

PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE

NON-FEASANCE, MISFEASANCE, MALFEASANCE

ACTION FOR DAMAGES BASED ON CRIME

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (OTHER SOURCES OF

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (DEFAMATION, FRAUD,

Persons and Family Relation

International Flavors and Fragrance (Phils.) Inc. v. Argos

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (VIOLATION OF

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (QUASIDELICTS/TORTS)

Persons and Family Relation

Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals

DEFINITION AND NATURE OF MARRIAGE

PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF EXISTENCE AND

AUTHORITY OF SOLEMNIZING OFFICER

MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE

Persons and Family Relation

BIGAMOUS/ POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES

Persons and Family Relation

MARRIAGE IN VIOLATION OF ART. 40 FC

CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL

Persons and Family Relation

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL

Persons and Family Relation

Dedel v. Court of Appeals

ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF

PROPER ACTION AND PROCEDURE

APPEARANCE OF THE STATE

DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT ON THE

FINAL JUDGMENT AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS

Persons and Family Relation

VOIDABLE MARRIAGES, CONCEALMENT

FORCE, INTIMIDATION, UNDUE INFLUENCE

DOCTRINE OF TRIENNIAL COHABITATION

LEGAL SEPARATION, GROUNDS

DEFENSES, CONDONATION/ PARDON

Persons and Family Relation

DEFENSES, MUTUAL GUILT

MANDATORY COOLING-OFF PERIOD

NECESSITY OF TRIAL AND INTERVENTION OF STATE

LEGAL SEPARATION PENDENTE LITE

DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION

Persons and Family Relation

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES