NORMA A.

ABDULLA versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 150129 April 6, 2005

Facts: Appellant Norma Abdulla was charge before the Sandiganbayan of the crime of illegal use of public
funds along with Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, appellant was charged under an Information which
pertinently reads: That on or about November, 1989 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Jolo, Sulu,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused: NORMA A. ABDULLA
and NENITA P. AGUIL, both public officers, being then the President and cashier, respectively, of the Sulu State
College, and as such by reason of their positions and duties are accountable for public funds under their
administration, while in the performance of their functions, conspiring and confederating with MAHMUD I.
DARKIS, also a public officer, being then the Administrative Officer V of the said school, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without lawful authority, apply for the payment of wages of casuals, the
amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00), Philippine Currency, which amount was appropriated for
the payment of the salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the said school, to the damage and
prejudice of public service .Appellants co-accused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both acquitted.
Only appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan with a fine of three thousand pesos and
was imposed the penalty of temporary special disqualification for a period of six (6) years.. Upon motion for
reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended appellants sentence by deleting the temporary special
disqualification imposed upon her. Still dissatisfied, appellant, now before this Court on petition for review
under rule 45, persistently pleas innocence of the crime charged.

Issues: 1) Whether or not there was unlawful intent on the appellants part.

2) Whether or not the essential elements of the crime of technical malversation is present.

Ruling: 1) NO. The presumption of criminal intent will not automatically apply to all charges of technical
malversation because disbursement of public funds for public use is per se not an unlawful act. Here, appellant
cannot be said to have committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State College to its
employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees were entitled to under existing civil service
laws. There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purpose payment of the wages of laborers
working on various projects in the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high priority which laborers wages
enjoy as claims against the employers funds and resources. Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on
the strength of evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. Absent this required
quantum of evidence would mean exoneration for accused-appellant. In the absence of criminal intent, this
Court has no basis to affirm appellants conviction.
2) No. The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of secondary school
teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of the crime of technical malversation which
requires that the public fund used should have been appropriated by law, is therefore absent. The
authorization given by the Department of Budget and Management for the use of the forty thousand pesos
(P40,000.00) allotment for payment of salary differentials of 34 secondary school teachers is not an ordinance
or law contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant herein, who used the remainder of
the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) released by the DBM for salary differentials, for the payment of the
terminal leave benefits of other school teachers of the Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty of technical
malversation in the absence, as here, of any provision in RA 6688 specifically appropriating said amount for
payment of salary differentials only. In fine, the third and fourth elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of
the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this case. Acquittal is thus in order.
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
(on m. in se heinous crimes)

G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001


FACTS:

Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by R.A.
No. 7659 substantially provides that any public officer who amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty
million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, being
prosecuted under the said Act, assailed its constitutionality, arguing inter alia, that it abolishes the element
of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code; and as such, is a violation of the
fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080 is a malum prohibitum.

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court held that plunder is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Moreover, the
legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. The
predicate crimes in the case of plunder involve acts which are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, and are
committed willfully, unlawfully and criminally by the offender, alleging his guilty knowledge. Thus, the crime
of plunder is a malum in se

** [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any
form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very
existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context,
no less heinous are the effect and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in
death, and drug offenses involving government official, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not
be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat
prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P.
Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.


To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on
constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long
dead issue. The declaration of the Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of
the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. INOCENCIO GONZALEZ, JR.
G.R. No. 139542 June 21, 2001

FACTS: After their vehicles almost collided with each other, Andres and Appellant had an altercation.
Thereafter, Andres went back inside to his car when he was blocked by the appellants son who said, "Anong
problema mo sa erpat ko." Andres testified that he felt threatened and so he immediately boarded his vehicle,
sat at the drivers seat, closed the door, and partially opened the car window just wide enough to talk back to
appellants son, Dino. In the meantime, appellant, thinking that Andres was going to get something from his
car, took a gun. However, he was pushed by his daughter-in-law which made him lost his balance and
accidentally fired the gun hitting Andres wife, and two sons.Appellant was charged and convicted of Murder,
Double Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder in the RTC.
The appellant seeks a reversal and prays that judgment be rendered exempting him from criminal and civil
liabilities contending that he had no intention to shoot Noel Andres much less his wife nor the children. He lost
his balance when his daughter Trisha approached and pushed him backwards to stop him from joining Dino
and Noel Andres but the appellant tried to free his right hand holding the gun and it accidentally fired.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was treachery attendant in the crime.

RULING: No. Treachery under par.16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the deliberate
employment of means, methods or forms in the execution of a crime against persons which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the intended
victim might raise. For treachery to be appreciated two elements must concur: 1) the employment of means of
execution that would insure the safety of the accused from retaliatory acts of the intended victim and leaving
the latter without an opportunity to defend himself and 2) the means employed were deliberately or
consciously adopted by the offender.
8

We affirm the recommendation of the Solicitor-General that the shooting was not attended by treachery and
accordingly the crime committed for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide and not murder.


FELIX RAIT vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 180425 July 31, 2008

FACTS: On May 26, 1994, Rait and Pitago were charged in an Information, which reads:

That on or about November 19, 1993, at 2:00 oclock in the morning, more or less (sic) at Nazareth, Cagayan
de Oro City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there, wilfully (sic),
unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Rape, directly by overt acts, on the
person of a [17-year-old] minor, [AAA], by then and there (sic), with force and against the latters will while she
was in a state of intoxication, touching her breasts, removing her panty, holding her feet (by Janiter Pitago)
and lying on top of her (by Felix Rait), but did not perform all the acts of execution which would produce the
crime of Rape, by reason of some cause other than his own spontaneous desistance, that in when (sic)
offended party was able to kick them and the two ran away.

Petitioner argues that he should be acquitted of the crime of attempted rape. If he is to be found guilty of any
offense, he puts forward the theory that based on this Courts ruling in Baleros, Jr. v. People, he should be
convicted only of unjust vexation. In Baleros, accused was convicted of attempted rape. The CA sustained the
conviction. Upon review, this Court reversed the conviction and found accused guilty of light coercion. In
Baleros, the act for which the accused was charge of attempted rape was that he pressed a chemical-soaked
cloth in the mouth if the victim. The SC ruled that such act is not an overt act that will logically and necessarily
ripen into rape. There was no performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape the victim.

ISSUES:

1. What is an overt act?

Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to
commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its
complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor
by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense.

The raison detre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of
the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is
necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be
lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of
the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is
so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the
intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards
the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step in a direct
movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made." The act done
need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt
must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an
immediate and necessary relation to the offense.

2. Whether the Baleros case should apply in this case.

We are not persuaded by petitioners argument. Several facts attendant to this case distinguish it
from Baleros, enough to convince us to arrive at a different conclusion. Unlike in Baleros, the acts of
petitioner clearly establish his intention to commence the act of rape. Petitioner had already
successfully removed the victims clothing and had inserted his finger into her vagina. It is not empty
speculation to conclude that these acts were preparatory to the act of raping her. Had it not been for
the victims strong physical resistance, petitioners next step would, logically, be having carnal
knowledge of the victim. The acts are clearly "the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement
towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made."

Under Article 6, in relation to Article 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the
offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts
of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance.

People vs Dela Cruz 571 SCRA 469
Facts:
On November 15, 2002, charges against accused-appellant were made before the RTC for Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and Possession of Dangerous Drug. The RTC acquitted accused-
appellant of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition but convicted him of possession of dangerous drugs.
On December 7, 2005, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the RTC Decision claiming that: (1) the
version of the prosecution should not have been given full credence; (2) the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that he was guilty of possession of an illegal drug; (3) his arrest was patently illegal;
and (4) the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the illegal drug allegedly in his possession.

The CA sustained accused-appellants conviction. It pointed out that accused-appellant was positively
identified by prosecution witnesses, rendering his uncorroborated denial and allegation of frame-up weak. As
to accused-appellants alleged illegal arrest, the CA held that he is deemed to have waived his objection when
he entered his plea, applied for bail, and actively participated in the trial without questioning such arrest.

Accused-appellant claims that the presence of all the elements of the offense of possession of
dangerous drug was not proved beyond reasonable doubt since both actual and constructive possessions were
not proved. He asserts that the shabu was not found in his actual possession, for which reason the prosecution
was required to establish that he had constructive possession over the shabu. He maintains that as he had no
control and dominion over the drug or over the place where it was found, the prosecution likewise failed to
prove constructive possession.

Issue: Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of violation of
section 11, article ii, RA 9165 despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the commission of the offense
charged beyond reasonable doubt?

Ruling: The SC acquitted accused-appellant of violation of sec. 11(2) of RA 9165. The prosecution in this case
clearly failed to show all the elements of the crime absent a showing of either actual or constructive
possession by the accused-appellant.

The elements in illegal possession of dangerous drug are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object
which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the said drug. On the third element, the court have held that the possession
must be with knowledge of the accused or that animus possidendi existed with the possession or control of
said articles.

In the instant case, there is no question that accused-appellant was not the owner of the nipa hut that was
subject of the buy-bust operation. He did not have dominion or control over the nipa hut. Neither was
accused-appellant a tenant or occupant of the nipa hut, a fact not disputed by the prosecution. The target of
the operation was Boy Bicol. Accused-appellant was merely a guest of Boy Bicol.

Since accused-appellant was not in possession of the illegal drugs in Boy Bicols nipa hut, his
subsequent arrest was also invalid. The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant was effected under Sec.
5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto. For this type of
warrantless arrest to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. The prosecution was not able
to adequately prove that accused-appellant was committing an offense. Although accused-appellant merely
denied possessing the firearm, the prosecutions charge was weak absent the presentation of the alleged
firearm. His arrest, independent of the buy-bust operation targeting Boy Bicol, was therefore not lawful as he
was not proved to be committing any offense.







PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO ABARCA, accused-appellant, G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987
153 SCRA 735


Facts:
That on or about 15th day of July 1984 in the city of Tacloban Leyte Philippines, the accused Francisco
Abarca went to the bus station and travel to Dolores Eastern Samar to fetch his daughter in the morning.
Unfortunately, the trip was delayed at 2 pm because of his failure to catch the trip plus the engine trouble
which causes him to proceed at his fathers house, and then later went home. When he reaches home the
accused caught his wife in the act of sexual intercourse with Khingsley Koh in the meantime his wife and Koh
notice him, that makes her wife push her paramour and got his revolver. Abarca peeping above the built-in
cabinet in their room jumped and ran away to look for a firearm at the PC soldiers house to where he got the
M-16 rifle. The accused lost his wife and Koh in vicinity at his house and immediately proceeded to a mahjong
house where he caught the victim aimed and shoot Koh with several bullets on his different parts of his body
causing Mr. Khingsley Kohs instantaneous death. By that time, Arnold and Lina Amparado had inflicted
multiple wounds due to stray bullets causing Mr. Amparados one and one-half month loss of working capacity
including his serious hospitalization and the latters wife who had slighter physical injuries from the incident.
The RTC hereby sentenced Abarca to death for Murder with double Frustrated Murder and must indemnify the
Amparado Spouses and Heirs of Kho.
Issue:
Is the penalty of destierro correct ?

Ruling: No.
The Supreme Court modified the appealed decision of destierro to arresto mayor from the lower
court sentencing four months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor indemnifying Amparado spouses for
expenses and damages. The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although
as a rule, one committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, the rule presupposes that the
act done amounts to a felony. The accused-appellant is totally free from any responsibility performing an
illegal act when he fired shots at the victim but he cannot be entirely without fault. It appears that before firing
at the deceased, he uttered warning words which is not enough of a precaution to absolve him for the injuries
sustained by the Amparados. The acts of execution which should have produced the crimes of murders as a
consequence, nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will. However, the Court
finds negligence on his part. He is liable under the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365 that is less
serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence. For the separate injuries suffered by the
Amparado spouses impose upon the accused-appellant arresto mayor in its medium and maximum period to
being the graver penalty.





People v. Avecilla
G.R. No. 117033, February 15, 2001

FACTS: Avecilla was charged with the crime of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm under PD 1866. The
elements of the offense are: 1) there must be a firearm, 2) the gun was possessed by the accused, 3) the
accused had no license from the government, and 4) homicide or murder was committed by the accused by
the use of said firearm. However, PD 1866 was amended by RA 8294. Sec. 1 of said law imposes a penalty of
prision correccional in its maximum period upon any person who shall unlawfullypossess any low powered
firearm: Provided, that no other crime committed. If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. If
the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion,
insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup dtat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of such
crimes.

ISSUES:
1) What is the effect of RA 8294 to PD 1866?
2) Should the law be given retroactive effect?
3) Can the accused be charged of homicide or murder?

HELD:
1) Where murder or homicide results from the use of an unlicensed firearm, the crime is no longer
qualified illegal possession, but murder or homicide, as the case may be. In such a case, the use of the
unlicensed firearm is not considered as a separate crime but shall be appreciated as a mere
aggravating circumstance. In view of the amendments introduced by RA 8294 to PD 1866, separate
prosecutions for homicide and illegal possession are no longer in order. Instead, illegal possession of
firearms is merely to be taken as an aggravating circumstance in the homicide case.

The crime of illegal possession of firearm, in its simple form, is committed only where the unlicensed
firearm is not used to commit any of the crimes of murder, homicide, rebellion, insurrection, sedition
or attempted coup dtat.

2) YES. Inasmuch as the amendatory law is favorable to Avecilla in this case, the same may be
retroactively applied. This new law applies even to violations that occurred prior to its effectivity as it
may be given retroactive effect under Article 22 of the RPC.

RA 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997. The crime involved in the case was committed on May 5, 1991.
As a general rule, penal laws will generally have prospective application except where the new law
will be advantageous to the accused. In this case RA 8294 will spare Avecilla from a separate
conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearm. Accordingly, said law should be given
retroactive application.

3) NO. Avecilla cannot be convicted of homicide or murder with "the use of the unlicensed firearm as
aggravating," inasmuch as said felonies are not charged in the information but merely mentioned as
the result of the use of the unlicensed firearm. He was not arraigned for homicide or murder. Hence,
he cannot be convicted of any of these crimes without violating his right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, not to mention his right to due process.


People v. Tiu Won Chua 405scra 280
Facts:
Accused Tiu Won Chua a.k.a. Timothy Tiu and Qui Yaling y Chua a.k.a. Sun Tee Sy y Chua were charged and
convicted by the lower court for violation of Section 16, Article III of the dangerous drug act of 1972, for their
illegal possession of a regulated drug, shabu.
They appealed the decision of the lower court questioning the legality of the search warrant and the search
and arrest conducted pursuant thereto, and the correctness of the judgment of conviction imposed by the
RTC.
Accused-appellants contend that the defect in the issuance of the search warrant, for it was issued in the
name of timothy tui (not Tiu won chua) and did not include appellant qui yaling, would make the search
conducted and consequently, the arrest, illegal. And that the evidence presented cannot be served as basis for
their conviction being fruits of an illegal search.
Issues:
1. Whether or not there was a valid search warrant.
2. Whether or not the court correctly imposed judgment of conviction to the accused.
Ruling:
1. There are only four requisites for a valid warrant, i.e,: (1) it must be issued upon "probable cause"; (2)
probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) such judge must examine under oath
or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; and (4) the warrant must
particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
A mistake in the name of the person to be searched does not invalidate the warrant,especially since in
this case, the authorities had personal knowledge of the drug-related activities of the accused by
virtue of the surveillance and test-buy operations of the said authorities. In fact, a "John Doe" warrant
satisfies the requirements so long as it contains a descriptio personae such as will enable the officer
to identify the accused.
Moreover, a mistake in the identification of the owner of the place does not invalidate the warrant
provided the place to be searched is properly described.
However, the court affirms the illegality of the search conducted on the car for it was not part of the
description of the place to be searched mentioned in the warrant.

2. In a prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1) appellants were
in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such
possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the appellants were freely and consciously aware of being
in possession of the drug.
Since the crime is malumprohibitum, hence, lack of criminal intent or good faith does not exempt
appellants from criminal liability. Mere possession of a regulated drug without legal authority is
punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.
In the case at bar, the prosecution sufficiently proved that the packs of shabu were found inside a
room in the unit subject of the search warrant, more particularly inside the mans handbag and ladies
handbag owned respectively by the accused.

As to the penalties imposed, the court did not sustain the trial courts decision attributing to both
appellants the illegal possession of the same amount of shabu. Since no conspiracy was proven, the
amount of the shabu from each accused was made the basis of the penalty imposed.

Thus, since 234.5 grams of shabu were found inside the mans handbag, deemed to be owned by Tiu
Won, he is guilty of violating Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, while Qui Yaling, whose handbag
contained only 20.3673 grams of shabu is guilty of violating Section 20 thereof. Section 16, in
connection with Section 20 (1
st
paragraph), provides the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos where the amount of shabu
involved is 200 grams or more. Where the amount is less than 200 grams, Section 20 punishes the
offender with the penalty ranging from prisioncorreccional to reclusion perpetua.


G.R. Nos. 147674-75, March 17, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ANACITO OPURAN, appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Opuran (O) was charged with two counts of murder, with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery, for
the deaths of Patrimonio (P) and Dacles (D) under separate informations, to which O entered a plea of not
guilty at his arraignment. According to the witnesses for the prosecution, O stabbed D, who was lying on a
bench, on the chest with a knife. D, despite several stab wounds, was able to run inside a neighbors house,
who helped bring him to the hospital, but he died 15 minutes later. On the same day, O also stabbed P with a
knife several times while the latter was walking near the so-called lovers lane. P was brought to the hospital
where he died the next day. For his part, O denies being present at the place and time of the stabbing
incidents. He claims he was never out that night, but was resting in his house when policemen came to arrest
him.
Hearings were postponed due to the defenses failure to present other witnesses. Later, they moved for
suspension of the hearing because of an Order authorizing the psychiatric examination of O. The court then
granted the motion for psychiatric examination of O.
When the hearings resumed, a Dr. V testified that she examined O 3 times through interviews, and learned
that he had a history of inability to sleep and talking irrelevantly. She confirmed her medical findings that O
was psychotic before and during the commission of the crime and even up to the present so that he could not
stand trial. Her diagnosis was that O was suffering from schizophrenia.
In its decision, the trial court found O guilty of murder for the death of P, and homicide for the death of D.
O appealed, stating that the trial court failed to appreciate the exempting circumstance of insanity. He
contends that he was suffering from a psychotic disorder and was, therefore, completely deprived of
intelligence when he stabbed the victims. The OSG, however, avers that O failed to establish with the required
proof his defense of insanity or his claim of the mitigating circumstance of diminished willpower. According to
Dr. V, she was certain that O was not grossly insane, but was uncertain that he was unconscious at the time
of the incident.
ISSUE: WON Opuran was insane.
RULING: Article 800 of the Civil Code presumes that everyone is sane. This presumption, however, may be
overthrown by evidence of insanity, which under Article 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code exempts a person
from criminal liability. He who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it,

for insanity as a defense is in the nature of confession and avoidance.

An accused invoking insanity admits to
have committed the crime but claims that he is not guilty because he is insane. The testimony or proof of an
accused's insanity must, however, relate to the time immediately preceding or coetaneous with the
commission of the offense with which he is charged.

It is, therefore, incumbent upon accuseds counsel to
prove that his client was not in his right mind or was under the influence of a sudden attack of insanity
immediately before or at the time he executed the act attributed to him.


Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in
language and conduct.

However, not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes insanity.

As
consistently held by the court, "A man may act crazy, but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he
is legally so."


Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who
is intimately acquainted with the accused; has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on
his own perception; or is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. Thus, according to the defense, O was
insane because he would wear a Barong Tagalog and long pants even when there was no occasion requiring
such attire. He behaved oddly a few days prior to the stabbing incident; he would sometimes talk to himself,
laugh, shout and utter bad words, but at times, he was also just quiet.
A careful scrutiny of the records, however, indicates that Anacito failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the defense of insanity. For one thing, it was only Bambis personal perception that there was no
reason or occasion for Anacito to wear Barong Tagalog. Tested against the stringent criterion for insanity to be
exempting, such deportment of Anacito, his occasional silence, and his acts of laughing, talking to himself,
staring sharply, and stabbing his victims within a 15-minute interval are not sufficient proof that he was insane
immediately before or at the time he committed the crimes. Such unusual behavior may be considered as
mere abnormality of the mental faculties, which will not exclude imputability.
Anacitos psychiatric history likewise fails to meet the stringent yardstick established by case law, because it
merely shows that O was prescribed medicine to remedy his lack of sleep and noisiness. It was never shown
that these drugs were for a mental illness that deprived Anacito of reason.
Moreover, as found by the trial court, the results of Dr. Veronas examinations on Anacito were based on
incomplete or insufficient facts. Her conclusions have no supporting medical bases, and failed to demonstrate
how she arrived at her conclusions. She failed to show her method of testing. The court could only conclude
that her findings refer to the period after the stabbing accident and, hence, would prove Os mental condition
only for said time.
Interestingly, O failed to raise insanity at the earliest opportunity. He invoked it for the first time only after he
had already testified on his defenses of alibi and denial. It has been held that the invocation of denial and alibi
as defenses indicates that the accused was in full control of his mental faculties.

Additionally, the trial judge
observed that, during the hearings, O was attentive, well-behaved, and responsive to the questions
propounded to him. Thus, the shift in theory from denial and alibi to a plea of insanity, made apparently after
the appellant realized the futility of his earlier defenses, is a clear indication that insanity is a mere concoction

or an afterthought.

ISSUE: WON there was treachery.
RULING: We agree with the trial court that treachery cannot be appreciated as far as the killing of Allan is
concerned because the sole eyewitness did not see the commencement of the assault.

For treachery to be
considered, it must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where no
particulars are known as to how the killing began, the perpetration with treachery cannot be supposed.


Treachery was correctly appreciated in the killing of Demetrio Jr. Anacito was lying in wait for his victim in a
dark place at the national highway. When Demetrio Jr. reached the "lovers lane," Anacito emerged from his
hiding place and stabbed the former several times. Anacitos attack came without warning; it was deliberate
and unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no opportunity to resist or defend
himself.
We do not find merit in appellants contention that he cannot be convicted of murder for the death of
Demetrio Jr. because treachery was not alleged with "specificity" as a qualifying circumstance in the
information. Such contention is belied by the information itself, which alleged: "All contrary to law, and with
the attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery." In any event, even after the recent amendments to the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as
qualifying or qualified by to properly qualify an offense.