Rosario, Dyrene Mara S. DELOS REYES vs. JUDGE CRUZ A.M. No.

RTJ-08-2152, 610 SCRA 134, January 18, 2010

Duty to Court

This is an Administrative case filed against Judge Danilo Cruz and Godolfo Gundran of RTC Branch 52, Pasig City. Facts: A letter-complaint was filed by complainant Luminza Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes) against respondents Judge Danilo S. Cruz (Judge Cruz) and Clerk of Court V Godolfo R. Gundran (Gundran for dereliction of duty. Specifically, Judge Cruz is charged with delay in the disposition of LRC Case No. R-5740 while Gundran is charged with failure to timely transmit the records of said case. Complainant alleged that she is the defendant in LRC Case No. R-5740 pending before Branch 152 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. She claimed that Judge Cruz issued an Order giving the parties 15 days within which to file their respective memorandum after which the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The parties complied; hence, the case was deemed submitted for decision. However, it was only after more than three years since the case was submitted for resolution when the decision was rendered. Consequently, complainant argued that Judge Cruz incurred delay in disposing the case thus should be held administratively liable therefor. Complainant also alleged that after receipt of the adverse decision, she timely filed a notice of appeal and paid the corresponding appeal and docket fees. However, despite the lapse of more than six months from the time the appeal was filed, respondent Gundran still failed to transmit the records to the appellate court in violation of Section 10, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, Judge Cruz did not deny that he incurred delay in the disposition of the said case. He also begged for the indulgence of the court and claimed that he was indisposed since the latter part of 2004 due to his illnesses. He also claimed the delay was partly due to heavy pressure of work. Meanwhile, Gundran denied being remiss in his duties. He claimed that he already instructed the clerk-in-charge to complete the records of the case and to prepare the transmittal letter but the clerk-in-charge encountered some difficulty in completing the records. He also claimed that he found it difficult to personally examine if the records have been completed and transmitted on time due to the heavy court docket and the numerous reports that needed to be prepared and submitted. Finally, he insisted that there was no deliberate intention to delay the transmittal of the records or to cause damage to the complainant. Issue: Whether or not both respondents neglected their duty.

Ruling: The Court finds both respondents to be remiss in their duties. As regards to Judge Cruz, the Court found him to be grossly inefficient in failing to decide LRC Case No. R-5740 within 90 days from the time it was submitted for decision. He should be mindful that failure to resolve cases submitted for decision within the period fixed by law constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to the speedy disposition of their cases. The Court also considered his physical condition however respondent judge should have request for an extension

of time within which to decide the case. Moreover, the Court did not accept Judge Cruzs justification that the delay was partly due to heavy pressure of work. Precisely, a judge is mandated to resolve cases with dispatch. Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides that all judges to perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. For respondent Gundran, the Court ruled that he is guilty of simple neglect of duty for failure to timely transmit the records of LRC Case No. R-5740. The duty to verify the correctness and completeness of the records of the case rests with the respondent. However, in this case, respondent Clerk of Court Gundran relegated the performance of his job to another court employee without any justifiable reason. Adjudication: Judge Danilo S. Cruz was found guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision in LRC Case No. R-5740 and was fined the amount of P11,000.00. Likewise, Clerk of Court V Godolfo R. Gundran was also found guilty of simple neglect of duty and is hereby meted the penalty of suspension of two months without salary and benefits. They were both sternly warned by the Supreme Court that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Rosario, Dyrene Mara S.

Duty to Court

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE HARUN ISMAEL A.M. No. RTJ-07-2045, 610 SCRA 281, January 19, 2010 This is an Administrative case filed against Judge Ismael for gross inefficiency. Facts: On April 25 to May 14, 2005, a judicial audit was conducted in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 22, presided over by respondent Judge Harun B. Ismael. As a result, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) issued a memorandum directing respondent to explain his failure to decide and act on current and inherited cases, as well as to resolve incidents in various cases pending before him, within the reglementary period provided by law. Respondent was likewise directed to inform the OCA if cases already submitted for decision or resolution had in fact been decided or resolved within the reglementary period. Consequently, respondent was ordered to immediately cease hearing cases in his sala and confine himself to deciding or resolving cases submitted for decision or resolution. In respondents stead, Judge Edilberto G. Absin was directed to handle active cases, other than cases submitted for decision, until respondent could comply with the directives or until he retired. In its memorandum, the OCA noted that respondent failed to fully comply with its directives and the respondent judge did not ask for extensions of time within which to comply with the subject directives. Issue: Whether or not the respondents failure to decide cases within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency. Ruling: It is settled that failure to decide or resolve cases within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and is not excusable. The New Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code admonishes all judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the period specified in Section 15 (1) and (2), Article VIII of the Constitution. Violation of the basic tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes a breach of Canons 1 and 12 as well as Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Adjudication: Judge Harun B. Ismael was found guilty of gross inefficiency and violation of Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary for which he was fined in the amount of P20,000. Respondent was likewise found guilty of violation of Canons 1 and 12 as well as Rules 1.03, 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which he is fined in the amount of P10,000.

Rosario, Dyrene Mara S.

Duty to Court

GONZALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE TOLENTINO A.M. no. CA-10-49-J, 611 SCRA 179, January 28, 2010 This is an Administrative case filed against Associate Justice Amelita Tolentino. Facts: This case stemmed from a civil case for damages filed by complainant Ramon Gonzales against Alabang Country Club, Inc. when he was charged by the Board thereof that he allegedly falsified proxy forms for the 2004 election of Board members. The RTC decided the said case in complainants favor and issued a writ of execution allowing him to resume his rights as a member of ACCI. The defendants therein then filed a petition for review with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued TRO against the execution of the decision of the civil case. When the TRO expired, the CA directed the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction which was challenged by complainant Gonzales through a petition for certiorari but it was dismissed by the same court for his failure to sufficiently shown that the said issuance was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The complainant also filed a Motion for Inhibition of respondent because he claims that the issuance of the writ was against the law. The said motion was not acted upon by the respondent and as a result, complainant filed a letter-complaint against the respondent. Issue: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of unduly delay in resolving the complainants Motion for Inhibition. Ruling: The Court held that the respondent is guilty of unduly delay in rendering an order. Article VIII, Section 15 (1) of the Constitution directs that All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from the date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts. In this case, the Court finds that the motion was filed on September 29, 2005 after complainant filed before this Court on September 8, 2005 a petition for certiorari to assail the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The Court resolved the petition for certiorari on April 11, 2007. It was only on October 8, 2008, however, or only after complainant filed on August 20, 2008 the letter-complaint which this Court referred to the Court of Appeals, and after complainant also filed on August 21, 2008 a reiterative motion for inhibition, that respondent resolved the motion by granting it. Therefore, given the nature and history of the cases, it clearly shows that the respondent unduly delayed the resolution of a mere motion for inhibition. Adjudication: The respondent is found guilty of undue delay in rendering an order, and is fined Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00), with warning that commission of the same or similar infraction shall be faulted strictly.

Rosario, Dyrene Mara S.

Duty to Court

REQUEST OF JUDGE NINO A. BATINGANA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 6, MATI, DAVAO ORIENTAL FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO DECIDE CRIMINAL CASE NO. 4745-05 A.M. No. 08-2-107-RTC, 611 SCRA 187, February 1, 2010 This is an Administrative Case in the Supreme Court. Facts: On November 13, 2007, Judge Nio A. Batingana, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Mati City, Davao Oriental, wrote a letter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), requesting an extension of 90 days from November 13, 2007 within which to decide Criminal Case No. 4745-05 for Estafa entitled People v. Rosalinda Tiro. The Court granted the request. In a letter dated August 8, 2008, Judge Batingana sought another extension of 90 days from August 9, 2008 within which to decide the same criminal case. The Court now denied the request and was directed to immediately decide the case, furnish the Court, through the OCA, a copy of his decision, and explain why he should not be declared administratively liable for his delay in deciding the case within 10 days from notice of the Resolution. Issue: Whether or not respondent judge violated Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in not promptly deciding the case within the required period. Ruling: As oft stated, justice delayed is justice denied. The honor and integrity of the judiciary is measured not only by the fairness and correctness of the decisions rendered, but also by the efficiency with which disputes are resolved. Judges are therefore mandated to perform their duties with utmost diligence in order to preserve the confidence of the public in the judiciary. Adjudication: Judge Nio A. Batingana is found administratively liable and is fined in the amount of Eleven Thousand Pesos (P11,000.00), with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Rosario, Dyrene Mara S. GARRIDO vs. GARRIDO A.C. No. 6593, 611 SCRA 508, February 4, 2010 This is an Administrative Case filed for Disbarment. Facts:

Duty to Society

Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit and a supplemental affidavit for disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P.Valencia before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline charging them with gross immorality. The complaint-affidavit states that Maelotisea is the legal wife of Atty. Garrido and Atty. Valencia is the latters mistress with whom he begot a child. On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner submitted her Report and Recommendation for the respondents' disbarment. The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board of Governors) approved and adopted this recommendation with modification. The ruling states that Atty. Garrido is disbarred while the case against Atty. Valencia is dismissed for lack of merit of the complaint. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Garrido and Atty. Valencia are still fit to be allowed to continue as members of the Bar. Ruling: The Court resolved to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors against Atty. Garrido and to reject its recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.

Atty. Garrido

By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyer's oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession. He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the Bar. As a lawyer, he violated his lawyer's oath, Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, all of which commonly require him to obey the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered this second marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which commands that he "shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct"; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that "[a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession"; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."

Atty. Valencia

The Court finds that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. As officers of the court, lawyers must not only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a member of the legal profession.

Conclusion

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyer's lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this reason. Adjudication: Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia are disbarred from the practice of law and their names are stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys.

Rosario, Dyrene Mara S.

Duty to Society

ATTY. DENNIS NIO vs. JUSTICE NORMANDIE PIZARRO A.M. No. CA-08-45-J, 613 SCRA 302, February 20, 2010 This is an administrative complaint charging respondent Court of Appeals Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro with gross ignorance of the law, rendering an unjust judgment, partiality and undue delay in the resolution of an application for a temporary restraining order (TRO). Facts: This case arose from a civil case for collection of sum of money to which complainant Atty. Nino represented Gentle Supreme, the complainant therein. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of complainants client and issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Real Property to the defendants of the said case to satisfy the judgment. Consulta, the defendant therein, filed a petition for Annulment of Judgment and prayed for the issuance of a TRO to enjoin the public sale of his property before the Court of Appeals. A resolution was then issued by respondent giving due course to the said petition and directing the issuance of summons upon Gentle Supreme. Complainant then filed his Answer with Counterclaim arguing that the issuance of the TRO be denied. Thereafter, he likewise, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and successively filed a motion for early resolution of the motion for issuance of TRO. In a resolution, respondent directed Consulta to file a comment on the Motion for Summary Judgment but instead of comment, Consulta filed a Motion for Inhibition of the entire division where respondent belongs which was granted; thus, resulted to the immediate re-raffling of the case to another division. Issue: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law, rendering an unjust judgment, partiality and undue delay in the resolution of an application for a temporary restraining order (TRO). Ruling: The Court held that there is no merit in the charge against respondent for gross ignorance of the law. In order for this administrative offense to prosper, the subject order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, more importantly, must be attended by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. Moreover, it is a settled principle that judges have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue delay. A judge who fails to do so has to suffer the consequences of his omission as any delay in the disposition of the cases undermines the peoples faith in the judiciary. In this case, respondent practiced the principle. There was no delay on the part of respondent that would warrant an administrative sanction. Adjudication: The administrative complaint filed against Justice Normandie Pizarro was dismissed for lack of merit.

Rosario, Dyrene Mara S. SOLIDON vs. MACALALAD A.C. No. 8158, 613 SCRA 472, February 24, 2010 This is an Administrative Case in the Supreme Court for disbarment. Facts:

Duty to Client

Atty. Macalalad accepted to handle the judicial titling of a parcel of land owned by Atty. Solidon's relatives for a consideration of P80,000.00. Atty. Macalalad received P50,000.00 as initial payment; the remaining balance of P30,000.00 was to be paid when Atty. Solidon received the certificate of title to the property. Atty. Macalalad has not filed any petition for registration over the property sought to be titled up to the present time and has not responded to the request of report on the status of the case. A Complaint was filed before the IBP and the Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Macalalads negligence in filing the application for registration is contrary to the mandate prescribed in Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. The Board of Governors adopted and approved the report for the suspension of the respondent from the practice of law for three (3) months and Ordered him to Return the amount of P50,000 with 12% interest per annum to complainant. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Macalalad violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Ruling: The Court agreed with the IBP's factual findings and legal conclusions. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for the rule on negligence and states: Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. The mere failure of the lawyer to perform the obligations due to the client is considered per se a violation. A lawyer's duty to his client is fiduciary in nature once an engagement for legal services is accepted. A lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of protecting the latter's interest with utmost diligence. The lawyer bears the duty to serve his client with competence and diligence, and to exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interest of his or her client. Accordingly, competence, not only in the knowledge of law, but also in the management of the cases by giving these cases appropriate attention and due preparation, is expected from a lawyer. Atty. Macalalad failed to act as he committed when he failed to file the required petition.

In addition to the above finding of negligence, The Court also finds Atty. Macalalad guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires a lawyer to account for all the money received from the client. In this case, Atty. Macalalad did not immediately account for and promptly return the money he received from Atty. Solidon even after he failed to render any legal service within the contracted time of the engagement. Adjudication: Atty. Macalalad is suspended for six (6) Months.

Rosario, Dyrene Mara S.

Duty to Society

RE: NON-OBSERVANCE BY ATTY. EDEN T. CANDELARIA, CHIEF OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES (OAS), OF EN BANC RESOLUTION A.M. NO. 05-929-SC DATED SEPTEMBER 27, 2005 AND EN BANC RULING IN OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION A.M. No. 07-6-6-SC, 613 SCRA 661, February 26, 2010 This is an administrative matter filed against Atty. Eden Candelaria, Chief of Administrative Services. Facts: In 2005, the Court en banc classified as highly technical or policy-determining the position of Chief of MISO and established the qualification standards thereof. In August 2006, Joseph Raymond Mendoza was appointed as MISO Chief, however, he did not meet the approved qualifications; thus, his appointment was made coterminous with the then Chief Justice Panganibans tenure. Upon the retirement of Chief Justice Panganiban, then Chief Justice Puno directed the reappointment paper of Mendoza as MISO Chief. The Office of the Administrative Services (AOS), through its Chief, Atty. Eden Candelaria, drafted the said paper stating that Mendozas reappointment was coterminous with Chief Justice Puno but he was to serve for only six months. Subsequently, the OAS submitted the reappointment paper and the earlier coterminous appointments of Mendoza to the CSC for approval. After few months, the PMO recommended the permanent appointment of Mendoza as Chief of MISO after he passed the Career Service Professional Exams. But action on this was deferred to first await the CSC's approval of Mendoza's coterminous appointments. However, in June 2007, the CSC disapproved Mendoza's coterminous appointments on the ground that the CSC had no occasion to declare the position of Chief of MISO as primarily confidential, highly technical, or policy-determining as to qualify Mendoza to a coterminous appointment. Consequently, Justice Carpio, in his memorandum, recommended the taking of disciplinary action against Atty. Candelaria for gross neglect of duty, gross incompetence in the performance of official duties, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He alleged that Atty. Cadelaria violated Courts resolution and its 2005 ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission when she submitted Mendoza's appointments and all other Supreme Court third level appointments to the CSC for approval when this was not legally required. In her Comment, Atty. Candelaria denied committing the offenses charged. She also said that she submitted Mendoza's appointments to the CSC for approval in compliance with the Civil Service Law and implementing rules and that she would have faced administrative sanction if she had not. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Candelaria is guilty of gross neglect of duty, gross incompetence in the performance of official duties, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Ruling: Regarding Atty. Candelarias submission of appointment paper of Mendoza to the CSC for their approval, Section 9(h) of the Civil Service Law bestows on the CSC the power and function to approve all such appointments and to disapprove the appointments of those who do not possess the required qualifications and eligibility. Hence, Atty. Candelaria is required to submit to the CSC all appointment in the civil service under pain of administrative sanction for neglect of duty. Moreover, since the Congress did not enact a law superseding the said provision, the officer charged with the duty to submit all appointments from the Court, had no choice but to abide by them and submit Mendoza's appointments to the CSC for its approval. Thus, there is no sufficient ground exists to take disciplinary action against Atty. Candelaria for gross neglect of duty, gross incompetence in the performance of official duties, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Adjudication: The Court resolved to note Atty. Eden T. Candelaria's Comment dated July 10, 2007 and to admonish her for failing to take up with the Court the results of the meeting she had with the Assistant Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission.

Rosario, Dyrene Mara S. SPS. RAFOLS vs. BARRIOS A.C. No. 4973, 615 SCRA 206, March 15, 2010 This is an Administrative Case in the Supreme Court. Facts:

Duty to Client

The complainants were the plaintiffs in civil case wherein they sought the cancellation of a deed of sale. The case was assigned to Branch 37 of the RTC presided by Judge Dizon, Jr. The complainants were represented by the respondent, paying to him P15,000.00 as acceptance fee. On December 22, 1997, the respondent visited the complainants at their residence and informed complainant Manuel that the judge handling their case wanted to talk to him. The respondent introduced Manuel to the judge, who informed Manuel that their case was pending in his sala. The judge likewise said that he would resolve the case in their favor, assuring their success up to the Court of Appeals, if they could deliver P150,000.00 to him. The complainants paid Judge Dizon a total amount of P160,000.00. Accordingly, the respondent demanded P25,000.00 as his expenses in securing the testimony of Soledad Elevencionado-Provido in Iloilo City to be used as evidence in their civil case. In addition, the respondent requested the complainants to borrow P60,000.00 from the bank because he wanted to redeem his foreclosed Isuzu Elf, and because he needed to give P11,000.00 to his nephew who was due to leave for work abroad. Judge Dizon was dismissed from service in an earlier decision of the Court. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Barrios engaged in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct.

Ruling: The Court approved and adopted the report and recommendations of the OBC, but it resolved to impose the supreme penalty of disbarment, which it believes is the proper penalty. The respondent' denials were worthless and unavailing in the face of the uncontradicted evidence showing that he had not only personally arranged the meeting between Manuel and Judge Dizon, Jr., but had also communicated to the complainants the judge's illegal reason for the meeting. The practice of law is a privilege heavily burdened with conditions. The attorney is a vanguard of our legal system, and, as such, is expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a very high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing in order that the people's faith and confidence in the legal system are ensured. Thus, he must conduct himself, whether in dealing with his clients or with the public at large, as to be beyond reproach at all times. Any violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition on the attorney of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. Specifically, the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins an attorney from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful conduct. Corollary to this injunction is the rule that an attorney shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the Legal Profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

The respondent did not measure up to the exacting standards of the Law Profession, which demanded of him as an attorney the absolute abdication of any personal advantage that conflicted in any way, directly or indirectly, with the interest of his clients. The conclusion that the respondent and the disgraced Judge Dizon, Jr. were conspirators against the former's own clients, whom he was sworn to protect and to serve with utmost fidelity and morality, is inevitable for the Court to make in this administrative case. And, being conspirators, they both deserve the highest penalty. The disbarment of the respondent is in order, because such sanction is on par with the dismissal of Judge Dizon, Jr. Adjudication: Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. is disbarred.

Rosario, Dyrene Mara S.

Duty to the Legal Profession

VAFLOR-FABROA vs. PAGUINTO A.C. No. 6273, 615 SCRA 223, March 15, 2010 This is an Administrative Case in the Supreme Court. Facts: An Information for Estafa was filed on June 21, 2001 against Atty. Iluminada M. VaflorFabroa (complainant) along with others based on a joint affidavit-complaint which Atty. Oscar Paguinto (respondent) prepared and notarized. Respondent also filed six other criminal complaints against complainant for violation of Article 31 of Republic Act No. 6938 (Cooperative Code of the Philippines) before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, but he eventually filed a Motion to Withdraw them. On October 10, 2001, complainant, who was Chairperson of the General Mariano Alvarez Service Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO), received a Notice of Special General Assembly of GEMASCO on October 14, 2001 to consider the removal of four members of the Board of Directors (the Board), including her and the General Manager. The notice was signed by respondent. On October 15, 2001, respondent and his group took over the GEMASCO office and its premises, the pump houses, water facilities, and operations. On even date, respondent sent letternotices to complainant and the four removed directors informing them of their removal from the Board and as members of GEMASCO, and advising them to cease and desist from further discharging the duties of their positions. Issue: Whether or not respondent committed a multiple violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Ruling: The Court finds that by conniving with Gerangco in taking over the Board of Directors and the GEMASCO facilities, respondent violated the provisions of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines and the GEMASCO By-Laws. He also violated the Lawyer's Oath, which provides that a lawyer shall support the Constitution and obey the laws. When respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal complaints against complainant, he violated the Lawyer's Oath that a lawyer shall "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same." When, after obtaining an extension of time to file comment on the complaint, respondent failed to file any and ignored this Court's subsequent show cause order, he violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that "A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so." Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondent's deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment

for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes. Adjudication: Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto is suspended for two years from the practice of law.

Rosario, Dyrene Mara S.

Duty to Court

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. ATTY. PADUGANANPENARANDA A.M. no. P-07-2355, 616 SCRA 178, March 19, 2010 This is an administrative matter filed against Atty. Mary Ann Paduganan-Penaranda, Clerk of Court of MTCC-Cagayan de Oro City, and Jocelyn Mediante, Cashier I of the same court. Facts: On May 21, 2001, the Audit Team of the Court Management Office conducted a partial financial audit of the books of account of the MTCC-Cagayan de Oro City. In the audit report, it appeared that there was a shortage in the Judiciary Development Fund amounting to P49,589.14 and there was an over-remittance to the General Fund. The Court, in an Order, directed Penaranda and Mediante to restitute the shortage amount and to be relieved of their duties as collecting officers. Penaranda then restituted the shortage amount and claimed that when she took over as clerk of court, there was no actual and physical turn-over of either property and cash accountability. She further contended that the she never knew that there was a shortage and assuming that there was a fault on her part, it was merely the fact that she gave her staff full confidence and trust. On the other hand, Mediante claimed that the shortage was not due to bad faith, but was a result of the loose tracking of accounts, mismanagement, lack of information on the proper accounting system, and/or negligence. However, after further evaluation, the Audit team found a shortage amounting to P72,745.00 on the Fiduciary Fund of the MTCC-Cagayan de Oro. Thus, the OCA then recommended that Penaranda be directed to restitute the said shortage in Fiduciary Fund. Penaranda then restituted the said amount. But Mediante, in her manifestation, clarified that there was no shortage of funds and explained that there was an over-remittance for May 2001 and other expenses were not accounted in the record which resulted to the discrepancy. Penaranda likewise corroborated Mediantes manifestation and further laimed that there was a delay in remittances and erroneous withdrawals of cash bond. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Penaranda and Mediante should be held liable for the shortage in the Fiduciary Fund. Ruling: The Court ruled that respondents violated Supreme Court (SC) Circular No. 50-95, which commands that all fiduciary collections shall be deposited immediately by the Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with an authorized government depositary bank. SC Circular Nos. 13-92 and 5-93 provide the guidelines for the proper administration of court funds. SC Circular No. 13-92 commands that all fiduciary collections shall be deposited immediately by the Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with an authorized government depositary bank. In this case, while Penaranda was not the custodian of the courts collection, she still is expected that she would perform all the duties and responsibilities of a Clerk of Court. Jointly, Pearanda and Mediante are accountable officers entrusted with the great responsibility of

collecting money belonging to the funds of the court. Both have been remiss in their duty to remit the collections within a prescribed period and are liable for keeping funds in their custody Pearanda as the one responsible for monitoring the courts financial transactions and Mediante as the one in whom such functions are reposed. Undoubtedly, Pearanda and Mediante violated the trust reposed in them as disbursement officers of the judiciary. Thus, they should be held liable for the shortages in the Fiduciary Fund. Delay in the remittances of collections constitutes neglect of duty. Further, the court held that the failure to remit judiciary collections on time deprives the court of the interest that may be earned if the amounts are deposited in a bank Adjudication: The Court finds both respondents guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty and was suspended from office for two (2) months.

Rosario, Dyrene Mara S.

Duty to Society

CRISOSTOMO PLOPINIO vs. ATTY. LIZA ZABALA-CARINO A.M. no. P-08-2458, 616 SCRA 269, March 22, 2010 This is an Administrative case filed against Atty. Zabala-Carino by Crisostomo Plopinio. Facts: The instant administrative case stemmed from a Letter Crisostomo M. Plopinio (complainant), informing the Court that he had charged Atty. Liza D. Zabala-Cario (respondent Atty. Cario), Clerk of Court, RTC Branch 29, criminally and administratively before the Office of the Ombudsman, for violation of Section 4(c), Republic Act No. 6713 and Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019. Complainant stated that respondent Atty. Cario may not have disclosed to the Supreme Court, in the course of her application as Clerk of Court, her pending administrative and criminal cases before the Ombudsman. In her Comment, respondent claimed that she was truthful when she answered that she was not have been ever formally charged and pointed out that the two complaints filed against her are still in the preliminary investigation and pre-charge stages, since probable cause has yet to be determined by the investigating officers and as such, should not be considered as formal charges yet. The complaint was then re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and was referred to Executive Judge Jaime Contreras for investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report, Judge Contreras that the complaint warrants disciplinary action against the respondent and contends that the latter should have known that the kind of query in her application was intended to dig into her personal background; whether administrative or criminal cases were filed against her regardless of whatever stages these may be. The findings were adopted but were modified by the OCA with regards to the penalty recommended. Issue: Whether or not respondent Atty. Carino is guilty of dishonesty for allegedly falsifying her Personal Data Sheet (PDS). Ruling: The Court disagreed with the findings and recommendation of the OCA. Dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a question of intention. In ascertaining the intention of a person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the petitioner, but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment. The intention to falsify or misrepresent, as found by the Investigating Judge, is absent on the part of respondent Atty. Cario when she answered the question Have you ever been formally charged? When she filled-up her PDS, she had in mind the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service that a person shall be considered formally charged in administrative proceedings (a) upon the filing of a complaint at the instance of the disciplining authority; or (b) upon the finding of the existence of a prima facie case by the disciplining authority,

in case of a complaint filed by a private person. Thus, from the complaint itself, it is evident that at the time respondent Atty. Cario was applying for the position of Clerk of Court, she had not yet been formally charged administratively or criminally. Adjudication: The administrative complaint against Atty. Liza Zabala-Carino was dismissed for lack of merit.

Rosario, Dyrene Mara S.

Duty to Court

RE: CASES SUBMITTED FOR DECISION BEFORE HON. MELITON EMUSLAN A.M. no. RTJ-10-2226, 616 SCRA 280, March 22, 2010 This is an administrative matter on the ground of failure to render decision within the reglementary period. Facts: Judge Meliton G. Emuslan applied for Compulsory Retirement Benefits under Republic Act No. 910, as amended, effective October 23, 2009. In the process of completing his Certificate of Clearance, however, his Branch Clerk of Court issued a certification that Judge Emuslan had fortythree (43) cases already submitted for decision that had remained undecided beyond the reglementary period. The judge did not indicate any reason for not acting on the forty-three (43) cases, except in Criminal Case No. U-9757, entitled People v. Amor Pader, for Illegal Possession of Prohibited Drugs, wherein he attributed the delay to lack of transcript of stenographic notes. Because of this, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) withheld the Payment of Judge Emuslans retirement/gratuity benefits. In its report, the OCA found respondent liable for gross inefficiency, and recommended that he be fined P50,000.00, to be deducted from his retirement/gratuity benefits Issue: Whether or not Judge Emuslan committed gross inefficiency for failure to render decision within the reglementary period. Ruling: Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates lower courts to decide or resolve cases or matters for decision or final resolution within three (3) months from date of submission. Failure to decide cases within the 90-day reglementary period may warrant imposition of administrative sanctions on the erring judge. Moreover, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to dispose of their business promptly and to decide cases within the required period. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved by all lower courts within a period of three (3) months from submission. Thus, because Judge Emuslan could not proffer any valid excuse, his failure to decide the 43 cases translates to gross inefficiency in the performance of his duties. He should be held administratively liable. Adjudication: The Court finds Judge Meliton Emuslan guilty of Gross Inefficiency and was fined for the amount of P50,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement/gratuity benefits.

Rosario, Dyrene Mara S.

Duty to the Legal Profession

BARANDON vs. FERRER, SR. A.C. No. 5768, 616 SCRA 529, March 26, 2010 Administrative Case in the Supreme Court. Facts: This administrative case concerns a lawyer who is claimed to have hurled invectives upon another lawyer and filed a baseless suit against him. Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-affidavit against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for the following offenses: 1. Atty. Ferrer used abusive, offensive, and improper language which insinuated that Atty. Barandon presented a falsified document in court; 2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon for alleged falsification of public document; 3. On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Daet before the start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened Atty. Barandon. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Ferrer is guilty of violating Canons 7.03 and 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Ruling: The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability. Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Specifically, in Rule 8.01, the Code provides: Rule 8.01. - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. Atty. Ferrer's actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence shows that he imputed to Atty. Barandon the falsification of the Salaysay Affidavit of the plaintiff in Civil Case 7040. He made this imputation with pure malice for he had no evidence that the affidavit had been falsified and that Atty. Barandon authored the same. Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 of the Code provides: Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrer's drunken invectives at Atty. Barandon shortly before the start of a court hearing.

All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Atty. Ferrer's display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold. Adjudication: Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. is suspended from the practice of law for one year.

Rosario, Dyrene Mara S. MANIAGO vs. DE DIOS A.C. No. 7472, 617 SCRA 142, March 30, 2010 This is an Administrative Case in the Supreme Court. Facts:

Duty to Court

The instant case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint dated April 2, 2007 filed by Ligaya Maniago, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Lourdes I. de Dios for engaging in the practice of law despite having been suspended by the Court. Respondent explained that she served the suspension immediately upon receipt of the Court's Resolution on May 16, 2001 up to November 16, 2001. In a Manifestation filed on October 19, 2001, respondent formally informed the Court that she was resuming her practice of law on November 17, 2001, which she actually did. Respondent averred that for the period stated in the affidavit of complainant Maniago, during which she allegedly practiced law, she was neither suspended nor in any way prohibited from practice. The complaint, she added, was baseless and malicious, and should be dismissed outright. The OBC submitted its Memorandum for the Court's consideration. The OBC made it clear that the lifting of the suspension order was not automatic. Issue: Whether or not the lifting of a suspension order is automatic.

Ruling: The Court notes the Report and Recommendation of the OBC. It must be remembered that the practice of law is not a right but a mere privilege and, as such, must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Supreme Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities. Whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of the Supreme Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw that privilege. However, as much as the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer, it should, at the same time, also ensure that a lawyer may not be deprived of the freedom and right to exercise his profession unreasonably. Adjudication: It is resolved that the following guidelines be observed in the matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law.

Rosario, Dyrene Mara S.

Duty to Court

CECILIA SENARLO vs. JUDGE MAXIMO PADERANGA A.M. no. RTJ-06-2025, 617 SCRA 247, April 5, 2010 This is an administrative complaint filed by Cecilia Senarlo against Judge Maximo Paderanga for gross ignorance of the law, knowingly rendering unjust judgment, and grave abuse of authority, relative to Civil Case No. 2005-160. Facts: An action for reconveyance and quieting of title was instituted by Lorna Cabarrubias Bacalzo (Bacalzo) against the Archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church of Cagayan de Oro City (the Archbishop) before the RTC, presided over by Judge Paderanga. Bacalzo was seeking to recover a piece of land which her predecessor-in-interest had previously donated to the Roman Catholic Church, since allegedly the said property was no longer being devoted for the purpose it was donated. Considering that Bacalzo was already residing in the United States of America (U.S.A.), she was represented by her granddaughter, Senarlo. Judge Paderanga then issued an Order for mediation. He directed the parties to proceed and personally appear, with or without counsel, on November 4, 2005. However, the designated date was proclaimed holiday thus Bacalzo requested to reset the mediation and was approved by the mediator Atty. Velez. Subsequently, regardless of resetting the mediation proceedings, Judge Paderanga issued an Order dismissing the civil action which lead to the filing of administrative complaint against him for (a) Gross Ignorance of the Law and Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment for issuing the Order dated November 9, 2005, without regard to the fact that November 4, 2005, the date when the mediation conference was first scheduled, was declared a holiday; and (b) Grave Abuse of Authority, for issuing the said Order in the absence of the corresponding Mediators Report. In his Comment, Judge Paderanga denied the allegations against him and insisted that he did not dismiss the said civil case precipitately and without any basis or out of bias and hostility. In its Report, the OCA found Judge Paderanga guilty of grave abuse of authority. Issue: Whether or not Judge Paderanga is liable for grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law. Ruling: The Court held that Judge Paderanga is not guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure. To be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge must be shown to have committed an error that was gross or patent, deliberate or malicious. Also administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law is a judge who shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption ignored, contradicted or failed to apply settled law and jurisprudence. the Second Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of Mediation Proceedings and Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court grant judges the discretion to dismiss an action for failure of the plaintiff to appear at mediation proceedings. In this case, there was ostensible legal basis for Judge Paderanga to dismiss an action for failure of the plaintiff to attend the mediation conference. However, Judge Paderangas Order dismissing Civil Case No. 2005-160, was

improperly and prematurely issued. Judge Paderanga no longer bothered to look into the reason for the non-appearance of the parties or the basis for the request of the mediator for resetting. Without providing any reasons therefor, Judge Paderanga chose to ignore the request for resetting and immediately ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 2005-160. His action is contrary to the policy that the judge referring the case to mediation should extend to the mediator every possible support and assistance. Evidently, Judge Paderanga failed to exercise the necessary diligence before issuing the Order dismissing Civil Case No. 2005-160, to the prejudice of Bacalzo. This, however, makes Judge Paderanga liable for simple negligence, and not gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority, as charged by Senarlo. The Court deems simple negligence as falling within the ambit of simple misconduct. Adjudication: The Court finds Judge Maximo Paderanga guilty of Simple Misconduct and orders him to pay a fine of P10,000.00.

Rosario, Dyrene Mara S. MARIA PANCHO vs. JUDGE JOSE AGUIRRE A.M. no. RTJ-09-2196, 617 SCRA 486, April 7, 2010

Duty to Court

This is an administrative complaint charged by the complainants against Judge Jose Aguirre of RTC Branch 56. Facts: The complaint arose from respondents issuance of an Order finding complainants guilty of Contempt committed against the Municipal Trial Court and sentencing them to suffer imprisonment of four months and issuance on even date of warrants for their arrest. Complainants fault respondent for violation of 1) Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court for giving due course to a mere unverified motion for contempt and declaring them guilty thereof, and 2) Section 7 of the same Rule for imposing a penalty of four months imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed respondents Order but modified the penalty, noting that what complainants violated was an injunctive order which was issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), hence, punishable by one month imprisonment, in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 71 of Rules of Court. By Memorandum, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found respondent liable for gross ignorance of the law, Section 7 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court being plain and simple. The OCA accordingly recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of P25,000. Issue: Whether or not Judge Aguirre is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Ruling: The Court ruled in affirmative. Provision under Section 7 of Rule 71 is clear. Since what complainants violated is an order of the MTC, the imposable penalty is one month, not four, of imprisonment or a fine not exceeding P5,000 or both. When the law or procedure is so elementary, such as the provisions of the Rules of Court, not to know, or to act as if one does not know the same, constitutes gross ignorance of the law, even without the complainant having to prove malice or bad faith. Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, classifies gross ignorance of the law as a serious charge and Section 11 thereof penalizes it with 1) Dismissal from the service; 2) Suspension from office; and 3) A fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000. Since, respondent judge had retired (and died), the first two sanctions may no longer be considered. The penalty recommended by the OCA fine in the amount of P25,000 is in order. Adjudication: The Court finds now deceased Judge Jose Aguirre guilty of gross ignorance of the law and is fined for P25,000.00.

Rosario, Dyrene Mara S. ALFREDO FAVOR vs. JUDGE CESAR UNTALAN A.M. no. RTJ-08-2158, 618 SCRA 166, April 13, 2010

Duty to Society

This is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent judge of the Decision dated July 30, 2009. Facts: A verified complaint dated May 10, 2004 was filed by complainant Alfredo Favor with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), charging respondent Judge Cesar Untalan of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) Branch 39, of Quezon City with: (1) illegal trespass to dwelling; (2) taking advantage of his office and position to act as an agent to sell real property; (3) assisting a private individual to settle a case; (4) harassment/coercion; and (5) violation of Rule 3.09 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. In its Decision dated July 30, 2009, the Supreme Court held that respondent judge is guilty for violating Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and ordered him to pay a fine of P5,000.00. Issue: Whether or not respondent judge should be fined P5,000.00 considering that he is a first time offender. Ruling: The Court granted the motion for reconsideration. The Court is duty-bound to sternly wield a corrective hand to discipline its errant employees and to weed out those who are undesirable and also has the discretion to temper the harshness of its judgment with mercy. Thus, in the interest of fair play and compassionate justice, considering that this was respondent Judge's first offense, the Court resolve to grant the instant motion for reconsideration. Adjudication: Judge Cesar Untalan is admonished to be more circumspect in his official and personal deportment, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Rosario, Dyrene Mara S. ROA vs. MORENO A.C. No. 8382, 618 SCRA 693, April 21, 2010 This is an Administrative Case in the Supreme Court. Facts:

Duty to Society

Sometime in September 1998, respondent sold to complainant a parcel of land located along Starlite Street in Cupang, Antipolo. Complainant paid respondent P70,000 in cash as full payment for the lot. Respondent did not issue a deed of sale. Instead, he issued a temporary receipt and a Certificate of Land Occupancy purportedly issued by the general overseer of the estate in which the lot was located. Not long after, Roa learned that the Certificate of Land Occupancy could not be registered in the Register of Deeds and that there was a real owner of the lot. Complainant then filed a criminal case against respondent. The trial court convicted the respondent of swindling. On appeal, the RTC set aside the lower court's ruling for lack of evidence establishing respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The complainant filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) an AffidavitComplaint against respondent. The IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months and ordered to immediately deliver the amount of P70,000 to complainant. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the present case to the Supreme Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Moreno is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.

Ruling: The Court ruled that a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. In the present case, respondent acted in his private capacity. He misrepresented that he owned the lot he sold to complainant. He refused to return the amount paid by complainant. As a final blow, he denied having any transaction with complainant. It is crystal-clear in the mind of the Court that he fell short of his duty under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is enjoyed only by those who continue to display unassailable character. Thus, lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, not just in their dealings with their clients but also in their dealings with the public at large, and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and even disbarment.

Respondent's refusal to return to complainant the money paid for the lot is unbecoming a member of the bar and an officer of the court. By his conduct, respondent failed to live up to the strict standard of professionalism required by the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent's acts violated the trust and respect complainant reposed in him as a member of the Bar and an officer of the court. Adjudication: The Court finds Atty. Juan R. Moreno guilty and is suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.

Rosario, Dyrene Mara S. BARCENAS vs. ALVERO A.C. No. 8159, 619 SCRA 1, April 23, 2010 This is an Administrative Case in the Supreme Court. Facts:

Duty to Client

On May 7, 2004, Barcenas, through her employee Rodolfo San Antonio (San Antonio), entrusted to Atty. Alvero the amount of P300,000.00, which the latter was supposed to give to a certain Amanda Gasta to redeem the rights of his deceased father as tenant of a rice field located in Barangay San Benito, Victoria, Laguna. The receipt of the money was evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt dated May 7, 2004. In the said receipt, Atty. Alvero said that he would deposit the money in court because Amanda Gasta refused to accept the same. Subsequently, Barcenas discovered that Atty. Alvero did not deposit the money in court, but instead converted and used the same for his personal needs. Atty. Alvero promised to return the money. However, as of the filing of the instant complaint, despite repeated demands, Atty. Alvero failed to return the same. Thus, Barcenas prayed that Atty. Alvero be disbarred for being a disgrace to the legal profession. The IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Alvero be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year for gross misconduct. Atty. Alvero was, likewise, ordered to immediately account for and return the amount of P300,000.00 to Barcenas and/or Rodolfo San Antonio. The IBP Board of Governors modified the penalty of suspension to two (2) years. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Alvero breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Ruling: The Court sustained the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD. Atty. Alvero breached 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. From the records of the case, there is likewise a clear breach of lawyer-client relations. When a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client. These, Atty. Alvero failed to do. Jurisprudence dictates that a lawyer who obtains possession of the funds and properties of his client in the course of his professional employment shall deliver the same to his client (a) when they become due, or (b) upon demand. In the instant case, respondent failed to account for and return the P300,000.00 despite complainant's repeated demands. As a final note, The Court reiterates: the practice of law is not a right, but a privilege. It is granted only to those of good moral character. The Bar must maintain a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. For the practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of

which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral character. Those who are unable or unwilling to comply with the responsibilities and meet the standards of the profession are unworthy of the privilege to practice law. Adjudication: Atty. Anorlito A. Alvero is suspended for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law.

Rosario, Dyrene Mara S.

Duty to Court

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. ATTY. FERMIN OFILAS A.M. No. P-05-1935, 619 SCRA 13, April 23, 2010 This is an administrative matter filed against Atty. Fermin Ofilas, Clerk of Court of RTC of San Mateo, Rizal, and Ms. Aranzazu Baltazar, Clerk IV of the same court. Facts: A financial audit was conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on the books of accounts of the Office of Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal. The audit, covering the period from January 1992 to March 4, 2004, bared irregularities in the handling of the financial transactions of the court and a considerable shortage in the financial accountabilities of Atty. Fermin M. Ofilas and Ms. Aranzazu V. Baltazar. In his Written Explanation and Report, Atty. Ofilas refuted the charges against him. He blamed the lack of orientation and proper turnover of responsibilities and accountabilities when he assumed the functions of his office on January 28, 1992. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Ofilas is guilty of gross inefficiency.

Ruling: The Court ruled in affirmative. As clerk of court, Atty. Ofilas is one of the ranking officers of the judiciary. The nature of the work and of the office mandates that, aside from the proper administration of justice, clerks of courts perform a delicate function as designated custodians of the courts funds, revenues, records, properties and premises can never be overemphasized. They wear many hats those of treasurer, accountant, guard and physical plant manager of the court, hence, are entrusted with the primary responsibility of correctly and effectively implementing regulations regarding fiduciary funds. They are, thus, liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of such funds and property. In this case, the Court finds Atty. Ofilas, seriously remiss in the performance of his duties. The explanation proffered by him largely involves apology, denial and claims of ignorance. Moreover, Atty. Ofilas utterly failed to perform his duties with the degree of diligence and competence expected of him. Atty. Ofilas played his role in a perfunctory manner, relying heavily on Ms. Baltazars supposed ability and honesty to handle the finances of the court. This is a reprehensible display of inefficiency which cannot be justified by good faith, naivety or inexperience. Atty. Ofilas lack of orientation or training prior to his assumption of office is no excuse to delegate his essential duties to Ms. Baltazar especially those concerning financial matters. Adjudication: The Court found Atty. Fermin Ofilas guilty of gross inefficiency with the forfeiture of all his retirement benefits, except his terminal leave pay. Further, he is disqualified from re-employment in any branch or instrumentality in the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.

Rosario, Dyrene Mara S. DIPATUAN vs. JUDGE MANGOTARA A.M. No. RTJ-09-2190, 619 SCRA 48, April 23, 2010 This is an Administrative Case in the Supreme Court. Facts:

Duty to Court

On September 5, 2001, a criminal case for murder was filed against Ishak M. Abdul and Paisal Dipatuan, complainant's husband, before the RTC of Marawi City, Branch 10, then presided by Judge Yusoph Pangadapun, for the killing of Elias Ali Taher. Judge Pangadapun died during the pendency of the case. The case was transferred to different judges. One of the designated judges is the respondent. Mangotara suffered a mild stroke, hence, the Supreme Court revoked his earlier designation and designated Judge Lacsaman M. Busran as the new Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 10. On December 28, 2007, Mangotara issued the disputed Decision in Criminal Case No. 362001 and found both accused Abdul and Dipatuan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced them to imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. In an Order dated February 1, 2008, Mangotara denied the motion for lack of merit. In another Order of the same date, Mangotara applied the same increased bail bond with regard to accused Ishak M. Abdul. However, again on the same date, Mangotara issued another Order recalling the foregoing Orders. Thus, on May 14, 2008, complainant filed the instant complaint. Complainant alleged that Judge Mangotara displayed bias and prejudice against her husband Dipatuan when he did not inhibit himself from the case, considering that he is a relative by affinity and consanguinity of the victim Elias Ali Taher. Complainant also pointed out that despite the designation of Judge Busran as Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 10 on December 26, 2007, Judge Mangotara, acting with grave abuse of authority, illegally and maliciously rendered the December 28, 2007 Decision as well as the two Orders dated February 1, 2008. Issue: Whether or not Judge Mangotara displayed bias and prejudice and acted with grave abuse of authority. Ruling: On the charge of bias and partiality resulting to grave abuse of authority, the Court ruled in the negative. Complainant indeed failed to specify the degree of relationship of respondent Judge to a party in the subject case. To be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. Opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings, although erroneous, as long as they are based on the evidence presented and conduct observed by the judge, do not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. Moreover, the Court likewise found no basis to hold respondent Judge administratively liable anent his issuance of the Decision dated December 28, 2007. Mangotara acted in good faith when

he issued the subject decision, since he received notice of his replacement by Judge Busran, dated December 26, 2007, only on January 26, 2008. It must be stressed that not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge can find refuge. As to the charge of gross ignorance of the law in so far as his act of increasing the bail bond of the accused instead of cancelling it, it is not a mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment on the part of respondent Judge, but a patent disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law. It is a pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the law and changes therein, as well as with the latest decisions of the Supreme Court. One cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory acquaintance with the statute and procedural rules. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one - not even judges. IGNORANTIA JURIS QUOD QUISQUE SCIRE TENETUR NON EXCUSAT. Adjudication: Judge Mamindiara Mangotara is found guilty for which he is fined in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000,00), to be deducted from his retirement benefits.